# INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOLUME 53

1977

*Published quarterly for the*

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

*by the*

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

## No. 1—JANUARY 1977



## No. 2—APRIL 1977

## No. 3—JULY 1977



## No. 4—OCTOBER 1977

# INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOUNDED IN 1922

JANUARY 1977



*Published quarterly for the*

**ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

*by the*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

## *CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE*

**Professor J. E. Spence** is Head of the Department of Politics at Leicester University.

**Ian Smart** is Deputy Director and Director of Studies at Chatham House.

**Marie Claude Smouts** is a Research Fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris.

**Richard Burt** is a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

**Edward S. Milenky** is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston College, Mass. His publications include *The Politics of Regional Organization in Latin America: The Latin American Free Trade Association* (1973).

*Editor*
Wendy Hinde

*Editorial Office*
Chatham House, St. James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE
Tel. 01-930 2233
*All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor*



*The Editor is ready to consider suggestions for articles that might be suitable for publication in* International Affairs. *It is advisable to write a preliminary letter before sending a complete manuscript.*

*International Affairs* may be ordered through any bookseller or newsagent or from the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD
Tel. 01-450 8080

 ISSN 0020–5850

# INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 53 JANUARY 1977 No. 1


# DETENTE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN INTERIM JUDGMENT*


*J. E. Spence*


JUST over two years have elapsed since Mr. Vorster, the South African Prime Minister, publicly committed his government to a policy of detente, the essential objective of which was to promote 'a durable, just and honourable solution '[1] to the conflict between the white minority Rhodesian regime and the African nationalist forces ranged against it. It would be foolish to attempt a definitive judgment on the events that have occurred in Southern Africa during this period; there is, however, some value in offering an interpretation to serve as an interim verdict on the initiatives taken by Mr. Vorster and a balance-sheet of the success and failure the policy has thus far encountered.

The desire for a settlement of the Rhodesian issue did not, in itself, represent a new departure for South African foreign policy; this objective was of long standing and its importance to the Republic was based on a clear recognition that the uncertainty surrounding Rhodesia's future ever since UDI in 1965 placed severe constraints on its ambition to play a dynamic and influential role in the affairs of Southern Africa commensurate with its economic strength and military capability. Worst of all, there loomed the prospect of having to support the Smith regime indefinitely with economic and military aid and being compelled ultimately—as the guerrilla war escalated—to intervene on a massive scale with consequences similar to those which characterised the American experience in Vietnam.

What was new in Mr. Vorster's 1974 overtures was the recognition on his part that a measure of co-operation was required between the several governments in the region if a peaceful transition to majority rule was to occur in Rhodesia. The quick response of President Kaunda to what he called 'the voice of reason '[2] emanating from the Republic


* The author is grateful to the Trustees of the Nuffield Foundation and the Research Board of the University of Leicester for a grant of funds which made possible a visit to Southern Africa in July–Sept. 1976. He would also like to express his appreciation to Mr. John Barratt and the staff of the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg. Their kind assistance made the visit an interesting and profitable one.


[1] Statement by the South African Prime Minister in the Senate, Cape Town, Oct. 23, 1974. For a complete text of this speech, see *Southern African Record* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs), No. I, March 1975, pp. 1–8.

[2] Address by President Kaunda at the University of Zambia, Oct. 26, 1974. See *Southern African Record*, *op. cit.*, No. II, June 1975, p. 17.

was made possible because he and his fellow black presidents in Mozambique, Botswana and Tanzania saw some advantage in co-operating with their traditional enemy for the achievement of a *specific and limited objective*—namely the decolonisation of Rhodesia. Hitherto South African offers of co-operation, especially in the area of economic aid and technical assistance, had been spurned largely because they seemed an obvious attempt to extend the Republic's hegemony and in so doing ensure white survival indefinitely. On this occasion, however, co-operation was possible because Rhodesia's neighbours had clearly perceived how difficult it would be to contain a protracted conflict and prevent its effects from spilling over national boundaries, with all that implied for the stability of their economic and political systems.

This brutally rational appreciation of what constituted South Africa's interests vis-à-vis the future of Rhodesia, was by and large accepted by the white electorate. At first sight this was surprising, given the traditional importance attached to the maintenance of a 'white' buffer between the Republic and the independent states of black Africa and the emphasis laid on the kith and kin 'linkage' during the early days of UDI. Nevertheless, support for detente crossed party lines, and here the role of the Afrikaans press appears to have played a crucial part in explaining the realities of South Africa's position after the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique and the corresponding increase in Rhodesia's vulnerability to guerrilla infiltration on its eastern border. This domestic consensus was also a reflection of a growing conviction that the government was attempting a positive and dynamic role in the region in sharp contrast to the defensive and negative posture that had characterised its role in international society in earlier decades. Moreover, detente was seen as the logical extension of the 'outward movement' of foreign policy, with this difference, that the Republic's diplomatic efforts were openly acknowledged and supported in Western capitals—a development which received dramatic confirmation with the visit of Mr. Callaghan, the British Foreign Secretary, to Port Elizabeth to confer with Mr. Vorster in January 1975.

## Contrasting perceptions of detente

The heady atmosphere in which these initiatives were launched encouraged a range of interpretations both with respect to the motives governing the behaviour of the various participants in the initial phase of the detente exercise and the consequences that would attend success or failure over the long term. The more optimistic reading implied an agenda of priorities for the government which took as its starting point

the change in the balance of power represented by Portuguese withdrawal from the region. Hence the incentive to liquidate commitments in Rhodesia and Namibia in an orderly manner and gain time for the initiation of major changes in the structure of relations between black and white in the Republic.[3] Furthermore, if this process of liquidation were to be both cause and effect of a measure of diplomatic accommodation between Pretoria and its northern neighbours, the pressures for internal change emanating from the signatories of the Lusaka Manifesto (April 1969) would be based on a more realistic appreciation of what could be done within South Africa in contrast to the sterile, ideological exchanges that had characterised relations in the past. Indeed, the terms of the Manifesto, especially the emphasis on the willingness of the signatories to 'negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill' should 'changed circumstances' indicate a prospect for peaceful rather than violent change, were regarded as crucially relevant to an understanding of the detente policy.[4] In the past the Manifesto had been dismissed as irrelevant, as an ideological disguise for the impotence and inability of the African states to apply significant pressures on Pretoria. But with the addition of Angola and Mozambique to the ranks of the African states, the latter in their capacity as potential hosts to the liberation movements were at last in a position to force awkward choices on the Republic with respect to the future of Rhodesia and Namibia. Hence, it was claimed, detente abroad would inexorably lead to detente within as Mr. Vorster's government came to recognise the indivisibility of foreign and domestic policy to the extent that maintenance of good relations with its new-found partners (after a successful resolution of the Rhodesian and Namibian issues) would depend on a commitment to promote meaningful changes in the political and economic status of the African majority at home.

This interpretation of detente rested on the further assumption that the achievement by peaceful means of majority rule in Rhodesia by the joint efforts of the neighbouring states and the establishment of a government sympathetic to South Africa in Namibia (after a devolution of power to those elements in the territory willing to negotiate on Pretoria's terms) would provide a basis for further co-operation

[3] This optimism was fuelled by Mr. Vorster's remark in a speech to his constituents at Nigel on Nov. 5, 1974: 'give South Africa a chance for six months and you will be astonished as to where it will then be'. See the statement to the Security Council by Mr. R. F. Botha, South African Permanent Representative at the United Nations on Oct. 24, 1974: 'Discrimination based solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be defended. And we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on race and colour'. Quoted from *Southern African Record*, *op. cit.*, No. I, p. 21.

[4] *Southern African Record*, *op. cit.*, No. II, p. 3.

especially in economic matters. Thus detente was regarded as the first step towards the creation of a regional community of states—in itself a traditional aspiration of South African policy-makers who have always assumed that the benefits of such co-operation with a powerful and rich neighbour would in time become self-evident to the poor, weaker states on the Republic's periphery.

So much for the 'grand master plan' interpretation of detente. There were, however, two variations on this theme to which allusion must be made before attempting an explanation of subsequent events. The first accepted the premise of an agenda of priorities, involving far-reaching changes, on both domestic and external fronts, but seriously questioned whether the African states, flushed with success at bringing down white regimes in Rhodesia and Namibia, would 'reward' Mr. Vorster for his efforts and accept his version of what constituted progress in eliminating racial discrimination in South Africa. The more probable outcome—according to this view—would be a renewed determination to tackle the last remaining bastion of white supremacy and an insistence that the South African government should apply within its borders the policy recommended for its counterparts across the Limpopo. Further, it was argued, black opinion within the Republic would hardly remain indifferent to the achievements of Africans so close to home, and this combination of rising domestic expectations coupled with pressures from without would compel Mr. Vorster to intensify existing methods of social control and rely on a strategy of deterrence involving the threat of retaliation against any who challenged the status quo.

It is in this context that a third interpretation of detente has relevance: namely that Mr. Vorster's government saw no necessary connection between the new imperatives governing their policy towards Rhodesia and Namibia and those relating to the maintenance of white supremacy at home. A phased and peaceful withdrawal from Rhodesia and Namibia was, so it was argued, simply a preliminary to the creation of a garrison state with more secure and defensible borders; that if detente had an internal corollary, this would not imply fundamental reform but—at best—a stronger commitment to promoting change within the existing framework of policy. All that could be expected on this reading of detente was an acceleration of homelands' development, an easing of the restrictions of petty apartheid and marginal concessions to improve the status of the urban African.

## The Angolan intervention

How have the events of the last two years affected this variety of perceptions on the utility of detente? The South African intervention

in Angola provides a convenient starting point for analysis. At the time this seemed a surprising development since there was a plausible case for the view that the constraints which hitherto had operated against military intervention in Rhodesia would operate with equal force with respect to other neighbouring states. On the other hand South Africa's oft-expressed commitment to the principle of non-interference (strictly observed, for example, when Frelimo came to power in Mozambique) was bound to be strained by the very different circumstances which attended the birth of Angola as an independent state.

Initially, the government strategy appeared to have two limited but related objectives: (a) a strengthening of the Namibian border to guard against 'spillover' from the civil war; and (b) the launching of swiftly executed attacks on bases belonging to the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in the immediate Angolan hinterland. But the limitations on the means employed, the geographical area involved and the goals sought were rapidly superseded by the wider objective of lending support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) faction in its efforts to become the government of Angola. Hence there followed a military penetration deep into the heart of the territory until the prospect of having to mount, single-handed and without Western support, a major conventional struggle against Russian-backed Cuban troops, forced a withdrawal.

It is a truism of strategic theory that successful intervention by military means requires a careful and prior definition of the political objectives sought in clear, unambiguous and limited terms. Furthermore, as the experience of the great powers since the Second World War amply demonstrates, successful intervention depends not simply on relating military means to political ends, keeping the former subordinate to the latter, but also on the possibility of rapid disengagement whether or not the original objective is attained.[5]

This rubric for successful intervention does provide a set of criteria for judging the South African performance in Angola. Although the analogy of President Kennedy's experience during the Bay of Pigs fiasco readily comes to mind, we may, for lack of evidence, discount the view that the politicians were over-impressed by the arguments advanced by their military advisers. There is, perhaps, more substance to the thesis than the structure of civil-military power in the Republic had not really been tested since the Second World War and was, therefore, liable to miscalculation as

[5] In this context note the success which attended British military intervention in Kuwait in 1958 and East Africa in 1964.

politicians grappled with an unfamiliar problem, namely, the conduct of war in a neighbouring territory. However, even if it is assumed—for the sake of argument—that the politicians rather than their military advisers were in effective control throughout the operation, and that the political objective of installing a friendly government in Luanda had, in fact, been achieved, it seems improbable that a defeated Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) would have accepted this adverse change in its fortunes. Would its supporters not have done precisely what Unita did (subsequent to its defeat) and take to the bush to harass the newly-installed government in its postwar efforts not simply to impose physical control on the length and breadth of the territory, but also to establish itself as legitimate in the eyes of its former enemies? The conclusion remains that there is little to be gained by *installing* a 'friendly' government in a neighbouring state by military means unless there exists the means and the commitment to remain to back up that government's efforts to become legitimate. This is precisely the role the Cubans appear to have played in post-revolution Angola. Whether South Africa, in the event of a military victory over the MPLA forces, could have done the same without incurring the wrath of black Africa, creating political and indeed military problems from which it would have become progressively difficult to extricate itself, is highly doubtful. Thus 'victory' in Angola would have been a costly and perhaps ultimately self-defeating outcome, giving pertinent evidence to those who have always claimed that apartheid was a threat to international peace and security. Thus, paradoxically, South Africa's withdrawal from Angola saved its government from a worse fate—the beginnings of the Vietnamisation of Southern Africa, that is, a situation where an occupying power struggles desperately to prop up an insecure government, which is harassed from within and without and denied international legitimacy because of its status as a puppet of the intervening ally.

It is clear that the intervention had important consequences for the detente policy. From the South African point of view, the use of military force seemed an attractive proposition; detente had hitherto been a diplomatic exercise, but the civil war in Angola presented an opportunity to back up the diplomatic offensive with military muscle, to do something for South Africa's partners that they were precluded from doing for themselves, as well as deal with a revolutionary movement that might have dangerous implications for their domestic systems and disturb the delicate balance of power therein. But in deploying military force, the Republic weakened its capacity to continue playing a constructive diplomatic role in the region because initially attention was diverted from the critical issue of Rhodesia.

Indeed Mr. Smith might well have taken comfort from the Angolan episode and been confirmed in his judgment that if the worst happened in Rhodesia and full-scale insurgency got under way, Mr. Vorster would ultimately be compelled to come to his aid. Secondly, the scepticism of Tanzania and Mozambique about detente was confirmed and even a 'moderate' leader like Seretse Khama of Botswana could be heard castigating the Republic in distant Peking. A third consequence was that those African states which might have been expected to be hostile to super-power intervention in whatever form swallowed their doubts when the facts of South African involvement became known. Thus the pursuit of a flexible diplomacy—the essence of detente—was made much more difficult and such allies as South Africa possessed on the African continent were embarrassed at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations.

In a famous passage in his classic work, *On War*, Clausewitz talks of war between states as embodying a reciprocal relationship. 'War', he claims, 'is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme'.[6] With a little ingenuity, this proposition can be applied to the subject under discussion: the use of force in Angola strengthened the hands of those —especially in the liberation movements—who have never doubted that the final solution of Southern African problems must be by violence. Correspondingly, it has weakened the attempts of the African nationalist leaders within Rhodesia to keep those movements under control. In these circumstances it became increasingly difficult for politicians—whether black or white—to keep the diplomatic lines open, to resist pressures both from within and without to define the situation exclusively in military and bellicose terms. And in this context we should bear in mind the premise on which the South African view of detente was based—that in time there would occur a mutual recognition by black and white leaders in the region of the need to redefine relationships in *political* and *diplomatic* terms in order to replace seemingly outmoded postures of ideological antagonism and military confrontation. Detente also assumed that both sides would start making threatening noises against each other and, more positively, that each would take steps to de-escalate the military struggle building up in Rhodesia; hence in the initial phase of detente, the call for a ceasefire on the guerrilla front, backed by Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana; hence South Africa's willingness to withdraw its paramilitary units from Rhodesia.

This joint willingness to subordinate short-term military and

[6] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (London: Kegan Paul, 1911), vol. I, p. 4.

strategic considerations to the achievements of long-term political goals foundered on the rock of intervention in Angola. The failure of the Republic to achieve its objectives in that territory substantially undermined both the achievements and the promise of detente and it seems doubtful whether the political and diplomatic initiative could be recovered. It could of course be argued that one valuable by-product of the Angolan affair was the direct involvement of the United States in the task of promoting a settlement of the Rhodesian question; that the series of Kissinger-Vorster talks in Europe and the Republic and the constitutional 'package' that finally resulted, restored South Africa's standing as an influential actor in the region. On the other hand, the fact that the United States in the person of Dr. Kissinger had to play the major diplomatic role in getting the Rhodesian proposals accepted by the 'front line' presidents as a basis for the Geneva Conference effectively destroyed one major assumption of the detente policy, namely, that the local protagonists by virtue both of their interests and experience were best placed to promote change in the subcontinent.

Whether this new-found accord with the United States will compensate for the loss of an independent role in promoting peaceful change in Rhodesia and Namibia depends on whether the Republic can count on some quid pro quo from Washington in return for its co-operation over Rhodesia. What shape this might take can only be a matter of speculation at this stage, but the incentive to provide it will certainly weaken if the Geneva talks break down and the Rhodesian situation remains unresolved.

Press reports in South Africa at the time of the Kissinger-Vorster talks in September 1976 suggested that Mr. Vorster hoped that the United States would eventually acquire a more 'realistic' appreciation of South Africa's value to the West and perhaps in due course would reconsider its refusal to recognise the new state of the Transkei. Whether Dr. Kissinger was willing to offer a quid pro quo of this kind in return for South African support over Rhodesia seems unlikely on two counts: (a) uncertainty about both his own position in view of the Presidential election in November 1976 and the extent to which a Democratic successor would be obliged to honour such informal commitments; (b) the weakness of Mr. Vorster's bargaining position, given that he had all along wanted a Rhodesian settlement. It may well be, however, that his co-operation over Rhodesia was purchased on the understanding that the United States would take a sympathetic line at the United Nations in defence of the Republic's efforts to promote constitutional change in Namibia—an objective shared in principle by the Americans.

**The consequences of Soweto**

Yet there can be no doubt that the Republic's image as a stable polity has been profoundly affected by the disturbances which broke out in Soweto in June 1976 and rapidly spread to other urban areas. These have called into question the entire basis of government policy; indeed this combination of external and internal developments—the Angolan intervention (the product of short-term calculation) and the urban riots (the product of a long-standing malaise in the body politic) —have conspired to put the Republic on the defensive and reduce its credibility as an agent of peaceful change in Southern Africa as a whole. It has also put paid to any notion of detente constituting an agenda of external and internal priorities in that order. Events have failed to fit this neat, predetermined course as the introduction of new actors ranging from Dr. Kissinger and the Cubans to the youth of Soweto have compelled the government to cope simultaneously on a variety of fronts. No longer, therefore, does the Republic have the capacity to manipulate its domestic and external environment which was so characteristic of its position in the 1960s and early 1970s. The two have fused together to damage beyond repair the aspiration, embodied in the 'outward movement', to keep foreign and domestic policy separate with respect both to the implementation of policy and its consequences. Thus, the Republic, in sharp contrast to its position in earlier decades, now increasingly finds itself having to react to events both within and without its borders and being forced into situations where awkward choices have to be made and where there is always the possibility of major error.

It is surely more than coincidence that urban disturbances occurred at a time when South Africa's detente policy appeared to have ground to a halt in the light of the failure of the Angolan intervention and the increasing pressure exerted on Pretoria at the United Nations over the future status of Namibia. And although the South African withdrawal from the territory appears to have been conducted in an orderly fashion, the Republic's failure to achieve its objective has damaged the image of invulnerability hitherto characteristic of its standing as a military power in the region as well as its capacity to deter threats to its security. Admittedly, it is difficult to find quantifiable evidence for assertions of this kind, but the willingness of the young Africans and Coloureds to challenge the status quo in Soweto and elsewhere, and to defy the efforts of the police to restore order, is symptomatic of a profound rise in political expectations after sixteen years of comparative quiet on the domestic front. Their receptiveness to doctrines of 'black consciousness' and their apparent indifference to injury and death have been strengthened by their perception of the radical

changes that have occurred in Southern Africa over the last two years. This points to a central weakness in the South African security system, namely, its inability to prevent information about, and understanding of, events beyond the Limpopo making an impact on the thinking of the black majority.

In the domestic context, the government has come under pressure from a variety of sources (*Verligte* Afrikaners, the Progressive Party, Homeland leaders and the English-speaking press to mention only the more important) to make radical changes in the status of the African with respect to his right to own property in the city, to enjoy security of employment and be provided with a range of facilities and services which elsewhere are regarded as essential if life in the city is to be made tolerable. On the other hand, the *Verkrampte* Afrikaner would argue that such a fundamental re-casting of policy (especially if this involved a far greater measure of local political control for the urban African) would mean jettisoning ideological assumptions which have served to sustain the Nationalist Party in power for nearly thirty years. Furthermore, such changes would arouse more intensely felt political expectations and invite demands less easily satisfied without a major reconstitution of the existing political system. Whether Mr. Vorster would respond pragmatically and make important concessions or, alternatively, strengthen the security system and rely on a policy of deterrence, is not the relevant point at issue. What is significant is that a choice between these strategies will ultimately have to be made and neither can be made without incurring risks and costs over the long term. And this is a far cry from the premise on which detente was originally based. The policy was essentially designed to minimise risks and enable the government to control the pace of change, both internal and external. A combination of Angola and Soweto have made this strategy difficult, if not impossible. To this extent, then, detente has failed. Whether the initiative can be recovered depends on the outcome of the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia. Even if the outcome is a constitutional settlement providing for a peaceful transition to African majority rule, it seems doubtful whether South Africa will be able to maintain the independent and influential role which, in effect, was the basic aspiration behind the detente policy. A victory for African nationalism in Rhodesia would greatly encourage Africans within the Republic and increase the pressures available to South Africa's black neighbours and if the transition to majority rule is achieved by a long drawn-out revolutionary war their mood would be correspondingly more militant.

**Implications of Russian involvement in Southern Africa**

Russian and Cuban success in Angola requires to be put in a global perspective. That victory was a limited and local achievement made possible by the unwillingness of the United States to indulge in crisis management—that curious mixture of competition and co-operation which has characterised the behaviour of the super-powers where their proxies, whether in the Middle East, Vietnam or Cuba, have drawn them into conflict with each other. To be effective crisis management usually requires the fulfillment of at least two conditions: (a) that each super-power in the initial stage of the crisis should be perceived by its rival to be willing to back up its proxy with diplomatic and military support; and (b) that as the crisis intensifies, both super-powers should be capable of restraining their proxies for the sake of a joint interest in avoiding escalation to the level of direct confrontation and all that that implies in terms of potential nuclear involvement.

These rough and ready guidelines (and there is nothing sacred about them—things can and do easily go wrong), have become conventions of super-power behaviour precisely because each recognises the danger of being dragged unwillingly into conflict with each other because of their proxies' tendencies to view their local conflicts in all or nothing, life and death, terms. These conventions cannot operate if one super-power is prevented by domestic or other constraints from sustained participation in the crisis, as was the case with the United States in the Angolan civil war. Its proxy, South Africa, failed to get official and public support from the United States to cope with the Cuban intervention and the Soviet Union capitalised on the inability of its super-power rival to sustain its involvement in the crisis.

Yet paradoxically, the United States' failure to check its rival may in retrospect seem to have been the appropriate policy. Leaving aside the mood of Congress and the legacy of Vietnam as explanatory factors for American policy, it could be argued that the techniques of crisis management were not really appropriate to the Angolan situation. Civil wars are notoriously difficult to fit into the rubric of crisis management if only because the factions involved are not easily subject to the restraints that can be exercised upon well-established state proxies such as those of Israel or Egypt. A massive American involvement in Angola and a corresponding increase in the Soviet commitment would have effectively destroyed the social fabric of Angolan society and had devastating repercussions on the security of the states in the surrounding region. And even if we assume that the Russians would have backed down in the face of such an American commitment, the business of pacifying the region and maintaining

control would have done untold damage to American interests elsewhere on the continent—particularly if the United States was seen to be co-operating with South Africa. Thus, perhaps those liberal Senators and Congressmen who opposed intervention and effectively cut off funds designed to support the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) were correct in their appreciation of what constituted the American national interest in Angola.

Nor does it follow that Russian success in Angola will automatically and inexorably lead to military intervention in Rhodesia, Namibia or the Republic. There is an assumption—widespread in South Africa and in certain quarters in the West—that the Soviet Union, by virtue of the ideological component in its foreign policy, enjoys a degree of autonomy in international relations which makes it less subject to the constraints that operate on other powers. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Soviet victory in Angola was interpreted as the first step in a master plan to subvert the entire region and bring it under Soviet influence. No doubt Russia has a real interest in gaining influence in whatever new states emerge from the final process of decolonisation in Southern Africa, but to assume that it could follow such a policy free of constraints would be attributing to it far too much control of its external environment. Ultimately these may be ignored, but that they are present and should be taken into account by Western policy-makers cannot be denied.

To list these constraints baldly is to suggest that they are all of equal weight, which is patently not the case. However, taken together they constitute an inter-related set of inhibitions sufficient to delay and perhaps indefinitely postpone what on a more pessimistic reading of Soviet policy would seem inevitable:

(i) With respect to the incentive to intervene elsewhere in Southern Africa, the Russians cannot be sure of forbearance on the part of the United States similar to that exercised in Angola; indeed Dr. Kissinger's new-found interest in Africa is no doubt in part designed to create at least a degree of uncertainty about ultimate American intentions vis-à-vis Southern Africa on the assumption that an element of uncertainty about a state's intentions can strengthen its ability to deter a rival power.

(ii) The Angolan intervention has some claims to be considered a special case; it does not follow that the fortuitous combination of events which gave the Russians carte blanche there will recur—namely, an America barely recovered from the chastening experience of Vietnam, a President and Secretary of State hamstrung by the exigencies of an electoral campaign and a Congress with genuine doubts about the legitimacy of crisis management in a region which

up to then had not figured largely in the calculation of American interests.

(iii) There is also the commitment of the Soviet Union to maintaining and consolidating the detente which the two super-powers have laboriously built up over the last ten years. This might be regarded as the crucial factor in any analysis of Soviet behaviour on the international scene in so far as it inhibits the Russians from pursuing policies which would bring their government into serious conflict with the United States. It is in their interest to impose restrictions on an arms race with America which has proved prohibitively expensive; there is, too, the fact that as in most industrialised states, the Russians are now beginning to face a rise in the expectations of their own people, and Soviet resources for meeting them are not infinite; hence their willingness to import a variety of Western technologies. Moreover, the Russians realise that in a serious conflict with the United States there is an implicit danger of a sudden sharp rise to the level of nuclear confrontation and this makes it unlikely that they would want to provoke a major conventional conflict with the United States in Southern Africa.

(iv) Both the Russians and the Cubans presumably recognise that military intervention elsewhere in Southern Africa would be likely to encounter rather sharper resistance than was the case in Angola. Indeed, one factor deterring Cuban intervention in Rhodesia might well be a belief that this would call for a corresponding South African response in kind.

(v) The factor of Sino-Soviet competition in the region: this is a more complex constraint since there is clearly present in Soviet policy a strong incentive to block Chinese influence in Southern Africa. Certainly the implications of the contest between the two communist powers was a strangely neglected factor in discussions of the Angolan intervention and it is important to realise that Soviet moves in the Third World are designed as much—if not more—to counter Chinese influence as to make life difficult for the West.[7] Therefore, Soviet policy must at least in part be governed by the need to avoid being forced into a corner, facing an informal Peking-Washington axis. This may sound fanciful, and perhaps a more important constraint is that a too aggressive Soviet policy would antagonise the OAU, giving substance to the Chinese claim that Moscow's activities in Africa are 'imperialist' in motivation.

It follows, therefore, that policies which might have seemed

[7] An honourable exception in this context is Colin Legum. See 'The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LIV, No. 4, July 1976, pp. 745–762.

appropriate for the West when it was engaged in a bi-polar struggle with the Soviet Union at the height of the cold war, are not necessarily the most appropriate in a tri-polar world. An example in this context would be Western responses to the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Part of the reason for that presence is to pre-empt in advance, or nullify where it already exists, Chinese influence on the African littoral. It does not follow automatically that the optimum solution for the West is to incorporate the Republic into its defence arrangements for the area, despite the temptation to do so because of the emergence of black governments, conceivably backed by the Soviet Union, on South Africa's borders. If the struggle between the three super-powers is for political influence, other, more subtle, strategies of an economic and political kind may be required and here the example of the Chinese-built Tanzam Railway comes readily to mind. This achievement was, after all, made possible without the deployment of *a single destroyer or submarine in the Indian Ocean.* Thus, Chinese success in this context does cast doubts on the traditional techniques of gaining influence through the deployment of naval power or the use of force as an instrument of intervention. The difficulty lies, of course, in defining what these new strategies should be, but the lesson of Angola for the future direction of Western policy towards South Africa must involve a recognition of the need to devise self-consciously some middle course between the unpalatable extremes of military intervention on the side of a beleagured minority and a passive stance which gives its opponents the benefits of a 'free ride' in maximising their influence. And the task is not made any easier by the ideological and political inhibitions which prohibit giving help to liberation movements and the advantages enjoyed by the Soviet Union and China in this context. But clearly, unless a more appropriate policy is devised, the West will find itself facing painful dilemmas if and when the struggle between black and white intensifies in Southern Africa.

**Western attitudes to the Transkei**

One strategy that appears to have been decisively rejected by Western governments is the exploitation of the situation created by the granting of 'independence' to the Transkei in October 1976. It has been argued, for example, that recognition of the Transkei and supplying the new state with economic assistance might in the long run enable the Homeland leaders to play a helpful and constructive role in promoting change throughout the Republic to the extent that the strategy enhances their bargaining role vis-à-vis Pretoria.

Nonetheless, the diplomatic silence which greeted the emergence of the Transkei as an independent state was hardly surprising. It had been

clear for many months that there were powerful legal and political arguments operating against recognition of the Transkei and in particular the belief—widely held at the UN and the OAU—that the Transkei did not fit the legal definition of self-determination required for recognition as an independent state. The United Nations practice over a period of thirty years has—according to one influential school of thought—elevated this definition to the status of customary international law. Thus, according to this theory, self-determination is now commonly defined in racial terms and deemed only applicable in a colonial context. Related to this problem is the question of the unit to which it is deemed appropriate to apply the principle. According to Dr. Higgins, 'self-determination refers to the right of the majority within a generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power'.[8] This definition has been widely accepted for three reasons: (a) the unit has to be 'generally acceptable', otherwise there is the obvious danger of fragmentation of the international system—in other words, a line (literally) has to be drawn somewhere; (b) without some clearly understood means for determining who is eligible for self-determination, conflict across state boundaries would be encouraged; (c) the great majority of new states have demonstrated a willingness to accept the frontiers inherited from their colonial masters. (In this context we should note the 'solemn declaration' in 1964 of the Cairo Conference of African Heads of State that 'all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence'.)[9]

Given this definition, the arguments advanced against recognition include the following: first, that the Transkei is not a generally accepted political unit, but rather the artificial creation of the South African government. Secondly, the claim is advanced that the 'unit' in question is the Republic as a whole and the 'majority' in question the African population as a whole. Thirdly, that nothing should be done to dismember the South African state as this 'majority' could be expected to achieve self-determination in due course. Thus here we see the clear connection between self-determination conceived in racial terms and the principle of majority rule as a requirement for self-determination as this has been enunciated over the last three decades.

Ironically, the Transkei's case for self-determination might have had an easier passage had the Wilsonian 'doctrine' of self-determination (applied at the end of the First World War) still been in operation. At that time the criteria by and large employed by the Versailles peace-

[8] Rosalyn Higgins, *The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations* (London: OUP for the RIIA, 1963), p. 104.

[9] Zdenek Červenka, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter*, 2nd ed. (London: Hurst, 1969), p. 94.

makers were language and culture, and a number of new states came into being after the collapse of the central European empires. But the criterion changed after the Second World War: as Rupert Emerson remarks, '. . . ethnic identity is essentially irrelevant, the decisive, indeed, ordinarily, the sole, consideration being the existence of a political entity in the guise of a colonial territory '.[10]

From the point of view of the OAU and the UN South Africa is therefore a 'colonial situation'—not in the sense that the government would, no doubt, prefer to construe it, *i.e.* Pretoria as the metropole and the Bantustans as colonies moving forward to independence—but rather as a white regime illegally exercising power over a dispossessed black majority. Thus for the Republic's critics, the Transkei does not fit the orthodox definition of self-determination and its hopes for admission to the UN and the OAU have proved unfounded. Yet if Western attitudes on the issue of recognition are to change, clear evidence will have to be provided that the Transkei government is capable of playing a role in the 'high politics' of the region as a whole rather than resting content with the 'low politics' of a local government role, providing such services as its small resources will allow and remaining indifferent to the plight of Africans elsewhere in the Republic. Western leaders will also need to be convinced that the structure and process of government in the Homelands genuinely promotes the well-being of the inhabitants in ways very different from those obtaining in the Republic.

And even if such evidence were presented over the long term, there would still exist major constraints on Western policy-makers—namely the degree to which recognition would open the way to accusations from influential elites in their own countries as well as in the African states that apartheid in general was thereby acquiring international legitimacy. Here we need only recall the intense hostility generated in Holland over the issue of whether or not to sell nuclear reactors to South Africa. Recognition of the Transkei might well provoke similar hostility and no Western government seems likely to be willing to give hostages to its opponents unless some massive and obvious quid pro quo is forthcoming from the Republic to counterbalance the discomforts arising from domestic and external opposition. And at present there are few signs that the Republic is about to embark on policies which will encourage Western governments to adopt a patient and flexible attitude over the long term.

[10] Rupert Emerson, 'Self-Determination', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. LXV, No. 3, July 1971, p. 463. The author is grateful to Mr. David Bonner of the Faculty of Law, University of Leicester, for drawing his attention to this article and for some very helpful advice on the question of legal recognition of new states.

# OIL, THE SUPER-POWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST*

*Ian Smart*

WITHIN the scope of public debate, it is a commonplace that the Middle East is an area of frequently violent international conflict, where the level of violence is subject to sudden and considerable elevation. It is a second commonplace that the two super-powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—have significant, and sometimes divergent, interests and influence in the Middle East, substantial enough respectively to encourage and support their involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts. It is a third commonplace that, as major industrial states, both super-powers, and especially the United States, must be concerned with trends in an international energy market which is itself decisively affected by the volume and price of oil exported from the Middle East and North Africa.

The historical prevalence of political and military conflict between and within Middle Eastern states hardly needs to be proved. The second commonplace is more questionable, however platitudinous it may appear. Soviet and United States interests in the Middle East are evident enough, even if they may frequently have been misunderstood. Influence is another matter. Despite the widespread advertisement over twenty years of their respective links with a list of 'client states' in the region, neither super-power has been notably or consistently successful in manipulating Middle Eastern politics or Middle Eastern conflicts to its own advantage. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, they have shared, especially since 1967, the predicament of having responsibility without control.[1]

The third of the commonplaces must also be open to question, on at least two grounds. First, it must be recalled that the United States and the Soviet Union, in addition to being two of the largest industrial economies, are also the two largest oil-producing states in the world; whatever their dependence, if any, on imported oil, they can never be so vulnerable to its supply or price as the industrial states of

* First read to the Seminar on 'Consequences and Alternatives of the New Energy Situation' held during the 30th International Congress on Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Aug. 3–8, 1976, in Mexico City. A volume of the conference papers, edited by Victor L. Urquidi and Ruth Troeller, will be published in 1977.

[1] 'The super-powers and the Middle East', *The World Today*, Jan. 1974, pp. 4–15.

continental Western Europe or Japan.[2] Second, the current dependence of the two super-powers on imported oil differs enormously: the Soviet Union is fully self-sufficient, whereas the United States, in 1975, relied upon imports for almost 38 per cent of its supplies.[3] Questions derived from these comments need not, of course, invalidate the commonplace as a whole; marginal dependence may be economically critical, while the impact of world prices for Middle Eastern oil may be important even to a country such as the Soviet Union which is not called upon to pay them itself. Nevertheless, the comments are to be borne in mind, not least because of their implication that, whatever else they may share, the super-powers do not share a similar attitude or sensitivity to the world market for Middle Eastern oil.

In investigating the influence and interests of the super-powers in the Middle East and its oil it will be possible to address also a more general question about the existence of causal relationships between Middle Eastern conflict, super-power influence, and the case of oil. By considering the events of the past three or four years, it should be possible to identify the causal links, if any, which have operated.

The central question is: what effects, if any, have the dramatic events in the world oil market since 1973 had upon conflicts in the Middle East or upon the attitudes of the super-powers to those conflicts? To that, there must eventually be joined a further question about potential effects in a foreseeable future. One object of this paper will be to argue that the impact of the oil factor on the Middle Eastern policies of regional and external powers has possibly been more uneven and, in some respects, less powerful than superficial impressions might indicate. Another object will be to suggest that the future interaction between those two contexts will not only be similarly heterogeneous but may also display features which differ markedly from those readily extrapolated from past experience or current impressions.

A major problem in analysing policies and events in or associated with the Middle East since 1973 is that of distinguishing between the effects of qualitatively distinct factors which have coincided in time. Indeed, the 'oil factor' is itself a misnomer, in that the term, as used hitherto, embraces at least three separate processes, each with its own economic and political significance. In the first place, it must

[2] In 1975, the US produced 473 million tonnes (mt) of oil (including natural gas liquids) and the USSR 485 mt, compared with Saudi Arabian production of 344 mt. (*BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry 1975*, p. 6.)

[3] Out of a total consumption of 764 mt in 1975, the US had net imports of 203 mt of crude oil and 97 mt of oil products. (*BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry 1975*, p. 10.)

e remembered (although it is now often forgotten) that a so-called energy crisis' was widely advertised and widely feared well before October 1973, especially amongst those who argued inter alia that ie world's resources of hydrocarbon fuels were being depleted at a angerously accelerating rate, and that one result was bound to be ie concession of progressively greater international power to those Iiddle Eastern states which controlled so much of the remaining eserves of oil.[4] In the second place, there is the traumatic episode of ie 1973–74 'embargo': the politically-motivated restriction of oil roduction and export to particular countries, including the United tates, by some (but not all) the members of the Organisation of Arab 'etroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).[5] In the third place, there ; the enormous increase in the world price of oil imposed, in a series f steps since 1970 and especially since October 1973, not by Arab roducers alone but by the wider Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 'ountries (OPEC), largely, it should be added, at the instigation of wo of its non-Arab members (Iran and Venezuela). Even if these hree dimensions of the 'oil factor' are not unconnected, it would be aive to suppose that they are merely facets of a single phenomenon r to ignore the extent to which they have had distinct effects upon Aiddle Eastern affairs, on the one hand, or the super-powers, on the ther.

It would also be naïve to ignore the significance of two other series f events which have nothing directly to do with oil at all. One is that ong sequence of contacts, explorations, negotiations and agreements etween the two super-powers themselves, stretching back into the 950s, which goes by the name of 'detente'. The other is the much horter sequence, confined within no more than three weeks, which onstituted the October 1973 war between Israel, Egypt and Syria. Iad oil never existed, or had none of it been contained within the Aiddle East, it is certain that each of those processes, the long and ie short, would have had a considerable effect upon the pattern of iter-state conflict in the Middle East and upon the related policies f the United States and the Soviet Union. Just as it is sometimes ifficult, in looking at Middle Eastern politics or super-power policies, o decide which dimension of the tripartite 'oil factor' has preominated in a particular case, so it is often difficult (and sometimes npossible) to judge whether super-power detente and/or the October

[4] See, for example, Walter J. Levy, 'Oil Power', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 4, 971, pp. 652–668, and James E. Akins, 'The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here', *oreign Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1973, pp. 462–490.

[5] Iraq refused to join its OAPEC partners in restricting production and export, and, ideed, increased its own production significantly, during the term of the 'embargo' id since (from 72 mt in 1972 to 99 mt in 1973, 97 mt in 1974 and 109 mt in 1975).

1973 war would still have created a particular effect without the intervention of the ' oil factor ' in any of its forms.

### The ' oil factor ' in the October 1973 war

The evolution of international conflict in the Middle East since 1973 has been largely, although not exclusively, linked to the apparently secular dispute between Arab states and Israel. The detailed story of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and of its aftermath need not be set out here. Nor need the details of those intricate and sometimes confusing chapters in which the United States and the Soviet Union were seen to vie with each other in supporting the antagonists in war while simultaneously co-operating actively in bringing that war to an end. What does need to be pointed out is the patent or putative part played, in any of its forms, by the ' oil factor '.

There seems to be no reason for suggesting that the ' oil factor ' made any *direct* contribution to the initiation or the military outcome of the 1973 war. Although Israel, Egypt and Syria all produce limited quantities of oil, and although one result of the 1967 Arab-Israel war had been to leave some of Egypt's most productive oil fields (in the Abu Rudeis area) in Israeli hands, competition for access to oil reserves in the ground has never played any significant role in the conflict between Israel and its neighbours.

That is not quite the same as saying that the issue of oil supplies has not figured in the conflict. Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal to Israel's shipping in and since 1948 complicated the task of supplying crude oil to the refinery at Haifa, as, of course, did the parallel closure, by Jordan and Iraq, of the pipeline which had fed that refinery before 1948. More seriously, Egypt's blockade of the Straits of Tiran in 1967, which did so much to provoke the immediately subsequent war, threatened the vital traffic of tankers bringing oil, principally from Iran, to Israel's southern port at Eilat. The fact remains that neither oil reserves nor oil supplies were directly of more than marginal importance to the 1973 war itself.

A more interesting question is whether the issue of oil may have had a less obvious and more indirect relevance to the 1973 war— or, at least, to the timing of the Egyptian and Syrian attacks with which it began. Two possibilities suggest themselves. The first is that the leaders of Egypt and Syria may have been encouraged to take the offensive against Israel by the conviction that, in 1973, those other Arab states, in the Gulf and North Africa, which produced so much of the world's oil were both more able and more willing than in 1967 to use oil as a political weapon in support of their own military endeavours. The second possibility is that a different and more subtle

consideration, especially for Egypt, was that, unless determined military action against Israel were taken quickly, political leadership within the Arab world would pass irrevocably from the major actors on the ' armed struggle ' stage, in Cairo and Damascus, to the major actors on the oil stage, in Tripoli, Baghdad and Riyadh.

There is some evidence to support the former possibility. In particular, the attitude of Saudi Arabia, which was clearly critical to any concerted use of the Arab ' oil weapon ', appeared to have changed considerably since 1967. Whether because King Feisal's well-known anxiety to pray again in Jerusalem was growing with the advancing years or because he and his ministers were increasingly aware of their vulnerability to criticism or attack by more radical Arab states or forces if they held back, the Saudi government had become progressively more openly exigent, especially of the United States, in pressing for Israel's total withdrawal from territory occupied in 1967.

The changing Saudi attitude is well documented. Speaking publicly in Washington in October 1972, the Saudi Minister of Petroleum, Sheikh Ahmed Zeki al-Yamani, proposed a long-term bilateral agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States, offering the latter an assured supply of Saudi oil in return for the exemption of that oil from quota restrictions and tariffs and the facilitation of direct Saudi investment in the United States, especially in the ' downstream ' sectors of the oil industry. No policy ' strings ' were directly attached. In April 1973, however, Sheikh Yamani, speaking again in Washington, openly linked his country's willingness to meet projections of the 1985 oil demand to the abandonment of the United States' policy of allegedly consistent support for Israel. Then, in August 1973, immediately after President Sadat of Egypt had secretly visited Riyadh, Saudi Arabia announced limitations on oil production growth, following this at once by repeating the warning to the United States that it would be difficult to satisfy the American demand for Arab oil unless there were substantial modification of United States policy in the Middle East. Finally, most bluntly of all, King Feisal himself, through the medium of American television on August 31, 1973, openly threatened to use his ' oil weapon ' against the United States unless ' complete support of Zionism ' were abandoned.

It was hardly surprising if all this persuaded the leaders of Egypt and Syria that they could at last rely upon the ' oil weapon ', wielded by other Arabs, to be used in an effort to separate Israel from its Western friends in a new war. Nor were these expectations disappointed. On October 17, 1973, ten days after the new war began, OAPEC voted to impose progressively more drastic production cuts until Israel withdrew to the 1967 borders. During the next two weeks,

the majority of OAPEC members imposed a complete embargo on supplies of oil to either the United States or the Netherlands. Further decisions on production cuts followed in November. All in all, the encouragement to military action which Egypt and Syria may well have drawn from the brandishing of the 'oil weapon' by Saudi Arabia and others before October 1973 seemed to be well justified.

Evidence in support of the second of the possibilities mentioned earlier is necessarily more difficult to find. Even if Egyptian or Syrian leaders were indeed afraid that their political prestige might slip away to other Arab rulers unless they acted swiftly against Israel, they could hardly be expected to advertise the fact. Nevertheless, such alarm would not have been unfounded. President Qaddafi of Libya, for example, had already gained in stature within the Arab world through his country's militant leadership in the struggle by OPEC (and OAPEC) members since 1970 to obtain a higher economic return from oil exports and a larger share of control over oil production itself—a militancy which culminated in the Libyan seizure of American oil company assets and installations in August 1973. He had also acquired credit, as well as some odium, by his well-publicised financial support of Palestinian 'freedom fighters', of other radical groups in the Arab world, and of selected states and rulers further south (such as President Amin of Uganda). Finally, and most directly, he had presented an open challenge to the Egyptian government by his abrasive advocacy of a Libyan-Egyptian union, by his financial support for dissident groups within Egypt and, in July 1973, by his action in launching a 'union' march by 40,000 Libyans across the Egyptian border, further dramatised by his own rapidly withdrawn resignation. None of this would have been either possible or credible had Libya not been in a position to exploit its oil and the income from its production.

Libya, however, despite its President's phrenetic activity, did not mark the direction from which the most serious challenges to the status of Egypt or Syria within the Arab world were, arguably, emerging. The capitals which seemed, in their control of massive oil resources, to present the real challenge were Riyadh and Baghdad, rather than Tripoli. The Iraqi challenge was admittedly potential, rather than actual, in that it was based on the expected existence of very large oil reserves, rather than on current oil production. Despite that, it was naturally of particular interest to Syria, given proximity, a history of strained inter-state relations and a frequently vicious enmity between the Ba'athist groups in power in the two countries. Saudi Arabia, however, represented the more immediately obvious challenge. Although other Arab oil exporters such as Kuwait had

adopted similar policies, Saudi Arabia had progressively established itself as the most important paymaster of the Arab world: by making loans for general economic purposes, but especially by advancing money to Egypt, Jordan and others to finance their post-1967 purchases of foreign military equipment. With that role of paymaster, there went obvious and considerable prestige, as well as political influence—even if the role itself was assumed, in part, to protect Saudi leaders from political attack. More important, the very steps taken by Saudi Arabia in 1972–73 to prepare for the use of the 'oil weapon', which served, on the one hand, to encourage Egyptian and Syrian military attack, served also, on the other hand, to remind Arabs, as well as the West, that it was King Feisal, rather than President Sadat or anyone else, who now had the power to move the wheels of Arab politics, to set the scene and the terms for action against Israel, and to deal from a position of strength with the United States itself. The Saudi 'oil weapon' was seen, as it emerged from its scabbard, to be an Arab sword with two edges. If one threatened to slice into the economic prosperity of the United States and its allies, the other seemed poised to cut down, in the same stroke, the political status of Egypt and its like. The Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in October 1973 might reasonably have seemed, in these circumstances, to have been a necessary exercise in pre-emption on two fronts: the military front of the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights, and the political front of relative status in the Arab world.

If oil represented, in any sense, a direct issue in the October 1973 war, its significance in that role was trivial. If, indirectly, it encouraged —or even impelled—the military attack by Egypt and Syria, the extent to which it did so may never be provable. What many have seen as both substantial and self-evident, however, is the part played by the factor of oil in bringing the war to an end and in promoting subsequent steps towards the military disengagement of the combatants. The 'oil weapon' was unsheathed and turned against the West. The impact of supply restrictions was enormously enhanced by the multiplication of prices. Thereafter, it is argued, the United States, threatened with real damage to its energy economy and with far more serious damage to the economies of its major allies, hastened to bring unprecedented pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire and, thereafter, to accept progressively more extensive adjustments of the demarcation lines between its forces and those of Egypt and Syria.

The case, in approximately those terms, has been widely espoused—as has the general conclusion that the events of October 1973 and since, by demonstrating the vulnerability of the United States and

the West to the 'oil weapon', have revealed the possession by Arab states of an instrument potentially capable over time of forcing one super-power, in effective collaboration with the other, to impose on Israel a settlement acceptable to its adversaries. But is the case or the conclusion a persuasive one?

Circumstantial supporting evidence certainly exists, especially in the declarations made by Western governments and their spokesmen in and after October 1973. The European Community countries and Japan, depending on the Middle East and North Africa for some 80 per cent of their oil supplies, were predictably swift in conforming, at least rhetorically, to Arab pressure: the Community by its public demand that Israel withdraw to the 1967 borders and recognise Palestinian rights (November 6), and Japan by its strongly pro-Arab statement on the territorial issue (November 22) and its subsequent haste to contribute most generously to Palestinian relief works and the economic rehabilitation of Egypt. The United States, drawing only some 8 per cent of its oil supplies directly from the Arab countries, was naturally less subservient.[6] On occasion, however, it was a good deal more abrasive, and even belligerent, in its reactions.

President Nixon's request to Congress, two days after the Arab oil 'embargo' was announced, for massive new military aid for Israel was certainly regarded by the Saudi Arabian and other Arab governments as abrasive, as was his Secretary of State's proposal, in December 1973, that the industrialised oil-importing countries should establish a new consumers' bloc, the Energy Action Group, to concert their policies.[7] As to belligerence, the United States Secretary of Defence referred openly, in January 1974, to the possibility of military action being taken against oil-exporting states if their policies threatened to 'cripple' the industrial world (a studiedly imprecise threat, which attracted rather more attention when Dr. Kissinger repeated it in January 1975, substituting the idea of 'strangulation' for that of 'crippling'). And two days later, on January 8, 1974, Vice-President (subsequently President) Ford added a new dimension by hinting broadly that those oil-exporting countries which sought to exploit American dependence on their oil would do well to remember

[6] Although in 1972 oil imports from the Middle East and North Africa (including Iran) represented only 4·4 per cent of US oil consumption, equivalent to 2 per cent of US energy consumption, the proportion rose sharply in the first nine months of 1973. The estimate that US imports from Arab states alone in June–October 1973 equalled 8 per cent of oil consumption is from Joel Darmstadter and Hans H. Landsberg, 'The Economic Background' in *The Oil Crisis: In Perspective*, *Daedalus*, Vol. 104, No. 4, 1975, p. 22, where it is also estimated that an additional 2 per cent of US oil supplies in that period came indirectly from OAPEC countries.

[7] The President's request for $2·2 billion of military aid for Israel was submitted to Congress on Oct. 19, 1973 Dr. Kissinger's proposal of an Energy Action Group was made during a speech at the Pilgrims' Society dinner in London on Dec. 12, 1973.

how dependent they were on American agricultural exports for their own food.[8]

On this evidence, there can be no doubt about the sensitivity of the United States and its closest allies to the ' oil weapon '. Nor is it in dispute that, from the middle of October 1973, the United States began to bring strong preessure on Israel, first to cease fighting and withdraw from the western bank of the Suez Canal and later to withdraw also from some of the territories it had conquered in 1967. What is not clear is the extent to which pressure on Israel was prompted by the effects of the ' oil weapon '.

Use of the Arab ' oil weapon ' was directly linked, from the outset, to the current war against Israel and to the alleged responsibility of the United States for that war. The OAPEC resolution of October 17, 1973, made that clear. ' Considering ', it said, ' that the United States is the principal and foremost source of the Israeli power which has resulted in the present Israeli arrogance and enabled the Israelis to continue to occupy our territories. . . . The participants . . . recommended . . . that the United States be subjected to the most severe cut. . . . The participants also recommended that this progressive reduction leads to the total halt of oil supplies to the United States from every individual country party to the resolution '.[9]

## Effect of the ' oil weapon ' on the United States

Ostensibly, it was, then, the United States which was to be brought under the greatest pressure—and to transfer that pressure to Israel. Yet, for obvious reasons, it was also the United States which, of all the Western industrial countries, was the least vulnerable to the pressure of the Arab ' embargo '. Although American imports of Arab oil were cut from 1·2 million barrels a day in August/September 1973 to a mere trickle in January/February 1974, that reduction amounted to only 7 per cent of the country's oil consumption—enough to be troublesome, but hardly enough to cripple or strangle the economy.[10] In such circumstances, it would, in fact, have been astonishing if the direct impact of the ' oil weapon ' alone had achieved a radical change in the Middle East policy of the United States.

Indirectly, the impact of the ' oil weapon ' on American interests was, of course, more serious, especially in so far as it threatened the economies of Japan and of American allies in Western Europe far

[8] Speech on Jan. 8, 1974, to the Manufacturing Chemists Association (USIS, Jan. 9, 1974).

[9] Resolution adopted by Oil Ministers of the OAPEC member states at Kuwait, Oct. 17, 1973; reproduced in *Survival*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, 1974, pp. 38–39.

[10] The figures are from Robert B. Stobaugh, ' The Oil Companies in Crisis ' in *The Oil Crisis: In Perspective*, *op. cit.*, pp. 179–202.

more dependent than the United States itself on Arab oil. If
United States was unlikely to be forced into imposing a settlem
on Israel by its own predicament, it seemed more plausible that
would be so forced by the predicament of its friends. President Nix
indeed, said as much as the 1973 war ended:

> . . . one of the major factors which gave enormous urgency
> our efforts to settle this particular crisis was the potential of
> oil cut-off. . . . Europe, which gets 80 per cent of its oil fr
> the Mideast, would have frozen to death this winter unl
> there had been a settlement, and Japan, of course, is in th
> same position.[11]

Yet neither the then President's words nor the superficial plausibil
of his thesis make the case secure. Some countries certainly suffer
but none suffered greatly. Japan and members of the Europe
Community in any case escaped the full potential force of the '
weapon', by making placatory statements and gestures and, to
lesser extent, by scrambling with more alacrity than dignity for ava
able supplies. There is no doubt that many Western governments we
alarmed by the limitation on Arab oil production—largely becau
they had not done some simple sums—and that their alarm had so
political effect. On looking back at October 1973 and the months th
followed, however, there is a notable lack of evidence in support
the thesis advanced by President Nixon. Although oil consumption f
during the six months from October 1973 in Western Europe (but n
in Japan), the cut-back seems clearly to have been due more to gene
economic recession than to Arab action. Moreover, there is no in
cation that, after their initial cries of pain, any of the allies of t
United States sought, on grounds of oil hunger, to sway Americ
policy towards Israel.

None of this is to say that the Arab 'oil weapon' was complete
ignored by American policy-makers or their West European a
Japanese counterparts in reacting to the 1973 Arab-Israel war
the various efforts to secure Israeli withdrawals which followed; t
importance of Arab oil to the world energy economy is obvious, a
the demonstration that its supply could and would be manipulat
for political purposes has cast a diffuse shadow over the policy deli
erations of all major states. But it is to say that the 'oil factor' h
apparently played something much less than a determinant role
shaping American policy, or even the policies of its major allies.

Indeed, it is symptomatic that the passage from President Nixon
press conference quoted earlier not only exaggerated the facts beyor

[11] Press Conference, Oct. 26, 1973 (USIS, Oct. 29, 1973).

recognition but also represented almost the only public reference to the Arab 'oil weapon' or to the broader considerations of the international oil market in any contemporary official explanation of American policy. It is not the task of this paper to explain the strenuous efforts of the United States government to impose a cease-fire on Israel in October 1973 or to bring about Israeli withdrawals in Sinai or on the Golan Heights thereafter. Arguably, however, the explanation lies much more in the context of the United States' political relationship with the Soviet Union and of the associated policies of detente than in the context of the United States' vulnerability, direct or indirect, to restrictions on the supply of Middle East oil. For an explanation on the latter basis, there is little evidence.

Hardly surprisingly, a great deal more evidence exists of the effect upon the United States of the price of Middle East—and other—oil. The price agreements reached between members of OPEC and the international oil companies at Tehran and Tripoli in 1971 had had a 'guaranteed' life of five years. Eighteen months later, they were destroyed in the first stages of what, by January 1974, had become a fully-fledged revolution. The average price of the 'marker' crude (Arabian Light 34° f.o.b. Ras Tanura) was $1.73 a barrel in January 1973. On October 16, 1973 (one day before OAPEC decided upon its 'embargo'), the OPEC members in the Gulf, abandoning efforts to negotiate new terms with the companies, unilaterally decreed increases which brought the average price of the same oil to $3.55 a barrel. Encouraged in part by the artificially high panic bids made for small quantities of 'free market' oil during the OAPEC 'embargo', but urged on even more by some members, such as Iran, who were hungry to maximise their income, OPEC then threw caution to the winds and, in December 1973, imposed a further rise to $9.41 a barrel: an increase in the average price of the 'marker' crude over twelve months of 444 per cent. By January 1975, twelve months yet further on, it had reached $10.46 a barrel.

Increases of these orders were bound to have a dramatic effect on the import bills of all OPEC customers, including that one major customer of OPEC which was also a super-power. The cost of American imports from the Arab states and Iran, almost all of which consisted of oil or oil products, shot up from $1.4 billion in 1973 to $6.1 billion in 1974 and $8.1 billion in 1975.[12] Evidence of a change in the terms of trade as they apply to Middle East oil exporters could hardly be more striking.

[12] These figures and those in Table 1 are taken from a newsletter ('Spending the Petrodollar Billions', Feb. 9, 1976) written by Kenneth C. Crowe of *Newsday* for the Alicia Patterson Foundation, New York. They are there attributed to John Haldane of the US Dept. of Commerce.

The reactions to the enormous increases in the price of OPEC oil were, of course, immediate and tumultuous. OPEC's actions were seen as promoting both inflation and recession in the industrialised world, as creating a chronic imbalance of trade and payments which would disrupt the international banking and monetary systems, as threatening less developed—and some developed—importers of oil with imminent bankruptcy. Not all the predictions were unjustified; despite attempts by some OPEC members to cushion the shock, the effect on a number of less developed countries remained extremely serious. But the predictions of grave damage to the American economy, with which we are particularly concerned here, proved generally fragile. The increases in oil prices between October 1973 and January 1974, as much by their speed as their extent, did reinforce the other factors already combining to inflate prices and constrain the level of economic activity in the United States. But their contribution to those processes appears, with hindsight, to have been subsidiary in scale and transient in duration. The hectic expansion of banking activity required to cope with 'petrodollars' did impose certain strains on the American banking system, amongst others, and a few casualties were sustained in the process. But the banking system survived, and even prospered, as its managers learned to adapt not only to the problems but also to the opportunities presented by new oil wealth in the OPEC states. As to the trade balance of the United States, the prophets of doom, as Table 1 strikingly demonstrates, were out of season. Far from penalising the American economy, the multiplication of the world oil price created a vastly expanded market for American products in the Middle East, accelerating the recovery of the United States economy into a new period of growth and more than off-setting the additional bill for

Table 1

*US Trade with Middle East Member States of OPEC (including Iran), 1973–75*

(US $1,000)

| | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
|---|---|---|---|
| US imports | 1,438,800 | 6,086,900 | 8,128,100 |
| US exports | 3,849,680 | 10,349,550 | 11,344,120 |
| (of which military equipment) | (2,531,680) | (6,114,550) | (3,957,202) |
| *Balance* | +2,410,880 | +4,262,650 | +3,216,020 |

(*Source*: see n. 12)

imports of oil. The United States was obviously more fortunate—or more successful—in this respect than many of its allies (although both West Germany and Japan prospered in a similar fashion). Moreover, these simple measurements take no account of other effects upon the American economy, in relation, for example, to investment in alternative sources of energy. The fact remains that, from this evidence, it would be difficult to conclude that the six-fold increase in world oil prices during 1973 and 1974 imposed any irresistible pressure upon the Middle East policies of the United States, at least in regard to the promotion or resolution of international conflict.

There is one important caveat to add. The figures in Table 1 do show the success of the United States in balancing its higher 1974 and 1975 import bills for Middle East oil. But they also show how much of that success was initially due to only one factor: the increased sale of American arms. Non-military sales to Middle East oil countries all but covered the counterpart import of oil in 1973. In 1974, however, the proportion of the oil bill thus matched fell to 70 per cent, and although it rose again to 91 per cent in 1975, it was above all the fact that military exports during those two years reached the remarkable total of over $10 billion which guaranteed the United States a continuing trade surplus.

In several respects, such a rapid expansion of the arms trade offers hostages to fortune. In the first place, it is always harder for a government to divorce the pattern of its country's military exports from its own political posture than it is to separate official policy from non-military trade. The sale of arms and the associated commitments to train, maintain and re-supply involve governmental sanction and imply governmental approval to a unique extent. In the second place, the more active promotion of arms sales to the Middle East by one super-power, in response to the demands of commerce even more than of security, tends to issue a licence to others, including the other super-power, to follow suit, thus revivifying those fears of a progressive strategic polarisation of the region which were so widely expressed in the decade after 1955. In the third place, making any important trade balance heavily and persistently dependent upon military exports entails commercial risks for the arms supplier concerned, simply because the pattern of such exports tends, in the longer term, to be so irregular. However high their ambitions, Middle East states will not order a new generation of, say, combat aircraft or missiles each year; even assuming that the same supplier is retained, their major purchases of such expensive capital equipment will be relatively widely spaced, so that, the phasing of deliveries notwithstanding, the volume and value of the trade will be subject to rather

large periodic fluctuations. All in all, therefore, the emphasis placed since 1973 on the sale of American arms to Middle East oil exporters carries with it potentially considerable longer-term costs and, even if it marks no conscious or immediate change of political attitude, is likely, over time, to impose significant pressures upon American policy-making.

If one super-power has suffered little damage from the operation of the 'oil factor' in the Middle East, and may even have derived some short-term advantage from it, albeit at the risk of longer-term penalties, the other super-power appears, at first glance, to have obtained, in at least two respects, a clear-cut profit.

The Soviet Union, whether or not it has ever aspired since 1945 to dominate the Middle East itself, has constantly striven to prevent domination of the area by the West. The vision of OAPEC banning, with impunity, the supply of oil to the United States must therefore have been welcome, as must the demonstration, over a longer period, that the Western oil companies no longer had the ability to regulate the production or control the price of Middle East oil. It would, to be sure, have run strongly counter to Soviet interests and desires if the United States had, in fact, been driven to intervene militarily in the Arab world. It would also have been to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union, more subtly but perhaps even more substantially, if OAPEC or OPEC actions had caused a serious economic crisis in the major countries of the OECD. Neither situation arose—and there is no sign that the Soviet government considered either likely. On balance, therefore, the greater independence from the West demonstrated by Middle East oil-exporting countries, and the self-confidence obtained from its demonstration, may be set by the Soviet government on the credit side of the account.

A more tangible credit also accrued to the Soviet Union from the events of 1973–74. The Soviet Union has hitherto purchased only trivial quantities of Middle East oil, and almost all of that has immediately been re-exported. It is, however, an exporter of oil in its own right, with the majority of its exports going to Eastern Europe but with a minority being sold for hard currencies outside Comecon. The dramatic increase in the OPEC price levels gave the Soviet Union an ideal opportunity to raise the prices charged for that latter proportion of its own exports, and thus to increase very substantially indeed its earnings of hard currency. The opportunity was seized. Moreover, the effect of higher prices for Soviet oil was extended also to allies in Comecon, by means of a complicated agreement which means not only that East European states are likely to be paying something like the full OPEC price for Soviet oil by about 1978, but

also that they are liable to pay for any such oil over a set quota out of their own scanty reserves of hard currency. All in all, therefore, the decisions taken by OPEC in 1973–74 on prices—even more than those taken by OAPEC in October 1973 on supply—represented a valuable windfall for Soviet leaders. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union actively encouraged OPEC's price increases, while the Soviet government's welcome for OAPEC's use of the 'oil weapon' was, at most, muted. Nor is there any evidence that Soviet policies towards the Arab-Israel dispute or other international conflicts in the Middle East have been significantly affected by considerations connected with oil. It is not unreasonable to judge, however, that the Soviet Union was a net benefactor of the events in the Middle East oil market in and after October 1973.

If the story were to stop here, it would seem to be a relatively simple one, with a relatively simple moral. The 'oil factor' has neither ignited nor extinguished Middle East conflicts in the past three years, although it may conceivably have hastened the onset of the 1973 Arab-Israel war. What it has done, within the region, is to procure a progressive transfer of relative wealth and political influence from the Arab states bordering Israel, and especially Egypt and Syria, to the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf and North Africa. As to the super-powers, it seems to have played only a relatively minor role in determining their attitude to Middle East conflicts—a lesser role, certainly, than that played by their mutual interest in improving and sustaining their own bilateral relationship. Indirectly, through its effect upon allies, it has clearly had some influence on the United States. By the same token, in ways not explored in this paper, it has had an impact upon relations between those allies and the United States. In neither the American nor the Soviet case, however, has it obviously been a determinant of policy in the Middle East. It casts a shadow, but it does not draw lines. One corollary is that, if significant causal links have existed between Middle East oil and Middle East conflict, the flow of causation has been from the latter to the former, rather than the reverse. As 1973 so amply demonstrated, international conflict in the area is liable to affect the supply of oil and to provide occasions for, rather than to cause, rapid changes in its price. Those effects impinge in different ways upon the energy economies and policies of the super-powers. Thus, it is not so much that the 'oil factor' has shaped super-power attitudes to Middle East conflict as that Middle East conflict, by affecting the oil market, has borne upon super-power policies and positions in regard to energy. In the current equation, oil is more effect than cause.

The future may be different. That is properly a subject for a

separate essay. Here, it must suffice to set out some of the considerations in the briefest form.

**Reorientation of Gulf and Maghreb towards the Levant**

Within the Arab world, the long-term importance of shifting the political centre of gravity from 'warrior states' to 'oil states' is incalculable, but potentially great. Much will eventually depend on the intentions—and the identities—of those who, by one means or another, become the future governors of the 'oil states'. In the very long run, much will also depend on the ability of each of those states to translate its existing assets into alternative means of earning a comparable income in that inevitable future when either the supply of, or the demand for, oil has failed. Meanwhile, what may be more significant in the shorter run is the way in which events since the beginning of October 1973 have tended to re-connect the policies of oil-exporting countries in the Gulf and the Maghreb to the political and military situation in the more confined Arab-Israel context of the Levant. Religious fervour, national prestige, personal ambition, political prudence: all have recently combined, under the stimulus of the 1973 war, to prompt a more active commitment by a number of those who wield the 'oil weapon' to the imposition of territorial contraction upon Israel. It is far from certain that the effect will endure; other international problems and opportunities compete for attention, and the Lebanese civil war has already served as one violently divisive cross-current. In so far as it does endure, however, the reorientation of the Gulf and the Maghreb towards the Levant will not be the least important outcome of the 1973–74 crisis, especially, of course, for Palestinian leaders who, controlling no oil themselves, must seek to obtain its benefits, political and economic, at second hand. They have already learned to exploit the fact that those who are publicly very rich frequently find it politic also to be publicly very generous, but they would naturally wish to secure active political and diplomatic support as well as money. For their hopes to be realised consistently, the concern of distant oil exporters for the affairs of the Levant will have to be at least sustained, and preferably reinforced.

Turning to the super-powers, the effect of the 'oil factor' on their relative positions in the Middle East may well be reversed as time passes. The Soviet Union, having extracted some little advantage from a largely passive policy, may have to pay a price in the longer term. Those in the Middle East to whom oil is bringing the greatest international influence—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates—are not, on the whole its friends. Even Iraq is an uncertain

quantity, while Libya is nobody's friend at all. Moreover, the Soviet Union has less than the United States to offer oil-rich friends. Above all, it is less able to serve the urgent desire of the oil exporters to equip their countries with modern and technically advanced industries. That, indeed, is arguably the other super-power's greatest long-term advantage. Over the next ten years, in fact, the Arab ' oil weapon ' will progressively find itself facing an American ' technology weapon '. As the potential but reciprocal impact of those weapons increases—as it will—surprisingly solid relations of mutual respect and advantage may be forged. In the process, however, the United States will find its own freedom of political action in the Middle East restricted in new ways—as it is already being restricted by the sale and purchase of arms. American influence in much of the Middle East may well increase, but American flexibility will, at the same time, decline. That possibility may reinforce other arguments for compensating by reducing the constraint hitherto imposed on American policy by close relations with Israel.

Viewing that specific contingency against the background of more various future uncertainties in the Middle East itself, those responsible for policy in Israel must be apprehensive, and may well become more so. The 1973 war, despite its outcome, delivered a brutal shock to the military confidence of most Israelis. The first concerted use of the ' oil weapon ' and the subsequent conversion of new Arab oil revenue into new Arab armament have greatly encouraged the view thus formed that time is not on Israel's side. American diplomatic pressures for territorial ' disengagement ', especially in the context of continuing super-power detente, have strengthened fears of Israel's eventual diplomatic isolation. The overall effect has been to erode the essential foundation of that cautious middle-of-the-road strategy of ' nothing for nothing but something for anything ' which has, in fact, dominated Israeli domestic politics and international policy alike since the 1950s.

Those who have led Israel during the last twenty years have done so consistently from positions within the middle ground of national politics, rejecting both the greater rigidity and the greater pliancy advocated by different domestic opponents. The rhetoric and gesture of positive policy notwithstanding, their ability to command electoral support has essentially depended throughout upon the largely unspoken but widely shared assumption that Israel's best course, like Mr. Micawber's, must be to hold fast and wait for something to turn up. Israeli governments have, in fact, allowed almost all their significant foreign policy decisions since 1957 to be taken for them

by external actors or external events—a strategy which has had much to commend it, but which implicitly assumes two premises: that the United States stands firm as the effective guarantor of Israel's security, and that, partly as a consequence, Israel can maintain sufficient diplomatic and military strength to deter or repel any foreseeable Arab attack. It is the challenge apparently offered to those premises by the fabrication and employment of the Arab 'oil weapon', by the use of larger Arab oil revenues to arm Arab forces and support Palestinian militancy, and above all by actual and potential reactions in the United States to these new factors, which threatens to undermine the popular case for a middle-of-the-road strategy and progressively to polarise Israeli politics between those who, fearing Arab strength and American defection, advocate unilateral concessions in the interest of settlement and those who, sharing the same fears, advocate military as well as diplomatic intransigence.

Partly because the latter advocates are at least as likely as the former to prevail, it is by no means impossible, in fact, that the 'oil weapon' will turn out in the longer term to have cast its deepest shadow within Israel. The crucial and precedent question, however, will be that of its longer-term influence in the United States. In 1973–74, considerations of oil supply and oil price seem to have played relatively little part in shaping American policies towards Israel in particular or the Middle East in general. The question is whether relations with Arab and other Middle East oil exporters will not come steadily to loom larger in American calculations over the next decade. On the one hand, the most recent OECD estimates are that America's dependency on oil imports, far from declining, will rise inexorably from 290 mt in 1975 to almost 430 mt in 1985, with much of that increment presumably having to come from the Arab Middle East.[13] On the other hand, there is the strong probability that many companies as well as many government agencies in the United States will, in any case, become increasingly involved in elaborating a pattern of closer and more complex commercial, technical, financial and even military relations with Middle East oil-exporting states as the latter pursue their own development plans. If the pressures thus generated combine to alter substantially the American attitude to Israel—as they will certainly combine to impose some more general limitations on American policy—then the fears which tend to polarise Israel's

[13] This OECD estimate that net US imports will be 8·6 million barrels per day in 1985 was presented in March 1976 to the Energy Commission of the Conference on International Economic Co-operation and subsequently quoted publicly by R. E. Hamilton of the OECD Secretariat ('Trends in Energy Consumption and Supply': Paper presented at the University of Cologne, June 22, 1976; mimeo., p. 16).

domestic politics will be both magnified and largely justified. In the longer term, the 'oil factor' could thus acquire some of that important causal status, in relation to super-power policy and regional affairs, which it seems not to have occupied in 1973–74. If so, the price of its doing so, not least in terms of Israeli desperation, may turn out to be high.

# FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY: THE DOMESTIC DEBATE

*Marie Claude Smouts*

SINCE the departure of General de Gaulle in 1969, observers have tended to consider the foreign policy of the French government basically with reference to the Gaullist doctrine. The main question over the past seven years seems still to be: continuity or discontinuity? Thus *Le Monde*, when announcing the resignation of Jacques Chirac, put the question of its effect on foreign policy in terms of '*still less Gaullism?* ' This way of stating the question may correspond to a considered methodological procedure,[1] but more often it is merely the expression of the weight of the Gaullist inheritance in the French national consciousness and political life. Under the Presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing perceptible modifications in foreign policy have been introduced. In such important spheres as defence, European policy, international monetary problems, and relations with the United States, an evolution in the practice and philosophy of international relations distinguishes the diplomacy of M. Giscard d'Estaing from that of his predecessors.[2] Moreover it must not be forgotten that the most relentless opponents of General de Gaulle's foreign policy are among the 'presidential majority' and in certain cases, such as M. Lecanuet, are in the government itself.

Nevertheless the internal debate which should accompany that evolution continues to be muffled, indefinite and restricted. Public opinion is chiefly interested in questions immediately affecting employment and the standard of living, and is little aware of the facts of foreign policy. The parties and the parliamentary groups are slow to define a strategy designed to defend their positions in this sphere. The President himself seems hesitant, especially as to whether he should try to mobilise opinion on new foreign policy issues which might bring about a redistribution of existing political cleavages. A vague malaise surrounds diplomacy, but the terms of the debate are blurred and its

[1] *Cf.* Alfred Grosser, 'La politique extérieure française en 1969–70: continuités ou discontinuités', in *L'Univers politique 1969* (Paris: Editions Richelieu, 1970), pp. 167–184.

[2] *Cf.* Marie Claude Smouts, 'Du Gaullisme au néo-atlantisme: les incertitudes françaises', in *Les politiques extérieures européennes dans la crise* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976), pp. 87–113.

possible repercussions difficult to calculate. No question of foreign policy, in fact, can be isolated from the internal political struggle. Every such question is found in a context dominated by three basic facts: (i) the Gaullist heritage and the great emotive power of the idea of national independence; (ii) the peculiar characteristics of the constitution of the Fifth Republic in which presidentialism and parliamentarianism coexist side by side, and thus compel the Head of State to take into account a parliamentary majority not necessarily coinciding with the presidential majority; (iii) the ideological and political division of France into two camps of equal force but in which the cleavages are different according to whether the subject is internal problems or questions relating to Nato, defence and, most of all, Europe. During his first two years as President, M. Giscard d'Estaing has been more concerned to overcome the doubts that his foreign policy might produce, and therefore to avoid a debate on it, than to secure the support necessary for an individual line of his own. The question of elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage might bring the moment of truth, by formulating precisely the elements of a discussion which the information system, sociological considerations, and the complexity of internal political manoeuvrings have hitherto combined to circumscribe rather than organise.

**Diffusion of information and public opinion**

M. Giscard d'Estaing has made frequent references to the importance he attaches to informing the French people about the government's policy. The departure of M. Chirac enabled him at one and the same time to launch a dart at the former prime minister and define his own view: 'What has struck me during the recent period is that, *apart from the explanations I myself provided*, this policy was not clearly understood by French opinion '.[3] The government reshuffle of August 1976 provided the opportunity to reorganise the services responsible for information: each minister is to see to its expansion in his own sector, and the President of the Republic ensures its co-ordination. This wish, publicly recognised, to pass on the government's message more effectively bears witness to the uneasiness existing between the politicians in power and the general public. The conduct of internal affairs does more than foreign policy to foster this uneasiness, but here the explanations provided in 1975 and 1976 have too often resembled corrections or *a posteriori* justifications for the President not to feel the need to resume the initiative. On coming into office M. de Guiringaud stated that one of his first concerns was 'to improve communica-

[3] Television interview, Aug. 25, 1976 (emphasis added).

ns between his Ministry and the public and to explain French reign policy better '.[4] This seems a difficult task when one remembers w the public, the administration, and to a certain extent the press, ve all connived in accepting that foreign policy should remain 'the ng's secret'.

In France, as in a good many other countries, public opinion genery takes little interest in foreign policy except for a few categories persons directly concerned: wine-growers affected by the EEC's ricultural policy, for example, or the heads of firms dealing exports. Now that daily life depends more and more on decisions ken at an international level, the complexity of the subjects treated that level (finance, trade, industrial co-operation, and so on) deflects e public's interest towards more immediate preoccupations. The sence of any burning foreign problem reinforces this indifference. addition, the idea that foreign policy is no concern of the public very widespread. In a general way, in France the feeling that politics a dubious and rather obscure activity is accompanied, paradoxically ough, by a certain respect for the majesty of power. It is therefore sy to concede that 'the high-ups' should keep certain pieces of formation to themselves. (French people's inability to understand an 'air such as Watergate testifies to this ready acceptance of the anoeuvres and secrets which, in their eyes, are an inevitable accomniment of political activity.) Such an attitude means that restrictions information arising from the specific exigencies of foreign policy e readily understood, the need for discretion is recognised, and public inion is relatively unexacting.

Administrative practice in France also helps to make foreign policy mething of a secret domain. The regulations governing public service ipose on the official 'a duty of reserve', an obligation to exercise scretion 'with regard to everything relating to facts and information at he learns through the exercise of, or in the course of exercising, s functions'.[5] The rule of secrecy also affects administrative docuents. (The strict application of these principles inevitably brings its vn problems in a system which, unlike that of the United Kingdom, ves no official standing to the Opposition.) Various reports and draft ws have been drawn up with a view to reforming and giving greater xibility to administrative secrecy, but it is acknowledged that any anges should not apply to national defence and foreign policy.[6]

[4] Television interview, Aug. 31, 1976; *Le Monde*, Sept. 2, 1976.

[5] Regulation of Feb. 5, 1959. *Cf.* comment by Roger-Gérard Schwartzenberg, *Le nde*, March 3, 1976.

[6] See *Report of the Commission on Administrative Co-ordination*, ed. by Documentan française (Paris, 1975), and the draft law presented by a Socialist deputy on June 1976.

This is normal, and is common practice in all countries, including those which, like Sweden or the United States, enjoy the reputation of having a 'transparent administration'[7]: the demands of democracy stop at the point where diplomacy begins. In France, the obvious imperatives of foreign policy are augmented by a cult of secrecy extending throughout the entire administration and developed to the highest degree for questions affecting foreign relations.

A twofold phenomenon reinforces this tendency. The personalisation of foreign policy which characterises the Fifth Republic leads the administration to feel that matters of information appertain to the President of the Republic, the real head of diplomacy, and that it falls to him to decide what should be revealed. But at the same time the logic of interdependence leads the various ministries in France, as in Germany and Britain, to be themselves responsible for the foreign relations necessary to their work. For example, important negotiations relating to industrial co-operation fall outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and are instead conducted by the Ministry of Industry in conjunction with the Prime Minister and the President.[8] Thus whenever foreign relations are involved information is dispersed not only among the Elysée (the Presidency of the Republic), Matignon (the Prime Minister), and the Quai d'Orsay (Foreign Affairs) but also among various ministries which do not have personnel specially trained in press relations and which maintain an ultra-prudent attitude in their relations with the public.

In reply to a written question from a deputy concerning information to the public on France's foreign policy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs answered: 'In daily press conferences the Ministry's spokesman, who is the director of press and information services, explains to the representatives of the French press the meaning of the Foreign Minister's action. In this way, by means of the written or spoken press, the public is to a large extent kept informed about our actions in foreign policy'.[9] In actual fact these daily press conferences are conventional exercises which produce very little. They merely give authorised statements at the most general level which in no way provide the opportunity for a real dialogue with the press. By tacit agreement between the spokesman and the journalists few questions are asked and no explanation beyond what has just been given is expected.

[7] *Cf.* Pierre-François Divier, 'Etats-Unis: l'administration transparente, l'accès des citoyens américains aux documents officiels', *Revue de Droit Public*, January/February 1975, pp. 59–108.

[8] *Cf.* decision of May 5, 1975, to merge the CII (Compagnie Internationale pour l'Informatique—International Data Processing Company) with Honeywell Bull, which upsets both the data processing market in France and the basis of European co-operation in this field.

[9] *Journal Officiel de l'Assemblée Nationale*, April 13, 1974, p. 1607.

In a general way, journalists share the consensus of opinion that the government does not have to give much information about foreign policy and, in any case, not to the general public. They are not in the habit of besieging the Quai d'Orsay and the diplomats. They know that they will not be able to pick up a chance remark or write, like their American colleagues, 'a high official said . . .'. They themselves agree that the style of journalism practised in the United States is much more dynamic and that they are resigned to the lack of communication existing between their own government and the diplomatic press.[10] In practice, three different levels exist: a very general level where information that is hardly more substantial than that provided by press agencies is given by authorised spokesmen in press conferences for public use; an operational level which touches on strategy and really important matters about which no information is given; and a third level which might be termed 'semi-operational'. This is accessible to a small circle of selected journalists chosen for their recognised sense of responsibility; information is given through direct contacts between the government and a limited number of leader-writers who respect implicit but rigorous rules of discretion. In actual fact it is less a question of helping them to inform their readers better than of giving them the background to a diplomatic action or, on occasion, to make use of them in a strategically calculated 'leak'.

Many of the points touched on so far apply equally to information given to members of Parliament. Most members show relatively little interest, are only occasionally exacting, and possess only a limited knowledge of international relations—the result to a great extent of lack of time and the nature of the questions put to them by their constituents. The transmission of information to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly or the Senate is often a pure formality. The information, prepared by services whose aim is to be criticised as little as possible, does not include the whole background. Nor do the replies of ministers and high officials to questions in Parliament go beyond a very general level. Parliamentary information is conveyed elsewhere, in a confidential and restricted way which, in present circumstances, excludes the representatives of the Opposition.

**To inform or to soothe?**

The radio and television networks in France provide an important and good-quality coverage of foreign policy. But, as one of the best published studies on the subject points out, it is 'more like postcard-type news than political information: indeed foreign information

[10] *Cf.* report of a recent meeting between French and American journalists comparing their respective methods, *Le Monde*, May 29, 1976.

involving French relations with another country is treated like information on internal policy, i.e. with all the preliminary precautions . . . French television is good at covering an international event so long, of course, as it has no repercussions on French policy '.[11] A mixture of self-censorship and vulnerability to government pressure enables the spoken and televised news bulletins to avoid embarrassing the government's foreign policy.[12] They transmit official interpretations without discussing them or arousing debate on the subject.

Within the limits already described, the written press is more demanding. Admittedly, no journalist in France at the present moment is capable of mobilising opinion and provoking a debate in Parliament, and newspapers with an editorial policy are rare. It is necessary for questions to be asked in several newspapers at the same time before the President or a minister will consent to explain in public some particular aspect of his policy: the incidents which occurred during the President's visit to the Soviet Union, the proposals made with regard to the Lebanon, and defence policy have been discussed with the press much more at the request of journalists than on the initiative of the minister concerned.

The perplexity that emerges here and there in the diplomatic reports in *Le Monde*, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, *Le Point* or *L'Express* does not seem to have much echo among the public. Opinion polls reflect a satisfaction proportionate to the ignorance displayed. To the question: ' Since the election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, would you say that things are going better or worse as far as France's role in the world is concerned? ', 43 per cent of those questioned say things are better but 42 per cent don't know and 15 per cent think they are worse.[13] When asked, ' In which sphere do you think the Head of State's action has been most effective? ', 36 per cent say in foreign policy but 41 per cent don't know, while 8 per cent think he has been least effective in that sphere.[14]

This relative satisfaction is to be explained as much by the way in which policy is presented as by the way it is practised. The two do not always coincide, since certain constraints prevent the reasons for an action being explained to the public.

[11] Denise Bombardier, *La Voix de la France* (Paris: Laffont, 1975), pp. 209–227. Also, by the same author, *Le traitement de la politique étrangère française dans les journaux télévisés de l'ORTF*, doctoral thesis (Paris: Université de Droit, d'Economie et des Sciences Sociales, June 1974).

[12] On two occasions since 1974 television embarrassed foreign policy, first by transmitting interviews with Jiri Pelikan and Mme. Sakharov during the President's visit to Moscow, which annoyed the Soviet authorities and then by showing a film on Mme. Claustre, who was held by rebels in Chad. On the other hand, a more recent film, shown on television in 1976 in several foreign countries, was prevented from appearing in France.

[13] *France-Soir*, Sept. 19, 1975.

[14] *L'Aurore*, Dec. 15, 1975.

When M. Giscard d'Estaing addresses himself, as he does, to 'Madame, Mademoiselle, Monsieur', he is addressing those 'Françaises, Français' who, ever since 1958, have been told about national independence and the majority of whom approved the 'Gaullist' attitude of Michel Jobert when he alone among his EEC partners said 'no' at the Washington conference on oil in February 1974. The constraint 'which, for the French government, the phraseology of independence represents—lived with as a conviction or submitted to as a fact of domestic policy',[15] is reinforced by the extreme sensitivity of authority to public opinion. The atmosphere of a permanent electoral campaign which prevails in France causes indexes of popularity and manifestations of discontent to be given an importance which is incompatible with any impulse to educate public opinion towards accepting another line from that to which it has been accustomed.

Moreover, on the domestic plane, M. Giscard d'Estaing has been able to measure the narrowness of the social basis of his power and the difficulties to which he would expose himself if, going over the head of the parties, he were to address himself directly to the electorate to secure support for his policy. Elected by 50·7 per cent of the votes, he is even less able than his predecessor was to try openly to remove the multifarious ambiguities surrounding French foreign policy, not the least of which is the way it is presented as if it had no economic background.

The themes which those in responsible positions are most ready to tackle before the public are topics that reassure by demonstrating the continuity and vitality of foreign policy. Defence is presented in such a way that *Le Monde* can print on its front page (May 7, 1976) 'M. Giscard d'Estaing has little to alter in the defence policy of the Fifth Republic'. The possibility of a return to Atlanticism is described as 'foolishness' and not to be thought of, indeed 'the bare idea serves as an alibi for mediocrity of thought'.[16] National independence is reaffirmed, the desire for detente is proclaimed. In this orthodox presentation, the more 'Giscardian' themes are introduced: 'globalisation' and 'conciliation', the North-South dialogue, and the 'new economic world order'. They suggest an active diplomacy, enamoured of peace, conscious of the planetary dimension of problems. And if the word 'rayonnement' has replaced the word 'grandeur', France's presence on the international scene appears assured.

With regard to Europe, the talk is less and more discreet, although the building of Europe is considered a priority. Before opening the

[15] Alfred Grosser in *Les politiques extérieures européennes dans la crise*, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

[16] Television interview, May 5, 1976.

great public debate on European institutions, the President seems t be proceeding tentatively and taking soundings. After the Rome sun mit he devoted two sentences, in a television talk on December 4, 197: to the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, witl out specifying how it would be done and what the consequences woul be, but waiting for the reactions of political circles.

But nothing is said about France's place in the industrial world an the choices in foreign policy with which the world economic cris confronts it. While the economic and financial environment is pr sented as a constraint on domestic affairs, only fleeting references aı made to the influence of interdependence on choices in foreign polic the principles of the EEC's agricultural policy are recalled in order t defend to farmers the attitude adopted in Brussels, the claims of tł Third World are evoked to account for the North-South dialogu the need for concerted effort in the monetary sphere is brought out t justify the Rambouillet meeting—and that is about all. The limits c national independence within the Western world are never defined, a if the effects of internationalising the economy were felt only in tł domestic sphere. On the other hand, foreign policy continues to t presented as independent of domestic choices, and the problem c balancing means and ends is never discussed. The immediate coı sequences of this are twofold: the public is unprepared to accept tł changes, let alone the sacrifices, demanded by the grand designs (i particular with regard to the Third World); and the policies based o the belief that the internal economic and social system must be saf guarded through co-operation with the United States cannot be openl implemented.

To a great extent, the realities of foreign policy are not brougl out in official speeches but can be discovered by reading the economi press. The journalists in this field are among the best informed as result of their relations both with the technical advisers of the Elysé and the ministries and with the business world. Employers' organisatior and management circles have permanent contacts with governmer departments and are well informed about daily internation exchanges. The search for contracts abroad and the various aspects c 'payments diplomacy' call for reciprocal information and regular coı sultation between these circles and the Department of Foreign Trad and the relevant ministerial offices. This obviously raises two point how far these departments are the transmission-line for the goverı ment's foreign policy, and whether the practical results will syı chronise with the aims of the Elysée. But this supports the suppositio that business circles know more about the background of Frenc

foreign policy than the rest of the public and rather agree with it; their reservations concern more the President's domestic policies.

To say that big business inspires foreign policy would be to put the matter badly. The big decisions are taken by the President, a secretive man not given to consulting others, and there are numerous examples of ideas launched by him without first asking the opinion of business circles. But since the start of the financial crisis and the shock of 1971, economic considerations have become of major importance in international relations, and since the oil crisis the aim of foreign policy has been to cover the deficit in foreign trade. The objectives of the government and of leading businessmen coincide on this point and, in particular M. Giscard d'Estaing's three main axes of foreign policy are generally accepted. Business circles are now more satisfied with French policy towards Europe than they were in the time of General de Gaulle and Michel Jobert. Organised as they are for an intra-European trading policy in which the main trading partners are in the EEC and in particular West Germany, they congratulate themselves on the President's wish to strengthen Europe and maintain good relations with Federal Germany. Policy towards the Third World, which encourages the search for markets and opens up the possibility of important contracts, is equally approved, the more so since the practical implications of the new world economic order still lie in the distant future. Lastly, and most important, the reconciliation with the United States, the wish to bury the hatchet and accept, discreetly, a certain degree of Atlanticism, coincides with the widespread conviction among business circles of the need for a closer understanding with American firms. In the spheres of nuclear energy, data processing and aeronautics, French industrial policy seems to be 'completely based on Atlanticism'.[17] Everything goes on as if the government and the industrialists, faced with the need to finance important programmes and the setback to European co-operation, had reached the conclusion that only co-operation with American partners would make possible the penetration of markets across the Atlantic and in the rest of the world. The practical implications of these conclusions for France's situation vis-à-vis the outside world are perceived and disputed only by a few initiates: certain veterans of Gaullism (although a good many industrial decisions were carried out under the government of Jacques Chirac), the trades unions of staffs affected by the new agreements (for example in data processing or aeronautics), and the left-wing opposition parties, but the debate then becomes merged in the great debate on the 'choice of society' which divides the French people.

[17] *Cf.* Jean Boissonnat, 'Néo-Atlantisme', *L'Expansion*, Dec. 1975, p. 3.

Diplomacy, in the traditional sense of the word, is not extensively discussed. It is presented in such a way as to respond to the public's expectations and not to lead it to pronounce an opinion on new options. Its evolution goes on step by step, discernible only to attentive and informed observers. It is really only discussed in political circles, and the debate is closely linked with the evolution of the domestic situation.

**The political debate**

A peculiar feature of the discussion of foreign policy in France is that it brings into confrontation not only the majority and the Opposition but also the components of each, leading to some curious alliances and unusual divisions. In the pre-electoral atmosphere which surrounds debates, the stakes are a good deal higher than the subjects under immediate discussion. The cantonal elections of March 1976 and all the opinion polls have shown that the cleavage dividing France into two has remained unchanged and that voting intentions have not varied. In so far as foreign policy questions may distort cohesion in the two camps, they form the object of an attention whose sole aim is not to define France's place in the world.

The Presidential majority which brought Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to power on May 19, 1974, has not been transformed into a coherent parliamentary majority. It has continued to be a coalition without homogeneity, in which the three main elements [18] do not share the same views or aspirations. In this coalition the Gaullist UDR still holds the predominant position: it has been in power since 1958, it includes some influential and vocal personalities, and, above all, it has 173 out of 490 seats in the National Assembly, which makes it numerically the most important group.[19] In so far as Parliament exercises prerogatives on the subject of foreign policy, the strength of the Gaullist movement represents a constraint which M. Giscard d'Estaing has to take into account. Under the chairmanship of Maurice Couve de Murville, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly is being more active than in the past, and frequent questions are addressed to the minister. In a more general way, since 1973 the number of written questions on foreign policy subjects has been progressively increasing,[20] which indicates an increased vigilance and a desire to exercise parliamentary control.

[18] The coalition consists of the UDR (Union des Démocrates pour la République), Independent Republicans, Centrists and Social Democrats.

[19] The composition of the Assembly as at Dec. 31, 1975 is: UDR, 173; Socialist Party, Left-wing Radicals, 107; Communists, 74; Independent Republicans, 70; Reformists, Centrists and Social Democrats, 52. Total, 490.

[20] Written questions to the Foreign Minister were: 1973, 171; 1974, 183; 1975, 210. Source: *Bulletin de l'Assemblée Nationale*, Statistiques, March 1974–1975–1976.

The Gaullists' criticisms of Giscardian diplomacy are directed less to particular decisions than to the style and general conception. They deplore a lack of coherence, the absence of a guiding line, an over-conciliatory spirit, vain hopes based on Europe, in short a weakening of France's will and of its role on the international scene. These criticisms, often harsh, pronounced in the National Assembly by former ministers of General de Gaulle bear witness to the disarray in which the Gaullist movement may find itself.

In fact, M. Giscard d'Estaing's candidature, and the subsequent obligation to support the presidential policy, have caused some lively tensions within the UDR, and the remaining binding factor in this otherwise seriously divided party continues to be a common philosophy of national defence and foreign policy, the pride of the Fifth Republic. Fidelity to Gaullist principles and regret for a certain style, definable by the art of knowing how to say 'no', lead certain of its members to adopt an attitude which M. Lecanuet has described as 'Gaullist fixation' and which consists of 'constantly estimating the policy of the President of the Republic in the sphere of reforms, his defence policy and his diplomacy, by reference to the past, and in particular to attitudes which could have been those of General de Gaulle'.[21] But this behaviour belongs more to some personalities who held positions of responsibility under the presidency of General de Gaulle or of Georges Pompidou than to the party's executive. Despite its ability to make or unmake the majority, the UDR has only a limited margin of manoeuvre, permitting it to lead a little parliamentary *fronde* and to touch up the texts of laws, but not to pursue an open struggle with an established government unless it is prepared to accept the risk of a dissolution and a crisis of the regime. M. Chirac, then Prime Minister, explained to UDR deputies in June 1976, à propos of the proposal to impose a tax on increments: 'It is necessary that you should understand that the struggle has shifted on the political ground and that a systematically negative behaviour would be fatal and suicidal'.[22] Would the same apply to foreign policy?

Discussion of the government's foreign policy in parliamentary debates has continued to be very general, abstract, and, according to participants, rather colourless despite the Gaullists' criticisms and the multiplication of instances where Opposition deputies have pointed to the slide towards Atlanticism and denounced the inadequacy of official explanations. On the other hand, two subjects always provoke lively reactions and are liable to create divisions in the Opposition and

[21] July 30, 1976; *Le Monde*, Aug. 1-2, 1976.
[22] June 16, 1976; *Le Monde*, June 18, 1976.

a serious crisis in the majority: national defence and the European alliance.

In these two spheres M. Giscard d'Estaing seems to want to modify certain earlier choices but without losing sight of the need to preserve UDR support and avoid shocking public opinion. Here the management of the debate on military policy represents a certain success, obtained by a mixture of ambiguity and firmness, or reassuring comments and invitations to be silent. The new defence policy, certain aspects of which had been revealed on television by the President himself (November 12, 1975, May 5, 1976), was described in less detail in the parliamentary debate on the five-year military plan 1977–82 than in the publication, a few days later, of the statement of the chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff and a speech by M. Giscard d'Estaing.[23] It includes a certain number of points that disturb the Gaullists: the desire to reinforce conventional arms and discard the nuclear 'all or nothing' theory, the idea of an 'enlarged sanctuarisation' (as opposed to the 'sanctuarisation' of the national territory alone) involving the hypothesis that French troops could take part in the 'forward battle' and be enlisted in times of crisis side by side with their allies for the protection of the eastern frontier of Federal Germany. Despite repeated declarations from the President and the Defence Minister that there was no change in France's defence policy, certain Gaullists have voiced lively criticisms with regard to a strategy that 'implies so close a co-operation with Nato that it almost amounts to integration',[24] and have uttered warnings about the slowing-down of the nuclear effort and the weakening of the French deterrent.[25]

The new orientations of French military policy, raising clearly the problem of France's relations with Nato, about which there had been a number of ambiguities since 1966, and underlining the limitations of the nuclear deterrent in the face of 'regional and world destabilisation', have caused a lively discussion in political circles and a deep disquiet within the UDR. The basic principles of the Gaullist doctrine to which it harks back seem to have been put in doubt in a way that threatens the whole foundation of the movement's cohesion and unity.

[23] The law on the military plan was passed on May 26, 1976. The statements made in March 1976 by General Méry were published in *Défense Nationale*, June 1976. The Head of State's address to civilian and military students at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale was given on June 1, 1976, and published next day (full text in *Défense Nationale*, July 1976). On that occasion the President recalled, making it his own, a saying of Louis XV at the battle of Fontenoy: 'Gentlemen, I ask you to be silent. The battle plan has been drawn up, the commander is appointed. It is for him to conduct the action'.

[24] M. Messmer, former Defence Minister and Prime Minister, on television, June 9, 1976 (he had stated to *Le Monde*, June 11, 1976, that it was 'a jump backwards of ten years in French military thinking'). Michel Debré expressed similar fears in the course of the same broadcast.

[25] Gaston Palewski, former minister under de Gaulle, *Le Monde*, June 4, 1976.

Nevertheless, and not without reason, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing can congratulate himself that the law on the military plan was adopted on March 26, 1976, ' by one of the biggest majorities every registered: 303 votes, in other words the whole number of votes that could be counted on to support such a decision '. In the course of the parliamentary debate, several deputies from the majority had shown anxiety about the imprecision of governmental undertakings and expressed their fears concerning the evolution of the doctrine of the use of the armed forces. These doubts and uncertainties did not prevent the UDR deputies from voting expenditure allocations for six years, thus providing the means to carry on a defence policy whose lack of precision they deplored. If one compares this attitude with the zeal these deputies brought to bear to modify the government's text on increments, discussed at the same time, one may conclude that the President has won some points and gained some time. To avoid a breakdown of the majority, the two sides maintain the fiction that, since the French forces remain outside the integrated Nato command and the nuclear effort, though slowed down, still goes on, nothing is changed in defence policy or in the foreign policy it has to serve. Such ambiguities increase the element of contention between the UDR and the President and lend fuel to a conflict which only electoral considerations prevent from breaking out.[26]

The Gaullists' disquiet is not without its repercussions on the internal tactics of the left-wing parties. The most ' Gaullist ' of them proves to be the Communist Party (PCF) which, less reserved than most of the UDR deputies, denounces ' the successive abandonments of sovereignty ', regularly deplores that ' not much is left of the foreign policy laid down and carried out by General de Gaulle ', and presents Giscardian policy as ' an undertaking to dismantle national independence '. After having confirmed at its 22nd congress the watchword ' union of the people of France ' and resoundingly proclaimed that ' everything that is national is ours ', the PCF pursues its policy of extending a hand towards the Gaullists. On the day when the UDR published an embarrassed communiqué the PCF launched ' un appel solennel à tous les Français et Françaises ' in these terms: ' . . . It is no longer possible for men and women who have remained faithful to what General de Gaulle's foreign policy signified in terms of attachment to French independence to allow themselves to be misled. In

[26] The communiqué published by the UDR's executive office after General Méry's article and the President's speech bears witness to its embarrassment: it recalls that priority must be given to national defence and consequently to deterrence; that absolute priority does not exclude participation if need be in Western and European security within the framework of the alliance but ' notes the government's recent declarations affirming that there had been no change in our defence policy ' and ' intends to remain vigilant about this fundamental matter '. Published in *Le Monde*, June 5, 1976, p. 11.

this march towards surrender, the responsibility of the UDR, which has rallied and submitted to the Giscardian-Centrist coalition, is overwhelming '.[27]

The Socialist Party adopts a less forthright position. One of its best-known experts on defence matters considers that ' the discussion going on within the majority assumes the character of a settlement of accounts', and that in any case 'neither de Gaulle nor Georges Pompidou had in actual fact quitted the Atlantic alliance'.[28] This reserve, for which the party was reproached by its partner in the Union of the Left reflects the different appreciations of the Gaullist phenomenon and the policy to be adopted towards it that are found among the various trends in the Socialist Party. It also arises from some uncertainties within the Socialist Party about the definition of foreign policy and defence policy, two points which, incidentally, are among the least clear in the common programme of the Left. While acceptance of the nuclear deterrent seems to be assured, the partners are not in agreement either about the role of the armed forces (national defence or European defence?) or about France's relations with the Atlantic Alliance, a subject on which the Communist Party asked in June 1976 that negotiations should be renewed. But the awkward point for the Union of the Left continues to be, above all, European policy, and the different attitudes adopted by the Socialist Party and the PCF towards elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage are an illustration of this.

In accepting the principle of that election M. Giscard d'Estaing has resurrected a twenty-year-old debate which revives the divisions that emerged under the Fourth Republic in relation to the European Defence Community, but which do not correspond to the present-day cleavage between majority and Opposition. The Communist Party, the ' historic ' Gaullists and a minority faction in the Socialist Party are opposed to the idea. The Independent Republicans, Centrists, Reformists and Radicals have pronounced in its favour, as also have the left-wing Radicals and the majority of the Socialist Party with, in the last case, one condition: that the European Parliament should be elected by direct universal suffrage under proportional representation, and that Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome, envisaging the election ' according to a uniform procedure in all the member States ', should be respected. The UDR is divided between those of its members who remain sensitive to the arguments of Michel Debré or Alexandre Sanguinetti (who calls for a ' new resistance ') and those who, like

[27] June 4, 1976; *Le Monde*, June 6–7, 1976.

[28] Charles Hernu, ' Une querelle qui n'est pas la nôtre ', *L'Unité*, June 11, 1976, pp. 3–6.

Olivier Guichard, Minister of Justice and president of the Movement for European Independence, have pronounced themselves in favour of this election but on certain conditions.

However sincere the President of the Republic may be in his desire to relaunch Europe by means of its institutions, these lines of division within the political forces are too complex for him not to be tempted to utilise the situation for domestic ends, the more so since 1978 will also be a general election year in France. Ever since the beginning of his seven-year term of office he has expressd the wish to 'govern at the centre' and has never found the opportunity to do so. Around the building of Europe, he might be tempted to launch a great operation aiming to bring together public opinion on a truly Giscardian theme, Europe, to divide the Left and break the UDR. The disappointing results obtained by Georges Pompidou in a similar attempt in 1972 have shown the difficulty of this kind of step. Probably the two parties embarrassed by the question of the European Parliament, the UDR and the Socialist Party, will avoid adopting a definite stand by shifting the debate on to procedural grounds.

While President Giscard d'Estaing may enjoy greater latitude than is supposed in the conduct of foreign policy, he nevertheless remains in a position of 'supervised liberty' on the subject. Thus new orientations that are liable to prove contentious are presented as trial balloons which cause the debate to be resumed on a piecemeal basis but prevent a full discussion of the issues. From this develops a feeling of confusion. French political forces, with the possible exception of the Communist Party, take part in this game, which enables them to avoid defining clearly the means and consequences of a national independence that all demand. The controversy is carried on basically over domestic questions, with preoccupations of foreign policy serving as counterpoint to the fundamental debate on the nature, structural or short-term, of the crisis.

# TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST ARMS CONTROL

*Richard Burt*

THE primary focus of interest and governmental energy in East-West arms control is now directed towards two parallel sets of negotiations—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the so-called Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) talks.[1] Despite the important differences between SALT and MFR, both are dedicated to reaching mutual arrangements in which quantitative constraints, in the form of numerical ceilings, are placed on the forces of the respective participants in the negotiations.[2] In the early 1970s, this approach appeared to enjoy a real chance of success. The SALT dialogue, which began in late 1969, produced agreements constraining the deployment of both offensive and defensive strategic forces two-and-a-half years later.[3] While optimism over the prospects of MFR was more restrained, the very fact that negotiations got underway in 1973 was viewed by many as a significant breakthrough in reducing tension in Europe. Wittingly or unwittingly, the SALT and MFR processes came to serve as the foundation for East-West detente diplomacy during the first half of the decade.

Yet a powerful sense of gloom now pervades analyses of the future prospects of East-West arms control—at least in the West. While

[1] The full title of the talks is 'Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe'. The shortened form, Mutual Forces Reductions (MFR), is more convenient and will be used here. Western governments prefer the acronym MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction).

[2] SALT, of course, is a bilateral dialogue between the two super-powers. The nations participating in the Vienna talks, on the Western side, include the United States, Canada, Britain, West Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. On the Eastern side, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland are participants. The remaining Nato and Warsaw Pact states function as observers in the talks.

[3] The 1972 SALT accords consisted of a treaty limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and a five-year 'interim' agreement constraining the size of land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces. The ABM Treaty restricted ABM deployment to two sites with a maximum of 100 launchers each. (This was amended in 1974 to restrict ABM deployment to one site with 100 launchers.) The Interim Agreement placed ceilings on existing numbers of land-based missiles and set limits on the maximum numbers of sea-launched missiles and missile submarines that each side could deploy. For the texts and a useful commentary on these agreements, see Hedley Bull, *The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation* (Canberra: Australian National University Press for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1973; Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence 15).

officials continue to emphasise the central importance of arms control in working towards less antagonistic bloc and super-power relations, their statements contain hints that the search for agreement has become unexpectedly difficult.[4] The analyses of private observers are less reserved and far more pessimistic. In part, this is due to lack of substantial progress at MFR and, perhaps more important, the difficulties encountered by the United States and the Soviet Union in attempting to iron out the details of the guidelines of a new SALT accord agreed to at the Vladivostock summit in November 1974. But questions of a more fundamental sort have clearly contributed to the pessimism over the future of SALT and MFR. These are less concerned with the problem of getting agreements than making sure that the content of new accords actually serve the interests of arms control. Some argue that the 1972 SALT agreements do not really constitute a triumph for arms control, but that the accords have only served to increase mutual insecurity and legitimate arms competition.[5] Others contend that SALT and MFR threaten specifically Western security interests, because the terms of past or potential accords have or could create important asymmetries in military capability.[6] Others argue that the wider detente relationship that in the recent past supported the SALT and MFR experiments has been severely weakened by domestic and international developments—the Angolan episode, the American presidential elections—and that neither side now possesses the political will necessary to work out difficult arms control problems.[7] Still others defend earlier agreements and the existing processes, but complain that arms control has been 'over-sold' to Western public opinion, thus creating unreal expectations which governments have been unable to meet.[8]

These explanations are all, to a varying degree, plausible but they obscure what is probably the most important obstacle to progress in arms control in the longer term—new developments in weapons tech-

[4] See 'Arms Control in an Election Year', speech on April 26, 1976, by Fred C. Ikle, reprinted in *Survival*, July/Aug. 1976, pp. 177–179.

[5] This has been a constant complaint of more liberal critics of the SALT process. For a concise presentation of this view see *Strategic Arms Limitation Part II: The SALT Agreements and the Future of the Arms Race* (SIPRI Research Report no. 6) (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell; New York: Humanities Press, 1972) and Bernard T. Field, 'What's Wrong with SALT?' *Arms Control Today* (Washington: The Arms Control Association, Dec. 1975).

[6] The most articulate proponent of this view for SALT is Paul Nitze. See 'Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1976, pp. 207–232. Jeffrey Record has argued along similar lines in criticising proposals at MFR. See 'Imbalanced Force Reductions', *International Herald Tribune*, Feb. 25, 1976.

[7] See section on 'The Super-Powers' in *Strategic Survey 1975* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)), 1976, p. 50.

[8] See Gerard C. Smith, 'SALT after Vladivostok', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, 1975, pp. 7–18 and Alton Frye, 'Kissinger and Arms Limitation', *Washington Post*, Aug. 17, 1974.

nology. By offering states a new range of interesting, and perhaps important, military capabilities for the 1980s, technological developments have more than simply introduced new complications into negotiation processes. The thesis that will be developed here is that the impact of new military technologies on the existing framework of East-West arms control runs far deeper: systems such as precision-guided cruise missiles and remotely-piloted vehicles (RPV) threaten the central assumptions underlying the processes of both SALT and MFR; and that unless a serious effort is made to examine ways of 'restructuring' East-West arms control, the various doomsavers for SALT and MFR may well be proved correct. Over the coming decade, technology will not only inject new uncertainties into the search for agreements, but if SALT and MFR agreements are reached, technology promises to make them irrelevant, at best, and counter-productive, at worst, to the task of enhancing military stability between East and West.

**The problems posed by technology**

To grasp the nature of the challenge that technology poses for the existing framework of arms control, it is first necessary to describe briefly what observers have begun to describe as the 'qualitative revolution' now going on in weapons performance.[9] Developments in advanced guidance, propulsion systems, nuclear and non-nuclear warheads and command and control capabilities are now being actively exploited in the West and the Soviet Union in the design of new classes of shorter-range missile systems for use on the battlefield as well as longer-range missiles capable of strategic strikes. When compared with the weapons they are beginning to replace, these new systems offer greater accuracy, longer ranges, smaller size, greater destructiveness (but less unwanted damage) and they are more easily launched and transported.[10] These qualities, in addition to relatively low procurement and maintenance costs, make it highly likely that nations will move quickly to deploy this new generation of weapons, especially when these systems appear to open up a variety of new military options.

[9] See statement attributed to Malcolm Currie, the US Defence Department's Director for Research and Engineering in Phil Stanford, 'The automated battlefield', *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb 23, 1975, p. 12.

[10] Probably the best sources of information on new weapons development and design are the aerospace trade and technical journals such as *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, *Flight International* and *International Defence Review* (see especially 'World Missile Yearbook', *Flight International*, May 29, 1976). For a useful inventory of new weapons under development, see Appendix A in *The Other Arms Race*, edited by Geoffrey Kemp *et al.* (Lexington, Mass., Farnborough: Heath, 1976), pp. 151–190.

This is not the place to examine these options in detail, but it should be noted that the potential performance characteristics of many of the new systems will provide some compelling arguments for procuring them in large numbers. The widespread deployment of advanced anti-tank and defence missiles, for instance, could improve Nato's defensive capacity against an armoured attack by the Warsaw Pact.[11] Highly accurate missiles and remotely-piloted vehicles, meanwhile, could become cost-effective alternatives to carrier-borne or land-based tactical aircraft in Europe.[12] Longer-range cruise missiles, moreover, launched from 'stand-off' aircraft or submarines could be more efficient in a strategic role than manned bombers or even ballistic missiles. At the same time, a new class of conventional munitions, such as fuel-air explosives, might be used in roles that are now assigned to nuclear weapons.[13] Taken together, the new weapons technologies have raised a host of military possibilities whose implications for military mission performance, deterrence (above and below the nuclear threshold) and the structure of forces, promise to be profound.

If the two super-powers and their allies move rapidly to develop and deploy these systems, their impact on SALT and MFR will be equally profound. Specifically, five propositions can be offered in support of the general argument that technological developments promise to make new agreements more difficult to negotiate and less relevant to the objectives sought for them:

**Proposition 1:** *By injecting new uncertainties into projections of the future shape and effectiveness of military forces, technological developments will make both sides hesitate to limit new, but untested, options and reluctant to enter into long-term arrangements whose military implications could change over time.* Technological innovation is a central feature of the East-West military relationship. As a result, new technologies are bound to frustrate arms control arrangements which are designed, at the minimum, to reduce uncertainties over the future shape of adversary military forces by 'freezing' existing military relationships. As the American and Soviet experience over early efforts to limit the deployment of multiple independently-

[11] See James F. Digby's arguments in 'Precision-Guided Weapons', *Adelphi Paper 118* (London: IISS, Summer 1975), pp. 8–10.

[12] Richard Garwin, 'Technology and US Force Design', (unpublished paper, May 1972), and Jonathan Medalia, 'Policy Implications of Remotely Piloted Vehicles' (unpublished paper, Sept. 1975).

[13] Fuel-air explosives disburse volatile substances over target areas which are then ignited by an explosive. See Ivan Hudson, 'Promises of Technology', in *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence*: New Aims, New Arms, edited by Johan Holst and Uwe Nerlich (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976).

targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) suggests, governments are generally unwilling to place constraints on an ' attractive ' new technology until they understand its operational potential and have actually demonstrated a capacity to exploit it.

In terms of simple efficiency, MIRV appealed to an American defence establishment interested, in the late 1960s, in improving the capabilities of land and sea-based missiles without having to procure additional launchers; the Soviet Union, for its part, did not appear interested in controls on MIRV until it had acquired the technology.[14] But the MIRV case does not merely serve to underline the complications that American technological ' enthusiasm ' and Soviet technological ' paranoia ' inject into arms control considerations. For the most important effect of American and Soviet MIRV deployment during the 1970s has been to raise questions over the future survivability of land-based missiles in both countries—a problem that was ironically reinforced by the rigidities introduced into force planning by the 1972 SALT Interim Agreement on offensive missiles. By placing separate ceilings on the numbers of land-based and submarine-launched missiles that each side could deploy, the Interim Agreement essentially ruled out the possibility of either side reducing substantial numbers of land-based missiles and replacing them with missile submarines, an option that many observers supported on the grounds that land-based missiles would become increasingly vulnerable to attack by MIRVed missiles.[15] Another possible solution to the problem of land-based missile vulnerability—the deployment of mobile, land-based missiles—was also effectively ruled out by the 1972 SALT accords because of the difficulty of monitoring an agreement that allowed their deployment.[16] The combined effect of MIRV deployment and the 1972 Interim Agreement, then, was to accentuate the problem of land-based missile vulnerability and preclude a technological solution to it. In this case, the short-term advantages of obtaining an agreement

[14] For a comprehensive history of the American MIRV programme, and particularly the role that cost-effectiveness criteria had on the decision to procure MIRV, see Ted Greenwood, *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger for the Program for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1975).

[15] This idea was particularly popular with the American arms control community in the early 1970s. See the ' alternative ' defence posture presented by Sen. George McGovern, *Congressional Record*, Jan. 24, 1972. It should be noted, however, that the terms of the Interim Agreement did provide for the limited substitution of SLBM for older ICBM. In the American case, the 54 Titan 2 could be retired for SLBM, while the Soviet Union was allowed to phase out some 210 SS-7/8 ICBM for new SLBM. The United States subsequently announced that this course would not be followed. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has begun to exercise its replacement option.

[16] The deployment of mobile ICBM was not specifically prohibited by the 1972 SALT accords, but in a unilateral statement released with the agreements, the United States declared mobile ICBM procurement to be ' inconsistent with the objectives ' of ' more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms '.

appear to have run counter to the 'intrinsic' arms control objective of bolstering deterrence through ensuring strategic survivability. This curious situation was ameliorated somewhat by the 1974 Vladivostok guidelines, which provided for an aggregate ceiling on launchers (with the 'freedom to mix' land and sea-based missile and bomber forces) and permitted the deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). But the Vladivostok solution comes at the expense of other problems—creating asymmetries in force structure and meeting verification requirements—that are examined in propositions 2 and 3 below.

Arms control limitations may not only impede technological solutions to unforeseen strategic problems, but they may also serve to rule out potential financial savings that could accrue from the exploitation of new technologies. The United States is, at present, planning to procure a fleet of B-1 strategic bombers at an estimated ten-year investment and operating cost of over $70 billion.[17] One independent study of the B-1 programme has suggested that $15 billion of these costs could be saved by deploying a force of less sophisticated aircraft armed with long-range cruise missiles; under this scheme, the aircraft would 'stand-off' from heavily defended Soviet air space and deliver these air-breathing, subsonic drones.[18] A new SALT agreement, however, that restricted the range or numbers of cruise missiles that could be deployed in this mode (or banned them altogether), would foreclose this option. At MFR, a similar situation could result from an agreement which restricted the use of cruise missiles or RPV for roles that are now currently assigned to aircraft; a new class of tactical missiles may come to possess important cost advantages over manned aircraft and they might also be less vulnerable to attack (thus reducing pressures for pre-emption in a European conflict). Freezing the existing situation in Central Europe would thus appear to run counter to interests of both economy and stability. Of course, not all new technologies offer intriguing solutions to military or budgetary problems, but while the potential of systems like highly accurate cruise missiles or RPV remains unclear, there will be an understandable reluctance on the part of governments to sacrifice interesting technological options.

Uncertainties over the potential of new technologies can also affect the calculation of arms control preferences. In December 1975, Nato negotiators at MFR proposed to reduce the American nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe as well as limit numbers of European-based delivery vehicles in return for a preferential Soviet reduction

[17] This is an estimate made by Alton Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood in *Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 23–28.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

of European-based tanks. This so-called 'tanks for nukes' offer was based essentially on the assumption that for the foreseeable future Warsaw Pact superiority in armoured forces would constitute the most troubling aspect of the European military balance. But as we have seen, a new generation of Western anti-tank systems might substantially reduce the threat posed by Pact armour. The likelihood that this will happpen depends on several factors, questions which are unlikely to be resolved before the end of the decade.[19] In the meantime, uncertainty over the value of armoured forces will be mirrored in uncertainty over the place of these systems in arms control negotiations. In raising questions over the long-term role and effectiveness of specific military forces, new technologies act to alter the 'unit of account' of systems in agreements that seek broad limits on mixed classes of weaponry.

**Proposition 2:** *The asymmetrical acquisition of new systems will exacerbate existing differences in the military balance, while even the balanced acquisition of new weapons could, in some cases, accentuate such built-in asymmetries as geography and distance.* As the issue of Soviet tanks in Central Europe suggests, the problem of asymmetries—in forces, in doctrine, geography and even political systems—has long been recognised as a fundamental obstacle to arms control. In the 1972 SALT agreements, it was surmounted by focusing only on those systems (anti-ballistic missiles, ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)) that allowed for some rough measures of comparison. Inter-continental-range ballistic missiles downgraded differences in geography and distance. While these differences were more striking in the case of SLBM, American advantages in the deployment of submarines (easier access to ocean-operating areas and forward bases) were compensated for in the Interim Agreement by allowing the Soviet Union to deploy a larger number of systems.[20] There was also some degree of rough comparability within the specific categories of systems covered by the Interim Agreement: possessing sixteen launch tubes each, American *Polaris* missile boats could be generally equated with Soviet Y-class submarines. Similarly, the mainstay of the Soviet land-based missile force, the SS-11, could be compared, in size and payload capabilities, to its counterpart in the United States, the

[19] While the procurement of new anti-tank weapons should enhance Nato capabilities against existing Soviet forces, the Soviet army appears to be actively discussing ways to counter their widespread deployment in the West. See Philip A. Karber, 'The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate', *Survival*, May/June 1976, pp. 105–111.

[20] Under the terms of the Interim Agreement, the Soviet Union was allowed to deploy a maximum of 950 SLBM, while the United States was restricted to a maximum of 710.

*Minuteman*. At the Vladivostok summit, the desire to maintain a rough comparability of forces—as a means of arriving at a mutually acceptable definition of parity—led to agreement on a mutual ceiling of 2,400 for launcher vehicles, under which the Soviet and American 'triads' of ICBM, SLBM and long-range bombers would be included. As technology evolves, however, the emphasis placed on symmetrical force size and posture may become increasingly irrelevant as gross and relatively simple comparisons of the sort described above no longer facilitate meaningful measures of effectiveness.

This seems true for two reasons. First, improvements in missile accuracy, propulsion and warheads will make it increasingly difficult to measure relative capabilities in terms of launcher or warhead numbers: manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MaRV) will possess far greater destructive potential (against point targets such as missile silos) than less accurate warheads of similar yield, while developments in propellants, launching techniques and warhead miniaturisation will enable missiles to deliver larger payloads without large increases in size. This means that older and newer-generation systems may still 'look' the same, but, in fact, will be quite different.

A second, and perhaps more daunting problem, stems from the fact that technology is not being exploited by Western states and the Soviet Union in the same way. In the strategic area, both sides are moving to modernise their ICBM forces, but in the American case, the emphasis is placed on improving the accuracy of existing systems, while the Soviet Union has chosen to deploy a new generation of large, high-payload missiles. In the longer term, American forces could consist primarily of missile-equipped submarines and aircraft, while for various reasons (not least the fact that a new generation of ICBM is now undergoing deployment), the Soviet Union is likely to continue to emphasise the ICBM component of its forces. While an evolution of this sort is compatible with the Vladivostok formula of an aggregate ceiling for launchers, problems will arise from a situation where observers on both sides will be tempted to criticise arms control arrangements that appear to leave the adversary force superior in one or another index of strategic capability.[21] As the strategic forces of the two sides increasingly diverge, agreements will increasingly appear to be comparing 'apples and oranges'.[22]

[21] This was evidenced in the comments that followed the signing of the Vladivostok *aide mémoire* in 1974, which did not limit the modernisation of Soviet ICBM forces and thus provided the Soviet Union with a potential long-term advantage in missile payload. The Vladivostok arrangement also did not curb improvements in missile accuracy, which, for the Soviet Union, is a prime source for concern.

[22] Under the Vladivostok 'freedom of mix formula', long-range bombers, with thousands of pounds of payload, will be treated on equivalent terms with small-payload ICBM. In similar fashion, 'heavy' ICBM, like the Soviet SS-18, will be equated with relatively small-payload SLBM.

New systems will not only create new differences between forces, but tend to heighten existing ones. Unlike ballistic missiles, whose penetration to target is 'guaranteed' by the 1972 ABM Treaty, lower and slower-flying cruise missiles must engage air defence systems, a sector in which the Soviet Union possesses distinct advantages.[23] The widespread deployment of cruise missiles will also re-emphasise differences of geography and distance in strategic calculations.[24]

Taken together, a new class of intermediate-range missiles and aircraft will also highlight the most politically salient geographical factor in the East-West military relationship—the fact that regional nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe possess ranges that enable them to be used against the Soviet homeland, while those deployed in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union are generally unable to target the United States. This enables the Soviet Union, as the experience at SALT with forward-based systems (FBS) indicates, to argue that Western regional nuclear weapons should be limited at the super-power level while those deployed in the East must be left out of the negotiations. The implications of this argument for the creation of a 'hostage-sanctuary' relationship between Western Europe and the Soviet Union will be examined in greater detail below, but here it is sufficient to note that as new regional weapons like cruise missiles, the Soviet *Backfire* bomber and the Soviet intermediate-range SS-X-20 ballistic missile become more important components of the forces of the two sides, the problem of reconciling inherent differences stemming from geography will grow more severe.

**Proposition 3:** *The small size and high mobility of new weapons systems, as well as the diversity of launch platforms available for their launch, will severely test the effectiveness of unobtrusive methods of monitoring compliance.* If one precondition for success in recent approaches to arms control has been the ability to compare forces, another has been the ability to monitor agreements that limit their numbers. Despite the growing effectiveness of satellite reconnaissance and other unobtrusive means of intelligence-gathering, capabilities

[23] American continental air defences are being downgraded and at present consist of a small number of interceptor aircraft. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, must respond to threats from the air emanating from Western Europe. As a result, active air defence forces include about 2,500 interceptors and 12,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers. See *The Military Balance 1975–1976* (London: IISS, 1975), p. 8.

[24] Because American and European targets lie closer to coastlines and are more accessible by sea, intermediate-range cruise missiles deployed by Soviet naval vessels will be able to target a higher percentage of urban and industrial assets of their Western counterparts. See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. and Jacquelyn K. Davis, *SALT II: Promise or Precipice?* (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976), p. 24. Against this Soviet advantage must be weighed the fact that Western naval forces have easier access to ocean-operating areas.

for verification are now being challenged by new methods of launching, transporting and deploying weapons. In the 1972 SALT Interim Agreement, verification requirements were met by constraining missile 'launchers' (ICBM silos and submarine launch tubes that could be identified and counted from satellites) rather than the actual missiles. But the development of mobile ICBM systems and the development of new silo-launching techniques for fixed-site ICBM will complicate the launcher-missile equation. Reconnaissance systems will be hard pressed to keep track of mobile forces, while the development of so-called 'cold-launch' techniques for silo-based missiles could enable single silos to launch several missiles in short periods.[25] With cruise missiles, the launcher-missile equation breaks down altogether. Not only can a single aircraft, submarine or surface platform carry and launch several of these systems, but cruise missiles can be accommodated aboard a wide range of aircraft, naval vessels and land launchers. Even if the decision were taken to restrict the deployment of cruise missiles to specific categories of launchers, the small relative size of these systems (15 to 20 feet in length) means that these provisions could be evaded without much difficulty. At MFR, verification problems are even more severe, particularly in the case of potential agreements that envisage small initial reductions in numbers of troops and equipment.[26] As new categories of forces are introduced into mixed package arrangements, ensuring compliance becomes additionally complicated, especially when only small initial cuts in equipment numbers is envisaged.[27] The debate during 1975 over alleged Soviet violations of the SALT Interim Agreement serves as a reminder that all arms control regimes must live with ambiguity. But as verification requirements are stretched to encompass a new generation of weaponry, the resultant ambiguity may no longer be politically tolerable.

**Proposition 4:** *The deployment of a new class of multi-role delivery vehicles, able to perform both tactical and strategic missions, will make it progressively more difficult to identify a class of weapons in*

[25] Cold-launch silos eject an ICBM by means of low-pressure gas before the missile's motor is ignited (the same principle used to launch SLBM).

[26] The first stage reductions of forces under discussion at MFR could result in less than 30,000 troops being withdrawn from the Western portion of the 'central guidelines area'. Reductions on a small scale are likely to tax verification capabilities, and the political implications of erecting an inspection system in Central Europe has become a source of concern for Nato authorities, see *Atlantic News*, No. 777, Nov. 19, 1975, p. 2.

[27] The Nato proposal that American tactical nuclear weapons should be included with American manpower cuts in a first phase MFR agreement (in exchange for Soviet reductions of manpower and tanks) reportedly called for the reduction of only 90 nuclear-capable delivery vehicles: 54 F-4 aircraft and 36 *Pershing* tactical ballistic missiles. See *Strategic Survey 1975*, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

*terms of their function, thus confounding efforts to separate super-power and regional arms control concerns.* Both SALT and MFR are directed towards placing quantitative limits on forces, but they differ in the way that the boundaries for agreement are defined. As a *functional* (or mission)-bounded arms control exercise, SALT is organised to limit a specific class of armaments—American and Soviet 'strategic' weapons. Yet the boundary between strategic forces and other weapons has never been clearly drawn and depends, for the most part, on visible differences between weapons procured for strategic missions and those deployed for tactical roles. For most of the postwar era, developments in technology facilitated the categorisation of weapons in terms of the roles they could perform. The relative inaccuracy and cost of early ICBM, for example, made inter-continental-range missiles only suitable for missions against strategic targets in the homeland of the adversary. But military technology no longer allows function to coincide with form: while new technologies are allowing older systems to take on new roles, a new generation of advanced missiles and aircraft are capable of performing a wider spectrum of roles, ranging from shorter-range non-nuclear missions to intercontinental-range nuclear bombardment. Increasingly, then, strategic arms cannot be said to comprise a readily definable class of weaponry. In theory, this means that the functional categorisation of weaponry will have declining utility as an organising principle for arms control. In practice, this means that controls placed on strategic capabilities of the super-powers are bound to limit their capabilities to carry out other military tasks.

The prospect that the outcome at SALT will affect military capabilities below the strategic threshold, raises a different set of problems than those described in Proposition 1, where the requirements for successful negotiations were seen, in certain cases, to clash with attractive new options; these might simply be rejected on the grounds that the political costs of deploying a new technology outweigh their projected financial or military benefits. For example, a strong argument against deploying mobile ICBM has been that this would complicate verification tasks, despite the fact that mobility for missiles would decrease their vulnerability to attack. But arguments of this sort assume that trade-offs between military options and objectives at SALT can be confined to the American-Soviet strategic relationship. Controls placed on a new class of multi-purpose weapons at SALT will not only limit their strategic effectiveness, but could also influence how they will be exploited for tactical roles. Thus, decisions reflecting strategic preoccupations could well have important consequences for the theatre military balance in Europe and Asia. The gravity of this

problem was vividly demonstrated in negotiations at SALT during 1975 by the inability to incorporate the Soviet *Backfire* bomber and the American cruise missile into a new agreement. Attempts to limit numbers of the new bomber were resisted by the Soviet Union on the grounds that it was not being procured for use against the United States, but for regional contingencies.[28] The cruise missile issue was more complex because the United States is planning to deploy both 'tactical' and 'strategic' versions of the system.[29] But like the *Backfire*, the cruise missile poses a special dilemma for the super-powers. Because the widespread deployment of these systems threatens to alter the strategic balance, each side has placed a high priority on bringing new weapons under SALT controls. At the same time, neither side appears willing or able to accept the consequences of using the vehicle of SALT to foreclose potentially important tactical military options.

The growing artificiality of strategic-tactical distinctions between weaponry raises critical problems not only for SALT, but also for efforts to co-ordinate the SALT process with the negotiations over troop reductions in Europe. With potentially tactical systems (cruise missiles) under discussion at SALT and potentially strategic systems (forward-based aircraft) now under discussion at MFR, the jurisdictional boundaries of the two major East-West arms-control institutions appear to be disintegrating. Because the boundaries of MFR are not defined in functional terms but are geographical in character, the

[28] As of July 1976, the Soviet Union was reported to have deployed 60 *Backfire*, all of which possessed refuelling equipment and thus possessed the capability, in theory, to strike targets at intercontinental ranges. Thirty of these aircraft, however, had been assigned to the Soviet naval air arm which indicates that they are not now assigned strategic missions.

[29] Both the US Air Force and the US Navy have 'tactical' and 'strategic' versions of the cruise missile under development. The Navy version, called the *Tomahawk*, will be capable of being launched from submarines and surface launchers as well as aircraft. Tactical versions, possessing shorter ranges and conventional warheads, will essentially be indistinguishable from strategic versions, equipped with terrain-matching guidance and armed with nuclear warheads. The problem, then, is simple: how can a SALT accord that restricts 'strategic' versions of the cruise missile be constructed so as to leave open various 'tactical' options? In attempting to answer this question, it should be recognised that the real difficulty is not the cruise missile itself, but the component technologies that the American programmes embody. Different cruise missile versions will be able to employ different guidance systems and munitions packages, and will possess different range characteristics depending on their designated role. See 'The Sea-Launched Cruise Missile', *International Defence Review*, Feb. 1976, pp. 198–202. One means of possibly constraining 'strategic' cruise missile deployment while leaving 'tactical' versions unaffected would be to place restrictions on cruise missile range. This idea was apparently resisted by the Ford administration on the grounds that: (1) range restrictions would be practically impossible to verify; (2) that range is, at best, an imperfect indicator of mission; and (3) that the range restrictions under discussion (600 km) would enable the Soviet Union to target a far higher percentage of targets in Europe and the United States than in the case of Western powers. See press briefing by Dr. Fred. C. Ikle, Feb. 27, 1976, and statement by Sen. Griffin, *Congressional Record*, May 26, 1976, S8045.

potential exists for issues in one set of negotiations to 'spill over' into the other. In some respects, the fact that SALT and MFR share overlapping sets of concerns gives negotiators added flexibility in dealing with certain specific problems. In the FBS case, the United States refusal to discuss European-based aircraft at SALT is not matched by a similar reluctance to consider their inclusion in an MFR agreement. At the same time, the lack of any clearly defined 'division of labour' between the two forms poses the constant threat that understandings reached in one will prejudge negotiations in the other. The deployment of new weapons with military relevance to both the super-power and the Nato-Warsaw Pact relationship increases the threat. Despite the fact that European-based American aircraft were left out of the ceiling for delivery vehicles at Vladivostok, the FBS issue was re-introduced into the SALT dialogue in the form of the Soviet insistence that cruise missiles be included in a new SALT agreement. This not only creates the possibility that European deployment options for the cruise missiles could be constrained by SALT, but it also could have an important bearing on the calculation of MFR outcomes. If existing American aircraft and tactical missiles were to be included in an agreement at MFR, an issue that would have to be resolved is whether the remaining force could be replaced or supplemented by new systems such as cruise missiles. Because the resolution of this question could have an important impact on the future military balance in Central Europe, it can only properly be addressed in the MFR context. A decision, however, to limit new technologies at SALT could serve to pre-empt discussions over European force modernisation.

**Proposition 5:** *While new weapons technology will create jurisdictional ambiguities between SALT and MFR, a growing class of 'grey area' weapons is likely to escape inclusion in future arms control regimes altogether.* The problems created by American forward-based aircraft and Soviet regional nuclear forces have already been mentioned, but to this category must also be added the British and French nuclear forces as well as cruise missile-equipped Soviet naval vessels.[30] As a class, the weapons that occupy a 'grey area' between

[30] The Soviet Union at present deploys 500–600 SS-4 and SS-5 M/IRBM, and over 650 medium-range bombers, the majority of which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons on Western Europe. In addition, over 300 SS-N-3 nuclear-armed cruise missiles are deployed aboard Soviet surface vessels and submarines, all of which can be targeted against Western Europe or North America. The British nuclear forces consist of four *Polaris* missile boats, equipped with 16 missiles each. France at present possesses a nuclear 'triad', consisting of three 16-tube missile boats, 18 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and 36 *Mirage-IV* bombers, *The Military Balance 1975–1976, op. cit.*, p. 21.

SALT and MFR are likely to become more numerous over the next decade. This will consequently make it more difficult for nations engaged in arms control discussions to ignore their existence. For a start, the widespread modernisation of Soviet 'Euro-strategic' forces —Soviet intermediate-range missiles and bombers—as well as the introduction of a new class of nuclear-capable strike aircraft can only serve to underline their anomalous position in East-West arms control.[31] The potential American deployment, moreover, of hundreds of cruise missiles around the periphery of Europe could result in another class of weapons escaping arms control constraints. The same would be true if Britain and/or France chose to exploit cruise missile technology in order to bolster existing nuclear capabilities. The problem posed by the 'grey area' is not simply that it exists, i.e. that a growing and potentially more important class of weapon has been allowed to proliferate unchecked. As these forces grow in size and importance, it becomes inevitable that their presence will intrude into calculations made at SALT and MFR. Here, an ominous precedent is the Soviet effort in 1974 to gain American acceptance of the 'equal security' principle at SALT, which would have meant, in practice, that the Soviet Union would have been allowed to deploy a larger number of missiles to compensate for the existence of the French, British and Chinese nuclear forces.[32]

## The political dimension

The problems sketched out above would only be of academic concern were it not for the different national interests attached to, and reflected in, the institutions of SALT and MFR. As a bilateral exercise, SALT is as much a forum for super-power consultation and co-ordination as an instrument for arms control.[33] SALT provides both states with a privileged channel for strategic communication, which, particularly in the Russians' case, confirms their status as global actors and more specifically, as managers of change in Europe. A wider set of concerns is reflected at MFR and, on the Western side, the Vienna talks are a process for intra-Alliance consultation over European security as well as an exercise in inter-bloc negotiation. Seen from this perspective, MFR functions as an Alliance-wide counter-

[31] These aircraft include numbers of the SU-19 *Fencer*, which is thought to be the first Soviet nuclear-capable tactical aircraft able to perform deep-strike missions against targets in Western Europe. See 'Europe's New Generation of Combat Aircraft: Part I: The Soviet threat', *International Defence Review*, May 1975.

[32] See *Strategic Survey 1973* (London: IISS, 1974), p. 57.

[33] See Miriam Camps's discussion of the role of SALT in the super-power relationship in *The Management of Interdependence* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1974), pp. 22–25.

weight to the United States' 'special relationship' with the Soviet Union. So far, the two-tiered structure of SALT and MFR appears to have served as a relatively successful means of balancing super-power and Alliance interests in arms control. But will this structure be able to accommodate the potentially conflicting interests attached to a new generation of weaponry? The answer to this question hinges on an assessment of the implications of emerging technology for the East-West military relationship. As we have seen, the central thrust of technological change suggests that it will become progressively more difficult to disassociate the bilateral super-power strategic relationship from regional military concerns. Western Europe, in other words, will possess a growing stake in the SALT process. If this fact fails to be recognised by the United States, numerous opportunities will be created for intra-Alliance discord and conflict. But even if European interests are taken into account in the American-Soviet dialogue, it is still difficult to see how intra-Alliance strains can be avoided. An agreement reached at SALT over cruise missiles, for example, that seriously restricted the deployment of tactical modes would significantly narrow future theatre defence options for the Alliance as a whole. Even if a SALT agreement were reached after extensive Alliance-wide consultation over the issue, it would be highly probable that an American decision to accept severe restrictions on cruise missile deployment at SALT would be viewed (by some Europeans at least) as tantamount to an American decision to enhance American-Soviet ties at the expense of Alliance-wide capabilities. A more troubling set of problems would result from an agreement at SALT containing non-circumvention provisions which led to restrictions being placed on the transfer of military technology to third parties.[34] A SALT agreement which curbed the growth and spread of independent European strategic capabilities would itself create controversy, but if it also had the effect of excluding tactical options, the consequences for Alliance cohesion would be far more serious.

Closing off Western military options through arms control is only one of the ways in which the United States might be accused of sacrificing European interests in order to perpetuate its dialogue with the Soviet Union. Another would be not moving quickly enough to limit new Soviet options. A hostage-sanctuary relationship between Western Europe and the Soviet Union was essentially created in the early 1960s with the Soviet deployment of intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles presumably targeted on European cities. This relationship

[34] Several nations, including Britain and West Germany, have reportedly expressed interest in purchasing air and sea-launched cruise missiles from the United States. See 'UK, Israel may buy new missile', *Financial Times*, July 9, 1976.

was institutionalised a decade later by an arms control structure that left these Euro-strategic systems out of both super-power and multilateral East-West negotiations. Although this situation is not viewed with favour, it has generally been accepted by European governments. The deployment of new bombers and the replacement of older missiles with the SS-X-20, however, is likely to spur a European reaction to the built-in inequities of the existing system of regional deterrence.[35] This could take several forms, including increasing pressures on the United States to take Soviet regional forces into account in formulating proposals at SALT. While the United States, in principle, might be receptive to such pleas, the prospect that the Soviet Union would reject out of hand any explicit attempt to link SALT with regional nuclear options makes it unlikely that American negotiators would pursue this point too energetically.

Technology not only places West European interests in jeopardy. Over the next decade, the super-power relationship at SALT could be gradually undermined by European military initiatives. Both in terms of finance and expertise, Western Europe is better placed to exploit developments in weapons than in early periods of technological change.[36] Acting unilaterally or together, 'middle level' powers such as Britain, France and West Germany possess the means to acquire a new generation of more accurate and secure strategic weapons. At the minimum, nuclear-armed cruise missiles might provide a cost-effective approach to maintaining the viability of existing European 'minimum deterrent' forces in the 1980s and beyond. Alternatively, new technologies could form the core of a European effort to provide strategic forces with greater flexibility and a wider range of targeting

[35] According to one writer, 'the disparities in favour of the Soviet Union are particularly salient in relation to medium-range systems which the Soviet Union has insisted on defining out of the SALT context, and thus by implication defining Western Europe as coming within the Soviet sphere of strategic influence. The American arms control community has remained consistently insensitive and unsympathetic to these dimensions of the strategic force problem'. See Johan Jorgen Holst, 'SALT in the Process of East-West Relations in Europe', NUPI/N-90 (Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk-Institutt, April 1975). In this regard, it should be noted that the Soviet deployment of a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear systems could have a direct impact on the American-Soviet central strategic balance. At present the Soviet Union deploys over 100 SS-11 ICBM which are believed to be targeted primarily against Western Europe. As with the introduction of new intermediate-range missiles, SS-11 now assigned to regional missions could be retargeted against the United States.

[36] Spending on military research and development in Britain, France and West Germany now exceeds a third of the American total (as compared with 10–15 per cent in the 1955–65 period). The cluster of technologies embodied by the American cruise missile programme—small turbofan motors, precision guidance and low radar reflectivity—are now being exploited in several European anti-shipping missiles (the French *Exocet*, the Italian *Otomat* and the Norwegian *Penguin*). See table of cruise missile developments in *Strategic Survey 1975*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

options.[37] But even in circumstances where Europe chooses not to explore strategic alternatives, the exploitation of technology for theatre roles would create new uncertainties for the Soviet Union. Because a new class of long-range anti-shipping or deep-interdiction missiles would in theory be capable of threatening certain targets in the Soviet homeland, the Soviet Union would strongly resist their deployment, and at SALT, Soviet negotiators could be expected to press ahead with initiatives that sought to strengthen super-power control over European choices.[38] It is doubtful whether the United States would be willing or able to agree to any schemes (like an 'equal security' arrangement) which would result, in effect, in the placing of limits on the expansion of European forces.[39] The cost to the United States, however, of maintaining the cohesion of the Alliance would be the gradual loss of Soviet interest in the bilateral arms control dialogue. Examining the experience of the 1960s, Jerome Kahan has argued that the United States, in 'choosing between alliance solidarity and super-power stability' may have placed too great an emphasis on securing the cohesion of Nato.[40] Looking at the issues that could arise out of the deployment of new weapons by the Europeans, the experience of the 1970s could be just the reverse.

Another cluster of troubling issues is raised by the notion that highly-accurate missiles armed with conventional warheads will not allow the Alliance to rely on nuclear weapons to deter war. This is not a development that will immediately affect outcomes at SALT or MFR, but it does promise to have important implications for Alliance agreement over the question of what constitutes deterrence and how escalation is to be controlled if war breaks out. According to some observers, the ability to use conventional arms for roles that were previously thought to require nuclear use will have the effect, if deterrence fails, of raising the 'threshold' for nuclear use in Europe. But great care must be taken in assessing the implications of this development for the fragile consensus in the West over military

[37] For comprehensive analyses of how European nuclear targeting options against the Soviet Union might be expanded, see Geoffrey Kemp, *Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers*, Part 1: Targets and Weapons Systems; Parts 2 and 3: Strategic Requirements and Options (London: IISS, 1974; Adelphi Papers 106 and 107).

[38] While sensitive to new technological initiatives undertaken by the United States, the Soviet Union appears even more concerned over the prospects of European force modernisation and movements towards increased co-operation amongst the European members of Nato. See D. Proecktor 'Military Detente: A Soviet View', *Survival*, Nov./Dec. 1976.

[39] Under an 'equal security' arrangement, increases in the size of European nuclear forces would require the United States to undertake reductions in its own forces. Assuming that the United States would be unwilling to 'trade in' its forces for new European systems, the result of including European nuclear systems under American ceilings would be to freeze the existing size of French and British forces.

[40] See *Security in the Nuclear Age* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 141.

doctrine. Would a concerted effort, orchestrated by the United States, to raise the nuclear threshold re-open in Europe an old doctrinal debate by alarming those who contend that the threat of nuclear escalation is an essential component of deterrence? Would a strategy, moreover, based on raising the nuclear threshold, while perhaps making nuclear war less likely, serve to lower the overall threshold to conflict? Even more vexing questions are raised by the suggestion that, in the 1980s, conventionally-armed systems could be used against strategic targets in the Soviet Union. Again, this might be justified in terms of raising the nuclear threshold as well as providing non-nuclear states with their own ' conventional deterrent '.

But how would the United States react to the spread of strategic conventional capabilities within the Alliance? If this development were seen as threatening its ability to control the escalation process, this would serve to reinforce American reluctance to get involved in a local conflict in Europe. In the long term, arms control measures could have an impact on how these issues are resolved. Efforts directed towards lessening Western dependence on nuclear weapons may ultimately gain Alliance-wide acceptance. Agreements at SALT or MFR, which ruled out the modernisation programmes necessary to bring this about would, however, ironically serve to reinforce Western reliance on nuclear weapons.

**Restructuring East-West arms control**

Because technological developments have made arms control less manageable, it is tempting to conclude that the solution to this problem lies in exercising restraint in the deployment of new weapons. But as this essay has attempted to demonstrate, technology does not so much threaten arms control *objectives* as arms control *institutions*. In the process of technological change, arms control negotiations and their results have apparently become detached from the objectives of arms control itself. The problem is not that technological change will create greater instability, new incentives to escalate or vast increases in defence budgets—in some cases, the exploitation of technology might have the opposite effect. The problem, instead, is that SALT and MFR are built around assumptions concerning the character of military technology that are on the verge of becoming obsolete. Thus, a compelling case can be made for redefining the boundaries of East-West arms control in order to accommodate changing political interests and new military capabilities.

How might the task of restructuring arms control be approached? The first step would be to recognise that the American-Soviet strategic relationship is becoming more closely intertwined with the military

balance in Europe. Hence, multilateralism in arms control must assume a new importance. The MFR exercise offers a multilateral framework, but its restricted geographical boundary rules out the inclusion of regional nuclear forces in negotiations. This has prompted the suggestion that a new regional arms control forum should be convened which would focus specifically on limiting the Euro-strategic weapons that comprise the 'grey area' between SALT and MFR. While this is an interesting proposal, it does not appear to be a workable one. First, it assumes that the participants in such an exercise would be able to agree on what constituted a 'regional' weapon. Soviet intermediate-range missiles, as well as the British and French nuclear forces, might slip easily into this category, but what about technologies, such as the cruise missile, that one or both of the super-powers might prefer to discuss at SALT? Determining whether specific weapons would be dealt with at the bilateral level or in the context of a new set of multilateral negotiations would present ample opportunity for disagreement. Second, negotiations over regional nuclear forces might lead to unacceptable results for Western Europe. Despite the new military options open to the West, it is likely that the Soviet Union will maintain, if not expand, its present margin of superiority in numbers of intermediate-range bombers and missiles. In these circumstances, large mutual reductions in regional forces would result in the virtual elimination of independent European capabilities—a point that explains the continuing opposition of France to the idea of including European nuclear forces in East-West negotiations.[41] For this reason it is difficult to envisage the circumstances in which any existing or potential European nuclear power would have any interest in regional nuclear arms control.

Thus, one is logically led to consider the possibility of a comprehensive structure for East-West arms control, where both the superpower and regional implications of new military technology could be considered together. This would mean that the SALT and MFR processes would be incorporated into a single multilateral negotiating format, which would also treat those weapons now excluded from arms control constraints altogether. It is clear that a comprehensive East-West forum for arms limitation would constitute a revo-

[41] An agreement, for instance, that called for a reduction of 100 medium or intermediate-range missiles would leave the Soviet Union with approximately 500 missiles while Britain and France would be left with less than 50 submarine-launched missiles between them. Percentage reductions, while requiring the Soviet Union to retire a larger number of missiles, would still have the effect of substantially reducing the effectiveness of the small Western European forces. If negotiations over Euro-strategic forces were to follow the SALT example, West European governments would have to adopt the Kennedy administration's policy of 'arming to disarm' and greatly increasing numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles.

lutionary departure from present approaches to managing military competition. While it need not spell the end of the super-power dialogue over security issues, it would recognise that if arms control is to maintain a focus on limiting force levels, super-power and regional military relationships can no longer be viewed in isolation. But it is also clear that a comprehensive approach to arms control would be unwieldy. Negotiations would be enormously complicated by more participants, on the one hand, and an expanded range of systems, on the other. Even the most straightforward proposals for agreement would become hostage to the labyrinthine task of assessing their implications for the overall military balance. Still, this would formally recognise the expanding linkages among super-power strategic, Euro-strategic and theatre military concerns. By explicitly calling attention to these relationships, it may be possible, under the umbrella of a comprehensive framework, to parcel out responsibility to working groups brought together to examine specific problems. Under a 'building block' approach, negotiations over different issues would be co-ordinated from above, in an effort to package together understandings reached over a wide spectrum of forces. Short of this, agreements on more narrowly-defined areas could still be negotiated, albeit with more attention paid to the implications of accords for strategic or theatre military relationships as well as Alliance disruption.

With the possibility that a new SALT agreement as well as an MFR accord could emerge from negotiations in 1977, it is, of course, unrealistic to argue that governments should jettison existing processes in favour of what appears to be a risky and cumbersome alternative. But as we have seen, new agreements at SALT and MFR are unlikely to deal adequately with the problems posed by new technology. Regardless of whether new arms accords are reached in the near future, the blurring of traditional distinctions between weaponry suggests that governments will be led, probably with reluctance, seriously to consider 'comprehensive' arms limitations by the end of the decade.[42] Thus, while energy should continue to be directed towards reaching agreement at SALT and MFR, efforts should also begin to fashion an alternative framework for negotiation which might be substituted for the existing one at an appropriate moment. In the meantime, more modest changes can be implemented. Within many Western defence and foreign policy establishments, planning for arms control is compartmentalised, with middle-level bureaucracies dealing

[42] It is interesting here to note that while the Soviet Union agreed at Vladivostok to leave American forward-based systems out of a new SALT accord, Soviet negotiators have since stated that the FBS issue would be a central topic for follow-on negotiations.

with one set of issues, say, force reductions in Central Europe, paying little attention to problems emerging from the deployment of new strategic weapons.[43] This means that top-level planners are often unable to appreciate the linkages between different issues created by the deployment of new weapons. If 'comprehensive' East-West arms control is unfeasible at present, there is at least a strong case that individual governments should explore mechanisms for better co-ordinating arms control policies. On the Alliance level, similar dangers are posed by compartmentalising consultation procedures. Western governments are justifiably proud of their efforts in recent years to consult on arms control policy, but Alliance consultation is normally undertaken among groups who share similar institutional pre-occupations. Thus there also seems to be a case for better co-ordinating procedures for Alliance consultation. At present, a plethora of groups under the Nato 'umbrella' possess overlapping interests and jurisdictions in East-West arms control: the Nuclear Planning Group, the Nato Disarmament Expert meetings in Brussels, the Nato ad hoc group at MFR in Vienna, the SALT experts' panel and the Nato ad hoc groups at the Geneva Disarmament Talks. There is a strong case for better co-ordinating and consolidating the work of these formal and ad hoc bodies. At the least, communication among these groups might be improved through the establishment of an arms control 'clearing house' which could function under the supervision of the Nato Council of Ministers.

A more integrated Western approach to arms control would go a long way to minimise the opportunities for disrupting the Alliance discussed in the previous section. But restructuring governmental planning and Alliance consultation will not provide solutions to all the problems arising from the deployment of new weapons. The growing complexity of comparing Eastern and Western military forces and providing for adequate verification will make it difficult to negotiate quantitative limitations on force levels regardless of how arms control

[43] In the United States, the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961 was meant, according to legislation, to establish 'a central organisation charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field'. During the negotiation of the first SALT agreements, the director of ACDA headed the American delegation at the talks and ACDA exercised a major planning role in formulating proposals. Since 1972, however, ACDA has not played a significant role in framing policy for SALT. Planning for other areas of arms control has meanwhile become increasingly fragmented, with the State Department, the Defence Department and other executive agencies, as well as the Congress, taking the lead on different arms control initiatives. In short, while ACDA maintains organisational responsibility for some arms control processes, it lacks it for others. See *Review of Arms Control Legislation and Organization*, Report prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1974).

is organised. Thus it may ultimately be necessary to go beyond restructuring and examine whole new approaches to East-West control: negotiated restrictions on defence spending, confidence-building measures or perhaps giving up negotiations altogether and basing arms control on unilateral acts of restraint. But as long as East-West arms control retains its current emphasis on limiting numbers of forces, it is necessary to begin thinking about the establishment of more flexible and comprehensive planning and negotiating arrangements.

# LATIN AMERICA'S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY:

## INTEGRATION, DISINTEGRATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE

*Edward S. Milenky*

MULTILATERAL relations among Latin American countries and between these nations acting collectively in dealings with outside powers and organisations are in transition to a new era. Older regional organisations devoted to economic integration have suffered sharp declines in prestige and effectiveness. A new pan-Latin American organisation, the Latin American Economic System (SELA), has replaced an ad hoc committee in planning strategy for international collective bargaining. Individual nations pursue more active foreign policies, often in conflict with other Latin American countries, but continue to resort to collective action. Relationships among Latin American countries have passed from a period of economic integration, through disintegration, towards a new and potentially more important pattern of interdependence.

Throughout these changes certain factors remain constant. In common with other developing nations, Latin American countries show a continuing preference for organisational contacts to maximise scarce resources, to express the existence of a regional identity, to enhance the importance and leverage of individual nations within and outside the group, and to gather and act upon information more effectively.[1] The goals of multilateral diplomacy also remain constant. These include the pursuit of economic policy objectives such as the promotion of national development through joint projects, agitation for reforms in the global economic system and for more assistance, and bids for a greater role in international economic negotiations. Individual nations also pursue their own objectives with the benefit of collective backing.

[1] Michael O'Leary, 'Linkages Between Domestic and International Politics in Underdeveloped Nations', *Linkage Politics*, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 344.

**Overall trends and influences**

Behind the transition to a new era of multilateral diplomacy are several long-standing trends and the post-1973 impact of the global energy and economic crisis. Latin American nations have become more active globally and regionally. Established contenders, such as Brazil and Argentina, compete more intensely with each other to expand global contacts. Previously passive Mexico is bidding for bloc leadership along with oil-rich Venezuela and pro-Third World Peru. Cuba's role is growing as it resumes hemispheric links after a decade of isolation. Panama's dispute with the United States makes it a militant supporter of Latin American solidarity. Previously submerged conflicts over ideology, frontiers, and economic relationship between Latin American states are emerging as United States dominance wanes under the impacts of global multipolarity and a low-profile policy of its own choosing.[2]

Independent English-speaking countries in the Caribbean now participate in some regional activities because they share similar perspectives on global economic and development-related issues. However, the Caribbean countries are profoundly suspicious of Latin American domination, conscious of cultural differences, and maintain the Caribbean Common Market as a distinct organisation. As former colonies they also have privileged access to the European Economic Community, in direct competition with Latin American producers of primary products and in contravention of the Latin Americans' efforts to negotiate their own arrangements.[3]

The politico-economic assumptions supporting multilateral co-operation in Latin America are shifting. 'Integration', defined as the application of the Western European model of free trade and market forces to Latin America to provide a basis for extending import-substitution industrialisation to a regional base, has been discredited. This approach, as promoted during the 1950s and 1960s by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), produced the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade

[2] Pending territorial disputes include: Venezuela-Guyana, Venezuela-Colombia, Bolivia-Chile, Guatemala's claim to all of Belize. On Latin American foreign policies, see Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum, eds., *Latin America: The Search for a New International Role* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975). For a Latin American view of the US low-profile policy, see Felix Peña, 'Tendencias y perspectivas de la integración economica en America Latina', paper presented to the Mesa Rodonda sobre el Subsistema Latinoamericano y su Participación en el Sistema Internacional, Buenos Aires, July 3–5, 1974 (Buenos Aires: Instituto para la integración de America latina (INTAL), 1974), mimeo.

[3] Caribbean countries also back Belize's independence against Guatemala's claims. Many are suspicious of Venezuela in particular. The history of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is sufficiently separate not to merit inclusion in this discussion of intra-Latin American multilateral co-operation.

Association (LAFTA). Both failed to provide their members with greater freedom from global economic pressures and strong stimuli to national development programmes. Shifting ideological climates in several countries have also come to favour development through central or state planning rather than reliance on private enterprise or a more open economic setting, and complete structures of industry over a share in a regional market.[4]

Developmental nationalism as an alternative to integration has also not produced a viable base for regional co-operation. This strategy is based on the sharing but not the pooling of scarce resources and on providing marketing opportunities for assigned plants and production lines in order to create national structures of industry. It produced the Andean Pact and unsuccessful reform proposals within LAFTA. However, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, the region's industrial giants, rejected any long-term commitments that would compromise their relative advantages of size and existing levels of development. Within the Andean Group deadlock has occurred.[5]

Bloc bargaining with outside powers and organisations as a basis for Latin American multilateral action continues, but with shifting and less certain ideological foundations. Originally co-operation through the Special Latin American Co-ordinating Commission (CECLA), was founded on general acceptance of a programme for improving the position of the developing nations through continuing negotiations with the industrial powers. These demands were founded on ECLA's assumption that a quasi-colonial international system exploited Latin America and prevented its economic growth and industrialisation.[6] But now Latin American countries are divided over the efficacy of natural resources diplomacy and confrontation with the industrialised nations on the OPEC model.

Global economic crisis exacerbates all these trends. The region is divided into oil-exporting countries with large balance-of-payments surpluses and oil-importing countries with large or small petroleum-induced payments deficits. Markets for some exporters of primary products have declined, while flows of investment capital and development assistance from traditional sources in the industrialised nations

[4] See 'Hacia el futuro: el pacto constituyente de la comunidad Latinoamericana' (Buenos Aires: INTAL, March 12, 1975), mimeo, and Peña, *op. cit.* Both of these papers were part of an intellectual current which contributed directly to reforms in regional institutions. On the ideology of 'integration', see UN, ECLA, *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems*, April 27, 1950, UN Doc. E/CN.12/89/ Rev. 1.

[5] On developmental nationalism, see *Grupo Andino: La integración en desarrollo* (Lima: Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena), p. 17. For its application, see Edward S. Milenky, 'From Integration to Developmental Nationalism: The Andean Group 1965–1971', *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Winter 1971, pp. 77–91.

[6] UN, ECLA, *The Economic Development of Latin America*, *op. cit.*

have slackened.[7] Economic distress has decreased the ability of countries in the area to sustain the costs of economic integration programmes with long-term payoffs and relatively few short-term benefits. In general, Latin American nations are more aware of the need to renegotiate their monetary, technological, trade, and investment relationships with the industrialised countries, and to come to terms with the growing financial and political power of the oil-exporting countries. Consequently, extra-regional economic relationships command more attention than intra-regional ones, but the importance of collective bargaining increases.

### Breakdown of the old system

Within the older system of multilateral relations Latin American countries acquired the experience now being translated into new patterns. Until 1973 intra-regional relationship were fragmented among a group of unaffiliated Caribbean countries and Panama, the Central American nations united in the Central American Common Market, and a core group of Brazil, Mexico and the Spanish-speaking South American countries. The Latin American Free Trade Association includes all the core group. Pacific coast countries, Bolivia and Venezuela, belong to the Andean Pact. Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay comprise the Plata Basin Group. Extra-regional collective activity was largely centred in CECLA, now disbanded, which included all Latin America except Cuba, plus Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago. Transnational associations exist but have played little role in the transition to a new system of multilateral diplomacy. Regional business and labour associations are affiliated with each of their intra-regional organisations except the Plata Basin Group, but have been entirely concerned with the technical details of economic integration programmes. Labour unions and trans-governmental associations of state oil company officials and central bankers have pan-Latin American membership, but have also been confined to their respective technical fields. A loose alliance of technocrats and intellectuals from the secretariats of ECLA, the Inter-American Development Bank, the intra-regional organisations, and some uni-

[7] In 1974, 18 oil-importing countries had a $12 billion deficit. Bolivia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela together had a $4·8 billion payments surplus—90 per cent of which went to Venezuela. The purchasing power of Latin American exports declined by 13 per cent overall in 1974. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico experienced a 3·8 per cent decline in export purchasing power. *El proceso de integración en America Latina en 1974* (Buenos Aires: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID)-INTAL, 1975), p. 11 and speech of President Antonio Ortiz Mena before the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, *News Release* (Washington: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), March 25, 1975).

versity faculties has supplied some ideological support for Latin American collective ventures.[8]

*The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)*

As originally conceived, LAFTA was to be a first step towards more intense forms of economic integration. By early 1976 it had become a limited economic success and a nearly total political failure. After the United States, the association is Latin America's largest market for manufactured products, but Argentina, Brazil and Mexico account for 79 per cent of all exports. An average of 11 per cent of member state trade goes to the zone, but the smaller and medium-sized countries have frequently suffered from payments deficits.[9]

Since becoming deadlocked in 1968 over the Common List of products to move in free trade the member states have virtually ceased to make new tariff concessions in the annual negotiations. The Caracas Protocol of 1969, which amended the Montevideo Treaty, the association's basic agreement, postponed the establishment of a free trade area from 1973 until 1980 and reduced the annual obligation to cut tariffs. Under the terms of the Protocol the member states agreed to hold talks aimed at reviving the organisation in 1973 and adopted a 1970–80 Action Plan to prepare for accelerated trade liberalisation and joint industrial development on the developmental nationalism model.[10] However, the Action Plan produced only a few technical studies, and the collective negotiations were delayed because Uruguay and Venezuela did not ratify the Caracas Protocol until November 1973, thereby nearly plunging the association into juridical chaos.

By the time the talks began in July 1974 Latin America faced the full fury of a fourfold increase in the price of oil and the Arab boycott. The Andean Group had demanded the right to withdraw all

[8] On transnational organisations see Henry L. Landsberger, 'Linkages to World Society: International Labor organizations in the Western Hemisphere', *Contemporary Inter-American Relations*, ed. by Yale H. Ferguson (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Isaac Cohen Orantes, *Regional Integration in Central America* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1972); Edward S. Milenky, *The Politics of Regional Organization in Latin America: The Latin American Free Trade Association* (New York: Praeger; London: Pall Mall, 1973); *Boletin de la Integración* (Buenos Aires, INTAL) regularly carries notices of meetings.

[9] Representative sample of member state exports to LAFTA for 1973: Argentina—24 per cent, Brazil—8·8 per cent, Mexico—7 per cent, Venezuela—5·4 per cent. See also UN, ECLA, *Latin American Development and the International Economic Situation, Second Regional Appraisal of the International Development Strategy*, Feb. 21, 1975, UN Doc. E/CEPAL/981/Add. 2 part 2, *The External Economic Relations of Latin America and the International Situation*, pp. 68, 210–214.

[10] Text of Montevideo Treaty in Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, *Instruments relating to the Economic Integration of Latin America* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1968), pp. 207–230. Caracas Protocol appears in *Sintesis Mensual* (Montevideo: ALALC Dec. 1969), No. 54, p. 540; action plan is in No. 62, July 1970, p. 318. The old obligation was 8 per cent per year. (ALALC is the Spanish acronym for the Latin American Free Trade Association.)

tariff concessions which conflicted with its sectoral industrial development programmes, amounting to nearly 18 per cent of the concessions given by all countries and covering some of the most promising areas of industry. Outside the framework of the Montevideo Treaty, Argentina had concluded major bilateral trade agreements with Peru, Uruguay and Bolivia, as had Brazil with Colombia and Uruguay. With the exception of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, all the members were demanding that future commitments should be adjusted to each country's level of development. Unresolved issues facing the association included the future of the trade liberalisation programme, the prospects for joint industrial development, financial co-operation, and trade in agricultural products.[11] As a result, the collective negotiations failed to resolve any pending issues. The deadlines of the Caracas Protocol have not been met, and the members of LAFTA are only obliged to reduce their tariffs towards each other by 2·9 per cent annually until 1980.[12]

LAFTA will remain a fairly stagnant 'holding operation' for the immediate future. The dissolution of the association would destroy the legal foundation under which several countries avoid applying the most-favourd-nation principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to their intra-regional trade, along with a limited but useful device for negotiating economic co-operation.[13] In the context of an ideological climate which pays lip service at least to Latin American unity, the public abandonment of commitments would be politically embarrassing. Given present international economic pressures, intra-Latin American competition for national prestige, particularly between Brazil and Argentina, and the Andean Group's decision to maintain its own programme, formal treaty amendments are also improbable.[14] In the larger context of multilateral relations in the region the LAFTA experience illustrates the problems faced by any proposals for comprehensive programmes of co-operation within a large group of diverse nations.

[11] ALALC, 'Las negociaciones colectivas de 1974', ALALC/Secretaria No. 14, document prepared for the Caracas Protocol talks, reprinted in *Revista de la Integración* (Buenos Aires: INTAL, Vol. VII, No. 17, Sept. 1974, pp. 23–25). The talks were held in: July 1974—Buenos Aires; Aug. 1974—Quito; Nov. 1974—Montevideo. See also *Síntesis Mensual*, No. 106, July-Aug. 1974, p. 24; *Comercio Exterior* (Mexico: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior), Vol. 24, No. 1, Jan. 1974, pp. 10–14, and Vol. 24, No. 11, Nov. 1974, pp. 1110–1113; and ALALC 'Acta final del decimocuarto periodo de sesiones ordinarias de la Conferencia de las Partes Contratantes', ALALC/C.XIV/Acta final Dec. 18, 1974.

[12] Author's interviews with LAFTA Secretariat officials and members of national delegations, Montevideo, Uruguay, Aug. 1975.

[13] GATT exempts customs unions and free trade areas from the most-favoured-nation principle.

[14] See ALALC 'Las negociaciones colectivas de 1974', *op. cit.*, p. 52. Conclusions also based in part on interviews cited above and author's access to non-public papers.

### *The Andean Group*

When the Andean Pact's constituent treaty, the Cartagena Agreement, was signed in 1969 it was hailed as a major advance over LAFTA. Since then it has met many of its original objectives, which included planned industrialisation on a developmental nationalism model, in a qualified fashion. Tariffs have been dropping according to a schedule of linear pre-arranged reductions, but in 1975 the rate of liberalisation was challenged. A minimum common external tariff was being converted into a full common external tariff until the group split between Chile, Bolivia and Colombia, which favoured relatively low rates, and the others, particularly Venezuela, which insisted on high levels of protection. Furthermore, only 5 per cent of member-country exports go to the sub-region, and no important increases have occurred since the programme began in 1970. Although trade is diversifying it consists mainly of agricultural products.[15]

Decision 24 of the Andean Commission establishes a common policy on foreign investment under which all multinational corporations operating in the six-country area must set up enterprises with majority local ownership and management within fifteen years. However, only Colombia adopted the Decision's rules into national law, although it began to agitate for a more liberal policy in 1975. In 1974 the Andean Junta, the organisation's panel of impartial technocrats charged with advisory and planning functions, ruled that Chile's new foreign investment law violated Decision 24. After a major confrontation Chile complied, but it generated a new crisis in 1975 by deciding to sell off firms nationalised under Allende to foreign investors.[16]

Through a series of agreements on industrial sectoral development the Andean countries were to have allocated among themselves new plants and production lines for two thousand products in several sectors of heavy industry. The Metal-Mechanical Agreement in August 1972 and the Petrochemical Agreement in September 1975 allocated exclusive production rights among the members for various capital goods and petrochemicals respectively. ' Bases for a Subregional Development Strategy ', drafted by the Junta in 1972, established an overall industrial development programme.[17]

[15] For the text of Cartagena Agreement see *Sintesis Mensual*, No. 49, July 1969, pp. 283–316; an unofficial translation appears in *The Andean Common Market* (New York: Business International, 1970).

[16] *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan. 1975, p. 19; Francisco R. Sagasti, ' Integración economica y politica tecnologia : el caso del andino ', *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan. 1975, p. 4; *Ultimas Noticias* (Caracas), April 7, 1976, p. 10; *LATIN* (Buenos Aires), July 17, 1976. N.B. Chile withdrew in December 1976.

[17] *Grupo Andino*, No. 7, Sept. 1971, p. 4; *El proceso de integración en America Latina en 1974*, *op. cit.*, p. 158; the Metal-Mechanical Agreement is supposed to generate $300 million in production and 110,000 jobs by 1980—*Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 9, Sept. 1975, p. 907.

However, the December 1975 deadline for completion of agreements in all areas was not met. State and private firms in several countries are resisting plans for cars, steel and fertilisers. Colombia and Chile want free trade rather than rigid planning, since this would favour them as the most industrialised members. Colombia and Venezuela rejected the production assignments under the proposed automobile pact, while Peru's deal with Argentina in 1974 to manufacture Mercedes Benz vehicles introduced another complication.[18] Most fundamentally, the emphasis of conservative governments in Chile and Colombia on private enterprise has collided with the central planning favoured in Venezuela and Peru.

Ideological and political divisions between military and civilian governments also plague the Andean Pact. Lingering resentment over territorial losses to Chile in the nineteenth-century War of the Pacific has surfaced in Peru and Bolivia, particularly in the latter's drive to recover its lost seacoast. Chile has become a pariah for the left, while Peru moves closer to the non-aligned group. Oil wealth is making Venezuela more dominant and suspect within the organisation, as Chile suffers a severe economic crisis.[19]

Apart from its internal problems the Andean Group suffers from external power plays. To counter what it regards as Brazilian influence Argentina has pushed for membership, only to run into firm Colombian and Venezuelan opposition. Mexico established a joint commission in 1972 and extended a $5 million credit to the Andean Development Corporation, the group's international bank, but has not been invited to join.[20]

In April 1976 all these pressures produced critical decisions about the Andean Group's future. Decision 100, the Lima Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement, extends the deadlines for concluding the industrial sectoral agreements, reducing tariffs and establishing the common external tariff, from December 1975 to December 1977; reduces the number of countries required to approve a sectoral agreement from six to four, but allows the dissenters to abstain from participation; and introduces permissible maximum and minimum levels into the future common external tariff. Chile received permission to sell nationalised

[18] *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 9, Sept. 1975, p. 976.

[19] Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, *Bolivia y los problemas de la integración andina* (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andres, 1970), p. 189; speech of Bolivian President, Hugo Banzer Suarez, Oct. 17, 1975, Domestic Service Radio, La Paz, as monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Latin America* (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, US Dept. of Commerce). This publication cited below as FBIS.

[20] *El Comercio* (Quito), July 15, 1973: *Boletin de la Integración* (Buenos Aires: INTAL), Vol. 8, No. 86, Feb. 1975, pp. 102–103; *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 24, No. 12, Dec. 1974, p. 1237; Vol. 25, No. 9, Sept. 1975; ANSA (Buenos Aires), Nov. 16, 1974 (FBIS).

firms to foreign investors, provided that production was restricted to the domestic market. However, by September 1976 Chile had not signed Decision 100. The remaining countries gave the Pinochet government sixty days to decide and began to plan the future of the organisation without it.[21] An Andean Group will survive, but with its planned economic development philosophy severely compromised and without the intimate economic, social and political links originally envisaged.

*The Plata Basin Group*

As originally conceived in a 1969 treaty, the Plata Basin Group was to join Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in a multilateral effort to develop international water resources, hydroelectric power, and infrastructure in co-operation with a consortium of international organisations headed by the Inter-American Development Bank. Planning was to be carried out through a standing intergovernmental committee and annual ministerial-level meetings. International waters were also divided among riparian countries in an area both Brazil and Argentina regarded as strategic. However, mutual suspicion has converted the programme into a series of disconnected bilateral agreements and undermined the settlement of riparian rights over international rivers.[22]

The Itaipu dispute between Argentina and Brazil is the most serious failure of the Plata Basin scheme. In April 1973 Brazil and Paraguay agreed to construct the Itaipu Dam, which would be potentially the world's largest hydroelectric power project, on the upper Parana River. Argentina has claimed that its rights as a riparian state were violated when Brazil failed to consult it before concluding the Itaipu agreement. Brazil insists that prior consultation in the use of a shared resource is not required and cites the Declaration of Asuncion, issued by the Fourth Conference of Plata Basin foreign ministers, which states that each country may act alone when developing international rivers, provided no damage is done to other riparian countries. Argentina has asked Brazil and Paraguay to modify the Itaipu Dam to prevent alleged flooding and damage to downstream Argentine-Paraguayan hydroelectric projects at Corpus and Yacireta-Apipe, while Brazil rejects these allegations. Behind the substantive issues of the dispute is intense competition for influence in the buffer states of Bolivia,

[21] *Bank of London and South America Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Feb. 1976, pp. 60–62 and No. 6, June 1976, pp. 317–318; AFP (Paris), Aug. 2, 1976.

[22] Treaty text in *Derecho de la Integración* (Buenos Aires: INTAL), Oct. 1969, No. 5. For history of project see *Hacia el desarrollo integral de la Cuenca del Plata* (Buenos Aires: INTAL, 1967) and Milenky, *The Politics of Regional Organization in Latin America, op. cit.*, pp. 142–144.

Paraguay and Uruguay, and a race to develop hydroelectric resources which promise some relief from dependence on OPEC oil.[23]

For the immediate future at least, the Plata Basin Group will remain an arena for Argentine-Brazilian political and economic competition and a mechanism for channelling international financing to bilateral projects. Indirectly the goals of the 1969 treaty are being served through the development of highway systems, hydroelectric power and communications links.[24] The meeting of foreign ministers in June 1974 did agree to establish a $20 million development fund, but the group has yet to use it for multilateral purposes.

### *The Central American Common Market (CACM)*

While the members of the Central American Common Market (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Costa Rica) have been peripheral to major developments, their experiences illustrate some aspects of the emerging pan-Latin American pattern of multilateral diplomacy. CACM was organised in 1960 as a customs union. With extensive research and technical support from the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and financial backing from the United States, the Inter-American Development Bank, Mexico and several European countries, the group did succeed in establishing a common external tariff and in eliminating most internal tariffs before a war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 wrecked the organisation. Other provisions for integrated industrial development were largely ignored.[25]

Since 1969 the Central American countries, with assistance from ECLA, have attempted to reconstruct their organisation. Interim arrangements have restored trade except between Honduras and El Salvador, which, by the end of 1976, had not resolved the issues growing out of the 1969 war. Furthermore, all five nations faced an unequal distribution of benefits within the group, particularly the trade surpluses of Guatemala and El Salvador as compared to the deficits of the others, and the problems of the largest oil-induced payments deficits in the region.[26]

[23] *La Nacion* (Buenos Aires), Sept. 24, 1973; *La Razon* (Buenos Aires), Nov. 28, 1973; history of Itaipu project appears in 'Lista de Proyectos multinacionales' (Washington, DC: IDB, 1967), mimeo. The Itaipu dispute is still a live issue. See EFE Madrid, May 28, 1975, and TELAM (official Argentine news agency, Buenos Aires), May 27, 1975 (both FBIS) for Argentine-Brazilian exchange at Cochabamba meeting of Plata foreign ministers.

[24] See project announcements in *Boletin de la Integración*, 1973–75.

[25] Robert W. Gregg, ed., *International Organization in the Western Hemisphere* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1968), p. 96; Orantes, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–31.

[26] ACAN (Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias) (Panama City), Aug. 21, 1975 (FBIS); *El Cronista* (Tegucigalpa, Honduras), Oct. 1, 1975.

Political disagreements and global economic pressures make complete reconstruction of the Central American Common Market unlikely. Instead, its five nations will be drawn into a pan-Latin American system and into bilateral relationships with richer and more powerful neighbours, particularly Venezuela and Mexico. The presidents of Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama met at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, in December 1974. As a result, Venezuela is now financing the oil deficits of these nations by loaning back payments made in local currencies for use in approved development projects. Venezuela is also financing a coffee buffer stock retention scheme designed to support world prices for Central American producers, and has been purchasing the bonds of the Central American Bank of Integration.[27]

*Special Latin American Co-ordinating Commission (CECLA)*

Between 1964 and 1973 CECLA was the vehicle for the region's first sustained effort in collective bargaining with outside countries and international organisations. It was an ad hoc diplomatic gathering functioning either on the expert or ministerial level, with each host country providing secretariat and archival services until the next session. Additional technical and support services came from ECLA on an informal basis.[28] The Commission was first established in 1963 at a meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES), solely to draft a Latin American position for the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but a year later it was re-established on a continuing basis.[29]

Most of CECLA's programme of demands and principles was established in documents prepared for sessions of UNCTAD, particularly the 1964 Charter of Alta Gracia and the 1968 Charter of Tequendema. These position papers advocate for developing countries increased participation in talks on international trade and monetary reform, non-reciprocal tariff preferences in the markets of industrialised nations, and the annual transfer of one per cent of rich countries' Gross National Product as aid. At the 1972 UNCTAD meeting CECLA

[27] *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan. 1975, pp. 59–60; Fernando Mateo and Eduardo White, 'Public Corporations as a Means of Distributing Costs and Benefits in a Framework of Integration', paper presented to UNCTAD Seminar on the Distribution of Costs and Benefits in Economic Integration among Developing Countries, Guatemala, Dec. 10–19, 1973 (Buenos Aires: INTAL, 1973), mimeo, pp. 42–43; *Excelsior* (Mexico City), Oct. 6, 1973.

[28] Basic documents of CECLA appear in *Recopilacion de documentos basicos*, E/CN.12/L.80, Aug. 14, 1972, E/CN.12/L.80 corr., Aug. 28, 1972, and E/CN.12/L.80 add. 2, Oct. 3, 1972.

[29] Author's series of interviews with officials of ECLA, Santiago, Chile, Aug. 1975; and 'Declaracion de Lima', TD/13/10, Dec. 10, 1964, in *Recopilacion de documentos basicos, op. cit.*

added demands for unrestricted national sovereignty over natural resources.[30] The Consensus of Viña del Mar of 1969 and the Declaration of Buenos Aires of 1970 extended these principles to relations with the United States and the European Economic Community, respectively.[31] In all cases CECLA's concerns were Latin America's disadvantageous position in the international economic system, the means for reforming that system, and the search for a more balanced, even preferential, relationship with the region's principal trading partners and sources of investment capital. At UNCTAD the Commission became a vehicle for expressing a Latin American interest distinct from that of the Third World.

By bloc bargaining with the United States CECLA attempted to achieve a bilateral US-Latin American relationship in place of the legal fictions of twenty-three juridically-equal American states, and promoted the Commission's politico-economic agenda in preference to the Organisation of American States's (OAS) focus on international peace and security in an increasingly obsolete cold war context. CIES was used as a sounding board for CECLA-inspired resolutions, while a sub-committee established in 1970, the Special Negotiating and Consulting Commission (CECON), undertook negotiations on the programme of the Viña del Mar Consensus. The first clash came in 1971 when the United States imposed a 10 per cent surcharge on imports and suspended the convertibility of the dollar. CECLA's Manifesto of Latin America accused the United States of violating promises not to impose new trade restrictions and of ignoring the fact that it ran a trade surplus with the region.[32]

Collective bargaining through CECLA did establish the basis for longer-term changes in relations with the United States. CECON became the first permanent forum for US-Latin American trade negotiations, even surviving CECLA itself. In the changed circumstances after 1973 many CECLA demands became the subject of concrete negotiations, while others were actually realised. A limited bilateral relationship with the United States was established, but the OAS did not become a revitalised forum for the negotiation of CECLA's agenda. Instead, talks eventually took place outside its framework.[33]

[30] For Charter of Alta Gracia, see UP/CIES/7/CECLA/4, 1964 (Washington: Pan-American Union, 1964).

[31] *Boletin de la Integración*, Vol. 4, No. 43, June 1969, p. 294 and Vol. 5, No. 56, Aug. 1970, pp. 429–432.

[32] 'Consenso de Bogota', CECLA XIII Reunion a Nivel Expertos, Bogota, March 20–24, 1972, reprinted in *Boletin de la Integración*, Vol. 7, No. 76, April 1972; version passed at CIES meeting in Bogota in Feb. 1973 appears in *Boletin de la Integración*, Vol. 7, No. 81, April 1973. See also OEA/Ser. H/XIII/CECON for the CECON documents.

[33] See below on aftermath of Tlatelolco Conference. For a late 1972 assessment see 'Declaracion sobre la CECON', CECLA XIV Reunion a Nivel de Expertos, Santiago, Sept. 4–9, 1972, in *Recopilacion de documentos basicos* E/CN.12/L.80/add. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

Collective Latin American interest in the EEC fell into two categories. Europe's potential as a source of investment capital, technology and development assistance could offset dependence on the United States. However, the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy and growing network of association agreements with Mediterranean countries and former colonies threatened to destroy markets for Latin American primary products. Initial proposals came from the EEC's Council of Ministers, which in July 1969 called for special arrangements governing trade in beef with Uruguay and Argentina and various types of development aid, including a Community Fund to promote imports from Latin America and co-operation with the Inter-American Development Bank, the Andean Development Corporation, and the Central American Bank of Integration.

From the Latin American perspective, the talks with Europe were disappointing. In the absence of an institutional mechanism for policy co-ordination, the Latin American ambassadors at EEC headquarters in Brussels established a continuing dialogue loosely directed by a series of CECLA declarations. European resistance thwarted a much-desired inter-regional conference at ministerial level and the conclusion of any substantive agreements. At the only high-level review of inter-regional relations, which took place at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in March 1974, between representatives of the EEC Commission and Latin American foreign or economic ministers, the Latin American bloc obtained neither an end to EEC curbs on beef imports nor endorsement of Mexico's draft Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, a version of the CECLA programme for international economic reform. The Lomé Agreement of February 1975, in which the EEC gave forty-six African, Asian and Caribbean countries special access to the European Common Market in direct competition with Latin American producers, and provided assistance to exporters of primary products, likewise produced no effective response from CECLA.[34]

An entirely separate set of negotiations conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank produced the only substantive breakthrough in Latin American-West European relations. Under the terms of the Declaration of Madrid of December 1974, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia became non-regional members of the Bank in August 1976 along with Israel and Japan. Austria, the Netherlands, Italy and France were also expected to join shortly. These new members vastly augmented the capital of the Bank and diluted the voting power of the United

[34] *El Economista* (Buenos Aires), July 5, 1975; *La Opinion* (Buenos Aires), March 6, 1974, and March 7, 1974.

States over loan decisions. However, Europe has for the most part turned away from Latin America in favour of agreements with Arab oil producers and secure sources of raw materials in former African colonies.[35]

The Special Latin American Co-ordinating Commission succeeded in giving the region experience in international collective bargaining and in creating an agenda of demands and principles for long-term negotiation. If the post-1973 energy crisis had not intervened, it is possible that CECLA might have continued for a longer period. It was flexible and non-bureaucratic, but ultimately too weak and had too indefinite a commitment from its membership to survive the radical changes which occurred in the international system and among its own members. Peru, Venezuela and Mexico demanded a new rationale for bloc action and, together with Argentina, they wanted Cuba's participation. CECLA had excluded Cuba and was not organisationally or ideologically disposed to cope with the more stridently anti-Western position adopted by members of the Third World, or with the tactical approach to bloc bargaining suggested by OPEC. Moreover by 1973 CECLA had few concrete achievements. All these factors combined to produce a hiatus in institutionalised Latin American bloc bargaining between the last CECLA meeting in early 1973 and the first meeting of the Latin American Economic System in January 1976.

## Towards a new era in multilateral diplomacy

Key elements in the emerging pattern of multilateral action include the Latin American Economic System, the Latin American Energy Organisation, and less successful experiments with cartels of raw-materials-exporting countries, and multinational enterprises.

### *The Latin American Energy Organisation (OLADE)*

This organisation originated in two meetings of Latin American energy and petroleum ministers called by Venezuela. At Caracas in August 1972 Venezuela proposed the creation of an organisation to co-ordinate regional policies on the pricing and development of all energy sources. It was seeking backing against the multinational oil companies which were accused of trying to break up OPEC, which had itself originated in a Venezuelan proposal.[36] At Quito the following April the petroleum ministers recommended the creation of OLADE

[35] *Boletin de la Integración*, Vol. 10, No. 112, April 1975, p. 21; *Guardian* (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad), Sept. 25, 1975; *El Economista* (Buenos Aires), July 5, 1975; *La Opinion* (Buenos Aires), March 6 and 7, 1974; *IDB News*, Vol. 3, No. 6, July 1976, pp. 1–3.

[36] Speech of Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera to Caracas session, *Boletin de la Integración*, Vol. 7, No. 82, Oct 1972, p. 589.

to preserve, allocate, and defend the region's energy supplies, but with the proviso that each country should retain full sovereignty over its resources. The new organisation would study the formation of an energy common market. A Secretariat of Co-ordination was installed in Quito to draft a treaty and associated statutes, including provisions for an energy development fund. Venezuela agreed to prepare an inventory of regional energy resources and market patterns.[37]

OPEC's price demarche in October 1973 and the accompanying Arab oil boycott made OLADE more urgent and more controversial. Venezuela emerged as the region's largest financial power and link with OPEC. It also acquired an interest in defusing the tensions generated by its new status. The commitments assumed at Quito now promised Venezuela allies as well as new financial and political demands from countries looking for non-Arab oil and price concessions. In particular Brazil, with 86 per cent of its imports coming from the Middle East, and Argentina with 12 per cent, wanted to use OLADE to shift to Latin American oil.[38]

These changed circumstances produced serious divisions at the Lima meeting of energy ministers in October 1973. A majority of the delegates favoured a strong organisation to regulate petroleum prices and supplies, and to establish direct negotiations between Latin American oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Instead of this Venezuela offered to support the proposed energy development fund. Peru and Ecuador supported an organisation which would defend the prices and supplies of raw materials against the industrialised countries and multinational corporations. Cuba was present for the first time, to the dismay of the new Chilean Junta and Brazil.[39]

As a result of the tensions created by the energy crisis OLADE was stillborn. The Convention of Lima simultaneously asserted Latin America's collective right to defend its resources and each country's absolute sovereignty and freedom of action in relation to energy. Latin American petroleum was not assured for Latin America, thus allowing Venezuela to preserve its commitments to OPEC and its principal markets in the United States. OLADE was to be little more than a framework for voluntary joint development projects, it was hoped with Venezuelan financing, and an opportunity for Latin American oil-importing countries to express their solidarity with each

[37] *El Comercio* (Quito), Sept. 17, 1973.

[38] Figures for Petrobas (Brazil) and YPF (Argentina) respectively as cited in ARPEL XIX Reunion a Nivel de Expertos, Lima, July 22–26, 1974 (Montevideo: Asistencia Reciproca Petrolera Estatal Latinoamericana n.d.). ARPEL is a transgovernmental association of Latin American state oil companies.

[39] *El Cronista Comercial* (Buenos Aires), Nov. 1, 1973; *La Opinion* (Buenos Aires), Oct. 25, 1973, and Nov. 11, 1973; *La Nacion* (Buenos Aires), Nov. 4, 1973.

other and with OPEC in the hope that they might at best escape from dependence on Arab oil and at least become preferred customers.[40]

Subsequent meetings of OLADE have not altered the 1973 balance. Despite an agreement in August 1974, direct collective talks between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries have not begun. In February 1975 OLADE was formally launched at a meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, but the energy development fund will not be established until the Secretariat, which has been in existence for two years, is fully operative. The proposed fund will only support projects included in a regional energy plan, which presumably will need unanimous approval. As of September 1976 Argentina, Costa Rica, Haiti, Paraguay and Venezuela had not ratified the Lima Convention.[41]

OLADE's future hinges on its status as a conduit for aid and secure oil supplies. The meeting of the organisation in September 1975 did discuss a prospective $6 billion credit to Latin American oil-importing nations from an unidentified source. However, Venezuela, the most likely source of aid, has thus far ignored OLADE. The Inter-American Development Bank is administering a $500 million trust fund established in February 1975 by Venezuela to make loans for development, including energy projects, but not oil deficits. Venezuela's ventures into guaranteed oil supplies or deficit financing are bilateral, including the Puerto Ordaz agreement with five Central American countries and Panama, and a deal made in October 1975 to supply Jamaica. In September 1976 Venezuela was negotiating oil sales agreements with Argentina and the Dominican Republic. With Mexico, Venezuela also participates in a triangular arrangement under which oil is shipped to Cuba, Cuban goods go to the Soviet Union, and Soviet goods go to the oil exporters. The only step towards a multilateral commitment was the Venezuelan Investment Fund's decision to channel $25 million for projects, but not balance-of-payments relief, to the Caribbean Development Bank of the Caribbean Common Market.[42]

Other Latin American oil-exporting countries have done just as little through OLADE. Although Mexico, on the verge of becoming a

[40] For reporting on the Latin American mood see *Le Monde*, Nov. 3, 1973; *El Comercio* (Quito), Oct. 29, 1973; *El Cronista Comercial* (Buenos Aires), Oct. 23, 1973, and Nov. 22, 1973; *Prensa Libre* (Guatemala City), Nov. 7, 1973; *La Prensa* (Lima), Aug. 20, 1974; on the meeting see *La Nacion* (Buenos Aires), Nov. 4, 1973; *El Cronista Comercial* (Buenos Aires), Nov. 1, 1973; *La Opinion* (Buenos Aires), Nov. 11, 1973; statement of Venezuelan President Caldera, EFE, Madrid, Jan. 24, 1974 (FBIS).

[41] INFORMEX (Mexico City), Sept. 9, 1975 (FBIS); *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 4, April 1975; AFP (Paris), Sept. 12, 1975 (FBIS).

[42] H. J. Maidenberg, 'Venezuela Asserts Her Oil Power', *NY Times*, April 27, 1975, p. f2; *NY Times*, Dec. 19, 1975, p. 6; *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan 1975, pp. 59–60; *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), Oct. 21, 1975; Caracas domestic service radio, Aug 25, 1975 (FBIS); *Daily Gleaner* (Kingston, Jamaica), Oct. 22, 1975 (FBIS); *NY Times*, Nov. 11, 1975, pp. 43, 48.

major exporter, supports the organisation strongly, it has not moved beyond establishing bilateral technical aid and exchange agreements between PEMEX and ten other Latin American state oil companies. Bolivia, a relatively small exporter of oil and natural gas, has been the object of intense Argentine-Brazilian competition for several years.[43] Given this rush towards bilateral deals, OLADE is likely to remain inactive.

*Commodity cartels*

Latin American attempts to copy OPEC have failed. On a Mexican initiative, twenty Caribbean and Latin American sugar-producing countries met three times in 1974 and 1975 and again in March 1976 to organise a cartel controlling 60 per cent of world exports. However, Cuba and Brazil, the region's largest exporters, resisted out of fear of consumer retaliation. The group did agree to establish a Latin American Sugar Enterprise with a permanent secretariat to present a common position at meetings of the International Sugar Organisation, to make a commodity price agreement which includes consumers, and to ban sales below the daily market price. It has not set a minimum price for sugar.[44] Would-be cartels for bananas and coffee have been even less successful.

*Multinational enterprises*

Latin American governments have used multinational enterprises to benefit from economies of scale, to make better use of scarce resources, to enhance bargaining power with third countries, or to implement joint development programmes. Established examples include a Colombian-Ecuadorean shipping line and Chilean-Ecuadorean steel and tuna processing plants. This form of organisation is compatible with currently popular statist development philosophies, and provides a way of copying the feared but admired success of foreign multinational corporations.

Within the context of newer regional organisations multinational enterprises may become the most concrete links among Latin American governments. The first multilateral venture, the Caribbean shipping

[43] *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 4, April 1975, pp. 373–375; AFP (Paris), Oct. 4, 1975 (FBIS). Both Brazil and Argentina have pipelines to the Bolivian gas-fields and oil-fields. See Juan E. Guglialmelli, 'Banzer-Buenos Aires-Brasilia', *Estrategia* (Buenos Aires: Instituto Argentino de Estudios Estrategios y de las Relaciones Internacionales, Jan.–Feb. 1974), esp. pp. 6–7, 9. Both countries have or seek drilling concessions in Arab countries. On Mexican oil potential see *NY Times*, Nov. 11, 1975, pp. 43, 48.

[44] Participants: Argentina, Brazil, Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, with Philippines as observer. H. J. Maidenberg, 'Politics and Sugar Don't Mix', *NY Times*, May 4, 1975, p. f2.

enterprise, began operations in February 1976 with $30 million in capital and Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama and Mexico as members.[45]

*The Latin American Economic System (SELA)*

Unifying and revitalising intra-regional and extra-regional co-operation within a single organisation, the Latin American Economic System is an attempt to recast the entire pattern of multilateral diplomacy. Twenty-five nations attended the October 1975 ministerial-level conference in Panama City, which formally launched the new organisation. It will act through a Latin American Council of national representatives meeting annually at ministerial level, and Action Committees composed of the governments participating in approved intra-regional projects. A small secretariat will provide limited support for all activities. Through this structure Latin America is supposed to respond immediately to changing world economic conditions.[46]

SELA is a more institutionalised and ideologically-overhauled version of CECLA, combined with Latin America's long-standing programme for international economic reform. Among the documents cited as its inspiration are Mexico's Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Action Programme on the Establishment of a new International Order of the non-aligned nations.[47] Its aim is to formulate common policies on international economic and social matters, including control of multinational corporations. However, the members are bound only to consult. On the intra-regional level SELA is supposed to be more open and pragmatic than organisations based on rigid timetables. It is to support existing integration programmes, establish multinational enterprises, conclude special agreements on exports of raw materials and imports of capital goods and technology, encourage trade liberalisation, and promote industrial complementary agreements, all among interested countries on a voluntary basis, with the Latin American Council giving final approval.[48]

[45] On multinational enterprises generally see Fernando Mateo and Eduardo White, 'Public Corporations as a Means of Distributing Costs and Benefits in a Framework of Integration', paper presented to the UNCTAD Seminar on Distribution of Costs and Benefits in Economic Integration Among Developing Countries, Guatemala City, Dec. 10–19, 1973 (Buenos Aires: INTAL, 1973), mimeo. On the Caribbean venture see *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 6, June 1975, p. 622.

[46] Attending and signing: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. For text see *Notas sobre la Economia y el Desarrollo de America Latina* (Santiago, Chile: ECLA, Nov. 1, 1975), No. 202, pp. 1–4.

[47] SELA, Grupo de Trabajo de Alto Nivel, 'Proyecto de Convenio Constitutivo', Reunion sobre et Sistema Economica Latinoamericano, SELA/GT/13, Sept. 9, 1975, pp. 1–4.

[48] *Notas sobre la Economia*, No. 202, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–4.

Mexico and Venezuela are responsible for establishing SELA. National ambitions for bloc leadership and developments at the Tlatelolco Conference of American foreign ministers in January 1974 provided the specific inducements for action.[49] This conference, a product of Henry Kissinger's 'New Dialogue Policy', was an attempt to place United States-Latin American relations on a more pragmatic footing by opening negotiations on economic and political issues previously the subject of rigid United States policies. It was held outside the OAS in order to establish a completely new climate. By developing support on such issues as energy and international economic reform the United States also hoped to cover its flank in the emerging conflict with developing countries. This took the form of calls for a hemispheric community which would include consultations and efforts to establish common positions for international economic negotiations.[50] Working groups on transnational enterprises and the transfer of technology were established to continue talks after the conference. In a related decision the OAS established the Committee to Study the Inter-American System and Propose Measures for its Restructuring (CEESI), to overhaul institutions and the Rio Treaty, the basis for sanctions against Cuba.[51]

Post-conference negotiations induced Latin America to avoid a confrontation with the United States. The Working Group on Transnational Enterprises adopted a long-standing Latin American demand that multinational corporations should submit to local jurisdiction. While CEESI produced no radical reforms in the institutions of the OAS, it did propose changing the Rio Treaty to allow a simple majority in place of the old two-thirds rule. A clear majority favoured resuming relations with Cuba. In July 1975 the OAS adopted the CEESI formula, thereby leaving each country free on relations with Cuba. In January 1975 the US Trade Reform Act became law, including provisions allowing the United States to extend non-reciprocal tariff preferences to developing countries, except for members of cartels restricting access to raw materials. This provision excluded Venezuela and Ecuador as members of OPEC from the law's benefits.[52]

[49] 'Declaracion conjunta con motivo de la visita del Estado a Venezuela del Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Luis Echeverria Alvarez de 25 a 29 de julio de 1974' in 'Visita del Estado del Presidente de Venezuela a Mexico, documentos', supplement to *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 4, April 1975.

[50] 'An address by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before the Inaugural Session of the Conference of Tlatelolco, Feb. 21, 1974' (Washington: Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Feb. 21, 1974).

[51] *El Cronista Comercial* (Buenos Aires), July 11, 1975.

[52] *La Opinion* (Buenos Aires), July 7, 1975, July 25, 1975; *El Cronista Comercial* (Buenos Aires), July 11, 1975; *La Nacion* (Buenos Aires), July 22, 1974, Nov. 19, 1974; *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 4, April 1975, pp. 376–377.

Tlatelolco and its aftermath also produced strong negative reactions, for a hemispheric community inspired fears that the United States would become the sole spokesman and detach Latin America from the Third World, while in reaction to what it regarded as United States attempts to split the region over the energy crisis Venezuela called for the unity of countries producing raw materials on the OPEC model. The anti-OPEC provisions of the new United States trade law also produced a round of denunciations which eventually scuttled a hemispheric foreign ministers' conference scheduled for Buenos Aires in March 1975.[53] Altogether, these aspects of the Tlatelolco Conference reminded Latin American nations of the benefits of bloc bargaining.

SELA was also rooted in the changing perspectives of the Latin American technocrats of ECLA, the Inter-American Development Bank, and selected university faculties and think tanks, which had supplied the ideological and conceptual impetus for multilateral co-operation.[54] A paper presented by the Institute for the Integration of Latin America (INTAL) in August 1975 to a session of the Latin American Forum, a transnational group of scholars and technocrats in Caracas, advocated a new pan-Latin American organisation along the lines of the joint Mexican-Venezuelan proposals. A new regional institution was justified as a response to the growing deterioration of the global economic system, which made collective self-help Latin America's only option. OPEC and the non-aligned movement had demonstrated the new credibility of collective bargaining with industrial nations. The new organisation would not displace the OAS, but would 'clarify' the dialogue with the United States within it. Ideological pluralism and non-intervention in any nation's internal affairs would be basic principles. Venezuela and Mexico had acquired prestigious intellectual support for SELA, while the technocrats gained the opportunity to salvage the system of multilateral co-operation they had long advocated.[55]

[53] *El Comercio* (Quito), Feb. 26, 1974. For Echeverria speech see *Clarin* (Buenos Aires), Feb. 22, 1974; Caldera quoted in *Ultimas Noticias* (Caracas), Feb. 22, 1974, and Calvani in *Excelsior* (Mexico City), Feb. 22, 1974. Brazilian opposition reported in *La Mañana* (Montevideo), Feb. 24, 1974; for Vignes on cancellation of foreign ministers' conference see TELAM (Buenos Aires), Jan. 27, 1975 (FBIS).

[54] For a study of this transnational elite's outlook see Edward Milenky, 'Problems, Perspectives and Modes of Analysis: Understanding the Latin American Approach to World Affairs' in Hellman and Rosenbaum, *op. cit.*

[55] 'Hacia el futuro: el Pacto constituyente de la Comunidad Latinoamericana', *op. cit.* See also the following for evidence that the SELA concept represented long-term intellectual gestation: Luciano Tomassini, 'Hacia nuevas formas de cooperacion latinoamericana', *Comercio Exterior*, Vol. 25, No. 4, April 1975; Carlos Perez Llana, 'Principales aspectos que presentato las relaciones intra-latinoamericanas', Mesa Redonda sobre el Subsistema Latinoamericana y su Participacion en el Sistema Internacional, Buenos Aires, July 3-5, 1974 (Buenos Aires: INTAL, n.d.), mimeo; and from the same round table, Felix Peña, *op. cit.*, sem. 26, dt. 4.

However, support for a new regional organisation was not universal. The Mexican-Venezuelan project implied a confrontation with the United States, particularly if its bid for natural resources diplomacy on the OPEC model was taken literally, and possibly the end of the OAS as well. Initially, Argentina and Brazil opposed SELA on these grounds. Neither was willing to submit to Venezuelan and Mexican leadership of Latin America. In February 1975 Ecuador flatly rejected any new Latin American organisation in favour of strengthening the OAS. While continuing to support the project, Mexico and Venezuela resorted to private assurances that SELA would neither spark off a confrontation with the United States nor replace the Inter-American System.[56]

Since October 1975 the Latin American Economic System has attempted to fill CECLA's old role. The meeting in January 1976 prepared a position paper for the ministerial-level meeting of the Group of 77, which was held in Manila the following month, and for the session of UNCTAD in Nairobi in May 1976. In a comprehensive declaration SELA reconfirmed the old CECLA programme for international economic reform and endorsed the resolutions of the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly on the establishment of a common reserve fund to support buffer stocks and prices for basic products, control of multinational corporations, and liberalisation of access to technology. The January meeting also declared that the organisation's main objective would be the establishment of multinational enterprises to promote development, with special attention to sugar, fertilisers, aluminium and basic products.[57]

As long as SELA concentrates on the consensus established by a decade of Latin American collective consultation on international economic reform, it will be able to fill a well-established place in the Latin American regional system. However, the organisation will not be able to overcome completely the tensions introduced by the energy crisis, intra-regional balance-of-power politics, deep ideological divisions among Latin American nations over such issues as the Middle East and the political as distinct from the economic goals of the non-aligned group, and the character and intentions of individual governments. Signs of these differences appeared in the UN vote on the General Assembly's anti-Zionist resolution. Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Grenada and Guyana supported it, while the others abstained or were

[56] Venezuelan Finance Minister Hector Hurtado visited Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, while Mexican Secretary of National Properties Francisco Javier Alejo went to Guatemala—*LATIN* (Buenos Aires), Feb. 17 and 19, 1975 (FBIS), AFP (Paris), Feb. 21, 1975 (FBIS).

[57] *LATIN* (Buenos Aires), Jan. 1, 1976; *Integración Latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires: INTAL), Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1976, pp. 55–59.

opposed. Voting reflected attitudes towards the United States as well as attempts to curry favour with the Arabs.[58] At the January meeting of SELA, Venezuela faced an ultimately unsuccessful effort to force discussion of aid to offset the impact of higher oil prices. Cuba's Angolan adventures and encouragement of black revolutionaries in the Caribbean led to the cancellation of a Latin American summit meeting scheduled for the 150th anniversary, in June 1976, of Bolivar's Amphyctionic Congress of Panama.[59]

Another demonstration of the limitations of SELA occurred during its ministerial-level meeting in June 1976. Scheduled simultaneously with the Santiago session of the OAS General Assembly, the SELA gathering attracted a few of the economy ministers who were supposed to plan a joint development programme and in fact accomplished nothing.[60] Brazil and the military governments of the southern zone of South America gave priority to reviving political and military co-operation with the United States in the face of renewed Cuban activities in the hemisphere and the emerging Soviet threat to the South Atlantic sea lanes. Thus, at best, SELA will promote a few discrete multinational development projects but it is unlikely to lead to high levels of economic or political co-operation.

**The present pattern of multilateral diplomacy**

All these changes have produced a new pattern of multilateral diplomacy in Latin America. Compared to the pre-1973 period, intra-regional institutions are weaker. SELA will not become the directorate for a cohesive Latin American bloc. OLADE will remain a diplomatic gesture. Older organisations perform only technical functions. Previously important indicators of growing integration, such as intra-regional trade, have been overshadowed by global political and economic pressures. The international interests of Latin American nations have diverged. Therefore, distintegration—defined as the weakening of institutionalised relationships, modes of collective decision-making, and the ability of a group of states to act as a unit for certain purposes—has occurred.

Latin America has become a more distinct region within the international system. Individual governments are more aware of, and prone to consider, each other as factors in the formulation of foreign policy. Economic and political interaction is more intense, it is taking on more of a pan-Latin American character, and increasingly involves a

[58] *NY Times*, Nov. 12, 1975, p. 16.

[59] *NY Times*, Feb. 4, 1976, p. 3; *Critica* (Panama City), Feb. 29, 1976, p. 4; *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), April 29, 1976, p. 4.

[60] *LATIN* (Buenos Aires), June 7, 1976.

still somewhat distinct group of Caribbean countries. Internal and external observers recognise Latin America as a separate theatre of international politics with the relationships which exclude outside powers.[61] Therefore, interdependence, the ability of one state to affect another, has increased.[62]

This new pattern of multilateral diplomacy will affect the collective and individual behaviour of Latin American nations. The present international crisis has reminded virtually all governments, with the possible exceptions of Venezuela and Brazil, that they occupy low status positions in the international power hierarchy and that the world is bipolar for the most critical relationships but muiltipolar for certain forms of economic power. Intra-regional autarchy has been revealed as a mirage. The new pattern suggests that Latin American nations are prepared to make instrumental use of bloc bargaining on economic issues and selected joint developments as second-choice, but necessary, concessions to their weakness in world affairs. However, competition within the Latin American group to manipulate the instruments of collective solidarity for national benefit will be intense.

Important policy implications derive from these observations. SELA was established primarily to negotiate with the United States, Latin America's most important economic partner and still its most dominant political reality. So far only Cuba is willing to submit to the even more grievous servitudes attached to membership in the Soviet camp. Western Europe is turning to its former colonies for secure sources of raw materials and placing its faith in its ability to trade weapons and technology for Arab oil. Association with the non-aligned group can bring Latin America increased negotiating leverage on international economic reform issues, but cannot meet its needs for trade, capital and technology. In brief, from the Latin American perspective the global system is evolving towards a set of north-south relationships between developed and developing nations which exist apart from the United States-Soviet political-military confrontation. Maintaining national independence and re-establishing momentum towards economic growth, the most critical tasks of Latin American governments, thus become more difficult and more perilous.

Therefore, Latin American nations, collectively and individually, are likely to fall back upon a familiar strategy for the weak—pragmatic opportunism. Collective and individual negotiation with the United States will be set off against collective and individual negotiation with

[61] *Cf.* list of regional subsystem attributes compiled in William R. Thompson, 'The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explanation and a Propositional Inventory', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1973, p. 93.

[62] *Cf.* Oran R. Young, 'Interdependencies in World Politics', *International Journal*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Autumn 1969, p. 726.

the non-aligned group and its various member nations. Isolation is the most perilous condition in an anarchistic free-for-all international system. Consequently, multilateral diplomacy directed primarily towards extra-regional targets, supplemented by intra-regional action but frequently disrupted by competitive struggles among leading nations, will be a central feature of the Latin American region.

# REVIEWS

## CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

**The Erosion of a Relationship:** India and Britain since 1960. By Michael Lipton and John Firn. *London, New York, Delhi: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1975. 427 pp. £13·00.*

'THERE are some dramatic facts to explain: for example, . . . in 1970, British exports to India were worth half as much as in 1960, and one third of the real 1956 level'. I think few people would object that 'dramatic' was too extreme an adjective. Nor is this particular fact atypical; on the contrary, it is only too typical and the message which pervades this excellent book is that the ties between Britain and India have steadily declined since independence. This is not surprising in itself. However, the extent of the decline is, and on virtually every variable examined, except Indian immigration to Britain, and (absurdly) net Indian technical assistance *to* Britain, mainly in the form of Indian doctors, the figures show a marked decline, and a very steep decline during the 1960s. To take just two examples. In 1960 the percentage of British exports which went to India was not a great deal less than it had been in 1950, but by 1970 it had collapsed from 4·1 per cent (1960) to only 0·9 per cent. The number of Indian students in British universities in 1970–71 was 58 per cent of the number ten years earlier. These are very big falls. The book emphasises the economic dimension, and some of this, as the authors seem rather ambiguously to admit, is because of the greater tendency of economic factors to throw up measurable indicators. However, they do not ignore other factors; education and the image the media of the two countries present of the other are discussed among other things in some detail. Besides, the economic indicators are of great importance in themselves, and the rapid decline of the economic connection may well be as much a causal factor as anything else in the decline in the other links.

The major part of the book is concerned with the facts of the situation, but the authors do offer some explanations. Their major contribution, however, is to show that there are some facts which require explanation. Now, that some decline in the relationship would occur between Britain and India after independence is hardly surprising. One would presume that Britain's imperial position would mean that the links between the countries would be kept at some artificially high level. Thus some of the decline is simply the consequence of the removal of the artificiality. That this accelerated during the 1960s is also not surprising. A time lag would be expected. Nevertheless, the extent of the decline does require examination. One of the major explanations offered by Lipton and Firn is that it was due to absentmindedness, though they put it slightly differently. In effect both sides have been involved in other things and have not devoted a great deal of effort to securing this relationship. This is perhaps even more true on the British side than the Indian. Despite the nostalgia which resides in the collective consciousness for India (Kipling is being rehabilitated, though the Indians may not find this a positive indication), in practice there is very little interest in

Indian affairs. The wars of the Indian subcontinent seemed to arouse much less concern than those of the Middle East despite the major rearrangements within the subcontinent itself and the implications as far as relations between China and the Soviet Union are concerned.

An argument like this is one of the class of arguments which holds that people can only hold a certain number of things in their active attention for so long. This seems plausible. For the most part, the relationship was not reduced in any active way; it just declined.

There are of course other reasons behind this. Economic ties reduced markedly, and a good deal of this development can be attributed to both India and Britain being low-growth economies. All things being equal, if a country exports to two other economies, one a low-growth and the other a high-growth economy, then over time the relative proportion of exports going to the high-growth economy will increase. It appears that too many things really were equal in both India and Britain. If the level of economic transactions affects that of other transactions, then the rest follows. So perhaps the whole thing is not a mystery after all—but only after Lipton and Firn have explored and analysed it in detail.

The book is essentially based on statistical arguments. It is a model of what I suppose could be called ' Applied Political Economy '. The statistical tables are in an appendix but when discussed in the text one is never in doubt what bit of which table is being used. The authors are careful to distinguish reliable statistics from the ones about which they have had to make a hopeful guess. In the mass of statistics the reader is never lost, which is remarkable. Econometric techniques are not used simply because they are not necessary (nor even particularly useful) in an exercise of this kind. This is a book which I found both enjoyable and instructive.

*Richardson Institute, London* MICHAEL NICHOLSON

**Energy as a Factor in Soviet foreign Policy.** By Jeremy Russell. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough: Saxon House for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 241 pp. £7·50.*

As an up-to-date assessment of an important and topical set of issues, this study is to be welcomed. I have some reservations about it which I shall mention in a moment, but it is informative, and both the interpretation of past events and the assessment of future prospects are judicious. This is as it should be, for Mr. Russell is an oil-industry executive. He is the Shell Group's Area Manager for the Soviet Union, and the book is the product of a year's sabbatical spent at Chatham House.

Part I is devoted to an assessment of the Comecon energy position. It includes chapters on the Soviet energy balance, the Soviet oil, gas, coal and electricity-supply industries and the energy position in the East European Comecon countries. The focus in each case is on developments since about 1960 and prospects up to 1980. Part II deals with foreign-trade and foreign-policy implications and includes a rather longer-run projection—for oil only—up to 1985.

Mr. Russell argues that many Western commentators have over-dramatised the Soviet energy position. He does not accept the very dim view of the Soviet energy sector's performance and prospects which a number of American authors have expressed. He therefore does not share the belief

that the Soviet Union desperately needs Western credits and technology for Siberian oil and gas projects if it is to avoid a substantial energy deficit in the near future. Nor does he think it likely that the Comecon group as a whole will become net energy importers by 1980.

His projection for 1980 (p. 124) is that the Comecon countries will be importing more oil than at present from the Middle East but will remain, on balance, net exporters to the rest of the world of about 10–15 million tonnes of oil, 25–35 million tonnes of coal and a modest volume of natural gas. He does, however, consider it likely (p. 135) that by the mid-1980s the East European oil deficit will exceed the Soviet oil surplus so that Comecon may have a net oil import of perhaps 50 million tonnes a year.

Both the projected 1980 net energy exports and the projected 1985 net oil imports are small in relation to the rest of the world's fuel trade and energy consumption. One important conclusion of the study therefore is that Comecon is not likely to do a great deal either to solve or to compound the energy problems of the rest of the world. On the whole, this is convincingly argued.

On the more directly political issues the book is sensible and therefore almost totally inconclusive. The author reminds us that the Soviet leaders want Western technology; do not want a super-power confrontation; want to increase their influence in the Middle East; perceive the West's vulnerability to reduced and/or more expensive oil supplies, and will weigh these and other considerations in future policy-making. The reader is left with only one firm conviction: that the future lies ahead.

The most interesting discussion of political issues refers to the recent past. Mr. Russell shows, for instance, how the jump in oil prices after the Yom Kippur war reinforced Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. On the one hand, it reduced the pressure on the Soviet Union to deliver larger volumes of oil to the West in order to earn more hard currency, thus making it easier to increase supplies to Eastern Europe. On the other hand, it made the resort to Middle East oil vastly more expensive for Eastern Europe, thus reinforcing dependence on Soviet supplies. In short, the OPEC countries did more by a single decision to foster a more 'organic structure' among the Warsaw Pact countries than American diplomacy could ever aspire to under the bizarre Sonnenfeldt doctrine.

This book suffers from a certain sacrifice of careful analysis and presentation for the sake of being up-to-date. There are too many drafting errors, such as references in Chapter 3 to non-existent tables, which should have been corrected. It is disappointing, too, that an author professionally acquainted with both the Soviet and Western oil industries should offer no serious comparison of their technical and managerial performance. The treatment of Comecon energy-consumption and fuel-substitution prospects is cursory.

The economic arguments are occasionally unclear or wrong, as in the assertion (p. 35) that average production costs are the costs that are relevant to Soviet foreign-trade decisions. It is marginal costs that matter: there is no point in developing, say, high-cost East Siberian gas for export if the imports the Soviet Union will get in exchange could be produced domestically with fewer resources. This remains true even if other gas exports are less costly and total gas exports are on average 'profitable'. And the judgment (p. 176) that only emergency grain imports now prevent the Soviet Union

from generating hard-currency surpluses will not survive a confrontation with the 1975 trade figures: grain imports were about $1·2 billion and the hard-currency deficit was $6·3 billion.

Despite these presentational blemishes and analytical loose ends, however, the book provides a valuable background to Soviet policy.

*University of Birmingham* PHILIP HANSON

**Choices for the Japanese Economy.** By Hiroshi Kitamura. *London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 211 pp. £7·00.*

THIS book has come out, appropriately enough, at a time when the internal as well as external conditions underlying the Japanese economy are passing through a period of decisive change. Preceded by an introductory chapter, the main body of the book is divided into two parts, 'the domestic aspects' and 'the international aspects', each consisting of four chapters. Professor Kitamura's purpose is essentially to re-examine from these standpoints the implications of Japan's spectacular economic growth and industrial development during the past two decades in order to evaluate the future options open to it.

In the first part, although the author devotes one chapter to a succinct survey of crucial factors leading to the 'miraculous' growth of the Japanese economy, greater emphasis is placed on the demerits of the particular pattern of its economic expansion. In particular, he stresses, rightly, that until quite recently public policy was so preoccupied with fostering investment and production in the private sector, especially in the heavy and chemical industries, that it grossly neglected the parallel expansion of the supply of public goods and services as well as the problem of environmental conservation. Indeed, Japan has been substantially lagging behind Western standards in such fields as housing, sewage systems, social security, and higher education; in fact, in recent years the government has been proclaiming the need for more welfare-oriented planning policies, though still in vague and abstract terms. It is a pity therefore that the author is no more concrete than official publications are in specifying the programme for a welfare society. At least one would have liked to know more precisely what ought to be the guiding principles in a modern mixed capitalistic economy concerning, on the one hand, the proper division of labour between the private or market sector, which is in charge of efficient production, and the public sector responsible for communal objectives, and, on the other hand, the appropriate correspondence between objectives and measures of economic policy. Professor Kitamura's repeated emphasis on the need to raise the share of private consumption in the gross national product and to adjust the distributive share in favour of labour is particularly puzzling in this context, because these shares are rather questionable, or at best indirect and perhaps remote, indicators of social balance and equity. Readers would have been given a better perspective if the arguments had been cast in terms of the balance between private and public sectors in their consumption and investment activities rather than of private consumption-savings decisions, and of the distribution of income and wealth at the personal level rather than of the functional distribution of income between labour and capital.

In the second part of the book the author considers from various angles

the problem of adjustments in Japan's external accounts; and, understandably, the greater part of the discussion is addressed to the question of adjusting its huge balance-of-payments surplus in the period 1968–72. Many of the conclusions in this part, however, appear to rest on questionable foundations, and the suggestions made are controversial. For example, Professor Kitamura considers that 'a mere adjustment in the exchange rate would have amounted to an attack on the surface phenomenon of international imbalance', because it 'would not lead to an equilibrating growth of productivity among various sectors or to making changes to lay more emphasis on welfare and consumption' (p. 173). And he suggests that 'a more straightforward solution' would consist of 'an increase in the relative share of labour' and 'a determined policy to raise the share of consumption and social services in the final demand structure' (p. 174). Apparently, there is a confusion between ends and means. Another controversial line of argument is the idea of adjustment through capital transfers. In various places the author advocates policy measures to encourage increased transfer of capital abroad, including foreign aid, as a preferable method to the realignment of the exchange rate. There are, however, good reasons for not subjecting international capital movements and foreign aid to balance-of-payments considerations, just as there are with respect to current-account transactions.

It may be inevitable that many topics and ideas can only be touched on rather superficially, but on the whole the book is rather disappointing in respect of analysis and policy implications. Even so, it contains useful information on recent developments of the Japanese economy with liberal drawings on materials which are relatively inaccessible to foreign students because of the language barrier.

*Kobe University, Japan* AKIHIRO AMANO

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

**The International Political System.** By F. S. Northedge. *London: Faber. 1976. 336 pp. £6·95. Pb: £3·25.*

THIS book, which represents the author's life-time experience of introducing his students to the complexities of international politics, is an excellent summary of what may be called the 'traditional' wisdom, gleaned from the study of history and of its interpretation, enlivened by occasional shrewd insights and by apt historical illustrations. About half of the text is devoted to the international system itself and the other to the behaviour of the states within it. The central thesis is simple and sensible: first, that there is something which can be meaningfully called an 'international system'; second, that the states are by far the most important units within it; and, third, that the behaviour of states shows important uniformities stemming from their common membership of the system, although it shows also differences arising from their different domestic systems. Professor Northedge's history is accurate; moreover, he acknowledges the limitations of his approach, occasionally referring to domestic or transnational politics and to non-state units.

Books so broad in their contents are, by definition, vulnerable to a variety of criticisms and it would be grossly unfair to claim that the author should

have written his book in a different vein. It is hard to assess the reactions of individual readers but they are likely either to ask whether the analysis is fully up-to-date, especially regarding the international position of states, or to question the depth of treatment and the methodology.

To start with the former, the analysis is firmly rooted in Western experience relating to the pre-1914 period and perhaps even more strongly, the rationalist traditions of the nineteenth century. The author repeatedly mentions the geographical expansion of the system and the new states. But would many of the citizens of the latter accept the validity of the Western view of the evolution of the international system and of the Western rational assessment of interests and policies? Surely in the new world of the commodity-rich and of the voting power of the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations the traditional notions of power and of rationally assessed traditional interests have lost much of their utility. Moreover, although it is true, as Professor Northedge claims, that the states have not been displaced as primary actors within the international system, surely the near-universal recognition of their inadequacy to secure the major social objectives of domestic societies requires recognition. For, although it may have been true in the past that the state was primarily a vehicle of foreign policy, is it still true today, as the author asserts? To the average citizen the state is primarily an instrument of domestic politics and the resulting impact of domestic politics upon foreign policy consequently becomes an all-important phenomenon which the author does not adequately recognise, let alone analyse.

Second, although he is admirably clear and convincing in his taxonomies and diagrams, his analysis fails to reflect the refinements available in contemporary analysis of international relations which he does not utilise. Owing to the lack of a clear analytical focus, his history of the antecedent and the contemporary international systems consists of not readily comparable brief histories; Professor Modelski's recent analysis in terms of imperial and pluralist tendencies is much more telling.[1] The discussion of 'interests' is couched in terms of the traditional rational models of *raison d'état* (Chapters 9 and 3), without analysing the subjective nature of evaluations, the fluctuating nature of the salience of individual interests, and their ideological and symbolic implications; the application of the theories of bargaining would have greatly improved Chapter 11; the important issues of the spectrum between hostility and friendship discussed in the rather obscurely named Chapter 13 on 'States of International Relations' have been more cogently analysed in terms of 'affect'; perhaps most importantly, the analysis of conflict suffers from the absence of the theory of games and does not come to grips with the central issue of the relationship between conflict and co-operation.[2]

With all these reservations, this is a good book. It is based upon a wide range of readings and is extremely well organised, written and produced—the only printer's lapse noted refers to the misspelling of Adda B. Bozeman's name (pp. 35 and 44).

*University of Southampton* J. FRANKEL

[1] George Modelski, *Principles of World Politics* (New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1972). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1973, p. 431.

[2] Joseph Frankel, *International Politics: Conflict and Harmony* (London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1971, p. 112.

**Détente.** Edited by G. R. Urban. *London: Temple Smith. 1976. 368 pp. £8·00.*

THIS stimulating and well-produced book—certainly one of the most worthwhile to have come out of the European security conference (CSCE) debate so far—seems, with a few notable exceptions, to have received less publicity than it deserves. It comprises some dozen 'in-depth' interviews originally conducted by the editor on Radio Free Europe between 1973 and 1975: all of them of high quality, coming from a panel of experts well versed in their fields, though by no means uniform, or predictable, in their opinions. A short review cannot do much more than indicate the contents. The former Austrian Vice-Chancellor, Bruno Pittermann, on 'the moral factor in foreign policy'; Sir William Hayter, who presents what may be termed the classical case for detente; François Bondy, and Robert Byrnes (University of Indiana), who discuss critically the subject of cultural exchanges and agreements; the strategist, J. J. Holst, now State Secretary at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, on 'Security as mutual education'; Wolf Halsti, soldier and historian, of Finland, on (appropriately) 'Finlandisation'; Richard Pipes, Professor of Russian History at Harvard, on Western ideological inertia; Alfred Grosser on 'The French paradox'; Claus Kernig (Trier University) and Adam Ulam (Harvard), whose opposing views are illustrated by their respective titles—'Why world stability requires the stability of the Soviet system' and 'Why the status quo in Eastern Europe is a threat to Soviet security'; and last but not least, three further eminent Americans, George Ball, Dean Rusk and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

If any one contribution may be singled out, it is perhaps Wolf Halsti's whose convincing analysis is based on much first-hand experience of, and reflection on, the actuality of close relations with the Soviet Union—and is aided not a little by Urban's informed questioning. He is concerned to distinguish between *limitation* and *erosion* of Finnish independence, arguing that in fact the country's freedom of manoeuvre is strikingly greater today than thirty years ago. Halsti is realistic about Soviet security preoccupations, and the need for meeting these, but condemns 'Stalin's disastrous decision to impose the communist system on Eastern Europe', characterising it 'a tragedy both for the Soviet Union and for the whole of Europe that after the war these nations were not given time to hammer out in peace and at their own volition a balanced relationship with the Soviet Union' (p. 162). Where the Finns themselves are concerned, he insists that while remaining loyal to their treaty obligations they will never accept forced sovietisation. And despite his emphasis on the essentially non-European nature of the Soviet regime ('an oriental polity'), he is not without a certain hope as to its gradual reform. By contrast, he is somewhat pessimistic about the West, America and Europe alike, not least its will and ability for effective defence. Altogether, this is a fascinating essay, with vivid personal touches.

The volume concludes with a lengthy dialogue between Leopold Labedz and François Duchêne, which takes account of the foregoing material without, however, attempting any kind of synthesis. There is, on the contrary, a basic difference of approach between them, which—to the extent that so subtle and wide-ranging an argument is capable of summary—may be indicated in the editor's closing paragraph:

One of the decisive questions the last quarter of the twentieth century

> will have to answer is whether the problems arising from the world conceived as a single system will in fact de-politicise and de-ideologise . . . the conflict between East and West, which threatens (otherwise) to imprint its particular imperatives on the world's diversified preoccupations (p. 347).

Duchêne thinks they will, indeed are already doing so. Labedz disagrees.

A final word of praise is due to George Urban, not only for his skilful editing of so much varied material, but also for his own substantial contribution to the interviews themselves, which is by no means confined to serving as a foil to his distinguished interlocutors.

MICHAEL F. CULLIS

**Mission for Hammarskjöld:** The Congo Crisis. By Rajeshwar Dayal. *London, Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1976. 335 pp. £7·00.*

FROM September 1960 to May 1961 Rajeshwar Dayal was the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo and as such in charge of the United Nations operation there during a long and crucial period in its melancholy but heroic history. He is the last major figure of that enterprise still surviving whose memoirs we lack; *Mission for Hammarskjöld* therefore fills a serious gap in the historical record. It does so with a combination of personal commitment and scholarly objectivity altogether commendable and strikingly at variance with some other personal narratives surviving from that period. Yet scrupulous respect for the record and a studied restraint in assessments of character and motive have not prevented Mr. Dayal from conveying the uniqueness of the Congo operation: the snake pit beneath the civilised veneer, the disparities of diplomatic nicety and tribal ferocity, the combination of sophisticated intrigue and primitive passion. There are graphic pictures of Mobutu as a Congolese Hamlet dependent on whisky and sympathy, of von Horn's abstention from his duties at the peak of one of ONUC's military crises, of Forminière, the mining company, flying out its weekly production of diamonds over the heads of starving refugees outside its compound. And throughout the whole narrative, like an unexorcisable spirit, wanders the figure of Lumumba, to whom Mr. Dayal devotes a chapter of keen insight and unusually balanced analysis.

The figure, however, that dominates the book is, as its title suggests, that of Dag Hammarskjöld. There was obviously a rapport between the Secretary-General and his Special Representative which transcended the identity of diplomatic and political viewpoints. True, a seasoned and tough-minded Indian diplomat was uniquely qualified to fill the key role in the Congo operation—if, that is, anyone could be qualified to control chaos. But the fact that Dayal and Hammarskjöld found the same things and persons admirable, comical or tragical as the case might be, meant that for this period of the Congo operation—and perhaps for this period only—there was a close meshing of gears between New York and Leopoldville, a genuine reliance by each on the reactions of the other. As an instrument for maintaining this intimacy Hammarskjöld relied heavily on an outpouring of information and guidance—almost a daily ' thinking aloud ' by cable, such as made his Representative privy to his personal opinions and impressions as well as fully briefed about official directives. Extensive quotations from these Hammarskjöld cables constitute the most interesting new material in the

book. Ironic, inspiriting, oracular by turns, they offer a unique glimpse into the mind of the Secretary-General as well as highly informative insights into the workings of the Advisory Committee on which he so much relied.

The book's personal narrative ends with Dayal's recall, a sacrifice by Secretary-General and Special Representative alike to the pressures of the Western powers whose behaviour throughout the Congo incident remains a permanent blot on the record of postwar Western diplomacy. But the book, true to its main focus, follows the Congo story through to Hammarskjöld's final personal involvement. A final chapter assesses Hammarskjöld's philosophy of action with shrewdness and a deeply penetrating sympathy.

A set of helpful biographical notes on the principal Congolese figures and a useful bibliography—which, however, omits Brian Urquhart's invaluable *Hammarskjöld* [1]—are appended.

*New College, Oxford* H. G. NICHOLAS

**Guerres, Révolutions, Croix-Rouge:** Réflexions sur la rôle du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge. By Jacques Freymond. *Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales. 1976. 222 pp. Pb.*

THIS book is a candid and revealing analysis of the problems that the Swiss-staffed International Red Cross faces in a world torn by internal political conflicts and terrorism. The author, Professor Jacques Freymond, Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, served for several years on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The organisation, he says, must change with the times if it is to discharge successfully its humanitarian role in countries where governments fight ' armed political movements ' and where the Geneva Conventions are so often ignored. Adapt, or lose much of the prestige built up over decades of magnificent work—this is the stark choice as Professor Freymond sees it.

The ICRC, he submits, has failed so far to formulate a long-term strategy for dealing with the civil wars and acts of terrorism that affect international peace. He reviews the experiences (some of them personal) of Vietnam, Nigeria and the Middle East. Is there still a role for the Red Cross to play in this world of violence? Professor Freymond answers with an affirmative hedged with reservations. The purpose of his study is ' to draw attention to the political dimension of humanitarian work ' (p. x).

The reader finds little but praise in *Guerres, Révolutions, Croix-Rouge* for the man known as the ' third combatant ', the Red Cross delegate who risks his life in the field. The success or failure of an intervention depends on his personality, his devotion to duty, his sense of initiative and his political know-how. Yet, over the years, ' the ICRC has lost some of its best delegates . . . through clumsiness or negligence on the part of the central administration ' (p. 12). The challenges must not be underestimated. Events burst upon the ICRC and require the immediate mobilisation of additional personnel. Thus, few outside the Geneva headquarters realise that during a six-month period of the Nigerian conflict, the Red Cross had 2,000 people in the field, 600–700 vehicles, a dozen aircraft and several ships. The budgetary outlay was 340 million Swiss francs.

Image-building was never one of the strongest achievements of an

[1] London: Bodley Head, 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1973, p. 524.

organisation pledged to discretion or total secrecy. Professor Freymond sees a need for a better information policy if the Red Cross is to surmount the 'rather widespread indifference of the general public' (p. 46). Case histories deserve to be published more fully and promptly where publication does not hinder future negotiations. Archives should be more easily accessible to bona fide researchers.

The suggestion has been made that the efficiency of the ICRC might gain from an admixture of outside talent, in the form of 'associated' or 'corresponding foreign members'. Professor Freymond agrees. But the most immediate task, as outlined in this study, is the elaboration of a humanitarian policy in a period of increasing violence: a task for the forthcoming Diplomatic Conference of the Red Cross. The attention of the public, of governments and of leaders of 'armed political movements' must be focused upon the need to extend the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to the victims of internal troubles. 'In a revolutionary era the Red Cross must not be a toy in the hands of adults' (p. 187).

F. AUBERJONOIS

## DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

**Nations in Arms:** The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence. By Adam Roberts. *London: Chatto and Windus for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1976. 288 pp. (Studies in International Security no. 18.) £7·50.*

TERRITORIAL defence, in simple terms, amounts to using a combination of conventional military tactics, guerrilla warfare and civil disobedience to absorb exterior aggression within the territory of the state under attack. Counter-offensive action of any kind is banned, the aim being to wear down the invader or, better, to offer so indigestible a target that it will deter aggression. Such a doctrine, of course, flies in the face of the precepts of classical strategy, but it underlies the defensive thinking of a number of states, and in Nato it has been considered by some thoughtful officers as a means of adding depth to the defence by using a locally raised and locally deployed militia. The doctrine is open to many objections, but it commands much attention and cannot be lightly dismissed. This scholarly study by Adam Roberts, who has long been interested in the subject, is therefore timely and welcome.

His main examples are the defensive systems of two well-contrasted states: on the one hand Sweden, traditionally pacific, vulnerable, highly civilised and with an advanced arms industry, and on the other Yugoslavia, backward and ill-armed, but with a terrain ideally suited to a protracted defence by light troops and a strong martial tradition. He opens with an essay on the intellectual origins of the theory, beginning with Guibert and going on through Engels to the present day, concluding with two thoughtful chapters on the limitations of such a strategy and its possible wider application as an alternative to the 'offensive-defensive', in which he disarms many of the objections which spring to mind. All the same, some of these must be stated, although none detracts from the value of Mr. Roberts's analysis, which is descriptive rather than prescriptive and altogether to be admired.

For instance: can any strategic system suitable for one set of circumstances, made possible by the culture of the defenders as much as by the

material factors, ever be reduced to a theory for universal application? The so-called 'principles' of the classical strategists are nothing so scientific as a 'theory': they are merely rules of thumb, or guidelines.

The fact that there is no prospect of defence other than the miseries of a ruinous guerrilla war may actually deter the *defenders* from attempting to resist and encourage the aggressor to hold the pistol to their heads. 'Deterrence' is in any case a vague and imponderable concept.

What protection does the system offer against a *partial* occupation—as in Kashmir, for instance; or a blockade—Berlin, for example; or any low-level harassment?

There are no exclusive strategies in war: success depends on a combination of complementary strategies and any one used alone is almost certain to fail (i.e., pre-emptive, retaliatory or counter-offensive action; the 'indirect approach', economic sanctions, frontier defence and territorial defence in depth).

While some see the all-professional long-service army as a possible threat to the state, might it not be equally unwise to create a universal militia with its arms ready to hand at all times?

Is it unfair to suggest that part of the attraction of the doctrine to many students of defence is that it compromises between their moral repugnance to war and defence needs and so holds out false hopes that the brutal realities of offensive action can be avoided? Would it not be intellectually more honest for them to choose the course of complete non-violence?

These are all questions demanding an answer, and students of international and national security will be grateful to Adam Roberts, who has provided so factual, scholarly and informed a basis for the debate.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

**The Management of Defence.** Papers presented at the National Defence College, Latimer, in September 1974. Edited by Laurence Martin. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 137 pp. £6·95.*

THIS might be regarded as an exploratory volume into an area that has been 'under-exposed' to academic investigation. It is the second collection of papers to emanate from the National Defence College, and arises from a seminar held in September 1974 to examine decision-making in a predominantly British defence environment. As British practice appears to have derived much from American efforts, it is appropriate that one of the papers —by Professor John Dawson—should be concerned with American views on defence management. However, the transatlantic differences are very great, and Michael Hobkirk and J. W. Gibson—both from the 'inside' of government—are at pains to draw the distinctions: Hobkirk quite specifically in the opening chapter on British and American defence organisation and policy-making, and Gibson in dealing with the achievements of systems analysis.

The 'insiders' are essentially concerned with 'micro' organisation. The 'macro' view tends to come from 'outsiders'—from John Garnett and Gavin Kennedy, who respectively examine the constraints on defence policy-makers, and the uses and limitations of economic analysis. The differences in perspective lead to strikingly different judgments on the process of defence management. To the 'insiders'—perhaps looking for calmer waters after

a decade or more of upheaval and turbulence—what exists (or what existed in September 1974) is thought to be '. . . an adequate machinery . . . for ensuring that sensible questions are asked as well as for the provision of timely answers' (p. 90). That such complacency may be unwarranted is suggested by the 'outsiders'. This is especially so of John Garnett's stressing of the essentially 'messy' nature of decision-making, and suggesting that decisions far from being the result of reasoned argument and reflection about the specific issue, are a consequence of 'organisational strife between rival departments, sections, and individuals' (p. 39). The need to recognise the reality of bureaucratic politics is also a feature of Gavin Kennedy's paper in which he suggests not only some of the virtues, and some of the vices, of economic analysis, but also seeks to develop the technique from marginal cost analysis to compensatory cost analysis.

A third, and totally different, perspective is provided by Admiral Eberle who examines the command structure within the defence organisation. He suggests lines upon which it could, in future, be developed to give a supreme command structure suited for both crisis and day-to-day operation of the services. The Admiral, rather tentatively, touches on the idea of unbalanced national contributions to a unified alliance posture—an idea that might repay more vigorous examination.

Obviously, a volume produced from conference papers is unlikely to be comprehensive, but there are some surprising blank areas. From the micro-perspective there is very little that emerges on the internal constraints within government, other than that there is intra-mural competition for limited resources. One might have expected some illumination of the relations of the Ministry of Defence to other government departments, especially the Foreign Office, with which one might expect some degree of harmony, and the Treasury, where one might expect a degree of discord. It would also, for example, have been of great interest to have been given some enlightenment as to whether the merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices made defence management any simpler or more effective. And in the macro-perspective, how are the commitments determined? Does the ability—now claimed by the 'insiders'—to ask the right questions give any assurance concerning the quality of the answers, or the interpretation of the answers? These questions, and a host more, reinforce Professor Martin's editorial comments that the volume as a whole raises more questions than it answers. But the volume does serve the extremely useful purpose of bringing together a wide range of thoughts on defence management and as such it is to be welcomed as a valuable addition to a meagre field.

*Lanchester Polytechnic* ROGER CAREY

**The Soviet-American Arms Race.** By Colin S. Gray. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough: Heath. 1976 196 pp. £6·25.*

**The Dynamics of the Arms Race.** Edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. *London: Croom Helm. 1975. 244 pp. £6·00.*

BOTH books are of considerable interest to students of arms control and disarmament. Gray's extended essay on the choices in defence policy open to the American government is a useful, stimulating and, in certain respects, scholarly contribution to strategic studies. Unfortunately it is also over-extended, digressive, often obscure, frequently marred by murky syntax, and

poorly edited. But it is worth careful consideration. As an academic text it provides a meandering, but for all that instructive, guide to a variety of perspectives of arms race dynamics and patterns of strategic interaction. As a policy study (an earlier version was written for Rand and issued in 1974) it adds weight to the attack on the MAD/SALT tendencies of the Kissinger years. Gray's prescription for a revised American strategic policy is that 'the path to equitable arms control agreements and to an eventual deceleration of the arms race now lies, paradoxically, in the direction of more energetic arms race behaviour. . . . The United States must now accept the need for the earnest pursuit of a genuine equivalent in strategic capabilities' (pp. 187–188). But whereas late-period Kissinger presents the possible adoption of such a policy as a regrettable consequence of failure in SALT, Gray regards it as a necessary and preferable alternative. His specific recommendations amount to an endorsement of increased emphasis on the 'counterforce posture' in the 1970s and 1980s, for reasons which relate to particular strategic problems facing the West, but the overall objective of American policy should be to convince Soviet leaders that 'no worthwhile gain is likely to be registered as a consequence of energetic arms racing' (p. 168).

The difficulty with this prescription is that it calls for a sustained effort by the American people in a direction which would run counter to their most cherished myths as well as to what they believe to be the lessons of their recent history. It would require them to do things which many Americans would believe to be profoundly wrong, in the hope that this would eventually persuade the Russians to abandon a theory of power politics which they profoundly believe to be right. Although the Russians would probably be under the greater economic pressure as a consequence of the arms race, it would be unsafe to expect them to be the first to lose their stomach for it. Yet even if one discards what is to Gray an essential part of his argument and no mere sop to the disarming fraternity, one may still conclude on the basis of other arguments which he provides, that his recommendation of increased strategic effort is correct. If one shares Gray's view that the Russians' strategic policy is directed towards the achievement of political hegemony, not detente, and that their SALT and detente policies have already yielded them considerable gains in this direction and look like yielding them more, at least it may make more sense to think in terms of countering Soviet advances than to continue stumbling down the present road.

Carlton and Schaerf is the record of a disarmament symposium held in Padua by the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts. It contains some respectable academic contributions, but its main fascination is that it brings together unconscious confessions of futility by practising disarmers from the deservedly little-known fringe of the disarmament world. As a one-time denizen of Cloud Cuckoo Land, I am reluctant to explain in detail why I find some of these papers so richly comic. But the connoisseur should not miss a ten-page account of the life and work of the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament (CCD), which is described as 'the most obvious manifestation, almost the show-case, of that bipolar balance that has characterized the last ten years of international politics' (p. 125); nor an exposition of the issues at the equally celebrated Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development

of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, which effectively conceals the political objectives of the majority of participants; nor Academician Reutov's contribution on chemical warfare, which makes scrupulous references to Italian uses of gas in Ethiopia, and American uses in Vietnam and to German work on nerve gases in the Second World War, but which omits the interesting Egyptian experiments in the Yemen and the valuable experience gained by the German scientists who helped set up the Soviet chemical warfare programme in the 1920s. This is the book for anyone who wants a foretaste of the World Disarmament Conference.

*University of Glasgow* C. M. MASON

**Nuclear Weapons and International Behaviour.** By Henry T. Nash. *Leiden: Sijthoff. 1975. 172 pp. (Atlantic Series No. 9.) Fl. 39.00. $16.00.*

THIS little volume belongs to a collection of studies on subjects related to Nato, and seeks to analyse how states act today, as opposed to the way in which they acted before the development of nuclear weapons. Professor Nash takes three hypotheses as the foundation of his argument; first, that states do now behave differently; second, that we can identify and describe the forms of changed behaviour that are related to the emergence of nuclear weapons; and, third, 'that the identification of behavioural alterations can constitute a positive contribution to efforts designed to bring about a more stable international environment' (p. 1).

It is a very well-written book, in clear and forceful language and with the absolute minimum of technical jargon, from either international theory or strategic studies. This not only makes it very suitable for the student readership at which it is primarily aimed, but enjoyable as well, although Professor Nash is as hard put to it to acquire literary merit in describing the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations as the rest of us. The chapters on alliances and the nature of war in the nuclear age seem particularly good, both in presenting clear summaries of standard arguments and in advancing suggestive and novel ideas.

His conclusions, too, provide food for thought: thus, '. . . it is a unique aspect of the nuclear era that while destabilization exists, it does not at first appear to exist . . . The absence of general war . . . is not due to the realization of a new level of international stability but, instead, is the result of another phenomenon of the nuclear era—the phenomenon of unprecedented restraint in the use of force' (p. 148). He then goes on to discuss the factors which are destabilising because they are conducive to the abandonment of restraint. Altogether it is an interesting and useful textbook. The early discussion about the shift from a 'balance of power' to a 'balance of terror' does not perhaps make as many distinctions as one might wish about the limitations of any concept of balance, but this is a small price to pay, and the summaries of the arms control negotiations in SALT and MBFR, and of the European Security Conference (CSCE) are concise and useful.

Even so, sixteen dollars puts the book beyond the pocket of individual students, which is a pity.

*University of Lancaster* PETER NAILOR

**The Other Arms Race:** New Technologies and Non-Nuclear Conflict. Edited by Geoffrey Kemp, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. and Uri Ra'anan. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough: Heath. 1976. 218 pp. £7·25.*

THE avowed objective of this collection of papers is to evaluate the impact of new defence technologies upon conventional warfare. In practice this translates into a series of detailed studies of new defence equipment and its possible interaction with other equipment, allied to a dearth of detailed discussion on its political and societal consequences. J. F. Digby suggests, in the first paper, that precision-guided munitions offer greater advantages to the defence than to the offence; that they will produce short wars marked by a high intensity of operations; that they will lead to a reduction in collateral damage, but that they have major operational limitations in poor visibility. J. E. Ralph concludes that new technology will not radically change the effectiveness of tactical air power because, as M. W. Fossier demonstrates in detail in the third paper, defence suppression techniques should be able to cancel out the threat from surface-to-air missiles. Fossier points to the potential for unilateral technological breakthrough in this area, however, because the relationship between defensive and offensive technology is non-linear, and is susceptible to 'a " threshold " effect', resulting in 'improvement in SAM performance above its critical threshold [having] a catastrophic effect on the opposing air forces' (p. 39). R. M. Ogorkiewicz next reviews the future of the tank, and concludes that infantry and their anti-tank missiles are an aberration on the battlefield and that 'one can only conclude that [tanks] remain a highly effective piece of military equipment' (p. 55). Finally R. Leopold concludes that: 'In naval surface warfare during the remaining quarter of the century, the combat value of ship platform characteristics is not expected to be as significant as that contributed by surveillance, communications, targeting and counter measures characteristics' (p. 75).

The following three papers cover well-trodden ground, dealing with the effect of the new technologies upon warfare in the Middle East (Uri Ra'anan); upon potential warfare in Europe (Kenneth Hunt); and upon terrorism (Brian Jenkins). Finally, Kemp and Pfaltzgraff argue that the increasing divorce of weapon platform characteristics and total system performance will make accurate military evaluations difficult, and thus increase the uncertainty surrounding any military encounter.

Whilst the analyses contained in this book are well researched and interesting, they display a rather disquieting attitude towards processes of technological development. These are assumed to be determinist in nature, with the corollary that states must pursue them with the maximum effort available. Little appreciation is displayed of the potential political choices inherent in such processes, especially those which could alleviate some of the harmful effects of a wider diffusion of certain technologies.

The existence of major technical uncertainties undoubtedly makes such choices difficult, but this should not be an excuse for making no effort to separate the neutral from the harmful impacts of technology. In the absence of such a constraint, the 'other arms race' will inevitably continue, and provide further material for subsequent books of this nature.

*University of Southampton* JOHN SIMPSON

**World Armaments and Disarmament:** SIPRI Yearbook 1976. *Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1976. 493 pp. Sw. kr. 106.00.*

THE seventh issue of this yearbook is divided into three parts: the year in review, developments in world armaments and developments in arms control and disarmament. Each section is well provided with statistical tables and with references to sources used and Part 3 has a useful chapter on the implementation of agreements relating to disarmament.

*Chatham House* D. H.

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

**International Labor and the Multinational Enterprise.** Edited by Duane Kujawa. *New York, London: Praeger. 1976. 213 pp. £9·10.*

AT the present time, multinational enterprises are undoubtedly a cause of concern to workers in many countries. The possibility that Chrysler would pull out of the United Kingdom was seen by workers in Coventry and Linwood as a threat to their employment. In Britain, we may put too much emphasis on this one aspect of multinational operations. If our workers, for example, see the possible closure of the British Chrysler operation as a threat to their jobs, might not the workers of Detroit regard the whole of Chrysler's European operations as a loss of jobs for them? This is certainly the view of the American trade unions, as the contribution by Elizabeth Jager makes clear. The analysis by Robert Hawkins and Michael Jedel in the following chapter shows, however, that this is too simple a view. Much depends on the motives of the enterprise undertaking foreign investment. Setting up an overseas subsidiary to take advantage of lower costs may reduce domestic employment. If, however, there is a strong probability that export markets will in any case be lost to local competition, these jobs might be lost anyway. Moreover, the setting up of an overseas subsidiary will create some employment in the home country, both in the multinational's administrative headquarters and in areas of production that may be stimulated by the overseas investment.

The other major question considered in this book is whether or not there is scope for transnational action on the part of trade unions. Such action to date has been very limited, and it seems agreed that scope for future action is also very slight. There is no uniformity of interest among workers in different countries. While American workers may feel threatened by the proposal of an American corporation to set up a British subsidiary, British workers will welcome the creation of new job opportunities, even though they may have some reservations about multinationals. Similarly there can be no transnational uniformity of wages. Differences in labour productivity are such that wage uniformity would make production in some countries economically unviable. Workers in Britain would hardly support uniformity of wages with their American counterparts knowing the consequence would be to make it profitable to transfer production from a British subsidiary back to the United States.

The analyses of these major topics are supported by chapters dealing specifically with the problems of certain areas (Western Europe, Japan,

Latin America and Asia) and corporations (General Motors and Phillips). This book should be of value to readers with a wide range of primary interests. It is all the more stimulating because the contributors do not share a common outlook.

*University of Dundee* J. M. JACKSON

## LAW

**The Vietnam War and International Law, Vol. 4:** The Concluding Phase. Edited by Richard A. Falk. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for the American Society of International Law. 1976. 1051 pp. £21·90. Pb: £8·50.*

DE GAULLE predicted, in May 1961, that if the United States intervened in Indochina, as President Kennedy told him was the intention, 'you will sink step by step into a bottomless quagmire'. This quotation from the memoirs is given by Raoul Berger in his important article on the war power under the United States Constitution (p. 604 at p. 658). The quagmire has proved to be deep and noisome indeed, although not quite bottomless—the war is now over and the people of Vietnam are reportedly turning to reconstruction and, one hopes, reconciliation. Yet even in the recent American Presidential campaign the issue of amnesty versus pardon for deserters from the armed forces and exiled draft evaders was sharply contested.

This fourth and final volume of the series edited by Richard Falk for the ASIL puts us again in the Society's debt, particularly that of its Civil War Panel. There can be no legal issue, of international law including laws of war and war crimes, or of United States constitutional law, which has not been analysed and debated extensively in the periodical literature of the past decade. This volume captures representative pieces, and includes several previously unpublished papers, in the main of high quality. The stream of contributions will continue, certainly from the historians. The day for lawyers' comments may be declining as the heat of controversy cools. But for international lawyers in particular, appreciative of the special function of precedent in the field of state practice and the legal 'positions' which governments take vis-à-vis their own and others' acts, it is of inestimable value to have these four volumes,[1] encompassing all the arguments, a mass of factual information, indications of the many events which are in dispute, and a collection of basic texts, including United States court decisions and legislation, and international agreements.

Volume 4 is divided into five substantive sections: Role of International Law and Organisation; Laws of War; War Crimes and Individual Responsibility; Settlement of the Vietnam War (the 1973 agreements); and Constitutional Structure and War-Making. This reviewer found the contributions of Perry Pickert on 'American Attitudes to International Law as Reflected in "The Pentagon Papers"', L. C. Green on 'War Law and the Soldier' and Philippa Strum on 'The Supreme Court and the Vietnamese War' most valuable among previously unpublished work. The sections on the laws of

[1] Vols. 1 and 2 (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1968 and 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p. 400. Vol. 3 (Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press, 1972). Reviewed in *ibid.*, July 1973, p. 451.

war and war crimes (totalling 328 pages) repay study at this time when major additions to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are being attempted. As in Volume 3, students of the American Constitution are again richly catered for. Raoul Berger's article (of some 60 pages), reproduced from the *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, exemplifies the best in American legal and constitutional scholarship and offers foreign readers deep insight into the role of law, legal argument and judicial decision in the life of the nation. The Documentary Appendices (150 pages) contain, *inter alia*, the texts of the Paris Agreement and Protocols (1973), the Laos Cease-Fire Agreement, the 'Cambodia rider' to the 1973 Supplemental Appropriations Act, six court decisions, and the War Powers Resolution and subsequent legislation of 1973 and 1974. A final section entitled 'War Ends in Indochina' brings the story to May 1975 with comments from three leading participants in the debate, Robert Tucker, Stanley Hoffmann and Richard Falk. This section has excerpts from Thieu's resignation speech of April 21, 1975, and the text of the Nixon-Thieu letters of November 1972 and January 1973, released in April 1975. The volume maintains the high standards of editing and production of the series.

Clearly, 'the West' lost this long and bitter struggle for power in Indochina. Whether the result was also a defeat for democratic and liberal values is a quite distinct issue, on which the contents of the last section shed some light. While preparing this review, the writer saw a headline in *The Times* of July 2, 1976: 'Dr. Kissinger looks at Vietnam accord with pride and no regrets'. To have such confidence is perhaps what our kind of society demands from its politicians. Do we get the leaders we deserve?

*University of Manchester* GILLIAN WHITE

**Theory of International Law.** By G. I. Tunkin. Trans., with introduction, by William E. Butler. *Moscow: 1970; London: Allen and Unwin. 1975. 497 pp. £8·00.*

TUNKIN'S *Theory of International Law* first published in its revised form in the Soviet Union in 1970 was clearly and readably translated by William E. Butler for the Harvard University Press (1974) and now finally appears in a reprint for the British market.

Since the late 1950s Tunkin's name and reputation have been represented to the younger generation of international lawyers as embodying all of the Soviet attitude to international law that is learned and acceptable to Western ears. It is now possible for the student to see for himself and interpret on his own the various Soviet and socialist views that are set out. However, language may always be a barrier to understanding and the fact that it is one's own language does not necessarily remove all the obstacles. Tunkin writes clearly and argues concisely and carefully, sparing the reader, on the whole, from polemics in Marxist/Leninist jargon, but there are times when the author seems to lapse from his carefully formulated arguments to promulgate the message of Soviet righteousness or socialist solidarity. This occasionally intrudes too much into the scholarship and hampers easy understanding.

Tunkin's major themes are the development of international law since the October Revolution and the contribution of the socialist states to the so-called 'new' international law. While he claims that concepts such as

the self-determination of peoples, non-aggression, peaceful settlement of disputes, disarmament and peaceful coexistence are newly emergent principles of international law and that international law is basically developmental and dynamic, he adopts a much more conservative approach towards some of the older and more basic concepts of law. Likewise he is loath to see emergent customary principles in the development of international organisations and yet some of these principles may be better founded both in practice and theory than, for instance, self-determination.

Parts two and three of the book deal with the process of forming norms of international law and the legal nature and essence of contemporary general international law, and it is here that the student will find a thoroughly fascinating exposition of differences between the Soviet and Western approaches as seen by one of Russia's great scholars.

More than four years have elapsed between the original publication of the book and its appearance in Britain. During that period much has happened to affect the relations of the Soviet Union with the rest of the world. Tunkin's account shows a vital and growing interest and concern in the development of international law in the Soviet Union. It is a pity that discussion and debate of these erudite if sometimes provocative views has been delayed.

*University of Southampton* RALPH BEDDARD

## WESTERN EUROPE

**Social and Political Movements in Western Europe.** By Martin Kolinsky and William E. Paterson. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 360 pp. £9·95.*

IN this important symposium the editors have brought together a dozen contributions which consider, from a variety of angles, the relationships between political systems, political parties and social movement in recent and contemporary West European history. The time-span is (with the exception of Martin Kolinsky's essay on Fascism and Nazism) the thirty-odd years since 1945; geographically, the countries covered are France, Italy and West Germany (though a stimulating piece by Carole Webb on the European movement ranges slightly wider). The book thus deals with the main political forces at work in the three main continental member-states of the EEC, and a very rich diversity they offer. Right-wing extremist movements in Germany and France (in both cases phenomena of the 1960s rather than the 1970s) are considered by Steven Warnecke and David Bell respectively; Gaullism by Michelina Vaughan; Christian Democracy (the German and Italian varieties, though not the once-proud MRP in France) by Geoffrey Pridham; Communism and the French and Italian labour movements (in the sense of trade unions rather than political forces) by David Hine; West German Social Democracy (described here as an 'example', but surely unique?) by William Paterson; and the 'New Left' of the last ten years in Italy and France by Stephen Hellman and Ehud Sprinzak respectively.

The editors, in an introduction which is valuable not only for its conceptual clarity but also for its comprehensive references to the earlier English-language publications on the subject, lay down an ambitious agenda for the project. They remind us that the study of political and social move-

ments has to take account of the aspirations which these movements reflect, their relations with political parties, the composition of their support and membership, their ideological aspects, their organisational structure, and their interactions both with national party systems and with the political system in general.

As with most collective works, not all the contributions are equally successful, within their average span of under thirty pages, in tackling this formidable range of questions. The chapter on the labour movement and Communism in France and Italy, for instance, although it provides a clear and useful survey of an important and relatively little-studied topic, can only make passing reference to the socio-economic composition of the trade union movements concerned, and to the political dimension of competition between Communism, Socialism, and Catholicism. The essay on Gaullism, again, although it summarises the findings of Charlot, Goguel and other authorities, has disappointingly little to say about the sociological and political significance of Gaullism in the 1970s, post-Pompidou as well as post-de Gaulle.

Among other passages where this reviewer had a sense that compression was leading to distortion (so that the book might produce over-simplified pictures in the minds of students, unless their teachers fed it to them with correctives) was Martin Kolinsky's discussion of the Weimar Republic, where the Communist International's attacks on Social Democracy as 'social fascism' appear to be placed ten years too early (p. 36); on p. 211, summarising the early history of German Social Democracy, William Paterson describes Bebel's and Liebknecht's ideas as 'more Marxist' than Lassalle's (whose name is misspelt), though recent research on the period has cast serious doubt on this view.

Such minor reservations (a more serious one concerns the absence of a chapter on French Socialism, which is undergoing an impressive renaissance under Mitterrand) do not detract from the very considerable value of the book. By posing crucial questions (and by offering answers to quite a lot of them), the editors and contributors—not least Gordon Smith in the concluding chapter—have made a contribution which future researchers on West European political processes will do well to take into account.

*University of Loughborough* ROGER MORGAN

**Europe and the World:** The External Relations of the Common Market. Edited by Kenneth J. Twitchett. *London: Europa for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. 1976. 210 pp. £5·00.*

**The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries.** Edited by Avi Shlaim and G. N. Yannopoulos. *Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 352 pp. £11·00.*

LEO TINDEMANS, in his report on European union, placed progress towards a common foreign policy high on his list of priorities. These two books provide a great deal of substance about what has already been achieved in this area and most valuable analytical commentaries on the problems that confront the EEC in its external relations. In *Europe and the World* Kenneth Twitchett has edited a series of essays covering a wide gamut: the transatlantic relationship, the state trading countries, the Mediterranean, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, the Third World, and a

chapter by Professor Northedge on British foreign policy in a Community context. All six authors dealing with these issues write with authority, clarity and brevity and the book is a most useful addition to the growing number of studies on Community external affairs.

What has been achieved by the EEC is impressive and in his opening chapter Mr. Twitchett draws the conclusion that: ' Although there are growing pressures on the Nine to act together in the international system, the EEC's international activity is still confined to external relations. It is essentially a response to the requirements of the Rome Treaty, the initiatives of third countries, and the exigencies of particular situations rather than a coherent framework of goals which the Nine are striving to achieve ' (p. 34).

One can see how piecemeal the process has been when one looks at EEC relations with Mediterranean countries. Community actions have been virtually ad hoc responses to a series of changing circumstances. Stanley Henig brings this out well in his chapter on Mediterranean policy 1958–73 in *The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries*, a book based on papers prepared for a 1973 Reading conference: ' Although the Community had established by the time of enlargement a broad framework within which to negotiate and reach agreement with Mediterranean countries, the policy could not be considered multilateral. Individual negotiations took place for individual agreements with each applicant, invariably resulting in a bilateral institutional framework ' (p. 320).

But this is not necessarily bad. The EEC is frequently accused of being remote and dreaming up ideal blueprints that are never likely to be put into effect. This charge cannot be levied in the field of external relations. All that has been done has been thoroughly pragmatic building on the existing situation which has evolved from the past. If Lomé looks well thought out and comprehensive this is partly because less sophisticated but workable arrangements had previously been made under part IV of the Treaty of Rome, and under Yaoundé I and II.

Certain aspects of external affairs impinge directly on the structure of the EEC itself. What happens to the EEC when other European countries seek to join the Community, thus turning the Nine into the Ten, Eleven or Twelve? Can it indeed survive as a Community if European associates always see their status as an apprenticeship for automatic membership? Mr. George Thomson in his foreword to *Europe and the World* rightly poses the question: ' If I were asked to state in a sentence the fundamental issue that faces the development of the European Community, it is the question as to whether it should see its future as an increasingly integrated body, or whether it should remain more in the character of an inter-governmental organization, a permanent diplomatic conference, with attached to it some useful pieces of economic machinery ' (p. ix).

T. SOPER

**The Illusion of Peace:** International Relations in Europe 1918–1933. By Sally Marks. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 184 pp. £5·95. Pb: £2·95.*

DR. MARKS deals in this book with international relations in Europe between 1918 and 1933 in a mere 146 pages. Not surprisingly, her account is highly compressed and often over-simplified, but it is always lucid. Students will find it an invaluable introduction to the study of European history in the

interwar period, and a useful guide in the interpretation of particular issues which have most preoccupied contemporary historians over the past thirty years.

The Paris peace conference and the Treaty of Versailles, the Washington and Locarno conferences, Anglo-French-German relations, Mussolini's early diplomacy and Hitler's rise to power are amongst the issues which Dr. Marks subjects to close scrutiny, with reference to a wide range of original sources and recent scholarship. Her judgments are sometimes judiciously balanced and sometimes bold, but always vigorously outlined, and the period as a whole receives even coverage. In the process, the tangled web of European political and economic relationships is clearly delineated, and though teachers may quibble with some of the judgments and a few of the sweeping statements, most will find the book an indispensable addition to their twentieth-century reading lists. They should at the same time ensure that adequate stocks reach their libraries, since students may find the £6 price tag (or £3 for the paperback edition) rather too steep for their modest incomes.

*University of Lancaster* RUTH HENIG

**British Perspectives on a Changing Global Balance.** By James E. Dougherty. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia. 1976. 107 pp. (Foreign Policy Papers, Vol. 1, No. 2.) Pb: $3.00. £1·50.*

**Britain's Search for a Role.** By Laslo V. Boyd. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough: Heath. 1976. 170 pp. £5·95.*

AT a time when British foreign policy is undergoing critical examination at home, one looks with particular interest to see how writers from abroad will assess British views and British prospects. James Dougherty takes as his starting point Max Beloff's statement that in 1969 ' the structure of the global system, from the standpoint of Britain's security, was still bipolar, not multipolar '; and goes on to ask ' whether during the 1970s there has been any significant modification in the British perspective of the international system insofar as it bears vitally on the United Kingdom's security apprehensions and policies ' (p. 7). To answer this question he examines British perceptions of such areas as the American-Soviet strategic balance, American political will, the security balance in Europe, detente, the diffusion of power, the role of other principal actors in the international system, the future of the Atlantic Alliance and Europe as a prospective independent centre of power. The observations on which he draws for his ' collage of perspectives ' are those of the ' rather small elite group ' who, he feels, influence the foreign policy-making process in the United Kingdom; that is, the quality press, the leading research institutes and well-known writers on international relations. This book is a preparatory work for a larger study of what Mr. Dougherty describes as the ' much vaunted " multipolar power balance " ' and he gives the impression that he is, at least partly, using British views to grind an axe against Dr. Kissinger's theories. He does not quote any references to Kissinger's writings or speeches to support his interpretation, but suggests that Kissinger sees events only through ' multipolaroid ' glasses (p. 2), while the British discern elements of bipolarity in the multipolar system.

On some specific points, such as his assessment of the dominant British attitude towards detente as 'ambiguous', the reader might want to take issue with Mr. Dougherty. The essence of his conclusions, however, is not controversial. He feels that during the period 1970–75, the British were mainly concerned with the balance of power in Europe and, although uneasy about the Nixon-Kissinger management of detente, saw no alternative to going along with the Americans. However, in a book of this sort, as Dougherty himself says, the author must take responsibility for selecting and assessing, and he does not always succeed in giving a balanced view of opinion in Britain. For instance, in his chapter on East-West relations, he gives Leopold Labedz the first and last word, with very little to balance this; and the very last quotation in the book, taken from the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, gives a disturbingly apocalyptic twist to his conclusions: 'For the first time since the year immediately after World War I, the fear of revolution is a factor in British politics' (p. 90).

Laslo Boyd's book begins with a section setting out his 'framework for analysis' which appears to be more of a ritual obeisance to the theorists than an aid to the analysis carried out in the rest of the book, and the list of propositions in terms of which the evidence will be examined seems too obvious to stimulate any very penetrating re-examination of Britain's relationships. The first, for instance, states that 'the "importance" of the link with Europe for Britain increased, while that of the connection with the United States decreased' in the years under review. (Boyd uses the word 'important' in quotes to mean the ability of an alignment to respond to the needs of a participant (p. 4).) More seriously, some of Mr. Boyd's later propositions are argued loosely and on doubtful grounds. This is particularly evident in the chapter on 'Economic Policy: Britain and Europe'. Discussing possible trade-offs within the Community in the process of which, he suggests, Britain *may* become a leading advocate of monetary union, he makes the surprising statement that the French have always opposed monetary union, but might make concessions in the course of a re-evaluation of the CAP (p. 42).

In spite of this, and the author's pessimistic conclusions, the book does make a positive contribution to the discussion of Britain's search for a role. Mr. Boyd concentrates on an examination of the factors which have influenced Britain's choice (or lack of choice) of partners in the economic, military and political fields, rather than on the role it might play within those alliances. This approach is explained by his view, based on a good deal of statistical, tabular evidence, that in the sphere of Anglo-American relations there is 'no basis for an independent political role for Britain' (p. 150), while in Europe Britain can only expect to exert some influence, not leadership. This glosses over the complexities and subtleties of the sort of role Britain might play in both areas. It does, however, suggest that the concepts underlying Britain's search for a role could well be re-examined. Have British governments been led astray by the chimera of leadership abroad, when they should have been concentrating on the problems of economic revitalisation and the building of a domestic consensus? The suggestion which emerges from the book is that there should be an effort at home to build a consensus on the sort of society Britain ought to be and a reassessment of the contribution which Britain can make in a supporting role abroad. This is worth further consideration and elaboration.

JOCELYN STATLER

*Chatham House*

**Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939.** Second Series, Vol. XIV: The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute March 21, 1934–October 3, 1935. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert. *London: HMSO. 1976. 790 pp. £16·50.*

THIS is the first of three proposed volumes in the series of British documents on foreign policy, 1919–1939, dealing with the Italian-Ethiopian conflict which began late in 1934 and led to the effective demise of the League of Nations and the collapse of the front against Hitler formed by Britain, France and Italy at the Stresa conference in April 1935. The Italian campaign against Ethiopia, described by Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary until June 1935, as a 'petty squabble' (No. 195), was the true prelude to Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland a year later and the general descent into the abyss in 1939.

If the other two volumes are as good as this, it will be an excellent trilogy. Unlike other volumes in the series, this deals with only one subject—the Ethiopian question from the British exchanges with Addis Ababa about Zeila in March 1934 until the Italian invasion on October 3, 1935—and the tale unfolds with massive inevitability. The main phases are well known: the Walwal and Wardair incidents in December 1934, when Italian and Ethiopian forces clashed with heavy casualties, the unavailing efforts to settle the dispute under the aegis of the League Council in the spring of 1935, Eden's visit to Rome in June with the British proposal for a 'corridor for camels' in the form of Ethiopian access to the sea through British Somaliland in return for the cession of Ogaden to Italy, the three-power meeting in Paris in August in a final effort to stave off war. There is nothing new in this volume, except that the Maffey Report on British interests in Ethiopia, presented to the Cabinet in August 1935, is printed in full for the first time (Appendix II). But the crucial dilemma facing British (and, in a different way, French) ministers is superbly depicted: whether to press on with sanctions against Italy, which their own officials said would be fruitless, in the certain knowledge that this would drive Mussolini into Hitler's arms, or to strive for some Iraq-like status for Ethiopia which would put Italy in complete control of the country; and that, by destroying all faith in the League machinery, would immeasurably increase the difficulties of dealing with the German dictator when *his* turn came to topple the European system. Sir Samuel Hoare told Pierre Laval on September 11, the day of his famous speech on collective security at the League Assembly, that 'he had the whole time been thinking of the German danger' (No. 564).

*London School of Economics* F. S. NORTHEDGE

**Die Deutsche Tradition:** Über die Schwierigkeiten, Demokratie zu leben. By Fritz Croner. *Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1975. 266 pp. DM 28.00.*

AFTER taking his doctorate in 1921, Professor Croner worked for the German trade union movement (it would be interesting to know how many graduates the TUC had on its staff in the 1920s). He left Germany in 1933 and went to Sweden where for over thirty years he has been Professor of Sociology in the University of Stockholm. He has kept in close touch with his native land and the present book is his considered verdict on the Federal Republic. Measured by Swedish standards, he finds it sadly wanting.

The book is made up of a series of studies which no doubt hang together perfectly well in the author's mind but are not presented so as to make their interconnection altogether clear to the reader. It starts with an analysis of occupation in the Federal Republic since 1950, bringing out the growth of white-collar employees (*Angestellte*), especially in service industries. Next come four chapters on economic development in the same period, emphasising the failure to develop true social equality. These are followed by a section on trade union organisation, with particular reference to the failure of the movement to enlist support among *Angestellte*. This leads to a discussion of West German politics and parties, emphasising the extent to which these are run by small elites (whereas in Sweden a much greater effort is made to obtain the views of the rank-and-file before framing policy). A major chapter on 'The German Tradition' seeks to show (principally by three examples) how deep-rooted are feudal and romantic habits of thought. The next chapter illustrates the failure of the Republic to overcome this tradition by the inadequacy of the attempts at educational reform. A short survey of public opinion polls, bringing out the value still attached by the upper classes to 'order and discipline' and the obsequiousness of the lower classes, leads to a brief conclusion in which the author deplores the failure of Willy Brandt to introduce adequate internal reforms.

One is left with mixed feelings. The statistics are as indisputable as statistics ever can be. Both liberal and Marxist historians would now agree about the nature of the German Tradition and the effect which it has had on German political development. There can be no denying that after the Second World War American influence played a large, possibly even a decisive, part in preventing thorough-going socialisation and re-establishing free enterprise. German educationalists were deplorably slow in modernising their system and, partly as a result, are now making very heavy weather of the job.

But beyond such common ground, a host of questions suggest themselves. Was not the chief need of a democratic Germany prosperity and success? Could a planned economy have produced this after 1949? Would not a Republic which immediately embarked on socialisation have thereby deprived itself for good of any chance of winning the loyalty of the right, which Adenauer for all his faults secured? Is not the author underestimating the value of *Mitbestimmung*? Is it realistic to expect the ordinary person to take a close interest in politics? Does not the attempt to consult everybody slow down excessively the decision-making process? Are not Swedish history and circumstances so different from German as to make comparisons misleading? How would the Federal Republic show up if the comparison were with other more populous democracies?

Professor Croner is an idealist and a social scientist, not a historian or a politician. He takes achievement for granted in his anxiety to show how much still needs achieving. Whether it can ever be achieved and whether his line of advance is the most likely one must be left for time to show. Meanwhile many businessmen in other countries are likely to agree that German education has paid too much attention to inculcating the spirit of competition!

MICHAEL BALFOUR

**Judicial Politics in West Germany:** A Study of the Federal Constitutional Court. By Donald P. Kommers. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 312 pp. (Sage Series on Politics and the Legal Order, Vol. V.) £9·00.*

THE study of 'judicial politics' is seriously under-developed in Britain, perhaps understandably in a political environment hostile to judicial review. It is therefore not surprising that an analysis of the role of the Federal Constitutional Court within the West German political system should come from an author steeped in the American tradition of judicial research. Kommers presents it as a contribution to the burgeoning study of comparative judicial politics in the United States. However, it is entirely a single-country undertaking, and none the worse for that. On the contrary, it avoids in general the errors of perspective and false assumptions which sometimes mar attempts to survey and categorise a number of foreign political systems. The book can therefore also be recommended as filling a gap in the literature available in English on West German government. For it analyses an institution to which many of the major issues in German politics have found their way in recent years, from the Basic Treaty with East Germany to abortion law reform, from radicals in the public service to student participation in the running of universities. It should even be welcomed by students of politics in Germany itself, where discussion of the Constitutional Court has, with few exceptions,[1] been the exclusive, though prolific, preserve of legal scholars.

The one-word chapter headings reveal the compass of the book: setting, institution, actors, process, policy, impact. But the main emphasis is on those aspects relevant to an understanding of the Federal Constitutional Court as 'an instrument for the making of constitutional policy' (p. 11). It is true that this would also require a critical examination of judicial decision-making in substantive fields of constitutional law, which Kommers explicitly omits as 'the subject of another book' (p. 246). But what he does provide is an excellent all-round account of the Court, explaining its composition and 'workways', surveying the field and direction of its decisions, and pointing up its constant interactions with the rest of the political system.

The book is based on a year's research at the Constitutional Court itself, including extensive interviews with judges and their assistants. This is some compensation for the lack of much of the material available for studying the far less anonymous and more individualist American Supreme Court, such as judicial memoirs and papers and even (until 1970) dissenting opinions. But at times it encourages reliance on gossip. Thus party labels are assigned to some judges on slender evidence and the identification of networks in the recruitment of judges, such as the so-called 'Bamberg circle', gives an unduly conspiratorial impression. On the other hand the section on the historical background of constitutional and judicial review in Germany scarcely does full justice to a rather complex subject.

In general, however, Kommers presents a realistic and balanced picture of judicial review flourishing against a constitutional background quite different from that of the United States. He portrays a court characterised by pragmatism and judicial self-restraint (perhaps a little tarnished since Kommers completed the bulk of his research), and one which has been a not uninfluential protector of basic rights, umpire of the federal system,

[1] The most noteworthy is H. Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozess* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1968).

custodian of party democracy and equaliser of socio-economic opportunity. Not much time is spent discussing the legalism which pervades much of the West German political environment, the tendency to discuss political questions in constitutional terms and to seek authoritative judicial resolution of political disputes (no doubt because such characteristics seem less unfamiliar to an American than to a British observer). But this does not prevent the book from giving a valuable insight into the institution that lies at the heart of the judicialisation of politics in Germany.

Fortunately Kommers has also been relatively successful in his aim of avoiding unnecessary jargon: on a subject which might easily become dry or labyrinthine the book makes easy and rewarding reading.

*University of Kent* PHILIP BLAIR

**Parteien und Nationen:** Zur Rolle des Nationalbewusstseins für die politischen Grundorientierungen der Parteien in der Anfangsphase der Bundesrepublik. By Jörg Gabbe. *Meisenheim am Glan: Hain. 1976. 347 pp. (Studien zum politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 15.) DM 39.00.*

**Westdeutschlands Weg zur Bundesrepublik 1945–1949:** Beiträge von Mitarbeitern des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte. By Wolfgang Jacobmeyer *et al. Munich: Beck. 1976. 201 pp. (Beck'sche Schwarze Reihe, Band 137.) Pb: Dm 16·80.*

AT first glance another general book dealing with the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany may not appear very stimulating. In two senses, however, the Institute for Contemporary History (Munich) have produced a useful short book. First, it is written in a style which is (for German scholars) refreshingly direct and brief; the reason for such clarity is probably that it was originally written for German television. Secondly, the book deals with the problems of internal development within the Western Allies' zones of occupation, stressing the extent to which the Federal Republic is composed of economic, social and constitutional elements which had already been established by 1949. By contrast, the great bulk of literature dealing with the formation of the Federal Republic searches for its causes at the level of international politics, particularly in the growing tension between the American and Soviet power blocs. Internal politics in the zones of occupation during the period 1945–49 have been neglected. It is not, however, the intention of this book to reveal the results of new (and badly needed) research on this subject, but rather to summarise and communicate as widely as possible the results of recent research by others. There are essays dealing with economic and social policy, the Allies and German politics within the zones of occupation, the Basic Law, and literature. Whilst they can be recommended to students for their clarity, accuracy and breadth of coverage they uncover little new for the specialist in German politics.

By contrast, Jörg Gabbe deals with a more specific but extremely complex problem: the role of national consciousness in shaping the political conceptions of the parties in the early years of the Federal Republic (up to 1955). Whilst the concept of the nation was still much used by German politicians and much traditionalism was still apparent in this usage, Gabbe stresses the very different context of the concept. A major change is in its relation to other political concepts (state, democracy, territory, etc.),

apparent initially in the Basic Law and later in the espousal of European integration which can be seen as a route out of the traditional nation-state identity. Nevertheless the problem of the ' nation ' in German history is still far from solved. Thus, as the Federal Constitutional Court reminded politicians in 1973, the Basic Law commits the Federal Republic to the achievement of a reunified nation-state, since 1969 the Brandt and Schmidt governments have pursued the notion of ' two-states, one-nation ', whilst until recently the German Democratic Republic has preferred to use the term ' class-nation '. Although such complexity may be a source of anxiety, Gabbe comforts himself with the conclusion that the concept of the nation is not taken especially seriously either intellectually or beyond mere political tactics, for example, as a means to abuse opponents. It is in analysing the use of the concept of the nation in postwar debate that Gabbe's book is most useful to the German specialist.

*University of Liverpool* KENNETH DYSON

**Power Politics and Social Change in National Socialist Germany:** A Process of Escalation into Mass Destruction. By John M. Steiner. *The Hague, Paris: Mouton; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. 1976. 466 pp. (Issues in Contemporary Politics: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives, 2.) Fl. 58.00. $22.50.*

A RECENT development in the field of Nazi studies has been the ' sociological-psychological ' investigation of the Nazi regime, the Party leaders and followers, the effects of the regime upon the German state system and on the mass of Germans in general. One of the difficulties associated with this approach to the subject is that many of the problems investigated, and the conclusions drawn, are already familiar to anybody with more than a passing interest in Nazi Germany because of the vast amount of excellent historical work produced about the Nazi phenomenon which has also naturally touched upon such questions. This makes it increasingly difficult, therefore, for authors using the analysis and methodology of sociology and psychology to produce anything radically new about this subject, but it can be done if the purposes of such investigations themselves are somewhat original and are clearly stated and developed logically throughout such studies.[1]

By any standards, however, and despite the promise of its title, John Steiner's book is a pretentious and tiresome oddity. What ' sociological-psychological ' themes there are about the nature of power and responsibility in a totalitarian society soon get lost in a narrative rehash of familiar topics; for example, the chapter on that usual standby in such cases, the SS, takes up 82 of the book's 199 pages of text. Nor has the author considered it necessary to refer to basic historical works and articles when dealing with the nature of the German bureaucracy under the Nazi regime. Given the high standards demanded and expected today, one simply cannot accept as so-called ' scholarship ' the author's practice of filling page after page with chunks of direct quotation in German from other books, memoirs, diaries, analytical works or whatever, followed by an equally large number of pages

[1] *Cf.* Peter H. Merkl, *Political Violence Under the Swastika. 581 Early Nazis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

of the *same* quotations duly translated into English. This practice (also repeated throughout the book's 155 pages of footnotes) reaches its apotheosis at the end of the text when one has to plough through fifteen pages of quotations from the observation of Walther Rathenau (assassinated in 1922) on the function of authority and its division of labour. On page 149 we are informed that the Enabling Act of 1933 was passed in 1938, with subsequent sentences on the following page compounding this error. Nazi specialists will also learn to their astonishment of 'the completion of the so-called National Socialist revolution, in which the SS played an important role', apparently as early as March and April 1933 (p. 64). One could go on in a similar vein, but this review would then become as tiresome and irritating as the book.

JOHN P. FOX

**Communism in Italy and France.** Edited by Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1976. 651 pp. £14·60.*

THESE papers, given at a conference at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in October 1972, have been edited, somewhat belatedly, into a bulky tome which will interest primarily specialists. The contributors are all academics in American universities aided by the two leading French academic specialists, Annie Kriegel and Georges Lavau. All use the methodology of American political science, with much emphasis on mass interviews and on the statistical treatment of data.

Donald Blackmer begins with a history of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) since the war, and Annie Kriegel follows with the history of the French Communist Party (PCF) during the Fifth Republic. Georges Lavau provides a sociological analysis of the PCF's communications as a part of French political culture. This covers his familiar, and useful, account of the Communist party's role as 'tribune'.

Sidney Tarrow gives a 40-page glimpse of his forthcoming book *Integration at the Periphery*,[1] which deals with how communist mayors in both countries see their dual role of public official and party militant. It is based largely on interviews with 250 mayors in rural France and Italy. R. Putnam also used interviews with over 200 Latin politicians to construct an 'empirically derived composite portrait' of the communist politico.

Four papers, by junior academics, on the communist role in local government will be found rather pettifogging by most readers. These are typical PhD chores, handed out by professors who think it is 'scientific' to cut one's teeth gnawing away at some bone that everyone else has neglected, without asking whether the results of such labours could have any wider significance. One guesses that the professor has in mind some distant purpose, such as discovering whether communist experience in municipalities has helped to increase the parties' strength at the national level; but the PhD investigators are not encouraged to deal with such large matters. They are the troops sent over the top by the Napoleonic professor-general, who plans to reach his distant goal marching over their bodies. This is a dangerous method. Unless the empirical studies are directed at the goal,

[1] Yale University Press.

their products cannot be safely used by the second-degree generaliser, and they risk falling into scientific humbug, i.e. data collecting.

Five papers on the parties' alliance strategies bring us back to politics proper. Stephen Hellman demonstrates how the PCI's successful bid for the support of the middle classes has led the party to moderation and collaboration. Ronald Tiersky is, correctly, more cautious in saying that the same may have happened to the PCF in the course of its long negotiations with the Socialists (of which he gives the history) for a Common Programme. George Ross shows how the PCF still controls the trade union confederation, the CGT, whereas Peter Weitz describes how the Italian equivalent, the CGIL, won its way from subordination to the PCI to the status of an 'independent political force'. Finally, Sidney Tarrow ventures some 'comparisons and conclusions' which are based not only on the essays collected here but on his own immense knowledge of the subject.

NEIL MCINNES

**Alto Adige–South Tyrol:** Italy's Frontier with the German World. By Mario Toscano. Edited by George A. Carbone. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1975. 283 pp. £9·75.*

**Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954.** An Appraisal by the Five Participants. Edited by John C. Campbell. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1976. 181 pp. £7·20.*

JOSEPH SISCO of the State Department, speaking à propos Dr. Kissinger's efforts at mediation, recently quoted De Gasperi as saying that problems cannot be solved by diplomacy, they can only be alleviated and mitigated. These two books, both of which deal with the De Gasperi era, would seem in a way to belie that view, for in both cases solutions reached by diplomacy have proved lasting—at any rate 'insofar as anything sticks in international affairs for more than a certain period of years', as one of the Trieste negotiators, Geoffrey Harrison, says.

Both books deal with Italian frontier problems arising in the first instance out of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Under the Treaty of St. Germain, the South Tyrol and Venezia Giulia, till then under Austrian rule but focal points of Italian irredentism, were allocated to Italy. Both areas contained considerable ethnic minorities (German or Slovene respectively) and underwent some forcible italianisation during the Fascist inter-war period. When, after the Second World War, the question again arose whether they should remain under Italy, different circumstances pertained in each of the two regions. For the South Tyrol had been incorporated into the Reich in the latter part of the war, and the rival claimant, Austria, was technically an ex-enemy; whereas in the case of Venezia Giulia, Yugoslavia was an ally, and Yugoslav forces had entered and occupied Trieste during the war's last weeks.

The South Tyrol question was the more quickly settled, under the De Gasperi-Gruber agreement of September 5, 1946, which was written into the peace treaty. But its aftermath dragged on until the end of 1969. Professor Toscano's book, originally published in Italian as *Storia diplomatica della questione dell'Alto Adige* [1], describes in detail the whole course of

[1] Bari, Laterza, 1967.

this long-drawn-out dispute from its genesis down to 1967 when a settlement was already in sight. The editor of the present volume adds a last chapter to include the final settlement reached at the end of 1969 (a year after Professor Toscano's death), under which the Alto Adige achieved a considerable increase of autonomy.

As Professor Toscano describes, the immediate postwar problem centred round the resettlement of the German-speaking optants from the Alto Adige who, under the Hitler-Mussolini agreement of 1939, had chosen to go to Austria (by then incorporated in the Reich) and could now, if they wished, be repatriated. But the real difficulties arose in the mid-1950s, when the *Südtiroler Volkspartei*, the party representing the German-speaking elements in South Tyrol, secured Austrian support for their claim that the De Gasperi-Gruber agreements were not being fully implemented, and began demanding that the Alto Adige province should become a separate autonomous region, aiming eventually at return to Austria. This dispute became the subject of bilateral negotiations between Italian and Austrian ministers and officials for the next fifteen years, during which extremists staged sporadic terrorist attacks on Italian frontier posts and Austria at one point took the matter to the United Nations.

Professor Toscano was a diplomatic historian and, as he himself says, the book is a diplomatic history, excluding other considerations. Though he writes as an Italian, his extensive references to the diplomatic records include both sides of the question. It will be a valuable source book for students both of this particular problem and of diplomatic negotiation in general. It deserves a fuller index and a much better map.

The 'successful negotiation' described in *Trieste 1954* was of a more unusual kind. The peace treaty after the Second World War had ceded the whole of the Istrian peninsula to Yugoslavia but divided Trieste and its hinterland into two zones, A and B, respectively under American/British and Yugoslav temporary occupation, which were intended eventually to form a Free Territory of Trieste under a UN Governor. That territory never came into being, and occupation continued for several years during which various solutions were advanced and discarded. Matters came to a head in October 1953—by which time all the parties concerned were heartily sick of the dispute—when the American and British authorities announced that they proposed to terminate the occupation. At that point the idea emerged of mediation by a 'third party' between Italy and Yugoslavia. The resulting negotiations, which lasted eight months from February 1954, took place in London between four diplomats: Llewellyn Thompson, then US Ambassador in Vienna, and Geoffrey Harrison, then Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, as the 'mediators'; Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador in London, for Italy; and Vladimir Velebit, Yugoslav Ambassador in London, for Yugoslavia. The final role was played by Robert Murphy, at that time US Deputy Under-Secretary of State.

The book offers, as the Foreword explains, 'the unscreened and unadulterated recollections' of those five skilled negotiators, who by good fortune were still 'alive and alert' and available to be interviewed by John C. Campbell and Joseph E. Johnson in 1971–72 (Thompson died only three months after he had been interviewed).

The negotiations were carried on in complete secrecy—Thompson was ostensibly in London 'to buy clothes'—and all four diplomats stressed this aspect as an important factor contributing to their success. The negotiations

fell into three stages. First, the middlemen worked out with Velebit what conditions Yugoslavia might accept, the minor territorial modifications proving the most difficult (Velebit himself says he already realised in 1945 that Yugoslavia could not hope for Trieste). Then, in June, they presented the Yugoslav conditions to Brosio, who till then had known nothing of them in detail. He contested certain points, and in particular the question of Punta Sottile, a small coastal area hitherto in Zone A but forming part of the strip now claimed by Yugoslavia. Brosio refused to yield on this—as he says, 'in order to avoid a full defeat in a negotiation, you have to be prepared to break' (p. 117)—and deadlock seemed imminent. But in September a chance encounter in Washington between Robert Murphy and Mrs. Luce, then US Ambassador to Italy, led to Murphy's visit to Tito, whom he already knew, bearing a personal letter from Eisenhower which persuaded Tito to yield. So the nominally provisional Memorandum of Understanding was signed by all four negotiators on October 5, 1954. It has remained in force ever since until in November 1975 (after this book was written) it was replaced by an Italo-Yugoslav agreement recognising the permanence of the de facto boundary between the two zones.

In a summing-up chapter at the end, John Campbell enumerates the main elements contributing to this successful outcome. Besides secrecy, he stresses in particular the timing, especially favourable at that moment, and the exceptional qualities of all four negotiators. He also speculates as to whether this classic example of successful diplomacy might have an application in other disputes, such as Cyprus or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Be that as it may, it makes an absorbing story in itself.

MURIEL GRINDROD

**Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950–1974.** By Kemal Karpat and contributors. *Leiden: Brill. 1975. 233 pp. (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East, Vol. XVII.) Fl. 84.00.*

**Turkey:** A Delicately Poised Ally. By Andrew Mango. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. 1976. 73 pp. (The Washington Papers, Vol. III, No. 28.) Pb: $3.00. £1·50.*

THE simmering confrontation between Greece and Turkey has redirected attention towards the complex international position in which Turkey now stands. These two books help to explain some of the issues involved in this contest.

The first book begins with an introductory briefing on the background to Turkish foreign policy by its editor, Kemal Karpat. Mehmet Gönlübol then tells the story of Turkey's relations with Nato since it joined the alliance in 1952. Like most Turkish commentators, he is sharply critical of President Johnson's intervention in the Cyprus crisis of 1964, but he concludes nevertheless that it is in Turkey's best interest to remain within the alliance. In the following chapter, George S. Harris concentrates on American-Turkish relations since the Second World War, closing with an interesting and pertinent speculation as to the likely effect of the embargo on American arms deliveries to Turkey (now partially lifted). Kemel Karpat then discusses Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab states, and the guarded rapprochement with both which has

taken place since the 1960s. He suggests, realistically enough, that Turco-Arab friendship must always be subject to some serious limitations. There are two chapters on the Cyprus dispute: the first, by Suat Bilge, gives a detailed history of the conflict up to the crisis of 1974, while the second, by the editor, concentrates on the Sampson coup and its aftermath, up to the beginning of 1975. The book closes with a chapter by Baran Tuncer on the role of foreign financing in Turkish economic development.

With the exception of George Harris, each of the contributors to Professor Karpat's book is, of course, approaching the topic from a Turkish point of view. Some of the statements made may not win universal approval from British readers, such as Suat Bilge's reference to Cyprus as 'an old Turkish land' (p. 135) or, more seriously, Professor Gönlübol's claim that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee of Cypriot independence between Britain, Greece and Turkey gave the latter 'the right to intervene for the sole purpose of upholding her rights on the island' (p. 18). On the other hand, the writers are not uncritical of successive governments' conduct of foreign relations, particularly the insensitive attitude taken towards the Arab states during the 1950s and the frequent chops and changes in Ankara's Cyprus policy (p. 180). The lack of source footnotes in all except George Harris's contribution is, however, a tiresome defect, as are the not infrequent misprints.

From his position as Assistant Head of the BBC's South European Service, Andrew Mango approaches Turkish politics in a detached manner. The introduction to his short but useful book draws attention to Turkey's traditional frontier role between Europe and the Middle East. He then outlines domestic political developments, concentrating on the period since 1950. A subsequent chapter on foreign policy contains an account of the 1974 Cyprus crisis and its impact. The generally neglected problem of the Turkish Kurds is also the subject of a thoughtful chapter. In his conclusions, Dr. Mango includes a useful summary of the political position of the Turkish army.

Dr. Mango is refreshingly outspoken at many points, but one suspects that he is at times unfairly critical of the Turkish politicians' handling of their difficult task. In particular, I feel that his account of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 does less than justice to the Turkish case. He rightly remarks that the initial Turkish reaction to the temporary overthrow of Makarios was mixed, but explains the invasion by saying that 'the opportunity was too good to miss' (p. 43). This obscures the not unjustified fears of the Turks that if they failed to react strongly to the Sampson coup then Cyprus would, in effect, have been annexed by the Greek Colonels and the safety of the Turkish Cypriots placed at serious risk. Admittedly, Dr. Mango had to be brief, but he should have given more details on the reasons for Prime Minister Ecevit's crucial decision.

*University of Durham* WILLIAM HALE

**Radical Politics in Modern Turkey.** By Jacob M. Landau. *Leiden: Bril 1974. 315 pp. (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle Eas Vol. XIV.) Fl. 64.00.*

**Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey:** The Free Party and its Afte math. By Walter Weiker. *Leiden: Brill. 1973. 317 pp. (Social, Economi and Political Studies of the Middle East, Vol. VIII.) Fl. 84.00.*

ONE of the important changes in Turkish politics since the coup of 196 which ousted Adnan Menderes has been the emergence of new radic groups of both the left and right. Jacob Landau's book gives us a scholarl and detailed account of these developments, drawing on a wide range c sources.

He begins his study with a summary of Turkish politics during the 1960 describing the new constitution of 1961 and its political impact up to th second military intervention of 1971. He then considers the growth c Marxist influences in Turkish journalism. This is followed by a chapter o the rise of the labour unions and the career of the illegal Turkish Con munist Party. The (legal) Turkish Labour Party is the subject of a furthe chapter, in which Professor Landau gives a detailed description of ideologic divisions on the left and a useful precis of the works of some leftist Turkis writers.

He then turns to the more neglected subject of right-wing radicalism i Turkey, notably the Nationalist Action Party (NAP). Ideologically, th radical right has been faced with the problem of reconciling European-styl exacerbated nationalism, which assumes a racial (and implicitly secula basis of national identity, and religious conservatism, which draws on th supra-national Islamic state. As Professor Landau suggests, Turkish rightis tackle this dilemma by identifying Islam with the Turkish nation—a historically questionable, if politically expedient, solution. His penultimat chapter describes the organisation of the NAP, and he concludes his boo with an account of the electoral performance of the left and right-win radical parties. Unfortunately, this final chapter is marred by some errors i its description of the electoral system: the 1961 system was not based o 'remainders' (as he claims on p. 248) and there are some serious confusion in his account of the amendments to the electoral law introduced i 1968 (p. 270).

Walter Weiker's book concentrates on an earlier period in Turkey' modern history. Between 1923 and 1945 the political monopoly of th Republican People's Party (RPP) was broken twice; first, in 1924, when group of rebels from the RPP formed the Progressive Republican Part which was suppressed in 1925, and then in 1930, when Fethi Okya Ataturk's prime minister during the earlier episode, formed the Fre Republican Party, which in turn had only a three-month lifespan. Th second experiment, which is the main theme of the book, has been th subject of intense speculation. Granted that the Free Party was establishe with Ataturk's support, was it genuinely intended as the first step towards fully competitive multi-party system? Or was it merely designed to smok out those who opposed Ataturk's reforms, as a preliminary to their arrest

Professor Weiker comes down in favour of the first of these explanation After careful consideration of the evidence he decides that 'Ataturk wa completely serious when he urged Fethi Okyar to form the Free Party, an that he fully expected it to be a lasting institution' (p. 55). Once established

however, the party attracted reactionary opposition elements which could not be accommodated in a secularist republic, and the experiment was therefore ended.

His excellently documented book contains a good deal besides this important conclusion. After describing the career of the Progressive Party, Professor Weiker details the economic and political background to the emergence of the Free Party. He gives much information on the party's organisation at the local level, besides its parliamentary performance. The second half of his book contains important material on the aftermath of the Free Party episode. The experiences of 1930, he believes, helped to bring about the successful transformation to a fully competitive system after 1945, and also prompted an attempt to reorientate the RPP towards a more genuinely populist outlook. This bid to make the party behave as though there was an opposition when in fact there was none was bound to have only limited success, but the problems he describes will be of interest to those concerned with single-party states in other parts of the world, besides students of modern Turkish history.

*University of Durham* WILLIAM HALE

**The Warrior Diplomats:** Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey. By Metin Tamkoç. *Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 1976. 394 pp. $12.00.*

POTENTIAL readers of this book should not be misled by the rather over-dramatic title or the coloured photograph of the band of the Janissaries which decorates the dust-jacket. This is not another potted history of the Ottoman Empire but a serious attempt to analyse the structure of power in Turkey since 1919 and the Turkish leaders' conduct of their country's foreign relations.

After an introductory chapter, Professor Tamkoç explains Ataturk's rise to power, drawing attention to the fact that he was just one of several potential nationalist leaders at the end of the First World War, and that his progress to pre-eminence was gradual. He then considers the presidential careers of Ismet Inönü and Celal Bayar, comparing their performance with that of their successors, Presidents Gürsel, Sunay and Korutürk. This is followed by a rather sketchy analysis of Turkish political culture during the republican period. The third section of the book tells the story of Turkey's foreign relations from 1919 to the summer of 1974. Unfortunately, except for the opening of this section (Chapter X), which gives an interesting account of Ataturk's dealings with France, Russia, Italy, Britain and the United States in the early 1920s, drawn from contemporary intelligence reports, there is relatively little information in this section which is not already available in other published sources. After some brief conclusions, Professor Tamkoç ends his book with a valuable Appendix, which presents brief biographies of forty Turkish statesmen who have played leading roles in the foreign policy field.

This Appendix is probably the most useful part of the book, since it brings together a good deal of information which is not readily obtainable elsewhere. The main body of the book, while it is written in a generally fluent style and is well documented, seems less satisfactory. In the first place, Professor Tamkoç does not appear to have decided whom he is writing

for. The book is not sufficiently broad in its coverage to serve as a ger introduction to modern Turkish history for the newcomer; on the o hand, with the exception of the sections noted, it contains comparatively l new information for the specialist. In the second place, his interpretatio the subject is sometimes muddled and self-contradictory. He opens summary of modern Turkish politics by assuming 'the primacy of for over domestic policies' (p. 71). While this assumption may be true of years 1930–50 and at odd intervals during the 1960s and 1970s, it is ope serious question as an overall analysis of the Turkish political scene s 1923. His account of developments during the 1950s, at the end of Cha III, concentrates on the role of Celal Bayar at the expense of that of Ac Menderes, although, as he admits later (p. 243), 'Menderes became, fo practical purposes, the most important person in the country' during period. Again, on page 104 he claims that 'the absolute power of Sultans of the past has been replaced in the Republican era by the alı absolute power of the President'. As a generalisation, this might ceivably hold good for the period up to 1961, but not for subsequent ye as the author concedes in a footnote on the same page. It is shortcoming this kind which make for a book which is, unfortunately, good only in p

*University of Durham* WILLIAM HAI

**. . . slik jeg ser det.** By Haakon Lie. *Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag. 1975. 426 Nkr. 89.00*

SECRETARY of the Norwegian Labour Party for a quarter of a cen (1945–69), and a leading figure not only in domestic but in internati Socialist terms, Haakon Lie states in his Introduction the main purpose theme of these memoirs:

> What I have particularly tried to do is describe how, in my experie there has been a gradual weakening of the posture to which the Lal Party owed both its internal strength and the confidence it enjoye the country. I believe this to be in fact largely the Norwegian ver of what has become a main problem of the democratic labour m ment as a whole (namely) a growing failure to realise the neces relationship between the preservation of democracy and the wil conduct a realistic foreign and defence policy—something that is a closely bound up with a readiness to assess, carefully but firmly, threats posed by dictatorship and all its works. This could have er in tragedy for us in 1939–40, had luck, and America, not been on side. From the mid-1950s onwards we again entered a vicious circle tended to impair both strength and confidence. I invite the reade accompany me on a foray into the period: one that will howeve valueless if I do not say frankly certain things which I believe can th light on a subject still central to our problems and preoccupations. I more than ever such frankness seems to me essential, indeed I have uneasy feeling that it is precisely an unwillingness to speak out may be on the way to doing us mortal harm.

His account is certainly an outspoken and hard-hitting one, which already occasioned controversy at home. It is in fact in the mid-1950s he begins it, at a point where the steady postwar growth of the Lal

Party flattened off, and the possibility of an alternative government first appeared on the horizon, if the disparate opposition parties could but make common cause—thus invalidating Golda Meir's *mot* that Norway held, not elections, but re-elections. In practice, this was not to happen until the 1960s. Lie nevertheless dates the decline in the party's standing from somewhat earlier; and connects it with the emergence of just those tendencies to which his book, like his active career, presents so strong a challenge. They are, as he sees them, the familiar bogeys (should one say trolls?) of Nordic social democracy: pacifism, neutralism, selective moralising, self-satisfaction, and left-wing nostalgia in general. Not that he would claim such propensities to be peculiar to Norway, or Scandinavia: but he does accord them a special, characteristic place in his story. The debate on defence, particularly, is a thread running through it, and Lie gives a detailed account of how policies evolved, both in inner-party councils and in government, towards membership of Nato and East-West relations as a whole. Among much that will be of interest to close students of the Norwegian political scene, perhaps most revealing for the general reader is the account of the author's eventual estrangement from the leader of his party, Einar Gerhardsen, former prime minister and now elder statesman, whom he convicts of an ambivalent attitude towards defence, and inadequate understanding of foreign affairs, above all as regards the Soviet Union, even if this was not fully to reveal itself until his second premiership. (Gerhardsen's published memoirs have not so far dealt with these accusations: his version of events is, however, understood to have been deposited ad interim with the Norwegian Foreign Office, 'for security reasons'.) At the same time the book is a reminder of Norway's good fortune in having had in charge of its affairs during the critical postwar years men of the calibre not only of Lie himself and (one must surely add) Gerhardsen, but of other outstanding Labour leaders like Lange, Brofoss, Hauge and Bratteli—all of them well portrayed here.

The closing section of the book recounts the part played by Lie, after his resignation as Party Secretary, in the campaign for Norway's EEC membership: an issue that was to evoke extraordinary passions, but which he believes could have turned out differently had not the Centre, i.e., Farmers', Party prime minister of the 1965–71 coalition, Per Borten, changed direction at a critical stage. (Instead, it was to result in a further weakening of the Labour Party's representation in the Storting.) Other trends, not least in his own party, vis-à-vis the international situation likewise cause him concern. Yet although this must be to some extent a tale of progressive disappointment in an *anceps proelium* against those whom he sees as the backwoodsmen of Norse politics, the tone remains to the end that of a fighter and an enthusiast. The author's plain style evinces an attractively forthright personality, determined to say what he means: and the work is in its field a significant one which would seem to merit an English translation.

MICHAEL F. CULLIS

## USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

**The Soviet Economy.** By David A. Dyker. *London: Crosby Lockwood Staples. 1976. 173 pp. £4·95.*

**Implementation of Soviet Economic Reforms:** Political, Organizational, and Social Processes. By Karl W. Ryavec. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1976. 360 pp. £11·85.*

Both of these books deal with the same subject, the dismantling of Stalin's command economy, beginning with the Khrushchev reforms in 1957, and continued in the Kosygin changes in 1965. The authors have different readers in mind, Mr. Dyker setting out to explain to students of the contemporary scene in the Soviet Union the structure and functioning of the Soviet planned economy, Mr. Ryavec being concerned to convey to a wider audience the political and social factors involved in the measures initiated in the period from 1966 to 1973.

The strong impression left by these carefully documented studies is that, even after two decades, the far-reaching changes envisaged by the sponsors of the reforms have not been realised. The basic aim was to get away from rigid centralisation in the running of the economy, to release individual initiative by delegating more authority to the enterprise manager in industry and granting a greater degree of autonomy to collective farms.

The writers concentrate attention on the factory manager, for whom a special Charter was drawn up in 1965, setting out his new rights vis-à-vis supervisory bodies. No longer was he to be the passive recipient of orders from above. Higher organs of state, such as the State Planning Commission, along with the branch ministries, were to reduce the number of central instructions issued to enterprises, and to allow the individual managers much more freedom of action in dealing with suppliers and customers, and especially with the labour they employed.

At the time these departures from Soviet orthodoxy aroused great interest among Western commentators, some of whom even talked about a ' return to capitalism '. The studies under review offer convincing proof that nothing of the sort has happened. Instructions from the centre were indeed cut from over thirty to eight or nine, the manager's powers to control his labour force were enlarged, he could ' hire and fire ', use bonuses to reward good workers and penalise shirkers. But ' petty tutelage ' from his superiors continued as before, and his ability to secure the materials needed to fulfil his plans by entering into contracts freely negotiated with the directors of supplying enterprises, proved in practice to be illusory. All the defects of the pre-reform era were still in evidence—chronic supply difficulties, uneven rates of production and low quality levels, indifference to costs, inadequate material incentives for workers, further slowing down of growth rates, resistance to innovation.

It may seem astonishing to find an authoritarian state having its intentions frustrated by the very bodies entrusted with their implementation. The authors agree that the reasons for this outcome lie in the nature of bureaucracies themselves, and not in disagreement, still less hostility, between the organs of control and the government. It is a truism that, in any country, individuals or organisations that wield power are concerned primarily with consolidating, and if possible extending, that power. Soviet bureaucrats are no exception, hence their continuing tight control—contrary to the spirit of

the reforms—over all the activities of the producing bodies under their jurisdiction.

A further important factor stressed by the writers is that rapid industrialisation outran the supply of men trained in the art of management. Only in 1971 was a new Institute of Management set up, where future managers are trained in psychology, sociology and jurisprudence, as well as in engineering and economics.

A conclusion with which the authors emphatically agree is the urgent need for a new reform to take the place of the 1965 model which, they think, has served its time. Wisely, in a field so vast and so full of problems —informational, psychological, technical—they do not venture to make specific suggestions, but underline the need, in a country like Russia, for reform to be looked upon as a continuing process and not a 'once-for-all' event.

Mr. Ryavec believes that the cause of the failure of the Kosygin reforms arises from the unresolved tensions between the attempt to modernise Soviet society, and the resistance of 'ideologues and conservative functionaries' (p. 308). Nevertheless he considers that further changes in the direction of liberalisation are now essential, and seems confident that the leaders of Russia's politically controlled economy have the adaptability to bring this about. Mr. Dyker comes to similarly optimistic conclusions: that the Soviet authorities are faced with enormous, but not insurmountable, problems; that economic policy in the Soviet Union is as complex and subject to as many constraints as it is elsewhere; that when the next round of economic reforms comes into being, the aim will be the same as in previous attempts, viz., to effect a transition to a mixed economy, where command and market principles coexist. This time, he believes, practicable and realistic solutions may well be found.

There is reason to hope that the optimism is justified, based as it is on painstaking research in a field beset by obstacles to the ascertainment and interpretation of the facts behind economic development. If it is, prospects for peaceful coexistence will have a firmer basis than they enjoy at present.

MARGARET MILLER

**Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World.** Edited by Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry. *New York, London: Praeger. 1976. 242 pp. £9·65.*

THIS book is a selection from the papers presented at the First International Slavic Conference at Banff in September 1974. It is divided into four parts. Part I contains three papers on Soviet policies towards the Third World in general; in Part II one chapter examines the applicability of Soviet development models to Third World countries; the other analyses the evolution of Cuba's political and economic system in relation to Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union. Part III consists of two chapters on the Soviet Union and the Middle East. In Part IV there are five chapters on the Soviet Union and South and East Asia, of which three focus on South-east Asia with monotonous repetition. Here and there, apparently randomly, Roger Hamburg adds comments, the function of which is unclear. They neither serve to link the papers, nor to point out contradictions or agreements between contributors, nor to develop any argument further.

Analysis of current history always risks being overtaken by events. In this case the focus of Third World change and activity had shifted to southern Africa by the time this book was published, making the scant reference to Sub-Saharan Africa seem inadequate. Some of the papers are stimulating and interesting. Bhabani Sen Gupta points out that Western scholars tend to 'read Soviet writings between the lines and dismiss the lines themselves' (p. 22), and he pleads for a theoretical framework which is 'a synthesis . . . between Western and Soviet disciplines of political science, international relations and sociology" (p. 26). It is disappointing that, while presenting a useful explanation of the Soviet view of the Third World and the present historical period, he does not develop a theoretical framework.

Charles K. Wilbur raises some pertinent points about 'developmentalism', which regards economic growth and modernisation as good in itself (p. 50), without asking—development for whom? This reviewer found most informative Robert O. Freedman's well-documented account of the way in which the CPSU has almost always and almost completely abandoned local Arab Communist parties in the interest of state-to-state relations.

The general consensus of the other contributors can be summarised: although the Soviet Union is a status quo power, in all places and at all times Soviet leaders aim to protect Soviet security, to make known the global nature of Soviet super-power, and to counteract and counterbalance American and Chinese influence. Soviet leaders use various 'orthodox foreign policy tools' (p. 161) to pursue their 'normal national interests' (p. 183), and latterly Soviet leaders have tailored their policies to accord both with the perceived needs and interests of the country they are courting, and with the importance of that country to Soviet national interests. Soviet success is limited by local policies and changes, by Chinese policy, and by the primacy given by Soviet policy-makers to American-Soviet detente. On balance, the Soviet Union has not had any spectacular or lasting successes, but Soviet policy is unlikely to undergo dramatic change.

One would not, perhaps, argue with these views or doubt that they required re-stating. Whether they can be said to 'add to our increasing understanding both of Soviet policy in the third world and of the attraction of the Soviet developmental model in individual developing countries' (p. x) is questionable.

*University of Surrey* MARGOT LIGHT

**The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962.** By Herbert S. Dinerstein. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976. 302 pp. £10·48.*

WHY did Khrushchev send missiles to Cuba in 1962? To tilt the strategic nuclear balance in Moscow's favour? To deter a direct American attack upon Cuba after the Bay of Pigs fiasco? As a bargaining stake to secure Western retreats from Berlin or Turkey? Or, perhaps, to bolster Soviet prestige in the Third World, especially vis-à-vis China? Any attempt to assess the final outcome of the crisis necessarily fails unless we know Khrushchev's objectives. If, as he later claimed, the Soviet goal was simply to extract from Washington guarantees against another invasion of Cuba, then Khrushchev could claim to have attained his objective.

Dinerstein rejects Khrushchev's self-serving apologia for the Soviet retreat along with other single-goal explanations. After an exhaustive study of Soviet and Cuban press coverage of the crisis, he concludes that different members of the two countries' ruling groups had different objectives. Amongst these Khrushchev's desire to redress the strategic nuclear balance was probably pre-eminent. Despite election talk in the United States about a 'missile gap' Khrushchev knew his country was still far behind. Intermediate and medium-range missiles in Cuba would unquestionably have permitted the Soviet Union to kill many more Americans. The credibility of Soviet threats would have been enormously enhanced long before Russia could hope to catch up technologically.

An impressive demonstration of Moscow's deterrent power might also speed up Cuba's drift towards communism. Castro's timely discovery that he had always, albeit subconsciously, been a Marxist-Leninist encouraged Khrushchev to assume the role of Cuba's protector. Seeing this as the best way to assure his island's emancipation from North American tutelage, the pragmatic Cuban leader welcomed Soviet aid, including the missiles.

Dinerstein concedes that the Western scholar cannot claim to have penetrated the Kremlin's decision-making process. Instead he is obliged to rely upon deciphering the esoteric meanings in communist communications. This Dinerstein does with great skill, tracing the evolution of Soviet and Cuban objectives in communist press reports. He considers every nuance before indicating the most likely interpretation and resists the temptation to use the crisis as a peg upon which to hang a favourite theory. The book provides an objective analysis of the attitudes of the chief actors as these evolved from the Guatemalan crisis of 1954 to the missile crisis of 1962. It treats the missile crisis as a chapter in the gradual rapprochement between Castro's revolutionary opportunism and the more cautious approach of the orthodox communist leadership in Moscow and Havana. There are few lapses from the author's high standards of accuracy. (Khrushchev's opponents accuse him of '*hair*brained schemes' on p. 152.) Above all the book demonstrates, as its title suggests, the vital importance of historical context in the analysis of crisis decisions.

*Johns Hopkins University, Bologna* MICHAEL LEIGH

**Stalin as Warlord.** By Albert Seaton. *London: Batsford. 1976. 312 pp. £5·95.*

IN their series of studies of leaders in the Second World War, Batsford follow Ronald Lewin's *Churchill as Warlord* [1] with this companion piece on Stalin. The task of the author is even more difficult. The Soviet sources are tainted and obscure, while outside observers had only a partial view of Stalin's conduct of the war. Colonel Seaton possesses in full measure the rare qualities necessary to tackle such a subject: command of the Russian language; knowledge of Soviet military organisation; and insight into the enigmatic convolutions of Soviet memoirs and official history. (Rather strangely, however, his bibliography makes no reference to John Erickson's important book, *The Soviet High Command.*[2])

The author's chosen method is chronological narrative, with occasional

[1] Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1974, p. 692.
[2] London: Macmillan, 1962. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1963, p. 611.

pauses to describe the Soviet system of military communications (whose failures contributed considerably to the defeats of 1941); Stalin's working methods; and the development of Stalin's relations with the general staff. The approach is not entirely successful. Colonel Seaton handicaps himself by devoting sixty of his 256 pages of text to events of the Civil War and the Polish campaign of 1920. Stalin's early military experiences are certainly of some interest, but the author does not justify spending nearly a quarter of his space on them. This means that the remaining three-quarters, concentrating on the great campaigns of 1941–45, are very densely packed. The detail is overwhelming, with a constant succession of signals, orders, changes in organisation, and contradictions between the sources. The reader requires great tenacity to follow the thread of the narrative through these thickets. Little help is provided by an inadequate set of maps: the author rightly says that full-scale campaign maps could not be provided in a book of this scope, but surely the publishers could have done better than this for a work which is full of place-names, plans and troop movements. Nor is the index helpful: it is of persons only, so that the reader cannot look up places, battles, formations or subjects.

Unhappily, even a tenacious reader will not emerge with a picture of Stalin as warlord so clear and vivid as that provided of Churchill by Mr. Lewin. Something emerges: Stalin's grasp of detail; the crucial importance he attached to control of the reserves, notably during the Stalingrad campaign; his strange indecision and nervousness in May and June 1943, before the great victory of Kursk; his tendency to intervene in the detailed conduct of battles; and his often arbitrary treatment of commanders—making Churchill's dealings with Wavell and Auchinleck appear mild by comparison. But the pieces do not cohere into a whole. In part, this is doubtless due to the extreme difficulty of the source material; but this reader at least finished the book with a sense of disappointment that the author's deep knowledge and grasp of detail had not produced a clearer total picture.

*University of Liverpool* P. M. H. BELL

**Search for Security:** A Study in Baltic Diplomacy, 1920–1934. By Hugh I. Rodgers. *Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, Shoestring Press. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by Pandemic Ltd., London.) 181 pp. $12.00.*

THE title and the blurb on Professor Rodgers's book could lead the reader to expect an analysis of the diplomacy of all three Baltic republics, but it is in fact a study of Latvian diplomacy, and it might be better if the title had made this clear. The possibilities of any book on this subject are circumscribed by the character of the available sources. In this case the primary sources are documents of the German Foreign Office and the United States State Department, backed up by a comprehensive use of memoirs and other secondary materials, together with some newspapers and the standard collections of published documents. Latvian archives are not available, and the use of other Latvian material is very intermittent; some use of the Latvian press as a source might have been expected. No Russian-language material has been used, and the treatment of the Russian aspect of the subject seems inadequate and raises questions about the author's criteria of historical proof. It looks strange to find that a quotation from Lenin has been derived from a Russian exile source written in French (p. 111). The fact that a

German Foreign Office memorandum stated that the Soviet Union regarded the Baltic republics as a Russian sphere of influence, and perhaps aspired to annex them, does not constitute very strong evidence that this was the case. Similarly, while it may well be true that Soviet diplomatic and trade missions in Riga in 1924 were actively engaged in subversion, a report to this effect by an American diplomat and a German newspaper is not very convincing evidence for it. Professor Rodgers seems inclined to believe a rather improbable story that the acceptance by Latvia of a secret Russo-Polish offer to guarantee the Baltic states would have been followed by the immediate partition and annexation of Latvia on no better evidence than unspecified material said to have been supplied by the Finnish Foreign Ministry (p. 90). In general it must be said that the Soviet case, such as it was, always goes by default in this book.

Such considerations must leave the reader with some reservations about the book as a whole, but if it is accepted as a straightforward description of Latvian foreign policy as the various Latvian foreign ministers conceived it, then the deficiencies in the background material do not matter so much. Anyone who wants to know what the aspirations of Latvian foreign policy were in these years will find the answers clearly and concisely set out. The conclusion to which the book seems to point is that for a country of Latvia's size, placed in the position in which it was, the secure maintenance of sovereign independence was impossible. The author shows how by 1927 the Latvians had already tried all the possible permutations and that none of them was viable. He concludes: ' Cielens presided over the closing out of all the options for Latvian security. The fate of the Baltic States was settled, not in the fall of 1939, but in the fall of 1927. Although not aware of it in 1927, Latvia and her sister republics had already entered upon their via dolorosa (p. 73). Although if Professor Rodgers is right that ' Latvia's search for security was an exercise in frustration which ended in futility ' (p. 103), and all that he has to say supports this view, it would seem to follow that even in 1920, when formal sovereignty was established and recognised, the idea of a secure future for an independent Latvia was chimerical. The frenzied diplomacy of the Latvians in 1920–27 only underlined the obvious.

*University of St. Andrews* A. F. UPTON

**The United Front:** The TUC and the Russians 1923–1928. By Daniel F. Calhoun. *Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 450 pp. £10·50.*

THE abortive Soviet attempt to form a united front with trade union movements in Western Europe, and especially in Britain, is the subject of this fascinating work. The author makes substantial but understandable claims for the significance of the breakdown in relations between the Russian and especially the British trade unions towards the end of 1927. First of all, it had important implications for the defeat of Trotsky by Stalin:

> In one of the glorious ironies that make the historical discipline so appealingly enigmatic, British trade unionists, in 1927, played a modest role in achieving that objective which had eluded British infantrymen a decade earlier: the great Trotsky had finally been humbled (p. 390).

Secondly, and more importantly,

> Had the International not jettisoned the united front in 1928, it is questionable whether Adolf Hitler would ever have come to power in Germany five years later. To stop Hitler would have demanded a close alliance of the whole of the political left. By the new dogmas, however, for the Reds to participate in any such venture was simply out of the question. Communists considered reformists as irredeemable as fascists (p. 392).

The purpose of the book is not, however, to advance and defend these theses as such. It is rather to document the history of Anglo-Soviet trade union relations and to place them in several thoroughly investigated contexts. This entails integrating into a single narrative diverse subjects like the split between the Amsterdam-based International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and the Moscow-sponsored Red International of Labour Unions (RILU or 'Profintern'); the relations between the TUC General Council and its left-wing splinter group, the National Minority Movement; the attitude of the MacDonald and Baldwin governments both to the trade unionists and the Russians; the General Strike; the 'Arcos' Raid; Comintern activities; the Communist Party of Great Britain; and the political and ideological tussle inside the Soviet Union between Stalin and the 'Left Opposition'.

Professor Calhoun has combed through a formidable mass of published and unpublished source material, both in English and Russian, including Cabinet and Foreign Office papers, TUC reports, Labour and Communist Party reports, CPSU Congress reports and Narkomindel documents. Sometimes the reader feels so close to these detailed sources that he finds it difficult to follow the overall evolution of the narrative. But he is at all times helped by the *élan* of Professor Calhoun's style, which is vivid, forthright, conversational, ironical and irrepressibly witty. Professor Calhoun writes of Lozovsky, head of RILU:

> To construct an elaborate and intricate theoretical framework imprisoning great masses of inconveniently squirming realities seemed his favourite sport. He used arguments as if they were rubber truncheons, hammering his opposition over the head with them with such dull perseverance the poor reader or listener was finally clubbed into leaden acquiescence (p. 299).

It is indeed gratifying when history reads like this while remaining thoroughly and scrupulously professional.

*University of Hull* M. C. CHAPMAN

**The Masaryks:** The Making of Czechoslovakia. By Zbyněk Zeman. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1976. 230 pp. £6·50.*

THE lives of the two Masaryks span nearly a hundred years of Czech history. Thomas, the President and founder of Czechoslovakia, was born in 1850, his son, the Foreign Minister, died in 1948. Between them they witnessed three of the most momentous events of their country: the founding of the new state; its dismemberment; and the communist takeover in 1948.

Dr. Zeman draws an interesting portrait of the 'scholar President', an individualistic, curiously apolitical and yet far-sighted figure. Before 1914, as leader of the small Realist Party he exhibited none of the usual tendencies

of Czech politicians—he was neither pro-Russian, anti-semitic, nor a believer in unthinking Czech nationalism. Again, unlike others, he saw the 1914 struggle more as a conflict between the Central Powers and the Allies than as a battle between Hapsburgs and Slavs. His tactics of appealing to France and the United States paid off, and in 1918 he accepted the Presidency of the new nation.

The instability of the Czech political scene enabled Masaryk to increase the powers of the Presidency. He governed the country with a small group of friends and the leading representatives of the five main political parties —' a specialist workshop by compromise '. Having survived three Presidential elections, he finally resigned at the age of 85. He died a year before the nation he had worked so hard to found began to be dismembered.

Jan Masaryk was never such an important figure. Something of a playboy in his early years, he was at the London legation when Benes signed the Munich agreement, and remained there throughout the war years, broadcasting frequently to his home country. He returned as Foreign Minister to a Prague dominated by the Red Army, and with the government a virtual lackey of the Soviet Union. A month after the communists officially took over he was found dead in the courtyard of the Foreign Ministry—suicide rather than murder, is Dr. Zeman's interpretation.

The author has written a sound biography, at its best in the descriptions of Masaryk's attempts to found the new state. However, it does not adequately explain the causes of the economic crises which beset Czechoslovakia, and there is not enough analysis either of the rise of Fascism, nor of the problems of the minority movements which weakened the successor states in the interwar years. One is left with a useful but rather one-dimensional study.

*Brunel University* LISANNE RADICE

**The Legitimation of a Revolution:** The Yugoslav Case. By Denis Bogdan Denitch. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1976. 254 pp. £9·00.*

BY its very nature and history Yugoslavia is particularly suited to modernisation/legitimation studies. Bogdan Denitch believes it to be worthy of close examination on two counts: ' it is relevant to all societies seeking a path of independent development and modernisation; at the same time, it is an attempt . . . to solve the problems facing socialism in advanced industrial societies ' (p. 28). He describes his book as ' a detailed study of the development of the social and political bases of legitimacy of the revolutionary regime in Yugoslavia ' (p. 1). Employing the conventional tools of the political sociologist, Mr. Denitch presents a succinct account of the explosive mix that is Yugoslavia, tracing the history of the fledgling country and underlining the stresses inherent in the union.

Mr. Denitch concentrates on the major conflicts that have beset Yugoslavia, outlining the socio-economic backgrounds of those in the leadership who are dealing with those conflicts, and investigating their attitudes to crucial economic and political issues. He pays particular attention to the League of Communists; to attitudes towards self-management, which he regards as the participatory form of socialism—' a radical form of democratization in its classical sense . . . democracy as the rule of the people ' (p. 11); and to attempts to ease the nationalities disputes by means of the

'republic key', which allocates the tenure of federal posts among the constituent republics.

Mr. Denitch has gathered a wealth of sociological data, mostly Yugoslav in origin, which will be useful to students of modernisation and social mobility, as well as to those especially concerned with Yugoslavia. However, a deeper consideration of the effects of the break with the Cominform on the process of legitimation in Yugoslavia would have been welcome. Did it fragment a precariously poised elite only recently come to power? Or did it rally the people and cement the rulers' authority? Surely this would have been germane to a study of the legitimation of the Yugoslav revolution.

Mr. Denitch is convinced that the Yugoslav revolutionary elite has won general acceptance of its right to rule. As proof of this he presents the results of a survey carried out jointly by the Institute for Social Sciences in Belgrade and a team from Columbia University on the social backgrounds and attitudes of the 'strategic opinion-making leadership of Yugoslavia' (p. 207). In the author's view the fact that the survey took place is as important as the views expressed by the elite, and is confirmation of the communist regime's secure place in Yugoslavia. 'The Yugoslav political and intellectual leaders apparently were sufficiently confident of the legitimacy of their roles in society to be willing to collaborate with independent researchers who sought to examine them in a comparative context' (p. 208). But the real test of the acceptance of communist rule and the concept of a unified Yugoslavia will not come until the death of President Tito. Only when the revolution can no longer shelter behind its creator's drive and charisma will it be possible to assess just how firmly the new political culture has taken root.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

## MIDDLE EAST

**War and Peace in the Middle East:** The Experiences and Views of a UN observer. By Odd Bull. *London: Leo Cooper. 1976. (First publ. Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1973.) 205 pp. £6·95.*

GENERAL ODD BULL, late of the Norwegian Air Force, is a citizen who makes up his mind to take a job in half an hour, and leaves for a far destination next morning. He is decent, clear-headed and calm, and is capable of silencing the Syrian premier when he claims that breaking the sound barrier was an air raid, or Golda Meir when she avers that Israelis fire only at military targets.

His assignments to the Middle East were two. In June 1958 he was sent to the Lebanon as a UN commander to stop a civil war between Christians and Moslems. His description of the work, now forgotten, of the observer corps (UNOGIL) that held the balance there for the next month, before the Iraqi revolution which caused the American landing in July, shows that all the ingredients of the Lebanese disaster of 1975–76 were, without any adventitious aid from the Palestinians, present in embryo twenty years earlier.

His second assignment—the command of the United Nations Truce Organisation on Palestine's borders—was far more exacting in terms of both time and temper. He held from 1963 to 1970 a post that his predecessor, on handing over, called 'impossible and thankless but very fascinating'. The

first two qualities lay in the dead-end nature of far more than half the quarrels, the third in observing the minor gains that one side or the other contrived to make out of trifling incidents. Until mid-1965, these gains were mostly Israeli. Thereafter el Fatah became a reality, and the pinpricks that it administered provoked several massive Israeli military raids. The final one became the 1967 war.

Public opinion in Norway, the General says, has 'remained consistently favourable to Israel', partly for biblical reasons, and partly out of a wish to redress the tragedy of the Holocaust. This book, which first appeared in Norwegian, should correct the imbalance without causing it to tip too far the other way.

ELIZABETH MONROE

**The Economic Challenge of the Arabs.** By Gian Paolo Casadio. *Lexington, Mass., London: Heath. 1976. 216 pp. £6·95.*

**The Middle East: Oil, Politics, and Development.** A conference sponsored by the School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Edited by John Duke Anthony. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1975. 109 pp. $6.50. Pb: $3.00.*

THE Arab oil boycott and the sharp rise in oil prices of three years ago have encouraged exaggerated forms both of optimism and pessimism in about equal amounts. Gian Paolo Casadio is an optimist. 'The economic challenge of the Arabs', the fact that oil is a rapidly wasting resource without any obvious substitute in the short or medium term, are seen by him as providing the opportunity for an enormously ambitious scheme of economic co-operation not only between the Western industrial countries and the Middle East but also between the various Arab countries themselves. The outlines of such a scheme are sketched in large, bold strokes and involve, among other things, an agreement by which the governments of the oil-exporting countries would commit themselves to provide the industrial countries with a major share of their oil consumption at a fixed price over a definite period of time in exchange for the export of the goods and services they require for their development. Casadio also sets out the main lines along which he thinks Arab economic co-operation should proceed.

As with all such exercises, the political dimension is almost completely missing. The problems of establishing commodity agreements between the industrial countries and the primary producers of the Third World are sufficiently obvious not to require further comment. So too are the implications of the recently revealed agreement between the United States and Iran in which oil is being traded, on a regular basis, for arms. But it is a pity that the author did not augment his useful discussion of the economies and the economic necessities of the separate Middle Eastern countries with an examination of some of the more obvious difficulties which lie in the way of inter-Arab co-operation. One which clearly worries the rulers of the wealthier Arab states is the question of security of investment in a country like Egypt or the Sudan where, for all its economic potential, the existing government could quite easily be overthrown by a regime of a very different political complexion with quite different policies towards foreign capital.

*The Middle East: Oil, Politics, and Development* is the report of a conference held in Toronto in which both optimism and pessimism were given free rein. Having taken place in January 1974 just after the first big oil price rise, much of the discussion was taken up with what then seemed the huge problems of recycling Arab petro-dollars, the economic absorbtive capacity of the Middle East, and the search for substitutes. Contributors seem to have been divided about the ease with which such problems could be solved more or less according to whether they came from East or West, but there seems to have been a general overall assumption that somehow the interests of producers and consumers could be reconciled. Like all such conferences, the papers presented have something of an ephemeral quality. However, there is much to be learned, as always, from Edith Penrose's brief description of the changes in the balance of power between the international oil companies and the producer governments over the last twenty years.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* ROGER OWEN

**Development of the Iranian Oil Industry:** International and Domestic Aspects. By Fereidun Fesharaki. *New York: Praeger; London: Martin Robertson. 1976. 315 pp. £12·15.*

**Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy.** By Sheikh Rustum Ali. *New York, London: Praeger. 1976. 197 pp. £10·75.*

THESE volumes offer us two attempts at satisfying our curiosity about anything to do with Middle Eastern oil. Fesharaki has provided an excellent study of the Iranian oil industry; Ali a more disappointing one on Saudi developments.

Fesharaki's book is partly a history of the Iranian industry; partly a study of the contribution which oil has made to that country's economic development; partly an examination of the role of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC); and partly a critique of contemporary Iranian planning for the oil sector. Even when he is covering old ground (as in his historical sections), he makes a distinctive contribution, being both eminently fair to BP and extremely informative about Iranian initiatives (such as the 1957 Petroleum Act) which are not always given the due they deserve. He thus provides a valuable corrective to accounts by Western historians who underestimate the pioneering role played by Iran within the Middle East in the search for new relationships with the traditional oil companies. He is not afraid, however, to show where such experiments have failed to live up to expectations, and one's only criticism is that he plays down too much the importance of Latin American precedents, such as Mexico's 1938 expropriation (also, given the creation of Pemex, it is just not true that: ' NIOC was the first national oil company in a major oil-producing country ' (p. 60)).

One valuable chapter deals with the various non-concessionary contracts Iran has signed since the original joint venture with Mattei's AGIP. All the various deals are listed and analysed as official thinking moved on to encouraging service contracts during the latter part of the 1960s. He fails to make out a convincing economic case for the argument that Iran has gained from such deals, but anyone concerned with the new company-government relationships emerging in the Middle East will find his analysis of Iran's different approaches invaluable.

The book also contains a great deal of information about the history and workings of NIOC, particularly bringing out the way in which it has developed the domestic Iranian market which was too small to interest the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. He also shows how the country has now become so dependent on cheap oil supplies that governments have been unable to raise domestic prices for over a decade because of the violence of popular reactions the last time this was tried in 1964. It is for such insights into the workings of the Iranian political process that many will find this a particularly useful book. For instance, one gets a glimpse of some of the tensions stemming from apparent contradictions in the regime's economic policies. Though NIOC is charged with the responsibility for distributing oil products within the Iranian market, it is increasingly being forced to allow the incursion of private enterprise into areas such as the operation of service stations and various parts of the transport network. One would like to know more about why NIOC is being hobbled in this way. *Cui bono?*

Finally, Fesharaki analyses the country's strategies for disposing of its increased oil revenues. He is informative and not frightened to suggest either that some of the targets set within sectors such as petrochemicals are over-optimistic, or that, in the case of utilising gas for iron-ore processing, there are economically more attractive alternatives (such as re-injecting it). He is obviously not convinced that energy-intensive industrialisation is the best strategy, nor that the short-term export potential of oil-refining, petrochemicals or gas is particularly bright.

Having warmly recommended this study, one must register disappointment with Ali's book about Saudi Arabia and the oil weapon. The fact that he relies heavily on secondary sources should be irrelevant, except that he throws up no new insights, and is often wrong or ambiguous over facts (Aramco was not created in 1934 (p. 6), and does he really believe that the 50 : 50 profit-sharing principle still held as he wrote? (p. 27)). He is also often naive—he believes the United States is likely to become energy autonomous after 1985 (p. 154). He concludes that the oil weapon has almost had its day, now that alternative energy supplies are being developed, and the Saudis are realising their vulnerability to dire retaliation from the United States. He could be right, but he does not have the necessary grasp of all the variables to stamp authority on such conclusions.

Incidentally, it is good to see Praeger occasionally including an index in their books. However, in the case of these two, it is the undeserving one which is indexed. Those who need to refer to Fesharaki's study are unfortunately left to their own devices.

*Chatham House* LOUIS TURNER

**Guerrillas for Palestine.** By Riad El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 155 pp. £5·50.*

THIS is not really a new book. It was first published in 1974 by An-Nahar Press Services of the Lebanon as the fourth in a series of books dealing with various Middle Eastern themes and problems. On the cover jacket of the original copy, which has the same title, it is stated that 'the contents of *Guerrillas for Palestine* are based on privileged contacts and interviews with the leaders and theoreticians of the commando groups, conducted by the research staff of An-Nahar Arab Report'. It was also made plain that

the book was compiled by the research staff of the weekly digest in English produced by An-Nahar. The editors were El-Rayyas and Nahas who are named as the authors of the new edition. This is shorter because parts of the original have been entirely dropped, while others have been incorporated in other chapters by a major editorial surgery which has brought about some improvement in style and presentation. However, the new edition is not as useful to the serious student of Middle Eastern affairs as the first.

The book deals with the rise of the Palestine guerrillas, tracing their history from the early formation of the movement in the 1960s; it attempts to link this development to the indigenous politics of mandated Palestine and the subsequent evolution of Arab politics in general. The success of the guerrillas after the Arab defeat in the Six Day war of 1967 is the focal point of the book. A list of the commando organisations is provided, with a short profile of each. There is no explanation for the underlying tendency towards factionalism, and whether this has been peculiar to the Palestine national movement or is a symptom of the general malaise of Arab politics, the inherent rivalry for political leadership and the recurring disputes. The book is rather descriptive and provides little analysis of the guerrillas' role, their impact in war or in peace, in the politics of the Arab-Israeli dispute or in inter-Arab conflict. There is no appraisal of their defects and their achievement. The claim of the Palestine Liberation Organisation to be the only legitimate representative of the Palestine people is not examined, and the functions of the 'political apparatus', especially the Palestine National Assembly, as the parliament of the Palestine Arabs are not assessed. Moreover, much of the 'privileged' information which An-Nahar Report contained in its weekly account of developments at the time, are open secrets and general knowledge today.

*School of Oriental and African Studies, London* ABBAS KELIDAR

## AFRICA

**The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years:** Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Yassin El-Ayouty. *Washington, London: Praeger. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 262 pp. £8·80.*

SOMETIMES a niggling feeling of guilt may be experienced when one discovers a half-formed preconception at least partially confirmed: one such preconception is that a book on a subject such as the OAU, which includes contributions by some who are strongly committed to its variously-interpreted principles and their implementation, may produce an over-optimistic outlook, to say the least. But fortunately, many of the twelve contributors to this book do offer perceptive insights; David Meyers, for example, reminds us of the continuing compromise nature of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1963. The differences between the OAU's members on many issues meant that 'it could be formed under such circumstances only because of agreement that it was not intended as a supranational body but rather a loose association based on voluntary cooperation' (p. 118). Its purely political nature is confirmed by Jon Woronoff with his comment that '. . . we must remember that the OAU is not run by the jurists and diplomats one finds in most other organisations. If anything makes the OAU special, it is that its delegates are politicians . . . [who] . . . are not terribly worried about legal

niceties or even precedents. . . . They are men of action and not reflection, and what is most satisfying to them is what works (or at least seems to work)' (p. 76). But the most pertinent chapter in the first part of the book, which deals with theories and institutions (the second half, less satisfactory, is devoted to case studies), comes from that veteran Africanist, William Zartmann, in association with Scott Thompson. Beginning with a note on the importance of conference diplomacy in the African context which, whatever its critics say, does keep African problems within Africa and provides a semblance of unity if not action, they proceed to discuss the significance of three familiar problems: the *meaning* of unity in face of jealously guarded national independence and the specific principle enshrined in the OAS Charter, of non-interference in each others' internal affairs; intra-African subversion; and boundaries and the question of which is the legitimate referent, the state or the nation?

Other contributors also offer some substantial points of discussion, for example, Romain Yakemtchouk in his dispassionate analysis of the legal right to conduct a violent campaign of liberation. Another, more perhaps in the nature of a vignette, is provided by Leonard Kapungu who not only observes that less than a third of the members actually pay their subscriptions to the Liberation Fund, but that each application for funds must be closely examined by the 17-member Committee in conditions which augur badly for effectiveness, and still less for secrecy.

Against this background of reality, claims by Peter Onu that the Organisation has 'contributed immensely' to the unity and solidarity of Africa, and that the successful decolonisation of the ex-Portuguese colonies can be laid largely at its door, seem dubious. Boutros-Ghali also asserts that the work of the Organisation in economic and social matters must not be underestimated. Others attempt to overestimate the part played by the OAU in the resolution of certain crises, such as Zdenek Cervenka on Biafra, and Mansour Khalid on the Southern Sudan where, en passant, the problem is largely attributed to 'British cricket diplomacy' and *European* slave-trading (my italics). But fortunately, no attempt is made to gloss over the continuing failure of the OAU to work for unity among the various resistance groups in Southern Africa. After all, as Claude Welch (contributing an excellent analysis of the Uganda crisis of 1971) remarks in a different context, the OAS was unable to 'deal' effectively with Cuba and that was with a very influential superpower as a member. The last word, therefore, should go to Kapungu with his comment that 'revolutions cannot be subject to a timetable' (p. 150). No, indeed not.

*North Staffordshire Polytechnic* TONY THORNDIKE

**Change in Contemporary South Africa.** Edited by Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1976. 447 pp. (Perspectives on Southern Africa, 17.) £10·75. Pb: £3·75.*

THIS book is the product of a conference held at Mount Kisco, New York in mid-1974. The choice of the theme 'change' has been amply vindicated by the far-reaching implications of several developments which have occurred since. In particular the Lisbon coup, which took place within a fortnight of the Mount Kisco conference, has profoundly altered the

political and strategic balance in the subcontinent and it is not surprising th
the original conference papers 'were radically revised—in some cas
virtually rewritten'. In the Introduction Leonard Thompson poses tv
basic questions with which the sixteen contributors are concerned—' Wh
would constitute significant change in South Africa? And, to what exte
is significant change made likely by contemporary trends and events? '. T
authors are all opposed to the policies of *apartheid* and are generally agre
that 'significant change' would involve a 'radical redistribution of pow
and wealth', but they hold a wide variety of views on how such change w
come about. In four sections the book examines the sources of and prospec
for change. Part I looks at 'Changes within the White Oligarchy'. Part
is concerned with various aspects of 'Changes among Africans'. Part I
addresses itself to areas of 'Intercaste Relations' and Part IV conside
some of the implications of 'External Factors' for the processes of chan
within the Republic.

Van Zyl Slabbert and Michael Savage argue in their respective contrib
tions that the South African regime is attempting to force all manifestatio
of opposition, whether white or black, into government-sanctioned instit
tions designed, as Slabbert notes, to ensure Afrikaner Nationalists '
strategic role in whatever political change may come about' (p. 18). B
this increasingly authoritarian trend, backed up by a variety of 'instr
ments of domination', which are scrutinised in a chapter by Albie Sach
has been accompanied by modest social reforms (for example, with rega
to sport, and some theatres, international hotels, trains, and so or
Expressing a view shared by other contributors, David Welsh suggests th
'such *verligte* measures may have a symbolic quality whose catalytic effe
is of far more significance than their actual legal or administrative scop
(p. 78).

Sean Gervasi examines the theory that 'accelerated economic growth' w
result in a significant liberalisation of the political system and finds
wanting. Francis Wilson agrees that the prospects of political change bei
generated by economic growth are 'exceedingly slim' but stresses th
account must also be taken of 'such factors as the unforeseen consequenc
of present actions, the macro-implications of many micro-changes, ai
the psychological impact of decolonization outside the borders of tl
Republic' (p. 199). The success, for instance, of the liberation movemen
in neighbouring territories has certainly emboldened South African black
The pro-FRELIMO demonstrations in mid-1974, resolutions by the Bla
Peoples' Convention in support of the MPLA in Angola and the mood
young blacks in Soweto are clear indications of this. Philip Mayer's chapt
on 'Class, Status and Ethnicity as Perceived by Johannesburg Africans
although written before the Soweto disturbances, helps to unravel some
the complex factors behind them.

The absence of any analysis of the Coloured community and the Sou
African defence forces are two major omissions. However, the book provid
a valuable background of information and ideas with which to assess even
since it went to press—in particular the detente exercise, the dramatic ri
and fall of the gold price, South Africa's intervention in the Angolan civ
war, Dr. Kissinger's attempts to settle the Rhodesian and Namibia
problems and the grant of independence to the Transkei.

*International Institute for Strategic Studies, London* A. R. WILKINSON

**South West African Mandate.** By Gail-Maryse Cockram. *Cape Town: Juta. 1976. 531 pp. R 15.00.*

THIS is a general history of the South-West Africa mandate from its acquisition by South Africa after the First World War to the present increasingly heated international debate about its retention by that country. It is indeed ironic that whereas the present Nationalist government of South Africa shows such reluctance to give up control over South-West Africa, its political predecessors staunchly opposed the decision of the then South African government under General Louis Botha to invade the territory; it was the success of that invasion which led directly to the conferment of the mandate.

After a brief history of the German presence and defeat, the author describes the events leading up to the peace conference which created the Mandate and follows this with a discussion of the international problems which were thereby created. Two in particular are relevant to the contemporary debate about the status of the territory. First, there is the question as to wherein lay the sovereignty over the mandated territory, and secondly, how was the power conferred by the Mandate to be exercised?

On the first of these questions a clear division of opinion existed. There was the view, held among others by General Smuts, that power under the Mandate was exercised on behalf of the five principal allied powers—Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States—to whom the defeated Germany had ceded all its overseas possessions. According to this argument, sovereignty lay with these five countries. A counter-assertion was that power was exercised on behalf of the Allied Supreme Council, whose disappearance meant, arguably, that South-West Africa could not again be made subject to it. Or perhaps sovereignty lay with the League of Nations. And if so, did the United Nations inherit this sovereignty? These and other views will, of course, be very familiar to those who followed the arguments on the status of South-West Africa before the International Court.

Would a more precise peace treaty have made any difference? The American Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing was, prophetically, concerned at the complete absence from the treaty of a clear indication of where power over the mandated territories lay. Arguably, however, events would have rendered any precise formulae obsolete or otherwise unworkable. Furthermore, ambiguity or silence is part of the politicians' stock in trade, often deliberately used for the purpose of satisfying everyone.

The second of these two problems—which of the peoples of the territory were to benefit from the exercise of power—brought conflict between those who saw the natives as the principal beneficiaries, and those who believed that the interests of the white settlers were to have equal recognition. While the latter view might have implied consideration for the interests of *all* the inhabitants of the territory, it was at best unrealistic, at worst, cynical, in relation to a government dedicated to the separate (and inevitably unequal) development of different racial groups.

The author also blends the legal developments into the narrative. One severe limitation of the book, however, is its excessive reliance on direct quotations. It may be that Dr. Cockram wished to avoid anything but 'neutral' or 'objective' assessment, but in any case her views emerge clearly, if by implication, in the final chapters, one of which is tendentiously

called 'The Legalization of Terror'. There does, further, seem to be little reason for the introduction of isolated and unconnected references to the international debate on the Middle East. The author may have intended to demonstrate that the behaviour of the United Nations was absurd in relation to the Middle East in order to enable a similar conclusion to be drawn about its attitude to South-West Africa. It may be that through close reasoning and carefully drawn conclusions such a case could be made out, but this book fails to do so.

*King's College, London* HARRY RAJAK

**The Shrinking Political Arena:** Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics, with a Case Study of Uganda. By Nelson Kasfir. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1976. 323 pp. £16·45.*

THE title of this book is intended to convey what Rupert Emerson a decade or more ago called, more comprehensibly, *The Erosion of Democracy.* Readers who go to it for news of Uganda will be disappointed. The facts, which are more often referred to than stated, are there not for their own sake but to underpin a theoretical construct. Most of them are familiar, though an interview given to the author by Obote after his fall adds something to our knowledge. The attempted secession of the Konzo from the kingdom of Toro, which Dr. Kasfir considers to have been the most spectacular case of 'ethnic political participation' in Uganda, receives a few interesting pages.

What is the theoretical construct then? In the latest new clothes of American political science, 'participation' means just what you think it does: taking part (in politics). But it has an antithesis, departicipation, and this does not mean ceasing to take part but making it impossible for somebody to take part. Governments may be driven to departicipation when participation gets too much for them. 'Ethnic' is, of course—and rightly—substituted for 'tribal', since it is applied all the world over and does not imply a separate status for Africans. But it is rather too easily used in contexts where nothing more is at stake than local particularism; surely the competition between Acholi and Lango for the siting of a new factory is just like the competition between English counties to repudiate a new airport?

Dr. Kasfir is admirably fair to the reasons that led to the writing of regional autonomy into the Kenya and Uganda independence constitutions; yet he writes of 'the entrenched position of local government' as if there was something wrong about it. What about states' rights? He is fair also to the African governments who 'had to' get rid of the limitations on central power if their states were to hold together at all. He may be right, though Kenyatta did not give the experiment much chance; and was it just coincidence that the Kikuyu profited most by his policy? Dr. Kasfir concludes by examining the possibly beneficial effects of 'departicipation' in some circumstances. One experiences a curious nightmare sensation as the events that one recognises are described in his vocabulary of abstractions.

LUCY MAIR

**'wo African Statesmen:** Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania. By John Hatch. *London: Secker and Warburg. 1976. 268 pp. £6·00.*

'HIS is an appreciative study of two African rulers who have survived onger than most of their contemporaries chiefly by their integrity, simplicity f life and the respect of their people. Nyerere had the simpler problem. His as a poor and somewhat isolated country. Kaunda inherited a comparatively ich country, dependent on exports, with latent internal divisions and often urrounded by unfriendly, if not actively hostile, neighbours.

Mr. Hatch recounts his heroes' early lives, their struggles against olonialism and their policies since they have been in power. The struggles vere relieved by frequent trips abroad and by help and advice from friends 1 many countries, including the author. He describes both rulers as hilosopher-kings (p. xiii) and dwells at length on their philosophies, Ujamaa n the case of Nyerere and African humanism in the case of Kaunda. Both tress the importance of the common man and the socialistic structure of African life in pre-colonial days. Africans had no need to be taught emocracy and had no classes (p. 182). Romanticising the past may be ustified as part of the process of building up a new nation, but tribal istories show that those times could be as insecure and unsettled for the ommon man as the present. Chiefs could be arbitrary in their decisions nd although clan or family provided a system of social security, they are ardly adequate for a modern welfare state.

Both leaders have a strong puritanical streak in their characters and a eligious background. Nyerere was early influenced by the White Fathers, Kaunda by Scottish Presbyterians, but their later philosophies transcend Christianity (p. 236). Religion is man-centered, political decisions are to be nade by the people of the country (p. 240). Unfortunately, as Nyerere is uoted as saying, 'There is a devil in Africa' (p. 249), and he can make hings difficult even for philosopher-kings. A seven-hour speech to a party neeting in Mulungushi Hall followed by a lengthy television broadcast, carcely indicates spontaneous acquiescence in popular feeling (p. 243), and oercion had to be used to move people into Ujamaa villages for their own ood (p. 248). Ideologies in fact can become as uncomfortable as Procrustes' ed.

This book repeats and expands parts of a previous one, *Africa Emergent,*[1] ut is generally less analytical. No hint is given as to how far these doctrines re acceptable to a more sophisticated rising generation. Before they ucceeded to power Mr. Hatch knew both presidents well and as a university ecturer and Commonwealth Officer to the British Labour Party he advised hem on tactics and party organisation at formal seminars and many informal liscussions. He is thus well qualified to write about them and here he has lone full justice to two exceptional rulers.

JAMES MURRAY

**Africa South of the Sahara 1976–77.** Sixth edition of a survey and reference book of all the countries south of the Sahara Desert including a Who's Who of major personalities in the region. *London: Europa. 1976. 1149 pp. £18·00.*

T is hardly necessary to stress the importance of a new and updated edition f this valuable reference book. Part 1 which consists of ten signed articles

[1] London: Secker and Warburg, 1974.

under the heading 'Background to the Continent' includes one by Timothy Curtin on the Lomé convention. Part 2 deals with regional organisations and Part 3 is a country-by-country survey. The longest section in Part 4 is a Who's Who in Africa south of the Sahara.

*Chatham House* D. H.

## ASIA

**Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty.** By J. R. V. Prescott. *Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by Prentice-Hall International, Hemel Hempstead.) 518 pp. £22·55.*

DR. PRESCOTT's encyclopaedic study 'examines the political geography of those international boundaries of mainland Asia [which have been] settled by treaty' (p. vii) and provides a valuable work of reference. Asia has perhaps more than its share of unresolved boundary disputes, and those concerned with international relations in that continent will no doubt have frequent occasion in the future to turn to this work for clarification of the real politico-geographical issues embedded in the quarrels. Prescott supplies, for each of the thirty-six boundaries he covers, a general introduction, references for further study, and then the texts of the treaties governing the boundaries, where such exist. Where there are no treaties (and such boundaries are included) relevant documents are printed.

Prescott is, of course, studiously impartial, his concern is only to set down the evidence as clearly as possible, and he offers no comment on disputes. In some cases this will not prevent his work being resented by one party or another. His chapter on 'The Boundary Between India and China', for example, effectively demolishes the Indians' case for their claim to the McMahon alignment.

Four chapters are devoted to what are now the Sino-Soviet boundaries, and the historical background is set out with admirable lucidity. One disappointment in this section is that Prescott does not clearly set out one key element in the Sino-Soviet dispute as that concerns the riverine boundaries in China's north-east: that the Soviet Union claims a boundary lying along the Chinese bank of the rivers, whereas China reads the relevant treaties as establishing a boundary along the *thalweg*, the deepest line along the main channel. A further reservation is that an index is lacking, which must impair this study's usefulness as a ready reference. Otherwise Prescott's achievement must be warmly welcomed.

*Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Oxford* NEVILLE MAXWELL

**India's Second Revolution:** The Dimensions of Development. By Lawrence A. Veit. *New York: McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1976. 402 pp. $14·95*

SOME readers of this book may be reluctant to set much store by the judgment of an author who, in a preface dated December 1975, expressed it as his 'own hunch' that 'without sacrificing democracy India could achieve greater material progress than in the past' (p. xi). When this was written,

the Indian government had suspended such fundamental rights as the protection of the individual against arbitrary arrest. To be sure, the state of emergency was declared with reference to the constitution. Even so, it represented so stark a departure from a pattern of legality practised for a quarter of a century as to warrant more serious attention than could be given in an afterthought (epilogue) of three pages.

While students of contemporary Indian affairs cannot be expected to re-write every line of their current assessments, it hardly suffices to dismiss 'the events of 1975' as 'an aberration' (p. 373). Even if lasting economic benefits were to be derived from authoritarian rule, in return any orderly succession on Indira Gandhi's departure from the political scene may have been sacrificed. The safeguards which the processes of parliamentary democracy (however much abused at times by vested interests) used to provide are no longer at India's disposal. Sanjay Gandhi hardly presents an alternative. The checks and balances needed by a complex modern society are not easily restored once they have been replaced by cruder measures. The significance of the emergency is missed when the question is posed: 'is social justice greater in democracy with stagnation or in authoritarianism with economic growth?' (p. 372). The fabric of the state, and not only social justice—however important this is in itself—is at stake.

Four-fifths of India's population live in villages. More than half a million of these hold communities of up to 2,000 people. In the circumstances, it is distressing to read that 'the picture of village life [drawn by the author] is a caricature and, as such, contains an important element of reality' (p. 65). It is thus not surprising that the chapter dealing with the 'centrality of agriculture to the nation's development' lacks precision or indeed real understanding. In matters of economic policy and development strategy, including the never-ceasing disputes about the role of the public sector versus the private entrepreneur or the importance of import substitution versus export promotion, the author treads familiar ground. To refresh his memory, the discerning reader will reach for such classics on his bookshelf as the writings of Morris-Jones and the late A. H. Hanson.[1]

Where the author deals with bilateral Indo-American relations and with trade and aid in particular, he holds his own. As a former United States Treasury representative in India he speaks from personal experience. If 'the Indian Government is subject to a set of misperceptions and has tended to over-discount the impact of its actions on the United States' (p. 102), similar criticism can be levelled at the American policy-makers dealing with India. Soviet aid also gets a fair amount of critical comment. The record of the Aid India Group and its successor, the India Consortium, is particularly worth reading. As Professor John Lewis has indicated, Larry Veit's book is an ambitious undertaking. Unhappily, a good deal of the book falls short of what might have been expected of it.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* W. KLATT

[1] W. M. Morris-Jones, *The Government and Politics of India* (London: Hutchinson, 3rd edition, 1971). A. H. Hanson and Janet Douglas, *India's Democracy* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972).

**India: The Transfer of Power 1942–7.** Volume VI: The post-war phase: new moves by the Labour Government, 1 August 1945–22 March 1946. Edited by Nicholas Mansergh with the assistance of Penderel Moon. *London: HMSO. 1976. 1280 pp. (Constitutional Relations between Britain and India.) £30·00.*

As in the case of earlier volumes, the documents in this volume are arranged chronologically, but are indexed in chapters according to subject. They are preceded by a remarkably lucid and comprehensive introduction.

The story contained in this volume begins with the expectations of the Congress Party when the Labour government assumed office. The government was anxious to press on towards Indian independence and at first it intended to make an announcement on the lines of the Cripps offer. Lord Wavell felt strongly that no announcement should be made until the British government had formed conclusions about the Pakistan issue. The 'crude Pakistan' demanded by Jinnah was out of the question, but after the breakdown of the Simla conference, the Moslem demand could not be ignored. Wavell then proposed a public inquiry into the practicability of Pakistan, but the Cabinet's India Committee rightly regarded this as unrealistic. The Viceroy was then authorised—really against his own inclination—to announce on September 19, 1945 that, as soon as possible after the elections to the central and provincial assemblies, a constitution-making body would be convened. In the meantime the Viceroy was to find out if the 1942 proposals were acceptable or if there was an agreed alternative. The Indian reactions to this announcement were unfavourable and the political situation deteriorated rapidly. The decision—perhaps unavoidable—to try certain members of the Indian National Army, was grist to the Congress mill.

The Viceroy then put up his plan for action after the elections. He proposed to ask the Congress and the Moslem League to submit names from which he could choose a reconstructed Executive Council and at this stage it was his intention to avoid all discussion of the long-term constitutional problem. The India Committee considered that it would be impossible to separate the two issues. Nor did it seem right to the Committee to leave the Viceroy alone to carry on the discussions contemplated, since he would find himself continually having to consult the British Cabinet on points of policy. It was therefore decided to send out three Cabinet ministers, who would have full liberty to negotiate within a broad framework laid down by the Cabinet.

In the meantime Wavell insisted on having a breakdown plan. He seems to have thought that if at a breakdown stage Jinnah were told that any Pakistan he might secure would be not the large 'crude Pakistan' demanded, the Moslems might then abandon the idea of Pakistan altogether. The India Committee did not believe that such an effect would be produced, but it did authorise the Viceroy to take that attitude in the last resort. Perhaps the most interesting comment in these volumes on this issue is that made at the time by the present Assistant Editor of these documents: 'There is no more likelihood of obtaining Hindu consent to Division than Moslem consent to Union'.

The fourth chapter of the documents is largely concerned with the preparation of voluminous official briefs on the questions which might arise during the mission's discussions. The upshot of all these deliberations was

that on March 19, 1946 a delegation consisting of the Secretary of State and two other Cabinet ministers left for India armed with a very wide discretion to seek an agreed solution and with no commitment for or against Pakistan.

This collection of documents will be invaluable to future historians and two important facts emerge from it—the sincere determination of the British government to grant independence and the unwillingness of the Cabinet to partition India if it could be avoided, although it recognised that there might be no alternative.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

**The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929–1942:** The Penultimate Phase. By B. R. Tomlinson. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 208 pp. £10·00.*

MR. TOMLINSON has managed to write a careful and readable account of a subject which most people would find dreary—the internal politics of the Indian National Congress in the decade before the Second World War. At a time when Indian thought should have been concentrated on the problems of India's future, the energies of the Congress leaders were, as the author points out, mainly absorbed in the struggle for power within the party. Parliamentary activity at the centre was of secondary importance and the main concern of the All-India Congress leaders was to secure control over their provincial organisations. In the end their hold was very tenuous and when the Act of 1935 established provincial autonomy, not even Nehru's militancy could prevail over the determination of Congress in the provinces to assume power. Authority had passed into Indian hands in the provinces, but not at the centre, and the balance of power was changed.

Even in the provinces, however, the chain of command in the Congress hierarchy was weakened. Mr. Tomlinson shows that in choosing candidates for elections it became more important to choose men with local influence and patronage than 'good Congressmen'. Their selection often involved a great deal of gerrymandering and the author remarks that the machine became more important than the movement. The old freedom fighters were replaced by local party bosses.

The book falls into two parts and it must be said that the sections dealing with the Raj are less satisfactory than those concerned with the Congress. Mr. Tomlinson's assumption that the constitutional advances introduced by the British were merely meant to reconcile imperial interests with the need to keep India quiet is surely an oversimplification; so is his statement that the 1935 Act 'was designed to satisfy the problems of the government in London, not the Government of India'. He ignores the elements of genuine liberalism which actuated at least some of those concerned with British policy and altogether attributes to the British government a machiavellism which rarely existed.

One minor statement cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. He opines that 'Linlithgow was not the most imaginative or the most politically astute of men'. In the opinion of many who, like the present reviewer, worked under and in close contact with Linlithgow, he was one of the ablest and most understanding of viceroys in modern times. His political acumen was remarkable.

To sum up, the reader of this book will not learn much about the Raj, but will be enlightened and perhaps depressed by the author's account of Congress political infighting.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

**The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1941.** By William J. Duiker. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 313 pp. £10·50.*

ON reading the preface to this book, one may well groan: 'Not *another* former American government official who served in Saigon in the 1960s and is now trying to find out why it all failed!' However, for once the book turns out to be better than the occasion for it. Mr. Duiker has contributed something worthwhile to the literature of his subject, and his book will be useful in teaching the history of the period. Inevitably, he covers some of the same ground already trodden by previous writers, notably David Marr's excellent *Vietnamese Anti-Colonialism 1885–1925* [1] but in other places he is breaking entirely new ground, and he has made good (though hardly exhaustive) use of the newly opened French colonial archives for the period 1920–40. In particular he has some interesting things to say about the 1930s, a period which for some reason has been sadly neglected by previous historians of Vietnamese nationalism and communism, but which may well turn out to have been one of the most important decades in the whole modern development of Vietnam. He also does well in placing the career of Phan Boi Chau against the Chinese political background; and he is worth reading on the situation in Saigon in the 1920s.

Having said that, one is bound to be somewhat critical of certain aspects of the book. It is essentially a series of short essays, which in themselves are often very good. But as a result the book lacks chronological coherence, so that one does not very easily arrive at a clear picture of the overall situation at any given point during the period. For example, the 'crisis in Cochin-china' of 1925–26 appears in Chapter 7, but we have to wait till Chapter 11 for the foundation of Nguyen Ai Quoc's Revolutionary Youth League in Canton at the same period; likewise the Yen-Bay revolt of 1930 is dealt with in a chapter quite separate from the treatment of the Nhge-Tinh Soviets of 1930–31. This is a serious fault in a book which has set out to explain why by 1940 the communists had emerged as more important than rival groups, for the answer to that question must be sought at least partly in analysis of the relationship between the different groups in the same situation. Another failing is that the range of themes is not quite wide enough to justify the title. The most important missing subject is the history of the 'politico-religious' sects of South Vietnam, which were important both in the years 1911–16 and also in the 1930s. Mr. Duiker dismisses the Hoa-Hao sect (which was a revival of the *Buu Son Ky Huong* of 1916) and the Caodaists (some of whom later became communist supporters) with a couple of sentences; yet their failure was probably one of the most important elements in the overall failure of non-communist nationalism which he began by trying to explain. Indeed the whole question of the relationship between religion and nationalism is treated simply in terms of the decline of Confucianism.

In the chapters on communism, which are the most thorough, the outline of events is very good. But the importance of this theme demands a more

[1] Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

careful analysis, and the book would have benefited greatly if the author had been able to relate the political development of the movement to the character and structure of Vietnamese society. There is very little on the economic background, which is central to understanding the evolution of communist policy; nor does he say much about the important strike movements of 1928–29, 1936–37 and 1939. Above all, he fails to relate the theses and strategies of the Indochinese Communist Party to the continuing debates within the world communist movement in the 1920s and 1930s. His study of the Nghe-Tinh Soviets, in particular, suffers from lack of awareness of the different attitudes within the Comintern towards the rich peasants and village officials. The movement becomes much more intelligible when it is seen against the background of the Chinese Soviet at the same period. Moreover, the questions of principle which arose in 1930–31 were ones that were to remain important for the party at least into the 1950s. It is unfortunate that, whereas in earlier chapters he is very conscious of the Chinese background, by the time he reaches the 1930s the author pays very little attention to it.

Nevertheless, despite all these criticisms, it can probably be said that Mr. Duiker's book represents a valuable step forward in the study of his subject, and therefore deserves to be welcomed.

*School of Oriental and African Studies, London* R. B. SMITH

**The Chinese in Indonesia.** Edited by J. A. C. Mackie. *Melbourne, London: Nelson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 282 pp.*

**Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 1949–1967.** By David Mozingo. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 303 pp. £10·15.*

THESE two volumes are useful additions to the still relatively few books on Sino-Southeast Asian affairs and the status of the overseas Chinese at the present time. *The Chinese in Indonesia* starts with a preliminary chapter on the demographic conditions, civil status and economic role of Chinese in Indonesia. It also includes a brief summary of Sino-Indonesian relations up to October 1967, when relations between the two countries were mutually suspended. The essay on patterns of Chinese political activity in Indonesia is an attempt to refine academic analysis of the 'Chinese problem' in Indonesia, with occasional references to somewhat similar processes in other parts of Southeast Asia. Charles Coppel defines six types of activity, tracing patterns of activism during the colonial period up to the late 1960s. The constructions he presents are interesting, particularly as they relate to the informal political influence Chinese businessmen exercise over Indonesian power-holders (p. 21). But his attempt to demolish popular stereotypes about Chinese political participation falls into a series of somewhat bewildering arguments centering on 'the uniqueness' of the Indonesian situation. His conclusion that the process of disintegration among the 'pure Chinese' (*totok*) and the 'assimilated Chinese' (*peranakan*) results from the Indonesian government's measures to limit opportunities for furthering their communal and educational institutions, places too much importance on the assumed cohesiveness of those indigenous Indonesians constituting 'the government'.

Mackie's essay deals with anti-Chinese outbreaks between 1959 and 1968 and starts with an attempt to distinguish between 'predisposing factors',

'restraining factors' and 'precipitating factors'. To some extent, such a scheme does shed new light on the reasons why such outbreaks occur with the varying degrees of intensity that they have shown. On the other hand, the scheme implicitly assumes that these factors are 'controllable', or that at least the sequence of events necessarily starts with one factor and terminates because of the predominance of one particular 'restraining factor'. Does relative reality fit into this particular theoretical construction?

The essay by K. D. Thomas and J. Panglaykim is the most straightforward of the five presented in this book. Perhaps this reflects the advantages that empirical research on a narrowly defined topic tends to bring to the analysis of such a complex phenomenon as the Chinese role in the South Sumatra rubber industry. The essay is also less inclined to use speculative thinking, partly because the economists' perspective forces a flow of arguments based on presentable data. The result is a generally more optimistic outlook on Chinese-Indonesian relations in South Sumatra, although Thomas and Panglaykim qualify their optimism with the trend of economic conditions prevailing in other regions of Indonesia.

Professor Wang Gungwu's observations on the preceding essays are interesting for their incisive analysis. He is sceptical of Coppel's categorisations, sympathetic to the plight of the Chinese Indonesians throughout Indonesia's period of independence and is inclined to stick to his belief that all Chinese want to retain their distinct Chineseness. It is not surprising that he stresses the core problem of identity (be it political, cultural or socio-economic) as the uniqueness of the Chinese *in* Indonesia (as the title of the collection of essays indicates). As the author of the preliminary chapter suggests, further detailed research on the status of contemporary Chinese Indonesians is needed before a general typology can be constructed for purposes of clarity and precision in argument. Perhaps in the long run, Chinese Indonesians may get a fairer deal in their country of adoption and be identified by both scholars and politicians as 'the Chinese *of* Indonesia'.

David Mozingo's book on Chinese foreign policy towards Indonesia is written with perceptive knowledge of both Chinese and Indonesian political processes. The general thrust of his argument is simple enough: that the Chinese communists 'did not understand Indonesia' and miscalculated when they thought that their revolutionary experience (and their concomitant 'theory of international relations') were applicable to their diplomatic goals in Indonesia. Mozingo's presentation of the history of Sino-Indonesian relations from 1949 to 1967 is lucid and enjoyable to read. Domestic political events in Indonesia are interspersed with relevant references to contemporary shifts in the global balance of power so that the reader is constantly aware of the inter-relatedness of particular policies adopted or rejected, at both levels. Thus the emergence of the 'third force' strategy by the Chinese and the rise of the Peking-Jakarta axis parallels the reasons for the tilt by the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in 1963 towards the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Mozingo is on less secure ground, however, when he speculates on the probable course of events in Indonesia had the PKI succeeded in grasping governmental power in the attempted coup of October 1965. It is a curious exercise in view of the fact that in the preliminary chapter and in the subsequent narration of events, he constantly reminds the reader that the Chinese Communist Party leadership did not thoroughly understand the Indonesian domestic political situation.

J. SUDARSONO

**The Japanese Economy in International Perspective.** Edited by Isaiah Frank. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1975. 306 pp. £2·35. $3.95.*

**Japan:** An Economic Survey 1953–1973. By Andrea Boltho. *London: Oxford University Press. 1976. 204 pp. £5·00. Pb: £2·75.*

According to Professor Frank's introduction, this volume is intended to illuminate 'a number of aspects of the Japanese economy that affect its external relations in a major way' (p. 13). In practice this implies much less the international perspective promised by the title than the more limited framework of Japanese-American relations. Moreover, the book was completed before the real dimensions of the post-1973 recession could be foreseen. Nevertheless the sectoral studies by American and Japanese contributors contain valuable and occasionally original information. William V. Rapp's paper on industrial policy shows how Japan has 'guided economic forces and not tried to control them', and has thus avoided 'fostering policies domestically that are at odds with long-run international objectives' (p. 64). The methods used to orchestrate Japan's economy are further examined by Kozo Yamamura, while an enlightening study by C. Tait Ratcliffe explores the sociological labyrinth of the distribution system as well as the role of the trading companies. External trade, raw materials policy, foreign investments and the coming of the multinational corporations cover more familiar ground. But next to these practical aspects of doing business in Japan, and in view of the elections last December especially useful, is Haruhiro Fukui's excellent analysis of the economic, social and political attitudes of Japan's farmers and the reasons for their past identification with the ruling conservative party. Regrettably, however, he fails to examine whether the prolongation of an artificially large rural population may not also be inspired by military considerations.

Written for readers ranging from academia to business and government, Andrea Boltho's survey of Japan's economy during the past two decades is a lively and penetrating analysis. He asks the right questions and looks at socio-political components usually ignored by economists. The credibility of his assessment of Japan's economic performance is enhanced by its timing because he could contemplate the lessons of the recession and see the new, post-miracle Japan.

'Japan seems to have avoided, at least in part, the dilemma of reconciling equity and efficiency which faces so many of today's developing countries', he observes. That large income inequalities have to be accepted is not inevitable 'as Japan's experience would seem to prove, provided that the bulk of corporate profits is saved and that households' marginal propensities to save are high at all income levels (pp. 183–184). Attitudes, traditions and institutions are referred to and social peculiarities are examined to understand how they have brought about Japan's blend of some elements of central planning and others characteristic of market economies. 'It would seem'—he draws the conclusion—'that investment was not carried out for purely profit-maximization reasons, nor for purely growth-maximization reasons but rather in response to both motivations, with the latter influencing short-run plans and the former determining longer-run expansion' (p. 190). Yet, turning to the future, he rightly notes: 'The institutional changes are impairing the previous effectiveness of traditional instruments. The reconsideration of aims is raising new targets which the traditional instru-

ments may not always be suited to achieve and for which alternative tools must be found' (p. 132). Andrea Boltho's X-ray picture of the Japanese economy is probably the most successful among the numerous attempts to offer Western readers an easily accessible but well-documented volume, one which manages not merely to reconcile economic theory with daily behaviour but which may also be very useful in understanding the changes to come.

TIBOR MENDE

## NORTH AMERICA

**Foreign Policy Analysis.** Edited by Richard L. Merritt. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough: Heath. 1976. 159 pp. (Policy Studies Organization Series 9.) £7·75.*

**U.S. Foreign Policy:** Context, Conduct, Content. By Marian D. Irish and Elke Frank. *New York, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1975. 562 pp. Pb: £5·80.*

OVER the past decade foreign policy analysis has become an increasingly prominent theme in international relations studies, particularly in the United States. Intense interest in the decision-making processes of states, perhaps the most developed aspect of foreign policy analysis, has to a great extent challenged many of the conceptions which sustained the 'rational', 'billiard ball' Realist School of H. J. Morgenthau. That states' actions cannot be assumed to emanate from any single, clear constitutional construct, that government decisions are just one set of factors that determine the environment in which states exist, are but two of the several important considerations which foreign policy analysis presents to the student of international politics.

Both the books under review have made contributions to an understanding of the domestic and external determinants which affect the conduct of foreign policy. While each work is concerned with the foreign policy process of the United States, in both instances one is left with the feeling that their overall approaches would usefully serve as frameworks from which to assess the policy processes of other states.

Of the two, Richard Merritt's book is the more challenging and the more frustrating: challenging because Merritt, as editor, has compiled eighteen contributions representing some of the most interesting work being undertaken in the foreign policy analysis field; frustrating because, despite the editor's early warning that these contributions only represented 'some thoughts' on the subject (p. 1), too many of the contributors have displayed the menus without allowing more samples of the repasts.

What one has in too many instances are exciting, tantalising research statements which cry out for some form of validation. For example, Professor D. C. Piper's belief that 'the decision-maker is influenced by the [international] legal order and in turn may influence the [international] legal order in a way that facilitates the growth of the legal order' ('Foreign Policy Outputs and International Law', pp. 21-27) is an interesting hypothesis in an era increasingly cynical about the fundamental value of International Law. And though for seven pages Professor Piper toys with this intriguing proposition, the reader seeking evidence must be satisfied with the statement that a 'variety of foreign policy outputs needs to be examined to ascertain if the propositions suggested can be supported' (p. 27).

Still, Merritt's book is important, not necessarily because of the depth of any particular article but principally because of the breadth of the work in

its entirety. In five sections (External Environment; Domestic Constraints; Models and Research; Information and Actors; National Security), the editor's selections range from morality as a factor in decision-making and the characteristics of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the decision-making process involved in technology transfers and the impact traditional foreign policy doctrines have upon current policies.

Clearly those interested in the expanding field of foreign policy analysis will gain from this small volume a good idea of the potentially vast scope of the field, and furthermore they will also gather insights into the methodology which could be applied to assess the interactions affecting the foreign policy-making process.

As Merritt has shown, foreign policy analysis seeks amongst other things to deal with the complexities of decision-making beyond mere constitutional structures. Nevertheless an understanding of governmental institutions, their functions, interests and inter-relationships is a prerequisite of any attempt to analyse the process of foreign policy decision-making. Herein lies the strength of the study by Marian Irish and Elke Frank.

At least 60 per cent of this work spans the foreign policy roles of the legislative and executive branches of the United States government. The authors' approach is sometimes elementary, but generally full of insights. On a few occasions one might even be tempted to say that what Richard Neustadt accomplished in analysing presidential power, Irish and Frank achieve with respect to certain aspects of Congressional authority. Yet where Neustadt's *Presidential Power*[1] demands a good understanding of governmental machinery at the outset, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Context, Conduct, Content* does not. For in the final analysis, it is a textbook, a survey, although a very sophisticated one. It pries open various often neglected sources of foreign policy influence such as the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, the Department of Commerce, the Office of Management and Budget, and reveals the impact these bodies have on foreign policy formulation.

In a manner similar to that of Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision*[2] or Morton Halperin's *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*,[3] Irish and Frank have blended their theoretical and descriptive excursions into the realm of the American government apparatus with a wide range of historical examples and short case studies. To that extent they have very successfully combined the conduct and the content of American foreign policy-making.

The weakest part of this book is its beginning, the attempt to describe the context, both internal and external, within which American foreign policy responses are generated. It is weak both because it attempts too much and because it is too simplistic. To say, for example, that most career officers in the State Department 'hope to climb the ladder' merely 'because every promotion means better pay with which to raise the level of living for themselves and their families' (p. 15) is too facile an explanation for the motivations of the 'bureaucrat'. Such statements, and there are quite a few like that in the first three chapters of the book, detract from a work in which the conduct and content of American foreign policy are so well surveyed.

*University of Southern California* RANDOLPH KENT

[1] New York, London: John Wiley, 1960.
[2] Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
[3] Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1976, p. 145.

**The Energy Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy.** Edited by Joseph S. Szyliowicz and Bard E. O'Neill. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1975. 258 pp. £10·20. Pb: £3·85.*

**The United States and International Oil:** A Report for the Federal Energy Administration on U.S. Firms and Government Policy. By Robert B. Krueger. *New York, Washington, London: Praeger. 1975. £24·75. Pb (abridged): 366 pp. £4·70.*

**U.S. Energy Policy:** Alternatives for Security. By Douglas R. Bohi and Milton Russell. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, Inc. 1975. 131 pp. $5.00. £2·85.*

SZYLIOWICZ and O'Neill have produced a useful set of contributions on American policy towards the Middle Eastern oil producers, with some side-glances at the implications that the success of the OPEC powers has had on American relations with Europe, the Soviet Union and other major powers.

Richard Mancke and Szyliowicz independently bring out the bureaucratic muddle in Washington, which characterised American policies both on energy and the Middle East before 1973. At least five executive departments and four agencies or regulatory commissions have been concerned with energy, while Dr. Kissinger was so busy building up the National Security Council's involvement in detente that seemingly lesser issues like the Middle East were left on a back burner in a somewhat demoralised State Department.

The three outstanding contributions come from Don Peretz, John Campbell and Alvin Cottrell, all of whom concentrate closely on developments within the Middle East and that area's relationship with the United States. Between them, they emphasise that events in the oil industry will not only affect the Arab-Israel question, but also the tension between traditional rulers and republican forces, and the rivalry of Iran and its Arab neighbours. Cottrell is particularly worried about the 1980–90 time frame, since he is convinced that it will be impossible to maintain the countries round the Gulf as the world's main pocket of royal or quasi-royal rulers. He fears a chain reaction of anti-monarchical coups within the Arab states, resulting in the removal of one of the chief bonds between them and non-Arab Iran. Even if the Shah can maintain his regime, the chance of strife round the Gulf will be increased, with the probability that the super-powers will be sucked into the maelstrom. This particular view may well play down too much the stability of traditional regimes when allied with military establishments kept happy with all the latest tools of their trade. But these three contributions are particularly commendable for their historical sense and their stimulatingly wide-ranging analysis.

This is equally true of Abraham Becker's chapter which puts the energy question into the context of American-Soviet detente. He points out the important role that Russia's various Siberian oil or gas deals have had in this process, and then analyses the Soviet Union's problems in the Middle East, once it has moved beyond the issues of anti-Zionism and anti-oil imperialism. He points to some of its difficulties in maintaining solidarity with the Third World—a fact which obviously contributes to Dr. Kissinger's acceptance of the need for innovations like the North-South dialogue in Paris.

The two remaining volumes are more closely concerned with how the United States should best handle the question of securing its supplies. Krueger's report was originally prepared for the Federal Energy Adminis-

tration and is commendably ambitious in its coverage. Although it is by no means easy to read, and is made more difficult by the absence of an index, it is a useful survey of American oil policies and a systematic study of the various options open to the United States. Its historical analysis is based quite heavily on the documentation coming out of Senator Church's subcommittee on multinationals, and does not add much to what can be gained from reading that committee's final report on 'Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy'.

This book, however, should not be read for its history, but for its analysis of the policy options open to the United States and, as such, it is interesting evidence of the kind of issues which Washington was willing to consider in the early part of 1975. Like the Bohi and Russell volume, it favours an internationalist, co-operative approach towards the OPEC powers. The International Energy Agency is seen as a low-cost option with a potentially high return. The report also favours consumer-producer talks as a way of defusing the energy issue and increasing the chances of compromise by OPEC members. At the same time, it by no means rules out the efficacy of bilateral deals between the United States and key producing governments. On the question of the role of the traditional American majors, the report argues that they do have a useful buffer function in insulating commercial transactions from the turmoil of political relationships: it is therefore unenthusiastic about calls for innovations such as a Federal Petroleum Corporation, or the regulation of the oil companies as public utilities. It suggests that there should be some system for limiting oil imports (tariffs are favoured), but that in return for leaving the oil companies in the firing line, there should be a review and appraisal agency to vet their deals with the producer governments.

Krueger's strength lies in the number of options he evaluates. He concerns himself not just with measures like stockpiling, but with the potential of formal diplomacy and the manipulation of non-governmental bodies like the oil companies. However, this breadth is at the expense of any really deep analysis of individual options, so that the book is not as stimulating as the final volume under review.

Bohi and Russell have produced a succinct study, which tries to measure the cost-effectiveness of various possible American strategies given the likely behaviour of the oil producers. They do not think that OPEC will break up before the mid-1980s and argue that the most obvious strategy for the oil producers is to follow a pricing policy focused on the price that is likely to lead to American self-sufficiency. They then make an interesting attempt to quantify the economic pressures on each of the leading oil producers, concluding that, at 1973 prices, the Saudis will be able to let the price of oil range between $7.50 and $10 a barrel. It is only if the price moves out of this range that the system will become unstable. They then evaluate various ways of increasing American security, arguing that complete self-sufficiency is a waste of resources and that instead a mix of policies is needed. Ultimately, their conclusions are not very different from Krueger's, but they reach them in a more stimulating way, with greater precision and with fewer words.

*Chatham House* LOUIS TURNER

**Economic Diplomacy:** The Export-Import Bank and American Foreign Policy 1934–1939. By Frederick C. Adams. *Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1976. 289 pp. $12.50.*

THE narrative scope of this work is broader than its title suggests. The first third deals with international (mainly American) economic relations during the 1920s and early 1930s, and ends with an exposition of nationalist-bilateralist versus internationalist-multilateralist remedies for American trade recovery. This survey provides the historical and conceptual setting for the establishment of the Export-Import Bank (EIB) in 1934; and then follow five separate chapters (and a conclusion) recounting the policies and actions of the Bank (and other federal bodies, notably the Department of State) towards the Soviet Union, China and Latin America.

Dr. Adams combines history and theory, promising new information and insight into areas of public policy: the federal promotion of 'private enterprise'; 'the relationship between export-oriented interest groups' and federal decision-making; the use of 'economic assistance [in maintaining the] structure of international relations'—thus qualifying the tradition of American isolationism; the concentration of power in the executive and the insulation of 'government officials . . . from democratic pressures' (Preface, pp. vii–viii). These are indeed important but not new issues—even in the 1930s, as the early chapters inadvertently show. Thus Dr. Adams cannot avoid being measured by his success in producing fresh historical material to resolve some of these past and present political questions.

*Economic Diplomacy* suffers from being addressed to knowledgeable readers. (Few are likely to begin their historical or political-science studies in such a specialist area.) It is generally known that much New Deal legislation reduced congressional power; but it will frustrate readers to find that the author himself ignores Congress until the last pages—and then ducks the reasons for congressional delegation. (The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Acts are not discussed.) Likewise the international silver-buying of the EIB is mentioned (favourably), but not the congressional pressure for a policy which was denounced at home and abroad. (See pp. 96, 138–9, 168, 229, 235; silver is not listed in the index.)

If these appear trivial historical omissions, what are the theoretical implications of a discussion (extending over two chapters) of China in the 1930s and the attempt to promote its 'stability' and 'modernization' through private and governmental American economic measures, without a single reference to the Civil War? Or of an equally long review of US-Latin American relations which never once questions the presumption of American economic, political or strategic control or explains what exactly is meant by 'American interests'? (the footnote on pp. 224–5 merely shifts an issue from the 'interest-group' to the 'policy-makers': see below.)

Dr. Adams is at his best in describing the Russian debt negotiations and outlining the debate between the bilateralists and multilateralists; but his success in narration ultimately demolishes his own ideals. Dr. Adams appears to side with the liberals of the 1930s; but the (implicit) argument of *Economic Diplomacy* is that 'an international system built on Wilsonian principles' grew increasingly unrealistic; or, paradoxically, could be achieved only through 'statism' (see especially pp. 225, 253f). However, rather than face

this disturbing conclusion squarely, the author shifts to a form of bureaucratic functionalism (p. 254) and thus avoids the need to answer the very questions which made this work initially so welcome.

*University of Sussex* MICHAEL DUNNE

## LATIN AMERICA

**Urban Guerilla Warfare in Latin America.** By James Kohl and John Litt. *Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1975. 425 pp. £6·25.*

ALTHOUGH the authorship of this book is ascribed to James Kohl and John Litt it contains contributions from many others. The introduction gives an account of the rise of urban guerrillas and is followed by studies of their operations and ideas in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. There are gross exaggerations as, for example, when Eduardo Frei is described as 'a conservative charlatan' (p. 14). There are also naïve distortions; a catechism of thirty questions to a Tupamaro contains the statement: 'In Cuba the Popular Socialist Party opted to support the struggle which it had neither initiated nor led, and survived' (p. 227). In fact, of course, the communist *Partido Socialista Popular* did not support Castro until the eve of his triumph and for some time after opposed his policies. Castro eventually removed the old guard and reorganised the party under its present name of *Partido Comunista de Cuba*. This was hardly support and survival.

The book is anything but objective and the underlying idealism only adds to its partisanship. But it is a sad reflection on this idealism that its significance can be measured only in terms of nuisance value. The book may well prove useful as source material when a more measured account of urban guerrillas in Latin America comes to be written; in the meantime it is not without interest. There is a useful bibliography and a competent index.

J. A. CAMACHO

**Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930–1939:** The Politics of Trade Rivalry. By Stanley E. Hilton. *Austin, Texas, London: University of Texas Press. 1975. 304 pp. (Latin American Monographs, no. 38.) £6·00.*

**Brazil and the United States:** Toward a maturing relationship. By Roger W. Fontaine. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University. 1974. 127 pp. (AEI-Hoover Policy Study 13 (Hoover Institution Studies 48.)) Pb: $3.00.*

THESE two books are evidence of the increasing wealth, strength and importance of Brazil. The foreign policy of weak and poor nations merits little attention but the authors of these books rightly believe that Brazil's foreign policy deserves the closest study and analysis. Professor Hilton covers the relations of Brazil with the United States and Germany, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, from the assumption of the presidency by Getulio Vargas until the beginning of the Second World War. Mr. Fontaine, in a much briefer study, attempts a review of relations between the United States and Brazil from 1808 almost to the present day. Professor Hilton's book is detailed, exhaustive and lengthy; Mr. Fontaine's is inescap-

ably superficial in places and he pays more attention to the Brazilian side of the equation.

There are some factual disagreements in respect of the brief period where the two books overlap. For example, Mr. Fontaine asserts that it was three old destroyers that protests from Argentina prevented the United States from selling to Brazil in 1937 (p. 21), whereas, according to Professor Hilton, the successful Argentine protest was against the leasing of six destroyers. Much more important is the discrepancy in the interpretation of the motives behind the policies of Brazil and the United States in the 1930s. Mr. Fontaine's study nowhere makes clear the evident purpose of Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles to present Brazil to the world as an ally and supporter of the principle of liberal free trade as opposed to the German policy of bilateral trade agreements and the use of compensation (*aski*) marks. Nor does he explain how Getulio Vargas successfully sought the best of both worlds by paying public lip service to the United States objective and making secret deals with the Germans; he makes no reference to the Brazilian need for arms which (apart from three submarines from Italy) only the Germans could supply.

Professor Hilton makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of Brazil in the years before the Second World War. The roles played by Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Office), by the *Conselho Federal de Comércio Exterior*, by the *Sociedade Internacional de Comércio*, and finally by the armed forces, are admirably explained and analysed. The struggle between Oswaldo Aranha, when he was ambassador in Washington and advocated adherence to the United States policy of free trade, and Itamaraty, already won over to the need for a bilateral agreement with Germany, is made wholly understandable. What emerges is the triumph of the wily Getulio Vargas, to the point that it was intervention by the United States which persuaded the United Kingdom after the war had begun to allow through the blockade a last shipment of arms from Germany, though they had been purchased with compensation marks the use of which the United States had stubbornly opposed.

Mr. Fontaine has a different approach. A brief historical summary is followed by studies of the contributions to Brazilian foreign policy by intellectuals, by Itamaraty and by the military. Some may think that the xenophobia of the intellectuals is exaggerated, and that Itamaraty is not as exclusive, professional, united and correct as here suggested; but the role of the armed forces is interestingly presented and offers information not as widely known as it should be. In places the final chapters are almost as fanciful as the extravagant claims made for Brazil by some of the more imaginative intellectuals quoted in Chapter 3. The growth in importance of Brazil is impressive, but it is early perhaps to talk about 'the emergence of the hemisphere's second superpower'.

Professor Hilton's book has an exhaustive bibliography and a useful index; Mr. Fontaine's has neither. On the other hand the notes of the former are grouped at the back whereas those of the latter are more usefully to be found at the foot of each relevant page.

J. A. CAMACHO

# OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

CROZIER, Brian, ed.: *Annual of Power and Conflict 1975-76*: A Survey of Political Violence and International Influence. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1976. 232 pp. £5·00, $11.25.

EKEDI-SAMNIK, Joseph: *L'Organisation Mondiale de la Propriété Intellectuelle (OMPI)*. Brussels: Bruylant in collaboration with the Centre de Recherches sur les Institutions Internationales. 1975. 302 pp. Pb: Bel.frs. 2350.

GRIFFITH, William E., ed.: *The World and the Great Power Triangles*. Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press. 1976. 480 pp. £12·00.

HERZ, John H.: *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics*: Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century. New York: McKay. 1976. 307 pp. Pb: $4.95.

MANSBACH, Richard W., FERGUSON, Yale H. and LAMPERT, Donald E.: *The Web of World Politics*: Nonstate Actors in the Global System. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1976. 326 pp.

MAYER, Pierre: *Le Monde Rompu*. Paris: Fayard. 1976. 310 pp. Pb.

RAMAN, K. Venkata: *The Ways of the Peacemaker*: A Study of United Nations Intermediary Assistance in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1975. 142 pp. Pb: $5.00.

## DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

BURTON, Anthony: *The Destruction of Loyalty*: An Examination of the Threat of Propaganda and Subversion against the Armed Forces of the West. London: Foreign Affairs Research Institute. 1976. 63 pp. Pb: £1·50, $3.00.

EUROPA-ARCHIV: Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Beiträgen und Dokumenten. Bonn: Verlag für Internationale Politik. 1976. 339 pp. Pb.

PFALTZGRAFF, Robert L. Jr., ed.: *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control*. Lexington, Mass., London: Lexington Books, Heath. 1975. 350 pp. £9·75.

PFALTZGRAFF, Robert L. Jr. and DAVIS, Jacquelyn K.: *SALT II*: Promise or Precipice? Coral Gables, Florida: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami in association with the International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 1976. 45 pp. $9.95. Pb: $6.95.

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI): *Safeguards against Nuclear Proliferation*. Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press; Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. 1975. 114 pp. Sw. kr. 49.50.

SIPRI: *Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age*: A Handbook. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell for SIPRI; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press; Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press. 1976. 308 pp. Sw. kr. 82.00.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE: *Dictionary of Basic Military Terms*. A Soviet View. Washington: US Government Printing Office. 1976. (First publ. Moscow, 1965.) 256 pp. (Soviet Military Thought 9.) Pb: $2.95.

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

ALVAREZ, Francisco Casanova: *New Horizons for the Third World*. Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1976. 136 pp. Pb: $6.00.

BELL, Daniel: *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*: A Venture in Social Forecasting. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976. (First publ. USA: 1973; London: Heinemann, 1974.) 507 pp. Pb: £3·00.

ECKHOLM, Erick P.: *Losing Ground*: Environmental Stress and World Food Prospects. New York: Norton for the Worldwatch Institute. 1976. 223 pp. Pb: $3.95.

EHRMANN, Henry W.: *Comparative Legal Cultures*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1976. 172 pp. Pb.

FARMANFARMAIAN, Khodadad, ed.: *The Social Sciences and Problems of Development*: Papers presented at an International Conference in Persepolis, Iran, June 1–4, 1974. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Studies on the Near East, Princeton University. 1976. 332 pp. Pb.

FRANK, André Gunder: *On Capitalist Underdevelopment*. Bombay. 1975; London. 1976: Oxford University Press. 113 pp. Pb: £1·25.

GORDON, J. King: *The New International Economic Order*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 28 pp. (Behind the Headlines, vol. XXXIV, no. 5.) Pb: $0.75.

GREGORY, Frank: *Protest and Violence: The Police Response*. A Comparative Analysis of Democratic Methods. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1976. 16 pp. (Conflict Studies 75.) Pb: £2·00, $4.50.

HOOD, Christopher C.: *The Limits of Administration*. London, New York: John Wiley. 1976. 213 pp. £6·95, $13.20.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE: *Social Policy in a Changing World*: The ILO Response. Selected Speeches by Wilfred Jenks. Geneva: ILO. 1976. 265 pp. Pb: Sw. frs. 20.00.

MANNING, D. J.: *Liberalism*. London: Dent. 1976. 174 pp. £3·95. Pb: £1·75.

MONTI, Mario, ed.: *The 'New Inflation' and Monetary Policy*. (Proceedings of a conference organised by the Banca Commerciale Italiana and the Dept. of Economics, Università Bocconi in Milan, 1974.) London: Macmillan. 1976. 307 pp. £10·00.

MORGAN, Elaine: *Falling Apart*: The Rise and Decline of Urban Civilisation. London: Souvenir Press; Agincourt, Ont.: Methuen. 1976. 272 pp. £3·60.

O'SULLIVAN, Noël: *Conservatism*. London: Dent. 1976. 173 pp. £4·50. Pb: £1·75.

PYATT, Graham and THORBECKE, Erik: *Planning Techniques for a Better Future*: A summary of a Research Project on Planning for Growth, Redistribution and Employment. Geneva: ILO. 1976. 91 pp. Pb: Sw. frs. 17.50.

RAICHUR, Satish and LISKE, Craig, eds.: *The Politics of Aid, Trade and Investment*. New York, London: Sage. 1976. (Distrib. by John Wiley, Chichester.) 218 pp. (Comparative Political Economy and Public Policy Series, vol. II.) £12·00, $21.55.

RIDLEY, F. F., ed.: *Studies in Politics*: Essays to mark the 25th Anniversary of the Political Studies Association. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1975. (Reprint of the special 25th anniversary issue of *Political Studies*, vol. XXIII, nos. 2–3.) 286 pp. £6·25.

RIESCH OWEN, A. L.: Selig Perlman's Lectures on Capitalism and Socialism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1976. 183 pp. $12.50.

ROBINSON, Richard D.: *National Control of Foreign Business Entry*: A Survey of Fifteen Countries. Washington, London: Praeger for the Bureau of International Labor Affairs, US Department of Labor. 1976. 508 pp. £19·50.

ROGERS, Paul, ed. in assoc. with VANN, Anthony: *Future Resources and World Development*. New York, London: Plenum Press. 1976. 268 pp. $30.00.

SEN, Debabrata: *Basic Principles of Geopolitics and History.* New Delhi: Concept Publishing. 1975. 270 pp. Rs. 60.00, $12.00.

SENGHAAS, Dieter and MENZEL, Ulrich, eds.: *Multinationale Konzerne und Dritte Welt.* Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. 1976. 304 pp. Pb: DM 49.00.

STAVRIANOS, L. S.: *The Promise of the Coming Dark Age.* San Francisco, Reading: Freeman. 1976. 211 pp. £6·60. Pb: £3·40.

WAGSTAFF, Howard: *World Food: A Political Task.* London: Fabian Society. 1976. 23 pp. Pb: £0·40.

WALSTON, Lord: *Dealing with Hunger.* London: Bodley Head. 1976. 152 pp. £3·50.

WESTLAKE, Melvyn: *World Poverty: The Growing Conflict.* London: Fabian Society. 1976. 32 pp. (Young Fabian pamphlet 44.) Pb: £0·70.

## LAW

*The Canadian Yearbook of International Law*: Vol. XIII, 1975. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press under the auspices of the Canadian Branch, International Law Association. 1976. 465 pp. $18.00.

CIOBANU, Dan: *Preliminary Objections related to the Jurisdiction of the United Nations Political Organs.* The Hague: Nijhoff. 1975. 230 pp. Pb: Dfl. 65.00.

GOLDSTEIN, Joseph, MARSHALL, Burke and SCHWARTZ, Jack: *The My Lai Massacre and its Cover-up*: Beyond the Reach of Law? The Peers Commission Report with a Supplement and Introductory Essay on the Limits of Law. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 586 pp. Pb: $2.95, £1·95.

GREEN, L. C.: *Law and Society.* Leyden: Sijthoff; Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana. 1975. 502 pp. Dfl. 68.00.

ZEMANEK, Karl: *Die Schiffahrtsfreiheit auf der Donau und das kunftige Regime der Rhein-Main-Donau-Grossschiffahrtsstrasse*: Eine völkerrechtliche Untersuchung. Vienna, New York: Springer. 1976. 73 pp. (Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, Supplement 4.) Pb: DM 44.00.

## WESTERN EUROPE

ASHTIANY, Sue: *Britain's Migrant Workers.* London: Fabian Society. 1976. 24 pp. (Fabian Tract 444.) Pb: £0·50.

BARBER, Noel: *The Week France Fell*: June 1940. London: Macmillan. 1976. 320 pp. £4·95.

BAUMEISTER, Dieter, ed.: *Berlin Fibel*: Berichte zur Lage der Stadt. Berlin: Berlin Verlag. 1975. 384 pp. Pb: DM 18.80.

BÉJOT, Michel: *La Protection des Actionnaires Externes dans les Groupes de Sociétés en France et en Allemagne.* Brussels: Bruylant. 1976. 237 pp. Pb: Bel. frs. 1219 (Belgium), Bel. frs. 1500 (elsewhere).

BLACKMER, Donald L. M. and KRIEGEL, Annie: *The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France.* Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1975. 61 pp. (Harvard Studies in International Affairs no. 33.) $2.75.

CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION: *Britain's Associated States and Dependencies.* London: HMSO. 1976. 40 pp. Pb: £0·40.

DETWILER, Donald S.: *Germany*: A Short History. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press; London, Amsterdam: Feffer and Simons. 1976. 273 pp. $10.00. Pb: $4.95.

EITHORN, Eric S.: *National Security and Domestic Politics in Post-War Denmark*: Some Principal Issues, 1945–1961. Odense: Odense University Press. 1975. 105 pp. (Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences, vol. 27.) Pb: Dan. kr. 30.00.

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT: *Portugal and Spain: Transition Politics*. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1976. 24 pp. Pb: £2·00, $4.50.

KATZENSTEIN, Peter J.: *Disjoined Partners*: Austria and Germany since 1815. Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1976. 263 pp. £9·45.

MCCALL, Louis A.: *Regional Integration*: A Comparison of European and Central American Dynamics. Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage. 1976. 77 pp. Pb: £1·50.

MAYRZEDT, Hans and HUMMER, Waldemar: *20 Jahr österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik (1955–1975)*: Dokumentation Teilband I and II. Vienna: Braumüller. 1976. Teilband I: 689 pp. Teilband II: 338 pp. (Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen Band 9.) Sch. 1520.00 the set.

OECD ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE: *Belgium–Luxembourg*. Paris: OECD. 1976. 68 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10, F 10.00.

*OECD Economic Outlook 19*. Paris: OECD. July, 1976. 152 pp. Pb: $7.00, £3·10, F 28.00.

OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: *Income Distribution in OECD Countries* (Malcolm Sawyer); *Public Sector Budget Balances* (Mark Wasserman). Paris: OECD. 1976. 51 pp. Pb: $7.00, £3·10, F 28.00.

SERVADIO, Gaia: *Mafioso*: A History of the Mafia from its Origins to the Present Day. London: Secker and Warburg. 1976. 316 pp. £4·90.

TIDL, Marie: *Die Roten Studenten*. Dokumente und Erinnerungen 1938–1945. Vienna: Europaverlag for the Ludwig-Boltzmann-Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung. 1976. 300 pp. (Materialien zur Arbeiter bewegung Nr. 3.) Pb.

*Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1975*. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 80 pp. Pb.

## USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

CLIFF, Tony: *Lenin*: Vol. 2, All Power to the Soviets. London: Pluto Press. 1976. 412 pp. £7·50. Pb: £3·60.

*Brassey's Warsaw Pact Infantry and its Weapons*. Ed. by J. I. H. Owen. London: Brassey's. 1976. (Distrib. by Seeley, Service and Cooper, London.) 112 pp. £5·95.

POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: A Polish View*. Warsaw: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers. 1976. 290 pp. Pb.

RIGBY, T. H. and MILLER, R. F.: *Political and Administrative Aspects of the Scientific and Technical Revolution in the USSR*. Canberra: Australian National University Press for the Dept. of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. 1976. 115 pp. Pb: A$4.95.

SVIRSKY, Grigory: *Hostages*: The Personal Testimony of a Soviet Jew. London: Bodley Head. 1976. (First publ. Paris: Les Editeurs Réunis, 1974 as *Zalozhniki*.) 305 pp. £4·95.

## MIDDLE EAST

ANDERSON, Norman: *Law Reform in the Muslim World*. London: The Athlone Press, University of London. 1976. 235 pp. £6·00.

BERTELSEN, Judy: *The Palestinian Arabs*: A Non-State Nation Systems Analysis. Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage. 1976. 81 pp. (Sage Professional Papers in International Studies 43.) Pb: £1·75.

BURRELL, R. M. and COTTRELL, Alvin J.: *Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan: Tensions and Dilemmas*. Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 1974. 68 pp. (The Washington Papers, vol. II, no. 20.) Pb: $2.50, £1·00.

BUTLER, William J. and LEVASSEUR, Georges: *Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran*: Two Reports. Geneva: International Commission of Jurists. 1976. 72 pp. Pb: Sw. frs. 6.00, $2.50.

CHUBIN, Shahram: *Iran and International Organization: The Use of the UN on Selected Issues 1960–1971*. Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies. 1976. 80 pp. (Tehran Papers no. 4). Pb.

CHUBIN, Shahram and FARD-SAIDI, Mohammad: *Recent Trends in Middle East Politics and Iran's Foreign Policy Options*. Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies. 1975. 106 pp. (Tehran Papers no. 3.) Pb.

FIELD, Michael: *A Hundred Million Dollars a Day*: Inside the World of Middle-East Money. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. 1975. 240 pp. £6·50.

KHOURI, Fred J.: *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*. 2nd ed. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1976. (First ed. publ. 1968; reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1969, p. 283.) 466 pp. Pb: $5.95.

KIRKBRIDE, Alec: *From the Wings*: Amman Memoirs 1947–1951. London: Frank Cass. 1976. 159 pp. £6·95.

OFER, Yehuda: *Operation Thunder: The Entebbe Raid*. The Israelis' Own Story. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976. (First publ. Tel Aviv: Massada Press, 1976 (in Hebrew), *Operation Jonathan: Liberation from Entebbe*.) 141 pp. Pb: £0·70.

PRIGMORE, Charles S.: *Social Work in Iran since the White Revolution*. University, Alabama, London: University of Alabama Press. 1976. 194 pp. £5·60.

TROELLER, Gary: *The Birth of Saudi Arabia*: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud. London: Frank Cass. 1976. 287 pp. £8·50.

WADDY, Charis: *The Muslim Mind*. London, New York: Longman. 1976. 204 pp. £6·75.

## AFRICA

BIELENSTEIN, Dieter, ed.: *Perspectives in Afro-German Relations*. An International Conference under the auspices of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, Oct. 8–10, 1975. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 1976. 241 pp. Pb.

CLAYTON, Anthony: *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*: A Study of Military Operations against Mau Mau. Nairobi: Transafrica. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Rex Collings, London.) 63 pp. (Transafrica Historical Papers no. 4.) Pb: £1·50, sh. 15.00.

DEI-ANAG, Michael: *The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations, 1957–1965*: A Personal Memoir. London: The Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. 1975. 88 pp. (Commonwealth Papers no. 17.) Pb: £1·50.

DE LINT, George J.: *The United Nations*: The Abhorrent Misapplication of the Charter in respect of South Africa. Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink. 1976. 121 pp. Dfl. 17.50.

FEIT, Edward: *Workers without Weapons*: The South African Congress of Trade Unions and the Organization of the African Workers. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by Pandemic Ltd., 7 Maiden Lane, London WC2.) 230 pp. $12.50.

FODERARO, Salvatore: *Independent Africa*. Gerards Cross: Colin Smythe. 1976. (First publ. in Italian, 1975.) 183 pp. £3·75.

GERTZEL, Cherry: *Party and Locality in Northern Uganda, 1945–1962*. London: The Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. 1974. 100 pp. (Commonwealth Papers no. 16.) £1·25.

MEER, Fatima: *Race and Suicide in South Africa*. London, Boston, Mass.: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1976. 319 pp. £5·95.

MUNRO, J. Forbes: *Africa and the International Economy 1800–1960*: An Introduction to the Modern Economic History of Africa South of the Sahara. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield; London: Dent. 1976. 230 pp. £5·95. Pb: £2·95.

PATON, David M., ed.: *Breaking Barriers*: Nairobi 1975. The Official Report of the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Nairobi, Nov. 23–Dec. 10, 1975. London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans in collaboration with the World Council of Churches. 1976. 411 pp. Pb: £3·50.

RODE, Reinhard: *Die Südafrikapolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968–1972*. (Summaries in English and French.) Munich: Kaiser; Mainz: Grünewald. 1975. 371 pp. (Studien zum Konflict im Südlichen Afrika 7.)

THOMAS, D. Babatunde: *Importing Technology into Africa*: Foreign Investment and the Supply of Technological Innovations. New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. by Martin Robertson, London.) 202 pp. £13·00.

TÖDT, Ilse: *Theologie im Konfliktfeld Südafrika*: Dialog mit Manas Buthelezi. Stuttgart: Klett; Munich: Kösel. 1976. 298 pp. (Studien zur Friedensforschung, Band 15.) Pb: DM 26.00.

TWADDLE, Michael, ed.: *Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians*. London: The Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. 1975. 240 pp. (Commonwealth Paper no. 18.) Pb: £4·50.

ULBRICH, Wolfgang: *Bergbauliche Ressourcen im südlichen Afrika*: unter Berücksichtigung der Resources Diplomacy in den internationalen Beziehungen und in ihrer Auswirkung auf Europa. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. 1976. 184 pp. (Hamburger beiträge zur Afrika-Kunde 19.) Pb.

VAN ONSELEN, Charles: *Chibaro*: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900–1933. London: Pluto. 1976. 326 pp. £7·50.

WOLPE, Howard: *Urban Politics in Nigeria*: A Study of Port Harcourt. Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1974. 314 pp. £10·85.

## ASIA

CAMERON, Allan W.: *Indochina: Prospects after 'The End'*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 37 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 35.) Pb: $2.00.

FEULNER, Edwin J. Jr., ed.: *China: The Turning Point*. Washington: Council on American Affairs. 1976. 167 pp. Pb: $5.00.

FURTH, Charlotte, ed.: *The Limits of Change*: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1976. 426 pp. (Harvard East Asian Series 84.) £10·90.

GHOSH, S. K. and SREEDHAR, eds.: *China's Nuclear and Political Strategy*. New Delhi: Young Asia Publications. 1975. 298 pp. Rs. 64.00, $8.00.

JACOBS-LARKCOM, Dorothy: *As China Fell*: The Experiences of a British Consul's Wife 1946–1953. Ilfracombe, Devon: Stockwell. 1976. 160 pp. £3·50.

JAIN, J. P.: *China in World Politics*: A Study of Sino-British Relations 1949–1975. New Delhi: Radiant. 1976. 373 pp. Rs. 65.00.

JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY: *Defense of Japan*. (English version of White Paper, *The Defense of Japan*, publ. 1970.) Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency. 1976. 167 pp. Pb.

KUMAR, Satish, ed.: *Documents on India's Foreign Policy 1973*. New Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India. 1976. 680 pp. Rs. 150.00.

NATHAN, Andrew J.: *Peking Politics 1918–1923*: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism. Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1976. 299 pp. £10·50.

OECD ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE: *Japan*. Paris: OECD. 1976. 70 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10, F 10.00.

PING, Ching and BLOODWORTH, Dennis: *The Chinese Machiavelli*: 3,000 Years of Chinese Statecraft. London: Secker and Warburg. 1976. 346 pp. £4·90.

RADA, Edward L. and WU, Kan, eds.: *Self-Help in Pacific-Asian Development*. (Proceedings of a conference on self-help in Pacific-Asian development held in Taiwan, Nov. 1973.) Taiwan: Soochow University Press; La Mirada, Calif.: Twilight Publications. 1975. 172 pp. Pb.

ROY, Ramashray: *The Uncertain Verdict*: A Study of the 1969 Elections in Four Indian States. 2nd rev. ed. Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1975. (First publ. by Orient Longman Ltd., 1972.) 297 pp.

STURTEVANT, David R.: *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines 1840–1904*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 317 pp. £12·25.

SUNOO, Harold Hakwon: *Japanese Militarism*: Past and Present. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 1975. 164 pp. $8.95.

## NORTH AMERICA

ANDREWS, Bruce: *Public Constraint and American Policy in Vietnam*. Beverly Hills, Calif., London: Sage. 1976. 64 pp. (Sage Professional Papers in International Studies 42.) Pb: £1·75.

ARKHURST, Frederick S., ed.: *U.S. Policy toward Africa*. New York, London: Praeger. 1975. 259 pp. £9·10. Pb: £3·85.

COLLIER, Peter and HOROWITZ, David: *The Rockefellers*: An American Dynasty. London: Jonathan Cape. 1976. 746 pp. £7·95.

DOBELL, Peter and D'AQUINO, Susan: *The Special Joint Committee on Immigration Policy 1975*: An Exercise in Participatory Democracy. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 24 pp. (Behind the Headlines, vol. XXXIV, no. 6.) Pb: $0.75.

FAIRLIE, Henry: *The Spoiled Child of the Western World*: The Miscarriage of the American Idea of Our Time. London: Sheldon Press. 1976. (First publ. New York: Doubleday, 1975.) 350 pp. £4·95.

GARDNER, Lloyd C.: *Imperial America*: American Foreign Policy since 1898. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1976. 301 pp. Pb: £3·05.

MONSMA, Stephen V.: *American Politics*. 3rd ed. Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 394 pp. Pb: £6·50.

PENNIMAN, Howard R.: *Canada at the Polls*: The General Election of 1974. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1975. 310 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 24.) Pb: $4.50.

PLANO, Jack C. and GREENBERG, Milton: *The American Political Dictionary*. 4th ed. Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 481 pp. Pb: £5·25.

RIPLEY, Randall B. and FRANKLIN, Grace A., eds.: *Policy-Making in the Federal Executive Branch*. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 209 pp. £8·00.

SCHRAMM, Carl J.: *United States Strategies for World Hunger*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 20 pp. Pb: $0.75.

VOLGER, Gernot: *Die Zahlungsbilanz der Vereinigten Staaten*: Dominanz und Dependenz im internationalen Währungssystem. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. 1976. 207 pp. (Schriften zu internationalen Wirtschaftsfragen 4.) Pb: DM 58.60.

## LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

HODGKINSON, Edith, ed.: *Development Prospects and Options in the Commonwealth Caribbean*. Report of a conference jointly sponsored by the British-North American Research Association and the Overseas Development Institute at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, Feb. 20–22, 1976. London: ODI. 1976. 85 pp. Pb: £1·50, $3.00.

INCE, Basil A.: *Decolonization and Conflict in the United Nations*: Guyana's Struggle for Independence. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. 1974. (Distrib. by General Learning Press, Morristown, NJ, USA.) 202 pp. Pb.

LEVIN, Aida Luisa: *The Organization of American States and the United Nations*: Relations in the Peace and Security Field. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1974. 114 pp. Pb: $4.00.

STRACHAN, Harry W.: *Family and Other Business Groups in Economic Development*: The Case of Nicaragua. New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 129 pp. £9.75.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

HEERE, Wybo P.: *International Bibliography of Air Law*: Supplement 1972–1976. Leyden: Sijthoff. 1976. 169 pp. (*International Bibliography of Air Law 1900–1971*, publ. 1972.) Dfl. 58.00, $22.00.

*The Statesman's Year-Book 1976–1977*. Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World. Ed. by John Paxton. London: Macmillan. 1976. 1556 pp. £7·95.

TETT, Norman and CHADWICK, John, eds.: *Professional Organizations in the Commonwealth*. 2nd ed. London: Hutchinson for the Commonwealth Foundation. 1976. (1st ed. publ. 1970.) 584 pp. £10·00.

# BOOKS REVIEWED, JANUARY 1977

# INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 53 APRIL 1977 No. 2


## NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AT THE UNITED NATIONS

## UNCTAD AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER*


*Gamani Corea*


I HAVE to speak today on UNCTAD—the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—and the New International Economic Order. You will remember that the call for a New International Economic Order emanated from the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly that was held in April 1974, when a Declaration and Programme of Action for its establishment was adopted. At the time this call was made it was already evident that the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade, which had been launched but a few years earlier, had already lost much of its relevance. The multiple crises of that period—the monetary disorder, the escalating spiral of inflation in the industrialised countries, the world food shortage and finally the energy crisis, had all combined to wreak havoc on the developing countries and to jeopardise their prospects of attaining the goals and targets set forth in the International Development Strategy as well as in their own development plans. The immediate background for convening the General Assembly in special session was the dramatic rise in the price of petroleum which prompted a proposal for the summoning of a global conference on energy. This was not acted upon since the developing countries were strongly convinced that the energy crisis had to be set in the wider context of other development issues.

It was not perhaps surprising, given this background, that the issue of structural change was the dominant theme of the resolution finally adopted by the General Assembly. Although it was well recognised that the immediate response to the crisis facing the developing countries was emergency aid and financial accommodation of various kinds, this was only a short-term solution to a problem whose roots lay much deeper. Two concepts in particular provided the underpinning of the

* The text of the 25th Stevenson Lecture, given at the London School of Economics on December 6, 1976.

new order—that of structural change in the sense of changes in prevailing systems, mechanisms and relationships, and that of collective self-reliance in the sense of harnessing and applying the capacity of developing countries for joint action and mutual co-operation. Without doubt the action of the members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), themselves developing countries, was viewed by the countries of the third world as constituting some kind of watershed in North-South relations. The developing countries saw in this action, despite the consequences it had for many of them, a manifestation of the idea of self-assertion and a departure from what appeared to them the futile exercises in persuasion, even supplication, in which they had hitherto been engaged. Although many of the specific goals and objectives enumerated in the Declaration and Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order are also to be found in the Strategy for the Second Development Decade, the new Programme distinguishes itself from the Strategy by the very marked emphasis it places on these twin themes of structural change and collective self-reliance. Another United Nations document which was being negotiated at that time and adopted subsequently was the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, which reflects a similar emphasis on changes in prevailing structures and relationships, as evidenced by the assertion of such concepts as that of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

I see the call for a New International Economic Order as reflecting in a sense the insistence of the countries of the third world on belonging to, and being treated as, an integral part of the global order. It is a reflection of their unwillingness to continue to remain on the periphery of such an order. The prevailing economic order had, during the period in which it was working at its best, brought undoubted benefits to the industrialised countries, but the developing countries did not feel that they enjoyed a commensurate share of these gains. The two and a half decades that spread over the conclusion of the Second World War and the beginning of the 1970s witnessed a vast acceleration in the economic and productive capacity of the developed countries and a major transformation in their consumer living standards. It witnessed a remarkable upsurge in the intra-trade of these countries. But the balance sheet for the developing countries was not similarly impressive. Their economic expansion did not suffice to meet the needs of their growing populations, to overcome in a significant way the problems of mass poverty, malnutrition and unemployment. Their share in world trade declined during this period. The weaknesses in commodity markets on which many of them were heavily dependent continued to persist. Their attempts to expand their trade in manufactures were often frustrated by limitations on market access, particularly in those very areas where their export

capacity was greatest. At the end of the period the developing countries found themselves struggling to cope with highly charged and volatile social and political situations internally, situations that were exacerbated by new expectations and a rising consciousness on the part of their own peoples. In the period since the beginning of the 1970s the prevailing order has ceased to work well for even the industrialised countries. The multiple problems of monetary instability, payments disequilibria, inflation and recession indicate that the need for change could indeed be universally felt, a change whose aim would inevitably need to be a re-ordering of prevailing systems and relationships.

For the developing countries, the changes needed must reach out to at least four broad areas where prevailing mechanisms have proved to be inadequate or weak and have failed to serve as channels for the transmission to the developing countries of the global forces of expansion and of economic and technological transformation. The prevailing mechanisms are weak in the area of the developing countries' trade in primary products or commodities where old structures and systems still persist as a legacy of past history. They need to be changed in the area of the developing countries' trade in manufactures if the trading requirements of these countries, as implied by their goals of industrial transformation, are to be realised. Changes are needed in the area of monetary and financial arrangements if the developing countries are to have a better accommodation of their need for both short-term and long-term resources, and for a coherent framework to regulate their external debt problems; if they are to share adequately in the creation of international liquidity in the process of decision-making, and be able to apply processes of adjustment that adequately reflect the particular character of the problems they face. Not least, changes are needed in the present predominantly two-way or bipolar pattern of trade and other exchanges which link them excessively to the former metropolitan countries and are again a legacy of earlier times—changes which intensify their links with other parts of the global economy, with the socialist countries, but above all amongst themselves, changes which would reduce their dependence by diversifying their ties with the outside world.

All these issues have for long been the very essence of UNCTAD's concerns. But I believe it would be right to say that the Sixth Special Session and the call for a New International Economic Order gave a new impetus to UNCTAD and its work. The Sixth Special Session enunciated the outlines of a new order in general terms. The subsequent Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly in 1975 resulted essentially in an agreement to negotiate on issues that were pertinent to a new scheme of things. But it was the fourth session of UNCTAD held in Nairobi last May that was perhaps seen as the first opportunity to make concrete and translate into specific results the broader policies and

principles that had been outlined in general terms. The Paris Dialogue, as the Conference on International Economic Co-operation is called, was also dealing with many of these issues. But whilst the need for a mutually supportive relationship between these two events was recognised, and I would say has even been realised up to now, it was the Nairobi Conference that was nevertheless seen as the first major test of the willingness and capacity of the international community at least to begin, in concrete terms, the quest for new arrangements and new relationships.

It is not my purpose on this occasion to attempt an evaluation of the Nairobi Conference. As I have said elsewhere, there were both achievements and shortcomings at Nairobi. On some issues the conference took significant decisions which could have a more operational or more immediate impact. In other fields it laid some solid foundations for the future and took initiatives that could be of growing relevance in the longer term. In still other fields, and this essentially concerns the area of money and finance, the conference failed to act decisively in respect of either immediate or long-term problems.

**Nairobi Conference's new attack on the commodity problem**

The most prominent result of the Nairobi Conference was in the realm of commodities. It was the commodity issue that loomed largest and commanded the most attention. The Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly had called for a new and integrated approach to the commodity problem. It is not without significance that the session itself was devoted to the theme of development and raw materials. A new deal in the area of raw materials was seen as being central to the very concept of a New International Economic Order. In August 1975 the secretariat of UNCTAD outlined its proposals for an integrated programme on commodities, as a new attack on the commodity problem incorporating a new approach. The integrated programme did not, as was commonly believed, seek to dispense with the treatment of individual products on a case-by-case basis, but instead of dealing with such products in an isolated and fragmented fashion, as was the practice in the past, it sought to organise the quest for particular solutions within a common framework or umbrella of objectives, principles, mechanisms and negotiating procedures. A number of basic elements in the overall approach to commodity problems are reflected in the integrated programme but the most important of these is the establishment of internationally-owned stocks for a range of products of particular interest to developing countries and of a Common Fund for financing these stocks. Despite the apparent complexity of the discussion and debate that has centred round the programme, a debate which has

shown that many misconceptions and misunderstandings still persist, the rationale behind this idea is basically simple. Essentially it is that international action should be taken to intervene at certain times in commodity markets to prevent the disruptive collapse of commodity prices, which the world has witnessed all too frequently, and as its corollary, to prevent the runaway spiral of rising prices that also occurs at times as a result of such factors as a temporary shortage of supplies. The resources for this intervention are to be mobilised and made available through a single institution—the Common Fund—to individual commodity bodies that may wish to seek such support.

The Nairobi Conference acted in the field of commodities by adopting a resolution on the basis of a consensus. It is important to note that the resolution did endorse the concept of an integrated programme for commodities and set out the principles, objectives and mechanisms that govern it. Some countries—a few—made qualifications but these were in respect of the Common Fund. The conference also established an extensive framework of negotiations on two fronts—on the one hand it authorised preparatory meetings leading to negotiating conferences for a series of individual products of interest to developing countries. Eighteen such products were specified in the resolution, although it was stated that the list was not exhaustive. At the same time the resolution authorised a parallel negotiation on a Common Fund, to be held not later than March 1977 and to be preceded by preparatory meetings. The negotiating framework established at Nairobi has no precedent in past experience. The negotiations that were then launched are not to be a series of fragmented and isolated events, as has been the case in the past with commodity negotiations; they are to be part of a single exercise; they are to be completed within a clearly defined time-frame—the end of 1978—and they are to be subject to monitoring or surveillance by a special mechanism created for the purpose in the form of an ad hoc inter-governmental committee on the integrated programme for commodities to be established in UNCTAD.

The negotiating exercise initiated at Nairobi is in fact now under way. There have already been preparatory meetings on two commodities—copper and jute—and a third on hard fibres commences today. Similar meetings on other products are scheduled for next year [1977]. The ad hoc committee that would take an overview of all these negotiations has already been established and has had its first meeting. The first preparatory meeting for the negotiation of the Common Fund has also been held.

It is, of course, too early to hazard an opinion on the prospects for success. But the crucial importance of the process that is now under way cannot be exaggerated. It is vitally necessary that the whole international community should become aware of the significance of this

endeavour. The question of commodities or raw materials is central to the development problem and to the very concept of the New International Economic Order. Measures to deal with it cannot but form part—an important part—of any package of measures or solutions that is intended to deal with North-South problems, with relationships between the developed and developing countries. Although financial transfers are themselves important, and there is much scope for improvement in this area, they could not by themselves be the basis of a sufficient response to the needs of developing countries or a substitute for structural changes. I would venture to say that this is also true of trade liberalisation, taken by itself.

It is important and necessary to recognise that the integrated programme for commodities, whatever views one may have about its content, is firmly predicated on the concept of producer-consumer co-operation that has been a premise of international commodity policy since the days of the Havana Charter, or even earlier, even though it has been translated into hardly more than a handful of actual arrangements. I cannot help feeling that the negotiations that are now under way put this concept to a crucial, perhaps a final, test. As I have stated repeatedly, if the negotiations are to succeed they will stengthen and reinforce the concept and give it a new life, but if they were to fail, the concept itself would be gravely undermined. The consequences of failure will be serious indeed. Besides the impact on North-South relationships, a lack of success would generate new reactions and a search for new ways of dealing with the commodity question. The premise of co-operative solutions would, as I said, be undermined and would for that reason give way to a search for other alternatives and approaches, approaches of a more unilateral character, however difficult and however questionable the prospects for success might be. The very search for these solutions and the attempt to implement them could not but affect the future climate of international relations.

It is for this reason that I consider it absolutely vital that all governments should recognise the political significance of the current process and regard it as one of their major preoccupations over the next eighteen months to two years. The negotiations will not succeed if they are seen as primarily technical exercises devoid of political content. In the absence of an over-riding will to achieve results, it is all too easy for technical complexities to get the upper hand. It is not enough that governments come to these negotiations in a mood of relaxed agnosticism. It has of course to be recognised that viable solutions need to be based on a solid foundation of information and analysis. But a balance has to be struck between the need for studies and the need for urgent action and, in any event, calls for information and data should not be a mere reflection of a reluctance to act. The developing countries them-

elves need to organise for the task ahead. The results that are looked for re not the more conventional resolutions familiar to the United Nations r UNCTAD itself. They are not even a new declaration or programme f action. What is being aimed at is a restructuring of commodity narkets, one by one, for a range of products of significance to leveloping countries. This is a task that calls for organisation, for ohesion and for expertise on the part of the developing countries, on scale that has perhaps had no precedent up to now.

One of the significant features of the commodity negotiations is that, erhaps for the first time, it is not entirely an exercise in supplication r even persuasion on the part of the developing countries. In this ield they are not totally bereft of what I would call leverage. I believe hat a decisive factor in bringing about the results attained at Nairobi vas the capacity shown by the developing countries not merely to express heir general support but to commit their own resources to the inte- rated programme and the Common Fund in particular. The special nnouncements of resource support for the Common Fund by a succes- ion of developing countries, including most of the member countries of )PEC, was one of the dramatic happenings at the Nairobi Conference. 'he Common Fund has been so conceived as to afford a sound and emunerative investment outlet to those developing countries, such as he OPEC countries, which possess financial surpluses. In fact, the reater part of the Fund's resources are to be harnessed through borrow- ng, by the offer of sound security and adequate rates of return to the ender. To the extent that the developing countries are willing to make vailable financial resources for the Fund, they can help ensure its stablishment. It is significant that the non-aligned countries, at their neetings both in Dakar and more recently in Colombo, have expressed heir intention of setting up a developing countries' fund for the nancing of stocks and other purposes if the search for a more universal ype of fund were not to prove fruitful. But it is also important to note hat whatever one might think of the desirability and feasibility of nilateral action of this kind, it is not the preferred alternative of the eveloping countries.

The Nairobi Conference was not confined to the subject of com- nodities. As I have already indicated, its decisions encompass many of he other fields where structural changes or changes in prevailing elationships are needed. The conference took decisions on such issues s the adoption of a more comprehensive strategy for dealing with the rade of developing countries in manufactures, the negotiation of a ode of conduct on the transfer of technology and the building up of he technological capacity of developing countries, the negotiation of quitable principles and rules on restrictive business practices, the unching of new programmes in the field of trade relations between

countries with different economic and social systems, and of programmes to deal with the problems of specially disadvantaged categories of countries such as the least developed, the landlocked and the island developing countries. It also adopted a decision on debt which opens the door to the formulation of guidelines or principles that could become part of an international policy framework for dealing with debt problems.

**Co-operation among developing countries**

But an issue of particular significance in the context of the New International Economic Order with which UNCTAD is concerned and on which the Nairobi Conference took decisions, relates to the question of co-operation amongst developing countries themselves. This concept has for long been recognised, and even reflected in certain schemes for regional integration and co-operation. But it received a major impetus in the General Assembly's proclamation on a New International Economic Order when it came to be embodied in the wider theme of what has been called collective self-reliance. It is a theme that is gaining momentum and acquiring increasing political importance as a reflection of the growing self-awareness of the countries of the third world. There are two facets to this theme. One is the notion of co-operation by the developing countries for the purpose of improving their collective bargaining power vis-à-vis the outside world, of mobilising countervailing pressure, of acquiring muscle and applying leverage. The other facet is the notion of intensifying trade and other linkages between themselves. This latter concept has itself two aspects. One is intensified co-operation by groups of countries at the regional or sub-regional level in various schemes and enterprises. The other is the notion—of some political significance—of co-operation across the board, so to speak, encompassing all the countries of the third world. In the course of 1976 alone we have witnessed a remarkable upsurge of discussion and activity in this field. Co-operation amongst developing countries was the subject of three major meetings in 1976, in Manila, Colombo and more recently in Mexico City. As a result of all this, much progress has been made in the attempt to give some specific content to the broader principle of co-operation and to identify specific possibilities for action. The proposals are in fact quite wide-ranging. They extend from ideas for the establishment of joint ventures and enterprises in a number of sectors by groups of countries to the establishment of such across-the-board facilities as a system of third-world preferences, a third-world payments arrangement, a third-world currency, and third-world financial institutions.

The concept of co-operation among developing countries should not

be seen as an attempt at autarky or at establishing a closed system. It should, on the contrary, be seen as an integral part of a global economic system and an essential element of a global strategy for development. It is in this context that UNCTAD has established a new inter-governmental committee to deal with the subject of co-operation among developing countries. But the committee is universal in character and not confined to membership by developing countries. It is open-ended and will include the participation of the socialist countries, and the Western countries. Its main function would be not to spell out the content of co-operation among developing countries, which is seen as a matter for the developing countries themselves, but to identify the ways in which their efforts at co-operation can be supported by the outside world and by international institutions.

**Need for new 'rules of the game'**

The several themes that I have referred to in the context of a New International Economic Order lead me to reflect for a moment on a wider question. Has the time arrived to start the process of reviewing and rewriting the principles and rules which have up to now lain behind the conduct of international economic relations? The so-called 'rules of the game' which have governed international trade and other relationships were written in the immediate postwar period at a time when the presence, so to speak, of both the socialist and the developing countries on the international political scene was limited, or even virtually non-existent. The rules embodied in the GATT, the principles reflected in the Havana Charter, and the institutions set up at Bretton Woods were all fashioned in that context. In the field of trade, liberalisation and non-discrimination were the essential themes. The rules of the game and the institutions that were established in the early postwar period undoubtedly contributed positively to the expansion and maintenance of stability in the global economy. But we have now to ask ourselves whether they do in fact continue to reflect the realities of our time. It is true that the needs of the developing countries, for example, have been recognised through various additions and modifications to these rules. The Part IV of the GATT and the General System of Preferences are examples. Trade with socialist countries has been made possible through bilateral arrangements of various kinds. But by and large, these modifications have taken the form of exemptions or exceptions or waivers from the main body of precept and intended practice. But when the exceptions begin to acquire a growing prominence, the time would appear ripe for a fresh review of the main body of the doctrine itself. If the exceptions reflect the reality and are likely if anything to grow in importance, should they not form an

integral part of a new set of precepts, a new set of rules of the game which take account of the new developments?

Such a new set of rules could take account of and incorporate dimensions that already exist. Some new principles are to be found, for example, in the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States. The Code of Conduct on Liner Conferences, though it has yet to come into operation, provides a new framework to govern relations in the field of shipping. If we are successful in establishing new regulatory mechanisms to deal with commodity markets, this would be yet another major element in the international economic scene. So too would a code of conduct for the transfer of technology, and a set of rules and principles to regulate restrictive business practices—both of which are now being drafted. The Lomé Convention breaks new ground in relation to certain aspects of relations between industrialised countries and developing countries. The movement towards co-operation among developing countries and the establishment of facilities and institutions to foster this end—preference systems, payments arrangements and so on—would also need to be incorporated in a new framework. So too would the activity of transnational corporations, in respect of which a code of conduct is now being evolved. There are several similar examples. If the basic concepts of free trade or trade liberalisation and non-discrimination are limited by all these developments, would it not be appropriate to embark upon a new venture of merging in a consistent and coherent fashion the realities of the day? It is not merely a question of recognising the special position and modalities of operation of the socialist countries or of the developing countries; it is also a question of adapting the rules to the needs of the industrialised countries of the West to take account of the many changes that have occurred since the early postwar period. For example, what remains of the energising impact of the principle of non-discrimination in the context of the establishment of free trade areas and common markets amongst groups of industrialised countries? What remains of the validity of the concept of trade liberalisation itself in the context of the pervasive role played by transnational corporations? All these issues would, of course, imply that any attempt to recast rules or principles would indeed prove to be an ambitious and vast undertaking, and I can only speculate about its desirability and feasibility. But I cannot resist the thought that a time may come for working towards the adoption of what may be called a new world trade and economic convention, incorporating the changes that are so rapidly unfolding. Perhaps a start could be made if scholars gave this subject their attention.

I have been talking all this evening about international relations, about a New International Economic Order. But I do wish to emphasise that a new order internationally will have little meaning if it does not

find its corollary or counterpart in a new order internally in all countries, but particularly—in the context of the development issue—in the developing countries themselves. What UNCTAD is attempting to do is to help create an international framework which is more conducive to the development process. It is striving to improve the external environment within which development takes place. But the heart of the development process is internal to the societies of the developing countries themselves. The need for new strategies and new styles of development—for poverty or basic needs strategies—is therefore of the greatest relevance. These new styles or strategies should not of course imply that the goals of the developing countries for the transformation of their productive and technological capacities should be weakened in favour of programmes of internal distribution. The essential need is to evolve strategies where the attack on poverty is the direct result of the process of economic, social and technological transformation. The emphasis on new strategies for internal development should not also imply that the developed countries would thereby be relieved of the need to adapt international structures and relationships. On the contrary, the one must complement the other.

Before long the international community will begin to focus attention on the Third Development Decade and on the international strategy for the period to come. Doubtless the new strategy would reflect the concepts of the New International Economic Order, the need for changes in structures, the longer-term perspectives of the global economy to which attention has recently been drawn in some important studies, and the concepts of relevance to internal strategies and development styles. But I myself feel that if a new international strategy is to have any meaning it should not confine itself to an enumeration of policies and goals, however desirable and analytically sound they are, but should also spell out the ways in which these would be realised and what might be done if in fact they are not realised. If the developing countries were to seek new targets for international co-operation, they would need also to spell out the ways in which these might be brought about. The mobilisation of the capacity of the developing countries to improve their collective bargaining power in the quest for new structures and relationships may be a significant feature of the decade to come. This would itself be a test of their capacity for joint action—a test of the very concept of collective self-reliance that is regarded as so basic an element of the new order.

# NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AT THE UNITED NATIONS

## HOW THE UN VOTES ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

*Sidney Weintraub*

THE countries most prone to pushing contentious issues to a vote in the United Nations are precisely those least likely to permit meaningful votes at home on controversial issues. This obviously promotes cynicism about votes in the General Assembly and its major committees. However, this cynicism is accompanied by varying degrees of concern by individual countries about being on the losing side when an issue is brought to a vote.

During a debate at the end of 1974 on the role of the UN in strengthening international security, the then American Ambassador, John Scali, stated: 'Each time this Assembly adopts a resolution which it knows will not be implemented, it damages the credibility of the United Nations . . . Unenforceable, one-sided resolutions destroy the authority of the United Nations.' This implies that votes may not matter, but that they should. This came to be known as the 'tyranny of the majority' speech.[1] Henry Kissinger's speeches were replete with the theme that unenforceable votes bring no practical advantages to the majority: '. . . those nations who are asked to provide resources . . . must be accorded a commensurate voice.'[2] Or: 'We can resist confrontation and rhetorical attacks if other nations choose that path. And we can ignore unrealistic proposals and peremptory demands.'[3]

The Sri Lanka Ambassador, Hamilton Amerasinghe, stated the developing country side in this 1974 debate: 'It is understandable that powers accustomed to command imperiously find it intolerable to comply gracefully. There was no need for a debate on this item to be punctuated with sermons on how the developing countries should behave.' The Algerian Ambassador, Abdellatif Rahal, said: 'The debate

[1] This quotation and others dealing with the debate on a draft resolution on strengthening the role of the UN with regard to the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security come from provisional verbatim records of the General Assembly, 29th Session, starting with the 2,307th meeting of Dec. 6, 1974 (A/PV.2307). This debate came in the aftermath of the Sixth Special Session.

[2] Address to the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly, September 1, 1975 (USIS, September 2, 1975).

[3] Speech to UNCTAD-IV, May 6, 1976 (USIS, May 6, 1976), and Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1927, May 31, 1976, p. 658.

on " strengthening the role of the United Nations " has been transformed in the most unexpected manner into a harsh criticism of the General Assembly and into a process as intemperate as it is tendentious, into a trial of the majority within this Assembly. Conducted by the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany . . . .'

The French Ambassador, Louis de Guiringaud, stated: 'There are only two possibilities: either we adopt texts in which a majority will find political comfort but which remain inoperable; or we try to reach real agreements which will be binding on all the parties concerned and which will subsequently be reflected in the policies and decisions of Member States.'

How seriously are votes taken, particularly by the most powerful among the developed countries? Do these countries really want to transform the Assembly from a voting machine in which they can ignore the final tally into a conciliation-negotiation body whose final resolutions will subsequently be reflected in the *changed* policies of member states? They have said they do, but I doubt whether they mean this, and the bona fides of their assertions may never be put to the test. The developing countries have good reason to use their votes to force issues.

What are national behaviour patterns respecting votes in the General Assembly and related organs? Do these patterns show anything significant about the attachment of different countries to the UN? What do they portend for the UN? Is it a hall of winds and likely to remain so in the economic field or does it have a substantive future? My own judgment is that it will not have a significant substantive future, at least directly, in north-south economic negotiations. Its role is to force unilateral concessions and/or negotiations elsewhere.

**National voting patterns**

I have chosen six UN economic meetings which received reasonable coverage in the communications media of the major countries (to the extent that any meetings which are not overtly political or political-military are covered at all) and also on the basis of the frequency with which their final resolutions were cited in the preambles of subsequent UN resolutions. Old resolutions never die but fade away into the preambles of history. The six selected were the Santiago and Nairobi meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTADs III and IV); the meeting of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation held in Lima in March 1975 (UNIDO-II); the various sessions leading to the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS); the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly in 1974, which led to the promulgation with-

out a vote of a New International Economic Order, and which prompted the General Assembly debate on the 'tyranny' of the majority or the 'imperiousness' of the minority, depending on one's viewpoint; and the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly in September 1975.

I will examine the voting behaviour of the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, France and Japan at these meetings to see if there are consistent national patterns. With the exception of France, these are the countries one developing country observer has called the 'hardliners'.[4] The behaviour of a sixth developed country would in theory also merit examination, given its international importance, but it is easy to dismiss the Soviet Union's tactics in a few sentences. Speaking on behalf of his own country as well as of Bulgaria, Byelorussia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union, the Czech Ambassador said at the close of the Seventh Special Session: 'While supporting the developing countries in their just demands, the socialist countries maintained that there could not be an equal responsibility of all for the unfavourable economic situation of the developing countries, which has been inherited from the colonial system and preserved and, in many cases, even made worse by neo-colonialist policies.'[5] Russia has opted out of this kind of UN debate, and apart from exerting some sporadic modest pressure, the developing countries have accepted this. This, too, is part of the reason for the cynicism which exists in official circles in the major non-communist countries about economic votes in most UN bodies. The UN is near universal in membership but its membership is selective in its application of pressures. The pressure is most intense where the potential for payoff is greatest, i.e., the seriousness with which the country seems to take votes. The Soviet Union gives little in aid or trade benefits to developing countries and, *mirable dictu*, it is therefore generally left alone.

Let me categorise in summary fashion the normal voting-behaviour patterns of the other five major countries. The United States vacillates between seeking consensus and voting as its 'principles' dictate, i.e., voting no when it means no. Joining a consensus frequently means voting yes and then negating part of this vote by spelling out disagreements for the record. However, of the five major countries examined, the United States is the most straightforward in voting as it believes. This has been called 'hardnosed' and unco-operative; but it can also be interpreted as meaning that the United States takes UN votes and behaviour more seriously than do other countries. When Daniel

[4] Diego de Gaspar, 'Nairobi, Vancouver, Geneva . . . Beyond Conference Ritual', *Development Digest*, Vol. IV, No. 6, July-Aug. 1976, p. 1.

[5] This particular quotation comes from A/AC.176/SR.3, Sept. 16, 1975, Ad Hoc Committee of the Seventh Special Session, Provisional Summary Record of the Third Meeting. Comparable quotations exist from other conferences.

Moynihan was American Ambassador to the UN, he asserted that the latter was the reason for his frankness. The Japanese go to great lengths not to be isolated. They will rarely vote no and will abstain only when they have company. Their explanations of votes are crisp and to the point. The West Germans generally also seek company when refusing to accept a resolution. The British are sometimes willing to make a stand, but often dodge doing so.

To borrow a favourite expression from General de Gaulle, there may well be some Anglo-Saxon (including the Americans, British and West Germans) mentality at work producing the attitude that it is hard to tell little white lies and it is better to be excoriated as a hardliner than praised for promising what will not be delivered. This may be an excess of ideology, it may be honesty, or it may just be maladroit diplomacy. There are countries that everybody knows will not deliver in certain areas and consequently their votes in these are not taken seriously. For example, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, and the Soviet Union never have generous aid programmes.

Just as the United States is the country most likely to stand alone in voting no or abstaining on a resolution, France is the country most likely to depart from the pattern of the other four and vote yes when the others abstain, or abstain when the others vote no. On some issues these voting disagreements among the major countries represent substantive disagreements. France favours a link between the issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) and providing development assistance, and the United States does not, and there is a logic to a different voting pattern between them on this issue. On other issues, the different voting patterns represent not substantive differences but political perceptions of the importance of voting to relations with developing countries. For example, West Germany and the United States voted differently on the SDR-aid link at UNCTAD-III despite their substantive agreement. France favours commodity agreements and the other four generally do not, but the other four do not always behave identically on votes on this issue. None of the five is entranced with the idea of a common fund for financing buffer stocks to be decided on before reaching the underlying commodity agreements, and none of the five accepts the legitimacy of expropriation without adequate compensation, but on both sets of issues their tactical behaviour varies. It is not just substance that makes them different; it is also that they are different.

## Negotiation through confrontation

There were 49 resolutions adopted at UNCTAD-III (Santiago, April

[6] Quotations concerning UNCTAD-III come from *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, Third Session, Santiago, Chile, April 13-May 21, 1972, TD/180 (New York: UN, 1973), Vols. I and Ia.

13–May 21, 1972) of which 10 had some negative votes and 16 (including the 10) had abstentions.[6] The key issue at UNCTAD-III was the SDR-aid link, and there were two separate votes on the resolution covering that subject (making altogether 17 votes on which there were abstentions). The critical passage of resolution 84 on the international monetary situation was in paragraph 10, in which the conference asked the International Monetary Fund to study the link idea and invited '. . . the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund to present as soon as possible to the Board of Governors the studies required for decisions that are necessary on the possible implementation of a viable scheme'. There were six abstentions on this paragraph; of the major countries, only the United States abstained. The West Germans and the Japanese were also generally anti-link, but they preferred to be less explicit. There were undoubtedly internal disputes among officials in the West German Finance Ministry, Bundesbank and Foreign Ministry on the politics of abstaining on such imprecise wording and the Foreign Ministry apparently won. In the United States, the Treasury prevailed.[7] It was only subsequently that the Finance Minister and Chancellor made clear that the Federal Republic also opposed the link.

On the resolution as a whole, only the United States abstained. The British delegate then explained the vote on behalf of 14 developed countries, including the five major ones, as follows: 'In endorsing the call made in this paragraph for the studies, the delegations for whom I speak do not consider that this prejudices the outcome of the studies.' The United States did not like the link and abstained on a resolution calling only for a study looking towards its 'possible implementation'. West Germany and Japan felt more or less the same way, but voted yes, as did Britain and France. Then all five were able to join together in a statement that tended to make all the votes comparable, but with differences of nuance.

There were only 15 resolutions adopted at UNCTAD-IV (Nairobi, May 5–31, 1976) and all but one of these were adopted without overt dissent.[8] The one that was not adopted dealt with 'Transnational corporations and expansion of trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures', on which there were 16 abstentions by developed countries. This pattern of seeking consensus represented a shift in style by the United States and to a lesser degree by some of the other so-called hardliners, but not really any shift in substance. In many cases the votes were yes but the meaning was clearly no. Even here, however, in saying no by means of explanatory votes, the styles were different.

[7] I base these statements on knowledge obtained during my participation as a delegate to UNCTAD-III.

[8] Quotations concerning UNCTAD-IV come from State Department releases and the actual resolutions.

The United States explained its major reservations in some detail, specifically stating that calling preparatory meetings on commodities does not imply reaching commodity agreements; consent to a preparatory meeting on buffer stock financing does not imply consent to a common fund (the wording of the resolution is much more precise in that it requests the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to convene a preparatory meeting on 'the financing needs of a common fund and its structure'); consent to a resolution citing the New International Economic Order and CERDS does not imply any change in the attitude of not accepting them; agreement to a ministerial-level meeting on the debt problems of developing countries reflects no change in the position of looking at rescheduling negotiations only on a case-by-case basis 'where there is some presumption of imminent default'.

Of the major countries, only the United States felt constrained to make so comprehensive a statement of disagreements. Britain, West Germany, and Japan, which, according to *The Wall Street Journal*, had considered joining the United States in a joint statement on the commodity resolution, decided to let the Americans go it alone.

What emerges from an analysis of the resolutions and the voting at UNCTAD-IV is that few countries were looking for a fight. There was some euphoria remaining from the results of the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly late in 1975, when a final resolution was adopted by consensus without acrimony; the major countries did not want to revert to the aftermath of the Sixth Special Session, when a final resolution was adopted by consensus but with acrimony. Thus, at UNCTAD-IV some particularly difficult passages in the multilateral trade negotiations were included as the views of the developing countries: for example, the binding of preferential tariff margins in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the inclusion of all developing countries as beneficiaries in the schemes of generalised preferences, when it was known that this would require a change in American legislation.

It may have been this desire to seek agreement and this willingness by the United States, in contrast to its attitude at UNCTAD-III, to examine proposals it opposed (such as general debt rescheduling and a common fund for commodity buffer stocks even before it was known what stocks were involved), which caused the Americans' pique over the refusal of the conference to study their proposal for the creation of an international resources bank. Dr. Kissinger and the Secretary of the Treasury, William E. Simon, used some strong language: 'If the dialogue between the developing and developed countries, to which we attach great importance, is to succeed, suggestions put forward by the developed nations, such as the international resources bank at UNCTAD, must be treated on their merits and with serious consideration. The less-

developed countries must not lend themselves to parliamentary mani pulation by those states who contributed nothing to the developmer of the poor nations of the world.'[9] (They had the Soviet Union i mind.)

The conference at which differences in voting behaviour emerge most starkly was UNIDO-II (Lima, March 12–26, 1975).[10] The vot on the final resolution, the so-called Lima Declaration and Plan c Action on Industrial Development and Co-operation, was 82 in favou one against (the United States), and seven abstentions (Britain, We: Germany, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Canada, and Israel, but not France There were many explanations of votes, from the German delegate 'o ideas his government could not support', from the British, Japanes and others. As usual, the American explanation was the most detaile Its key point was that '. . . we found that our fundamental principl were being impinged upon by language advocated by the Group of 77 These principles included opposition to aspects of the New Internation Economic Order, the CERDS, and the idea of associations of commodit producers to raise prices, and also the importance of the allocati function of markets as opposed to seeking to organise markets.

The United States requested separate votes on many of the paragrapl of the resolution in order to 'make known and defend' these 'fund mental principles'. There were two paragraphs on which all five maj countries voted no, four on which all but France voted no, one on whic the United States, Britain and West Germany voted no, and one o which the only no votes came from the United States and West German

At the time several academic commentaries on the UNIDO-II vo were critical of the United States for casting the only negative vote. Yet the appearance was deceptive. West Germany said that it als disliked indexation of commodity prices, was concerned over the lac of reference to international law in the paragraph on sovereignty ov natural resources and objected to the repetition of points it ha opposed on the CERDS and the New International Economic Orde but then abstained on the final vote. Japan referred to its objection t the New International Economic Order and abstained. Britain did th same. The voting differences were not substantive but tactical an behavioural. It was not that the United States was necessarily mor negative than other major developed countries but rather that it was wil ing to say no in a vote rather than just in an explanation of its vote.

The idea for the CERDS was born in a speech by President Echeverri

[9] Department of State press release No. 279, June 1, 1976.

[10] Quotations come from UNIDO. ID/CONF.3/SR.1–18/Add.1/Rev.1, May 22, 197 Summary Records of plenary meetings.

[11] One such example was Roger D. Hansen, *A 'New International Econom Order'? An Outline for a Constructive US Response* (Washington: Overseas Develo ment Council, Development Paper 19, July 1975), p. 7.

of Mexico at UNCTAD-III in 1972 and it came to a final vote late in 1974 at the UN in New York. The major areas of disagreement between developing countries and most developed countries, as explained by the Mexican chairman of the CERDS working group, centred around such investment issues as nationalisation and compensation for nationalisation, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and the relations between states and companies and the rights of each.[12] There were many votes, on particular articles and subparagraphs of articles, and on the resolution as a whole. The United States requested the former and Mexico the latter. The final vote on the resolution as a whole was 115 for, six against, and 10 abstentions. The six negative votes were the United States, Britain, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg. France and Japan abstained. There were at least 19 other separate votes on which one or more countries voted no and/or abstained.

Japan's delegate stated that 'His delegation's abstention on the Charter as a whole did not imply any change in its negative vote on individual articles.' He then noted Japan's non-acceptance of articles dealing with sovereignty over natural resources, nationalisation-compensation, primary commodity producer associations, commodity agreements, and on adjusting developing countries' export prices in relation to the prices of their imports. The United States' explanation of its negative vote included the following: 'Many of the provisions on which agreement had been lacking were fundamental and were unacceptable in their present form. They included the treatment of foreign investment in terms which did not fully take into account respect for agreements and international obligations, and the endorsement of the concept of producer cartels and the indexation of prices.' The American and Japanese reasons for voting as they did were practically identical, even if stated with different ideological intensities, but their votes were different. Britain made a point, to which I will revert, on the differences between a parliament and the UN, namely, that too many provisions were 'couched in terms appropriate to a legislative document'.

Perhaps the most contentious meeting in recent years was the Sixth Special Session, at the end of which, on May 1, 1974, two major documents now at the heart of the North-South confrontational literature were adopted: a declaration on the establishment of a New International Economic Order and a programme of action to implement this declaration.[13] Both documents were adopted without a vote, but this did not imply consensus. It was the history of the Sixth Special Session that led to the debate in the General Assembly later in 1974 from which quotations were given at the beginning of this essay. At this Special

[12] Quotations concerning the CERDS come from Official Records of the General Assembly, 29th Session, Second Committee, Economic and Financial Questions, Summary Records of Meetings, Sept. 18–Dec. 11, 1974, A/C.2/SR.1586–1653 (New York: UN, 1975).

[13] See n. 1.

Session procedure mattered, and the French were on the side of the Americans, the British, and the West Germans. The Japanese were silent in this debate.

The French Ambassador talked like American ambassadors often do at UN meetings, although perhaps more eloquently. He said that the procedures employed in the Second Committee (the economic committee) make it doubtful whether the resolutions will be reflected later in policy. 'A private club seems to be emerging which monopolises the scene . . . Patience is our virtue, confrontation our agony. Any abuse dooms us; agreement rewards us.' The British Ambassador also sounded like the Americans: 'We have seen resolutions in which the interests of a minority whose co-operation may be essential for their implementation have been brushed aside . . . We are deeply concerned at these attempts to create an impression of unanimity where it does not exist. . . .'

The Sixth Special Session represented something different from what had gone before. Confrontation between developed and developing countries is not new in UN circles. It was apparent when UNCTAD was created in 1964, and indeed UNCTAD was born because the developing countries wanted a forum in which they could 'negotiate' (a word often used, but since it is hard to negotiate with 130 countries sitting around a room, a better word is 'confront') and whose secretariat and procedures they controlled. Confrontation was not an end in itself but the prelude to obtaining concessions. The Sixth Special Session came after the Yom Kippur War, after oil prices were dramatically increased, when there was talk of commodity power in the air of both developed and developing countries. For the most part, the United States handled the Sixth Special Session just as it had normally handled UNCTAD conferences, by essentially ignoring it. But whatever the intrinsic merits of its substantive paragraphs, the New International Economic Order slogan took hold. The developed countries began to pay attention at home and in their own club, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to relations with developing countries.

For this reason, the Seventh Special Session in September 1975 was different from the previous Special Session. Instead of the United States ignoring it, a major address was delivered in the name of the Secretary of State which was probably the most comprehensive exegesis of American economic policy towards developing countries in more than a decade. This American leadership made a difference, and the Seventh Special Session ended with a consensus resolution that truly represented a consensus.[14]

But it was not without its caveats. The United States associated itself with the 'larger objectives' of the resolution, but then demurred

[14] Quotations are from A/AC.176/SR.3, Sept. 16, 1975, *op. cit.* See n. 5.

on: 'any implication that the world was now embarked on . . .' a New International Economic Order; all references to the CERDS; indexation of commodity prices; a legally binding code on technology transfers; deliberate redeployment of industries out of developed countries; and the SDR-aid link. The atmosphere had changed a good deal, at least temporarily, but the familiar substance had altered only infinitesimally.

The other major countries contented themselves with briefer statements. Both Britain and Japan entered reservations on committing themselves to the 0·7 per cent official development assistance/gross national product aid target as stated in the consensus resolution. France had some reservations about untying aid and on contributions to new international aid funds (presumably to the International Fund for Agricultural Development). The Secretary-General of the UN summarised the meeting simply, when he expressed his gratification 'that it was possible to start a negotiating process . . .'. The American Ambassador, Daniel Moynihan, overstated in the exuberance of the end of a conference that was not vitriolic: 'Perhaps never in the history of the United Nations has there been so intensive and so genuine a negotiation among so many nations on so profoundly important a range of issues.'

And then later, at the same session of the General Assembly at the end of 1975, and again at the 31st Session at the end of 1976, the typical voting patterns and explanatory verbiage re-emerged. In response to a resolution introduced by the Philippines on 'acceleration of the transfer of real resources to developing countries', the General Assembly vote on December 12, 1975, was 112 in favour, one against (the United States), and 14 abstentions. This resolution requested the Secretary-General to submit a study on the subject to the 31st Session, and such a study, prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat, was prepared. When this study, and a revised Philippines-sponsored resolution (on 'Ways and means of accelerating the transfer of real resources to developing countries on a predictable, assured and continuous basis') were submitted to the Second Committee, the vote on December 13, 1976, was 74 in favour, one against (the United States), and 19 abstentions (including West Germany, France, Japan, and Britain). *Plus ça change.* The East Europeans were in top form. This time the Bulgarian spoke for them, including the Soviet Union, and explained their abstention on the grounds that the proposed resolution dealt with financial relations between developed and developing countries which 'were not applicable to economic relations between socialist and developing countries'.[15]

[15] Quotations concerning this draft resolution (A/C.2/31/L.49/Rev. 2, Dec. 10, 1976) come from Summary Record of the 66th Meeting of the Second Committee, Dec. 13, 1976 (A/C.2/31/SR.66 of Dec. 15, 1976).

It only remains to note that the United States explained its negative vote on the basis of its opposition to the 0.7 per cent official development assistance/gross national product target and indirectly to one other key provision in the resolution recommending 'that developed countries give serious consideration to the establishment of a development tax to be earmarked for international development assistance'. This idea had been discussed in the Secretary-General's report. The West German and British representatives explained that their countries' opposition was because of the aid target language, the French representative said his country's opposition was because of the development tax and several other operative paragraphs, and the Japanese were opposed to both the 0.7 per cent target and the development tax. These all resembled the American explanation, but the four countries abstained.

**What is the United Nations' economic role?**

The UN Assembly is obviously not a legislature. 'A legislature passes laws. The General Assembly passes resolutions, which are in most cases advisory in nature.' This was from John Scali of the United States. The French Ambassador referred to the need to 'create a favourable climate for debate'. He added that '. . . we behave like a parliament although we are not a parliament'.[16]

Binding or not, the votes are often taken seriously. The general candour of the United States in its voting behaviour on major issues would imply that it attaches importance to some votes. It is hard to say why, since the United States, like any other country, will not carry out a resolution with which it does not agree regardless of what other countries present at the General Assembly or UNCTAD or UNIDO resolve. There must be some Puritanism in the American voting behaviour, some Lutheranism in the German, some Anglicanism in the British, since, roughly in that order, these are the countries most likely to vote as they believe. Ideology has its role and must be made explicit. It is difficult in Japanese society to say no in a direct, unvarnished fashion, and perhaps this, coupled with Japan's recent re-emergence on the world scene, helps to explain the normal Japanese evasiveness in voting. There is a quotation from the Swiss philosopher, Henri Amiel, that the Frenchman '. . . is always thinking of others, playing to the gallery',[17] and this is apt for French voting behaviour in UN organs. After all, apart from the vote, all these countries enter reservations on particular sections of resolutions which they do not intend to carry out even when they vote yes or abstain. They could all vote yes on everything and then explain why this means no. They do not do this, at least not all of them and certainly not all of the time.

[16] See n. 1 for sources of these quotations.

[17] *Journal Intime*, Jan. 22, 1875.

All the major countries have stated at one time or another that they seek more negotiation in the UN. From time to time proposals have been made to set up formal conciliation procedures to avoid premature votes until there has been sufficient negotiation.[18] These efforts may succeed, but I doubt whether they would then set in train a serious substantive as opposed to semantic negotiation.

However, negotiation is what lies behind the confrontation of votes. The developing countries want votes because this is the one overt way to demonstrate their solidarity, in fact to negotiate through confrontation. To analogise, a labour union does not obtain concessions by pleading, but by the exercise of power. The bringing into being of the various national systems of generalised tariff preferences in favour of developing countries, the creation of the International Development Association (the soft loan window of the World Bank group), the American initiative at the Seventh Special Session to liberalise the IMF's compensatory finance facility, and the willingness of the United States, Britain, Japan, and West Germany to look seriously at commodity agreements all stem from the exercise of this confrontational power. In the minds of most developing countries, confrontation is a necessary condition preceding negotiation. Of all the institutions suitable for confrontation, none is superior to the UN with its one nation-one vote mode of operation. Why conciliate if you are convinced that the path to progress is by kicking up a rumpus?

Viewed from the capitals of the major powers, why negotiate in a forum in which you are outnumbered, whose secretariat works primarily for the developing countries, and where a negotiation deals not in quid pro quos but rather in how far you are willing to go in giving concessions? (This is where the labour union analogy breaks down since the end result of collective bargaining is a two-way contract.) There was no explicit consideration from developing countries for the granting of tariff preferences to them; indeed, the developing countries have stated that this is intended to be non-reciprocal. The same is true for most of the other demands of developing countries in UN resolutions.

The developed countries are prepared to negotiate in the GATT, the IMF and in consumer-producer commodity forums, in all of which there are mutual rights and obligations. As the developed countries see it, the UN may propose, but they will dispose elsewhere. 'Co-operation and not confrontation' when used with respect to the UN is a developed countries' slogan without content. What they really mean is 'co-operation and not negotiation'.

Having said this, it is worth coming back to national voting behaviour

[18] The most recent is in *A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Co-operation*, Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System, E/AC.62/9, May 28, 1975 (New York: UN, 1975).

since what happens at the UN obviously gets under the skin of different countries in different ways. Mr. Moynihan obviously felt that the best way to deal with confrontation was to confront right back. He became something of a national folk hero in the United States for this behaviour. Here again is bluntness, which apparently is something of an admired trait in the United States. Ivor Richard, when he was British Ambassador at the UN, felt differently: 'I spent a lot of time preventing rows at the United Nations, not looking for them. Whatever else the place is, it is not the O.K. Corral, and I am hardly Wyatt Earp'.[19] Do the developing countries also wish to avoid fights? I doubt it, for reasons already stated.

The United States tried hard to avoid a fight at the Seventh Special Session and succeeded. This was the moment to consolidate gains from previous confrontations. It tried again at UNCTAD-IV and did not quite succeed. The consolidation process was apparently completed for that round. Japan, West Germany, Britain and France can generally avoid fights as long as the United States remains the contender. What if the United States changed its role and decided to vote yes on most controversial proposals and then explain for the record that it does not accept most of the content of these proposals? Given the nature of the American character, this is most unlikely to happen, but it would then be interesting to see how the other major powers ran for cover.

What then are the economic functions of the UN? It is obviously a debating forum, and occasionally there are substantive and penetrating debates. But not often because it is too big for this and because its permanent representatives are professional debaters, professional resolution writers, professional conciliators, and not professional makers of economic policy for their governments.

It is a confrontational forum. In getting ready for UNCTAD-IV, the Group of 77 made the following point at Manila: '*Emphasise* the close solidarity of all the developing countries which has made it possible for them to evolve a unified position, as well as the importance of harmonising positions which help to enhance the irreversible process they have created in international economic relations and to consolidate and strengthen their unity and solidarity through joint concerted action, thus laying the foundation for the new international economic order and for the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.'[20] This brief passage brings in many familiar themes, the New

[19] *The New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1975. In an article on Moynihan in *Rolling Stone*, Aug. 21, 1976 (' Ruling Class Hero '), Timothy Crouse argues that Mr. Richard's ' slap on the wrist ' regarding Moynihan's technique for handling resolutions was to wean an anglophilic American away from a disastrous course.

[20] The Manila Declaration and Programme of Action, Third Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, Manila, Jan. 26–Feb. 7, 1976 (TD/195, Feb. 12, 1976), is the most recent comprehensive statement of developing country views on economic issues.

International Economic Order and CERDS, and the importance of joint action, which can best be made manifest by confrontational voting.

The UN is a technical body, particularly in its specialised agencies which are not part of the General Assembly, UNCTAD, UNIDO ambit. Unesco recently entered this confrontational arena and is crippled as a result. The logic of solidarity for seeking substantive economic concessions does not exist in Unesco as it does in other UN forums, so that what is happening there is politics for the sake of politics and not economics.

This conglomeration of functions is used to seek concessions and promote negotiation, not necessarily in the UN proper, but somewhere. This is the rationale of bloc votes by developing countries. There is also a logic in directing confrontational pressure on countries that react to pressure—by their behaviour, their consciences, their voting. Blood does not come from turnips or aid from nations that assert they have no responsibility for underdevelopment in other countries. When developed countries do not wish to negotiate, in the UN or elsewhere, there is a logic to their no votes and abstentions and their explanations of votes.

However, the messy process of debate, confrontation, conciliation, and votes does in time bring about a change of positions. In a world of rich and poor, of vested interests and unmet aspirations, to hope for sweetness and light as the path to change is to seek a chimera. Why should the poor be content?

# KISSINGER IN RETROSPECT: THE DIPLOMACY OF POWER-CONCERT?*

*Coral Bell*

AMERICAN Secretaries of State are almost under obligation to be controversial characters: so many of the hopes and fears of the world circle round their heads. Those who escape debate are usually those who have not made much impact on events, like William Rogers, President Nixon's first Secretary of State, who actually had longer in the appointment than Henry Kissinger—five years as against three—but who seems in grave danger of going down in history as a footnote in the accounts of Kissinger's eight years of command. The three strong Secretaries of State of the postwar period—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger—have all been amply controversial in their respective times, and no doubt it is too early to assign any of them his final place in American diplomatic history. Nevertheless I think one can see Acheson and Kissinger in sequence as defining and developing—or even as creating—a tradition in American foreign policy which is quite unlike the predominant earlier tradition, and also distinct from the rather disastrous intervening years of Dulles and Dean Rusk.

In effect, I would argue that Acheson moved American policy away from the assumption which had underlain the policies of the interwar years and earlier, that the balance of power in peacetime was none of America's business, and that balance-of-power policies were an immoral un-American idea anyway, fit only for devious European minds. He took America into a balance-of-power coalition, Nato, which has stayed together with remarkable success for almost thirty years, and must be accounted his prime memorial. The Dulles years did not much damage it, but they conducted the United States into the equal and opposite error to isolationism, what Kissinger calls 'undifferentiated globalism', and tainted the traditional diplomatic sangfroid appropriate to balance policies with an ideological cold-war moralism or zealotry that prevented them from effectively producing their only hopeful and constructive outcome, a workable long-term modus vivendi or accommodation. Exactly how incautious a policy-maker Dulles could almost be during the high cold war was made apparent very recently by Mr. James Angleton's

* Some of the arguments put forward in this article are developed with more substantiating detail in the author's forthcoming book: *The Diplomacy of Detente: Studies in an American Foreign Policy and its Impacts, 1969–77.* (Martin Robertson.)

account of the CIA plans for 'spontaneous' uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1956.[1] However, the peak point of 'undifferentiated globalism' and the moral rhetoric of cold war was the Kennedy inaugural address of 1961, with its promise to 'pay any cost, bear any burden', a promise whose implementation in Vietnam proved that the American electorate's appetite for paying costs and bearing burdens was in fact no greater than that of any other sensible people. The anguish of the American involvement in Indochina (in my view the most painful and damaging error in the entire two hundred years of American foreign policy) so overshadowed everything else in Rusk's eight years of office as rather unfairly to blot out any successes that might otherwise be set to his account.

It is by comparing the world at the end of 1968 and at the end of 1976 that one can most readily measure Kissinger's tasks as the intellectually dominant policy-maker for the West for those eight years. In 1968 the United States seemed to be politically shaking itself to pieces as a consequence of its unwinnable war in Asia, alienating both its Western allies and third-world onlookers in the process. Its relations with China had hardly moved from the rut of pointless hostility in which they had been stuck for twenty years. Its relations with the Soviet Union were confused and uncertain in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Western Europe was tense, jittery, disillusioned and resentful of American inaction during that crisis. France was still offering a serious challenge to American leadership of the West. Eastern Europe was in a state of trauma and despair. No significant effort had been made towards the control of either nuclear or conventional armaments. The Middle East appeared as far from any kind of settlement as it had been for twenty years: the Arab world seemed positively eager for the status of a Soviet protectorate, and American influence was at an almost total discount. Latin America was on a rising tide of apparently revolutionary prospects. The two Iberian dictatorships, in Portugal and Spain, were visibly wearing out with their incumbents' lives, and the prospective succession crises appeared full of impending strategic dangers for the Western coalition, and even for the general peace. The political temperature in Southern Africa was simmering up to a level at which it would sustain a race war in which the Western powers might become involved in the fates of their delinquent kith and kin in Rhodesia and South Africa. Japan was caught in a crunch between its need for some measure of rapprochement with China and its inability to move until the United States did. America's other Pacific allies, Australia and New Zealand, were becoming as badly disrupted as America itself by the guilts and resentments of Vietnam.

[1] *New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1976.

Eight years on, the world that President Carter's policy-makers have inherited in their turn seems almost tamely rational. At the time of writing there is less scope for the profession of war correspondent than at any time since 1945: Ulster and Rhodesia and a few other guerrilla campaigns in the third world. The fact that the Western powers are morosely preoccupied with economic problems is in itself a reflection of the level of success in controlling security problems. The changes produced by these eight years seem to me, despite the West's economic downturn, to be almost wholly to the net advantage of the Western camp, as well as to the long-term prospects of peace. The change in the American relationship with China has been effected at astonishingly little cost, not even the full sacrifice of the connection with Taiwan. The relationship with the Soviet Union has been 'mutated' to a degree that has made some co-operation in crisis management possible, and which has brought some measure of control of both nuclear and conventional armaments into at least distant prospect. Neither the American alliance with Japan nor the alliance with Western Europe has been seriously sacrificed to this new articulation of the central triangle. It is true that both alliances were (deliberately?) put through somewhat abrasive periods of transition, the Japanese in 1971–72 and the West European in 1973–74, but in both cases the end result seems a more viable and realistic relationship. Nor has America's true strategic edge been sacrificed in the arms-control negotiations; it still retains substantial advantages in numbers of warheads, accuracy of guidance systems, general technological sophistication, and the level of invulnerability of the major strike force. (The election campaign did of course produce allegations to the contrary, mostly from Mr. Reagan, Senator Jackson and Admiral Zumwalt rather than Mr. Carter, but such alarms must be expected in the Presidential battle. In fact that particular campaign standby was less seriously pursued in 1976 than the analogous 'missile gap' allegations of the 1960 campaign, and seems likely to be disavowed with even greater speed by the new Administration. The new Secretary of Defence is already dismantling some of the more extravagant bits of the fantasy-structure of alleged Soviet advantage.)

The Middle East is not only apparently closer to an overall settlement than at any time since 1948, but has been astonishingly converted from an area of Soviet diplomatic ascendancy to one of American diplomatic ascendancy, with the Saudi Arabians, of all people, even moved to defend the interests of the Western capitalist world against those of their fellow members of OPEC in such matters as increases in oil prices. Southern Africa has been (belatedly) manoeuvred on to a course which at least conceivably might with luck prevent the great race war which previously had seemed inevitable. Japan's problem of how to reconcile its diplomatic identity as an American fellow traveller and its economic

status as a member of the advanced capitalist world with its cultural and political need to be on better terms with China has been greatly eased, perhaps resolved. The succession processes in the Iberian peninsula, either of which might have produced re-runs of the 1930s, have in fact evolved new governments in Portugal and Spain acceptable as members of EEC and Nato, and likely to be close strategic fellow travellers of the United States. That may have been pure good fortune for the West, but I think that in due course Kissinger's policies towards both regimes, as they emerged, will be shown to have been quite adroit, although they were much criticised at the time.

The East Europeans have had their diplomatic leverage against the Soviet Union unobtrusively sustained and enhanced, without being deceived into suicidal imprudence by promises of 'liberation', as was the tendency of the Dulles years. Quite contrary to Mr. Reagan's campaign charge that the Kissinger policies 'required slaves to accept their slavery', they have helped to maximise the breathing space the East Europeans are able to exact within the Soviet embrace and this is now quite considerable, as events in Poland and elsewhere in the post-Helsinki period have shown. Even in the fields of economic diplomacy, where Kissinger is usually given low marks, and in which he was undoubtedly very reluctant to engage himself, some advance has been made. The 'North-South dialogue' may mostly sound like an acrimonious argument, but it is at least under way. The meetings of the advanced capitalist powers (as at Rambouillet and in Puerto Rico, and prospectively in London) do not yet seem to have acquired a name but are nevertheless acquiring the status of an institution, and could be a powerful one. Some beginnings have been made on the problems of food and energy. The once rather frightening edge of OPEC as a potential weapon against the West appears to have been subtly turned. Altogether, as the necessary crisis-manager and power-conservator for the West, Henry Kissinger seems to have amply earned the Secretary of State's salary.

**From balance of power to concert of powers**

Some American and British opinion has suggested, in criticism of these activities, that the Secretary of State should have defined his role otherwise, as a sort of international welfare worker, largely preoccupied with human rights and economic advancement. But worthy though those causes no doubt are, many pressure groups and officials can and do tend them. No one, however, except the Secretary of State or the National Security Adviser can effectively look after the power-interests of the West and its overall relation with the adversary world. And the prevention of central war is, after all, a strikingly useful piece of welfare work for the human community as a whole. Besides, the frequently

advanced reproach that Kissinger deviated more than earlier policy-makers from American political values does not accord much with the historical evidence. Washington established its alliances with autocracies like South Vietnam, South Korea, Franco's Spain or the colonels' Greece well before Kissinger came on the scene. It practised 'destabilisation' and still rougher techniques in places like Iran and Guatemala and even Chile from the mid-1950s or early 1960s. As a recent Brookings study has shown, America used military action or military threat three times as often in the Kennedy years as in the Kissinger years.[2] In a specific human rights issue on which he was often attacked, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, Kissinger did vastly better than his noisiest critic. Between 1969 and 1973 he managed to raise the rate permitted by the Russians from 600 to 34,800 a year. When Senator Jackson loudly took up the cause, for his own political reasons, the Russians cut the rate back to 13,000 a year in 1975,[3] apparently to demonstrate their resentment of public pressure.

This problem was one which greatly affected the most criticised of his policies, the detente with the Soviet Union. Detente came under such frequent fire in the two-year run-up to the 1976 elections that it sometimes seemed doubtful that it could survive, at least under its proper name. However, I would argue that it will rank historically as the most important of Dr. Kissinger's strategies, because it sought to grapple creatively with the most dangerous power reality in the international system, the attainment of 'essential equivalence' (or something like it) by the Soviet Union in the overall balance of forces. This is the matter on which I interpret Kissinger as completing Acheson's work, and rescuing it from the ill-considered deviations of the Dulles period. Acheson created the balance-of-power coalition, and oversaw the beginnings of American acceptance of a permanent role in it, but he was not able to move from the balance itself, which is *necessary* but not *sufficient*, to the stable modus vivendi of diplomatic accommodation which it should make possible. Besides, in Acheson's period of office the time was not ripe, and unfortunately the process that created the twenty-two years of pointless hostility to China had already begun, thus putting the United States at a disadvantage in the triangular balance. Kissinger has been as determined a friend and defender of the Western power-base as could well be imagined (somewhat ruthless and tactically machiavellian in its preservation, in fact) but he brought a larger historical imagination and more subtlety of mind to elaborating and using that base in the construction of what he tactfully calls a structure of peace, but which, if it actually works, will look uncommonly like an old-fashioned concert of powers.

[2] *Int. Herald Tribune*, Jan. 4, 1977.
[3] *Int. Herald Tribune*, May 28, 1976.

The two terms are not incompatible: the nineteenth-century concert of powers, using the phrase in its broadest meaning, did in fact maintain a structure of peace, by and large, in the central balance for the century from 1815 to 1914. Kissinger's book about that concert, *A World Restored*,[4] which represents his first substantial research preoccupation, (it was his PhD thesis) is still a major source of illumination of his general policies. That is not to say, as has so often been alleged, that he is an uncritical enthusiast of Metternich, or that he has expected a late twentieth-century world system to work in precisely the same way as a nineteenth-century European system. But the business of transforming an achieved *balance* of power into a *concert* of powers involves the growth of the same sort of network of common conventions, common assumptions and some common interests in the two cases. This is what detente, in its more ambitious definition, has been about. Many analysts of foreign policy have not believed that it can be done, and Professor Brzezinski, who has now taken over as the chief intellectual strategist in the field, may still be among the sceptics. But the very nature of the contemporary balance seems likely to force some similar effort upon him. There is still enough distrust of the past traditions of European diplomacy in the United States, and in the third world, to make it injudicious to use officially the term concert of powers (the term detente came into disfavour during the election and Acheson would hardly have used publicly even the term balance of power) but nevertheless a surprising amount of this potential structure, or at least the scaffolding for it, seems to me to be already in place.

A new concert of powers would of course be on a world basis, not a European one, and one can already see its prospective 'candidate members' emerging in various parts of the third world: Iran, Brazil, Nigeria, for instance. Luckily it will not need any new formal structures, since the Security Council provides a ready-made one. It does, as I said, require a set of common conventions, expectations and assumptions, but these have been more rapidly advanced during the past eight years than is normally conceded. Even the vocabulary of this form of political understanding has spread surprisingly wide and fast. A few years ago the word 'detente' would hardly have been found outside the writings of the European diplomatic historian: now it is invoked even in race relations in the Southern African bush.

In sum, I would say that Kissinger's central task, as one of the makers of American diplomatic history, has been to build the bilateral balance of power achieved in Acheson's time into the more viable and flexible triangular balance of the present, and to maintain that balance as the infrastructure of a (hopefully) creative and peace-oriented diplomatic

[4] *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–22* (London: Gollancz, 1973; first publ. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

order, which may in time be strong enough to permit change and adjustment without the catastrophe of central war. His central strategy has been detente, deployed as a mode of management of adversary power vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and China, with an even-handedness intended perhaps to give the United States some of the advantages of the balancer in the classic system, with leeway for tilting towards the one or the other, as the occasion indicates. His chief intellectual model has clearly been the historic European concert system, whose nineteenth-century successes look a good deal more impressive, since there have been so many twentieth-century failures to compare them with, than they did in 1918.

Let us look now at the reasons why this undoubtedly constructive, imaginative and subtle-minded effort has created so many powerful groups of enemies. I do not mean to imply that Kissinger's policies have in general been unpopular: on the contrary, a poll taken after eight years of office showed him still enjoying a 65 per cent approval rating, and in periods of particular success, as after the first Middle East disengagements, he enjoyed (in both senses) a considerable degree of press adulation. But there has grown up a substantial assortment of particular groups with powerfully-felt cases against him, both on the left and the right, though predominantly on the left. That is logical enough, for he has been a conservative policy-maker in a double and literal sense, intent on conserving both the peace and the Western (particularly American) power-base. The liberal left, in America and elsewhere, has liked the peace-oriented side of the policy—arms-control efforts, the detentes with China and the Soviet Union, the playing-down of cold-war rhetoric, the attempts at a settlement in the Middle East, Panama, Southern Africa—but has resented the stubborn, frequently successful, and often devious or machiavellian defence of Western interests, as much in the contests with the third world as in those with the communist powers. The right has been resentful or suspicious chiefly of the detente with the Soviet Union, but also (in America), of the efforts to negotiate a Panama treaty and some of the Southern African diplomacy.

However, the largest and easily the most bitter camp of Kissinger's critics holds the remaining faithful of the anti-Vietnam movement, who cannot forgive him either for the four years that the disengagement of American forces took, or for the involvement of Cambodia. There is a neat irony in the situation of this group vis-à-vis the change of administration. Many of its members were supporters of the Carter candidacy, on the grounds, among others, that it would entail a break with the remaining unholy relics of the American involvement with Indochina, like the Secretary of State. But in fact the whole group of Carter appointments on the foreign/defence/intelligence side were far more parties to the initial Kennedy-Johnson decisions than Kissinger was. The origins

of the American escalation lay in the period in which the Kennedy administration took over the 'undifferentiated globalism' of the Dulles years, without finding a substitute for the caution or inertia with which Eisenhower mitigated or restrained the policies of his Secretary of State.

Kissinger was never an adherent of that 'undifferentiated globalism': in fact he was one of its most trenchant critics, especially in the Dulles period. And he began work very early in Richard Nixon's Presidency on removing the ruins with which this policy had scattered the international landscape. That, it seems to me, was the true meaning of the Guam Doctrine, announced on Nixon's first Pacific trip. But neither Kissinger nor, more conclusively, the President were prepared to pursue this course at the cost of an undisguised defeat for American arms, such as an immediate quitting of Indochina would have represented. For the President, this may have been merely because he was no more prepared than his predecessors to preside over the first American admission of defeat. For Kissinger the reasons seem to have been more complex, and bound up with his personal experiences. He was born in Bavaria in the year of Hitler's first *putsch*, and fled the country as a fifteen-year-old with his family as Hitler's 'final solution' started on its terrible way. He had therefore strong personal reasons for historical pessimism about the effect which military defeat may have on the psyche of a civilised people—for the Germans in 1914 were undoubtedly among the most civilised and educated of Europeans. In the deeply troubled America of 1969, a domestic polarisation of unforeseeable scope and consequences could not be ruled out. Moreover, in the international field, America's credibility as an ally would hardly have been enhanced if it openly cut the throat of the regime in Saigon which its own policy-makers had fathered, however ill-advisedly, in 1954. And most important of all, the stream of signals to Moscow and Peking, which American policy decisions inescapably constitute, might have proved dangerously misleading. They might have seemed to embody a sort of promise, an indication that American commitments in more strategically important parts of the world like north-east Asia or even Western Europe might not be met. And that in turn would increase the chances of the sort of miscalculations which tend to produce major war. The whole basis of a successful balance policy requires providing the *adversary* powers with clear and emphatic signals which will deter them from dangerous adventurism.

These reasons for the delay in American disengagement have been much scoffed at by Kissinger's critics, but they seem to me sober and realistic enough. The dichotomy between the need to disengage, and the need to minimise the consequences of doing so, was met by the process of diplomacy, delay and 'Vietnamisation', the latter being intended to make the South Vietnamese army equal to the task of defending its

base without outside help except the supply of weapons. The Cambodian invasion, in effect, was an ill-considered aspect of 'Vietnamisation': an effort to restrict the flow of supplies and reinforcements through Cambodia to the battlefields in South Vietnam. It was certainly a deplorable decision in all its consequences for Cambodia: a sacrifice of what slim chances there were of long-term political stability there for the sake of relatively short-term military advantages in Vietnam. It is always cited, along with Chile, as a major part of the moral case against Kissinger's policies. But one has to remember that these decisions were taken very early in Nixon's first administration, in 1969–70, when the President himself was very much in charge of policy-making, and Kissinger was a relatively obscure and easily-dismissed back-room boy. The soldiers (General Westmoreland as well as General Abrams) thought that their forces and allies ought to have the advantage of disrupting the supply trails and base camps in Cambodia; Nixon agreed, and Kissinger somewhat ambiguously went along with the decisions, whereas several of his National Security Council staff resigned in protest. The episode as a whole was the origin of some very painful troubles in the Watergate period.

'Vietnamisation' did not of course work on the military side, and when the new push from the North came in 1975, the southern forces and regime collapsed in a few weeks. But I would not therefore say that Kissinger's Vietnam policies failed in all their objectives. The domestic and international consequences that he felt must be avoided *were* in fact avoided. This has been particularly striking on the domestic side. Even in the 1976 election campaign, begun barely a year after the final debacle in Saigon, Vietnam was hardly mentioned. There has been no intellectual witch-hunt, as after the 'loss' of China in Acheson's time. Delay, and the abdication of responsibility by 'Vietnamisation', did their work almost eerily well. The end was not felt by the man in the street as an American defeat: the Saigon regime had by then become a remote unsatisfactory bunch of people whom the United States had once tried to help, but who had proved incapable of 'making it' and who deserved nothing more, not even the final allocation of funds Kissinger wanted for them. And internationally also, the process of delay and the time it gave for the development of detente with both China and the Soviet Union prevented either country from being inclined to sacrifice the advantages of its rapprochement with the United States for any forward policies in the period of readjustment. Thus the general alliance-structures and the central balance were hardly shaken.

The United States should never have intervened in Vietnam; the consequences of that intervention were catastrophically destructive for the peoples of Indochina, and very dangerous for America itself. But by the time it fell to Kissinger's lot to undo the errors of his predecessors,

the American commitment in South-east Asia was like some monstrous deadly vine, so intertwined into the useful structures of American power in the world that the task of cutting away without producing further disasters to that valuable piece of architecture was tedious, painful and bloody. The only plea in mitigation one can make is that the consequences of doing it in any other way might over the long term have been even more bloody.

**The critics of detente**

Among Kissinger's critics, I would put the enemies and sceptics of detente as next in intensity of moral conviction to the Vietnam protesters: those who remain basically nostalgic for the cosy simplistic days of the cold war, when an ally was an ally and the adversary was readily recognisable by his wicked ideological scowl. Many temperaments find considerable satisfaction in seeing international politics in terms of black and white, with themselves always on the side of the angels and the other side always fiendish oppressors. Moreover, this set of images is practically useful to a great many people: to the military, for instance, in their necessary task of securing adequate funds for the forces required to maintain the balance of power. But to understand both the nature and the limitations of detente requires a more sophisticated vision. A natural deviousness is considerable help in exploiting the usefulness of detente as a strategy.

The most articulate critics of detente in Kissinger's final year of office were of course the right-wing Republicans who adhered to Ronald Reagan, and the nearest they came to success was the contrivance of a severe snub to Kissinger in the Republican foreign policy platform adopted at the party's convention last August. But the real damage to his hopes was in the postponement for two years of the prospect of new arms-control measures. The SALT II agreement will now fall to the Carter Presidency, which Kissinger must find rather galling, especially as he reportedly believed that the agreement he reached in Moscow in January 1976 would have served as the basis for a SALT II treaty. President Ford, under heavy pressure from Ronald Reagan, dared not sign. But the troops who rallied to the anti-detente banner are not merely country-club anti-communists. The predominantly emotional tone of the movement stems from the many Americans of East European origin who have good reason to resent what Russian power is doing to their relatives' lives back home, and who were induced to believe, quite mistakenly, that the Helsinki meeting operated to their disadvantage. In fact the precise opposite was true, and this is now being conceded by Congressional and other observers, but it will take time for popular assumptions to catch up with realities.

A group of critics related to the anti-detente camp, and like them

commanding some academic big guns are what I will call 'the Friends of Israel'. The term 'Jewish lobby', which is often used, is misleading in suggesting that all its adherents are Jewish, whereas in fact many Gentile politicians, such as Senators Henry Jackson and Edward Kennedy, are prominent members. Carter was not one originally, but a cynical observer might say that he adopted associate membership for electoral purposes in 1976. It is ironic that the first Jewish Secretary of State should have run into so much opposition from this group, but it is logical enough. The American Jewish community is powerful, articulate and impressively prominent in the country's scholarship and in the media, as well as in the Democratic party machine. It has two major and well-founded reasons for suspicion and dislike of the Soviet Union: the oppression of the Soviet Jewish community on the one hand, and the Soviet machinations in support of the Arabs against Israel on the other. American Jewry is of course overwhelmingly Zionist, whereas Kissinger seems never to have been much of a Zionist, nor to be any longer observant, though he came from a family who were. An extra edge of resentment against 'one of our own who is not with us' can therefore readily be detected in much of the writing of this sector of opinion on his Middle East policies. At one stage, especially about March 1975 (which represented in several ways the low-point in his general success-rate), there were indications that a real hatchet job was being attempted against him, and that he would need extra reserves of toughness and guile to survive it. But he had won the undercover battle by the end of the year, and both the Israeli government and the 'Friends of Israel' now appear more reconciled to the view that the security of Israel has in fact been advanced, not diminished, as a result of Kissinger's Middle East subtleties. They certainly ought to be: if one compares the security situation of Israel in September 1973, when it proved vulnerable to surprise, despite its possession of the occupied territories, with its situation in January 1977, when both the incentives and the capacity of the Arabs to attack had been substantially undermined, one would certainly say the Israelis and their American supporters had no long-term reason to regret that Kissinger had turned his attention to the Middle East. Of course he was playing, very successfully, for the American hand, as the Secretary of State should, as well as for the chances of peace and stability, as should all policy-makers, but the accusations that he disregarded Israeli interests are unlikely to be endorsed by history, even Israeli histories. The opposite case, that he disregarded Arab interests, might be more easily sustained but does not have much of a lobby in the United States.

A group of critics strongly allied with the 'Friends of Israel' in Congress at the nadir of Kissinger's fortunes there, were the 'Friends of Greece', whose resentments stemmed mostly from his failure to

prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but also from his earlier failure to move against the Greek junta itself. However, the Greek colonels' friends in Washington were elsewhere than in the State Department: close to the President himself, in the form of a Greek-American millionaire contributor to campaign funds; very close to the Vice-President when Spiro Agnew so deplorably held that office; influential at the Pentagon, which found Greek facilities useful for the Sixth Fleet, and at the CIA, where former chiefs of the 'Athens station' had far too long and close connections with Greek politics. The Cyprus crisis unfortunately erupted during the final throes of Watergate, when Nixon was being remorselessly edged by events towards accepting the necessity of resignation, and that staggering melodrama was inevitably absorbing a good deal of Kissinger's attention. However, some of his manoeuvres in the Cyprus crisis do seem to have expedited the fall of the Greek junta, which ought to be accounted a blow on the side of the angels. He did fail to prevent the Turkish invasion, and the Greeks will clearly never forgive him for that, but the American diplomatic leverage by which the threatened earlier Turkish invasions of 1964 and 1967 were averted had become largely ineffective by 1974. One of the more ambivalent side-effects of detente is to make strong middle powers like Turkey less anxious for the protection of their great power allies, and thus to lessen the degree to which they will heed those powers' warnings when local interests are at stake. The Turks well knew that what they contributed to Nato in the form of strategic bases was far too valuable for the Americans to push events to a rupture in defence of Greek interests, and they were exasperated by the memory that they *had* heeded the American injunctions in 1964 and 1967, and that the fortunes of the Turkish minority in Cyprus had continued to deteriorate. Relations between Greek and Greek Cypriot decision-makers—Ioannides, Grivas, Makarios and the faceless irresponsible leaders of Eoka B—precipitated the Cyprus crisis; the Turks saw and took a long-wanted opportunity, and the Secretary of State felt unable to avert the consequences, save at unacceptable cost to the strategic relationships which he interpreted as his primary care.

The alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean now seems to be returning to an even keel. Both Greece and Turkey have negotiated new base agreements with the United States, and Greek-Turkish relations in the Aegean are easier, though the 'Friends of Greece' in Congress remained strong and resentful enough to prevent ratification of the bases agreements during the Ford administration. The population transfers within the island, enforced at such a cost of death and anguish by the Turkish army, seem unlikely to be reversed, except through some adjustment of the borders (though the Greeks still say they will never accept them), and a new constitution, federal rather than unitary in character, seems

likely to emerge in due course. In the long term that may have its benefits for both Cypriot communities, permitting each to live under the guardianship of administrators, police and militia of its own culture. The examples of other instances of two cultures sharing a small area—like Ulster and the Lebanon—do not encourage one to believe that the problems of living together are more easily soluble than the problems of local separation.

Earlier in Kissinger's term of office one would have had to give considerable space to other groups of critics: the 'Friends of India', the 'Friends of Japan' and the 'Friends of Europe'. But these voices are somewhat muted now, and for good reasons. The 'Friends of India' group was initially outraged by Kissinger's handling of the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, in which he took the view that the dismemberment of Pakistan (as it then was) ought if possible to be prevented, since it was likely to lead to instability and 'Balkanisation' in the subcontinent, thus providing new diplomatic opportunities for the Soviet Union. It was also unlikely to do much for economic welfare or human rights, an autonomous Bangladesh being likely to prove 'an international basket-case'[5]. Kissinger's efforts to prevent the Indian army's invasion were of course unsuccessful; Mrs. Gandhi seems to have proved an even tougher crisis-manager than himself. But the views on which his policy was based do not, at this remove, seem imperceptive. Further 'Balkanisation' remains a danger, Soviet machinations have recently been rebuked even by the Indian Prime Minister, the economy of Bangladesh varies with the harvest, but has mostly teetered on the edge of disaster. Above all, those who presented the Indian strategic success as a triumph for human rights and democratic freedoms have found the victory singularly hollow, for the prestige it conferred on Mrs. Gandhi, and her popularity with the military as a consequence of her disposal of the danger which the original Pakistani state had always represented to them, were to prove the basis on which she was later able to erect her personal or dynastic autocracy. Bangladesh is ruled now by a home-grown army given its orders in Dacca instead of Islamabad, and the residue of Pakistan fights off its assorted domestic instabilities as best it can. It is difficult to see that these outcomes are more advantageous to the citizens of the subcontinent than the compromise proposals (with autonomy for Bangladesh) which Kissinger was trying to promote at the time the Indian army moved. But at that date it was mandatory to take a more charitable view of Mrs. Gandhi's political techniques than it is now.

The case made by the 'Friends of Japan' was based on the roughness of the transition period when America's China policy was being remade.

[5] The phrase does not just mean an object of charity: it is US army slang for one mutilated by war.

Certainly it was possible to detect some degree of conscious diplomatic *brusquerie* in the 'Nixon shokku', though later evidence suggests that this may have originated mostly in the ex-President's personal attitude to the Japanese. The restoration of friendly relations with China was always bound to produce some mutation in the United States-Japanese alliance. Over the longer term the change has been very substantially to Japan's advantage, and if the roughness of the transition disturbed Japan's illusions about the nature of its situation vis-à-vis American power, that is not necessarily to be regretted. Diplomatic arrangements, however useful, ought not to be sentimentalised into eternal friendships: this merely encourages false expectations.

In the same way the case made by the 'Friends of Europe' was mostly based on the abrasiveness of a particular episode, the six months from October 1973 to March 1974, during the very difficult period when European assumptions were being adjusted after the Middle East war. This was a fascinatingly complex piece of in-fighting by some very accomplished hands, and cannot be satisfactorily explored except at considerable length. But I would in general argue that Kissinger came out a victor on practically all points in what was essentially a struggle over the nature of the future West European identity. This identity seems now to have acquired a settled Atlanticist definition, with very little challenge remaining from the sponsors of the alternative view. Kissinger was certainly less of an optimist concerning the European movement than earlier Secretaries of State, precisely because he knew much more European diplomatic history than they. And he assumed, like any European foreign minister, that the powers need to protect themselves against their allies as well as their adversaries. Of all the postwar Secretaries of State, he was the one most adept at the traditional diplomatic game within the old European conventions, and though this sometimes meant rather brisk battles, it was on the whole more congenial to Europeans than the moral lectures which some earlier American policy-makers had given them.

**Maintaining continuity through the Watergate crisis**

Reverting to the comparison with Acheson, one may note a very important respect in which Kissinger had a much harder row to hoe. In Acheson's time, European policy-makers like Bevin and Adenauer were not only forces in themselves, they represented strong European diplomatic establishments full of the consciousness that their own societies had even more at stake than the Americans in the rebuilding of a viable balance. By Kissinger's time Britain had (alas) become mostly a diplomatic and economic lame duck, to be helped rather forcefully to face stiles like Rhodesia. Brandt and Schmidt were admittedly helpful when they were in office, but Jobert and the Quai d'Orsay were still

absorbed in the lost battles of the Gaullist cause. And, to put it delicately, Kissinger was even less lucky in most of his political colleagues in Washington than in some of those abroad. Truman had been a moral tower of strength for Acheson, brave and politically astute even when at odds with Congress. As to the general quality of Mr. Nixon's moral leadership, silence is the only possible charity, though one can say he had the courage to make decisions in foreign policy which better men and better Presidents had failed to make. And as to Mr. Ford, it is difficult to see that he had much to contribute to foreign policy save his amiable and direct personality. He was never strong enough vis-à-vis Congress (having no mandate) to provide effective political endorsement, nor vis-à-vis his party was he strong enough to ward off the attacks of the right. The whole extraordinary constitutional imbroglio of Watergate was of course something for which the Secretary of State had no precedents, nor anyone else either. His capacity to maintain a sense of the continuity and the steadiness of American foreign policy, both towards adversaries and allies, in that trying time, is difficult even now to estimate at its full value and importance.

There remains, however, a final point of uncertainty in assessment of his work. One can already say of Acheson that his diplomatic construction has proved viable in that, thirty years on, his Western alliance is still the central factor in international politics. Only time can establish whether Kissinger's will stick as durably. All Secretaries of State are to some degree at the mercy of their successors, so Mr. Carter and his policy-makers must be a factor in Kissinger's chances of long-term accomplishment. One thing which is certain is a change in intellectual style from that of the 'lone ranger', the intellectual maverick, to a team effort whose dominant members are as yet uncertain. At the moment, in reaction against a strong personal style, this is being assumed to be necessarily advantageous. But the team player is always in some danger of 'group think'—the sacrifice of criticism to consensus—and no better example exists of that process than the early days of the Vietnam involvement, in which so many of President Carter's new team were prominent.

Policy-makers cannot command success, only deserve it. And intellectual constructs as ambitious as Kissinger's probably always proceed, if at all, in a 'two steps forward, one step back' fashion. His Secretaryship of State will certainly remain among the most interesting in American diplomatic history for its complexities and ambivalences. With a little luck it may prove also the most notable for its creativity.

# THE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

*James P. Piscatori*

THE disciplines of international law and international relations are currently in the predicament of Beatrice and Benedick during their early encounters in *Much Ado About Nothing*: their words and acts show that they are not fond of each other, but everyone is convinced that they could become such a nice couple. An affair is not likely as long as there are legal theorists who believe that the two fields belong to different worlds and even assume that their own is the morally superior one.

Still, many international lawyers have eagerly embraced the contributions of international relations in their own policy science,[1] behavioural [2] and world order studies.[3] Recently a significant amount of professional concern has also been expressed about the enlivening effect the social sciences generally can exert on international law. The American Society of International Law, in particular, has sponsored a major review of the potential contributions of the social sciences to international legal studies [4] and has arranged at least one panel at its annual convocation on the insights of political scientists and sociologists on the law dealing with conflict.[5] In addition, the New York-based World Law

* I wish to thank the Chairman and members of the Department of International Politics, University College of Wales, for their assistance and goodwill when I was Leverhulme Fellow there in 1975–76, during which time this article was prepared. I have also greatly benefited from the specific comments of Dr. M. Wright of Wales and of Professor R. K. Ramazani of the University of Virginia, to whom I am grateful.

[1] See, for example, Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation and International Coercion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), and, of course, the many other works by McDougal and his associates.

[2] See, for example, Roger Fisher, ed., *International Conflict and Behavioral Science: The Craigville Papers* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), and Ahmed Sheikh, *International Law and National Behavior; A Behavioral Interpretation of Contemporary International Law and Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1974).

[3] See, for example, Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., *The Strategy of World Order*, 4 vols. (New York: World Law Fund, 1966), and the several works done in conjunction with the World Order Models Project. One should note, parenthetically, that it is a testament to the interdisciplinary character of Falk's and Mendlovitz's scholarship that it is difficult to decide whether they should be classified as international politics or law specialists.

[4] Wesley L. Gould and Michael Barkun, *International Law and the Social Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[5] 'Round Table: The Social Scientist Looks at the International Law of Conflict Management', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 65, No. 4, Sept. 1971, pp. 96–106.

Fund is sponsoring a major research undertaking of a transcultural, multidisciplinary character—the World Order Models Project.[6]

On the other hand, as the academic study of international relations has matured, its devotees have noticeably cooled towards international law. Though the two studies were inseparable in the period immediately after the First World War,[7] they grew apart as a result of two influences from within the expanding political science establishment. One was the shift of focus from institutions to processes under the direction of Charles Merriam and the Chicago school generally. The most important elements to them were not the established state structure and existing legal rules but rather the real locus of power and the interaction of the several groups with political claims and influence. As William T. R. Fox has recently pointed out, Merriam in the interwar period inspired such scholars as Schuman, Lasswell and Wright to move international relations from the formalistic interpretation of the League Covenant and other legal documents to the interdisciplinary investigation of historical, economic, geopolitical, psychological and legal factors in interstate affairs.[8]

The second influence has come from the Realist movement which, placing power in the centre of politics and so in the centre of political study, has not found law powerful and so has not considered it important to study. E. H. Carr offered an early critique of the 'rule of law' approach whose proponents, he felt, failed to appreciate that only political leaders actually rule and that international law is the most political of all laws.[9] An indicator of the impact which this kind of Realist argument has had is that C. Wilfred Jenks accused some of his fellow international lawyers of painting the future black, precisely because they have succumbed to the view that advances in international law are restrained by political dictates.[10]

The result is that international law has been largely ignored, or at least noted only slightly, by students of international relations. There are, however, at least two broad approaches, offered by legal writers and relevant to efforts to comprehend the political system, which are available for consideration by students of international politics. One approach is that international law is a clear and authoritative communication of

[6] A general description of the project bearing the unmellifluous acronym, WOMP, is found in Yoshikazu Sakamoto, 'The Rationale of the World Order Models Project', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 66, No. 4, Sept. 1972, pp. 245–252.

[7] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971), p. 4.

[8] William T. R. Fox, 'Pluralism, the Science of Politics, and the World System', *World Politics*, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, July 1975, pp. 598–601.

[9] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939), pp. 228–229.

[10] C. Wilfred Jenks, *The Prospects of International Adjudication* (London: Stevens, 1964), p. 617.

assumptions about the state system, and the other is that international law is a normative order by which international relations are shaped.

**Law as communication**

It is a truism that part of law's doing is law's saying, but it is not always clear what is being expressed nor even what kinds of information can be expressed by law. William Coplin, in an article in *World Politics* in 1965, suggests that from an examination of basic legal factors the assumptions of world politics, in addition to specific rules of conduct and standards of behaviour, can be discovered. He argues that treaties and such legal concepts as neutrality, boundary and occupation conveyed the traditional beliefs that the state was the supreme actor in an international system where power was the primary element and balance of power the primary manner of interaction. The contemporary situation, he argues, has changed with international law so torn between classical norms and modern demands that it is in a condition of 'arrested ambiguity'. Supranational and transnational organisations now rival the state, the 'act of state' doctrine is in retreat and the individual is gaining in status as a subject of international law.[11]

Although Coplin assumes that the content of international law is best communicated by legal theorists who, presumably, have wide enough knowledge to be able to discover the underlying, political premises,[12] there are four potential difficulties in the transmission and interpretation. First, confusion may set in when law is viewed at the same time as reflection and prescription. To be sure, 'international law' both provides an empirical and normative record—*i.e.*, a cataloguing of what states do and want—and serves as a model by which the record can be judged and the future planned. The latter aspect of international law is consistent with the mainstream of natural law thinking whereby the ordinary is measured by and pushed in the direction of the extraordinary. There is danger, however, that the ideal will be perceived so strongly by the flesh-and-blood communicators that the report on what exists in fact will be coloured. The legal controversy over Vietnam illustrates how facts can be selectively discussed if not also partially distorted.

There is also the related danger that the law will be perceived as a means to change the political order to which it is tied. There is nothing wrong with reform through law, but if international lawyers can contribute to world order, as Coplin says, 'by *shaping* attitudes about the nature and promise of international political reality',[13] it may be wondered how reliable is their interpretation of the law as a reflection of existing attitudes. To the extent that lawyers work to reduce the

[11] William D. Coplin, 'International Law and Assumptions about the State System', *World Politics*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, July 1965, pp. 618–629.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 633.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 634, emphasis added.

ambiguity of contemporary law, they reduce law's helpfulness in understanding the real tensions within the international system and increase the suspicion that they substitute their own value preferences for what exists in fact. Reflection, in other words, gives way to prescription, and the *descriptive* potential of international law decreases as international politics is made in the image of that law.

A second danger in seeing law as the communication of political assumptions is that, even when dealing only with the record, the observer may look at only part of it and thereby distort the message. A great number of international lawyers, for example, point to the development of a 'new' international law in which the League Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter place restrictions on the resort to force by states. Restrictions on the use of state power, indeed, can be deduced from an examination of sections of these documents, particularly as they are set in contrast to nineteenth-century rules. But it would be misleading to conclude that this norm is a reflection of a fundamental shift in political attitudes. On the contrary, the observer, looking at other legal components, may conclude that no change in attitude on the use of state power has occurred. In one sense, the United Nations Charter itself recognises the traditional lack of limitations on at least the great powers—in the assignment of permanent seats and in the veto provision. In addition, while it is true that the practical revival of the just war doctrine in this century would profoundly change basic assumptions, the coexistence of the law of neutrality with Charter norms indicates that there is a continuing legal assumption that states may in fact engage in conflict. The lesson is that if law is to be an accurate communication of political assumptions, then partial glimpses of the communication must be viewed as inevitably misleading.

The third potential danger is that, even if the full picture is considered, varying interpretations at best and misinterpretations at worst may occur. The developing law of human rights, for instance, has given rise to arguments that it represents a basic shift from the state to the individual as the central political actor, that it means a possible though not probable modification of state sovereignty and that it signifies nothing more than a reaffirmation of Western values. The point is simply that legal communication is bedevilled by the possibility of reading the basic message differently, though it is conceded that what in any particular case constitutes the proper reading is a matter of some uncertainty.

In general, the chances of interpreting differently or misinterpreting the communication are high because of particular tensions within international law. At least five sets of competing norms exist which may be equally invoked by theorists as valid expressions of state norms. Rather than referring to the ambiguity which upsets Coplin and others because it allows states to find easy rationalisations in the labyrinth of competing

norms, the present discussion emphasises the ample latitude in the international legal corpus which allows legal writers, the 'publicists' referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to choose norms which they feel to be most characteristic of the system. Since we are concerned with how the study of international law can contribute to understanding international relations, we would do well to remember that the choice of those legal theorists largely reflects their own preferences and does not necessarily coincide with the real assumptions underlying the system.

The five tensions are connected, and while conceptually distinct, they are often difficult to separate in practice. The first tension in international law, as indeed in every legal code, is that between what Hoffmann calls rules of behaviour and rules for behaviour.[14] This disparity between the 'is' and the 'ought' is the most basic and is seen in the general conflict between norms protecting state sovereignty and those demanding governmental responsibility to human rights covenants. A second tension exists between national and universal values promoted by international law. The Charter of the United Nations exemplifies the tension: it embodies the principle of the sovereign equality and independence of every state (Article 2 (1, 4) and Chapter VII) and the common fraternity of all men (Preamble and Article 1 (3)). There is, thirdly, a tension between authorisation and obligation, right and duty; for example, a certain disparity exists between the norms which prohibit aggression and permit self-determination. Closely related to this point is the fourth tension between norms that preserve the status quo and those that are conducive to change. An example is the cleavage between the Charter's prohibition on domestic interference (Article 2 (7)) and the traditional law governing external assistance to insurrectionists. Finally, there is a tension between reciprocal and unilateral norms, such as that between humanitarian rules which insist on reciprocity in warfare and those rules which deny belligerent rights to aggressors.

These cleavages are not unique to international law, but the absence of an authoritative third party in international relations, which could resolve differences as with municipal law, enhances their significance. As states are free to choose the norms most in line with their policy objectives, thinkers on international law are also free to select the norms they feel should take precedence in a clash of perceptions. Wright's analyses reveal, for example, that he tended to believe that the law supports above all universalism and the status quo—[15] a com-

[14] Stanley Hoffmann, 'International Law and the Control of Force', in Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The Relevance of International Law: Essays in Honor of Leo Gross* (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman, 1968), pp. 21–22 *et passim.*

[15] On universalism, see Quincy Wright, 'The Foundations for a Universal International System', *Comprendre*, 33–34 (Venice: Société Européenne de Culture, 1969), pp. 1–22; on the status quo bias, see, among others, Wright's analysis of the Manchurian

bination that is not always shared by other theorists, let alone by the states in their policy formulations. Observers, then, may very well interpret differently the same content of the law, and the prospects of also misinterpreting it are high because of the tensions built into the law.

The final danger of approaching law as a communication is that if the information conveyed is not inaccurate, it may be trivial. The latter result is seen in the case of Coplin's analysis. If an examination of international law cannot tell us any more of the international system than that states and the balance of power are important, we may well wonder what international law can add to our stock of common sense, let alone to theory. The triviality of the conclusions seems to be related to the breadth of generalisation sought; the assumptions sought by Coplin are bound to be broad—and thus obvious—in an international order where political and cultural diversity reduces generalities on the system to the lowest common denominator. Perhaps the approach has some utility, however, when applied to specific cultural and historical systems. For example, an examination of the Islamic law of nations can tell us that to Muslims, at least before Ottoman-Western contacts, the primary political unit was the *umma*, or community of believers, which, while universal in spirit, had to coexist in a world where unbelievers, also ruled. The world, far from being polymorphous, was to Muslims bipolar, with their own part, the *dar al-Islam*, expanding inexorably and often by means of the *jihad*. The ten-year truce was acceptable in fact, but the peace treaty was questionable in theory because of the Koran's exhortation to fight the polytheists, if not the unconverted monotheists, to the end.[16]

In a similar manner, Hindu thought reveals that conflict was looked upon as a normal condition but that the wise sovereign was one who also entered into negotiations with his enemies and even concluded alliances with them. The system was really one of individual rulers whose ' states ' existed within a series of concentric circles alternately signifying enemies and friends. The lesson of this *mandala* was that the sovereign should follow morality as far as possible but not to the extent that such obedience to *dharma* would disrupt the fragile equilibrium of sovereigns encircling him.[17]

Crisis in Wright *et al.*, *Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), and his analysis of Goa in ' The Goa Incident ', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 56, No. 3, July 1962, pp. 617–632.

[16] The Islamic theory of international law is presented authoritatively in English by Majid Khadduri in *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), and *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966).

[17] A. L. Basham, ' Some Fundamentals of Hindu Statecraft ', in Joel Larus, ed., *Comparative World Politics* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1964), pp. 42–45. C. H. Alexandrowicz, ' Kautilyan Principles and the Law of Nations ', *The British Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. XLI, 1965–66 (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1968), pp. 301–320.

Such examinations of the legal philosophies of other civilisations can contribute to our understanding of their 'international' systems. Adda Bozeman has done precisely this kind of investigation in *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World*,[18] but the difficulty with her work is that she assumes there is a static quality to the cultures, and so finds the assumptions relevant still. The value of looking at other systems lies in the contrast they present to the predominantly Western, modern system we know and not necessarily in discovering rival systems of thought equally applicable to today's world. Whereas the study of international law is not likely to advance significantly our comprehension of the international system with which we are quite familiar, it can help to reveal the assumptions of other systems, in other cultures and other times, which by their differences accentuate the dimensions of our own. The examination of other cultures deals in broad strokes which, frankly, are saved from the label of triviality by their unfamiliarity to us.

The preceding discussion is not meant to cast aspersions on the application of communications theory to the study of international law. On the contrary, there is a sophisticated body of literature in this area and the approach may well bear fruit, for instance, in the attempt to clarify understanding between government officials as to the textual meaning of legal documents.[19] However, the observer of international politics does not stand to gain from the communication of law in his search for understanding of international reality; the communication is likely to be either biased, partial, incorrect or already well known.

**Law as normative order**

Another way in which the study of international law might contribute to an understanding of international relations is by presenting normative coherence to the data of international relations. The philosophical-moral side of international law is not surprising in view of its development from the *ius naturale* traditions of the Stoics and Church fathers. It is this side of international law which has enticed many, if not most, international lawyers to dwell on law's role in directing the behaviour of states. The common aspiration is that states and their citizens would fare better if guided by international law, and the implicit assumption is that law is equipped to guide because it is built on a clear understanding of what the world should be like. It is this clarification of world order that is potentially helpful to students of international relations, and it may be suggested that three general types have been proposed.

[18] Adda Bozeman, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[19] See: Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and James C. Miller, *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 371–372. See also, Gould and Barkun, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–149, for a general review of the relevant literature.

The first type may be designated minimal order. It imposes some normative direction, but the range of values is small and the extent of change from the existing system which the theorist advocates is limited. An example is the model presented by Myres McDougal and his associates in the New Haven school of policy-oriented jurisprudence. The goals are the promotion of human dignity and the curtailment of coercion, and the related enemies are totalitarianism and nuclear devastation. To McDougal and McDougalians, there is a need for 'minimum world public order' motivated primarily by the Hobbesian drive for self-protection and providing for society's liberty and plenty.[20] The international order they envisage does not radically differ from but rather seeks to build on the existing system: it is an order where law should not be expected to replace power but where the two naturally interact; and it is an order where force cannot be prohibited but where unauthorised coercion is likely to be limited as the self-interest and moral propriety of an emerging world community are increasingly accentuated.[21] The task of lawyers is important but modest, for although they are to examine the policy-process in all its complexity, in the end they cannot do more than elucidate the present dynamics so as to discover where and how law will be able to play a role in moving the system towards the goal of dignity.

The major difficulty with this scheme is that the many layers of values, functions and structures to which the political system is apparently reduced for clarity's sake do not really make the system more comprehensible, nor does the imposition of norms measurably improve our understanding because of the lack of specificity of the norms. McDougal, arguing that his goals are consistent with any philosophy or theology,[22] fails to see that dignity, liberty and even abundance are viewed differently in liberalism and Marxism, or in Buddhism and Islam. Whether or not this vagueness renders McDougal's thought vulnerable to manipulation,[23] it does reduce the ordering value; it is difficult for the observer of international relations to connect data with values whose content is unspecified.

Another example of minimal order is presented by Stanley Hoffmann. His is a vision of world order not vastly different from a glimpse of present conditions. International law for him can do little to stop conflict though it can perhaps contribute to conflict management if it reflects the

[20] McDougal and Feliciano, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–96.

[21] Myres S. McDougal, 'Law and Power', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 46, No. 1, Jan. 1952, pp. 108, 110–113.

[22] Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, 'The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order', *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 53, No. 1, Jan. 1959, p. 11. See also Myres S. McDougal and associates, *Studies in World Public Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 987.

[23] See Richard Falk, 'A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals', *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 84, No. 5, April 1975, p. 1012.

modification of states in practice.[24] The primary value which shapes Hoffmann's world is peace, though by the term he clearly does not mean the abolition of warfare. It is instead a relative value, an interruption in the stream of violence which both endangers men's lives and circumscribes their manoeuvrability.[25] The task of scholarship is to examine the basic causes of war and to formulate 'relevant utopias' which point leaders in the direction of preferred futures.[26] Hoffmann makes clear, however, that the theorist's role is not to revise the world himself but only to encourage statesmen to cherish peace, not merely for its own merits, but for the opportunities it provides for other values to be pursued. The trouble is that, like McDougal, Hoffmann gives no clues as to either what peace precisely entails or what other values are desirable.

The second type of world system clarification is intermediate order in which the range of norms is wider and the confidence of the theorist to change the prevailing system is greater. The work of Wolfgang Friedmann is an example of this type. Arguing that substantial alterations in the social basis of international law have occurred in the twentieth century, he suggested that the law of co-operation has supplanted the law of co-existence as the predominant body of norms. That is, emphasis has moved from the old concerns with recognition, treatment of aliens and diplomatic immunities to the new preoccupation with such universal matters as human rights and international economics.[27] Friedmann offered as evidence the trend towards international institutionalisation, particularly on a regional and functional scale. The goal of the evolving system is the eradication of economic and social imbalances and the development of a set of effective organisations designed to deal with the transnational concerns of ecology, communications, transportation and social welfare. The task of the legal theorist is somewhat greater than that assigned by McDougal and Hoffmann, for it involves more than explicating social reality; to Friedmann, the theorist must participate in the reforming of international law by re-evaluating old topics and approaches and in the expanding of law by including new subjects for study.[28] He appeared to be confident that the changes the fresh ideas suggest will take place if for no other reason than that men will come to understand that survival demands them.[29]

For all Friedmann's appreciation of the urgency of the situation and

[24] Hoffmann, 'International Law and the Control of Force', *op. cit.*, pp. 45–46.

[25] Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (London: Pall Mall, 1965), pp. 254–276.

[26] Stanley Hoffmann, 'International Relations: The Long Road to Theory', *World Politics*, Vol. XI, No. 3, April 1959, pp. 374–377.

[27] Wolfgang Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law* (London: Stevens, 1964), pp. 60–71.

[28] Friedmann, *ibid.*, pp. 71, 148–149.

[29] Wolfgang Friedmann, 'The Reality of International Law—A Reappraisal', *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 1971, pp. 57–58.

of the breadth of functionalist-type reforms needed, he de-emphasised the central problem of international relations—force. In stressing that life will become unbearable 'even without war' and in noting that the state is likely to remain the main power unit,[30] Friedmann both overplayed the economic-technical-social threats and underplayed the ability of law to deal with war and peace matters. The normative order is incomplete because, while going further than that of McDougal and Hoffmann to explain the need for 'co-operation', it at the same time does little to explain the problems of systemic violence. In a similar manner, Quincy Wright's analysis, although it includes four causes of war and corresponding conditions of peace which are indeed broad, in the end sides mainly with the tranquillity of the status quo and against all forms of state coercion not in self-defence or as part of a United Nations-sanctioned operation.[31] As with Friedmann's vision, Wright's scheme does not adequately deal with a key problem—demands for justice versus those for peace.

The final type of order by comparison is maximal in nature. The scope and confidence are greater than in the other two schemes, and Falk stands as the outstanding proponent. The world order he would like to see is one which, like McDougal's system, is based on dignity, but it is a dignity which takes on significance only as the values of peace, social justice, political freedom and environmental quality are widely accepted. A major shift is necessary from the state system to centralisation, a reform movement is required which is 'globalist' and 'populist'.[32] International lawyers are assigned the ambitious task of creating a new paradigm reflecting the values of the better world. Falk clearly differs from the others in the vigour with which he tries to persuade international lawyers of their responsibility—and implicitly of their influence: his 'is a plea for international lawyers to stop acting as if their most important task were to clarify the rights and duties of the various passengers on the planetary cruiseship Titanic.'[33]

It is precisely this supposed ability of lawyers to affect social reality which is objectionable. Falk is influenced by the pioneering work of Thomas Kuhn on scientific paradigms,[34] yet while Falk acknowledges that a judicial paradigm is less rigorous than one in the physical sciences,[35] he seems to overestimate the ease with which a paradigm shift leads to changes in the observed reality. A social scientific paradigm, unlike a natural scientific one, can induce changes in the real world, but only if the paradigm is widely shared and then only after the lapse of

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[31] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2nd edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 155, 863.

[32] Falk, 'A New Paradigm', *op. cit.*, pp. 973–975, 999, 1003, 1008–1009.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 992.

[34] See: Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[35] Falk, 'A New Paradigm', *op. cit.*, p. 977.

a considerable period of time. The difficulty in changing social reality is suggested by two facts: first, social behaviour is at best irregular, given the dimension of human freedom, and secondly, unlike the Copernican revolution which involved a change in astronomical *facts* recognised, a legal paradigm shift would involve a change in *values* desired. We may well wonder what benefit international law could be if it prescribed rules for Falk's world order option D, global populism, when in reality the system is still at option B, great power concert. States may insist, in an act of great and probably certain folly, on travelling on the planetary Titanic, but even sinking ships, perhaps especially such ships, need rules of order, and planetary Concorde rules would hardly be of help in the event. International law should not abandon the quest for normative change in the long run, but we should also be aware that for the conceivable future social paradigms cannot find the certainty that would be needed to transform the social setting, and particularly so when the changes sought are suspiciously viewed if not contemptuously rejected by the holders of power.

The normative visions of international legal theorists may contribute, generally, to our understanding of the present international system by contrasting it with idealised systems. The understanding we gain is limited, however, partly because these 'grand' views have internal weaknesses. When the order is minimal, the comparison between the present and ideal systems is unhelpful since the distance is not great and it is also uncertain when the key values sustaining the modest scheme are undefined; when the order is more extensive, the comparison is potentially unbalanced, with certain values being weighted more heavily than others; and when the order is far reaching and urgently motivated, the comparison is perhaps distorted by the great distance and by the assumption that theory can be readily translated into practice.

## Law as strategy

The most important reason why these two approaches make only limited contributions to the understanding of world politics is that they reflect the thinking of individuals who are inspiring in their scholarship but who are, nevertheless, dealing with international law and politics in abstraction. This perspective from above, what R. K. Ramazani[36] calls the 'macro' perspective, helps to clarify the general system but at the expense of reifying international law. To say that international law is a communication or a normative order begs the primary question—*whose* international law? Despite the fluidity and rapid changes in the international system, the answer must still be—it is an international law formed by and operative upon states.

[36] I am indebted to Professor Ramazani for explaining his conceptual approach in several discussions.

If we wish to learn from international law, attention could be profitably shifted from what theorists say to what states say and do—in short, to their legal strategies.[37] The assumption is evident that as military strategists study the manner in which military force is used by states to pursue their interests,[38] so too scholars should investigate the way states actually perceive and use law. There have been a few studies of this kind. Triska and Slusser have examined the Soviet Union's policy towards treaty law[39]; Cohen and others, particularly in conjunction with the Harvard Studies in East Asian Law, have examined the position of the People's Republic of China[40]; and Okoye and Elias have explored the broader legal milieu of the African states.[41]

This discussion amounts to a plea for more detailed studies of this kind from below, from the perspective of the state. The emphasis would be given, not to the content of the interstate norms per se, as Hoffmann suggests, but rather to the attitudes and actions of the states in regard to international law. Focus, then, would be moved from what international norms tell us about states to what we can learn from how states react to the norms. The difference is perhaps subtle, but the intent is to clarify what states want and deem important and not what they are allowed to do.

The proposed study would consist of two parts which themselves further subdivide. The attitudes of states towards international legal questions are indicators of their general perspectives on international relations; the attitude of China towards the International Court of Justice, for example, helps to illustrate its suspicion of an international order that for so long excluded it as an equal member. Attitudes take the specific form of *claims*, what states say they would like the world to be like, and *values*, what they believe in and want to preserve and/or advance. Legal claims need not always reflect the values of a society, and even when they are exaggerated, they are valuable expressions of state feelings. The Soviet claim to the 'socialist commonwealth' in the

[37] Stanley Hoffmann suggests the term but does not further explicate it in *The State of War*, *op. cit*, p. 131.

[38] John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions', in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 3.

[39] J. F. Triska and R. M. Slusser, *The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

[40] Jerome Alan Cohen, ed., *China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). See also: Hungdah Chiu, *The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu, *Agreements of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1967; A Calendar* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). And see Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu, eds., *Law in Chinese Foreign Policy: Communist China and Selected Problems of International Law* (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, 1972).

[41] Felix Chuks Okoye, *International Law and the New African States* (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1972); T. O. Elias, *Africa and the Development of International Law* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972).

Brezhnev Doctrine, for example, indicates the strong sensitivity to decentralising tendencies in the communist bloc. Values are also often revealed which have broad implications for international dealings; for instance, Muslim and Western values in the human rights area do not neatly overlap and sometimes directly conflict, which should serve to induce a measure of caution among those eager to construct universal orders.

The second element of the study is the practice of states in terms of both their *policies* and *acts*. Policies are what states say they will do based on their national interests and value stock, and acts are what actually is done regardless of the rationale. The United States policy of seeking legal restraints on intervention indicates its desire to stabilise world order, but its actions in Vietnam indicate that norms hostile to intervention do not apply when it is an anti-communist intervention.

While this approach is mainly applicable to the individual state, it would also be interesting to apply it to groups of states joined by a common factor, such as ideology, culture or geography. The advantages could be twofold: first, the findings might be more accented, and therefore hopefully clearer, by their comparison to those of other groups; and, secondly, the examination might reveal more of the nature of the grouping itself—for instance, whether or not the European Economic Community is a community, or the Persian Gulf a region, in the legal sense. The danger with this clustering approach, however, is that the ties that bind might also define—in other words, cultural, ideological, historical or geographical determinism is a temptation to the scholar who places states in corresponding categories.

The issues might also be aggregated around those which emphasise values, such as human rights questions, those which emphasise interests, such as law of the sea questions, and those which have a mixed emphasis on values and interests, such as the law of force questions. The distinctions are tenuous and will be difficult to make in concrete analyses, but they provide a convenient starting point.[42] Finally, the methodology would by necessity be eclectic with such diverse elements as treaties, international conference proceedings, foreign office statements and interviews of key officials examined. It is a large task requiring the co-operative work of international lawyers and area specialists.

The implicit analogy of this approach with military strategy should not be taken too far. An examination of international law as strategy would yield primarily descriptive results: it would tell us when states observe laws, what laws they accept and what laws they wish to advance. It is not likely that the explanatory yield, in the sense of elucidating why states so behave, would be great because of the multiplicity of factors

[42] I have followed this scheme in the study of one Islamic country, Saudi Arabia: 'Islam and the International Legal Order: The Case of Saudi Arabia' (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 1976).

entering into any examination of this sort and because of the impossibility of discovering what is in the minds of the actual decision-makers. Certainly, the prescriptive element does not enter at all, since, unlike military strategy, legal strategy does not assume a simple, rational, means-ends calculation.[43] International lawyers could not presume to suggest the most efficient way of fulfilling national goals by means of international law, because states sometimes forgo their immediate interests in favour of another, broader interest—appearing to be law-abiding or respectful in an international system where a little bit of virtue, even the semblance of virtue, goes a long way. Secondly, law as strategy should reveal that states do not always react to law as a way to satisfy interests; instead, they sometimes observe law because they believe the relevant rules are right. Given that law is not inevitably another means towards some interest and given that it may also be an interest itself or represent principles to which interests, narrowly conceived, must often defer, the predictive role of strategic analysis is out of place here.

There are, however, potential benefits of the law as strategy approach. In the case of legal study, it might help to make international law more realistic by placing it in its operational context; it might aid in testing the universality of the system by specifying the norms that are acceptable across most borders and those that are culturally variable; and, pinpointing the areas where national interests are not likely to be subject to or modified by legal shaping, it might assist in highlighting where law cannot be effective and accordingly how efforts at strengthening law can be most economically made. The approach, however, differs from that of 'law-in-action'[44] since its purpose is not to determine by a quasi-majoritarian method what international law *is* but to indicate, on the basis of state attitudes and practice, the areas in which law can develop.

More relevant to this discussion are the potential contributions to understanding international relations. Law as strategy presents only a part of state behaviour but one which, when combined with insights gleaned from the study of economic and military strategy, contributes to our understanding of the state system. Secondly, the study of legal strategy may clarify the value choices of states which themselves have implications for the pursuit of other strategies. For example, an examination of the values fostered in legal arguments by non-combatant Arab Muslim states could perhaps have suggested that they would be willing to employ economic coercion towards the liberation of the holy land. Finally, an analysis of legal strategy may help to indicate the real weight

[43] Garnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–18. Michael Howard in 'The Strategic Approach to International Relations', *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1976, includes prescription as part of strategy, p. 67.

[44] Irvin L. White, 'A Framework for Analyzing International Law-in-Action: A Preliminary Proposal', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1969, pp. 46–69.

of international law as a variable in world politics by making clear what role it is assigned and what significance it is given by the power centres of the interstate system. The end result is likely to be modest, for while increasing our understanding of the present, it cannot give a blueprint for the future. The most that can be said is that the analysis of legal strategy delineates current tendencies which, when other things are equal, may have continued relevance.

The law as strategy approach to international law is thus essentially empirical and inductive. Georg Schwarzenberger, as early as 1947 and more recently in 1965,[45] has endorsed induction as particularly relevant to the study of international law at a time when there is confusion as to norms and sources. The assumption of this discussion is that the detailing of the irregularities or uniformities of state legal behaviour would be as helpful or more helpful to the study of international relations at a time when grand theory has not yet emerged and when law is virtually ignored in political studies. However, the major difficulty with the method, as Anthony D'Amato points out,[46] is that it assumes the law is ' there ' and must only be clarified by accumulating data on it. The more telling criticism, from the perspective of international relations theory, is that the inductive approach entails a conservative bias whereby the normative abdicates in favour of the empirical; it matters what states do, not what the world should be like.

It would be useful to follow Jenks's suggestion that the inductive cannot finally be separated from the deductive: ' practice and principle together correct each other's limitations and enable law to give practical expression to the ideal of justice.'[47] In the case of international relations thinking, a symbiosis of relevant utopias and legal strategies is needed. Normative schemes must not be too far ahead of the existing strategies of states or they will be dismissed peremptorily by the power-brokers; legal strategies cannot be divorced from fundamental principles and visions of the better world or they are likely to perpetuate the status quo and in so doing dull our sensitivity to the reasons why change is required. A healthy body of international relations theory must tesselate the inductive and deductive, the empirical and normative, into a coherent pattern, however checkered. Studies of legal behaviour are important precisely because they contribute one square to the design. Whatever the combination of empirical investigation and deductive logic, if hard work is not also demanded of the international relations student, at least patience is required.

[45] Georg Schwarzenberger, ' The Inductive Approach to International Law ', *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 60, 1947, pp. 539–570 and *The Inductive Approach to International Law* (London: Stevens, 1965).

[46] Anthony A. D'Amato, ' The Inductive Approach Revisited ', *The Indian Journal of International Law*, Vol. 6, 1966, pp. 509–514, especially, pp. 513–514.

[47] C. Wilfred Jenks, *op. cit.*, p. 627. See Ch. 11 generally.

# THE QUESTION OF A UNITED IRELAND: PERSPECTIVES OF THE IRISH POLITICAL ELITE*

*A. S. Cohan*

POLITICAL leaders in countries with sharp ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages have no doubt often wished that some miracle would suddenly transform those societies into homogeneous entities. But at least one country exists in which virtually all political leaders would exchange safe homogeneity for uncertain diversity. That country is the Republic of Ireland. For fifty-five years its leaders have advocated 'rejoining' what is now the 26-county Republic of Ireland with the six-county Northern Ireland area which has remained part of the United Kingdom.

This paper focuses on the problems in Northern Ireland from the perspective of the Republic of Ireland. Specifically, it examines the perceptions of members of the political elite of the Republic with regard to the North. The questions that are relevant concern the views of the political elite about the likelihood of achieving a united Ireland, the factors that might impede or facilitate such an occurrence, and what form(s) a united Ireland might take. The analysis is based upon interviews that were conducted during the academic year 1968–69 and in March and December, 1975.[1]

The Republic of Ireland is one of the most homogeneous countries in the world. Its population is 96 per cent Roman Catholic of whom the vast majority are active communicants.[2] This widespread adherence to Roman Catholicism is strongly reflected in the social, cultural, and political life of the country and is reinforced by the particular mix of

* An earlier draft of this paper was presented in 'The Politics of Multi-Cultural Societies Workshop' at the Annual Meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, April 8–14, 1976. The paper has been revised considerably, particularly in light of recent events in the Republic of Ireland. The author wishes to thank the Social Science Research Council (United Kingdom) for financial support for research in Ireland in 1975. Tom Garvin, Department of Ethics and Politics, University College, Dublin, has been a constant source of support and helpful criticism in this and other work.

1 The first group of interviews were conducted under a grant from An Bord Scholareachtai Comalairte of the Republic of Ireland as part of the Fulbright programme. The most recent interviews were conducted under a grant from the Social Science Research Council (United Kingdom).

2 Irish Central Statistics Office, *Census of Population of Ireland, 1966*, Vol. I, *Population* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1967).

church and state in the educational process.[3] No language barriers exist; English is spoken by virtually all citizens despite intensive government efforts, until recently, to revive the traditional Irish language.[4] The communications network is centralised, emanating from Dublin, which contains more than 30 per cent of the national population. The administration is highly centralised as well. Decisions reached by the Irish government affect all layers of life in the country, and local administrations are bound by the decisions of the national authorities.[5] Even regional planning is carried out centrally, and, unlike many countries in Western Europe, no movements supporting devolution of the national authority actually exist, although it would be overstating the case to suggest that regional variations do not occur.[6]

But the political leadership of Ireland aspires to a country with much greater diversity. Since the foundation of the state in 1922, successive governments have been committed to ending the partition of the island. It is a commitment that has, at times, seemed unrealistic and unlikely. The recurring problems in the North, however, particularly since 1968, have once again brought the question of a united Ireland, or at least the relationship between the Republic and the North, to the top of the list of issues that must be confronted by Irish political leaders.

The troubles in Northern Ireland are both widely-known and well-documented. Far from being limited to that province, the violence, particularly in the form of bombings, has affected the Republic as well as the mainland United Kingdom. Indeed, the most destructive bombing thus far has occurred in Dublin. Since the present round of difficulties began with civil rights activities in late 1968, serious studies have traced

[3] The most useful work dealing with the relationship of church and state is John Whyte, *Church and State in Modern Ireland: 1923–1970* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971).

[4] Several works dealing with the language revival are available. Of particular use is the Report of the Commission on the Restoration of the Irish Language, *Summary, in English of the Final Report, 13 July 1963* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1963). The most recent report is by the Committee on Irish Language Attitudes Research, *Report as submitted to the Minister for the Gaeltacht, October 1975* (Dublin: Stationery Office).

[5] A fairly extensive literature dealing with Irish government is available. Among the most useful are Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Basil Chubb, *Cabinet Government in Ireland* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1974); James D. O'Donnell, *How Ireland is Governed* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1965); and John Collins, *Local Government* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1963). More specialist works on Irish politics include Brian Farrell, *The Founding of Dail Eireann: Parliament and Nation-Building* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971); Brian Farrell, *Chairman or Chief? The Role of Taoiseach in Irish Government* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971); Maurice Manning, *Irish Political Parties: An Introduction* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972); and A. S. Cohan, *The Irish Political Elite* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972).

[6] See Tom Garvin, ' Political Cleavages, Party Politics and Urbanisation in Ireland: The Case of the Periphery-Dominated Centre, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 2, 1974, pp. 303–327. Among more militant elements, a four-province, federal Ireland is often mentioned as a way to effect unification.

the origins of the problems and have suggested possible solutions.[7] These studies have come from journalists, historians and social scientists, and from the standpoint of both the depth and methods of analysis, many have been impressive, if almost universally pessimistic.[8]

With all of the work that has focused on the North, it is surprising that there has been a relative lack of interest in the postures taken by successive governments in the Republic. This has led to serious misunderstandings about the views of Irish political leaders. Indeed, press coverage of Ireland has tended to be curiously insensitive to the difficulties faced by the Irish government, and a certain hostility has been generated because of its supposed indifference to the northern problems, particularly terrorism.[9] In fact, virtually no attempts have been made to assess and understand the impact that the problems of the six counties have had both on the government and the people of the Republic.[10]

It is ironic that this is the case because the problems of the North would not have taken their present form had the Republic not existed.[11] The real stumbling block to any solution which involves some long-term peaceful arrangements between the two communities of the North is the presence of the Republic. Because of its existence, the minority community has a larger and alternative entity on which its loyalty may be focused in much the same manner as the residents of Saarland looked towards Germany in the periods both preceding and following the Second World War.[12] Further, and possibly more important, because of the existence of the Republic, the Protestant majority community in the

[7] See, for example, Liam De Paor, *Divided Ulster*, 2nd edn. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971); Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary, *Belfast Approach to Crisis—A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970* (London: Macmillan, 1973); *The Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Ulster* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972); John Magee, ed., *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).

[8] The most interesting review article—and also the best summary of the literature available is Arend Lijphart, 'Review Article: The Northern Ireland Problem; Cases, Theories, and Solutions', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 83–106.

[9] See the *Irish Times*, Dec. 3, 1975 (leading article).

[10] Some works which deal with the Republic are available. See, for example, Thomas E. Hachey, 'One People or Two? The Origins of Partition and the Prospects for Unification in Ireland', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1973, pp. 232–246; Richard Ned Lebow, 'Civil War in Ireland: A Tragedy in Endless Acts?', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1973, pp. 247–260; and Richard Ned Lebow, 'Ireland' in *Divided Nations in a Divided World*, ed. by Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow and John G. Stoessinger (New York: David McKay, 1974), pp. 197–265.

[11] This is a point to which Brian Barry alludes in an article full of insights. Curiously, he fails to develop it which is a pity for it bolsters his particular argument. See Brian Barry, 'The Consociational Model and its Dangers', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 1975, pp. 393–412. While it is true that sectarianism has existed in Ulster since well before the 26 counties became independent, I am assuming that in a majority Catholic 32-county Ireland, northern religious divisions (and their consequences) would have taken a much different form than they do today.

[12] This is not to suggest that this is what the Catholics in the North do want. It is far from certain that they long for a united Ireland. See, for example, Richard Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

North is unlikely to place its trust in any solution which involves sharing power with people it regards as fundamentally hostile to the continued connection of the province with the United Kingdom. Even if the vast majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland had no aspirations concerning a united Ireland, it would be very difficult to convince the Protestant population that this was the case, especially after so many years of troubles. Nor is it likely that alterations in the Irish constitution which would remove sections that are considered offensive would be likely to mollify fears concerning a dominant Catholicism.[13]

It is because of these factors that it is quite difficult to conceive of Northern Ireland as a single entity, or a separate state. This suggestion has been made by Arend Lijphart, but it is probably not advantageous, even from the analytical standpoint.[14] Northern Ireland's relationships with the United Kingdom and with the Republic make such an approach limiting for two reasons. First, the North now lacks any central decision-making apparatus of its own. Second, there is evidence that the people of the North feel ambivalent about their primary loyalties.[15] But if it is the case that the North ought to be treated with the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland clearly in mind, the reverse is true as well, particularly with regard to the latter. No reasonable understanding of Irish politics is possible without some knowledge of the reasons for, and the effects of, partition and the unresolved problem of a united Ireland.[16] Of all Irish values, the notion of a 32-county Republic is so firmly set that few ever speak out against its likelihood or, more to the point, its desirability.[17]

In order to examine the general range of views about a united Ireland, three aspects of the question will be discussed. First, the party policies towards the issue of the North will be outlined. Second, some of the obstacles to unification, such as the Catholic influence in the constitutional arrangements of the Republic will be discussed with particular reference to the perceptions of the political elite as to how such provisions

[13] Lebow and Hachey (see n. 10) both urge the government of the Republic to make certain alterations to the Irish constitution. Barry (see n. 11) is less optimistic about the impact such changes might make. My own view is close to Barry's.

[14] See Lijphart, *op. cit.*, p. 85. I had some difficulty interpreting Lijphart's particular suggestion. He argues ' It seems to me that, when we are primarily interested in the internal problems of Northern Ireland rather than in its external affairs, and particularly its relationships with Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, there is no serious disadvantage in treating the territory as a separate state for analytical purposes '. Is Lijphart suggesting that the relationships with Great Britain and the Republic are part of the external affairs of Northern Ireland, or does he mean that such relations are part of the internal problem? I think that he means the former, in which case I disagree with him, but the latter interpretation is also possible.

[15] See, Richard Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 203–217.

[16] This is also true of the United Kingdom. See, for example, E. Strauss, *Irish Nationalism and British Democracy* (London: Methuen, 1951).

[17] Some hardy souls, however, do. See Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland* (St. Albans: Panther, 1974; first publ. London: Hutchinson, 1972).

may inhibit moves towards unification. Finally, the form that a unite Ireland might take will be considered.

The research for this study is based largely upon interviews wit political leaders conducted in 1969 and 1975. The first series of inte views consisted of closed questionnaires administered to governmen ministers, opposition leaders and higher civil servants. In the secon series, open-ended questionnaires were used, and interviews were con ducted with government ministers and opposition leaders.[18] What wa particularly useful was the opportunity of interviewing a number c individuals in 1975 who had been questioned in 1969 as well.

**Party policies towards Northern Ireland**

The Irish constitution of 1937 was essentially the work of Eamon d Valera, then leader of Fianna Fail. Yet, with a few individual exception the leadership of all political parties have supported the constitutiona provision that calls for an end to partition. Article 2 states:

> The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, it islands and the territorial seas.

Article 3 sets out the temporary nature of the present arrangement:

> Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and withou prejudice to the right of the Parliament and Government estab lished by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whol of that territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall hav the like area and extent of application as the laws of Saorsta Eireann [the 26 counties] and the like extra-territorial effect.

But if the party leaderships are not inclined to depart from the prevailin myth of a united country encompassing the entire island, their emphase differ markedly, particularly with regard to how this is likely to com about and how quickly the barriers may be broken down.

A curious paradox, however, can be detected. As the problems in th North seem to become more complex and less solvable, a certai 'quickening of the pulse' of some politicians is apparent as they perceiv that unification is more of a possibility now than it was nine years ago before the troubles began. While this view is not universally shared, th politicians are certainly not more pessimistic than they were in the earlie

[18] In 1968–69, fifty interviews were conducted. These tended to be of the close questionnaire variety with some open-ended questions. In 1975, fourteen interview were conducted. They were all based upon open-ended questionnaires. For an exampl of the more open-ended approach see Robert D. Putnam, 'Studying Elite Politica Culture: The case of "Ideology"', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. Sept. 1971, pp. 651–681 and *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict an Democracy in Britain and Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). Where m own work differs from Putnam's is his interest in elite 'ideology' and political cultur (*i.e.*, the values that they hold). I have focused on more specific questions of curren policy and future policy directions.

interviews. There is, however, a generally expressed view that the public is probably less concerned about ending partition than it was earlier. Indeed, virtually all those interviewed expressed the view that the troubles in the North have lessened the desire of the public to end partition because of the fear that a united Ireland might be an unstable society with so many interests having to be accommodated. The homogeneity of the Republic has deprived its leaders of the opportunity to learn how to cope with a truly pluralist society.

Only one member of the present government, Conor Cruise O'Brien, has spoken out against the probability, or even desirability, of a united Ireland. In his book, *States of Ireland*, he argued that probably none of the 'main sections of the population wants unity'. While people in the Republic may be used to speaking about unity, they have come to see Ireland as a 26-county state. Further, with the troubles in the North becoming more difficult to resolve, the notion of a 32-county Republic has also become considerably less attractive.[19] O'Brien asserted that the government in the Republic ought to recognise the separate existence of the North, a step that was finally taken by the coalition government shortly after the Sunningdale talks in December 1973 in which the North, the Republic and the United Kingdom participated. As an outgrowth of those talks, a power-sharing arrangement in the North was set up and a proposal was made for a Council of Ireland which would provide an Irish dimension. The government of the Republic did not, however, revoke the constitutional recognition of the eventuality and desirability of a united Ireland by its acceptance of the status quo as a fact.

Few of the political leaders in the Republic could be expected to agree with Dr. O'Brien, at least openly. Indeed, among Fianna Fail political leaders—and this is reflected in party policy—there is considerable hostility to the O'Brien formulation. For Fianna Fail, the 'solution' to the northern problem rests with the British. Ultimately, the only arrangement that will be satisfactory is one which involves unification.

In November 1975, Mr. Lynch, as Leader of the Opposition, made a significant statement which separated Fianna Fail—officially—from the government's position. He called upon the British government to announce that it was planning a withdrawal of its military forces from Northern Ireland. He argued that if the British made clear their intentions about withdrawal, the parties in the North would be forced, by virtue of the new situation, to work out some sort of solution that would be of benefit to all parties.

The individuals from Fianna Fail who were interviewed all agreed with this policy. One respondent explained that if the British were prepared to tell the loyalists that 'the game is over' and the United Kingdom was

[19] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

preparing to sever links in about ten or fifteen years—he thought that under no circumstances should a withdrawal be hurried—the great majority of the Protestants in Northern Ireland would come to terms with the new situation. Another respondent suggested that if the United Kingdom were to give some indication of intent, he had no doubt that the loyalists would accept that they were at 'the end of the road' and would adjust accordingly. By adjusting, he meant that they would look south because they were hard-headed men when it came to economic matters and would quickly realise that they would have to come to some arrangement with Dublin since an independent Northern Ireland could not stand alone.

Mr. Lynch's statement about the withdrawal of the British was something of an anti-climax. Although it did not really mark a new departure from previous Fianna Fail policy, the leader of Fianna Fail had tended not to differ publicly from the leaders of the two coalition parties about the North. In fact, for several weeks before Mr. Lynch's statement, Fianna Fail front benchers were calling for British withdrawal. It is reasonable to assume that Mr. Lynch was under considerable pressure to espouse a more militant line towards ending partition than he had taken in the past. He may indeed have swung too far in the direction of moderation and away from the path of a united Ireland to please even the Fianna Fail moderates, so that his statement represented an attempt to return to the mainstream of his party.

Fianna Fail, the Republican Party, was founded by Eamon de Valera, the revolutionary leader, in 1926. It grew out of the original Sinn Fein and IRA which were defeated in the civil war that followed the acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 by the provisional Irish government. Since its inception, Fianna Fail has been a more clearly nationalist party than the others (with the exception of Clann na Poblachta, a party which rose and fell dramatically in the 1940s and 1950s). Although in more recent years a less aggressive posture has emerged, culminating in 1965 in the meetings between Sean Lemass, then *Taoiseach* (Prime Minister), and Terence O'Neill, then Northern Ireland Prime Minister, the troubles in the North brought to the fore a more militant element in Fianna Fail.

Ironically, Fianna Fail had been instrumental in virtually eliminating the IRA as a significant factor in Irish political life in the 1930s and 1940s. But when fears about pogroms in parts of the North were raised after the riots in Northern Ireland in 1969, a group of Fianna Fail leaders attempted to aid Catholics in the North. In fact, allegations were made that several ministers in the Republic may have been involved in helping the IRA in the North to obtain arms. This resulted in 1970 in a major government crisis in which four ministers left the

government and the credibility of Mr. Lynch's administration was badly shaken.

Interestingly, those interviewed had few regrets about the departure of the more militant wing. They blamed the pro-IRA faction for the loss of the election in 1973. The damage that had been done to the party over the issue of arms for the northerners was considered critical. When it was pointed out that in electoral performance, Fianna Fail had actually improved its first preference votes while losing to the coalition in the transfer voting patterns,[20] one respondent countered that had the 1970 split not occurred Fianna Fail would have won the election by a huge majority, and its relatively strong performance proved this.

All Fianna Fail respondents thought that the coalition government had abandoned any commitment to a united Ireland. They believed, instead, that the national aspects of Irish policy were at all costs being played down by the government. Basically, unity was of little consequence in the new policy. One remarked that the government wanted peace in the North even if it meant that it must say the government was no longer interested in unification. This was a position that could never be taken by a Fianna Fail leadership. Indeed, while they believed that violence probably stood in the way of unification, violence was perceived to be a consequence of partition, not the basic problem. If partition was ended, violence would end as well.

Those interviewed in the government coalition, whether members of Fine Gael or Labour, tended to express reasonably similar viewpoints about the North and the likelihood of an end to partition. It would not come about unless a fundamental change of attitude occurred among the majority group in the North. No force would bring about what the majority of people there were still against. Most argued that there was actually little difference between the government position and what was believed by the majority of Fianna Fail TDs (members of the lower house). There was, however, a minority in Fianna Fail which would, if they felt it necessary, encourage the use of force to bring about unification. One respondent suggested that any confusion about Irish policy towards the North stemmed from the fact that the government had one policy and Fianna Fail had two. Fianna Fail, according to the general non-Fianna Fail viewpoint, was caught in a trap. The problem stemmed from the old tradition of republicanism and the side Fianna Fail had taken in the civil war. Occasionally, the old connections asserted themselves as in the party split in 1970. It should be mentioned that several of those in Fianna Fail who took the hard-line position have very strong northern ties. One who left the party, Neil Blaney, is a TD from Donegal, one of

[20] See A. S. Cohan, R. D. McKinlay and Anthony Mughan, 'The Used Vote and Electoral Outcomes: The Irish General Election of 1973', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 1975, pp. 363–383.

the Ulster counties. Such ties might be expected to have a considerable impact upon the individual.

From the interviews, a clear distinction was determined. Government elites are not advocating a timed and phased British withdrawal from the North; instead, before anything happened the violence must be stopped and some arrangements suitable to all parties in the North must be made. The failure of the Sunningdale agreements was a great disappointment and clearly demonstrated how difficult the situation was. Several government leaders suggested that the road to union, or some closer arrangements, lay through economic factors. The EEC might aid a closer working relationship. In addition, the Republic ought to encourage more economic links.

Fianna Fail leaders, on the other hand, thought that a planned withdrawal by the British would help to end the violence. Once this ' realism ' was injected into the crisis, the antagonists in the North would have to come to grips with the new situation. At the very least, argued the Fianna Fail respondents, they were the more adamant party and were more determined than the other parties to bring about an end to partition.

The respondents were all worried about the problem of spillover. While the problems in the North did not affect the Republic particularly in 1968–69, they have a profound impact now. It was generally argued that investment from abroad has suffered, although this is difficult to measure, particularly with the world economic recession. Tourism has undoubtedly been hurt, and those interviewed believed that this was clearly the result of the problems in the North. This is particularly worrying as tourism has provided considerable foreign capital. In addition, non-political crimes such as bank robbery have increased, and this may be partly due to the problems in the North and the increased pressures upon the police.

Further evidence of the distance between the coalition policies and Fianna Fail's approach was provided by the government's decision to declare a state of national emergency after the assassination of the British ambassador in Dublin last year, a particularly graphic example of spillover. Growing out of the emergency, the government proposed two pieces of legislation. The first, the Emergency Powers Act, provided that an individual can be detained for seven days (rather than 48 hours) without charge. The second, the Criminal Law Act, increased the role of the army in investigating acts by members of illegal organisations (such as the IRA), expanded the power of prison officials in dealing with prisoners, increased the power of the police in investigating acts by individuals (or groups) against the state, and provided far more extreme penalties for a whole variety of acts related to the problems in the North.

Fianna Fail opposed the declaration of the state of emergency and the

expanded police power of detention in the Emergency Powers Act. In addition, various aspects of the Criminal Law Act were also opposed although, in principle, the increased penalties were supported. Fianna Fail's leadership thought that the emergency power of increased detention possibly violated civil rights, particularly since the country was not in a state of war. Indeed, it was this act that the President eventually referred to the Supreme Court for a verdict on its constitutionality. After the Supreme Court had decided that the Act was constitutional, the President signed the bill into law. He resigned shortly after, however, because a Fine Gael minister had criticised his delay in accepting the bill.

It should be added that the distinction between government and opposition is not quite so clear here because many elements in the Labour Party, one of the partners in the coalition, opposed the Emergency Powers Act. In the *Seanad*, the second (and less important) house in the Irish parliament, several Labour Senators voted against the legislation. The Liaison of the Left, a group within the Labour Party with views somewhat to the left of the party leadership, also opposed the measure. While expressing its opposition to the IRA, it was concerned about the infringement of civil liberties.

With regard to public support for reunification, all the recently interviewed members of the political elite believed that the general public was not as concerned about ending partition as it once had been and no longer saw this issue as the 'article of faith' it once was. Several of these respondents had been interviewed in 1969 and their views had altered; previously they believed the Irish people to be committed to unification. All thought that the extent of the violence had contributed to the apparent public apathy. Several respondents also suggested that people were uncertain about their material well-being if the status quo came to an end.

It should be understood that these are perceptions of members of the elite rather than the results of any general survey. They are interesting because they indicate that the members of the political elite believe that some of the dominant values in the Republic are changing and that the notion of unification is no longer as sacred as it once was. Indeed, Fianna Fail respondents were particularly concerned by this perceived change because such a shift would do greater damage to the traditional republican party than it would to the others. Further, Fianna Fail had just lost a by-election by a substantial margin, and one Fianna Fail respondent suggested that the party's less compromising policy towards the North may have been responsible for the defeat. But no Fianna Fail respondent wanted a shift in policy. As political leaders, they felt it was their function to lead rather than follow, and principles could not be abandoned for the purpose of electoral success. Whether the loss in the

by-election was due to Fianna Fail's policy is unclear, but some of its leaders feared it was.

Thus the clearest distinction between the two major groupings, the governing coalition and Fianna Fail, is found in their attitudes towards the continued presence of the British in the North. Further, government respondents saw the violence in the North as a block to any kind of dealings with northerners in the immediate future. Fianna Fail respondents, however, saw violence as a direct outgrowth of partition; end partition, and violence would eventually disappear. All saw the North as the most intrusive problem in Ireland. This marked a clear change from the previous set of interviews in which the post-revolutionary elites were mostly concerned with economic growth and development, with the North being mentioned hardly at all other than as the 'traditional' problem. Finally, all respondents believed that the general public was now less committed to the idea of a united Ireland because of the violence in the North and the growth of prosperity in the Republic.

### Obstacles to unification

The cultural divide in Northern Ireland is a religious one. If the problems in the North are not specifically religious to the extent that no one has suggested mass conversion of either side for the past several hundred years, the problems are at least rooted in the fact that religious differences exist. No such religious division exists in the Republic; the minority religious groups there constitute only four per cent of the population. The critical fact in the separation of the two Irelands is found in the religious dimension: the overwhelming majority in the Republic practice the religion of the minority community in the North.

Successive governments in the Republic have reaffirmed their strong adherence to the Catholic Church and, in doing so, they have given ample evidence to the Protestant community in the North of what they might expect if they were to cease being the majority community in the province of Northern Ireland and become the minority community in an enlarged Republic of Ireland. Protestants have tended to be reasonably prosperous in the Republic and are able to participate in most facets of life in the country. Many important posts are filled by Protestants; indeed, two of the six Presidents of the Republic have been Protestant. But a clear mix exists between the Catholic Church and the state in Ireland. While the Church is not the established Church, aspects of Catholic social teaching are incorporated in the constitution of 1937. These clauses must be responsible for a certain amount of disquiet in the North and, therefore, represent fair ground to cover in any interviews with the political elite of the Republic.

In addition to laws which restrict the importation of contraceptives into the Republic, two sections of the constitution have traditionally

been the most frequently cited as inhibiting relations between North and South. One of these was abolished, after a referendum in 1972, but its intention and the impact (or lack of impact) of its abolition should be explored. The abolished Article 44, 2, stated:

> The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith preferred by the great majority of the citizens.

The article also went on to recognise the various other denominations in the Republic, but only the Catholic Church earns a special position. Article 41, 3, 2, forbids divorce:

> No law shall be enacted providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage.

Other articles dealing with questions such as censorship and education may also be said to contain elements of religious teaching that give some offence to non-Catholics, or, at least, make life in the Republic occasionally inconvenient and constraining.

The constitution of 1937 was largely the work of Mr. de Valera who was *Taoiseach* at the time. The document was mainly designed to weaken the official links with Great Britain that had been retained in the original constitution of 1922. Why Mr. de Valera decided to include Article 44 (as well as the other elements of Catholic social teaching) is unclear, and commentators have not helped to clarify the reasons.

Any one of three reasons, not necessarily incompatible, may be accepted to explain Mr. de Valera's action. First, the particular provision came to him almost automatically because he was a product of a Catholic environment and had absorbed a view (or 'bias') that combined Catholicism and nationalism.[21] Second, after considerable thought and deliberation he decided to placate the hierarchy and place the provision in the constitution, but in a weak form.[22] Third, after careful consideration he rejected the strong Catholic position and, by granting full freedom rather than mere tolerance to a range of religious denominations, he paved the way to ending partition by displaying his liberalism.[23] Indeed, the constitution was, 'more Christian and Catholic than any other democratic constitution in the world', according to de Valera.[24] The key word here is 'and' which suggests that to the individual who

[21] See Conor Cruise O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

[22] A more cynical version of this view is found in *The Sunday Times* Insight Team, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[23] This more liberal interpretation is found in several works. See, for example, Basil Chubb, *The Government and Politics of Ireland*, *op. cit.*, p. 68; F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland Since the Famine*, 2nd rev. edn. (London: Collins/Fontana, 1973), p. 547; and The Earl of Longford and Thomas P. O'Neill, *Eamon de Valera* (London: Hutchinson, 1970), pp. 296–297.

[24] The Earl of Longford and Thomas P. O'Neill, *ibid.*, pp. 297–298.

drafted it it is a broadly, rather than narrowly, based document, which could easily be applied to a united Ireland as well as the 'truncated' version of the country.

In fact, if the provision which recognised the special position of the Catholic Church had never appeared in the constitution, the authority and influence that the Church possesses would not have been affected at all. Because of the long tradition of religion and nationality, the role of the Church in education and the continuing widespread practice of the Catholic religion, the social teaching of the Church is bound to have a profound impact on people and on the values they hold. Further, the recognised 'special position' gave nothing to the Church in terms of financial reward or benefit. In fact, legally the Church gained nothing from the provision. But such a clause in the legal framework of the state could scarcely serve to ease the suspicions of the Protestants in the North. Indeed, despite the traditional desire among the political elite in the Republic to end partition, successive governments have found it difficult to define clear lines between Church and state.

Not that there have been frequent clashes between the authorities of each institution. On the contrary, it is fairly difficult to find examples of active Church intervention in state affairs, other than the celebrated and well-documented Mother-Child Health Scheme controversy in 1951.[25] Even in that case the Church authorities were asked for their opinion by the government rather than offering it unsolicited. Further, the case involved inter-party and intra-party disputes as well as a clash between the minister responsible for the legislation and the Irish Medical Assocciation. But the publicity surrounding the dispute and the damage it did to the coalition government have certainly contributed to outsiders' image of the country as a priest-dominated society.

One of the most prominent figures in that dispute (and in the inter-party government of 1948–51) argued that the line between Church and state was firm and clear. The state was responsible for political matters and the Church had a right to be heard in matters of morality. But when asked what constituted a political question and a moral question (as well as which body had the right to declare a question moral or political), he refused to be drawn. Thus, problems such as divorce or contraception become very difficult to place in their respective categories. Presumably they were regarded as moral questions and, therefore, it was proper for

[25] The Mother-Child Health Scheme represented an attempt to provide free medical treatment to children and mothers. Because it was not means-related, it fell foul of the Irish Medical Association. Its concern with questions of motherhood raised fears within the Church hierarchy about questions such as birth control. In such areas, there is always the possibility of a clash between church and state. Much has been written about this controversy. For two divergent views see Paul Blanshard, *The Irish and Catholic Power; An American Interpretation* (London: Derek Verschoyle, 1954; first publ. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953) and the more balanced analysis found in John Whyte, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 196–302.

the Church to be consulted. If the Church authorities had a definite view on the matter then as guardians of the morality of the overwhelming majority of people in the state it was correct that this view should be incorporated into the body of state law.

It should be added that most of the people interviewed in 1968–69 thought that the Mother-Child Health Scheme controversy did represent an example of Church-state tension. But two points were also raised. First, it is doubtful whether it could happen again. The social (and political) environment in 1969 was different than it was in 1951. Second, many felt that it represented a case of poor handling by a minister who was relatively new to politics rather than a simple Church-state conflict. Had he been more flexible in the breadth of his consultation, the controversy might never have occurred.

Two questions asked in 1968–69 are most relevant to the discussion in this paper. The first asked: 'Should the section of the constitution that recognises the special position of the Catholic Church be abolished?' The second question was, 'Do you believe that the constitution should be amended to permit divorce?'

Only five of fifty respondents suggested an alteration of the constitutional provision recognising the special position of the Church. The most widespread view was that the provision was merely a statement of fact; it recognised that more than 95 per cent of the population is Catholic. Agreement about the worth of the provision was considerably less general. More than 30 per cent of the respondents did state that the provision might give offence to the Protestants in the North although no special privileges were given to the Church. Some suggested that the provision was remarkably restrained; the English have an established Church with far fewer adherents as a percentage of the population. The Catholic Church is not the established Church in Ireland. Generally, the respondents argued that if presented to the people in a referendum—the method used to alter the constitution—they would vote to retain the special position. This conclusion, of course, represents an unimpressive attempt at political forecasting by political leaders, but it should be borne in mind that the troubles in the North were not yet pronounced, and the question of placating Protestant opinion there had not arisen. What is particularly interesting is that in 1969 virtually no respondents believed that this provision in any way hindered any attempts to end partition.

In 1967, before the interviews were conducted, a *Dail* Committee on the Constitution had reported its views concerning the articles on religion. It had concluded that while no special rights were granted to the Church, 'there seems . . . to be no doubt that these provisions give offence to non-Catholics and are also a useful weapon in the hands of those who are

anxious to emphasise the differences between North and South '.[26] They concluded that the sections dealing with the recognition of religion should be deleted.

All respondents in the most recent interviews agreed that the vote to remove the special position clause was a reaction to the problems in the North, not a response to the recommendations of the Committee on the Constitution. They were far from unanimous about whether this was the only factor. Several suggested that a much greater ecumenism exists in Ireland now as a result both of the Second Vatican Council and the fact that Ireland is developing more of a European posture since becoming a part of the European Community. Some disappointment was expressed concerning the impact the 1972 referendum actually had on the northern problem. Generally, they felt, it had no effect at all. One respondent remarked that it had really been a non-issue and, in retrospect, a non-battle.

The question of divorce is rather more concrete. Although the special position of the Catholic Church gave it no special rights or privileges that other denominations did not have, the constitutional provision forbidding divorce does affect all people in the state. Yet here very little movement, in the opinion of members of the political elite, was noted between 1969 and 1975 in spite of the recommendation by the same *Dail* committee that some alteration in that part of the constitution was desirable.

Only five respondents in 1968–69 favoured some modification of the divorce provisions. One respondent suggested that the constitution should not contain any provision concerning divorce, either forbidding or permitting it; this was a matter for the *Dail.* Four of the five favouring modification did support the adoption of the commitee's recommendation which would permit divorce if the religion in which the person was married allowed the dissolution of marriage. Taken literally, this is not an enormous concession. It would still effectively forbid 96 per cent of the population from obtaining a divorce except in those cases where the Catholic Church actually permits the dissolution of a marriage.[27]

The more recent interviews produced some very interesting findings, particularly because of the unwillingness of the members of the political elite to bring about any more changes in the constitution. While all felt that the northern problem had hastened the demise of the special position of the Church, most believed that whatever pressures there were for permitting contraception and/or divorce were largely domestically generated. The troubles in the North may have hastened discussion of these

[26] See *Report of the Committee on the Constitution: December 1967* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1967), p. 47.

[27] Ironically, the prohibition on divorce is actually stronger than the position the Church takes. In the Republic, no grounds exist for the dissolution of a marriage.

matters, particularly the divorce question, but the issues would have arisen in any event.

Indeed, the contraception issue has become rather well-publicised since surveys conducted recently have indicated that for the first time there is a plurality in favour of liberalising the laws on contraception.[28] The *Dail* narrowly defeated legislation that would have permitted the sale of contraceptives, but it is probably only a matter of time before this issue is resolved in favour of contraception. Family planning services are available in Dublin and people, particularly the young, travel more now than in the past; they are more knowledgeable. These were seen as being nearer to the reasons for change than pressures from the North.

The divorce question is more difficult. Chastened by the reaction when Article 44 was altered, none felt that a change in the divorce provisions would make any real difference with regard to the North. Nor was any real public pressure for an alteration of the divorce provision discerned. In fact, one respondent suggested that the troubles in the North might actually have impeded progress towards liberalisation, because they may have caused a reaction to demands for change. But most believed that Ireland was becoming a more liberal society generally and this was, once again, a symptom of its new role as a member of the EEC and also the effect of the Second Vatican Council.

A recent survey, however, does suggest growing liberalism on the issue of divorce. Conducted for *Hibernia*, the survey indicated that while a majority still oppose laws permitting divorce (53 per cent), a substantial minority (37 per cent) would support provisions allowing the dissolution of a marriage. This marks an increase in those favouring some alteration of the present arrangements by comparison with a survey conducted several years previously. Most significantly, heaviest support for liberalisation of the divorce provisions came from those under 35 years of age.[29] Assuming the reliability of this survey, pressures for a change in the divorce provisions ought to build up over the next few years regardless of the situation in the North.

In the early interviews the economic question was not really raised with regard to the North. Although economic issues dominated the discussions held then, they generally referred to the prospects of the European connection. In the recent interviews, the economic question was more important. Ireland is a poorer country than any other part of the British Isles. Its per caput gross national product is lower, and, although its standard of living improved steadily during the 1960s, its economic situation now is affected both by the world recession and the poor performance of the British economy. The present inflation rate, for example, is higher than in the United Kingdom and so is the level

[28] See ' Confusion on Contraception ', *Hibernia*, Vol. 39, No. 19, Oct. 3, 1975, p. 4.
[29] See *Hibernia*, Vol. 40, No. 17, Sept. 24, 1976, p. 11.

of unemployment. In addition, the range of social services is not nearly as comprehensive as in the United Kingdom.

Those interviewed were acutely aware of how significant the economic question can become. Why, after all, should relatively well-off people give up the benefits they receive to join their poorer relations in the South? A united Ireland simply could not afford the level of social services that the northerners are receiving now. There was some speculation that, given certain factors, over a long period of time (perhaps twenty to twenty-five years) Ireland's economic situation may have so improved as to be even with, or ahead of, the rest of the two islands. But forecasting such growth was considered too speculative to be worth much.

Generally, the present party leaders are less inclined to consider their own cultural and constitutional arrangements as the barriers to ending partition. Indeed, all tended to agree with the viewpoint expressed by Mr. Lynch in July 1970 that the Republic would be flexible on these issues. The real barrier to unification was in the North itself, and, as long as the majority community remained hostile, there was little a government in the Republic could do. This is a rather interesting view because it suggests that the political elite in the Republic perceive their role as largely responsive rather than initiatory, except in the area of economic involvement. More will be said about this in the concluding section.

**A united Ireland**

Nine years ago, no questions were asked concerning the form that a united Ireland might take. There seemed no point. While many spoke of the possibility of ending partition in a generation, the individuals who had been revolutionary participants were particularly depressed about its prospects. Indeed, what was most striking was that the post-revolutionary group, who generally regarded economic problems as the most pressing, tended to think that reunification could come about in twenty-five to forty years if economic development continued. On the other hand, the revolutionary elite, who all maintained that the major problem facing Ireland was ending partition, were also the most pessimistic about the prospect of doing this. One revolutionary participant typified the sharp generation cleavage. A northerner himself, he argued that the problem was strictly sectarianism, and if you broke down the religious barriers, partition could end. This tended to be the view of most revolutionary elites. For them, the issue was still one of religion; for the younger elites, economic considerations had become paramount.

The post-revolutionary generation were, in their own words, committed to an ending of partition, but they had generally accepted the point that they were governing a 26-county Republic. They did speak about closer ties with the North, and they had some reason for optimism

about future good relations, especially after the Lemass-O'Neill talks and the co-operation between groups such as the tourist authorities. Some also spoke of possible breakthroughs in the relationship between the two through even closer economic co-operation if both Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Community. This, added to the already existing trade agreements, would mean more contacts among Irish people. Where such contacts could lead was not clear, but hopefully, over a long period of time, the citizens of both sections of the island might decide that they could live in some closer political arrangement with one another.

But the critical question about the form a united Ireland would take had not been asked, and no programme or plan was available which would have indicated the nature of a 32-county republic. Since that time, after all the troubles, a united Ireland, or at least an Irish dimension for solving the North's problems, has taken on more credibility. Given the troubles in the North and the growing expectancy that something might happen to hasten unification, policies or plans concerning the new state could, it may be thought, be useful if only as some sort of guideline.

In fact, the only published work which describes a 'possible' united Ireland by a current member of the political elite appeared in 1972. Garret FitzGerald, TD, an economist who is a member of Fine Gael and at present Foreign Minister in the coalition government, argued that a number of factors stood in the way of some sort of understanding between North and South.[30] He was particularly concerned with the effects of partition on both the Republic and the North. Significantly, the apparent lack of religious toleration in the Republic stems largely from the absence of a large minority group, such as the North contains, which the majority would need to conciliate. Thus no notion of pluralism actually exists in the Republic. But his most interesting concern dealt with the pronounced economic differences and the level of social services in the North. With regard to the future government he argued that 'the idea of a federal solution is already well-established in the Republic and commands widespread, if ill-thought out, acceptance. Few people in the Republic have given any thought, however, to the consequences that would flow from acceptance of such a system.'[31] While discussing some of the consequences, FitzGerald did not outline the form a united Ireland might take, suggesting that this would need to be left to those involved in the arrangements once some decision to bring about unification had been taken.

With the lack of discussion about a united Ireland, a range of questions was asked members of the political elite to determine the

[30] Garret FitzGerald, *Towards a New Ireland* (Dublin: Torc Books, 1973; first publ. London: C. Knight, 1972).
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

types of options about which they were thinking. The first questions were designed to elicit some information about loyalist thinking. The questions were:

> Realistically, do you think that the loyalist elements in the North would be willing to accept any compromise plan that would end partition? If *yes*, what would such a compromise have to include? If *no*, do you see any real likelihood of a 'united Ireland' in this generation (or in the future)? From which sources do you get your ideas about what loyalist elements might be thinking?
> Do you ever have any personal contact with loyalist leaders on an informal basis?

A final question asked:

> If you were asked to construct a scenario, by what process could a united Ireland come about and what form would it take?

The responses to the questions were surprisingly mixed, but several impressions emerged which indicate directions of thinking and also the lack of real consideration given to future arrangements.

To the first question all Fianna Fail respondents answered affirmatively. The reasons were suggested earlier: if the British government announced that it was withdrawing its troops from the North, and severing connections, the loyalists would have no option but to reach some arrangement. Only two government ministers thought that the loyalists might compromise. The remainder thought it unlikely.

One of the government respondents who thought that a compromise might be accepted suggested two possibilities. First, the loyalists clearly have an identity crisis: they are not certain whether they are British, Irish or Ulstermen. Even UDI is mentioned under the banner of the loyalists. In a sense, then, if the loyalty is to the Crown rather than to a greater United Kingdom, the possibilities of some compromise are evident, perhaps with Ireland becoming part of the Commonwealth once again, but this is unlikely. The second possibility is, again, economic. If economic growth continues at a faster rate in Ireland than the United Kingdom, then Ireland will begin to become an attractive option. Should Ireland surpass the United Kingdom then there is only one reason for the loyalists to remain separate, a fear of being swallowed by a Catholic society. But the Republic is more 'open' now than it was years ago so this, too, might not be as important.

He also raised the connection between the discovery of oil off the coast of Scotland and the rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party. If Ireland's wealth should increase by, for example, the discovery of off-shore oil or large gas deposits, then this economic good fortune might be seen as justification for a form of unity by northerners.

Other government figures who were asked this question (and to expand upon it) thought that there was simply too much bigotry and distrust stored in the North to enable any genuine compromises to be reached. One respondent typified this view. Given that it has not been possible to bring about some workable mix in government in the North, then it is clearly too much to hope that one could speak about the 'next stage' (co-operation with the Republic). He thought that if the loyalists could be brought to work with the minority in the North then the situation would improve. He (as did virtually all respondents) praised the Social Democratic and Labour Party for the work it has done. He remarked that it had been 'cool and deliberate' in its approach to problems.

With regard to the question of where the members of the political elite received their information concerning the attitude of loyalists, the responses were virtually the same. Almost all relied upon their particular party spokesman on the question of the North. Several expressed the view that they could not really identify the northern loyalist leaders. Much depended upon the organisation in which one was interested. But the point was made that because of the particular notion of department responsibility that exists in Ireland, most ministers or opposition leaders simply do not deal with the question of the North on a day-to-day basis.

This became most pertinent when dealing with the question of their contacts. With one exception, no respondent had any contact with northern Protestant leaders. One respondent said that through the 1960s he had informal contacts on holiday in the North, but these had now ceased. Further, with the abolition of Stormont the contacts that would normally have taken place no longer do. For example, ministers for departments such as agriculture, industry and commerce, and transport and power may have had reasons for frequent exchanges of views, but since their northern counterparts have ceased to function, the transactions have shifted to London or Brussels.

The latter point is of some interest. Most respondents, as has been suggested, perceived the European Community as a spur to further economic co-operation with the North, which may well be the case. Yet with the advent of Irish membership and the now frequent trips by Irish ministers to Brussels, their contacts with northern ministers were probably bound to become less frequent even if the Stormont government had continued to exist. If economic barriers fell more quickly, ministerial contacts would have been with the United Kingdom representatives to the Community, not with the Stormont officials.

This lack of contact is both revealing and discouraging. Although suggestions were made that the relevant party spokesman had regular contact with certain loyalists, this was not in fact clear. Contact was

maintained with the SDLP leadership, but this was relatively simple sin
members of the SDLP are often in Dublin. But without regular contac
among political leaders, any optimism seems misplaced. Moreover, giv
the general lack of interest in newspapers and journalists that w
expressed, the reliance upon party spokesmen—if, indeed, such spoke
men had regular contact with loyalists—still seems relatively narrow.

With regard to the question of the scenario that might be constructe
all spoke vaguely about some federal arrangement. But if the empha
among government leaders interviewed was upon federalism as an en
among Fianna Fail respondents federalism was seen as an interi
solution leading ultimately to a unitary Irish state.

One respondent, who thought that a unitary state would be t
eventual outcome, suggested a parallel with the Scotland-United Kin
dom case, a comparison frequently raised, but generally by those advoc
ing a federal arrangement. He thought that, just as Scotland will be ab
to make many of its own laws in a United Kingdom once devoluti
occurs, there would be no reason why the six counties could not al
make many of their own laws. But ultimate authority would inevitab
have to be located in Dublin.

Interestingly, despite their belief that power-sharing in the North wou
serve as a step towards solving the current problems, not one responde
suggested a power-sharing solution, in which Protestants were guarante
a role in government, for a united Ireland. This, however, may refle
a general view that if the border disappeared, sectarianism would di
appear as well. Bolstering this view were the responses to questio
about political party affiliation and alignment. Almost everyone believ
that if a united Ireland came about then classical conservative a
social-democratic parties could probably emerge. In this way sectari
conflict would give way to the more understandable and probably mo
desirable and manageable class conflict.

## Conclusion

The policy of any government in the Republic of Ireland towards t
North is predicated, first, upon the belief that a united Ireland wou
be preferable to the present arrangement. Second, any governme
accepts the proposition that unification can come about solely throu
peaceful means. Third, no government of Ireland will tolerate mo
than legitimate political activity by IRA sympathisers because of t
perceived threat not only to the North, but to the Republic as well.
is clear that this tolerance is limited, as shown by the recent stringe
legislation. If this can be termed ' policy ' then this is Irish policy
the question of the North.

But this policy is complicated by at least four factors. First, Fian
Fail and the present coalition government have different perceptions

the role that the British are playing in the North. To Fianna Fail, the British presence is illegitimate; to the coalition, the British are necessary for the time being. The second complication follows from this. Government policy in Ireland, regardless of party composition, has been geared to co-operation with successive British governments on matters related to security, especially on the border. This is a very difficult position to hold. It means that the Irish government is co-operating with the British in order to defeat, or at least limit, the activities of the IRA. But the IRA is attempting to forge a united Ireland, a goal which is an integral part of the country's value system. Moreover, governments in the Republic are in the unenviable position of having to work with the former colonial power, the country perceived to have been responsible for partition in the first place.

Third, because of the bombings in the mainland United Kingdom and the fact that at least a part of the IRA political activity (through either provisional or official Sinn Fein) is centred in Dublin, the British press and a number of MPs have condemned what they believe to be the laxity of Irish governments on security matters. Such criticism has occurred even though security expenditure in the Republic has trebled, and while British officials were, by their own admission, engaged in discussions with representatives of the republican forces. These activities have, at the very least, embarrassed Irish governments. Although the militant elements in the Republic are small in number, they have been vocal. Further, as seen in the debates over the recent state of emergency, the degree to which individual liberties and rights may be limited is by no means universally accepted.

Fourth, no idea about the form a united Ireland might take has yet emerged. Despite the suggestion of vague forms of federalism by some respondents, Irish political leaders would be faced with an entirely new situation if a united Ireland were suddenly to become a reality. Indeed, the Republic of Ireland would become a larger version of the present Northern Ireland with, of course, one major difference: the Catholics would be the majority group and the Protestants the minority.

Two reasons for the lack of any plans for a united country might be cited. First, any new arrangement must be worked out by all parties, not merely the majority Catholic bloc. This was the response of several who were interviewed, and it has also emerged in public statements by various political leaders. Second, and perhaps of greatest importance, while the *concept* of a united Ireland has been highly valued, time and distance have probably lessened the expectation that it might come about. Despite protestations by members of the political elite about the primacy of such a goal, they are not so optimistic as to envisage a quick end to partition. Very little consideration, therefore, has been given to the final product.

Thus, Irish decision-makers must continue to be responsive to events in the North; they cannot be initiatory. While they wait for a time when northern Protestants become more favourably disposed to a working relationship with the Republic, they must resist any temptation to support or encourage the republican forces in the North. It is, at the very least, an uncomfortable situation. What Irish governments must ultimately rely upon is the willingness of the electorate not to abandon them because of government policy. But even this support cannot be taken for granted. The cost of security is putting increased strains upon the economy and the new laws dealing with security have caused divisions even within the governing coalition. Some public disquiet may also be assumed although it does not appear to be too pronounced.

Finally, there is a real irony in the Irish situation. Political leaders in the Republic can plan and talk as much as they wish about a united Ireland. It means little without the acquiescence of northern Protestants. In much the same way, elements of the minority Catholic community in the North have a veto power over any potential solutions to the problems of that unhappy province. Although we tend to think of power in terms of the resources of the dominant group(s) in a society, small determined minorities can make life difficult for the majority. Just as the northern Protestants must wait for the militant elements of the Catholic community to agree to some solution to the present troubles, the Dublin government must wait for the northern Protestants to have a complete change of heart before the Republic's primary goal is realised.

# BOOKS

## REAPPRAISING THE AMERICAN ROLE IN ASIA

*David Steeds*

**The Cold War in Asia:** A Historical Introduction. By Akira Iriye. *Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 1974. 214 pp. Pb: £4·00.*

**International Politics in East Asia since World War II.** By Donald F. Lach and Edmund S. Wehrle. *New York, London: Praeger. 1975. 388 pp. £12·95. Pb: £4·95. $7.95.*

**Three and a Half Powers:** The New Balance in Asia. By Harold C. Hinton. *Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press. 1975. 306 pp. Pb: £2·80.*

**East Asia and US Security.** By Ralph N. Clough. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by Allen and Unwin.) 248 pp. $8.95. £4·65. Pb: £1·80.*

**The United States, China and Arms Control.** By Ralph N. Clough, A. Doak Barnett, Morton H. Halperin and Jerome H. Kahan. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1975. 153 pp. $8.95.*

**Asia and the Road Ahead:** Issues for the Major Powers. By Robert A. Scalapino. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1975. 337 pp. £7·10. $10.95.*

THIS is a good time to reflect on the recent course of international relations in the Far East, to analyse the present situation, and to speculate a little on the prospects for the next decade or so.[1] Significant events took place last year in three of the major powers active in the region, and by the end of the year it appeared that an era was drawing to its close. In China, Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung died, and the death of the latter was soon followed by a party and government crisis. The departure in quick succession of Chou and Mao, always the main architects of China's foreign policy, especially in the last few years since the death of the long-serving foreign minister, Ch'en Yi, and the succession of the relatively unknown and untried Hua Kuo-feng, in circumstances of some disorder and without a strong power base, cast doubt on China's stability and on the future direction of its foreign policy. In the United States, the presidential election of November 1976 ended eight years of Republican administration, years which saw major changes in American policy in Asia, with the Nixon Doctrine, the approach to China, and the withdrawal from Indochina. The election brought Jimmy Carter to the White House in place of Gerald Ford and, arguably much more important in terms of inter-

[1] The Far East is a useful way of describing in a British journal and from a British perspective the two regions called by geographers South-east Asia and East Asia. American historians and political scientists prefer to talk about East Asia. What is confusing is that sometimes East Asia is used in the restricted geographical sense, and sometimes it is widened to include South-east Asia.

national relations, it led to the replacement of Henry Kissinger at the State Department by Cyrus Vance. Finally, in Japan, the Lower House elections in December nearly led to the defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party, and almost brought to an end over twenty years of that party's control of the Japanese government. With the opposition parties in disarray, and quite incapable of forming any kind of alternative administration, the election produced a potentially most unstable situation. Japan must continue to live with the prospect of instability until at least June of this year, when the Upper House elections will take place. There is a distinct possibility that the government may lose its at present very narrow majority in the Upper House. The governing party's prospects in December last were not helped, and will not be aided again in June, by the continuing saga of the Lockheed scandal or by the factional in-fighting among its leaders. The year 1977 therefore began with question marks over Japanese politics and Japanese foreign policy.[2] These events in the three countries, following on the American debacle in Indochina in 1975, suggest the end of at least a chapter in the international politics of the Far East.

To assist the processes of reflection, analysis and speculation, a positive spate of books has been published in the past three years, six of which are under review here. It must be said of course that all the books discussed were written and published before the events of 1976 mentioned above, and if any one factor prompted them, it was almost certainly the ending of American involvement in Indochina, and the process of reappraisal of American commitments and options that followed.[3] It almost goes without saying that each of the six books is by an author or authors living in the United States, published in that country, and written very much for the benefit of an American audience, whether undergraduate, academic or official. It follows that each of the books, whatever its title and professed objectives, has a heavy emphasis on American involvement in Asia, the reasons for it, the mistakes made, the success achieved, and the alternative options available. To some extent this emphasis is almost inevitable given the information. As Iriye points out, for the years 1945 to 1950, one of the problems of balance is that there is far more source material available on the American side than elsewhere.[4] This problem is much greater in the 1960s and 1970s.

It must be said in passing that this emphasis on the role of the United States does lead to problems and arguably some lack of balance in the more general studies under review. Lach and Wehrle, for example, con-

[2] The result of the December elections was certainly a blow to the Liberal Democratic Party, but it was a blow that should be kept in perspective. After over twenty years in office, rocked by the Lockheed scandal, and almost paralysed by feuds among its leaders, surely it was a major achievement to lose only 16 seats (265 to 249) and to see its share of the popular vote fall by only 5 per cent from 46 per cent to 41 per cent. If you add seats and votes won by various Independents and members of the New Liberal Club, there is very little change from 1972. Of course, the circumstances of Japanese politics are unique and comparisons with European democracies are meaningless. Nevertheless, the use by the press and various pundits of words and phrases like ' debacle ', ' catastrophe ', ' disaster ' and ' crushing defeat ' to describe the fate of the Liberal Democratic Party seems absurd.

[3] Iriye states in his Preface (p. ix) that he started working on the first draft of his book in 1969. He goes on to say in his Introduction (p. 2) that, after the crucial events of 1972 and the Vietnam peace agreement of January 1973, ' The time seems opportune to seek a fresh understanding of one of the basic themes of recent history: the Cold War in Asia '. The book was published in 1974.

[4] Iriye, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

centrate on the international politics of East Asia and their chapters deal with the activities of China, Japan, Korea, the Soviet Union and the United States, with only the occasional passing reference to the countries of South or South-east Asia. They state in their Preface that they regard China as the centrepiece for events in the region, and that in describing American or Russian initiatives, or developments in Japan or South-east Asia, they will place those events in a frame of reference centring on developments and policies in China.[5] However, at the end of the book, one chapter, the second-longest in the book, deals with Indochina, most of it with events in Vietnam after 1954.[6] The overall theme of the chapter is very much a concern with the American presence in Indochina, a concern which can of course be justified on the grounds that American involvement there had effects on American policies elsewhere in Asia.[7] Nevertheless it is misleading to confine the book's one significant approach to the problems of South-east Asia to countries and events that involve the United States. It prompts the suggestion that perhaps there have been no other international politics worthy of the name in South-east Asia since 1945! Moreover, the chapter on Indochina contains a section on the Geneva Conference of 1954, which is very much concerned with Washington's problems and point of view, and the fact that the final declaration fell short of Washington's expectations.[8] The main characters are Eisenhower, Dulles and Bedell Smith, and the sterling work of Pierre Mèndes-France, Chou En-lai and, above all, Anthony Eden, merits scant attention.

A more significant reflection from these books, prompted by their emphasis on the United States and its policies, is how alone the Americans have been in East Asia since 1945. Whether in policy-making towards China or Japan, or in combating the activities of the Soviet Union, or in sustaining non-communist regimes in South Korea and Taiwan, the Americans have played a largely single-handed role, with little in the way of support—or competition—from their major allies, Britain and France. There was, it is true, limited involvement in the Korean War, and there was also Britain's concern with trade with China, and its attempt to play some kind of mediatorial role between the United States and China over the off-shore islands in the mid-1950s.[9] And there was of course always Hong Kong. But generally, and this comes through very clearly from the books under review, the European powers avoided commitments north of Indochina. Hanoi was as far as the French wished to go—and there only until 1954—and Singapore was far enough for Britain. All this is in sharp contrast to the period before the Second World War. Six comparable books dealing with various aspects of international relations in the Far East or Asia for the thirty years or so before Pearl Harbour, and particularly if relations with China were under consideration, would place a heavy emphasis on the role of Great Britain, though a much lesser one on that of France.

One reason for the new and very different situation that developed after 1945 was certainly the Americans' determination that, having borne the

[5] Lach and Wehrle, *op. cit.*, p.v. To be fair to the authors they add that their approach brings with it difficulties and distortions, and they will not always adhere to it.

[6] *Ibid.*, Ch. 8, pp. 298–361.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 308–320.

[9] R. Boardman, *Britain and the People's Republic of China, 1949–1974* (London: Macmillan, 1976), has some informative chapters on British policy towards China in the 1950s. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1976, p. 501.

main burden of the war against Japan, they, and they alone, were going to exercise the decisive influence in shaping the postwar Far East. Moreover, in terms of power available in the region, the United States could sustain this determination. But, to be fair to the policy-makers in the State Department, and even to some of the men on the spot, during and immediately after the Second World War, tendencies to act alone and to see all issues in terms of American interests were not always the results of galloping megalomania in Washington or Chungking or Tokyo, or of a deliberate policy of excluding other powers. Iriye quotes Sir Eric Teichman, one of the sanest and most knowledgeable of the Foreign Office China experts as lamenting in 1943:

> . . . [We] have . . . abdicated from the position of leadership which we have occupied in China for the past hundred years. China is by agreement regarded as in the American theatre of war, a decision the consequences of which seem to become more far-reaching every day . . . [In] the diplomatic sphere, where ten years ago we naturally took the lead, we now wait anxiously to see what the American Government may do.[10]

The reasons for this abdication, the collapse of power that preceded it, and the absence of any real attempt to make a come-back after 1945, obviously have to do with the disasters that struck Britain during the war both in Europe and the Far East, and with the almost intolerable problems that the country faced after 1945. However, whatever the reasons, the thought prompted by these books is that the results were not good either for the Far East or for the United States. This reflection obviously leads to accusations of arrogance, nostalgia for Empire, and a dog-in-the-manger attitude. But Iriye raises the interesting point as to what might have happened if Britain had decided to concern itself more with postwar China. He quotes Smuts as saying in April 1945 that the world needed the maturity and experience in world affairs that the British Empire possessed:

> There were grave dangers in power suddenly acquired, without experience and a mature sense of responsibility, as had been exemplified by the recent history of Germany and Japan. . . . The future of the world would depend on our being able to pull our weight in partnership with the two other Great Powers.[11]

The future of the world is not our concern, but the future of the Far East could have been different if Britain had chosen and been able to play a more active part. Iriye goes on to say that Britain might have pulled its weight in Chinese affairs in the hectic years after 1945, but it almost totally abstained from active involvement. One may question the rather sweeping nature of Iriye's comment, but the point remains a valid one.

It is interesting to compare the approaches of the various books to the issues of the area to be considered and the number of powers reckoned to be significant. Hinton has Asia and four powers, Lack and Wehrle, East Asia—with one major excursion into South-east Asia—and the same four powers. Clough is concerned with East Asia, which always includes South-east Asia, and the same 'four-power equilibrium'. Scalapino has the most complex and controversial frame of reference, for his Asia includes the

[10] Iriye, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

Pacific Ocean—in practice that part of the Pacific north of the Equator—and he divides this vast area into five regions: the Pacific Ocean, North-east Asia, the Continental Centre, South-east Asia and South Asia. Moreover, Scalapino deals himself two more cards, for he is concerned with six powers, India and Indonesia being added to the other four.[12] On the issue of the area to be studied, there is little to be said other than the obvious point that if you are concerned with a comprehensive analysis of international politics within the area, then the approach of Hinton and Scalapino is sounder, allowing, as it does, more attention to be given to the affairs of India and its neighbours. If, on the other hand, you are primarily concerned with the relationship of the United States to the area then it is legitimate to confine yourself to something called East Asia, provided that region is defined widely so as to include South-east Asia. If you are trying both to discuss international relations within the area, and spend a lot of time on the position of the United States, which is the task that Scalapino sets himself, then you are probably wise to add the generally neglected Pacific to Asia.

The question of which countries to study is a more interesting one, with much more room for debate. The general consensus on the big four seems reasonable, and Hinton has a good case for his provocative description of Japan. He calls it a 'semi-power, or upper-level middle power', and his summing up is damning: '[Japan] has virtually no foreign policy as yet, very little political influence, and no military capability beyond a modest defensive one'.[13] There is room for debate as to which powers, if any, should be included from South and South-east Asia. It is difficult to see how Asia east of the Persian Gulf can be studied without some concentration on India, and Scalapino is surely right to include that country among his major powers. On the other hand, his choice of Indonesia is open to question. He defines a major power as a state with the capacity to influence other societies on either a regional or global basis as a result of its 'particular mix of military, political, and economic capabilities', and goes on to describe Indonesia as a regional power of significance.[14] This seems unexceptionable, but the definition and description could equally be applied to North Vietnam (the book was published in 1975), and might even be applied to the Republic of China.

The six books fall neatly into two categories, three being mainly concerned with the recent past, three with the present and the future. In the first category, Iriye, after providing a historical background, writes in detail about the period 1942 to 1950, and his objective, as the title suggests, is to provide an interpretative history of the origins of the cold war in Asia. While concentrating on events in Asia, particularly China, and on the American response, he is concerned to try to place those events and that response in a global context. As he says, referring to the situation in China at the beginning of 1947 after the withdrawal of the Marshall mission:

> The question now was whether a seemingly hopelessly divided China would still be left alone by the big powers, or whether that country would become embroiled in the Cold War that was beginning to take definite shape in Iran, Turkey, and Greece.[15]

[12] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. ix.
[13] Hinton, *op. cit.*, p. 294.
[14] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[15] Iriye, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

Iriye traces the story of American policy from the *realpolitik* of Yalta through the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine to the disillusionment of 1949 when:

> Chinese independence and sovereignty should have consolidated rather than weakened the Yalta system, based as it had been on the maintenance of a balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, with China in the middle under neither power's control. But at that juncture all interested parties—American, Russian, and Chinese—tended to view the emergence of a China unified by the Communists in the context of a bipolar world.[16]

The analysis is sharp and balanced, the writing persuasive; the book is a fine contribution to the literature of the cold war, and essential reading for anyone who aims to understand subsequent American policy in the Far East.

Lach and Wehrle, writing primarily for an American college audience, cover in detail events from 1945 to 1973. The book is very much a textbook, but should not be condemned on that account, for the writing is brisk and clear, and the narrative interesting and generally accurate. According to the authors, the study began as an attempt to bring up to date a famous and earlier study of Far Eastern affairs, *Modern Far Eastern International Relations*,[17] by Harley F. MacNair and Donald Lach. In the new book Lach is promoted from junior to senior partner. While the new book is not an unworthy sequel to MacNair and Lach, it is certainly not as comprehensive, and it falls very far short in terms of bibliography. It is perhaps unfair to compare Lach and Wehrle, covering a much wider time-span, written with a different purpose, and devoting two chapters to events from 1945 to 1950, with Iriye who focuses on this period. It must be said, however, that the former book tends to see those events simply in a regional context. Iriye, as indicated above, is always concerned with the wider picture. Lach and Wehrle's comment that, with the fall of Chiang Kai-shek, American diplomacy in 1949 was 'frozen in its tracks, and the possibility of fostering a clear break between the Russians and the Chinese Communists was lost' is adequate in a Far Eastern context, but takes little account of the overall cold war situation in 1949–50.[18] As mentioned earlier, Lach and Wehrle are concerned with China as a point of reference in the post-1945 period, and the most thought-provoking parts of the book have to do with China's foreign policy after 1949. The authors argue that Peking made repeated efforts for twenty years after 1950 to break free from what they describe as its 'singular alliance' with the Soviet Union, and then to escape from isolation:

> Clearly no nation faced a more troublesome task in reassuming its role as a great power in the post-colonial period. Lacking the resources to assert fully its own independence in a world dominated by superpowers, Peking was caught in the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.[19]

In at least two periods before the events leading to the Nixon-Kissinger approach of 1971—1954–58 and 1963–65—China was ready for closer links

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 172.
[17] New York: Van Nostrand, 1950.
[18] Lach and Wehrle, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

with the United States; those links were not forged, and the autho implication is that while there were faults on both sides—any hope closer relations in the period 1963–64, for example, being thwarted both events in China and the Vietnam war—major responsibility must rest w the United States.[20]

Harold Hinton, in the third of the historical studies, begins with series of short chapters on events from 1945 to approximately 1969, whi he labels 'Asia in the Era of American Ascendancy', and then examin in much greater detail, the period from 1969 to 1975, 'Asia in the E of Soviet-American Parity'. While the book will be of interest to fell academics and the general reader—there are no footnotes—*Three and Half Powers* will probably be used mainly, and very profitably, by und graduate students of international relations and American foreign poli For Hinton the field of study is not merely the Far East or East As but all Asia east of the Persian Gulf, and the key powers are the Unit States, the Soviet Union, China and, to a lesser extent Japan—hence t rather insulting reference of the title![21] He provides a very full analysis developments since 1969, and identifies four significant trends or situatio that have operated, namely the strategic parity between the United Stat and the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet military confrontation, the Americ military disengagement from Asia, and the Sino-American detente.[22] He se the focus of attention of American Asian policy shifting after 1969 fro South-east to North-east Asia, and from the United States's smaller Asi allies and client states to the Soviet Union, Japan and China.[23] This very much a return to the priorities of the early 1950s as against those the 1960s. Hinton is careful to place Soviet-American relations in Asia a wider global context involving issues such as SALT, European security, a policies in the Middle East, for 'Asia is by no means at the top of the l of common concerns to the United States and the Soviet Union'.[24] A at the end, he discusses what is arguably the most important question of t 1970s, both for powers in the region and for outsiders like the Unit States, namely whether China, 'the sick man of East Asia' before 19 and a cause of instability, will, now that it is strong and united, be factor making for greater international stability in Asia. The answer gives is a guarded yes.[25]

Turning to the second category of books, those concerned with t present and the future, two are published by the Brookings Institution, t results respectively of a study group on American policy in East Asia a of research conducted under a contract between the Arms Control a Disarmament Agency and the Institution. The first of these, by Ralph Clough, although not published until 1975, reflects the ideas of a high-le study group of academics, officials and Congressional leaders who m between August 1969 and April 1970 under the chairmanship of Samuel Huntington. The author, who was study director for the group, has tak into account developments in the Far East since the last meeting of t

[20] I hope that I am not maligning the authors on this point. They refer to Chin more flexible diplomatic strategy in the period 1963–65 on three occasions: pp. 205, : and 363.

[21] Hinton, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 174.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 274.

group in the spring of 1970, and there is mention of numerous events in 1972 and 1973. The object of the book is primarily to reassess American interests in East Asia in the light of what are regarded as the important changes of the late 1960s and early 1970s: the shift from alliance to confrontation in relations between China and the Soviet Union, the end of American 'combat involvement' in South-east Asia, and Japan's emergence as a dominant economic power. But this is rather more than just another semi-official analysis of the contemporary scene with a dash of futurology; it is very firmly grounded in the historical context, and Clough's first chapter, 'The Containment Concept', is an excellent description of twenty years of American policy in East Asia from 1950 onwards.

The book's approach to the reassessment of American interests is conservative, optimistic and generally convincing. Moreover, no attempt is made to dodge the tricky issues. For Clough, the chief focus of American interests is and should be Japan, for 'The United States has intrinsic interests of the highest order in only one East Asian country: Japan'.[26] The American-Japanese alliance has worked surprisingly well, especially as it was between two countries which only a few years before had been engaged in all-out hostilities, and it has served well the commercial, political and strategic interests of both partners. It follows that any reassessment of American interests in other parts of the Far East must take into account the effects on the relationship with Japan. Thus in judging whether or not American interests in South-east Asia are important enough to be defended by force:

> The principal concern should be the impact of what happens there on the major U.S. interest in East Asia—Japan—and on this country's global general interests.
>
> If Japan lost confidence in the United States as a reliable ally and, deciding to go its own way, hastened to develop powerful military forces armed with nuclear weapons, U.S. interests in Japan would be seriously damaged.[27]

Again, involvement in both Korea and Taiwan, while important because of direct American interests, must also be seen very much in the context of Japanese interests in and concern for the future of both countries.[28] Finally, and most important, any developments in relations with China must take account of the effects on Japan, and must not weaken the alliance. The Americans blundered in 1971, and despite subsequent attempts to repair the damage of the 'Nixon shock', the Japanese still suspect that they are not kept fully informed about either American moves towards China or in the Far East in general.

With regard to relations with China, Clough disdains the euphoria of some American commentators, and his comments are cautious and surely realistic. Such relations must be kept in a proper perspective, and their importance must not be exaggerated in comparison to relations with the Soviet Union (globally) or Japan (regionally). The two countries are far apart in their declared positions on most major world issues and, although they may sometimes adopt parallel policies, any lasting improve-

[26] Clough, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–37.

ment in relations needs the more frequent adoption of such paralle policies, together with progress on bilateral issues and the expansion o trade. From the Chinese side, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai acted lik 'men in a hurry' in the haste they showed after 1970 to open relations:

> The effort to improve relations with the United States and Japan, lik the campaign to denigrate Lin Piao by his association with the Sovie Union, seems part of an effort by Mao and Chou to fix China's foreig policy course for possibly stormy times after Mao's death.[29]

The biggest doubt about Clough's generally convincing reassessment mus be over his optimistic view of the stability of the four-power system i East Asia. It is true that he is guarded in his optimism and, while playin down the chances of war among the major powers breaking out over th 'flashpoints of conflict'—Korea, Taiwan, the Sino-Soviet border, Indochin and Thailand—he does underline the danger of these flashpoints, particularl Korea.[30] But his arguments, admittedly qualified, that the Soviet Unio is essentially a conservative and status quo power in the Far East, an that there is considerable overlapping between the interests of the Unite States and Russia, are very debatable. A positive galaxy of authorities including the late Chou En-lai, Dr. James Schlesinger, Mrs. Margare Thatcher and President Park Chung-hee of Korea, would challenge eithe or both of these opinions.

The second Brookings Institution study, *The United States, China an Arms Control*, has a good deal in common with the previous book, whicl is hardly surprising since Clough is one of the four co-authors, and two o the others, A. Doak Barnett and Morton H. Halperin, were members o the study group which led to the Clough book. The assumptions of the fou authors about the interests of the United States in the Far East are ver similar to those of Clough's study. They also share, and with rather les in the way of qualification, the optimism of the previous book, not abou the stability of the system, but about possible common interests betwee China and the United States in various measures of arms control. Thi optimism is based not so much on available evidence of China's interest and intentions—the book and its Appendix, 'Chinese Nuclear Capability' and the short useful bibliography show very clearly what little evidenc we have—but on interpreting a number of Chinese actions, ignoring a goo deal of what the Chinese say, particularly about nuclear weapons, an occasionally doing some crystal-gazing. In the final chapter, 'Summin up', there is a good deal of what appears to be wishful thinking:

> These efforts [to involve China in arms control agreements or negotia tions] should not be discouraged by China's current rigid propagand line on disarmament and its denunciation of specific arms contro measures. There are sound reasons for believing that the Chines are likely to become more receptive to the concept of limited arm control measures as their participation in international affairs deepens.[3]

And again, referring to China's public opposition to the non-proliferatio treaty:

> While it would perhaps be difficult for China to change its publi position, Chinese leaders probably recognise that it would not be i

29 *Ibid.*, p. 146.
30 *Ibid.*, p. 158.
31 Clough, Barnett, Halperin and Kahan, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

> China's interest for Japan and India to acquire nuclear weapons. So it is by no means impossible that persuasion by other nations might help to convince the Chinese that it is in China's own interest to tone down its public opposition to the NPT and even to give it tacit support in private.[32]

It is of course always easy in reviewing books to pick out quotations to back up the praise or criticism that one wishes to make, and policy-oriented books, which speculate about future prospects, are easy meat. To be fair to the authors, they deal in a very thoughtful way with one of the great issues facing American policy-makers in the Far East: how to cope with the new strategic situation, and the attendant arms control problems, especially in Asia, of a China that already has the nuclear capacity to hit its Asiatic neighbours and the Soviet Union, and by the 1980s will probably have missiles that can reach North America. They examine the role of nuclear weapons in China's foreign policy, the effects of Chinese weapons on American defence, the possible effects on the global strategic balance, and the impact on America's relations with Japan and its other Far Eastern friends and allies. They then discuss Chinese attitudes towards arms control, and explore a number of possible 'arms control packages' with China, packages in which, in the opinion of the authors, Chinese interests parallel those of the United States.[33] Four packages are examined, two at length: an American no-first-use pledge, and various agreements covering the Korean peninsula including a declaration by the two Koreas that their territories would constitute a nuclear-free zone. In the course of their analysis, the authors tend to underline a number of the points made by some of the previous books: that China sees the Soviet Union as the most serious threat today, not only militarily, but also in a subversive sense as a rival for influence with other communist parties and with governments on China's borders[34]; that the Korean peninsula is the Berlin of the Far East, the place 'where the attainment of long-term stability is both so difficult and so vital'[35]; and that it is essential for the United States to maintain a firm and confident relationship with Japan. This means that the Americans should seek in advance Japanese agreement to their plans for approaches to China on arms control.[36]

It is over the prospects for the Korean peninsula, that there are interesting differences of emphasis among the books. In their detailed examination of the proposed package of agreements covering Korea, the four authors of *The United States, China and Arms Control*, while not ignoring the problems, remain optimistic and indeed enthusiastic. They support an agreement on the renunciation of force by both Koreas and by the four major powers in Korea, they argue for a nuclear-free zone, they look favourably on the gradual but eventual withdrawal of American forces from South Korea, and they consider international supervision of the demilitarised zone.[37] Hinton devotes much less attention to the future of the peninsula and, while there is no direct disagreement between his comments and those of the four authors, he is much more pessimistic on any prospects for agreement. Both

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–132.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 137.
[37] *Ibid.*, Ch. 6, pp. 105–127. I have not attempted anything other than the briefest summary of the main points in the chapter. The authors make their case persuasively.

books agree that while Peking publicly supports the demand for the complete withdrawal of American forces, in private the Chinese are much more lukewarm, fearing a vacuum that might tempt the Soviet Union, or more likely Japan.[38] Scalapino, in a lengthy analysis of American options, takes a much more gloomy view of the prospects for the establishment of a 'zone of peace' in the Korean peninsula and of the dangers of withdrawing American forces. His conclusions are that on both issues, particularly the latter, the risks and the drawbacks outweigh the possible gains. The four authors mention in passing that a united communist Korea could, like Yugoslavia, follow a more independent line in the communist world and not be so dependent on Moscow and Peking; Scalapino dismisses this argument.[39]

Finally to Scalapino's book, completed according to the Preface immediately after the final American withdrawal from Indochina, and written, one suspects, with at least half an eye to its effects on presidential candidates and their advisers. Such gibes apart, this is a study in the grand manner, combining a good perspective of the whole canvas, the continent of Asia, and plenty of attention to the detailed brushwork, the six powers. The book will be of value to fellow academics and to undergraduates, not least because it concludes with a long (22 pages) and full bibliographic essay. Scalapino's main concern is to look at what is happening in Asia today, and against this background to explore the options in foreign policy available to the major powers. Although the other five powers are dealt with adequately, and considerable attention is paid to domestic factors and internal politics and their possible effects on foreign policy, the main thrust of the book is undoubtedly an examination of recent American policies, and an appraisal of alternatives open to the United States. About one third of the text is devoted to this subject. While Scalapino is concerned with far more than a simple apologia for the United States, and is quite willing to be critical on points of detail, he is sympathetic to recent American policy and is generally willing to explain and defend American actions, for example in Indochina. His analysis of American involvement is cogent, he is rightly contemptuous of much of the polemical writing about American policy, and he makes some interesting and provocative points on the 'lessons' of Indochina for the United States. These 'lessons' have a possible application far beyond the confines of South-east Asia:

> The principal 'lesson' of Vietnam is that the United States cannot fight protracted limited wars involving the use of American military forces without risking profound political divisions at home. This will be true, incidentally, no matter what nations or regions are involved.[40]

Some of his conclusions are also extremely sobering:

> As noted earlier, a sizeable and growing body of opinion both in the United States and abroad holds that military incrementalism was a

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118; Hinton, *op. cit.*, p. 147. The point is of significance in view of President-elect Carter's promise that he expected to conduct a 'gradual and slow' withdrawal of the remaining American troops in South Korea, and Vice-President Mondale's confirmation of that promise when he visited Tokyo at the end of January.

[39] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–234, for an equally persuasive analysis of American options about and American policies towards Korea. In an earlier passage (p. 95) he argues that American and Chinese policies do not appear to be converging on the Korean issue.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 255. The main analysis of American involvement in Indochina is on pp. 250–270.

> critical error, and that if the United States at the outset had confronted Hanoi with the prospect of overwhelming force, the North Vietnamese would have had no choice except to desist. Right or wrong, the likelihood is that in the event of another conflict, that route will be chosen.[41]

Scalapino agrees with the other authors in seeing North-east Asia, where Russia, Japan, China and Korea come together, as the key area in Asia, indeed 'one of the most sensitive in the world', and an area in which 'the power relationships are especially important and complex'.[42] Again he stresses the primary importance of the American-Japanese alliance and, while not ignoring the economic and strategic problems that impede the working of the alliance, he argues that relations between the two powers are likely to be increasingly close in the years ahead. Scalapino shares Clough's lack of euphoria about relations with China, arguing that American-Chinese relations must be viewed as a part of a triangle including the Soviet Union, that the principal reason for the dramatic change in Peking's policies in 1971 was fear of the Soviet Union, and that the new ties between the United States and China were not produced out of any ideological or political convergence or from agreement on specific issues such as Taiwan or Korea. The elements bringing the two powers together have been largely negative, and 'a Sino-American alliance defies logic on many counts'.[43] The future of Sino-American relations also involves the question of American credibility, a point referred to on several occasions in the book. Scalapino is very concerned about the possible effects of a decline in American credibility, after the failure in Indochina, both on allies and friends of the United States like Japan and Korea, on neutrals, on the Soviet Union, and on China:

> If a major change comes about in Sino-Soviet relations in the near future, it will have been produced by Peking's re-evaluation of America and the decision that the United States is weak and unreliable.[44]

Taken together the six books provide a wealth of information and ideas about the international politics of Asia, particularly the Far East, since 1945, and offer some valuable and at times provocative suggestions about the present and the future. The overall quality of the analysis, whether one agrees with it or not, is high, and the viewpoint of the various authors is generally balanced and also conservative. It is impossible within the limits of a short article to do anything like justice to the great variety of themes and arguments deployed, and I have tried to concentrate, though I hope not to the total exclusion of all else, on what light the authors throw on American policy in the Far East, past, present and future. In choosing this theme—and the same objection would presumably apply to any other—one is obviously open to the danger and the charge that one merely uses the books to confirm one's own prejudices, ignoring contrary opinions. It is difficult to avoid this danger, and it is easy to make this charge.

However, having provided myself in advance with a rather flimsy absolution, it does seem possible to go on and draw one or two conclusions about American policy in the Far East that emerge from these books, certainly

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 266.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 241 and 297.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 244.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

from the ones dealing primarily with the contemporary situation. Of the many points that could be made, perhaps three need to be mentioned.

First, there is general agreement that the alliance between Japan and the United States is the key factor in American policy in the Far East, and that that alliance is likely to and should continue. The United States will be in danger of making a colossal international blunder if it ignores, downgrades or in any way undermines that alliance in the search for better relations with China or detente with the Soviet Union. Closely allied to this is a second point, the notion that the most important area for American policy and interests is Scalapino's North-east Asia, where Japan, China, the two Koreas, the Soviet Union and the United States meet and manoeuvre in a way not unreminiscent of the activities of the great alliance blocs in pre-1914 Europe. It is in this area that there is the greatest danger of a crisis leading to regional conflict and then to global struggle. Of course, concentration on North-east Asia must not be exclusive, and the point is stressed, with varying degrees of emphasis, that all the areas or regions of the Far East, and indeed of Asia, are interdependent. American policy-makers, and Congress, should remember that a decision, say, to go back on obligations in one area of the Far East (Indochina, for example) may well have terrible consequences elsewhere. A third point of general agreement is the sober view taken of the recent coming together of the United States and China and the associated pessimistic view of the prospects for more cordial relations in the near future. This is controversial, and there are powerful arguments on the other side. But some of the arguments set out here, that China and the United States have little in the way of real interests in common, or that so much in the relationship depends on factors like the Chinese assessment of American reliability and credibility, or on the future of relations between China and the Soviet Union or China and Japan, deserve much more attention than they receive from the more optimistic commentators on Sino-American relations.

To conclude on a lighter note, it is nice to see that even the most distinguished academics occasionally make confident forecasts that prove to be wide of the mark. Scalapino, in his analysis of the Japanese political scene, describes the Japan Communist Party as the ' most dynamic force within the Japanese left ', and as ' likely to gain additional seats in the Diet in the near future '.[45] These statements are hardly supported by the results of the elections last December, although Scalapino was in good company in making them, as almost all academic commentators forecast that the Communists would do well.[46] On the question of the succession in China after the deaths of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, not one of the books under review mentions Hua Kuo-feng and, with the exception of Scalapino, they very sensibly play safe and name no names, talking in general terms about successors and collective leadership. Hinton, in speculating as to whether or not there will be any more great upheavals in China, gives in a sentence what almost happened in China in the spring and summer of 1976:

> The only likely occasion of another ' upheaval ' would arise if Chou En-lai were to die before Mao, and if the radicals were then able to

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[46] According to *The Japan Times Weekly*, Dec. 18, 1976, the Japan Communist Party vote went up from 5,496,827 in 1972 to 5,878,192 in December 1976. However, the JCP share of the vote dropped from 10·5 per cent to 10·4 per cent and the number of seats held dropped from 38 to 17.

> overthrow or bypass Chou's moderate team and persuade the Chairman to order an ' upheaval '.[47]

As for Scalapino, he devotes some space to the question of the coming order in China, reviewing the prospects of a number of leaders, both civilian and military. His conclusion is that two men ' are destined for key administrative and party roles, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao '.[48] He may of course still be right about the irrepressible Teng, who in January was reported to be about to make a second come-back from political oblivion, but the prospects for Chang of doing anything more exciting than contemplating life on a remote commune appear to be slender.

[47] Hinton, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

[48] Scalapino, *op. cit.*, p. 59. The popular writer, Han Suyin, writing from a very different perspective, made a similar forecast in *Wind in the Tower: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution 1949–1975* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), p. 384.

# REVIEWS

## CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

**Soviet Science, Technology, Design:** Interaction and Convergence. By Raymond Hutchings. *London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 320 pp. £12·00.*

A GREAT deal has been published in the past ten years or so about the organisation, financing and economics of Soviet science and technology. While Dr. Hutchings's lively account of these matters, in the first half of his book, does not substantially change our existing picture, his description of the organisation of Soviet science is informative and realistic, and he is undoubtedly correct in his conclusion that the predominant position of the Academy of Sciences 'retains the theoretical bias of the pre-Revolutionary period'. In his chapter on expenditure on science and technology he refrains from making his own estimates, perhaps wisely in view of the wide margin of error in such calculations—but he should certainly have reported and discussed the important studies of this subject made in the United States by Nancy Nimitz, Louvan Nolting and others (incidentally, he comments that 'the absence of data for 1954 is particularly interesting', but the relevant figure was in fact published in *Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo* (1956), p. 73).

The discussion of technological policy and technical innovation is lively but brief. It is unfortunate that Dr. Hutchings's treatment of the stages of *experimental development* of prototypes and pilot processes, and *innovation* in the sense of bringing a prototype to first commercial production, are insufficiently distinguished; the organisational and economic problems of each stage are quite different.

The core of Dr. Hutchings's book—and his most original contribution to our knowledge—is his discussion of Soviet design (what the Russians called 'technical aesthetics') and its relationship with science and technology. Almost nothing has previously been written in English on Soviet design; and until recently it was a neglected topic in the Soviet Union, which did not establish its All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Technical Aesthetics until 1962. Dr. Hutchings attempts to bring out the links between the present state of Soviet design and historical, geographical, economic and cultural influences. Forced industrialisation, in which capital goods industries were strongly emphasised, resulted in lack of attention to design and to a considerable limitation on varieties especially in consumer goods; styles and colours until recently were very poor, and the Soviet Union does not produce bubble cars and caravans. What Dr. Hutchings calls the 'selectively uneven' quality of Soviet goods has also been determined by historical circumstances and present priorities, as has the 'earthy and foolproof simplicity' of many mechanisms. Less obviously, but nevertheless insistently, Dr. Hutchings argues, the 'Soviet horizontal syndrome' has led to preference for horizontal rather than vertical developments (partly for geographical reasons) and preference is shown for 'largeness, grandeur, grandiosity'. Here Dr. Hutchings sometimes pushes

stimulating ideas to the point of eccentricity: Khrushchev's hostility to the U-2 flights is partly attributed to his objection to vertical movement, and double glazing is an example of 'side-by-side placing' (p. 200).

The author correctly draws the general conclusion that 'design will become more imbued by science and technology; that science will become more design-conscious and more technology-conscious; and that technology will become more closely related both to science and to design'. He does not entirely succeed in pulling together his discussion of the inter-relationship between science, technology and design into a coherent account of the whole problem. But along the way he provides much interesting information and many ideas; he is very fully acquainted with the striking and rapid recent developments in Soviet design.

*University of Birmingham* R. W. DAVIES

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

**Power and Interdependence:** World Politics in Transition. By Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. *Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1977. 273 pp. $11.95. Pb: $5.95.*

**Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations.** By Edward L. Morse. *New York: Fress Press. 1976. (To be publ. in UK by Collier Macmillan, London.) 203 pp. $10.95.*

How radical is international political economy? Does it merely marginally redefine the study of international politics, introducing an intriguing new aspect or dimension to the existing discipline? Or does it—without necessarily being conscious of looking for a fight—challenge the very foundations of conventional study of the subject—so moderating the old assumptions and implications that by the time the work of conversion and reconstruction is complete very little of the old structure will remain unchanged?

Although neither of these books seems particularly revolutionary, each in its quiet and gentlemanly way will, I believe, play an important part in the eventual overthrow of conventional international relations, rendering the old debates between realists and idealists, classicists and behaviouralists as out-of-date and irrelevant as the theological controversies of another age. Of the two, Morse is perhaps the more consciously radical: 'the traditional paradigm for understanding international politics has become obsolete' (p. xvi); whereas Nye and Keohane still protest that their intention is 'not to supplant but to supplement' (p. 29) the realist view of the international system.

Both books however, are agreed on certain fundamentally radical points: that foreign policy as it used to be understood is a declining business; that military power is less often decisive and that the sources of power in and over the system are now so much more diverse that bargaining is much more complex; that the national pursuit of economic security leads not to harmony of interests but to conflict almost as deep as the pursuit of military security; and that the treatment of 'global commons', the provision of public goods and the conservation of resources are key issues in the newly integrated and interdependent transnational system. Significantly, both are remarkably cautious in their conclusions, and sceptical of any

pretension to predict outcomes. 'Contemporary international society', says Morse, 'is a transitional one . . . [but] it is by no means clear what its next stage will be . . . the breakdown of the system may well be as likely as its evolution to a new form of centralized control that would transcend the nation-state system' (pp. 192–193). Similarly, 'It is difficult to calculate asymmetries, and where there are many of them, to specify the linkages between them. Even if we felt fairly comfortable in our assessment of the power structure, whether based on asymmetries or military resources, we could not be sure of predicting outcomes as well' (Nye and Keohane, p. 225).

This caution and humility—and the shared respect for facts and all the untidily contradictory developments of the real world—does not deter either from pursuing the search for theoretical explanations. But it does produce —and a good thing, too—a much more pragmatic and tentative tone than was customary in many of the postwar schools of international relations theory.

This common feature is the more remarkable because of the great differences in style and approach. Nye and Keohane are more diagrammatic, and expository; Morse more pedagogic and argumentative, as well as more open to the literature on his political left.

Nye and Keohane set out by asking two questions. First, what are the characteristics of world politics under conditions of extensive interdependence—a question which in turn requires a closer examination of the real nature of interdependence, and its profound implications for the sources and uses of power in the political and economic relations within states and between them. Second, how and why do 'regimes' change in areas of complex interdependence? That is to say, what brings about revision of the rules of the game by and large observed by states in their dealings with economic enterprises and other non-state actors and with each other—whether in money, trade, communications, the catching of fish or the exploitation of undersea oil resources? Both questions seem to them to be either ignored or inadequately answered by the old-style 'realists' of the power-politics schools. Specifically, they criticise the latter for failing to recognise that economic interdependence implies: (1) multiple channels of communication and interaction between states—instead of the primacy of foreign policy interactions and structures; and (2) that the hierarchy of issues (implied by the realists) does not always hold and that there are issues in which military force is not used and may not even be relevant.

The method adopted is to examine in some detail two sets of international relations (United States-Canadian and United States-Australian relations, 1920–1970) and two 'issue-areas' ('money' and 'oceans'); and to use each to test the hypotheses emerging from the others. As a teaching device, this has the obvious advantage of persuading students to check generalisations against factual material, to use statistical data with discrimination and to be diligent in asking for political explanations of technical decisions.

For example, they suggest that complex interdependence in international relations decreases the uses of force—indeed they go further than I think most Canadians would go in discounting almost entirely the possibility that the United States would *ever* use force against its northern neighbour. The declining utility of force, they then suggest, tends both to make issues more

equal in importance and to make the outcomes of political bargaining more variable. The international hierarchy, they conclude, tends to be eroded, not reinforced—though they also admit that 'the politics of agenda control and formation become increasingly important' (p. 33) and in trying to form transnational coalitions to achieve political goals, the economically powerful states have obvious advantages rarely enjoyed by the weak and poor.

To account for regime changes, they propose (as a rough guide to analysis more than as either-or alternatives) four explanations: an overall structure model, an economic process model, the issue structure and the international organisation model. Of the four, the last one—as they themselves rather ruefully admit—is by far the weakest, often being little more than a mirror-image of forces at work outside the organisation. The book concludes with a brief attempt to apply some of its findings to the problems of contemporary policy-making in the United States.

Readers will find that many of the criticisms or objections that occur to them have been anticipated and answered—an obvious advantage perhaps of dual authorship. (Its corresponding disadvantage though is that each partner perhaps confirms the other in the use of jargon or analytical modes that in a single author would seem somewhat idiosyncratic.) Two such possible objections might be made. The issue-area concept, for example, can encourage either an over-narrow definition of the issues—very marked in the blind acceptance of the issues perceived by conventional monetary economists, for instance—or in a rather haphazard collection of very disparate 'oceans' issues linked only (as they confess) by the common denominator of sea-water. Similarly the idea of a 'regime', although neat and handy as an intellectual gadget, is surely apt to encourage a certain complacency about the efficacy of international law and organisation, a mistaking of appearance for the reality of order. This tendency to discount the anarchy in the system is nowhere more apparent than in the designation of the free-for-all legitimised by the Jamaica agreements of 1976 as a new international monetary 'regime'. Exaggerating the achievements of international conferences and organisations is a form of flattery that in the long run does little service to the admirable causes of co-operation and mutual understanding and accommodation to which both authors are so evidently devoted.

Morse's book by contrast is a straight argument, set firmly in a strong historical perspective. Thus, he is at greater pains to define rather more precisely what it is that is undergoing—he would not claim the process is complete—'transformation'. (Polanyi's phrase is a better and less ambiguous one than 'modernization', but the latter is explained by the fact that the book comes in a publisher's series on this rather woolly theme.) He identifies it as the Westphalia system since it was in the mid-seventeenth century that the fundamental assumptions were first made explicit of a secular international system based on sovereignty and equality of states and the primacy of foreign over domestic policy. The greater attention that Morse gives to non-American writers (Aron, Perroux, Prebisch and others, in dealing, for example, with the concept of core-areas and peripheries) makes him rather more sensitive to the systemic (indeed, transnational) sources of American power. (Nye and Keohane, in fact, disarmingly admit that the 'socio-structural aspect is not caught by our analysis of inter-government bargaining' (p. 189).)

**Both these books, however, possibly still tend to understate somewhat the vulnerability of the United States to disorder and discontent in the system—the dependence of American corporations on the profits of foreign operations being substantially greater than the dependence of the American economy on imports—and thus the political dilemma for policy-makers. But that is to carp unduly and ungraciously. Both from an academic and a political angle, these are important books.**

*London School of Economics* SUSAN STRANGE

**Crisis Management:** Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age. By Phil Williams. *London: Martin Robertson. 1976. 230 pp. £7·85.*

**Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. III.** Edited by Patrick J. McGowan. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 320 pp. £9·00. Pb: £4·00.*

**The Dynamics of International Politics.** 3rd edn., By Norman J. Padelford, George A. Lincoln and Lee D. Olvey. *New York: Macmillan Publishing; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 603 pp. £7·50.*

PHIL WILLIAMS regards ' crisis management ' as an art rather than a science (p. 9) and defines it narrowly but precisely, with reference only to confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union or China which opened a distinct possibility of military hostilities; the Sarajevo crisis serves as a foil. The central line of argument is found in the duality of purpose of crisis management in the nuclear era: on top of promoting conflicting positive national interests the parties have also a common negative interest in ensuring that a nuclear war does not ensue (p. 47 f.).

One quarter of the book is devoted to an outline of the background and development of the concept; the remainder is concerned with the actual practice: the issue of crisis decision-making, of maintaining control over events and of moderating coercive bargaining. The author concludes with a general appreciation of the remarkable set of rules of prudent restraint so far evolved and leaves the question open whether detente may render them unnecessary.

Williams happily uses the insights gained in the formal quantitative American analyses but blends them with a historical/analytical treatment which is more popular on this side of the Atlantic and thus avoids much of the forbidding terminology and abstruseness frequently encountered in literature. The Americans have not, of course, abandoned scientific treatment as the *Sage International Yearbooks of Foreign Policy Studies* clearly show.

In the preface to Volume III the editor surveys with a considerable degree of justified satisfaction, the twenty-eight articles so far published. Many British readers may tend to suspect these writings for varying reasons: their excessive pretension, recondite but frequently faulty methodology, misleading precision due to the employment of mathematical structures based on flimsy sets of assumptions, paucity of substantive findings, use of forbidding terminology, and so on. And yet, despite all these characteristics, the three *Yearbooks* undoubtedly add to our understanding of foreign policy by sharpening the readers' awareness of some facets of the field. Their usefulness would vary with individuals who have had to be both receptive *and* possess substantial knowledge of political realities; otherwise

it would be of little use and even misleading. All the nine papers in the present volume include, in varying proportion, empirical material, especially on the Middle East and the United States, extensive analytical treatment, and elaborate up-to-date bibliographies. Several deal with conflict and war. Some findings are quite illuminating and plausible; for example, A. R. Wiegner analyses four major options available to the Israelis in 1967 and the reasons why a pre-emptive strike was the most rational choice, while J. Wilkenfeld tests the potency of three factors in determining international conflict behaviour in the Middle East. He convincingly demonstrates that such behaviour is related to the conflict individual states have been subjected to, and to their conflict activity in the past but, with the exception of Jordan, not to domestic conflict.

At the same time, many American undergraduates continue to use 'traditional' textbooks which are becoming increasingly sophisticated. It is of some interest to note the similarity of the contents of the third edition of the sound and common-sensical text by N. Padelford, the late G. A. Lincoln and L. Olvey, and that of the 1954 *International Politics*[1] by the first two of its authors on which it is based. The focus remains on the United States as the primary actor, but economics and technology receive much more treatment and decision-making is expanded into a separate part. The concluding part on the organisation of international community remains similar in structure and is relatively reduced in size.

*University of Southampton* J. FRANKEL

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

**The Economics of the Oil Crisis.** Edited by T. M. Rybczynski. *London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre. 1976. 202 pp. £10·00.*

EARLY 1975 was a difficult time to publish a satisfactory volume on the economics of the oil crisis. The steady decline in the real price of oil during the 1960s had left energy economics in an intellectually barren state, and the damage was only just starting to be repaired when the climatic events of the autumn of 1973 overtook us all. This volume has its good points, but suffers very much from this previous lack of concern, in that the best chapters have least to do with the micro-economics of the oil and energy industries, concentrating more on the impact that oil price rises since the early 1970s will have had on the wider international economic scene.

The most stimulating contribution is Jan Tumlir's chapter on 'Oil Payments and Oil Debt and the Problem of Adjustment'. Fundamentally making a theoretical contribution, he points to the various outcomes which are dependent on whether we are seeing a financial or real transfer at work. He concludes to his satisfaction that the oil producers should be able to sustain an average growth of imports of 25 per cent per annum; that their current spending should equal current revenue around 1980; and that the surplus accumulated by then (about $250 billion) should be re-absorbed by these countries within the subsequent three to four years.

Two other chapters by Max Corden (both in conjunction with Peter Oppenheimer) complement and expand Tumlir's analysis. They look at the

[1] *International Politics: Foundations of International Relations* (New York, London: Macmillan, 1954). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1955, p. 272.

different kinds of balance-of-payments effects associated with the oil price rise, as well as at its inflationary and employment implications. The chapter with Oppenheimer looks particularly at the overall problem of adjusting aggregate demand and argues that the initial impact of the price increases was demand-deflationary at the very time that governments the world over were moving anyway towards deflationary measures to temper the 1973 world boom. In failing to appreciate the deflationary consequences of the oil price rise, government policies became more recession biased. Elsewhere, Harry Johnson provides a few of his usual trenchant pages (on why the recycling problem is unimportant) in a chapter which is concerned with the relationship between the growth of world inflation and exchange-rate systems. George Ray points to the danger that this crisis will increase the recourse to bilateral trading arrangements and protectionism.

On the whole, however, this book is somewhat disappointing, leaving an impression that the ' real ' world is far away, for it lacks authority in just those sectors which should be dealing with hard figures and projections. It is noticeable, for instance, that the various authors' predictions about the development of the petro-dollar surplus are at cross-purposes (see pp. xv, 9 and 48), but that no attempt is made to reconcile them because, one assumes, only Tumlir was really qualified to pass judgment on what the absorptive capacity of the oil-producing countries would really prove to be. Some judgments were rash even by the standards of early 1975 when the volume was put together (the editor himself gives a remarkably uncritical analysis of the implications of ' Project Independence ' in Chapter 7). There is also no hard discussion of the costs and lead-times of developing alternative energy sources, without which wider generalisations should really not be made. Of course, one recognises the problem of producing a volume when many of the effects of the 1973–74 price rises were still to be fully felt, but this should have been a better book.

*Chatham House* LOUIS TURNER

**International Marine Environment Policy:** The Economic Dimension. By Charles S. Pearson. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. 1975. 127 pp. (Studies in International Affairs No. 25.) £4·85.*

THE theme of this study, sponsored by the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University,[1] is that ' by not attaching prices to environmental resources services, the market system fails to achieve efficient resource allocations '. Common resources such as the sea and air, have been traditionally seen as ' free goods ', so that the price of their use or consumption does not reflect their real economic, or scarcity, value: further, ' users of the environmental resource for waste disposal purposes create costs that are external to themselves but are borne by others and are called externalities or external diseconomies '. Environmental controls must then ' internalise ' these ' externalities '.

To illustrate, the scale and development of transport of oil by sea is examined, with supporting statistics, and the problems of ocean dumping are surveyed, with the various conventions that have been adopted, or recommendations made, to regulate and solve them. The study divides the

[1] For review of other studies on the sea, see *International Affairs*, July 1976, p. 456.

cost-benefit distribution of restrictions on ocean dumping into four components: internal shift of costs, the increase to be borne by taxpayers, consumers and producers of substances generating waste for disposal; external shifts, such as the establishment of an international compensation fund for developing countries compelled to devise land disposal of waste; inter-temporal distribution, or the 'involuntary transfer of welfare from the future to the current generation'; a rent-charge for ocean dumping that falls within permissible limits.

There is also a numerical analysis in tabular form of flows of damage, abatement costs, and welfare charges between a given country and its neighbours, according to the various measures of marine environment control that are used.

This economic analysis of ocean management is both informative and illuminating.

*King's College, London* J. E. S. FAWCETT

**Marine Policy and the Coastal Community:** The Impact of the Law of the Sea. Edited by Douglas M. Johnston. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 338 pp. £9.95.*

THIS volume consists of a collection of thirteen essays on the law of the sea by a team of American, Canadian and British social scientists, most of them specialists in marine policy and coastal community studies. The authors' aim is a research study into the new developments of ocean technologies and their impact on the social sciences—'a blend of policy-oriented studies of marine affairs with the humanistic literature of community welfare' (p. 10).

Each chapter is clearly structured with a general introduction on the contents of the essay, subtitles preceding longer paragraphs, and final short summaries of the article and/or general conclusions. Extensive footnotes at the end of each analysis, as well as a detailed index, are of great value to students specialising in maritime studies, while additional references to further readings will also be appreciated by new readers looking for easily accessible literature.

The book is divided into three main parts: the Marine Economy, Ocean Politics, and the Coastal Community. They are preceded by an introductory chapter by Edgar Gold on the manifold aspects of the law of the sea—a historic retrospect as well as a profound account of the proceedings at UNCLOS III (United Nations Law of the Sea Conference); with cross-references to more detailed discussions of certain points in later chapters to avoid overlapping. As the new law of the sea is still under discussion, some conclusions are unavoidably only provisional. This becomes obvious in the final chapter by Douglas M. Johnston, in which he analyses the various items of the Informal Single Negotiating Text from May 1975, though this does not deprive his analysis of thoroughness and depth. The many tables, which serve to illustrate points raised in the articles, suffer, however, from being hopelessly outdated: most figures only cover the year 1972 (in some cases 1973), and the sources are from 1973 or 1974. At a time of rapid change in the law of the sea this is a great disadvantage.

Though a vast number of aspects of ocean politics are treated in the book, such as marine resources, marine transport, military use of the sea, biogeophysical marine attributes of states, and so on, fish and fisheries

politics are conceded a predominant role. This subject is dealt with in various chapters from different angles: from the biological point of view (pp. 45–48), the economic (pp. 70–77), the organisational (pp. 95–98), the supply-and-demand (pp. 119–141), and the political (pp. 183–214). All these aspects are then analysed in five case studies: Western Europe (Robert Boardman), the North Pacific (Choon-ho Park), Newfoundland (Geoffrey Stiles), Bermuda (Raoul Andersen), and Sri Lanka (Paul Alexander). The book is the first of its kind to base its analyses of ocean technologies and all related aspects on 'public international law and organisation, internal comparative politics, marine geography, resource and shipping economics, sociology and anthropology' (p. 10). As the study maintains high research standards throughout (despite the vast scope of its topics), it will be of great value to the expert as well as to the newcomer to the subject.

*Chatham House* ANGELIKA VOLLE

**Agricultural Trade Policies.** By J. C. Nagle. *Farnborough: Saxon House; Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1976. (Publ. in conjunction with the Agricultural Adjustment Unit, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.) 171 pp. £6·25.*

**Energy and Food Production.** By Gerald Leach. *Guildford: IPC for the International Institute for Environment and Development. 1976. 137 pp. £5·50.*

**Food, Foreign Policy and Raw Materials Cartels.** By William Schneider. *New York: Crane, Russak. 1976. 122 pp. (Strategy Paper 28.) $5·95. Pb: $2·95.*

**Food and Interdependence:** The Effect of Food and Agricultural Policies of Developed Countries on the Food Problems of Developing Countries. By David Jones. *London: Overseas Development Institute. 1976. 51 pp. Pb: £1·00.*

**Food and Poverty:** The Political Economy of Confrontation. By Radha Sinha. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 196 pp. £6·50.*

THESE books are concerned with aspects of the world food situation in the light of recent experience. Higher prices have created anxiety among both developed and developing countries. Understandably, there has been a wish to evolve a more stable pattern of international trade, to safeguard resources and to assure more adequate supplies of food for the needy. In fact, as the studies reviewed here make clear, there exist no obvious, simple or easy solutions. If current difficulties are to be overcome, then changes within agriculture in the attitudes of nations to each other and in the value systems of individuals may be needed.

J. C. Nagle, author of *Agricultural Trade Policies*, is familiar with official negotiations and international agencies. His book is stronger in descriptive than analytic terms and offers 'practical' rather than 'ideal' recommendations. After an account of recent agricultural policy in Japan, Europe and the United States, the author discusses recent trends in prices and trade. He concludes that the events of 1972–74 do not herald a period of global shortage. However, the prospects for developed and developing countries are in sharp contrast. Since food supplies are expected to grow less rapidly than food requirements in the developing countries, the pro-

duction potential of developed countries must be mobilised to bridge the gap. The problems of making this food available to the needy are acknowledged. The author suggests that both aid and trade must have a role and is hopeful of Lomé-type arrangements between developing and developed countries. He recognises that international trade arrangements have to work with measures which can safeguard agricultural incomes in developed countries and gives encouragement to the idea of international commodity management.

*Energy and Food Production* tackles the question of the viability of modern agricultural technology in an era of high-priced energy. The author makes a notable attempt to quantify energy input requirements for differing agricultural technologies. As the book makes clear, the basic statistical data do not permit entirely accurate or comprehensive measurement. An important and sometimes overlooked feature is the energy input needed not only on the farm but in the agricultural supply industries, in food processing and distribution and in cooking. Leach's work indicates that in this overall sense the food supply system of developed countries exhibits low energy efficiency compared with that of many pre-industrialised societies. Given the low energy prices of the 1960s this was a good deal, but at higher energy costs new technologies will be needed. An interesting review of the techniques of using straw, fertiliser and manure is given and the book is completed by useful appendices and energy budgets.

This is a timely and important book even after the first shock of the 'energy crisis' has been absorbed. The information it gives will be helpful to policy-makers. They will, however, have to face the problem that not only is energy scarce (and therefore 'valuable') but also that the world has too little capital, raw materials and human skills to match all its desires. Even an 'inefficient' use of energy may be justified in such circumstances. At times the author appears to identify food needs with nutritional requirements. This will not do. Men are not livestock needing a 'balanced ration' but people who choose certain foods and who are poorer if they are compelled to absorb the same nutrients in an undesired form. Food is not just fuel; it is also fun.

The concept of persuasion by restricting food supplies is as old as the story of siege warfare. William Schneider does not argue for a policy of starving one's opponents but does suggest that, as the world's principal source of grain exports, the United States is in a strong position to exert economic leverage. The basis of his analysis rests upon estimates of future agricultural production possibilities in the United States, upon a continuing Soviet commitment to increase livestock production and upon the assumed inability of agriculture in the Soviet Union or elsewhere to meet the implied growth in grain requirements. To safeguard its own raw material position—and that of its allies—the United States is urged to build stockpiles of sensitive materials. Having assured its own security the United States could then manipulate agricultural exports as a 'short term instrument' of diplomacy. By withholding supplies pressure would be put on the Soviet Union to transfer resources to food production and the American position in relation to raw material cartels such as OPEC would be strengthened.

The credibility of this analysis is open to doubt. Under pressure, importing countries can increase their self-sufficiency by cutting domestic consumption and increasing production. The process is politically unpleasant but if it can be claimed to result from foreign 'blackmail' most of the anger can be

directed against the defaulting supplier. Again, it is not easy to police a system of export embargoes unless all non-embargoed countries agree to limit their exports to the country against whom restrictions are directed. Finally, as a large commercial exporter the United States has a major interest in maintaining access to overseas markets. The possibility that American supplies might be cut off can be used by interest groups in importing areas, not least in Western Europe, to justify high levels of protection designed to ensure self-sufficiency.

The last two books reviewed here are concerned with providing food for those who cannot afford to pay, especially the poorest citizens of the poorest countries. Both recognise clearly that the problem is not simply a matter of giving away food but involves the whole process of economic change and of trade between nations. David Jones's contribution is notable for its clarity, its perception of many subtleties of the food problem and its readiness to make specific recommendations. Among these are suggestions that the EEC should import more meat and livestock products, produce more cereals, establish food security stocks and increase cereal production for the purpose of providing food aid. Mr. Jones knows well that these proposals will not command unanimous support, even among those who share his concern for developing countries, but this short paper provides an excellent basis for fruitful debate and a challenge to anyone who feels complacent about the problem.

Radha Sinha's book also challenges accepted opinion. He argues that only a radical redistribution of economic and political power from the developed to the underdeveloped countries can arrest a major confrontation. Greater equality is needed both within developing countries and between countries. Sinha emphasises that this will need a new ideology in which elitism of all sorts is removed. Precisely what this new ideology is to be remains unclear but it appears to draw heavily upon the ideas of Mao and to a lesser degree of Gandhi. In arguing for so radical a change, the author reviews the results of past attempts to solve the problem of providing food for the poor and argues that these have failed and cannot be expected to succeed in the future. His kindest comments on Western attempts to help are reserved for the Lomé convention which he regards as promising but unproven. For the future, developing countries are urged to act together to boycott trade and aid from richer countries and to co-ordinate their own industrialisation, trade and finance.

This is a thought-provoking book which makes uncomfortable reading for any Western citizen. It is scholarly with an abundance of references which demonstrate the author's depth of study. For many the work will be marred by an underlying and pervasive bitterness and hostility to things Western, especially American. However, in so far as the book underlines the fact that food problems are about our value system as well as about techniques of production and economic organisation it will help make discussion more realistic and effective. One can disagree with Radha Sinha but still feel grateful to him for this book.

*University of Reading* JOHN MARSH

**Policy and Practice in Rural Development.** Proceedings of the second international seminar on Change in Agriculture, Reading, September 9–19, 1974. Edited by Guy Hunter, A. H. Bunting and Anthony Bottrall. *London: Croom Helm in association with the Overseas Development Institute. 1976. 520 pp. £14·95.*

THE first international seminar held in Reading in 1968 was largely concerned with the technology of agricultural change in developing countries.[1] This was the time of euphoria about the early successes of the 'green revolution' when secondary and tertiary constraints had hardly been identified. A decade later, disappointments tend to overshadow some real advance. The proceedings of the second international seminar, held in Reading in 1974, are more sober, indeed in part almost cynical, in their formulations.

There were those who in the mid-1960s thought that there were no problems that biologists, entomologists and plant breeders could not solve. There are some who now think that all will be well if only the nuts and bolts of administrative and institutional arrangements can be fixed in the right places. In fact, reality is more complex than this. Among the seventy-odd papers of the first seminar and the forty-odd papers of its successor, there are a fair number which deserve to be preserved. Some are outstanding. Among those of the second batch are those by Arthur Gaitskell (of Gezira fame) on development strategies and tactics, by Solon Barraclough of Cornell on agrarian structures and policies, by Bruce Johnston of Stanford Food Research on the relations between agriculture and industry, by Bede Okigbo of Ibadan on research and farm patterns, by Sivaranan of the Indian Planning Commission on administrative constraints, and by Ruthenberg (Hohenheim) and Jahnke (Addis Ababa) on livestock development. Other papers, such as an excellent one by John Mellor of Cornell on economic and social aspects of agricultural change, have been summarised beyond recognition. In fact, the summaries, 'somewhat in the style of an annotated bibliography' (p. 12), are a travesty of the original papers.

To regard the managerial problems of agricultural change as of prime concern and as open to manipulation as the editors seem to think is as untenable a proposition as the belief in the biological miracle widely held a decade ago. Even within this narrow framework, the omissions are startling. In the economic sphere, the role of prices and price ratios and their impact on patterns of income and expenditure among farm producers and food consumers has been badly neglected. In the political arena, to take farm and food policies 'as given' (p. 55) was already a major weakness of the Reading/ODI project which preceded the seminar. Barraclough is almost alone in pleading for an appreciation of social trends and political forces, and only Bruce Johnston refers to the ill-effects of distorted price relations on economic development and structural change. Some sensible observations can be found about extension services and co-operatives. Ruthenberg and Jahnke make the important distinction between the individual's interest in livestock and the collective responsibility for land in pastoral societies. Only Haldipur refers briefly to the constraints which the caste system imposes on the Indian subcontinent. Lord Seebohm's plenary address is mentioned (pp. 301 and 498), but not reproduced; nor is his name listed among the contributors to the seminar.

In sum, to bring some eighty specialists together for an exchange of

[1] A. H. Bunting, ed., *Change in Agriculture* (London: Duckworth, 1970).

views is doubtless useful, but this does not necessarily produce a synthesis, let alone a theoretical concept, of change in agriculture.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* W. KLATT

## LAW

**Superior Orders in National and International Law.** By L. C. Green. *Leyden: Sijthoff. 1976. 374 pp. Fl. 68·00. $26·00.*

PROFESSOR GREEN of the University of Alberta was commissioned in 1972 to undertake a study of the defence of superior orders in both national and international law for the Canadian Department of Justice acting on behalf of the Judge Advocate General's Department which forms part of the Canadian Department of Defence. The present work is the outcome of the Report prepared on that specific topic. For that purpose he has scrutinised the domestic law of some twenty-five countries, selected, it would appear, on the basis of availability of law texts. In the main, he has avoided the profusion of articles and papers that have appeared on this subject. This means that the work is confined almost exclusively to statute law texts, reported decisions of cases, commentaries, and extracts from government manuals on service law. Not surprisingly, he found that any attempt to isolate the national law responses to the question of superior orders as a separate defence to a criminal charge would not be feasible. Part of the essential nature of the defence of superior orders is that it refuses to be confined to the narrow basis of the legal effect of an order upon the legal responsibility of the superior who gives, and the subordinate who executes, it. Very early in the work Professor Green found himself enmeshed with judicial decisions, legislative texts and extracts from manuals of service law which dealt with such related topics as duress, coercion, physical necessity, absence of a voluntary act, and lack of the necessary intent to constitute the criminal act with which the accused was charged.

Just under two-thirds of the work (pp. 17–235) is devoted to the defence of superior orders under the various national law systems he has selected. The arrangement is somewhat curious. He divides the countries whose penal law on the topic he has investigated into 'British Common Law countries' which include the older Commonwealth countries, India and 'British Africa', South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and then deals separately with Israel and the United States. Israel is in many respects a common law-based country, from the days of the Mandate, and the United States also shares that heritage. Then he deals with non-common law countries in Western Europe, other non-common law countries, Latin American countries, and, separately, the Philippines. When he comes to deal with the international law aspects of the question of superior orders (pp. 263–340), he finds that he has to divide the topic between 'International Decisions' and 'National Decisions' which forces him back to a further and different division of the countries under scrutiny.

No doubt, the format of the work has been controlled by availability of material, but there is a considerable amount of repetition of the central considerations underlying the defence of superior orders. Although the defence cannot be isolated from the associated defences of duress, coercion, necessity and mistake, and the distinct question of lack of the necessary

*mens rea*, there is not such a wide swing in the approaches made by the various national law systems. At the end of the day two main elements in the defence of superior orders come to the fore: the knowledge, or lack of it, of the illegality of the order to which the accused subordinate is exposed, and the pressures to which he is exposed at the time of compliance with the order.

Professor Green has approached the question of superior orders primarily as a lawyer imbued with the case law system of the common law. He has sought to omit no case that has a bearing, however tenuous, upon the question of superior orders. As many of these cases, whether decided by national or international tribunals, and whether dealing with international or municipal law, have tended to yield the same result, the effect upon the reader of reading extracts from many cases is somewhat tedious. The book is really a case book. It consists in the main of extracts from a number of decided cases with a slender interconnecting thread of his own text. Thus the book falls, perhaps, between two stools. There is not enough about the individual cases to make it a case book such as he himself has written.[1] At the same time there is not enough of connecting text to make it a textbook.

In general, the defence of superior orders will fail if the accused subordinate knew, or ought to have known, of the illegality of the order with which he has complied. It will likewise fail if the pressures brought to bear upon the accused at the time of compliance with the order were not so drastic and immediate in their nature as to render the act charged an involuntary act or one committed without the necessary intent. The area of controversy tends to centre around the question whether what a man ought to have known of the illegality of the order is a matter for subjective or objective determination.

Many of the war crimes trials that took place at the close of the Second World War may have only a limited relevance to cases of war criminality that may occur today. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the two Additional Protocols thereto, if they become law, provide for a strict obligation upon States Parties thereto to give all members of their armed forces adequate instruction in those instruments. These instruments embrace a considerable part of the modern law of armed conflict. Their bona fide implementation will tend to reduce, if not to eliminate, the occasions on which that part of the defence of superior orders that concerns the knowledge or ignorance of the subordinate accused of war criminality can be successfully invoked.

Professor Green has given us a useful compendium of law texts and decided cases of selected national penal law systems touching upon this defence of superior orders. It is perhaps a pity that he has been so self-denying in the discursive texts that link his citations.

*University of Sussex* G. I. A. D. Draper

**The Law of War and Dubious Weapons.** SIPRI. *Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. 1976. 78 pp. Pb: Sw.kr. 47.50.*

Promoted and published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and written by two of its members, Bert Röling and Olga

[1] *International Law through the Cases*, 3rd edn. (London: Stevens; Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1970).

Šuković, this concise and realistic study surveys the principles of the law of war, and then their application to certain modern weapons. These principles seek, in the words of the St. Petersburg Declaration (1868) 'to conciliate the necessities of the war with the laws of humanity'. The survey shows the uneasy compromises between these incompatibles, between the assertion of General Sherman that 'the only possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful conflict . . . is to make it terrible beyond endurance', and the international prohibitions of superfluous injury and of attack on non-combatants, inspiring the statement of the American tribunal trying Field Marshal List, that 'the rules of international law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a war'. The survey reveals some reaffirmation of traditional principles, particularly in the revision of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 and recent proposals of the International Red Cross conferences, and summarises them conveniently (pp. 42–44); outstanding are the principles of proportionality, survival of mankind, environmental protection, and threshold, the last three being new factors.

'Dubious weapons' are 'all the modern weapons made possible by technology which may fall within categories forbidden by the laws of war'; here an earlier report by SIPRI is cited, that about $20 billion is spent annually, and 400,000 scientists and engineers are occupied in weapon research around the world. Characteristic 'dubious' weapons are: nuclear, biological and chemical, geophysical, incendiary, small-calibre high velocity, fragmentation, and delayed-action weapons. Brief but detailed descriptions of each, and their effects, are given, and of contemporary efforts to outlaw them or limit their use. 'Ultimately', the study concludes, 'the primary issue is to prevent fighting that may put humanity itself in jeopardy.'

*King's College, London* J. E. S. FAWCETT

## SECOND WORLD WAR, ITS ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH

**March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland:** A Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy. By Simon Newman. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1976. 253 pp. £6·50.*

ON the afternoon of March 31, 1939, Neville Chamberlain, looking, in the words of Harold Nicolson, 'gaunt and ill', announced to a packed House of Commons the historic British guarantee to Poland, which came into effect on September 3 and thus lifted the curtain on the Second World War. The guarantee has been called unconditional and this word provides the title of a chapter in Simon Newman's study. In fact, it was a commitment to give the Polish government all support in Britain's power if any action occurred threatening Poland's independence (but not its frontiers), and if the Poles considered it vital to resist with their national forces. But the guarantee *was* unilateral until it was converted into a mutual assistance pact when Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, visited London a few days later. The most remarkable thing, however, about the guarantee to Poland was that it was announced after only the most cursory discussion with Mr. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to London, and before negotiations began with the Russians on how they were to be brought into an arrange-

ment which stood no chance of being implemented without their help. Mr. Newman recites all the well-known reasons for this extraordinary oversight, which went far to rob the Anglo-French-Soviet talks in Moscow in the summer of all meaning: the British military experts' exaggeration of Polish military strength, their underestimate of Soviet strength, British ministers' mistrust of Stalin's reliability, and, above all, British fear that unless Polish opposition to working with Russia were accepted, the Poles would agree with Hitler to sell their neutrality at the price of his acceptance of somewhat less than he originally demanded over Danzig. But it remains a sorry tale, fit to plant in Stalin's mind the conviction that the British did not understand the business they were in.

Mr. Newman tells the story well, using sparingly but with effect the Cabinet and Foreign Office papers now available under the thirty-year rule. His main argument, however, is in part superfluous and in part unconvincing. The superfluous part is the claim that Britain ' never intended Germany to have a free hand in Eastern Europe at all ' (p. 5), and hence that the Polish guarantee did not really arise from disenchantment with the policy of giving Germany a free hand after the Nazi occupation of Bohemia on March 15. Who indeed (apart from Richard Gott and Martin Gilbert in their book *The Appeasers*,[1] which Mr. Newman takes far too seriously) ever believed in the ' free hand ' theory? No sensible person could agree that British ministers would ever, as a matter of policy, give anything for nothing. The unconvincing part of the argument is that the 1939 war was really ' one of Anglo-German rivalry for power and influence ' (p. 6), which, Newman argues, took a different form after March 15 because conciliation had evidently failed and it was time for the mailed fist.

The fact is, as Mr. Newman shows later in the book, that Chamberlain's attempts to restore Germany to the European ' comity of nations ' ran into the sand with the Nazi seizure of Bohemia. Subsequent German pressure against Romania showed that unless Britain did something (it hardly mattered what), it would be written off by the rest of the world. Chamberlain was temporarily dazed, Halifax and the Foreign Office took over and in effect wrote the Polish guarantee. ' A frantic urgency to do something—anything—replaced a calm consideration of alternatives ' (p. 136). In fact, the Polish guarantee did not symbolise British determination to rival Germany in Eastern Europe, but the realisation, almost too late, that Eastern Europe was the test of Hitler's intentions in the whole world.

*London School of Economics* F. S. NORTHEDGE

**The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1941–1945:** A Documentary Study in Cold War Origins. Edited by Antony Polonsky. *London: London School of Economics and Political Science. 1976. (Distrib. by Orbis.) 282 pp. £5·00.*

MR. POLONSKY'S stated intention is ' to let the documents speak for themselves ' and to permit ' the student to make up his own mind ' upon the conflicting interpretations regarding the policies of the three great powers towards the Polish question in this period. For this purpose he has assembled 194 documents to which he adds a 37-page introduction ' to outline the points of dispute rather than to make any final judgment ' (p. 11),

[1] London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963.

three maps, a cast of characters and a list of abbreviations. The formula appears to be sound, but the result is definitely mixed.

As a documentary collection per se the result is appalling. There is no index, typographical errors abound, and there are too many factual errors. For example, Winant could not be American Representative on the European Advisory Commission up to 1947 (p. 51) since this body was wound up in 1945. The Home National Council was established earlier than January 22, 1944 (p. 32). There is even a mistake in the abreviations and the first footnote on p. 239 must be the most fatuous ever printed. There are disparities between the sources given in the list of documents and those given at the head of the documents themselves in the case of at least ten documents (Nos. 14, 36, 53, 93, 110, 113, 122–3, 126, 133). Just under half of the documents come from well-known published sources. The unpublished documents come mainly from Foreign Office and Cabinet files. A few of these 'unpublished' documents are in fact published. Document 80 has been available in Churchill's memoirs since 1952, and the general points of most are known from the official history.[1]

On the other hand one can only applaud a book which actually publishes the text of so many British documents. We thereby obtain important new information on, amongst other matters, the Soviet-Polish talks of May–June 1944 and the tripartite negotiations in Moscow in October 1944. It is also noteworthy that the full documents often show that the summary form of the official history probably omits much important information. Document 112 gives much information on the Soviet attitude to Mikolajczyk which is simply not mentioned in the official history.[2]

This reviewer is also impressed by how extensively the many facets of the Polish question are covered by such a brief and necessarily selective collection. There is, however, one exception to this. Mr. Polonsky deliberately excludes any reference to 'internal Polish politics' except where it is relevant to 'the way the Great Powers handled the Polish question'. Yet he also correctly states that the 'great gap in the source material lies in the making of Soviet policy' (p. 12). These two intentions are contradictory, since Soviet foreign policy can often only be understood in the light of the domestic activities of the indigenous Communist Party.

The lack of any Polish communist sources, used so effectively by Bethell and Ciechanowski,[3] makes it hard for the student 'to make up his own mind'. For example, Polonsky's introduction, which seeks to avoid final judgments, records that early in 1944 the 'encouragement of pro Soviet forces in Poland was also stepped up' (p. 32)—a reference to the establishment of the Home National Council. Yet in Documents 96 and 97 the student will read that Oskar Lange, who struck the British ambassador 'by his quiet good sense', concluded in May 1944 that 'the Soviet Government had had nothing to do with setting it up and that it was a spontaneous movement from within Poland'. Other evidence suggests that the Polish communists forced Stalin's hand on this and other issues.[4]

[1] Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vols. II and III (London: HMSO, 1971). Reviewed in *International Affairs*: Vol. II, July 1972, p. 458; Vol. III, January 1973, p. 67.

[2] *Cf. ibid*, Vol. III, p. 224.

[3] Nicholas Bethell, *Gomulka: His Poland and His Communism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972). First publ. London: Longmans, 1969; reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 372. Jan Ciechanowski, *The Warsaw Rising of 1944* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1974, p. 506.

[4] See Ciechanowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 104–110.

Mr. Polonsky would have done better to write a new monograph on the great powers and Poland from 1941–45. The standard work of Rozek [5] is in need of correction, if not replacement, and Polonsky's obvious interest, research and writing abilities would have been better rewarded if he had undertaken this task.

*University of Dundee* TONY SHARP

**Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946.** By W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel. *London: Hutchinson. 1976. 595 pp. £6·95.*

THE model for this book is Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy's *On Active Service in Peace and War*,[1] with Elie Abel writing up Averell Harriman's papers and recollections in the same way as McGeorge Bundy did those of Stimson. It is a good combination. Readers of Mr. Abel's book on the Cuban missile crisis [2] will know that he writes well in the best traditions of American investigative journalism, while Mr. Harriman is a figure of great interest and importance in the recent history of American foreign relations. The only drawback is that precisely because Messrs. Harriman and Abel have left it so long, their book does not contain many revelations. If the reader is prepared to dig, however, he or she will find some extremely interesting nuggets of information.

Two examples will have to suffice. The account of the Moscow foreign ministers' conference of October 1943 brings out, especially on pages 244–45, the attempt by the British to forestall the development of postwar spheres of influence in Europe and the American indifference to their efforts. It is all summed up in a note which Eden passed to Cordell Hull during one of the sessions: 'I am sorry to take your time, but behind all this is a big issue: two camps in Europe or one' (p. 245). For all his high-flown rhetoric, the American Secretary of State did precious little in practice to bring about the state of affairs he professed to desire. Then there is the first reasonably full account of the conversations which Harriman had with President Roosevelt in November 1944, which shows that whereas Roosevelt did not seem particularly worried about Soviet aims in Europe, he was concerned about them in China. 'When Harriman on November 10 described Stalin's plan to split the Japanese armies in China and Manchuria by driving all the way to Peking and Kalgan', Abel writes, 'the President responded with a troubling question: "If the Russians go in, will they ever go out?" It was a question he had not raised in the case of Eastern Europe, perhaps because he knew the answer and felt powerless to affect it' (p. 370). It was in this connection that Roosevelt authorised Harriman to ask Stalin the political conditions for Russian entry into the war against Japan, an approach which culminated in the notorious Yalta agreement on the Far East.

The present reviewer has it on good authority that one of the reasons which impelled Harriman to produce this book was his annoyance at the

[5] Edward J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland* (New York: Wiley; London: Chapman and Hall, 1958). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1959, p. 76.

[1] New York: Harper and Row, 1948; London: Hutchinson, 1949.

[2] *The Missiles of October: The Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1969).

revisionist school of historians, who he felt were distorting the historical record in their efforts to show that the United States was primarily responsible for the cold war. But this is not to say that he is uncritical of American policy. He is particularly hard on James Byrnes, citing a remark by Senator Vandenberg to the effect that ' We didn't know how lucky we were to have Stettinius [Byrnes's predecessor and often criticised for his alleged incompetence] until we got Byrnes' (p. 530). The Secretary of State's failure, between October and December 1945, to settle the nomenclature of the inter-allied body which was to consult with General MacArthur in Japan gave Stalin time, in Harriman's view, to consolidate his hold over Eastern Europe. ' So long as MacArthur had the last word,' Harriman said, ' I could not see that it made a great deal of difference whether we called it a commission [as the Russians wanted] or a council [as Washington proposed] . . . [But Byrnes] was more worried about dealing with the War Department, and with MacArthur, than he was about dealing with Stalin. It was a stupid performance because Stalin had made it abundantly clear to me that for him the question of Japan was linked with the peace treaties for Rumania and Bulgaria. He would not move on the Balkan countries until he had received satisfaction on Japan. And in Eastern Europe, time was on Stalin's side' (p. 517). In fact, it is clear from the book that one of the main reasons why Harriman decided to leave the Moscow embassy in January 1946 was his dislike of Byrnes.

Finally, the British reader may care to reflect upon a statement which Harriman made to the staff of the United States embassy in Moscow after a visit to London at the beginning of 1946. ' England is so weak she must follow our leadership,' he said. '. . . She will do anything that we insist [upon] and she won't go out on a limb alone' (p. 531). It was true then, and it is true now.

*University of Hull* GEOFFREY WARNER

**Meeting at Potsdam.** By Charles L. Mee Jr. *New York: Evans. 1975. 370 pp. $10.95.*

To judge from the material which the publisher enclosed with the review copy and the fact that a paperback edition [1] is already on sale in this country in some unlikely places, Mr. Mee's book on the Potsdam conference is a great popular success. It is certainly written in a popular style, exemplified by references to Stalin as ' the laconic, pipe-smoking Russian Premier' (p. 263), who ' stood as though he had been lowered into position by a crane' for the official photographs (p. 225). There is no logical reason why a book should not be both popular and scholarly, of course, but the combination is distressingly rare, and Mr. Mee's book is unfortunately no exception to the general rule.

Its greatest drawback to the serious student is the system of references which the author employs. There are no numbered notes in the text, and all the references are written up into continuous prose passages at the end of the book, often without any mention of specific page numbers. An example runs as follows:

> Churchill's special request for cold ham, the activities of the Russian and British guards just before the dinner party, and the awkward

[1] London: Corgi, 1976.

> moment after the 'second to none' toast were all reported in *The War and Colonel Warden*, by Gerald Pawle, based on the recollections of Commander C. R. Thompson, George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., London, 1963. Pawle also gives the menu, seating arrangements, and program of dinner music for the evening. . . . The autograph session and Truman's 'Ah, my boy . . .' remark appear in Birse. The foreign ministers' meeting with the Poles is documented in Annex I of the American transcripts of the foreign ministers' meeting for July 24. Truman's meeting with Bierut was documented in a memo by Harriman (740.00119 Potsdam/7-2445); Churchill's meeting with the Poles is in Churchill's *Triumph and Tragedy*, pages 661 to 667 (p. 347).

Only the last reference is sufficiently explicit to enable scholars to go straight to the source, and even then they would have to make sure they were using the American and not the British edition of Churchill's war memoirs. Citing the State Department's archival reference to the Harriman memorandum of the Truman-Bierut conversation may impress the ignorant, but it would have been more helpful to the student to point out that the document in question had been *printed* on pages 356–57 of the second volume of the published American records of the conference. In fact, it is hard to see what purpose is served by giving 'references' of the kind cited above. Not only are they confusing; they take up excessive space.

All this would not be so bad, perhaps, if one could rely upon Mr. Mee's use of his sources. Alas, one cannot. For example, he adopts the revisionist thesis, advanced by Alperovitz and others, that there was no military justification for the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan, and that this was done solely to impress the Russians. In order to sustain this interpretation, he tries to show, inter alia, that President Truman's military advisers were virtually unanimous in their belief that the bomb was not needed to defeat Japan. Thus, he describes a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at Potsdam on July 16, 1945, at which:

> [General] H. H. 'Hap' Arnold said conventional bombing could end the war. General George C. Marshall thought that the Japanese should at least be forewarned so that they would have a chance to surrender before the bomb was used. Admiral E. J. King believed a naval blockade alone would end the war by starving the Japanese into submission. General Eisenhower had told Stimson that Japan was already utterly defeated. It was, he said, 'completely unnecessary' to drop the bomb, and it would only rouse world opinion against the United States to use a horrible weapon that was 'no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives'. Admiral Leahy was at a loss to explain the determination to use the bomb and thought perhaps it was 'because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project' (pp. 78–79).

One could be forgiven for thinking that all these statements were made at the meeting in question, but at least two—those of Eisenhower (who was not even present) and Leahy—were not. Moreover, Eisenhower's and Leahy's sentiments are not quoted from contemporary documents, but from their memoirs, written after the event. Mr. Mee does not mention any of this in his 'notes'; nor does he provide any kind of reference for the JCS meeting.

Mr. Mee's brand of badly documented revisionism is not confined to the

Far East; he also proposes to send all students of the German problem back to the drawing board. 'The Potsdam conference seemed to fail', he writes, 'because it seemed to call for a united Germany that then seemed to fall apart because of the perfidy of the Russians or (according to revisionist historians) the perfidy of the Americans. But this is nonsense. Reparations split Germany consciously and intentionally, realistically and definitively. The political agreements for a unified Germany were never more than high-sounding sentiments, understood as such by both Truman and Stalin, which served handily in the emerging conflict between Russia and America to provide grounds for mutual recrimination' (pp. 267–68). Like Mr. Mee's contention about the use of the atomic bomb, this may be true. In this case, however, he provides even less evidence in support. Even the most gullible, moreover, must surely wonder how, in the absence of anything approaching adequate documentation, he can be quite so categorical about the perceptions of 'the laconic, pipe-smoking Russian Premier'.

*University of Hull* GEOFFREY WARNER

**The Origins of the Marshall Plan.** By John Gimbel. *Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1976. 344 pp. $15.00.*

OVER the past fifteen years, in a series of books and articles, Professor Gimbel has been probing away at the origins of the postwar division of Germany on the basis of the steadily accumulating documentation declassified by the United States government. The thesis of this book, his most ambitious study so far, is that both traditionalist and revisionist historians of the cold war have been guilty of unhistorical thinking in their treatment of the German problem. 'Although they differ sharply in their analyses,' he writes '[both schools] generally treat the occupation of Germany as a key element in the global cold war. . . . My study shows that there is little basis for the myth that the Russians caused the breakdown of the Allied Control Authority in Berlin or for the belief that the Americans abandoned four-power control to frustrate the Russians' (pp. 3–4). Similarly, '[t]he idea that the Marshall Plan originated as an American initiative in the cold war with Russia is apparently much clearer in the minds of historians in search of grand plans and historical systems than it was in the minds of those who fashioned the Plan. . . . The thesis of this book is that the Marshall Plan originated as a crash program to dovetail German economic recovery with a general European recovery program in order to make German economic recovery politically acceptable in Europe and the United States. It was not a plan conceived by long-range planners as a response to the Soviet Union or as an element in the cold war' (p. 4).

By thus consigning both traditionalist and revisionist interpretations to the scrap-heap, Professor Gimbel emerges as a revisionist in his own right, albeit one of a very different hue from authors such as Alperovitz, Kolko, Gardner or Kuklick. The trouble with his thesis is that, even if one accepts his interpretation of developments in Germany, this does not dispose of the belief that American policy in this period was primarily concerned with the perceived threat of a hostile Soviet Union. Let us accept for a moment Professor Gimbel's description of the Marshall Plan. We still have to ask why 'a general European recovery program' was considered necessary, and the answer can only be in order to strengthen Western Europe against

Soviet-inspired communism. As George Kennan put it in a memorandum of May 23, 1947, 'American effort in aid to Europe . . . should aim . . . to combat not communism, but the economic maladjustment which makes European society vulnerable to exploitation by any and all totalitarian movements and which Russian communism is now exploiting.' Similarly, although Professor Gimbel makes out a very strong case for blaming France rather than the Soviet Union for the breakdown of four-power government in Germany, he also demonstrates that the State Department consistently refused to put real pressure upon the French to change their policies because it felt that France was vital to European stability. This stability, of course, was equated with the preservation of non-communist regimes favourable to the United States as opposed to their replacement by communist regimes favourable to the Soviet Union. Although clearly aware of this dimension of American policy, Professor Gimbel seems to discount its influence in the formulation of the Marshall Plan.

Even in the case of Germany itself, however, one sometimes gets the feeling that Professor Gimbel is riding his hobby horse too hard. Although he agrees, for example, with the general view that the Moscow conference of foreign ministers in March-April 1947 marked an important turning-point in American attitudes, he implies that this was due solely to the economic problems arising out of the occupation of Germany. But this ignores the profound suspicion of Russia's *political* objectives in Germany on the part of American policy-makers, suspicions clearly voiced by both General Marshall and John Foster Dulles in their broadcast reports to the American people.

The reviewer would not, however, like to conclude on a critical note. This book is a major contribution to an important subject. If its overall thesis is unconvincing, it nevertheless modifies or demolishes a great many generally accepted interpretations, and students of the subject will ignore it at their peril.

*University of Hull* GEOFFREY WARNER

**The End of the War in Asia.** By Louis Allen. *London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon. 1976. 306 pp. £12·50.*

THE stultifying impact of the Japanese Emperor's broadcast ordering surrender, the chaos produced in Indonesia, Indochina and elsewhere in the immediate aftermath of the War as a result of Japan's promises of independence, and the friction between wartime allies which quickly arose as a result of conflicting aims after Japan's capitulation—these, and much else described in these pages, will be well-known to anyone interested in the Pacific War and its subsequent developments. What makes the special value of this book, however, is that its author not only records these happenings but, by painstaking research into Japanese and other first-hand sources and by personal interviews, has produced a most readable and human narrative, which includes a considerable volume of material, new or little-known to the general reader or even to the specialist in Japanese affairs.

Dealing in turn with the effect of the Emperor's order on the situation in Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Indochina, Korea, Manchuria and, finally, China, and with the impact on India of the part played by Chandra Bose's Indian National Army, the author has much of human interest to tell about

individuals in the story—the exploits of the enigmatic Colonel Tsuji and his escape to Chungking with, strangely enough, Chinese aid; Pu Yi's seizure in Mukden by the Russians just as he was about to escape to Japan; how it was that Ho Chi-minh's attempt to bring about a friendly settlement with France was thwarted and how this led, first, to the humiliating French capitulation at Dien Bien Phu and, subsequently, to the Vietnam War; and the circumstantial evidence disproving the once-held belief that Chandra Bose was still alive.

Although some eyebrows may be raised on reading that 'the liberation of millions of people in Asia from their colonial past is Japan's lasting achievement' (p. 262), the author is able to quote a number of prominent Asians whose countries suffered Japanese occupation and who, more recently, have paid tribute to the part played by Japan in paving their way to independence.

Although there are some other observations which may be open to question, factual errors are few and of very minor importance. It is incorrect, for instance, to say that Marshal Terauchi was among those in Tokyo awaiting trial (p. 149); Terauchi died in Saigon before he could be sent there. The account of Sir Reginald Johnston's attempt to obtain refuge for Pu Yi in 1923, though true in essence, is a somewhat bowdlerised version of what happened; and although the author describes how the one-time 'Boy Emperor' of China became Chief Executive of Manchukuo, he omits to add that later, in 1934, he was raised to the throne there as Emperor Kang Teh. Again, while it is true that Toyama was head of the Amur Society, it may not be clear to all that this is the anglicised term for what is better-known as the Black Dragon Society.

MALCOLM D. KENNEDY

## WESTERN EUROPE

**The External Economic Relations of the EEC.** By Peter Coffey. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 118 pp. £6·95.*

**The Developing Common Market.** 3rd rev. edn. By John Paxton. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 240 pp. £7·50.*

PETER COFFEY attempts to cover a major subject in just over a hundred pages and, as a result, is forced to be rather selective in what he chooses to emphasise. Roughly one third of the book is devoted to monetary problems, whereas the infinite complexity of relations with Mediterranean countries is summarised in a few short pages. The book is arranged in a haphazardly chronological sequence with the result that no geographical area is dealt with exhaustively in any particular chapter. In addition, the author finds it difficult not to repeat himself. In the Preface we are told that 'the Americans failed to understand that a redistribution of the world's income was taking place' (p. xi). We are told much the same thing on pp. 51, 55 and 96. On p. 86 we are told about the 'appointment, in the late summer of 1975, of a Chinese ambassador to the European Economic Community' and then, a few pages later, we hear of a 'policy crowned in 1975 by the appointment of a Chinese ambassador to the European Economic Community' (p. 94).

One major problem of interpretation runs through the book. In the

Preface, Coffey seems to be impressed with the cohesion and purposefulness of the Community's external relations—at least in the 1960s. But neither Coffey's own evidence nor the work of other writers (for example Henig, Alting von Geusau, Kohnstamm and Hager) suggests anything approaching systematic policy-making in the field of external relations. It is difficult to reconcile Coffey's contention in the Preface that the EEC 'started to develop a common personality and display a considerable degree of unity *vis-à-vis* third parties' (p. ix) with his verdict on the Treaty of Athens (1961) that it was so generous because 'the Community had not even thought about bilateral association agreements—let alone the economic consequences of such agreements' (p. 16). The author voices similar sentiments in the context of the enlarged Community more than ten years later: 'The main criticism is levied against the Commission and Council, which together failed to foresee the reaction of the nations concerned and then, to consider concessions, were eventually forced to make them, but to only one country!' (p. 58). Yet, in the Conclusion, Coffey is able to return to his theme that external relations were characterised by harmony: 'trade with Eastern Europe developed in a smooth fashion' (p. 90).

Coffey is at his best when describing the various stages of the international monetary crisis although it is arguable whether such a long section (pp. 46–71) is appropriate in a short book. By contrast, relations with the African countries and with EFTA get rather short shrift. It is not clear whether Coffey feels that the Yaoundé Conventions were 'colonialist' in character or not. He is keen to comment on the Curzons' contention that they were not (pp. 4–5) and yet reluctant to admit that they involved aid 'tied' to the EEC (p. 7). We meet Mrs. Curzon again on pp. 43–46 when Coffey appears to play down the serious objections made by her against the EFTA-EEC agreements. The Lomé Convention may mitigate these objections, but it was signed more than a year after Mrs. Curzon wrote her book!

The external relations of the EEC deserve fuller and more balanced treatment than they get here. The book is badly edited: the French Foreign Minister's name is mis-spelt, and Galtung's name is capitalised in the Preface. The book is not well written: besides the repetitions and inconsistencies, there are numerous sentences masquerading as paragraphs and the overall impression is one of lecture notes, not continuous prose. At £6·95, the book is over-priced.

*The Developing Common Market*, by John Paxton, is also rather disappointing. In the blurb we read that the book is a 'straightforward guide' but also that it will provide answers to such problems as whether the EEC is a 'real economic community'. Although the book is over 200 pages long, it does not provide all the information one would expect, and contains quite a lot of rather redundant history. Although the work claims to be 'completely revised',[1] it omits some crucial aspects of contemporary developments in the EEC. The Commission is described in a single paragraph (p. 55) where we learn that it is the 'civil service' of the Community, but not that it initiates legislation by submitting proposals to the Council. COREPER is not mentioned anywhere despite its cardinal role in the decision-making process. The section on the European Parliament gives a good description of the Vedel proposals, but has nothing happened since then? Chapter 8 describes the Common Agricultural Policy at some length but without

[1] First publ. as *Structure and Development of the Common Market* (London: Hutchinson, 1968). 2nd edn., *Into Europe* (London: Hutchinson, 1972).

mentioning the Monetary Compensation Amounts so crucial to its operation today. In sum, this book will be useful to students of the EEC since it gathers conveniently between two covers a mine of information. But they will need to look elsewhere to fill the gaps.

*Queen's University of Belfast* E. MOXON-BROWNE

**Changes in European Relations.** Edited by James A. Kuhlman and Louis J. Mensonides. *Leyden: Sijthoff. 1976. 214 pp. (East-West Perspectives 1.) Fl. 48.00. $18.50.*

THIS volume is the first of a series entitled East-West Perspectives and presents a collection of papers given at the 'Conference on American Foreign Policy and the New Europe' in Blacksburg, Virginia in April 1974. Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University delivered a paper on 'Changes in the international system: Impacts on American foreign policy', in which he elucidates, on the subjective plane, the fundamental change in the intellectual spirit of the time away from the optimism of living in an age of progress and, on the objective plane, the challenge to the existing international system. Although he praises the successes of foreign policy 'acrobats' like John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger, Professor Brzezinski proposes a move away from 'acrobatic' foreign policy in favour of the 'architectural' approach and also advocates 'making foreign policy a matter of public debate' (p. 36). Professor Brzezinski's 1974 views gain in importance today because he is the new presidential assistant for national security affairs in the Carter administration.

Professor Ronald Donaldson of Vanderbilt University, dwells on the beginnings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). He frequently quotes editorials from *Pravda* and *Krasnaya Zvezda* to explain what the Russians expected from the conference, their conception of 'peaceful coexistence' and their demand for the 'irreversibility of détente'. One of the problems in dealing with the Soviet Union, however, is that its stance remains, 'what is mine is "historically irreversible", and what is yours is open to "inevitable" transformations' (p. 93). Moreover, the Russians consider the CSCE's 'Basket Three' demand for the freer movement of people and ideas to be a sort of 'ideological subversion'.

Among the other papers, Professor Longin Pastusiak of the Polish Institute of International Affairs outlines Polish perspectives on the evolution of relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Although full of propaganda and doubtful propositions, this kind of paper must be expected in any East-West dialogue. Petar Vidovic discusses Yugoslavia's approach to European security and co-operation. Professor Robert Wood of the University of Virginia surveys the transition from cold war to detente, and Gerhard Mally, Research Associate with the US Atlantic Council, describes the methodological and normative aspects of the concept of regional integration, explains the political dynamics of detente in the light of East-West horizontal accommodation and internal vertical conflicts, and examines the role of the United States in Europe, especially its military presence. Centripetal and centrifugal effects of regional integration in Europe are also elucidated.

The last chapter by Professors Salmon and Taylor of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University concisely reveals the epistemological incompatibility of the Soviet system, which assumes knowing truth,

with the liberal Western system, which depends on the free flow of ideas to arrive at truth. They suggest a Yugoslavian model of combining approaches and reciprocal risk-taking to bridge the gap. In view of the fundamental epistemological differences between East and West, a longer version of this chapter would have served well as an introduction to this collection of essays.

On the negative side it may be regretted that none of the authors comes to grips with the issues raised by Russian dissidents. The preface only briefly mentions Alexander Solzhenitsyn, but his views on detente are not analysed in depth. Some of the papers would have greatly benefited by a final drafting, but it was surely more important to secure early publication of this interesting volume on East-West perspectives. A second volume will publish the other papers presented at the Blacksburg Conference.

*University of Göttingen* ALFRED M. DE ZAYAS

**The 1975 Referendum.** By David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 315 pp. £7·95.*

**Full-Hearted Consent:** The Story of the Referendum Campaign—and the Campaign for the Referendum. By Philip Goodhart. *London: Davis-Poynter. 1976. 264 pp. £5·00.*

THESE two informative and lucid accounts of Britain's first national referendum complement one another. Both achieve their authors' aims. Dr. Butler and Mr. Kitzinger have 'set out to tell the story of the referendum from three perspectives—as a crucial turning point in Britain's relations with Europe, as an episode in the continuing processes of British political life, and as a constitutional innovation' (p. 279). Besides telling the story of the referendum, Mr. Goodhart is equally concerned with the campaign for the referendum. Butler and Kitzinger include a chronology from 1946 to referendum day and re-print the texts of the official referendum leaflets. There is also a mass of supplementary statistical material in the text, as well as chapters on broadcasting by Anthony Smith and the press by Colin Seymour-Ure. Goodhart's shorter text is well documented, and he includes as appendices particularly interesting studies on the history of the referendum and the 1932 precedent for the Cabinet's agreement to differ.

Butler and Kitzinger live up to their impressive academic pedigree and it is much to Goodhart's credit that his book does not suffer by comparison with such an outstanding work. Goodhart's admirable wish 'To try and preserve the flavour of the moment . . .' (p. 9) necessitates numerous quotations by commentators and his parliamentary colleagues. This works well, but there is a danger of creating the impression that the European referendum occupied a much higher ranking in people's political priorities than it actually did. For example, analysing the outcome of the February 1974 General Election, Goodhart states that 'It is quite clear that the exploitation of the referendum issue provided the Labour Party with the small number of votes needed to tip the balance from defeat to victory' (pp. 77–78). This may be true. But in such a close result, any other issue on which Labour enjoyed a lead over the Conservatives could be substituted for 'referendum'. The European referendum is accurately placed in its correct political context by Butler and Kitzinger when they write: 'The referendum must not be assigned too prominent a part in the political and

social consciousness of the country during the first half of 1975. Politicians and people knew that, important as it was, it remained an exercise to be "got out of the way" before facing the sterner economic challenges that were waiting' (p. 1).

Both studies highlight the overriding importance of the 'leadership effect' on public opinion and the extent of support for the status quo on an issue where there was little enthusiasm and considerable ignorance. The problems of organisation which beset both pro-market and anti-market campaigns are chronicled in (often amusing) detail. Mr. Benn became the main campaign issue, which seemed to suit both Britain in Europe and the press—in his excellent survey, Seymour-Ure concludes that, 'far more even than in recent elections, the press and broadcasting *were* the referendum' (p. 245).

In his final chapter, Goodhart, who has produced a scrupulously unbiased account of the 1975 referendum, warts and all, argues cogently that the referendum has a regular part to play in the British constitution. As Butler and Kitzinger conclude, however, it is clearly too early to offer a final verdict on the main implications of the 1975 referendum. Even the Great Debate on the plural of referendum is unresolved—Goodhart opts for referendums, Butler and Kitzinger prefer referenda. Perhaps, to coin a phrase, the people should have the right to decide through the ballot-box.

ROBERT SHEPHERD

**La France de Pompidou.** By Charles Debbasch. *Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1974. 324 pp. Pb.*

CHARLES DEBBASCH, a professor of political science and president of the new Université de Droit d'Economie et des Sciences at Aix-Marseille, has provided us with an extremely useful handbook on French society and politics during the five-year rule of Georges Pompidou from 1969 to 1974. A mine of information, carefully researched, this book will undoubtedly be a durable source on the state of France at this period of its history.

The emphasis in the book is on France rather than Pompidou. It begins, however, with a narrative account of how Pompidou became the President of France, treating in respectful detail the byzantine activities at the court of Charles de Gaulle during the 1960s, and emphasising how the old-boy network of the École Normale plus skill in making the most of opportunities helped a quiet but politically sensitive *éminence grise* to win favour in Gaullist circles. But above all it is asserted here that de Gaulle recognised Pompidou's ability, rewarded it accordingly, then punished it when it became a rival to his own in 1968. Pompidou has often been described as a conservative President. Debbasch accepts this view, though argues that it was a reluctant conservatism determined by the election results of 1968 and the rejection of de Gaulle's reforms in the 1969 referendum; Pompidou was aware that many social structures were outdated, too rigid, and unsuitable for French needs, but he believed that public opinion wanted a rest from hectic change and that in any case he lacked the political support for reform (p. 20). He did, however, adopt the watchword '*ouverture*' which in itself implied criticism of de Gaulle's policies. He proposed to invite all parties except the communist to enter the majority; he proposed to open up governmental institutions; finally, he proposed to open the EEC to new members including the British (pp. 24–25). He certainly

developed a new relationship between Gaullists and Independent Republicans, gaining some freedom from the former by encouraging the latter (p. 86). On the other hand he kept the Presidency as strong as ever, probably fearing the emergence of a prime minister with the authority he himself had acquired by 1968 (p. 44). His success in enlarging the EEC turned sour by the time of his death when the oil crisis had estranged France from Britain, West Germany and the United States (p. 158). The picture is of a man more sinned against than sinning.

Most of the book is a survey of French problems tackled manfully by Pompidou despite limited time and resources. The institutions of government, the structure of parties and trade unions, the problems of most sections of society, from soldiers to scholars and from priests to women, are discussed with insight and a wealth of significant statistics. When the higher civil servants are discussed, for example, it is interesting to learn that increasing numbers leave the public for the private sphere at the culmination of their careers, though it is admitted that the École Nationale d'Administration is increasing its monopoly hold within the civil service. If there is a weakness in the book it is that it tries to cover too much ground, often expounding problems and proposed solutions in summary fashion, leaving the reader with the impression that matters are under control. It is no coincidence that one exception, where concern is expressed most forcibly, is the field of education which the author knows particularly well. But if one wants detailed research into particular issues one must look elsewhere. Meanwhile this book provides an invaluable introduction to the structure of French society and politics in the 1970s, even if its judgments must inevitably be provisional and open-ended, particularly on the character of Pompidou and his achievements

*University of Reading* NEVILLE WAITES

**Le CERES, un Combat pour le Socialisme.** By Michel Charzat and Ghislaine Toutain. *Paris: Calmann-Lévy. 1975. 279 pp. Pb.*

ALMOST written off after the electoral disaster of 1968, the French Socialist Party (PS) has astounded the pundits. Rebuilding itself with new leaders and new policies between 1969 and 1971, it then went from strength to strength, culminating in Mitterand's narrow failure to win the Presidency in 1974. Current opinion polls credit it with 35 per cent of voting intentions, making it potentially the biggest French party. Whence the transformation? The answer, according to this committed and challenging book, lies in the political vision and the hard work of CERES (Centre de recherches et d'études socialistes). The authors describe the group's origins, its role in the factional struggle within the PS over the last decade and finally its analyses and policies; useful supplements have information on the socio-economic composition of CERES militants.

CERES is a 'tendance' within the PS: it accepts proudly such labels as 'Marxist' and 'revolutionary'; it condemns roundly the 'social-democratic' majority of the party. Unlike those groups which have traditionally practised 'entryism' into socialist parties, hoping to gain power unobserved, as it were, and thus to implement their policies, CERES makes no bones about its aims; it wants to transform the PS into a mass organisation of activists, mobilised for the transformation of French society. CERES'

ambition is *autogestion*—decentralised socialism based on self-managing groups, not just in the context of the economy, but at every level of society. The PS is committed on paper to such an ideal, but CERES works to deepen that commitment, educating militants in *autogestion* and trying to provide the high level of consciousness necessary for such a system to work.

The authors are frank in their recognition that such a project necessarily has a mythic or Utopian content; and they also face up to the difficulties inherent in a transition to *autogestion*. They know that if France were to embark on such an experiment it would face external and domestic obstacles. Whether they give adequate solutions to these problems is another matter. Surely more than exchange controls will be needed to slacken the hold of multinational companies on the French economy? What help could a PS government expect from a civil service which *autogestion* might perhaps make redundant to a large extent? How will the army react? Above all, if, as the authors say, *autogestion* only has any chance on a European scale, what links have CERES and the PS with like-minded groups outside France?

All these problems deserved more treatment. But this book is aimed at the general reader, and given that, the authors have produced a lively and stimulating account of their movement and its hopes. With its commitment to an imaginative, theoretical socialism, CERES stems from a rich European tradition, of which the British Left ought to know more. But no doubt for that to happen, someone will have to translate this book into English.

*University of Reading* D. L. HANLEY

**Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s.** By Stanley Hoffmann. *New York: Viking Press. 1974. 529 pp. $15.00.*

'ARE the spectacular transformations of France's economic and social system, her constitutional order, and her role in the world a successful response to a formidable challenge, or a brave but ultimately doomed fight against internal paralysis and external decline?' In discussing this question Hoffmann avowedly presents 'an internal dialogue rather than a demonstration of a thesis' and his judgments tend to take the form of bias in their emphasis on discussion of decline in various aspects of French society and politics rather than amounting to a coherent set of conclusions. Before readers turn with relief from British problems to join in the new vogue for diagnosing *le mal français*, however, they should understand that Hoffmann treats France as 'a special instance of the general case: modern industrial society . . . it means that many of the problems France faces, which some of the French tend to blame on the idiosyncrasies of French traditions, habits, and style, are problems that plague other societies as well' (p. 449).

The book takes the form of discursive essays on issues raised in the title; it is not a history or comprehensive survey of France from the 1930s to the 1970s. It approaches the issues from four points of view. First, the Vichy experience is discussed principally to make it easier to understand the political attitudes and evolution of conservatives in France since the war. The Vichy regime is treated not as a bloc but rather as 'a pluralist dictatorship' (p. 4), allowing for some examples of encourage-

ment to big business and even trade unionism, but the attempt to define the forces of conservatism is unsatisfactorily vast and vague, and this becomes particularly shaky when 'conservatives' are said to have 'found a haven in the Fifth Republic' after having failed while running the Vichy regime (p. 24). The second point of view, the style of authority and its influence on leaders and led in French society, is essentially a discussion of rigid stratification in society and increasing centralisation of power, an analysis based on Hoffmann's earlier work, *In Search of France*,[1] where he characterised France as 'a stalemate society', and on the more recent publications of Michel Crozier, the French sociologist. Although convincing in general terms, the emphasis on blockages in French society tends to underestimate the lubricating, even purgative effect of French success as an economic and trading power since the Second World War, and also the French ability to create 'parallel' administrative channels to short-circuit blockages (p. 72). Do the French have greater problems than others? Or is it that their habitually structured analysis of economic, political, and social issues gives their problems a sharper focus? The French tendency to oscillate frenetically between extremes of optimism and pessimism should not blind one to the possibility of a more measured and complex view according to which this book might have been entitled *Decline* and *Renewal*.

The third point of view is that of de Gaulle. Hoffmann is a self-confessed admirer of de Gaulle, yet concludes that his ambitions outstripped his means. The impatient pursuit of *grandeur* in foreign policy as a top priority entailed neglect and sacrifice in domestic affairs thereby generating the crisis of 1968 and the long-term problems facing France today. A broader assessment of de Gaulle's foreign policy is included in the fourth part of the book, a discussion of the French role in the world, and here one finds admiration for de Gaulle's tactics in diplomacy. The British, for example, are castigated for not following his line during the 1969 Soames Affair, though no mention is made of his devious method of proposing an initiative while asking the British to take responsibility for it (p. 310). Nevertheless, Hoffmann concludes that de Gaulle's basic assumptions regarding possible independence in world affairs for middle-sized powers were untenable: 'The real tragedy for de Gaulle and for France was that at the moment when the balance of terror made it possible for a middle-size state to regain some freedom of action on the traditional international diplomatic-strategic chessboard, the evolution of industrial society and the balance of terror itself gave international relations a new chessboard—technological, economic, and monetary—and here the independence of a small or middle-size nation-state was gravely compromised' (pp. 431–32). Ironically, this analysis leads to a recognition that blockages in French society are paralleled in the world at large (p. 324), though the author confines his sense of impending crisis to France alone.

This is a seminal book containing thoughtful analysis and imaginative insights based not only on Hoffmann's own longstanding expertise but also on his encyclopaedic survey of recent research and debate in France to which he gives due acknowledgement.

*University of Reading* NEVILLE WAITES

[1] Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.

**Modern German Nationalism.** By Abraham Ashkenasi. *Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by John Wiley.) 222 pp. £9·00.*

DR. ASHKENASI regards European nationalism in general, and German nationalism in particular, as the 'tool for atavistic social elites' (p. 218). In his view, it was 'only outside Europe, outside the old European nationstate system' that 'nationalism was able to combine with social revolutionary movements' (p. 10). In other words, he appears to relate nationalism in Europe only to the capitalist system. This view is certainly consistent with Russian communism, but fails to carry much conviction in communist Warsaw or Bucharest. Dr. Ashkenasi need only have extended his observations as far as East Berlin in order to see that over the past decade the search for national identity has been pursued more actively in the German Democratic Republic than in the German Federal Republic. Had he done this, however, he would have had to modify his concept of post-1945, or 'modern', German nationalism as arising only in West Germany. He would also have had to modify his identification of this nationalism, both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with 'Easternism', by which he seems to mean the *Drang nach Osten*. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* thus becomes the great divide: 'For the first time, since at least 1740, and probably before that, Germany is basing its relations with Eastern Europe on a fair *quid pro quo* without any concern for territorial and national aggrandizement' (p. v). But this is to distort German history, quite apart from the difficulty of knowing what, before 1871, is meant by 'Germany' and what by 'Eastern Europe' subsequent to the last partition of Poland. If Russia is meant, the generalisation still fails to fit the facts; even after the Bolshevik Revolution, powerful sections of the old German social elite, such as Reichswehr officers, continued to favour close relations with Russia; the Hitler–Stalin pact, which Marxists find so hard to explain, was no more than a reversion to Rapallo.

The trouble with political scientists of a certain type is that they proceed, in accordance with their theories, to a minute examination of particular trees, without examining the wood as a whole. Thus Dr. Ashkenasi virtually ignores the most important fact of postwar German nationalism, namely the determination of West Germany to achieve a genuine reconciliation with France and embark upon a serious commitment to Western European unity. The traditional arch-enemy of German nationalism was not Russia, but France; but to have admitted this would have forced Dr. Ashkenasi to give the initial credit for the reconciliation not to the SPD, who remained opposed to Adenauer's *Europapolitik* until about 1956–57, but to the CDU/CSU, who in Dr. Ashkenasi's eyes are the heirs to the old atavistic social elite. It is true that he distinguishes between the two union parties; but he makes up for it by exaggerating both the influence of the CSU upon the CDU and the influence within the CSU of Strauss who, according to Dr. Ashkenasi, 'enjoys absolute power in the CSU' (p. xi). Recent events connected with the threatened disintegration of the CDU/CSU *Fraktion* have shown the limitations on the power both of the CSU and of Strauss.

The same restricted view distorts Dr. Ashkenasi's other chapters. The significant fact about the Bundeswehr is not that various sociologists have shown that military organisations are prone to right-wing prejudices, but that the Bundeswehr, despite extremely nationalistic traditions in the past, has accepted with so few protests the new situation, in which it has no Commander-in-Chief, is wholly assigned to Nato and is interpenetrated

by trade unionism. Similarly, the significant feature of the German press today is not the existence of the three minor, right-wing papers, which Dr. Ashkenasi examines in his final chapter, but the achievement of a free press and the containment of the Springer near-monopoly. Of course West German democracy has warts; but to assemble the warts and describe the result as a portrait of modern German nationalism is simply to mislead the reader. It must also be said that the reader is not helped by the many and gross negligences of Dr. Ashkenasi's proof-reader, nor by the lack of both bibliography and index.

*University of Reading* R. CECIL

**Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit:** Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers. Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen. Edited by Dieter Blumenwitz, Klaus Gotto, Hans Maier, Konrad Repgen and Hans-Peter Schwarz. *Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1976. 771 pp. DM 48.00.*

AMONG the many recent books on Konrad Adenauer this massive volume stands out through the wealth and variety of its fifty-five contributions, only some of which can be mentioned in a brief review. As all the writers knew Adenauer personally, they are able to throw new light on many facets of his personality, his policies and his attitudes to major national and international forces and events. On the German side the contributors include three of Adenauer's successors, K. G. Kiesinger, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, as well as such party leaders as Hans D. Genscher, Helmut Kohl and Franz Josef Strauss. Among the prominent foreign authors are Signor Guilio Andreotti, at present Prime Minister of Italy, the Earl of Avon, the Earl of Longford, who, as Lord Pakenham, was the minister responsible for the British Zone of Occupation in Germany, Lucius D. Clay and John J. McCloy, Military Governors in the American Zone, Jean Laloy, a prominent figure in the Quai d'Orsay in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Dutch diplomat, Dirk U. Stikker, Secretary-General of Nato from 1961–64. The German contributors include former high civil servants, ambassadors, trade unionists, journalists and Cardinal Frings, the Archbishop of Cologne.

The first part of the book discusses Adenauer's personality, his outlook and political style. The second deals with specific aspects of his domestic policies, ranging from his leadership of the Christian Democratic Union and his role in economic and social affairs to his attitude to the peasants, trade unions, refugees and journalists. In the third part Adenauer's relations with foreign statesmen and ministers, such as de Gaulle, Foster Dulles, Schuman and de Gasperi, are considered and so are some specific issues, for example, the West German Agreement with Israel of 1952, Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955 and his intervention in the difficult negotiations on the formation of the EEC in November 1956.

Although not all the essays are free from uncritical hero-worship, most of them aim at providing a balanced view of the man whose impact on German politics can still be felt today. Walter Scheel was once told by Adenauer that his bitter experiences in 1933, when former friends avoided greeting him in the streets, had strengthened his critical attitude to his fellow human beings. Willy Brandt goes further by arguing that Adenauer reacted to them 'notwithstanding important exceptions with controlled

contempt' (p. 99). Others maintain that Adenauer, though unsentimental and sceptical, was not a cynic. Talking about his chief in the 1950s, Walter Hallstein stresses his extraordinary physical stamina, his quickness in repartee, above all his courage in recognising reality, particularly when it was undesirable and dangerous. 'Nothing human was alien to him; therefore he was not completely free from fear; his ever alert distrust points in that direction' (p. 134).

In the field of foreign affairs Lucius D. Clay, Kurt Birrenbach, a prominent member of the Bonn Diet, and Klaus Dohrn assess Adenauer's attitudes to America and the Americans. Excellent as his relations with John Foster Dulles were, Adenauer deplored the latter's refusal to establish normal diplomatic relations with China, for the German Chancellor regarded tension between Red China and the Soviet Union as a bonus for Europe. Altogether Adenauer to an exceptional extent 'contributed to the fact that in America Germany is no longer regarded as the beaten enemy of yesterday but as the reliable ally of to-day and to-morrow' (Klaus Dohrn, p. 523).

The Chancellor's different and mostly cautious attitude to, and his relations with, Britain are penetratingly examined by Karl-Günther von Hase, until recently Bonn's Ambassador in London. Adenauer was always more interested in France and French civilisation and his coolness towards Britain was not improved by the regrettable dismissal from his post as *Oberbürgermeister* of Cologne by Brigadier John Barraclough in October 1945. With all his admiration for Churchill, Adenauer found it hard to understand Britain's reluctance to be involved in the integration of Europe in the 1950s. As Chancellor he visited Britain eight times compared with twenty-six visits to France and eleven to the United States. Adenauer's growing close relations with de Gaulle—an essay by Georg Schröder raises the significant question: 'Was Konrad Adenauer a de Gaullist?'—and his distrust of British attitudes, particularly towards the Soviet Union, tended to increase his aloofness from Britain. However, Herr von Hase argues that had Adenauer still been alive when Britain did in the end enter the EEC, he would have welcomed the British decision in the hope that it would strengthen Europe's power and capacity for joint action as a bulwark against threats from the Soviet Union.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

**Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik:** Changing West German Security Views. By Walter F. Hahn. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 89 pp. (Foreign Policy Papers 3.) £1·50.*

WALTER HAHN, deputy director of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis at Cambridge, Massachusetts, who enjoys a high reputation as a defence expert, particularly in conservative and Republican circles, has written a monograph of compelling lucidity—no easy task, considering the complexity of the subject matter. Mr. Hahn rightly pinpoints the root cause of the West German security problem as insecurity resulting from the country's pivotal geographic position in central Europe and the failure of earlier regimes to find a national role acceptable both internally and externally (ch. 1). The author's deft historical survey is marred by only one blunder: on page 11 he asserts that although the coalition of Social and Free

Democrats won the 1972 election, the opposition Christian Democrats remained the largest parliamentary group in the Bundestag. In fact one of the most salient features of 1972 was the success of the SPD in emerging as the largest party for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic.

The basis of the 'Adenauer conception' (p. 5) was, of course, the integration of Western Germany into Nato and (later) the EEC, while maintaining—at least in theory—the future option of reunification. Being on the frontline of the cold war, successive CDU/CSU defence ministers believed that their country's security rested on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation by the United States in the event of Soviet aggression. There were always differences of opinion between Bonn and Washington but these only became serious after Kennedy's election in 1960 when the United States turned to the policy of 'flexible response'.

Mr. Hahn argues that West German ministers began to re-adjust to the new American doctrine after the formation of the SPD/FDP government in 1969. As the Americans are only prepared to use their strategic nuclear weapons when fighting reaches a certain level, Helmut Schmidt and his successor as defence minister, Georg Leber, have had to place greater reliance on conventional defence: not just on the Bundeswehr but also on that important evidence of the American commitment to Europe, the United States forces stationed in Germany (p. 69).

The greater emphasis on conventional forces fits in with Schmidt's personal predilections (p. 58). He has always felt that a too extreme reliance on nuclear deterrence means that in any crisis the West's only choice would be surrender or devastating nuclear war. The argument against this theory was—and is—that being a small country immediately adjacent to the iron curtain, West Germany runs the risk of being overrun in the course of a lightning conventional strike.

A further problem arising from a greater dependence on conventional forces is the threshold at which the 7,000 American tactical nuclear weapons can be thrown into battle. Their use could postpone the strategic response but might cause enormous casualties. Interestingly, Mr. Hahn believes it is less this consideration than a desire to allay fears in Eastern Europe which explains the reluctance of Social Democrat ministers to allocate a very significant role in their plans to tactical nuclear weaponry (p. 57). Quite apart from the added burden this places on the Bundeswehr, one must ask whether communist sensitivities weigh so heavily in Bonn now that the active phase of *Ostpolitik* (1969–73) is over and the two sides are showing little inclination to develop their relations in anything but economic matters.

Mr. Hahn himself seems a little unsure how to assess the Brandt/Bahr *Ostpolitik*. On the one hand he hints that it was a new approach to Schumacher's policy of reunification (pp. 12–13). On the other hand he suggests that it might have been a reinsurance policy provoked by the policy of flexible response and the weakening nuclear commitment which that implied (p. 52). Details of Bahr's vision of an eventual dissolution of both Nato and the Warsaw pacts and their replacement by an all-European security system would tend to support the first interpretation (pp. 34–35).

As *Ostpolitik* has in fact done little to assuage the Federal Republic's basic feeling of insecurity, Bonn remains dependent on American protection. Hence the need, Mr. Hahn argues, for 'the continued and direct weight

of the United States on the scales of Europe' (p. 84). This in turn requires 'an honest dialogue and a greater reciprocal effort to comprehend the basic premises that motivate policies in both countries' (p. 84). However, Mr. Hahn feels this dialogue is bedevilled by fundamental differences in perception. An example is the shift in German defence thinking—since 1969—away from the danger of a Soviet military threat and towards the political threat posed by Soviet power: in other words, the fear of the 'Finlandisation' of Europe (pp. 41–42). Mr. Hahn feels that Washington, which is less aware of the political and psychological implications of military power, sees the Russian menace purely in military terms. He claims that the American view is that 'so long as an adversary can be credibly deterred from aggression—even by forces inferior to his own—he cannot use military superiority for political advantage' (p. 44). One can only hope that President Carter, who is well known for his ability to read books rapidly, will find time to consider Mr. Hahn's wise views.

W. TREHARNE JONES

**Social Structure in Divided Germany.** By Jaroslav Krejci. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 272 pp. £7·95.*

THE author has followed his earlier work, *Social Change and Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia*,[1] by applying the same methods of analysis to the German Democratic Republic and trying to make a fair comparison with the German Federal Republic. The subject is an excellent one and every reader's first reaction will surely be to wonder why on earth no one has attempted it before. Sad to say the answer soon becomes all too clear; there is simply not enough good sociological data about the DDR to make the necessary comparisons. Dr. Krejci has no difficulty at all in showing how small the significance of events before 1945 is in determining present socio-economic differences between the two German countries and how very important everything that has happened since. But the only chapter that really contributes anything new to our understanding is the very good opening analysis of the structure and distribution of income and wealth in the two societies. Here the author uses both 'Western' and Marxist methods of national income accounting to examine the functioning of each economy from the standpoint of the intrinsic values of the other. This works well because the DDR does publish ample and well-classified economic data. The Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung has occasionally tried to recalculate the DDR national income in 'Western' terms and the author himself makes some brave attempts at the reverse process. It is from these calculations that the real weight of his charge against the DDR comes, that the proportion of the 'surplus product', in the Marxist sense, going either on socialist aims or on consumption does not increase as the size of that 'surplus product' itself increases with economic growth. Whereas in the Federal Republic the increase in real wages has kept pace with the increase in productivity, in the DDR it has not.

The rest, unfortunately, is rather dull stuff and obvious. Even within the conventions of Marxist national income accounting the citizens of the Federal Republic are about one-third 'richer' in terms of access to goods and welfare. Their productivity is higher. They have a wider range of economic, intellectual, political and societal choice. The citizens of the

[1] London: Macmillan, 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1973, p. 128.

Democratic Republic, in contrast, enjoy a narrower gap in prestige and earnings between manual and clerical jobs and those of them who are in manual work have a better access to the higher educational system than their peers in the West. There is a better chance in the East of climbing the social ladder if you start near the bottom, but to do so you have to accept fully all the assumptions about the goals of human society which are officially held in that country. And the difference in assumptions about the future of mankind is the most fundamental difference, so fundamental that it makes comparisons virtually impossible since the social science frameworks in which they are undertaken are different from the beginning. The data would not really justify any conclusions less banal than these and not even the most handsome research grant would have provided any better information from the DDR. This is by no means a pointless publication but it needs more than a good idea to make a good book.

*UMIST, University of Manchester* ALAN S. MILWARD

**Political Violence under the Swastika:** 581 Early Nazis. By Peter H. Merkl. *Princeton, NJ, London: Princeton University Press. 1976. 735 pp. £20·90. Pb: £7·50.*

IN June 1934 a Columbia University sociology professor, Theodore Abel, ran an essay contest for pre-1933 members of the Nazi Party for the 'best personal life history of an adherent of the Hitler movement'. Professor Merkl has now subjected the unique collection of 581 autobiographical statements to a painstaking and searching 'sociological-psychological' analysis to establish why many early rank-and-file Nazis entered this extremist movement and how they participated in it. Although some historians may find the methodology of the social scientist somewhat heavy going at times, Professor Merkl's study is worth persevering with. Apart from being well written and with a truly deserved attitude of cynicism towards the exploits of many a Nazi 'old fighter', it shows just how complex a subject is the investigation of the beginnings of the Nazi Party within the context of the political, social, and economic history of the Weimar Republic. As Merkl puts it, 'there are several basic flaws in many of the existing theories of how class and status may relate to the genesis of National Socialism. The biggest mistake is to take the "lower middle class" as an undifferentiated and unchanging entity rather than as a collection of persons who are either on their way up or down, or static' (p. 75). Again, 'we cannot truly understand the minds of these rank and file Nazi activists by intellectualising their motivation into an ideological system of ideas. Instead, we need to examine the mixture of ideas, phobias, and prejudices on their minds which form a coherent political subculture that is more amenable to psychological than to intellectual analysis' (p. 447).

It is this heterogeneous and complex nature of the early Nazi movement which so clearly emerged from Abel's data and enables Merkl to pursue six different lines of inquiry: the social background of many Nazis; the impact of the war, the 'revolution', and the counter-revolution; the political socialisation of each Nazi; the escalation of extremist involvement and of political violence; the *Weltanschauung* and prejudices of the Nazis; and life and individual careers within the Party and its affiliates. The Abel respondents admit all the familiar reasons for joining the Nazi movement at different times in the 1920s and from 1930 onwards—the shock over

the defeat and revolution of 1918, the Ruhr occupation in 1923, anti-Republicanism, the depression, anti-Marxism, and anti-Semitism. What is more interesting is Merkl's detailed analysis of these and other factors, so that the pattern which emerges becomes almost as complex as the fabric of the society in which the movement developed and which it finally came to dominate. Merkl shows that many early members only came to the Nazi Party after having tried a number of other right-wing organisations and found them wanting; others had fierce arguments with families and Church over their membership; most had different personal, political, social, and economic reasons for joining the Party. As one stormtrooper candidly admitted, he liked the stormtroopers because of his 'lust for brawling . . . and I absorbed the Nazi ideology only gradually' (p. 248). It is the whole range of personal motivations for joining the Party—many of which were not based entirely on rational political thought—which so interests Merkl. As he remarks elsewhere, 'there is, probably, almost universal agreement that tall Nazi stormtroopers also may have grown from little problem children rather than from certain trends in German literature and philosophy' (p. 290).

JOHN P. FOX

**Confrontation in Central Europe:** Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia. By F. Gregory Campbell. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1976. 383 pp. £10·20.*

THE central theme of this study is German-Czech relations from Versailles to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. It is neatly divided into the inter-relationships between the two countries on the domestic (the Sudeten German problem), the regional (fears of Anschluss and German economic expansion in the Danubian region), and international level.

Professor Campbell clearly demonstrates that the basic aims of the two protagonists were inevitably irreconcilable. Czechoslovakia was a status quo power, Germany aimed at revision; but how overtly this clash of objectives was brought out into the open depended on circumstances. Initially, therefore, the young Weimar Republic counselled the Sudeten Germans to co-operate with the new state and, given the international situation, aimed at proper but cool relations with their Czech neighbours. Benes, depicted here as a cautious and pragmatic statesman, of course had more to lose, and therefore turned to his other neighbour Austria, with whom he hoped to achieve a close relationship at Germany's expense. It was an interesting diplomatic triangle and 'the three cornered game that developed in their relations explained much about Central-European diplomacy in the interwar years'.

If, on the one hand, Benes aimed at consolidation in Central Europe, on the other, he was acutely aware of the weakness of the successor states—and therefore approached France for further support. The Franco-Czech alliance of 1924 was based on a mutual need for security. Given that a speedy German recovery was probable, a revival of Austrian and Hungarian revisionism possible, and the attitude of Poland uncertain, the Czechs' need for closer links with a Great Power was imperative. The Germans were right to see the Czech statesman as the most formidable obstacle to German revisionist plans.

Professor Campbell's careful analysis traces the gradual disintegration of

the Versailles system. Whereas the Dawes Plan stabilised the economic situation in Europe, the failure of the Geneva Protocol and the signing of the Locarno Treaty undermined the new successor states—both Benes and the Poles rightly saw the latter as a successful move in German revisionism. Further, he draws attention to one of the major factors that undermined the stability of Central Europe in the 1920s: the failure to achieve any Polish-Czech collaboration. He shows how each country, though sympathetic to German claims against the other, underestimated the danger of German revisionist aims to itself.

The subtitle of the book is misleading: *Confrontation in Central Europe* is much more than just a narrow account of the relations between Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia. The study is broad and original in scope and documentation. German-Czech relations are seen in the wider context of the French search for security and later ineffectiveness; of growing British disapproval of both France and Czechoslovakia; of the short-sightedness of Polish diplomacy; and of Germany's natural inclination both for revision and for economic expansion in Central and Eastern Europe. The author is to be congratulated, not only on his lucid style and the penetrating quality of his analysis, but also on producing one of the most important and comprehensive studies in recent times on the diplomacy of Central Europe in the interwar years.

*Brunel University* LISANNE RADICE

**Sektionschef Robert Hecht und die Zerstörung der Demokratie in Österreich:** Eine historisch-politische Studie. By Peter Huemer. *Munich: Oldenbourg. 1975. 372 pp. Pb: DM 48.00.*

**20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralität.** By Felix Ermacora. *Frankfurt: Metzner. 1975. 265 pp. DM 64.00.*

**Das neue Österreich:** Geschichte der Zweiten Republik. Edited by Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik. *Graz, Cologne: Styria. 1975. 414 pp. Sch. 380.00. DM 55.00.*

THE internal history of Austria between the two world wars is inevitably claustrophobic and deeply depressing, but it continues to exert a certain fascination. Who were the guilty men, responsible for the destruction of the Austrian democratic parliamentary system: the ardently Catholic ex-officer Dollfuss who got rid of parliament and founded an abortive corporative state; the peace-loving Socialist leaders who failed to recognise the danger and abrogated their responsibilities until it was too late; Mussolini, egging on his protégé Dollfuss to suppress the Socialists—or Hitler, who created conditions which made it impossible for Austria to follow a normal political life?

Austrian historians have tended, since 1945, to lay much more stress on the internal factors than the external. This is also true of Peter Huemer, who has explored the ground afresh, using official sources supplemented by the contemporary party press, from the angle of the career and back-stage influence of a senior bureaucrat and legal expert, Robert Hecht. (If Hecht himself kept any private papers, they were destroyed by the Gestapo in 1938.) Hecht seems to have summed up in himself the bitter contradictions, conflicts and ironies of Austria's interwar experience. A Jew who became first a Protestant and later a Catholic, who felt himself to be simply an

Austrian and wanted to be accepted as such, he was devoted to the Habsburg Monarchy and was an exemplary officer in the First World War; thereafter he briefly served with similar efficiency the Socialist War Minister Julius Deutsch, and for a far longer period, with even greater devotion, a Christian Social Minister, reaching the climax of his career as the close and trusted legal and constitutional adviser of Dollfuss. When Dollfuss was murdered by the Nazis in 1934, Hecht retreated into the background, was seized by the Gestapo in 1938 and died tragically in Dachau soon after.

Huemer's book, though pegged to the career of the unfortunate Hecht, is really a detailed re-examination of Austrian political history in the 1920s and 1930s, concentrating particularly on its constitutional aspects. He is stern in his condemnation of Dollfuss, rejecting the view that his abolition of parliamentary democracy was a form of defence against National Socialism; he criticises, but less sternly, the Socialist leaders who failed to defend democracy; he exposes, in some detail, the weaknesses of Dollfuss's Fatherland Front and new constitution. Hecht's own role in all this, though at times influential, was never in any way decisive, however much he may have been attacked in the Socialist press as Dollfuss's evil genius.

The unhealed wounds of the interwar period seem to have imposed on Austrian historians of the post-1945 period the need to point the moral of the past and to stress Austria's need to defend itself against all external pressures and all serious internal clashes. Professor Ermacora's book examines Austria's first twenty years as a self-declared neutral in scholarly detail, with relatively brief accounts of the way in which this neutrality survived the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968.

*Das neue Österreich* is a valuable collection of essays on all aspects of Austria's development in the postwar period, introduced by a masterly summary of Austrian resistance from 1938 to 1945 by one of the two editors, Erika Weinzierl. (Together with Karl Gutkas and Alois Brusatti, she earlier produced a smaller work on the same theme.[1]) In addition to contributions on internal and external political, economic and social themes, there are very interesting essays on Church and State (by Erika Weinzierl herself), the mass media, literature, art and music. In all, it is a fine piece of work.

ELISABETH BARKER

**Cyprus In Search of a Constitution:** Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals, 1960–1975. By Polyvios G. Polyviou. *Nicosia: Chr. Nicolaou. 1976. 450 pp. Pb: £5·75.*

**The Cyprus Conflict:** National Identity and Statehood. By Zenon Stavrinides. *Nicosia: Loris Stavrinides Press. 1976. 134 pp. Pb.*

AFTER analysing the ill-fated constitution imposed on Cyprus by the tripartite settlement of 1960, and glancing briefly at the UN's unsuccessful mediation after its breakdown, Dr. Polyviou provides an exhaustive examination of the inter-communal negotiations that at last got under way in 1968, and continued, with interruptions, through the six years preceding the coup d'état and the Turkish invasion. A Greek-Cypriot constitutional lawyer, he is convinced that the original instrument was both too complex

[1] *Österreich 1945–1970: 25 Jahr Zweite Republik* (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1970).

and too rigid to work, and that the Turkish-Cypriot leaders used the disproportionate strength it gave them to prevent any correction of its anomalies. By 1968 both sides admitted that changes were needed, and the Clerides-Denktash discussions, documented for the most part in amicable Inns of Court English, seem to have progressed farther than appeared from the sparse communiqués issued at the time. The Turkish side was prepared to make some striking concessions in central government matters (for example, a 60:15 ratio in the legislature, instead of the original 35:15) in return for a radical and intricate restructuring of local government which (the Greek side feared) might well have produced a state within the state. The substantial gap between the parties was being narrowed in 1973 when a number of political developments, such as increasing interference in Cyprus by the Greek junta and intrigues by local Grivasites, together with a not unrelated hardening of Ankara's line, put an end to progress. An extra chapter gives a detailed record of the wholly fruitless Geneva Conference which paved the way for the second Turkish assault in August 1974.

There are some general criticisms of the way in which negotiations were approached; the author holds that it would have been better to have sought a common formula for Cyprus's complete independence from external interference first, before tackling the contentious details of internal reconstruction. But would the Cypriot Turks have agreed to abandon the Ankara lifebelt until they were absolutely certain they could keep afloat without it?

There is not a great deal new in the substance of Zenon Stavrinides's brief survey of the development, mutual alienation, uneasy symbiosis and subsequent conflict of Greek and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus. What makes his pugnacious little book rather memorable is the ruthlessness with which he castigates the leaders of his own community for their complacency, insensitivity, and parochialism—he has criticism for the Turks as well, but believes that in the quest for an indispensable reconciliation the majority should have shown far more initiative. He conveys particularly well the way in which affluence, in the later 1960s and early 1970s, blunted the political vision of many, so that it became easy to ignore the injustices and absurdities of de facto partition and the ever-present danger that one miscalculation could bring the house down. Now that this has happened, he sees the best hope in some form of accommodation which would recognise the inescapable fact that, for the time being at least, Cyprus contains two antagonistic national entities, and would establish conditions wherein their inevitable economic and social contacts could, in time, foster closer partnership and perhaps an eventual coming-together in something like a common Cypriot nationality. Most Greek Cypriots will probably consider his book, with its prolonged refrain (perhaps at times too facile) of *nostra culpa* to be unconstructive and over-pessimistic.

Like Dr. Polyviou, Mr. Stavrinides underlines the shortcomings of the 1960 settlement, which, by giving Greece and Turkey so many opportunities for direct involvement in the island's affairs, made further polarisation of the two nationalisms inevitable. He pays tribute to the few Cypriots of both communities who, in 1960–63, had the courage needed to speak out for co-operation and friendship; the extracts from N. C. Lanitis's pamphlet *Our Destiny* [1] (pp. 107–9) well deserved reprinting.

*University of York* J. S. F. PARKER

[1] Nicosia: Proodos, 1963.

**Essays on the Cyprus Conflict:** In Memory of Stephen G. Xydis. Edited by Van Coufoudakis. *New York: Pella Publishing. 1976. 53 pp. $6.00. Pb: $3.00.*

THESE three brief essays, sponsored and edited by the Center for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies at Queens College, City University of New York, contain little in the way of fresh insights into the nature and causes of the Cyprus tragedy. M. A. Ramady, in 'The Role of Turkey in Cypriot Communal Relations', offers one or two recent *aperçus* of conditions in the occupied zone; but his very superficial background sketch includes statements that will astonish anyone who knows the island well—for example, that 'the facial characteristics' (of the two communities) 'seem the same . . . the only differences between Greek and Turkish villages are the religious symbols of the different denominations' (p. 4). Still stranger is Professor Coufoudakis's assertion that 'the historical record in Cyprus is replete with instances of intermarriage, common opposition to oppressive taxation and administration, and *even the evolution of a Cypriot dialect common to both communities of the island*' (my italics). The title of his essay, 'The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multi-ethnic and Multireligious Societies—The Cyprus Case', prepares the reader for the disproportionate and unwieldy conceptual wrapping around a slim and unoriginal précis of the problem. Some good points are made; but it is hard to take the ponderous and almost tautological formulations about partition and division, ascribed to a body called 'The Internet on Divided Nations' (pp. 28–30) with a straight face. John C. Campbell on 'The United States and the Cyprus Question 1974–75' is too brief to be more than impressionistic; his broad conclusion is that the United States can do little, at present, to assist a settlement, though the EEC may in time be able to achieve something, and that at any rate 'neither in Athens nor in Ankara has the government tried to improve its position by turning to Moscow . . . Cyprus, by the record so far, does not pay off for anybody'.

*University of York* J. S. F. PARKER

## USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

**The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR.** Edited by Roman Szporluk. *New York, London: Praeger. 1976. 258 pp. £9·80.*

THE idea behind this book was an excellent one. While every schoolboy knows of the enormous impact of Soviet rule upon the incorporated Baltic republics and on the postwar East European states, the flow of influence in the other direction is, not surprisingly, less well known. While it would be ludicrous to claim that the reverse influence is in any way comparable, the problem of its extent is well worth investigating. Movement of ideas from West to East within both the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc is one of the most significant potential sources of change in the communist world.

The book itself is a little uneven and not so up-to-date as one would expect. It is based upon conference papers delivered in 1970 and though most of them have been, to a greater or lesser degree, rewritten, the notes to a majority of chapters carry no references to works published more recently than 1971. More trivially, but irritatingly, for a book produced by the cheap method of photographing a typescript, there is an astonishing number of typing errors—a prime example of camera-unready copy.

A brief but useful introduction by the editor is followed by a general assessment by Zvi Y. Gitelman of 'The Diffusion of Political Innovation: From East Europe to the Soviet Union', Leon Smolinski on 'East European Influences on Soviet Economic Thought and Reforms', Zygmunt Bauman on the influence of East European social scientists on their Soviet counterparts, Demming Brown on 'Czechoslovak and Polish Influences on Soviet Literature', V. Stanley Vardys on 'The Role of the Baltic Republics in Soviet Society', Yaroslav Bilinsky on the impact of the incorporation of the Western Ukraine on politics and society in the Ukraine as a whole, and Stephen Fischer-Galati on 'The Moldavian Soviet Republic in Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy'.

Gitelman's substantial chapter is an interesting contribution to the general problem of political innovation in the communist world. He provides a list of rules of the game which owe much to the hindsight afforded by the course of events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The first of these rules is that the innovator should 'never claim to be elaborating an alternative, competitive "model" of socialism' (p. 37). A really radical innovation will have a much better chance of being adopted if it can be presented as a tinkering reform. The Hungarians, with memories of 1956 all too strong, score well for playing down the extent of the changes they have introduced in more recent years.

In assessing the Soviet attitude to other 'models', Gitelman, however, makes a very common mistake when he writes that Soviet-proclaimed 'acceptance of "multiple paths to socialism" is frequently contradicted by inconsistencies and contradictions in behavior' (p. 15). The Soviet position, frequently reiterated after August 1968, is that you can have almost as many *paths* to socialism as you like, but there is *only one socialism*. In other words, the seizure of power by a minority party, the Bolsheviks, in Russia in 1917 or the emergence of a Communist Party as the largest party in parliamentary elections (together with their removal of independent coalition partners from office after a period of collaboration) in Czechoslovakia in the late 1940s are equally acceptable. What was not acceptable either in 1948 or 1968 was that the Czechs, or anyone else, should attempt to evolve a political system fundamentally different from the Soviet prototype *after power had been attained.*

The influence from West to East can work in different ways. The radical nature of the political changes under way in the Czechoslovakia of 1968 helped to undermine the position of Soviet economic reformers who shared the economic reform objectives of Czechoslovakia's Ota Šik. Other East European social scientists have, however, been more successful in making a positive impact on their Soviet colleagues. The example of Polish economists and sociologists was not lost upon a number of their Soviet counterparts, even if the disciplines developed in significantly different ways in the two countries. Postwar Polish and Czech creative literature, on the other hand, seem to have made little impact on Soviet literature.

So far as the wartime acquisitions to the Soviet Union itself are concerned, the Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics are in their different ways very important. Western Ukrainians who are under-represented in responsible positions in the Ukraine have apparently contributed disproportionately to the growth of dissent in that republic. The Baltic republics which have also shown many signs of rather widespread disaffection have been treated somewhat more favourably. They have been used as laboratories for ex-

periments in economic reform and have been allowed a greater latitude in cultural policy than obtains within the Russian republic, even if this falls far short of what Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians desire. What Stanley Vardys calls 'the reflection of the West in Baltic life' (p. 174) remains very strong and many Russian intellectuals are attracted by it. In spite of ruthless suppression of nationalism within these three republics, Baltic cultural influence within the Soviet Union is perhaps greater than a comparison of the population figures of Balts and Russians would lead one to suppose.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* ARCHIE BROWN

**Financial Checks on Soviet Defense Expenditures.** By Franklyn D. Holzman. *Lexington, Mass., London: Heath. 1975. 103 pp. $11·50.*

THE aim of this study (an earlier version of which was completed in 1965) is to investigate ways in which the Soviet Union might evade an agreement on reducing arms expenditure, and to devise stronger safeguards against such evasion. Holzman suggests that a statistical sampling process could greatly strengthen the possible apparatus of verification, without being unduly intrusive. The assumption that the Soviet Union would consent to external verification even of a sample of its accounts seems to this reviewer wholly unrealistic, since it rests on a premise—which I believe to be false—that Soviet policy regarding the provision of information constitutes a small and flexible element in total national policy. I was consequently not able to read the recommendations with any conviction that they could be implemented.

The analysis, by one of the most experienced observers of the Soviet financial scene, is nevertheless useful, being both many-sided in its understanding and clarificatory of what we do and do not know about Soviet expenditure categories, both budgetary and non-budgetary; but it is unsatisfying because of its paucity of detail. I presume that Holzman has constructed a number of chronological series for intermediate testing, but if so the results are not available for examination. There are unexplained and indeed unmentioned gaps, for instance of data relating to 1951–54 inclusive in Table 3–1 (p. 18). As a general rule no attempt is made to fit the available facts into theories of Soviet economic behaviour, although to do so can sometimes make individual changes more explicable: thus, a 'disconcerting' jump from 1958 to 1959 in the loans outstanding (p. 35) does not appear surprising in the light of the commencement in 1959 of the Seven-Year Plan, which one would expect to incite a stronger economic effort.

Although a welcome addition to the literature, this slim volume is therefore probably more usable by policy-makers, who may benefit from its survey of the problems of policing any agreement to reduce arms spending to which the Soviet Union is a party, than as a tool in on-going research.

RAYMOND HUTCHINGS

**The Grigorenko Papers:** Writings by General P. G. Grigorenko and Documents on his Case. By General P. G. Grigorenko. *London: Hurst. 1976. (First publ. Amsterdam: Alexander Herzen Foundation, 1973 as 'Mysli sumasshedshego'.) 187 pp. £6·95.*

THIS expensive little volume contains much that has already appeared in print—some of it even in English. However, it is both useful and desirable to have the materials on this Soviet dissident available in a collected volume, accessible to the non-specialist and specialist alike. Indeed, it is to be hoped that Grigorenko will not long remain one of the few individuals to be given such a generous coverage.

It is a varied collection of documents, ranging from historical analysis to appeals to the Soviet authorities. All, however, are marked by Grigorenko's hostility to the praxis of the regime, to its non-adherence to its own declared norms. Introductions and commentaries serve to provide the necessary background to each of these items and to place them in context.

The study of the Second World War is perhaps the most interesting, and yet all too little known before this, its first, appearance in English. It aims at a realistic self-assessment of the Soviet failures and shortcomings at the outbreak of the war, and is particularly notable for its estimates of Soviet strength on the Western Front. This in turn raises several related issues—some overtly, others merely by implication. For example, there is the question of whether the Soviet Union's apparent superiority in most weapons by 1941 really necessitated quite such a forced pace of industrialisation, with its commensurate show-trials of unfortunate managers and blood-letting among unsuccessful officials; and again there is the problem of locating responsibility for the initial setbacks of the war which eliminated any material advantages the Soviet union may have possessed. Grigorenko places the blame unambiguously on Stalin's shoulders, though implicating others, some still in high office at the time of writing in 1967. Even Marshal Zhukov receives his just share of blame. Such thorough criticism and self-criticism, accompanied by open reappraisal by the leadership as a whole, is essential, in Grigorenko's view, if the mistakes of the past are not to be bequeathed to the present nor repeated in the future.

Grigorenko's own case and his brushes with the Soviet authorities are interesting in that they highlight some misconceptions in the conventional wisdom. In the first place, criticism of Stalin during his lifetime is shown not always to have had fatal consequences—indeed, for party members, it could have consequences less severe than the imprisonment suffered by Solzhenitsyn for comparable reasons. A similarly less sycophantic, servile, careerist party membership and officialdom might well have mitigated some of the other peculiarly Stalinist abuses of the era. Again, it reveals something of the underlying continuities of the system. Even under the 'liberal', 'reformist' Khrushchev, officialdom saw fit to incarcerate a man like Grigorenko in a psychiatric hospital for his critical views and his readiness to voice them.

Grigorenko's own appeals against the imprisonment of others reveal most clearly the heroic side of the man, especially his work on behalf of the exiled Crimean Tatars. His campaigning has brought him to make a brave stand against the self-styled 'defenders of the revolution'—the KGB. So far, the match has proved uneven in the extreme. Ceaseless world-wide pressure did not preserve Grigorenko from another five years of imprison-

ment—once more in a psychiatric hospital, the workings of which he nonetheless still managed to lay bare, as shown in some of the papers here. Intimidation has seemed merely to reinforce the man's will to resist arbitrary authority; and yet much of the book reads as the testimony of one destined to join his son, now in the West, his criticisms unheeded, his hopes unfulfilled for the immediate future.

*University of Sheffield* JULIAN BIRCH

**Health Care in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.** By Michael Kaser. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 278 pp. £12.95.*

COMMUNIST studies suffer from at least three disproportions. Some communist countries receive substantially less attention than others. Some aspects of communist systems and societies are thinly researched. And cross-communist comparisons are limited in quantity, theoretical and methodological consistency, and scope.

One of the largely neglected fields is health care. As regards the seven European members of Comecon (the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania), this gap is filled by Mr. Kaser's latest book. Since national descriptions are the prime objective of the book, it is not strictly speaking a comparative study. But two arrangements facilitate comparison, in so far as comparable data are available. First, all country-surveys have an identical structure, each of them analysing legislation and policy, the demographic pattern, health conditions, the health service administration, health-care facilities, and the finance of health care. Second, a wide range of statistics is attached at the end of each chapter.

Although the book has a strong economic and legalistic bias, it mentions some significant sociological phenomena as well. For example, medical personnel tend to be concentrated in large cities (Hungary, Romania) and there is a high turnover rate of physicians in rural areas (the Soviet Union, Bulgaria). Contacts with physicians are much fewer in the countryside than in towns (Hungary, Romania). A long wait at the physician's surgery and a queue at the pharmacy are not uncommon (Czechoslovakia). Generally, no pay-beds are tolerated, but 'closed-access' facilities for senior Party and government officials do exist (the Soviet Union, Poland).

These and other phenomena (such as *sub rosa* payments, alcoholism, high rates of abortion, low birth rates, ageing populations etc.) indicate the limits of the respective regimes' control over the population. Ideological precepts and legal norms often bring about deviance, not compliance. Consequently, to understand communist systems it is not enough to concentrate exclusively or predominantly on the outputs of their political systems.

It is also of interest that even in this field official data and domestic studies are not always available and that occasionally the author had to rely on informal information.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* J. L. PORKET

## MIDDLE EAST

**The Israeli Communist Party.** By Dunia Nahas. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 113pp. £6·50.*

**Israel Divided:** Ideological Politics in the Jewish State. By Rael Jean Isaac. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976. 227 pp. £7·65.*

FROM opposed ideological standpoints, and with greatly differing degrees of sophistication, both these authors afford illustrations of how, good intentions notwithstanding, subjective bias can distort history. Even in the case of such a highly charged subject as the Middle East conflict, such distortion is not inevitable. The choice is not between milk-and-water objectivity and subjective special pleading; an unambiguous ideological stance can inform as well as deform. But not, alas, in the present instances.

The central thesis of Dunia Nahas's naïve essay is that 'in regions of conflict, a Communist party containing a clash of nationalities within its ranks is bound, ultimately, to divide along nationalistic lines' (p. 87). It must be said that, in the case of the Israeli Communist Party, this is hardly a strikingly new discovery. Notwithstanding the universal law propounded by the author, the book contains no attempt at a comparative analysis with other communist parties, nor any consideration of how far the Israeli example may be regarded as a genuine *cas témoin*. The book is marred by historical absurdities; for example, the Arab anti-Jewish riots in Jaffa in May 1921 are ascribed to the work of 'British provocateurs' who 'informed the Arab population that the Zionists wanted to expel them from their own land' (p. 17). There are frequent references to the allegedly 'racialist' character of Zionism (for example p. 56)—asserted rather than argued. The increasingly widespread doctrine of the infallibility of the UN General Assembly is perhaps presumed to obviate any necessity for rational defence of such cant. Apart from a few details concerning the 1965 split of the Israeli Communist Party into Arab and Jewish sections, the author has nothing original to say.

A much richer pottage, spiced with far more sophisticated analysis, is served by Rael Jean Isaac. Her aim is to discuss the impact on Israeli politics since 1967 of two fringe movements: the right-wing 'Land of Israel Movement' and the leftist 'peace movement'. She argues that before 1973 the rightists were winning the ideological struggle, but that nevertheless, since 1973, as a result of external pressure (from the United States), it is the programme of the 'peace movement' that the Israeli government has embraced. The author's right-wing bias distorts less her presentation of the facts (in general, admirably accurate) than her overall framework of analysis. She asserts, for example: 'The chief strength of the Land of Israel Movement is that it represents, in fact, normative Zionism. The peace movement, on the other hand, derives from a deviant but traditional strain that saw the basic task of Zionism as reaching agreement with the Arabs' (pp. 18–19). This is a thorough misrepresentation of the views of those Zionists who regard peace with the Arabs as a *condition* of the success of Zionism, not as its central aim. To assert that a figure such as Israel Eldad (of the Land of Israel Movement) is a 'normative' Zionist, while one such as Jacob Talmon (associated with the 'peace movement') represents a 'deviant' strain, is misleading nonsense. The author condemns

the peace-making efforts of Dr. Kissinger of which the only result, she prophesies, will be ' to put Israel in a more disadvantageous position when she fights the next war ' (p. 162). In spite of this she looks forward to the possibility that a new war may facilitate the implementation of the ideology of the extreme right, in particular the annexation of the present ' occupied ' territories.

Neither of these books is likely to add much to the debate over Middle East peace-making—except perhaps that each may tend to confirm the blinkered prejudices of the other.

*University of Sheffield* BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

**Egypt in the Arab World:** The Elements of Foreign Policy. By A. I. Dawisha. *London: Macmillan. 1975. 234 pp. £10·00.*

DR. DAWISHA'S book follows a current fashion in marrying the historical study of a specific situation with an analytical examination of factors and processes which can be used to ' facilitate the orderly classification of data ' in this and comparable situations. It is perhaps permissible to discount the value of the methodology while at the same time welcoming a solid contribution to the recent history of the Middle East. It is useful to have the single theme of Egypt's relations with the other Arab states since 1952 disentangled from the general history of the post-revolutionary period, and Dr. Dawisha's study gains greatly in perspective and significance from its extension beyond the death of Nasser into the early years of Anwar Sadat's Presidency.

The Free Officers who overthrew King Farouk in 1952 were not greatly concerned with Arab affairs. Dr. Dawisha suggests that it was the attempt of John Foster Dulles in the following year to draw the Arabs into a Western defence pact which first obliged the new rulers of Egypt to think in wider terms lest their refusal should isolate them from their neighbours. (It was in the summer of 1953 that Cairo's ' Voice of the Arabs ' started its transmissions.) But of course it was the tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956 which lifted Gamal Abdul Nasser to the leadership of the Arab world. It was an eminence which enlarged his influence but at the same time restricted his freedom of manoeuvre. There can be little doubt that his sense of what Arab nationalists everywhere expected of him overrode his pragmatic reluctance to yield to Syrian pressure for the ill-prepared and abortive union of 1958–61. He himself gave a similar explanation for his unexpectedly prolonged and appallingly costly intervention in the Yemen in 1962: ' we felt that we were doing a duty imposed upon us by the principles which we have upheld for the sake of the unity of the Arab struggle ' (p. 132).

Many Egyptians felt that the burden of responsibility thus imposed upon them was removed or at least diminished by the catastrophe of 1967, and the modification of Nasser's policies by his successor has corresponded to this mood. Fortified by a degree of military success in the war of October 1973, far exceeding anything achieved by Nasser, President Sadat is able to give a high priority to Egyptian national interests without sacrificing his own and his country's prestige.

Dr. Dawisha also uses his final chapter to convey a broader assessment of the new Presidency—the reversal of Nasser's pro-Soviet orientation, the increasingly close understanding with Saudi Arabia, and at home the trend

to political and economic liberalisation which has made further progress since this book went to press.

HAROLD BEELEY

**The Industrialization of Egypt 1939–1973:** Policy and Performance. By Robert Mabro and Samir Radwan. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1976. 279 pp. £6·75.*

THE authors have co-operated successfully to produce a sound and detailed study of Egyptian industrialisation over a 34-year period and have also included an interesting sketch of Mohammed Ali's pioneering efforts from around 1816 to the late 1830s. In many ways this new work supersedes the earlier book by Mabro, *The Egyptian Economy 1952–1972.*[1]

After Mohammed Ali and during the period of early British imperialism, Egyptian industrialisation proceeded by fits and starts. There were two main problems: lack of a sustained capital base and, later, the British tendency to encourage the 'notables' to put their money into land rather than into business since the latter would be an unwelcome factor of innovative economic and political change. It will be remembered that during the Cromer period considerable sale of khedival estates occurred. In view of the amount of Egyptian capital exported from the country to pay the bondholders of the Egyptian Public Debt and the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company and of other companies,[2] it is evident that but for imperialism Egypt could have been industrialised much earlier.

The crucial questions concerning Egyptian industrialisation (which the authors see as gaining impetus with the import-substitution and tariff reform movements of the 1930s) are how diversified it is, and how successful in relation to the needs of an Egyptian population estimated at over 34 million by 1971. As the authors demonstrate, Egyptian industry is still a tender plant and, excluding the transport and construction sectors, only employed 1.1 million in the mid-1970s as compared with 350,000 in 1937 (p. 240). Diversification has occurred, as is mentioned on pp. 103–114, and since 1967 the dominance of textiles has begun to be eroded. There is also a promising oil sector (pp. 219–221), and it has been estimated by later sources that by 1980 Egypt should earn some £E700 million from oil exports.

It is evident, however, that unless Egypt can obtain more capital from abroad to feed its nascent diversified industries, the growing population will remain trapped in conditions of malnutrition and disease. President Sadat has realised this, and the practical results have been seen above all in his struggle to end the pattern of conflict with Israel, but also in the re-opening of the Suez Canal, the Law 43 of 1974 which is designed to encourage an inflow of Arab and other foreign capital, and the so far unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Soviet Union to recycle and reduce Egypt's debts. But, as President Sadat revealed in 1976 when on a fund-raising tour of Western Europe, Egypt now has a deficit of £4,000 million and it has been estimated that this will persist for a further five years, and no doubt

[1] London, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1975, p. 438.

[2] See A. E. Crouchley, *The Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and Public Debt* (Cairo: Government Press, 1936).

longer if foreign capital does not move into Egypt. Here, the authors demonstrate that among the most useful changes which the Egyptian government could make would be to modify the educational system and to alter the employment laws which virtually guarantee a post to all graduates and most secondary school leavers. The effect of these laws is to encourage promotion by seniority rather than merit, to slow down both public and private administration, and to encourage more time to be spent at work but not necessarily in working effectively.

To conclude, this new work on Egypt is well-based statistically, the manifold problems of Egyptian data are thoroughly discussed in appendices, and statistical material can also be supplied on request to ' the eager research student ' (p. 244). It is also a valuable corrective to the simplistic swings of emphasis between developing agriculture or industry which beset the aid movement. As the book demonstrates, investing in industry or agriculture in a less developed country cannot be treated as simple alternatives since the interconnections between these sectors are complex.

M. J. GRIEVE

**Arab-American Relations in the Persian Gulf.** By Emile A. Nakhleh. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1975. 82 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 17.) Pb: $3.00.*

**The United States and Saudi Arabia:** A Policy Analysis. By Emile A. Nakhleh. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1975. 69 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 26.) Pb: $3.00.*

THESE two booklets attempt to analyse the policy implications stemming from the United States relationship with Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states along the Gulf. Nakhleh includes a fair amount of hard information, but it comes very much from secondary sources. If one views these volumes as a cheap, conveniently sized and readable introduction to the social and political structures of the countries in question, then one could do worse. On the other hand, the reader expecting to be illuminated about the American relationship with the area will on the whole be disappointed. The author's historical analysis of this is superficial, and his insights are few and far between.

However, these volumes are worth a browse. Nakhleh has been conscientious in his search through newspaper cuttings, professional journals, reference books and United States congressional sources. From these he has distilled enough hard information for all but the most informed reader to find material to catch their interest. Thus the volume on the Gulf States includes, among other factual material, a rundown of the rulers, ruling family and tribe of each of the emirates and states in question (pp. 10–11), as well as tables on the major weapons and military personnel employed in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (pp. 42–45). Similarly, the Saudi volume provides an organisation chart of the United States–Saudi Arabia Joint Commission (p. 27) along with a genealogical table of the House of Saud (p. 35).

He also has good points to make. He warns against over-enthusiastic arms sales to the area and calls for a serious re-examination of the role such sales should play in American policy. He warns against an over-reliance on ties with specific individuals or regimes who will not always

remain on the political scene. He points to the need for the United States to come to terms with the question of political modernisation in the area. To what extent should the United States back the forces of modernisation and democracy? If liberalisation does take place, can the process be controlled?

On the other hand, even if he raises such interesting questions, he rarely has much of interest to say in answering them. He does not, for instance, have a particularly deep knowledge of American policy towards the area, giving over-reliance to formal evidence given by the State Department to a Congressional sub-committee. On occasions he shows a rather disconcerting naïveté or woolliness, as when he ends his volume on the Gulf States with a stirring call for 'multidimensional partnership' between the United States and these states. Finally, he sees everything through strictly American eyes. There is no serious discussion of how the United States should fit in with a general Western approach to this area.

*Chatham House* LOUIS TURNER

**Un Algérien nommé Boumediène.** By Ania Francos and J. P. Séréni. *Paris: Stock. 1976. 416 pp. Pb.*

THIS is a disappointing book. The biography of a contemporary statesman is obviously difficult to write and Houari Boumedienne is a particularly elusive character to assess. The authors do not make clear what they are trying to do nor what sources they are using. The life does not fall into the genre of conversations with the leader to obtain his views. Conversations *are* quoted verbatim but without any indication of their authenticity, and sometimes mere facial expressions are interpreted verbally. 'Son curieux regard à la tension muette se fixe, semblant dire: "Toi, tu veux être roi. Mais n'oublie jamais qui t'a fait roi" ' (p. 104).

The book runs to over four hundred pages and has a chronology and extracts from the National Charter, 'approuvé par le Conseil de la Révolution' (p. 371), an interesting document barely mentioned in the text. There is no bibliography and no means of checking statements and quotations. The history of Algeria since the Revolution is seen largely as the conflict among the participants, but all these, including Boumedienne himself, remain cardboard figures and it is impossible to judge if their differences are ideological or personal. The economic problems of the new nation are treated cursorily at the end of the book. The great population growth, with its attendant stresses, is not mentioned until page 357, and then not related to the slight discussion of the economic plans. The schemes for industrial development are discussed fairly fully, but the difficulties encountered here, and in carrying out agrarian reform, are barely mentioned. Boumedienne's relations with the other Arab states and the Organisation of African Unity are dealt with at length, but again, sadly, not analysed. It is certainly time for a mid-term assessment of Boumedienne's ideas and achievements, but this book does not fulfil this function.

*University of Aberdeen* ANN WILLIAMS

## AFRICA

**Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone:** A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics. By Thomas S. Cox. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1976. 271 pp. £9·55.*

**Coups and Army Rule in Africa:** Studies in Military Style. By Samuel Decalo. *New Haven, Conn., London: Yale University Press. 1976. 284 pp. £11·55. Pb: £3·50.*

THE literature on coups and consequent military regimes proliferates in almost as many styles as the events themselves. But a proper appreciation of the role of the military in Africa demands indigenous insights and this we rarely get. These two books by American authors are in many ways admirable but inevitably a dimension is missing. If they had more African material to draw on they might have been able to answer questions such as: What is the true status of an army officer in African society? Does the notion of professionalism yet have a meaning in that context? How is military intervention in politics perceived by a traditional African ruler?

Thomas S. Cox's study lives up to the publisher's cover description of it as original and 'a model micro-study'. A thorough researcher, he was able to study virtually all the available material, both primary and secondary, and to interview most of the personalities as well as other scholars with expert knowledge. Though he applies political typologies and techniques, the book emerges as essentially an historical study of an important episode in the history of Sierra Leone. Even so his approach to the military in Sierra Leone under colonial rule is competent rather than revelatory, and his commentary on the effect of tribalism in their ranks is inadequate. As usual with such studies, recruiting policies and the origins of manpower in class as well as ethnic terms are neglected. It is not so much as a test-bed of theories related to political development and modernisation but as a memorial to the personal, idiosyncratic factor in military politics that *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone* will be academically respected. It would have been surprising if a study involving such 'dramatis personae' as Andrew Juxon-Smith, David Lansana, John Bangura and Ambrose Genda had turned out otherwise.

This in more general terms is the theme of Samuel Decalo's significant book *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, the impact of which may, however, be diminished by his determination to assert originality when it cannot properly be claimed. He should be delighted, however, by the publication of Thomas Cox's book, because he complains vehemently of the shortage of detailed case studies. His fault lies in excessive protestations to the effect that the contemporary proliferation of writing on the African military 'takes place within a theoretical vacuum filled with mutually contradictory hypotheses, neither tested operationally or grounded in solid empirical data' (p. 1) and that the importance of the personal, idiosyncratic factor has been neglected. He has in this respect a short memory: the work of some writers who have attempted to give this factor its due has in the past, with dubious validity, been criticised as essentially unstructured.

Samuel Decalo's tendency to invoke academic internecine conflict should, however, not be allowed to disguise an important contribution, primarily in the shape of four substantial case studies of Dahomey, Togo, Congo-Brazzaville and Uganda. Of these the best and most significant, again partly

because of the micro-cosmic subject, is that on Togo, where the army has behaved cohesively, as analysts originally thought they all might. The dominance of Kabré personnel has in a small force contributed to national stability.

It is in a way misleading, though temptingly topical, to use a photograph of Amin on the book's cover, for he emerges as 'a relatively rare case of personalist dictatorship and "imperial style" in Black Africa' (p. 173) rather than as head of a military government.

Samuel Decalo emphatically enunciates some important conclusions: 'military administration may not be systemically any different from civilian rule' (p. 239); 'theoretical generalizations about motivations for coups must come to an abrupt standstill' (p. 240); 'analysis of the characteristics of military rule cannot be completely divorced from an accurate assessment of the motivations for coups d'etat' (p. 240). He concludes with some interesting suggestions, particularly about what he terms 'Managerial brokerage systems . . . that actively cater to the satisfaction of group demands outside the armed forces' (p. 247). In this category he places Eyadema's Togo and Mobutu's Zaire. Altogether a most useful book which would be the better for a recognition of the constraints on pioneering in what the author admits is already a fairly well-ploughed field.

*University of Aston in Birmingham* WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

**The Soviet Union and Black Africa.** By Christopher Stevens. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 236 pp. £10·00.*

THIS is a good and useful book. Dr. Stevens is to be congratulated on writing an unsensational account of what, in terms of aid, trade and strategy, the Afro-Soviet relationship is really about, and what it means to African states. In particular the strength of this book lies in its treatment of the African end of this relationship. This is not yet another description of a succession of African states falling like dominoes under insidious Soviet domination. Instead it tries to show what African governments have sought from the Russians and how they have gone about getting it. Indeed it suggests that the lesser power makes a good deal of the running.

Dr. Stevens suggests that Soviet interests lie in increasing trade with a stable Africa rather than in creating instability and that the Chinese are feared for their encouragement of revolutionary tendencies. The image of the Soviet Union which emerges is one of a not unfriendly yet not too competent industrial power floundering about amid uncertain economies and polities: not quite comprehending, unsinister and rather less aggressive than Western aid givers. Similarly his account of the African side has the advantage of being based on serious information and not bar gossip. His chapter on strategy shows how the determining feature of the attitude of African states to what looks to others like a cold war involvement is their own local strategic situation. Instead of the usual lurid account of Somali-Soviet relations we have one here which takes into account the distinct, local, and rationally pursued Somali objectives.

The bulk of the book is organised around studies of aid and trade, and a consideration of well-chosen case studies: Ghana, Guinea and Mali, which had close relationships with the Soviet Union, and Nigeria and Kenya, which did not. Dr. Stevens shows how African raw material producers hoped

to sell directly to the centrally-planned economies and by so doing to improve their bargaining position on the world 'free market'. The relationship with the Russians did provide increased manoeuvrability in this area but few fundamental changes otherwise. It does not seem to have accelerated the rate of industrialisation (an aim of Soviet aid policy) nor to have ironed out any class differentials. The African bureaucracies which managed, and flourished with, the transition from the 'open' to the 'closed' economy in Ghana, Guinea and Mali in the early 1960s have looked after themselves elsewhere also. Overtly right-wing countries, without Soviet links, have since travelled similar paths.

Dr. Stevens does not deal with the Soviet relationship with the liberation movements in the South, perhaps the most idealistic and intelligently pursued of Soviet African policies. Perhaps this also will soon become a matter of routine. Some minor criticism: Dr. Stevens betrays total ignorance of the meaning of colonialism in Africa and, in the next book that it is hoped he will write, he might allow more of the actors to speak directly for themselves.

MARTIN CHANOCK

**Freedom Railway:** China and the Tanzania-Zambia Link. By Martin Bailey. *London: Rex Collings. 1976. 168 pp. £5·00.*

AFRICA might be said to have been railroaded into the Western world. Defended by deserts, unnavigable rivers, mosquitoes and tsetse fly it was almost impregnable so long as invaders had to rely on human porterage. Later it seemed that road and air transport had superseded railways. A number of surveys from the late 1920s onwards reported that although there would be no great engineering difficulties in building a rail-link between Kapiri Mposhi and Dar es Salaam, it would be uneconomic. Martin Bailey describes how the Rhodesian declaration of independence clearly indicated the political necessity for such a line to Zambia and Tanzania, though the cost had risen from about £10 million in 1929 to about £166 million in 1965.

Dr. Bailey is critical of Western and Soviet reluctance to help; he describes the 'Friendship Route' as a glowing advertisement for Chinese aid (p. 150) and easily demolishes scare rumours of ulterior motives on China's part. Many of its earlier attempts to woo Africa had been naïve and unsuccessful; it has now won much goodwill by the generous terms of its loan and a stronger third world could play an important part in reducing the influence of other powers. China with its huge population and long history need not look for immediate returns.

The Chinese employed much the same techniques as those used for the construction of the line between Kalomo and Kapiri Mposhi in the early part of this century, though on a much larger scale. The rate of track laying was also comparable. They are described here as using labour as capital (p. 96). Some 15,000 Chinese and 100,000 Africans were employed and the industry and ingenuity of the Chinese are a model for other aid projects, which have too often assumed that mechanisation is the answer to Africa's problems.

The book includes two sketch maps which might have been less sketchy and shown more of the places mentioned in the text and some physical features. The illustrations might have shown more of the engineering feats

and fewer handouts of foundation stone laying or the irrelevant picture of the Falls Bridge. Kapiri Mposhi does not mean 'Hills of Paradise' (p. 6) and F. C. Selous was not a German (p. 113).

The Freedom Railway is described as 'more than a railway—a highly political saga' (p. xiii). It has provided Zambia with an emergency exit so that it is no longer Rhodesia's hostage. Whether the territory through which the line runs will prove to be a Golconda and whether, after certain inevitable political changes have taken place further south, it will pay its way is less certain. Dr. Bailey says that foreign and political journalists have been discouraged from investigating the whole project and that he has attempted to straighten the record.

JAMES MURRAY

**Ideology and Politics in Uganda:** From Obote to Amin. By James H. Mittelman. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 302 pp. £7·75.*

WITH much attention now being centred on Uganda, it is inevitable that any book on that unhappy country, particularly a scholarly one such as this, would excite curiosity. An amended PhD thesis, it more than satisfies interest: it not only provides a route through the historical and sociological maze, but it also does so in a manner that will make future commentators on Ugandan and African affairs look to it as a model of social-scientific analysis.

Like many other African states, Uganda has been neglected by scholars apart from anthropological studies of the Baganda and historical accounts of the extraordinary missionary-promoted wars of the early colonial period. James Mittelman, however, concentrates upon ideology as a tool of modernisation and as an approach to the study of this fissiparous African political system. Reviewing the relationship between ideology and political action, he does not advocate a general theory of development, but suggests 'an analytical framework that focuses on ideology as values-in-action' (p. 248). Unfortunately, while an absolutely convincing case is made for the value and utilisation of ideology 'as a major driving force to bring about social change' (p. 249), its formulation and implementation in 1969, a full seven years after independence, was a crucial factor leading to Obote's downfall in 1971; after all, new ideologies unleash disruptive forces of change as well as promoting success. Further, any contemporary observer would agree with the author that, apart from occasional crude expressions of black (and latterly black islamic) nationalism, Amin's republic exhibits neither consistency nor ideology. The inevitable result is a book exhibiting a strong normative flavour, reinforced by Mittelman's explicit and welcome use of value judgments, for 'insofar as the social scientist gains particular insights from a scholarly discipline, practical suggestions should be one product of his research' (p. 28).

In the pre-1969 period, ideology in Uganda was confined to orthodox rhetoric, utilised when appropriate. The real problem was the clash between the traditional kingdoms, particularly Buganda, and the need in Obote's eyes for a modern centralised state. Mittelman notes that this tribal identity had been reinforced by British colonial policies, and that it was only resolved in Obote's favour by a bloody clash in which an over-violent Colonel Amin played a part. Following his victory, Obote was able to

establish a one-party state and eventually (and with little warning or consultation) launch the new ideology of the 'Move to the Left', with an associated 'Common Man's Charter'. But there was no real infrastructure or 'transmission belts' for ideological diffusion and the build-up of popular dissatisfaction, cynicism and even outright sabotage, along with a very severe dislocation of the economy and uneasiness within the army, led to Obote's dramatic downfall. While the author accurately describes the outright pleasure expressed by the popular British press, perhaps reflecting the anger of the British government at Obote's attack on the new South African arms policy, he does less than justice to the effect that Amin's coup had on the other African states generally and on the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). A minority of OAU states were sufficiently disturbed by it to question openly the rule of non-intervention upon which the OAU had been founded, and their opposition is not clearly brought out. On the other hand, the rapid recognition by the British government of the new Amin regime certainly is.

While the author is faced with problems inherent in any attempt to associate theoretical considerations closely with empirical analysis, there is a strong sense of intellectual focus. He notes that while 'the populace awaits a mass-based system of normative values rooted in local tradition and capable of serving as an effective mobilizing force for the transition to a new political and economic order' (p. 270), attempts at such systems may disrupt, and neither Obote nor Amin has resolved the problem. The ultimate victim is the ordinary person who has simply to persevere. Although Mittelman asks us to stress the systematic rather than the idiosyncratic in any analysis of Ugandan affairs, and that 'the excessive use of force, loss of life and disregard for human rights are enduring features of the colonial legacy, not the creation of a malevolent regime' (p. 269), I suspect that the common Ugandan peasant may occasionally disagree, or at least feel a little confused.

*North Staffordshire Polytechnic* TONY THORNDIKE

## ASIA

**The New Economics of Growth:** A Strategy for India and the Developing World. By John W. Mellor. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 335pp. £8·00.*

WHERE two thirds of the labour force are tied to the land, one third of the rural households consists of landless labourers and the farming sector accounts for almost half the nation's output, agriculture deserves a higher priority than it has had in most developing countries throughout most of the last quarter of a century. For much of this period, policies were pursued which led to imbalances between indigenous production and foreign trade, between producer goods and consumer necessities, between private savings and public capital formation, between the incomes of the well-to-do and those of the poor, and between the political power of the influential and the participation—or rather the lack thereof—of the deprived members of society.

Professor Mellor of Cornell University has been aware of these disparities for a long time. As a consultant to the World Bank, the Rockefeller and

Ford Foundations and, more recently, the US Agency for International Development, he has had ample opportunities to study in depth the problems of traditional societies in search of a modern mode of life. John Mellor has put to good use his vast experience, and particularly that gained in India. His is the work of a mature academic mind whose findings are presented with diplomatic tact. Instead of criticising India's political leaders for past errors, the author takes the patterns of existing policies and planning as the products of a period which has come to an end and thus as the starting points for a new strategy. He wishes this strategy to be substantially different from past practices, yet capable of being grafted on to existing growth patterns, which he does not believe need to be eradicated root and branch. As the author sees it, *The New Economics of Growth* can effectively be applied in an integrated strategy of labour-intensive development in which large numbers of previously underprivileged town and country people can participate. This is a concept which is bound to come into conflict with the powerful vested interests of urban and rural elites who have gained, in economic, social and political respects, from the capital-intensive approaches of the past.

In a programme of this kind, in which employment ranks before output, the jobless on the land, rather than the beneficiaries of public investment and the office holders of the central bureaucracy, are being given places of high priority. It is a precondition of success that agro-technical innovations begin to turn traditional agriculture into a modern industry. Here the author has skilfully built the experience of the 'green revolution' into his concept of the new economics of growth. Whilst he stresses the significance of food grains as the most important 'wage goods' of the newly-employed, he regards as no less important such rural activities as the production of vegetables, milk, eggs and poultry meat. These farm operations rank side by side with rural manufacturing industries which are not only labour-intensive but which—even more significantly—provide work throughout the year and thus tend to break the seasonal cycle between labour surplus whilst the crops grow in the fields and labour shortage during the months of transplanting and harvesting. The level of prices and price support and the volume of foreign trade and foreign aid are given their due place in the author's model for future growth and development.

As John Mellor is well aware, his commitment to the welfare of the underprivileged sections of the community presupposes a 'hospitable environment' (p. 78)—a political premise which can rarely be taken for granted. In fact, he knows it to be unrealistic to think that existing patterns can be changed 'without a radical alteration of either the political system or the strategy of growth' (p. 89). Unhappily, in the imperfect world of today the author's closely reasoned blueprint for the economic future of developing countries is likely to remain a wonderful dream. It is least likely to be fulfilled in present-day India, to whose welfare this book is primarily devoted.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* W. KLATT

## NORTH AMERICA

**The Vietnam Legacy.** The War, American Society and the Future of American Foreign Policy. Edited by Anthony Lake. *New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1976. 440 pp. $20.00.*

WHEN a super-power has committed over half a million men to the field, incurred losses of more than 55,000 dead, 300,000 wounded and $150 billion spent in a totally unsuccessful war against a modest adversary, it is fitting that post-mortems should be held. They are necessary in order that similar mistakes should not be made elsewhere at other times. They are also culturally necessary for the healing process, for the rebuilding of national morale, pride and dignity, particularly in a nation dedicated to assertive principles of human freedom and dignity.

This volume contains the reflections of twenty-three men and an editor chosen from the varied ranks of the policy-forming elites, under the aegis of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Contributors include a former American vice-president and senator, high officials of the Department of Defence, congressional staff members, journalists, professors of history, politics and sociology. It is a comprehensive list, although the Department of State seems curiously under-represented. The four major parts of the book are devoted to war and change in the world, change in the United States, American policies and practices abroad, and in conclusion a section on 'New Lessons, New Mistakes'. Within these broad categories are analyses of the impact of the war on American society at large and, through a particular case study, on a specific community; consideration of the problems of consensus and dissent, and of the policy-making roles of the bureaucracy, the press and the military, as well as those of the political branches of government.

Curiously absent is discussion of the economic impact of the war and of the interaction between domestic economic imperatives and foreign policy. The footnote explanation of this omission, that 'last-minute problems prevented inclusion of such an essay' (p. xxxi), is not particularly satisfactory in view of the considerable space devoted to other aspects and the widely held and long-standing belief in the inseparable connection between the American capitalist system and external policies. The editorial summaries that introduce each section are somewhat redundant and occasionally misleading. For example, Edward Shils argues that *if* the tendency to challenge authority continues, 'it will keep American society in perpetual disorder' (p. 65). The conditional is omitted from the summary on page 38.

Except for the essay on 'The Strategic Lessons of Vietnam'— . . . 'Thus the dominant policy adjustment, amounting to a new American consensual posture, will be the instrumental one . . .' (p. 265)—the contributions are lucidly, indeed elegantly, written and intellectually challenging. Many are commanding, but Shils's 'American Society and the War in Indochina' is a particularly important analysis of the tensions between authority and individualism that were re-invigorated by the war, with consequent implications both for the 'party of traditional outlook' and for that 'of progressive outlook'. Irving Kristol, Leslie Gelb and others offer perceptive and divergent views on the validity of consensus politics in foreign policy. Maxwell Taylor reaffirms the importance of negotiating from strength and

defends the Nixon-Kissinger policies; Paul Warnke underlines the difficulty of compromising irreconcilable aims, and makes the important observation that successful negotiations are usually built upon acceptance by all sides of the status quo, but that in Vietnam 'the status quo we were prepared to ratify was to Hanoi a silly and pernicious fiction' (p. 326). The aim of this volume was to provoke informed discussion rather than to offer definitive conclusions. In this aim it succeeds.

*University of Keele* D. K. ADAMS

**The Pattern of Sino-American Crises:** Political Military Interactions in the 1950s. By J. H. Kalicki. *London: Cambridge University Press for the Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics and the Centre of International Studies, Princeton University. 1975. 279 pp. (International Studies, Vol. 2.) £7·50. $17.95.*

DR. KALICKI sets himself to explore Sino-American relations in the 1950s in terms not primarily of collisions but of 'the far more positive record of crisis interactions between the two states' (p. 2). He sees both sides learning by painful experience to practise a more sophisticated and discreet diplomacy. In 1952 Dulles was arguing for a 'roll-back' policy against communism, instead of simple containment, while China had its own ideas of liberation, especially for Taiwan; both countries had to moderate their aims, for fear of being swept into ruinously costly adventure.

The objectivity of this study is praiseworthy; Dr. Kalicki sees far more than motes in the American eye, as well as in the Chinese. He blames the North for the outbreak of the Korean war, but he shows that South as well as North indulged in loud sabre-rattling beforehand, with MacArthur ready to egg Syngman Rhee on, and the Americans' over-reaction determined by 'more or less panicky perceptions' of the Far East (p. 40). All available materials have been sifted; the story is reconstructed mainly from the American side, but the interpretations of Chinese tactics are as a rule convincing. A minor blemish is an admixture of the American academic mystification of diagrams and polysyllables, packaging for a message that is really simple enough.

Before intervening in Korea Peking gave plenty of warnings that it might be compelled to do so if its own frontier were threatened, but Western 'insensitivity' and 'over-optimism' ignored these warnings (p. 56), and no adequate check was imposed on the rampaging MacArthur. Then China in turn allowed itself to be carried away by early success, and suffered heavy losses before the final stalemate. Meanwhile Washington had included Taiwan—which had been written off at the end of the Chinese civil war as irrelevant—in its defence perimeter; by an 'extraordinary extension' this was made to cover also the islands still held by Chiang Kai-shek just off the Chinese mainland (p. 126). Due credit is given to Senator Humphrey and other Senators for asking what possible value these islands could have, but Chiang forced the Americans' hand by putting a large part of his army there; he was obviously pining to embroil the United States in war with China.

The first Taiwan Straits crisis, in 1954–55, blew over, but was not followed by detente because of 'the American refusal—until too late—to take Peking's overtures seriously' (p. 163). But in the next bout, in 1958, both

parties showed commendable restraint: Dulles and Eisenhower were practising 'brinkmanship with kid gloves' (p. 191). It ended in a slow 'de-escalation'; one good outcome was that Washington felt obliged to re-define its alliance with Taiwan in more defensive terms. Dr. Kalicki must be right in describing Chinese foreign policy as at one time infected by 'the reckless exuberance of the Big Leap', and held back from dangerous courses by Moscow's reluctance to be involved (p. 171); this must be part of the background of the Sino-Soviet split. Clearly some of America's friends, especially Britain, are entitled to similar credit as a soothing influence. But in Washington the effect of these hard-learned lessons soon wore off; they did not deter Kennedy and Johnson from plunging into Vietnam. A specimen of American comprehension of the Far East is Acheson's description of Ho Chi-minh as a Soviet pawn, 'the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina' (p. 92).

*University of Edinburgh* V. G. KIERNAN

**William Lyon Mackenzie King, Vol. 3, 1932–1939:** The Prism of Unity. By H. Blair Neatby. *Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Books Canada, London.) 366 pp. £14·00.*

MOCKERS have a name for the well-financed and carefully controlled organisation devoted to the production of the 'official' biography of William Lyon Mackenzie King who dominated Canadian politics from 1921 to 1950. They call it The Fudge Factory. This explains why Professor Neatby has felt obliged to state in his preface that the only request of the directors of the enterprise 'was that I should try to maintain the high standards of scholarship established by Professor Dawson in his study of King's earlier years. They have never suggested any interpretations or questioned any of my conclusions. The final responsibility for this volume is mine alone' (p. viii).

This is good to know, but the mockers are likely to say that this volume only proves that the image-makers of the Liberal Party of Canada have picked the right man for the job they wanted done. Professor Neatby depicts Canada in the 1930s as a dangerously disunited community saved from disaster by the political skill of Mackenzie King.

We can take it for granted that Professor Neatby's scholarship is up to the standards demanded by Mr. J. W. Pickersgill and the managers of the 'official' biography. It will be, we suspect, a nearly profitless exercise to comb through the Mackenzie King papers and diaries, once they are open for public study, in order to see whether or not Professor Neatby has used his sources well. No one needs to look into Mackenzie King's diaries to know that he was an extremely skilful politician, and that this skill was based upon a theoretical understanding of society much superior to that of his predecessors, his opponents and his successors (with the possible exception of Pierre Trudeau). Mackenzie King was successful in terms of winning elections and keeping power because he knew what he was doing and why he was doing it in a way that Arthur Meighen, R. B. Bennett, L. B. Pearson and John Diefenbaker did not. This judgment of Mackenzie King was well established on a sufficient basis of evidence and intelligent

[1] Vol. 1, 1874–1923 by R. MacGregor Dawson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Methuen, 1953); Vol. 2, 1924–1932 by H. Blair Neatby (1963).

analysis more than twenty years ago and well before Professors Dawson and Neatby published their studies.

The real political question is not whether Mackenzie King was skilful, but what use he made of his skill. Professor Neatby takes it for granted, as if it were a natural fact like gravity or thunderstorms, that Canada is a divided and potentially unstable community. In his view Mackenzie King managed successfully, if he did not solve, this natural problem. He never considers whether Mackenzie King and his supporters did not exacerbate and to some extent create the problem for which they advertised themselves as the healers. They were competitors for power, and they used what means of mobilising support seemed best to them for this purpose. From his first entry into public life Mackenzie King showed himself an adept at the art of discovering problems, selling 'solutions' to all concerned, and winning the power to deal with the parties by promising to 'conciliate'. Too often the results were not 'solutions' but increased difficulties.

The Liberal Party of Canada and the enormous bureaucracy created by it have not solved the problem of 'disunity'. During the party's long ascendancy the disunity of Canada has increased to the point where the patient, which it has been doctoring so long, may conceivably die from its nostrums and manipulation. This is not a view Professor Neatby is fitted to consider nor would his sponsors have wished him to do so.

*University of Birmingham* H. S. FERNS

## LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

**The Hovering Giant:** US Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America. By Cole Blasier. *Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1976. 315 pp. $15.95.*

THE government of the United States is itself in origin a revolutionary government. Its foreign policy has repeatedly been marked by bold, unconventional initiatives, while its friends as well as its enemies have often had cause to dread the consequences of its revolutionary philosophy of egalitarianism and individual enterprise for their own condition. It seems appropriate, therefore, that in the year of its bicentenary another look should be directed at the nature of its policy towards other, more recent regimes that profess to be 'revolutionary'. *The Hovering Giant* is a study of one central area of American concern, revolutionary governments in Latin America, and of its varied responses to them. As one would expect, given the reputation and standing of its author, who is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh and founder of the Centre of Latin American Studies there, it is a scholarly study, securely based on an extensive range of sources, where possible original. Indeed Dr. Blasier, as he frankly admits, is not satisfied, since reliable sources are not yet available, to make more than tentative conclusions about American policy towards Peru since 1968 or Chile since 1970. Instead he bases his thesis on a detached study of the four historic examples of Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala and Cuba, on the second and third of which he gives us by far the most detached, reasoned critique of United States actions hitherto available. American relations with each are studied in phases of rebellion, reform and revolution consecutively, and in terms of a broad perspective including both bureaucratic politics and transnational relations. He then combines

the conclusions drawn from the observations at each stage into a series of propositions, summarised on pp. 236–8, before examining the later cases in a deliberately more impressionistic form in a section of epilogue.

Dr. Blasier certainly deserves great credit for this work, which has a much wider geographical significance than its title suggests and deserves the closest study by great-power policy-makers. It is highly unlikely, however, that any of them will find its conclusions altogether palatable. He believes that though economic and especially private business interests were important in United States policy-making and were often compatible with strategic considerations, it was strategic considerations that in the last analysis dictated governmental action. But he does not consider that American action was very successful in achieving its objectives, especially in regard to the 'revolutionary' phase where United States actions were dysfunctional in two out of the four cases, namely Guatemala and Cuba. American policies he believes, 'have generally not facilitated the efforts of revolutionary groups to reduce their dependence on the United States in spite of the latter's sometimes sincere protestations about its desire to do so.' On the other hand, 'the revolutionary process does not appear to have reduced the dependence of any of the four countries studied . . .'. This picture may indeed seem pessimistic, but it seems to fit the facts.

*University of Southampton* PETER CALVERT

**Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, 1933–1960:** A Political Sociology from Machado to Castro. By Samuel Farber. *Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 1976. 283 pp. $15.95.*

SAMUEL FARBER is a Cuban, who left his native island at the age of 18—before the advent of Castro—to study, research and teach sociology and political science in Chicago, London and California. His roots, interests and scholarship combine to make him eminently qualified for the task he has set himself in this book, namely to show that the watershed in the history of modern Cuba was not Castro's Revolution, but the Batista-led Revolution of 1933—when, incidentally, Batista himself could well have been described as a progressive. It was the class structure, the balance of political forces which emerged at that time, which made possible, and relatively painless, Castro's success in 1959.

The author claims that inadequate research of these factors by writers and academics has led to curious discrepancies in the categorisation of Castro's Revolution. Sweezy and Huberman called it 'peasant', Zeitlin called it 'working class', Draper 'middle class'. All of them are wrong, says Farber. Castro's Revolution was 'bonapartist', in the Marxist sense; that is to say a revolution in which the leader is not obliged—indeed cannot—rely on the support of any single class or political organisation, because no single class or party is powerful enough. What he does is use them all as the occasion arises, sometimes uniting them, sometimes playing one against the other, till all opposition is eliminated. By such opportunist, manipulative and finally repressive procedures Castro had succeeded in creating 'a totalitarian and bureaucratic state, in which one man, with the aid of a small group of associates controls the economic, social and political life of the country' (p. viii).

Few would quarrel with his thesis or with this description of Castro's Cuba in its early days—indeed throughout the 1960s. But since the

'Maximum Leader's' disastrous attempt to produce a ten million ton sugar harvest in 1970, the picture has changed, though Castro is still an opportunist and a shrewd manipulator. Would it not now be more accurate to say that he is no longer aided by a small group of associates, but rather that he is subject to pressure by the Soviet Union? This consideration, unfortunately, is outside the time span of the book. A pity.

The author tells us—or warns us—at the outset, that he has examined and analysed his data from 'the political standpoint of a revolutionary democratic socialist'. His views on Cuba, he says, are based on his 'revolutionary opposition to capitalist restoration and to imperialist intervention (whether American or Russian) in that country'. For a revolutionary democratic socialist with revolutionary opposition in his blood, he argues his thesis with admirable clarity and restraint. This is clearly the work of an academic, but in spite of its somewhat forbidding title and subtitle, it is not designed exclusively for an academic readership. The author writes simply and with a minimum of sociological jargon; he interprets what are mostly already known facts clearly and interestingly: all of it is well within the understanding of anyone who would like to know more about the genesis of Castro's Revolution.

HERBERT MARCHANT

**Prologue to Perón:** Argentina in Depression and War, 1930–1943. Edited by Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1976. 236 pp. £9·10.*

THIS collection of essays on Argentina's 'infamous decade' has a greater degree of unity than many similar collections. The unity stems partly from a preoccupation with explaining why the outcome of the period 1930–43 led to Peronism. Some of the generalisations about Peronism suffer from the over-simplification produced by attempting to pin a label on that complex political and social movement, but the major part of the book is a useful and well-documented account of the crucial years following the fall of the Radicals.

The book is unusual in giving prominence to cultural developments, one chapter dealing with intellectual currents, another with popular culture. But both chapters deal as much with general sociological themes as with cultural ones, and thus help to explain the 'strident and often resentful nationalism', as Professor Falcoff puts it, that pervaded political debate. However, it is odd that there is no article that deals systematically with the class structure and social change in this period. Professor Dolkart, in an interesting but too brief and hurried account of the provinces, remarks how complicated the process of migration was in this period—but nowhere are the complexities unravelled. It is even stranger that the editors should have almost completely ignored the labour movement.

The contributions on political developments are informative, though not particularly novel in their interpretations (except perhaps in some of the more puzzling statements—such as that 'during the thirties Argentina was better governed from a *purely technical view point of view* than ever before' (p. 47, author's italics. Those trains running on time again.). The most interesting contributions come from Javier Villanueva on economic development and, especially, Joseph Tulchin on foreign policy.

Dr. Villanueva's account of economic policy is firmly rooted in an understanding of what economic options were possible and practicable given Argentina's links with international markets, and the economic interests of the dominant political sectors. Professor Tulchin brings a sensitive approach to the complexities of Argentine foreign policy. This period was crucial for the realignment of Argentina's international interests after the Roca-Runciman Pact. The author is particularly concerned to explain foreign policy as the outcome of a process of internal political conflict and bargaining. As he writes: 'Over and over again the Argentines were sacrificed to the needs of British politics and national interest, not as a result of any deliberate foreign policy, but as the result of a political process in which the Foreign Office counted for very little' (p. 100).

Although Professor Tulchin's analysis is the most original and provoking presented in this book, all the contributions are worth reading.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* ALAN ANGELL

**The State and Economic Development:** Peru since 1968. By E. V. K. Fitzgerald. *Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 127 pp. (University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics Occasional Paper 49.) £5·50. Pb: £2·00.*

THIS book represents one of the first published attempts to evaluate the economic effects of the so-called revolutionary government of Peru since 1968. The book relies heavily on the style and methods of macro-economic planning. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a coherent survey of the process of economic development and an understanding of some of its constraints. The disadvantages are: first, the emphasis on aggregation and the almost total reliance on the national accounts as the source of data cast doubt on the validity of some of the empirical analysis; secondly, the technical-empiricist bias leads to a number of theoretical ambiguities and weaknesses which undermine the overall analysis and conclusions; and thirdly, the analysis is exclusively economic in emphasis and ignores the social and political bases of state intervention in the economy.

Fitzgerald's intention is 'to assess the intervention of the state in the process of surplus mobilization and allocation'. The background to this evaluation is given in a sketchy analysis of the economic structure up to 1968, which is characterised as an export-based dual economy with extreme concentration of ownership of productive resources and a highly-skewed distribution of income. The reforms identified by the author have to do mainly with changes in the pattern of ownership, in which domestic and foreign capital have been replaced by the state and workers' co-operatives. The author concludes that these changes have led to the emergence of a strong state 'capable of reducing dependency and assuring autonomous economic development'. However, he draws attention to several factors which constrain this process. First, the reforms have not changed productive or distributive relations within the 'traditional sector' and therefore have not affected the incomes of two thirds of the workforce. Secondly, the narrow resource base of the state (due to low taxation, low profitability of public enterprises and inflationary domestic borrowing) has resulted in a mounting external debt.

Three concepts are crucial to this analysis of the economy and evaluation of the reforms: dualism, dependency and surplus. The use of these concepts is unsatisfactory because of the brevity of definition, the inconsistencies with which they are applied in subsequent chapters and the lack of relationship to any coherent theoretical structure.

Dualism is defined in terms of differences in the degree of capitalisation acquired by higher physical productivity and internal terms of trade. No justification of these criteria is provided and the empirical analysis relies on a crude measure of enterprise size. The validity of these data may be questioned since they are based on national accounts estimates, which in turn are compiled on the basis of population projections and the residual of output after modern sector production has been accounted for. Fitzgerald is careful to disclaim any suggestion of a discontinuous relationship between the two sectors, yet his assumptions throughout are dichotomous and static. He maintains that 'the bulk of the peasants, artisans and tertiary workers have been excluded from the reforms', yet if the two sectors are in fact interconnected it is difficult to see how there could not have been some spillover in terms of employment or income. The existence of some linkage is logically implied by the rather crude assertion that 'it is doubtful whether the balance of duality has altered much since 1961', for the modern sector has expanded considerably during this period and this must have had some bearing on the expansion of the traditional sector for the balance to have remained the same. Since the nature of the connections between the two is not spelt out it is difficult to disentangle the contradictions in Fitzgerald's treatment of this problem.

Similar ambiguities abound in the discussion of dependency. Although the author suggests four aspects of this question, his judgment that the Velasco government significantly lessened the degree of dependency is based on only two of these (ownership of the means of production and export of profits). Fitzgerald's own data shows that according to the other two criteria (reliance on foreign finance and technology) Peru's dependence has increased. As far as the assessment of the scope of the ownership changes is concerned, the degree of precision suggested by the tables showing the proportion of output and employment accounted for by domestic and foreign capital in the periods before and after reform is misleading in view of the difficulty of obtaining accurate data on share ownership and managerial control, especially in the post-reform period.

The notion of surplus is the least satisfactory of all the concepts used. The author ranges from a Marxist terminology, including 'the realization of the surplus', 'autonomous reproduction' and 'the system of surplus extraction', to a Keynesian discussion of the structure of savings and capital formation. The 'surplus'—its extraction, appropriation and allocation—thus remains elusive throughout the text, in spite of its central position in the organisation of the book.

Brief references to general questions about the role of the state in economic development suggest that this book is intended to offer more than a simple national accounting exercise. Yet there is no extended discussion of general implications arising from this particular analysis. The reference to Kalecki's work on intermediate regimes provides no further elucidation since one typology is merely identified with another without further theoretical discussion. In view of the theoretical weaknesses, the usefulness of this book lies in the skill involved in the accounting exercise.

Here the major drawback is the lack of discussion about the adequacy of data sources and possible weaknesses in the aggregation operations. Nevertheless the provision of a well-informed survey of general economic problems in an important period of Peru's economic history will be of considerable value.

*University of Essex* ALISON M. SCOTT

## GENERAL HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY

**Slim: The Standardbearer.** By Ronald Lewin. *London: Leo Cooper. 1976. 350 pp. £7·50.*

SLIM offers a biographer a superb opportunity for a study of character on the grand scale, for he was the archetypical Englishman: from the Midland heart of England, hard-working, middle-class, self-made, respecting the antique virtues and, however high he rose, a 'Brummie' to his boots. It is the secret of Ronald Lewin's success that while he deals with an unerring touch with his subject's achievements he perceived from the first that Slim the man counted more than Slim the Governor-General, or Slim the Chief of the Imperial General Staff or even Slim the commander of a victorious army.

All the same, he is a difficult subject. No man is without faults, but Slim was, at least, without flaws. Positively, he was sustained by constancy in love and marriage, he was dead honest, brave, kind and troubled by an inner humility deriving from a personal Christianity worked out painfully for himself. Indeed, the solutions to all his fundamental problems were laboriously wrought and bear the marks of the mental hammer. Their simplicity—on the subject of morale, for instance—is apt to deceive those military experts who confuse complexity or obscurity of expression with profundity of thought. It would be fatally easy to become saccharine about so good, so wise and so well-loved a man as 'Uncle Bill', but there is a warning in that gun turret of a face—and how dauntingly it could revolve and train on the offerer of a light or hastily considered opinion! It reveals the Birmingham iron in both the man and the general. Slim rose to the heights because he had long made them his objective. Defeat he never countenanced, in war or in life.

Lewin recognises this and his study is well balanced. The high plateaux of Slim's career are described with historical accuracy based on his voluminous personal papers and also with great insight into how affairs at those altitudes are in fact conducted. Slim's immediate rapport with Mountbatten, the basis of his success, and the—in retrospect comical—account of his two dismissals are of peculiar interest, but nothing could be better done than the early chapters covering the period when the bedrock of Slim's character was being laid down, or more enjoyable than the glimpse of young Slim, filthy from the trenches of Gallipoli, bearding the embusqués of the 'Q' staff to obtain comforts for his soldiers or, later when he was a general, cheerfully discussing with a crony over a whisky and soda the chances that a decision he had just taken might prove fatally wrong. (It didn't.)

Slim's own memoir, *Defeat into Victory,*[1] contained gaps or suppressions

[1] London: Cassell, 1972.

due to discretion, kindness or inbred loyalty. These, and they are of historical importance, for example, on Wingate, have now been filled in. This is a biography on the grand scale and Lewin has risen to the nobility of his theme. Historians may not speculate, but one tantalising afterthought remains. How would Slim, politically no simpleton, have dealt with Gough Whitlam?

SHELFORD BIDWELL

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

**Political Handbook of the World: 1976.** Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations as of January 1, 1976. Edited by Arthur S. Banks. *New York: McGraw-Hill for the Center for Comparative Political Research of the State University of New York at Binghampton and for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1976. 545 pp. £16·55.*

THIS yearbook has come a long way since it first appeared in 1928 under the sole auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. It now gives information on the political structure and the news media of 162 independent states. A separate section contains the origins, purpose and organisation of over 130 inter-governmental bodies. One important feature not easily found elsewhere is the coverage of political parties and movements, with an assessment of their platforms and the names of their leaders.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**The International Who's Who.** 40th edn. 1976–77. *London: Europa. 1976. 1908 pp. £20·00.*

RICHARD FITZWILLIAMS, the new editor of this excellent biographical yearbook, has made some important innovations. For the first time distinguished sportsmen and women are included and the coverage in the fields of physics, chemistry and medicine has been considerably expanded.

All entries have been revised and checked and are remarkably up-to-date.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**Parliaments of the World:** A Reference Compendium. Prepared by Valentine Herman with the collaboration of Françoise Mendel. *London: Macmillan for the Inter-Parliamentary Union. 1976. 985 pp. £30·00.*

THE organisation, procedure and activities of fifty-six parliaments, as on September 1, 1974, are exhaustively examined in this well-produced volume. It is done by means of seventy tables, each preceded by a brief explanatory text. Each table deals with one particular aspect of parliament—methods of voting, the role of committees and so on—and lists the practice of each of the parliaments covered. The tables are divided into six parts. The first two deal with the composition, organisation and operation of parliament; the next three with its legislative function, powers over finance and control of the executive; and the last part with the nomination of government officials and judges and the judicial functions of parliament. Academics, government officials and journalists should find this work of immense value.

As it seems unlikely that anyone else will produce such a detailed survey for a very long time, a regular up-dating supplement would be welcome.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**A Chronology and Fact Book of the United Nations 1941–1976.** By Waldo Chamberlin, Thomas Hovet Jr. and Erica Hovet. *Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana. 1976. 302 pp. $12.50.*

THE fourth edition of this useful reference book contains the same features as before: a chronology with subject index, lists of members of the UN organs and agencies and texts of the Charter and of the General Assembly's rules of procedure. The book is an indispensable starting point for research on UN activities and organisation. The chronology ends in June 1976.

*Chatham House* S. M. G. C.

**Annuaire Européen, European Yearbook: Vol. XXII. 1974.** *The Hague: Nijhoff under the auspices of the Council of Europe. 1976. 836 pp. Fl. 225.00.*

ANY research library with an interest in the study of European organisations and particularly those without the means to acquire the great amount of documents which they produce, should obtain this annual. The present volume contains a cumulative list of articles published in volumes 1–20, five articles by such authors as Garrett Fitzgerald and Guido Carli and a documentary section with a chapter on each of the main European inter-governmental organisations. The select bibliography contains relevant articles in European languages, mostly published in 1974.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1976.** Edited by Richard F. Staar. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1976. 636 pp. $25.00.*

THE tenth issue of this yearbook surveys the events of 1975 in the communist parties and organisations of the world. There are two new features. One is a table giving the size and status of each party as well as its position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The other is a chapter giving brief biographies of nine prominent international communist figures. The select bibliography of books published in 1974 and 1975 includes a number of important ones in languages other than English.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**The Middle East and North Africa 1976–77.** 23rd edn. *London: Europa. 1976. 930 pp. £15·50.*

THERE are no innovations in this new edition but each section has been carefully up-dated, in many cases to July 1976. With the civil war in its second year, the chapter on the history of Lebanon gives a useful survey and that on Cyprus contains a map showing the ' Turkish Federated State '.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**Africa Contemporary Record.** Vol. 8: Annual Survey and Documents 1975–1976. Edited by Colin Legum. *London: Rex Collings; New York: Africana Publishing. 1976. £20·00.*

ANOTHER eventful year has been ably reviewed in the eighth edition of this annual. Essays on current issues are contributed by Colin Legum, Zdenek Cervenka, W. A. C. Adie, David Morison and others. These are followed by separate chapters on each country grouped by region. Part 3 contains texts of documents. It is particularly useful to have those of the Organisation of African Unity which are often very difficult to trace.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**The Far East and Australasia 1976–77.** 8th edn. *London: Europa. 1976. 1331 pp. £22·00.*

THE first part of this annual reference book deals with topics relevant to the whole area. There are chapters on population, religions and economic problems. The second part gives information on regional organisations and then follow sections on individual countries. They include statistics and directories of the press and of political and economic institutions. The final part contains a who's who and a select bibliography of periodicals; the latter unfortunately is not as up-to-date as it might be.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**Chile under Allende:** A Bibliographical Survey. By Jiřina Rybáček-Mlýnková. *Princeton, NJ: Research Program in Development Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. 1976. 59 pp. (Discussion Paper 63.) Pb.*

THIS paper reviews books and periodical articles published after the coup which established a military dictatorship in Chile in September 1973. It is followed by a ten-page annotated bibliography of items written during the period of the Allende government.

*Chatham House* D. H.

## OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

BROOKSTONE, Jeffrey M.: *The Multinational Businessman and Foreign Policy*: Entrepreneurial Politics in East-West Trade and Investment. New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 183 pp. £12·20.

FRY, Michael G., ed.: '*Freedom and Change*': Essays in honour of Lester B. Pearson. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. 1975. 258 pp. $12.95.

HOOLE, Francis W. and ZINNES, Diana A., eds.: *Quantitative International Politics*: An Appraisal. New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 520 pp. £22·75.

KEETON, George W. and SCHWARZENBERGER, Georg: *The Yearbook of World Affairs 1977*. London: Stevens under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs. 1977. 364 pp. £8·75.

SHLAIM, Avi, ed.: *International Organisations in World Politics*: Yearbook 1975. London: Croom Helm. 1976. 228 pp. £7·95.

WILKINSON, David: *Cohesion and Conflict*: Lessons from the Study of Three-Party Interaction. London: Frances Pinter. 1976. 274 pp. £8·00.

ZELLENTIN, Gerda in collab. with GOORMAGHTIGH, John: *Les Missions Permanentes auprès des Organisations Internationales*, Vol. 4: Conclusions Théoriques. Brussels: Bruylant under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1976. 165 pp. Bel.frs. 1272 (Belgium), Bel.frs. 1200 (elsewhere).

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

BIENEN, Henry and MORELL, David, eds.: *Political Participation under Military Regimes*. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 135 pp. (Sage Contemporary Social Science Issues no. 26.) £2·50.

BRITISH-NORTH AMERICAN COMMITTEE: *Mineral Development in the Eighties*: Prospects and Problems. (A report prepared by a group of committee members on the basis of a document provided by Ian MacGregor with a statistical annex by Sperry Lea.) London, Washington: British-North American Committee. 1976. 54 pp. Pb: £1·50, $3.00.

BROWN, Lester R.: *World Population Trends*: Signs of Hope, Signs of Stress. Washington: Worldwatch Institute. 1976. 40 pp. (Worldwatch Paper 8.) Pb: $2.00.

CURLE, Adam: *Mystics and Militants*: A Study of Awareness, Identity and Social Action. London: Tavistock. 1976. (First publ. London, 1972.) 121 pp. Pb: £1·50.

DOPFER, Kurt, ed.: *Economics of the Future*. London: Macmillan. 1976. 123 pp. £7·95. Pb: £2·95.

EMMINGER, Otmar: *On the Way to a New International Monetary Order*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 21 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 39.) Pb: $1.50.

ENZENSBERGER, Hans Magnus: *Raids and Reconstructions*: Essays on Politics, Crime and Culture. London: Pluto Press. 1976. 312 pp. £7·50. Pb: £3·30.

GEORGE, Susan: *How the Other Half Dies*: The Real Reasons for World Hunger. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976. 348 pp. Pb: £1·00.

GOLD, Joseph: *Floating Currencies, Gold, and SDRs*: Some Recent Legal Developments. Washington: International Monetary Fund. 1976. 87 pp. (Pamphlet Series no. 19.) Pb: free.

GOLD, Joseph: *The Fund Agreement in the Courts, Parts VIII–XI*. Washington: International Monetary Fund. 1976. 121 pp. Pb: free.

HONDERICH, Ted: *Three Essays on Political Violence*. Oxford: Blackwell. 1977. 118 pp. £4·50.

HONDERICH, Ted, ed.: *Social Ends and Political Means*. London, Boston, Mass.: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1976. 177 pp. £6·95.

HOUTHAKKER, Hendrik S.: *The World Price of Oil*: A Medium-Term Analysis. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 37 pp. (National Energy Study 13.) Pb: $2.50.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE: *The Impact of International Labour Conventions and Recommendations*. Geneva: ILO. 1976. 104 pp. Pb: Sw.frs. 20.00.

JOHNSON, D. Gale: *World Food Problems and Prospects*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1975. 83 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 20.) Pb: $3.00.

KYLE, John F.: *The Balance of Payments in a Monetary Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1976. 192 pp. (Irving Fisher Award Series 4.) £8·70.

LINDBERG, Leon N., ed.: *Politics and the Future of Industrial Society*. New York: McKay. 1976. 286 pp. $12.50. Pb: $6.95.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES: *Energy for Rural Development*: Renewable Resources and Alternative Technologies for Developing Countries. (Report of an ad hoc panel of the Advisory Committee on Technology Innovation, Board on Science and Technology for International Development Commission on International Relations.) Washington: National Academy of Sciences. 1976. 306 pp. Pb.

NIEZING, Johan, ed.: *Urban Guerilla*: Studies on the Theory, Strategy and Practice of Political Violence in Modern Societies. (Proceedings of the first international working conference on violence and non-violent action in industrialised societies, Brussels, March 13–15, 1974, Part I.) Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press. 1974. 149 pp. Pb: Fl. 28.40.

OECD: *OECD Economic Outlook 20: December 1976*. Paris: OECD. 1976. 126 pp. Pb: $7.00, £3·10, F 28.00.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION UNIT: *Stimulating Local Development*. London: ODI. 1976. 56 pp. Pb: £1·00.

PARKIN, Michael: *Inflation in the World Economy: 1958–1975*. Guildford: University of Surrey. 1976. 19 pp. (Surrey Papers in Economics no. 11.) Pb: £0·50.

POWER, Jonathan and HOLENSTEIN, Anne-Marie: *World of Hunger*: A Strategy for Survival. London: Temple Smith. 1976. 202 pp. £4·00. Pb: £1·95.

RUESCHHOFF, Norlin G.: *International Accounting and Financial Reporting*. New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 172 pp. £11·55.

SALAS, Rafael M.: *People: An International Choice*. The Multilateral Approach to Population. Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press. 1976. 154 pp. $10.00. Pb: $6.00.

WAYMAN, Frank Whelon: *Military Involvement in Politics*: A Causal Model. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 71 pp. Pb: £1·50, $3.00.

WESSON, Robert G.: *Why Marxism?* The Continuing Success of a Failed Theory. London: Temple Smith. 1976. 281 pp. £7·50.

YOTOPOULOS, Pan A. and NUGENT, Jeffrey B.: *Economics of Development*: Empirical Investigations. New York, London: Harper and Row. 1976. 478 pp. £14·20.

## LAW

BENSALAH, Tabrizi: *L'Enquête Internationale dans le Règlement des Conflits*: Règles Juridiques Applicables. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 1976. 269 pp. (Bibliothèque de Droit International Tome LXXIX.) Pb: F 85.00.

GREIG, D. W.: *International Law*. 2nd edn. London: Butterworth. 1976. 944 pp. £18·00. Pb: £12·00.

SIMMONDS, Kenneth R., ed., with the collab. of SARUP, Amrit: *Cases on the Law of the Sea*, Vol. 1. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana. 1976. 470 pp. $40.00.

SZEKELY, Alberto: *Latin America and the Development of the Law of the Sea*: Regional Documents and National Legislation, Vol. 1. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana. 1976. 361 pp. $60.00.

## WESTERN EUROPE

BECQUART-LECLERCQ, Jeanne: *Paradoxes du Pouvoir Local*. Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. 1976. 233 pp. (Travaux et Recherches de Science Politique no. 38.) F 115.00. Pb: F 80.00.

BREITENSTEIN, Rolf, ed.: *Total War to Total Trust*: Personal Accounts of 30 Years of Anglo-German Relations—The Vital Role of Non-governmental Organisations. London: Wolff in co-operation with the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany. 1976. 92 pp. Pb: £2·75.

CREAN, G. G.: *European Security—The CSCE Final Act*: Text and Commentary. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 75 pp. (Behind the Headlines vol. XXXV, nos. 2 and 3.) Pb: $1.50.

FOREMAN-PECK, James: *Overseas Development—Home Truths*. London: Bow Group. 1976. 16 pp. Pb: £0·40.

HÄRTLE, Heinrich: *Deutsche und Juden*: Studien zu einem Weltproblem. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel-Verlag. 1976. 328 pp. Pb: DM 28.00.

HENKEL, Joachim: *Die Auswahl der Parlamentsbewerber*: Grundfragen—Verfahrensmodelle. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. 1976. 79 pp. Pb: DM 18.00.

JACOBSEN, Hanns-Dieter: *Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen West und Ost*: Strukturen, Formen, Interessen, Auswirkungen. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. 1975. 176 pp. Pb.

OECD: *Iceland* (Economic Survey). Paris: OECD. 1976. 59 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10, F 10.00.

OECD: *Ireland* (Economic Survey). Paris: OECD. 1976. 57 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10, F 10.00.

OECD: *Portugal* (Economic Survey). Paris: OECD. 1976. 60 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10, F 10.00.

RIKLIN, Alois and ZELLER, Willy: *Die Schweiz und die Europäischen Gemeinschaften*. Zurich: Schweizerischer Aufklärungs-Dienst. 1975. 174 pp. (Schriften des SAD 13.) Pb: Sw.frs. 9.00.

UTLEY, T. E.: *Lessons of Ulster*. London: Dent. 1975. 154 pp. £4·95.

WESTERGAARD, John and RESLER, Henrietta: *Class in a Capitalist Society*: A Study of Contemporary Britain. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976. (First publ. London: Heinemann, 1975.) 432 pp. Pb: £1·50.

## USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

BERTSCH, Gary K. and GANSCHOW, Thomas W., eds.: *Comparative Communism*: The Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav Models. San Francisco, Reading: Freeman. 1976. 463 pp. £7·80. Pb: £3·90, $6.95.

DOUGLASS, Joseph D. Jr.: *The Soviet Theatre Nuclear Offensive*: Vol. 1. (Prepared for Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (NET Technical Assessment) and Defense Nuclear Agency.) Washington: US Government Printing Office under the auspices of the US Air Force. 1976. 127 pp. Pb: $1.60.

KEEP, John L. H.: *The Russian Revolution*: A Study in Mass Mobilization. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1976. 614 pp. £12·50.

MACLEAN, Fitzroy: *To Caucasus, the End of all the Earth*: An Illustrated Companion to the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. London: Jonathan Cape. 1976. 203 pp. £6·50.

MYAGKOV, Aleksei: *Inside the KGB*: An Exposé by an Officer of the Third Directorate. Richmond: Foreign Affairs Publishing. 1976. 131 pp. £3·00.

RADKEY, Oliver H.: *The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia*: A Study of the Green Movement in the Tambov Region 1920–1921. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1976. 457 pp. $12.95.

## MIDDLE EAST

CAMERON, James: *The Making of Israel*. London: Secker and Warburg. 1976. 104 pp. £3·90.

FENELON, K. G.: *The United Arab Emirates*: An Economic and Social Survey. 2nd edn. London: Longman. 1976. 164 pp. £4·75. (First publ. London: Longman, 1973; reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1974, p. 318.)

HASSOUNA, Hussein A.: *The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes*: A Study of Middle East Conflicts. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana; Leiden: Sijthoff. 1975. 512 pp. $25.00.

PAKISTAN HORIZON, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, 1975 (special issue). Ed. by M. Masood. *The Middle East, 1975*. Dedicated to the Memory of A. B. A. Haleem. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 251 pp. Pb.

PELCOVITS, N. A.: *Security Guarantees in a Middle East Settlement*. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 69 pp. (Foreign Policy Paper 5.) Pb: £1·50.

RUGH, William A.: *Arab Perceptions of American Foreign Policy during the October War*. Washington: Middle East Institute. 1976. 51 pp. (Special Study, no. II.) Pb: $2.50.

SICHERMAN, Harvey: *The Yom Kippur War*: End of Illusion? Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 91 pp. (Foreign Policy Paper 4.) Pb: $3.00, £1·50.

## AFRICA

CATHOLIC COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE IN RHODESIA: *Civil War in Rhodesia*: Abduction, Torture and Death in the Counter-Insurgency Campaign. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations. 1976. 103 pp. Pb: £1·00.

CELL, John W., ed.: *By Kenya Possessed*: The Correspondence of Norman Leys and J. H. Oldham 1918–1926. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1976. 382 pp. £14·25.

FARER, Tom J.: *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa*: A Crisis for Detente. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1976. 157 pp. Pb: $3.75.

TAYLOR, Catherine: *If Courage Goes*: My Twenty Years in South Africa. London: Macmillan. 1976. 350 pp. £6·95.

WORLD BANK COUNTRY REPORT: *Lesotho: A Development Challenge*. By Willem Maane. Washington: World Bank. 1975. (Sole distributors Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.) 98 pp. Pb: $4.75, £3·30.

## ASIA

CHEN, Theodore Hsi-en: *The Maoist Educational Revolution*. London, New York: Praeger. 1976. 295 pp. £11·00.

GHOSH, Oroon Kumar: *The Changing Indian Civilization* (A Perspective on India), Vol. II. Calcutta: Minerva. 1976. 432 pp. Rs.75.00.

LIVINGSTON, Jon, MOORE, Joe and OLDFATHER, Felicia: *The Japan Reader*: Vol. 1, Imperial Japan 1800–1945; Vol. 2, Postwar Japan 1945 to the Present. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976. (First publ. New York: Random House, 1973.) Vol. 1 517 pp.; Vol. 2 600 pp. Pb: £1·75 each vol.

LIM, David, ed.: *Readings on Malaysian Economic Development*. Kuala Lumpur, London: Oxford University Press. 1976. 421 pp. £15·75.

RUO-WANG, Bao (Jean Pasqualini) and CHELMINSKI, Rudolph: *Prisoner of Mao*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976. 326 pp. Pb: £0·90, $2.50. (First publ. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1973; London: André Deutsch, 1975.)

SCHARPING, Thomas, ed.: *Mao Chronik*: Daten zu Leben und Werk. Munich, Vienna: Carl Hanser. 1976. 235 pp. Pb.

WILBUR, C. Martin: *Sun Yat-Sen: Frustrated Patriot*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1976. 410 pp. $20.65.

WORLD BANK COUNTRY ECONOMIC REPORT: *The Philippines*: Priorities and Prospects for Development. By Russell J. Cheetham and Edward K. Hawkins. Washington: World Bank. 1976. (Sole distributors Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.) 573 pp. Pb: $8.50, £5·95.

## NORTH AMERICA

BROSSARD, Jacques: *L'Accession à la Souveraineté et le Cas du Québec*. Montreal: University of Montreal Press. 1976. 800 pp. Pb.

EL-KHAWAS, Mohamed A. and COHEN, Barry, eds.: *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa*: National Security Study Memorandum 39 (Secret). Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill. 1976. (Publ. in UK by Rex Collings, London.) 189 pp. Pb: $3.95, £3·95.

HAHN, Harlan and HOLLAND, R. William: *American Government*: Minority Rights versus Majority Rule. New York, London: John Wiley. 1976. 203 pp. £3·65, $7.30.

JACOMY-MILLETTE, A.: *Treaty Law in Canada*. Trans. by Thomas V. Helwig. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. 1975. (First publ. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1971, under title *L'Introduction et l'Application des Traités Internationaux au Canada*.) 431 pp. (Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa Monographies juridiques no. 8.) Pb.

KLEBANOFF, Shoshana: *Middle East Oil and US Foreign Policy with Special Reference to the US Energy Crisis*. New York: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1974. 288 pp. £7·25.

LISKA, George: *Beyond Kissinger*: Ways of Conservative Statecraft. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 1975. 159 pp. (Studies in International Affairs no. 26.) £7·80. Pb: £1·90.

LUKEN, Ralph Andrew: *Preservation versus Development*: An Economic Analysis of San Francisco Bay Wetlands. New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 155 pp. £9·75.

MARCUS, Henry S., SHORT, James E., KUYPERS, John C. and ROBERTS, Paul O.: *Federal Port Policy in the United States*. Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1976. 371 pp. £15·00.

MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP: *The Original Americans: US Indians*. By James Wilson. London: Minority Rights Group. 1976. 28 pp. (Report no. 31.) Pb: £0·45.

PEABODY, Robert L., ed.: *Cases in American Politics*. New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 208 pp. Pb: £2·95.

RANGER, Robin: *The Canadian Contribution to the Control of Chemical and Biological Warfare.* Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 66 pp. (Wellesley Paper 5.) Pb: $2.25.

SAYWELL, John, ed.: *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs 1975.* Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press with the support of York University. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Books Canada, London.) 406 pp. £24·50.

SINDLER, Allan P.: *Unchosen Presidents*: The Vice-President and Other Frustrations of Presidential Succession. Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1976. 118 pp. £4·45.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

STERN, Robert M., FRANCIS, Jonathan and SCHUMACHER, Bruce: *Price Elasticities in International Trade*: An Annoted Bibliography. London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre. 1976. 363 pp. £15·00.

*Yearbook of World Problems and Human Potential 1976.* Brussels: Union of International Associations and Mankind 2000. 1976. 1136 pp. $65.00, £24·00, Bel. frs. 2300.

# BOOKS REVIEWED, APRIL 1977

# INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOUNDED IN 1922

JULY 1977



*Published quarterly for the*

**ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

*by the*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

## *CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE*

**John Pinder** is Director of Political and Economic Planning (PEP).

**Michael Howard** is a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, and will be Chichele Professor of the History of War from October.

**William B. Quandt** is Associate Professor of Political Science, on leave from the University of Pennsylvania.

**Christopher Andrew** is a Lecturer in History at Cambridge.

**R. E. M. Irving** is a Lecturer in Politics at Edinburgh. He is preparing a book for Chatham House on Christian Democracy in the countries of the European Community.

**Loukas Tsoukalis** is a Research Fellow in European Studies at St. Catherine's College, Oxford, and author of *The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration* (1977).

*Editor*
Wendy Hinde

*Editorial Office*
Chatham House, St. James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE
Tel. 01-930 2233
*All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor*



*The Editor is ready to consider suggestions for articles that might be suitable for publication in* International Affairs. *It is advisable to write a preliminary letter before sending a complete manuscript*

The annual subscription for *International Affairs* is £6 (UK), $18 (USA), £8 (elsewhere), post free. Orders may be placed with any bookseller or newsagent or direct with the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD. Tel. 01-450 8080.

 ISSN 0020-5850

# INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 53 JULY 1977 No. 3

# THE REFORM OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: WEAK AND STRONG COUNTRIES *

*John Pinder*

ALTHOUGH we are now in the fourth year after OPEC quintupled the price of oil, the performance of the advanced industrial economies is still very bad. Unemployment is around 5 per cent or more in most OECD countries. Industry is working far below capacity. Production lost through normal growth forgone in the last three years must amount, cumulatively, to above a third of the OECD's annual gross domestic product (GDP), or a thousand billion dollars. Inflation has been reduced to rates of around 5 per cent in only two or three countries, and in several countries remains much higher. There is no reliable prospect that unemployment will be reduced; and there are grounds to fear that attempts to reduce it will send inflation spiralling upwards again.

Within this sombre perspective, international attention tends to focus upon the troubles of certain 'weak countries': Britain, Italy and, to a lesser extent, France. These countries certainly have great problems, which it is one purpose of this article to consider. But awareness of their particular ills should not divert attention from the defects of economic management, both national and international, which are general among Western countries today. These defects allowed the international instability which caused the British and Italian difficulties to get out of hand; a sound and expanding international economy would be of the greatest help in resolving their difficulties; and, even if these countries solved their special problems by their own efforts alone, the general malaise of the Western economy would remain. It is necessary, therefore, to consider this malaise, and the consequent need for a reform of economic management, in relation not only to the 'weaker countries' but also to the 'strong countries' and to the international economy as a whole.

The 'weak countries' include some very diverse economies with two things in common: high inflation and balance-of-payments deficits. The term 'weak' is somewhat misleading, as it gives the

* This article is based on a paper given to a conference at Chatham House on March 17–18, 1977, organised jointly with the Istituto Affari Internazionali of Rome, on 'Atlantic Relations: Divergent Capacity and Collective Responsibility'.

impression of a general and uniform weakness. In fact the 'weak countries' have a better record of production growth than the so-called 'strong countries'. Output per head of occupied population increased, from 1964 to 1974, by 4.8 per cent a year in Italy and 4.5 per cent in France, against 4.2 per cent in the German Federal Republic; by 9.2 per cent in Spain against 7.4 per cent in Japan; and, even in industrially stagnant Britain, by 2.4 per cent against 1.6 per cent in the United States.[1] In their capacity to improve the material consumption of their people, therefore, the 'weak countries' have been stronger than the 'strong'. Their weakness lies in the inadequacy of their adjustment to the enormous economic shock of the commodity boom of 1972–73 and the OPEC price rise in particular, which together injected up to 5 per cent of inflation into their domestic economies and imposed a deficit at an annual rate initially of $60 billion, now reduced to some $40 billion, to be shared among the importers of oil from OPEC.

Britain and Italy were among the countries hit hardest by the tidal wave of commodity price increases in 1973: Britain because it was most dependent on food bought at world prices, and Italy because it depends so heavily for its energy consumption on imported oil. But the severity of the two countries' inflation was due more to their weakness in dealing with the subsequent cost-push and price-push inflationary spirals.

Here, indeed, seems to lie the crucial distinction between the countries now called strong and those called weak. The American government has reduced inflation by raising unemployment to 7–8 per cent. The Japanese imposed a very sharp deflation. The Germans kept wage and salary increases at non-inflationary levels by their 'concerted action', which is a kind of economic contract between government and unions, or a voluntary incomes policy. In Britain, France and Italy, on the other hand, deflation as in Japan or the United States has not been a viable policy because of the economic and political strength of workers' organisations, whether trade unions or political parties; and political and social divisions have stood in the way of the sort of co-operative incomes policy that has been so effective in Germany.

There are, here again, big differences among the 'weak countries'. Britain can operate an incomes policy for two years out of three; but these two years are spent recovering from the first year's 'free collective bargaining', with its pay increases of 20–30 per cent, instead of

[1] *Basic Statistics of the Community*, 1975–76 (Brussels: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1976). The US figure may be understated as a result of changes in the methods of measuring the occupied population.

consolidating, as in Germany, on the uninterrupted exercise of self-discipline. France has had, until recently, stronger government than Britain or Italy. But in each case the weakness is rooted in the inability of politics and society to come to terms with the power of workers' organisations: a structural defect which is not likely to be quickly removed, and certainly not by conjunctural policies. These countries have high 'propensities to inflation'[2]; and this has kept the wheel of inflation spinning faster and longer than in countries where the workers' organisations are either accommodated more stably in the system or controlled by it.

This is the central weakness of the 'weak countries'. But the problems of the Western economies are not likely to be solved if this is seen as an ailment from which the weak suffer, while others do not. It is a matter not of all or nothing, but of more or less. Given the similarities among Western societies, indeed, it would be surprising if three of the largest of them (Britain, France, Italy) possessed characteristics which were entirely absent from the other three (Germany, the United States and—although here the cultural and social differences are greater—Japan). It is not, therefore, surprising that the 'strong countries' too suffer from the effects of pressure from cost-push as well as price-push. In their case, however, the pressure, being less powerful, is more readily contained by deflation, resulting not in such high inflation as in the 'weak countries', but in similarly high unemployment.

It will be apparent that the word 'strong' has some validity in comparing Germany, Japan and the United States with the weaker countries, which have high inflation as well as unemployment; but not in comparison with any normal standards of economic performance, which include full employment and economic growth as well as price stability. Germany, Japan and the United States have, in order to bring inflation down and keep it down, maintained unemployment at rates of 5 per cent or more; and in Germany and the United States at least, the day when they bring it below this level seems, on present policies, less likely to be this year or next year than sometime or never.

The record of these countries in creating employment is even worse than the unemployment figures imply. For they have tended to run surpluses on their current balances of payments when there was, as a result of the OPEC surplus, a huge deficit that has had to be borne by the non-OPEC countries, and which the OECD countries agreed to share equitably among themselves. These surpluses and

[2] See G. Magnifico, *European Monetary Unification* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 10.

deficits are considered in more detail later. The statistics indicate that Germany has a current surplus of about 1 per cent of GDP where its share of the OPEC-induced deficit should be a deficit of about 1 per cent. Hence Germany is exporting unemployment equivalent to perhaps a further 2 per cent of its workforce, quite apart from the loss of jobs by migrant workers who have returned home. This may be an improvement on the monstrous 3–4 per cent that the discrepancy had reached in 1974, but it is still a heavy burden shifted on to Germany's trade partners, and an alleviation of Germany's own unemployment that would otherwise, with unchanged policies, have reached American levels.

The Americans and Germans have persisted with their deflations in order to squeeze inflation out of their systems. Sooner or later they will try to reduce unemployment by relaxing their policies of demand management, although after initially pointing in that direction, the Carter administration seems to have drawn back to a more cautious posture; and the Germans still resist a policy expansionary enough to reduce unemployment for fear that it would lead to renewed inflation. Unfortunately, it seems reasonable to suppose that this belief is well-founded: that monetarism strict enough to maintain price stability will cause heavy unemployment, while Keynesianism expansive enough to maintain full employment will lead to inflation; that you are damned if you do expand and damned if you don't, and that there is no middle way in the management of global demand which will, without new measures designed to deal with the new problems of the modern economy, provide full employment with stable prices. In the world of neo-classical economics, based on the assumption of markets that are nearly enough perfect, this would be an untenable paradox. But the markets in the real world are no longer nearly enough perfect. There is reason to believe, on the contrary, that the normal market is now imperfect enough to require the addition of new methods of economic management, if growth and full employment are to be combined with stability.

Already in the 1930s attention was being drawn to the significance of imperfect competition.[3] Galbraith and others have since reiterated the theme. The scale of production and of enterprises leads to oligopolistic competition, strengthened by the branding or functional specialisation of products. Capital intensity makes oligopolistic price strategies necessary to maintain margins that will justify future investment; and the same capital intensity gives great bargaining

[3] Joan Robinson, *Economics of Imperfect Competition* (London: Macmillan, 1933); E. H. Chamberlin, *The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: Reorientation of the Theory of Value* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933).

power to organised labour, small groups of whom can inflict heavy losses by bringing expensive equipment to a halt. The specialisation and location of workers cause friction in the labour market; transfer of a worker from one job to another can be slow, expensive or even impossible. Specialisation and interdependence in product and labour markets give both labour and enterprises a bargaining power that enables them to administer their wages and prices, and thus to contradict the 'economic laws' derived from the model of perfect competition. All this has two results: to intensify the friction that impedes the movement of goods, capital or labour from one part of a market to another; and to make both cost-push and price-push pervasive in the system. Yet at the same time as these imperfections have multiplied until they now probably represent the predominant market form in the modern economy, there has been a widespread reaction towards simplistic monetarist and pure market economics, which is incapable of explaining what goes on in the real-world economy or of guiding policy makers towards valid solutions to its problems.

The frictions and rigidities between one market sector and another have made global demand management too blunt an instrument to secure economic growth and full employment of resources. Without powerful sectoral and structural policies, there will be bottlenecks and inflation in one sector or region while there is unemployment and idle capacity in another. A major investment in manpower (or labour market) and industrial investment policies is consequently required; and it is no coincidence that Sweden, where these policies have been farthest developed, is unique among the advanced industrial countries in having maintained full employment and high investment throughout the current international recession.

With resources fully employed, there is a constant pressure of cost-push and price-push due to the bargaining power of producers, both workers and firms. Attempts to resist this pressure by squeezing global demand do little to push back wages or prices in sectors where bargaining power is strong; instead, they cause lower wages or unemployment among weaker groups of workers and low investment or bankruptcy in smaller and financially weaker firms. Where cost-push and price-push are prevalent, therefore, price stability is compatible with economic growth and full employment only through some control of prices and incomes, and by ensuring a certain stability in the prices of primary products.

The Netherlands, Sweden and Britain have some useful experience of price and income policies; and the German 'concerted action', already mentioned, amounts to an undertaking by the unions not to press for pay increases above a norm agreed with the government. Yet

even in Germany this informal incomes policy is insufficiently effective. Why else should the Germans fear that a reflation, designed only to approach full employment and relaunch industrial investment, would in fact provoke a renewal of inflation?

The spread of imperfect competition provides theoretical grounds for expecting unemployment, low investment and inflationary pressure unless there is equivalent progress in manpower, investment, and price and income policies. The inability of even the 'strong countries' to resume full employment and high investment without the risk of inflation offers powerful confirmation in practice. Lacking a sufficient development of such policies, in what might be called a 'new economic management' alongside the orthodox management of global demand, the 'strong countries' are not really strong at all, but only somewhat less inflationary than the weak. Nor is their influence in the international economy at all helpful to their weaker partners. For until they reform their ideas and methods of economic management, they will remain condemned to export either deflation or inflation; and they will continue to impose an outdated concept of economic policy upon the international system as a whole.

### International economic mismanagement

Inflation, unemployment and low investment are the main symptoms of malaise in the national economies. Huge surpluses and deficits, disruptive industrial trade, and wild instability in the money and commodity markets are the international equivalents. The $60 billion surplus for the OPEC countries in 1974, due to their decision at the end of 1973 to quintuple the price of oil, was equivalent to about 15 per cent of the annual rate of total world imports at that time, and half the level of the world's reserves of gold and foreign exchange. The international economy had not been faced with disruption on this scale since the Second World War and the resulting dollar gap, to which the Americans enabled Europeans to adjust with the help of Marshall aid.

The United States had emerged as an economic and financial giant some decades before it used its strength with this sort of statesmanship; and the OPEC countries could hardly be expected to propose a constructive solution to the problem of their surplus immediately after creating it. After the sudden shock they imposed on the world economy, in 1973, they have done more than we had any right to expect in the rapid increase of their imports and of their aid programmes, and in the steadiness of their deployment of short-term petro-balances. But the responsibility for ensuring that methods of adjustment were adapted to deal with this extraordinary shift in

world trade and finance rested squarely with the Western, or OECD, countries. Their strategy for dealing with it was twofold: to share the burdens of balance-of-payments deficits and hence of trade adjustment, by distributing the total deficit equitably among themselves; and to rely on the private sector to accommodate the financial consequences of the OPEC surplus, under-pinned by mainly informal arrangements for recycling by the central banks. The latter has worked, so far. The former has not.

TABLE

*Distribution of deficits in 1974 and 1976* ($ billion)

| | United States | West Germany | Japan | France | Italy | United Kingdom |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. pro rata distribution of $60 billion OPEC deficit in 1974 | −8 | −5 | −4 | −4 | −3 | −4 |
| 2. actual balances on current account in 1974 | +2 | +10 | −5 | −6 | −8 | −9 |
| 3. discrepancy 2 minus 1 | +10 | +15 | −1 | −2 | −5 | −5 |
| 4. pro rata distribution of $40 billion OPEC deficit in 1976 | −5 | −4 | −3 | −3 | −2 | −3 |
| 5. actual balances on current account in 1976 | −1 | +3 | +3 | −6 | −3 | −3 |
| 6. discrepancy 5 minus 4 | +4 | +7 | +6 | −3 | −1 | 0 |

(*Sources*: International Financial Statistics, April 1977; IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook 1967–74; Survey of Current Business; Bank of Japan Monthly Finance Review; H.M. Treasury Monthly Note on Balance of Payments; OECD DES/N1/F(77)1.)

The table shows, in its first row, the proportions of the $60 billion deficit that would have corresponded, in 1974, to the share in world imports taken by each of the six largest OECD economies. In fact the OECD countries had less to share among themselves, because half the deficit was borne by the less-developed countries. But the practice of imposing this huge additional debt on the Third World and, as creditors, on the private banking system has been of most questionable wisdom; and it seems legitimate to judge the performance of the leading Western countries by the criterion of a pro rata distribution of the deficit.

The discrepancies between the agreed intentions and the actual outturn in 1974 were very big indeed. Germany and America between them were in surplus, above their shares of the deficit, by some $25 billion. The 'excess deficits' of Britain and Italy amounted to $5 billion each, and the deficits they actually had to finance were $9

billion and $8 billion respectively. This compared with their reserves of gold and foreign exchange of about $4 billion each. Even their equitable shares of the global deficit would have been burdensome; but they could have been borne through loans from the private sector. Given, however, that the stronger countries were shifting the deficit on to them on this scale, (as well as on to the smaller OECD countries and the Third World), their recourse to official loans was only a matter of time, even though they managed to halve the size of their deficits over the next two years.

By 1976, the OPEC surplus seemed to be settling down in the region of some $40 billion a year. OPEC could increase it again sharply by further raising the price, and the majority of OPEC members wanted to do so towards the end of 1976; but the Saudi Arabians have resisted increases beyond what they judge the international financial system can accommodate, and in the event the new prices have led to forecasts of a deficit of $45 billion for 1977. Row 4 in the table shows the pro rata distribution of the 1976 level of global deficit, which seems likely to remain at the lower end of the range of forecasts for the next few years; and row 5 shows the actual out-turn in 1976. Row 6 shows that Germany and Japan, and to a less extent the United States, were still shifting the burden on to the weaker countries. Britain and Italy, despite the progress they have made, were still carrying their share or more and still having to borrow; and France, which started better than they, was moving into a worse position, though its accumulation of debt is still much less.

Clearly, none of these countries has been willing to accept its share of the deficit. All have been struggling to remain in balance or surplus; and the move of America into deficit in 1977, while very helpful to the international system, is not likely to be enough so long as the German and Japanese surpluses remain. The result, since the OPEC surplus cannot be wished away, has been to place the whole burden on the shoulders of the countries which have the bigger adjustments to make or a lesser capacity to make very big adjustments. This is a fact. It is a matter of judgment to decide who is responsible and what should be done about it.

### Where should the responsibility for adjustment lie?

It is normal to blame the deficit countries and to enjoin on them the virtues of thrift and self-discipline. Old-fashioned though that may be, there is much truth in it. The British and Italians have not behaved sensibly, either socially, economically or politically. But this is not the whole truth, nor is it a sufficient guide for action, since much of our

behaviour is conditioned by structural factors which can hardly be changed overnight.

Indeed, although we doubtless have no right to diverge as far as we have done from sensible behaviour, it is not plausible to expect that all countries will, at a given moment, be equally capable of adjustment to an almost unprecedented change in circumstances. This would be possible in a world of the perfectly competitive model, where the right quantity of money would produce the right response to any situation. But in the world of imperfect competition, the response to economic and monetary policy depends on the behaviour of people, groups and institutions; and these we know to be diverse, even among peoples with as much in common as the Europeans. It is certain, therefore, that if the countries with the greatest capacity to adjust are striving for balance or surplus, countries with less capacity will have to bear more than their share, in any case large, of the global deficit. The international system allows us to adjust by means of deflation/reflation and depreciation/appreciation. Trade restrictions by countries with balance-of-payments difficulties are in principle accepted. But they have not normally been used, and the OECD countries agreed to forgo them during this recession. This agreement has been upheld with a few exceptions, such as the Italian import deposits.

The system of floating exchange rates has enabled the deficit countries to use depreciation, and this they have done. While it may be effective for adjustments amounting to a few percentage points of total external trade, however, trade does not seem to respond to depreciation sharply enough to accomplish adjustments equivalent to a fifth of total exports or imports, as Britain and Italy have tried to do since 1974. The famous J-curve—reflecting the immediate response to depreciation in higher import prices and the delay before export sales and import substitution respond—ensures that the full adjustment will come only after a year or two; and phenomena such as the persistence of German and Japanese export strength, or the prolonged weakness of British trade in manufactures, indicate that international trade may have become subject to increasing inelasticities —which is to be expected if markets are becoming more imperfect.

Perhaps the weaker countries have not devalued enough. The length of time before the J-curve turns up, and doubts about the sufficiency of trade elasticities, are no encouragement. Nor is the prospect that heavy devaluation will feed back, through the price of imports, into the inflationary cost/price spiral, just as the rise in prices of oil and other commodities did after 1973. The ratchet-like behaviour of wages (to increase them being easy and to cut them very difficult) makes appreciation, on the other hand, an easier and more effective instrument

of adjustment. But although it is easier and more effective, there is little in the international system to induce the surplus countries to appreciate, and they have shown little inclination to do so since 1974, beyond changes of a few token percentage points.

Nor have the stronger countries reflated substantially so far. Given that they would, by a general reflation, risk a resumption of the inflationary spiral, their reluctance is understandable. The Germans have at least given specific stimuli to demand and to the working of the market mechanism at points where it is needed in the labour markets, as a result of their very active manpower policy. The Americans have not yet done even this, nor have either the Americans or the Germans adopted a policy like the Swedish one of aids to industry specifically calculated to keep investment high, and to stock products the demand for which is slack during the recession. Such reflation, directed specifically at the sectors of markets where demand would otherwise be weak, or at reducing inflationary bottlenecks, would not cause the inflationary pressure of a general reflation, and could, if well directed, actually reduce it. If the Germans and Americans had acted like the Swedes, investment, growth and employment would be much higher in those countries and there would be better prospects for the international economy as a whole.

Reflation of this sort would help the weaker economies by expanding the import demand of the stronger. At their existing exchange rates, however, even full employment would not bring Germany or Japan to the point of accepting their share of the global deficits. Substantial currency appreciation would be needed as well. Whether even this would have been enough we cannot know. For the strong have undertaken neither selective reflation nor substantial appreciation. The weak, having devalued as much as seems prudent, have been thrown back on borrowing and deflation, given always that import restrictions have been ruled out by common agreement.

Britain and Italy have both borrowed their way through the private sector and into the hands of multilateral institutions (the IMF and the European Community) and the governments of the stronger countries (mainly the United States, Germany and Japan). Borrowing therefore leads also to deflationary conditions, since these are the only conditions the public international banking system knows how to apply. With investment rates so low, it may be questioned whether it is wise for banks that hope to get their money back in future, and hence have an interest in the future strength and vitality of the weaker countries, to concentrate so much on deflation to the exclusion of encouragement for industrial investment. It is also worth asking how far the

international banking system should press for further deflation in countries where unemployment is already as much as 5 per cent. These questions are not posed on the assumption that there should be an easy answer for the weaker countries in terms of unconditional soft loans and general reflation. They are put in order to emphasise that the international system seems at present to aggravate some grave problems instead of ameliorating them, and to draw attention to the need for some very serious thinking as to whether the system can be radically improved.

Britain, Italy and perhaps France must accept their share of the blame for their excessive inflation and deficits and for becoming points of weakness in the Western economic system. But, since they comprise three out of the six largest advanced industrial economies, and since unemployment, low investment and the fear of renewed inflation are common also to the 'strong', it would be surprising if the problems did not reflect more general weaknesses in the international system. Our examination of the deficits and surpluses has indeed indicated that they may have been too big to rectify with the orthodox methods of adjustment, i.e. manipulation of the exchange rate and the money supply; that the surplus countries did not in any case contribute much towards their share of the adjustment by way of reflation or appreciation; and that the deflation which has been consequently forced on deficit countries may be an inadequate policy for restoring their prospects of stability and growth.

In addition to the intractability of the deficits, the weaker countries as well as Germany and the United States have suffered disruption in particular industrial sectors by swiftly expanding imports not only from less-developed countries and Eastern Europe but also from Japan. It appears that, particularly while recession lasts, which may be for most of the time until we have reformed our methods of economic management, divergences of economic levels (less-developed countries), types (Eastern Europe) or rates of growth (Japan) are likely to cause such rapid changes of trading patterns that our industries, at least with existing policies, cannot adjust in a way that avoids long-term structural unemployment. Apart from the Multi-fibre Arrangement, there has been no systematic international attempt to deal with this problem. In the European Community, the greatest barrier to the development of a policy has been Germany, fighting a rearguard action in favour of international free trade.

Not only was the great inflation of the mid-1970s ignited by the soaring commodity prices (products such as wheat, sugar and the metals as well as oil); but primary products have been a source of dangerous instability in the world slump of the 1930s and, more recently, in the early 1950s as a result of the Korean war. The record

of instability is bad, and there are no grounds for confidence that, when Western countries reflate, the commodity boom will not appear and destabilise the international economy again. Yet virtually nothing has been done to safeguard against this. Although the piling of buffer stocks by importing countries during the recession could be an effective instrument of stabilisation, the United States and Germany have strongly resisted the idea. The Japanese have been quietly accumulating their own stocks. The Americans would, if they could make up their minds to use a proportion of their strategic stockpile for economic ends, be strongly placed. The European Community, which is as dependent on external sources of raw materials as Japan, has failed to do anything, except respond moderately to the demands of the less-developed countries, towards eventually establishing an international system; and it seems that the policies of at least some member governments rule out for the time being further action by the Community as a whole.

In international monetary policy, the central bankers' network has forestalled any currency collapse, and this is a great improvement on the 1920s and 1930s. But the international monetary system is still much too weak. There is no influence over the exchange rates of stronger countries, which are an essential element in the carrying through of big adjustments; the enormous Euromarkets remain insecure [4]; and the terms of official international lending reflect a concept of economic policy that is inadequate to deal with the tough new problems of the contemporary economy.

There has been little change in the basic principles of international economic management, as they relate to the advanced industrial countries, since the time of Bretton Woods. Progressive liberalisation is still the aim for trade; deflation or depreciation, not trade restriction, are the favoured instruments of adjustment for countries with deficits; and there is no effective obligation for adjustment by countries with surpluses. The use of depreciation has increased since floating replaced the adjustable peg in 1971. But this seems to be an alteration of degree, not of kind; and despite the radical changes of economic structure and the massive shocks of the mid-1970s, there has been no other basic reform, either in the European Community or in the wider international system.

These principles were contested by Britain at the time of Bretton Woods, on the grounds of their deflationary bias. They threw the whole burden of adjustment on those with deficits and provided for no defence against the export of unemployment by those with surpluses.

[4] See for example G. Carli, *Europa* supplement to *The Times* and other newspapers, March 1, 1977.

Nor did they offer much guidance for occasions when unusually big adjustments had to be made. The latter inadequacy was soon demonstrated, when the pound was made convertible in 1947 and the extent of Europe's dollar gap revealed. The American reaction was prompt, undogmatic and extraordinarily effective. The dollar gap was covered by Marshall aid, aimed at reviving the European economies and rebuilding their investments, and by the Americans' acceptance of European discrimination against them, by both trade restrictions and exchange controls. The result was the recovery of the European economies and, through the 1950s, the ending of dollar discrimination. A further consequence was the foundation of the European Community.

Despite notable differences, the 'petrodollar gap' after 1973 shows certain similar features: a shift in the balance of payments too big to be accommodated by normal methods of adjustment, associated with a severe inadequacy of investment. Yet there was no attempt to mobilise the surpluses, although they lay in Western banks, so as to cover the deficits in a way that would conduce to investment and the development of our economies, and would encourage the unity of the system. Instead, there has been a *sauve qui peut*, with the stronger countries in the lead, seeking national advantage at the expense of the system as a whole. Although, again, the differences are notable, there is an unpleasant echo of the tragedy of German reparations in the 1920s, when intolerable burdens were placed on a country that was in no position to refuse.

An absence of the order of statesmanship that made the Marshall plan possible is doubtless partly to blame. But there may also be grounds in the poverty of contemporary economic philosophy. Behind Marshall aid lay a great war followed by a starkly physical crisis, with people starving and unable to get the productive apparatus moving again. The crude need to get a mass of goods from A to B could hardly fail to penetrate the veil of economic dogma. But the current crisis is less stark. People in Europe are not starving. It is just that the economies are stagnant, unemployment is at 5 per cent, and although economic failure could lead to political and social collapse in some countries, and eventually to a decline of Western civilisation, this has not happened yet. In these circumstances, economic dogma can prevail; and, for the management of the international economy, the prevalent dogma is that of Bretton Woods, or, to put it more plainly, laisser-faire: the removal of trade restrictions; and adjustment through the money supply and, perhaps justifying the prefix in 'neo-classical', the exchange rate. Constrained by this view of economic management, we cannot expect to master the problems of the modern economy;

and the intractibility of the great stagflation of the 1970s is a painful and urgent reminder of the need for reform.

### The need for a new form of economic management

In perpetuating its laisser-faire philosophy, international economic management has fallen behind the economic management of individual Western countries. Active manpower policies are highly developed in Sweden and developing fast in Germany, France, Britain and other Community members. The Swedes, French, Japanese and others have effective industrial and investment policies. Price and income policies have been much used in the Netherlands, Sweden, Britain and, not least, implicitly in Germany. Only in Sweden have the manpower and investment policies been powerful enough to maintain full employment through this world recession. Only in Germany has incomes policy been reasonably effective throughout the world inflation. But the elements of a new economic management have grown in most Western countries to the point where it does not require a great feat of imagination to envisage a new pattern of management generally applied, with full employment maintained as the Swedes have done and price stability—though here we have tougher structural obstacles to overcome—like the Germans.

It is unwise to expect full employment and growth with price stability until this new form of management is applied. The old style of global demand management is still required; but unless it is supplemented by the new style of management, it is doubtful whether the main objectives of economic policy can be fulfilled in economies where imperfect markets prevail.

Nor will it be easy to maintain equilibrium and growth in national economies, however new and effective their form of economic managment, if the international economy continues to be ruled by laisser-faire. For the inelasticities and imperfections in the international commodity markets will continue to generate upheavals of a kind that would no longer be tolerated within any industrialised national economy; unacceptable disruptions will be caused by the pace of change in industrial trade among countries with sharply divergent economic structures; money will continue to flood periodically from one international financial centre to another; unmanageable surpluses, deficits and internationally transmitted inflation and unemployment will occur. It is hard to see how, without a new approach, the present world recession will come to an end; and it is only too easy to see how another bout of inflation, with the consequence of renewed recession, could begin.

The several national economies are now so interdependent that it is

increasingly difficult for them to shut out the effects of this international instability. It is therefore necessary to reduce instabilities in the international economy, just as the new economic management is proceeding to reduce them in the domestic economies.

It is already late to start taking precautions against the next commodity boom; but the effects of renewed commodity inflation would be so grave that an attempt should be made, even if only to ensure that the next upheaval will be the last. Of the various methods of commodity stabilisation, the most likely to be effective, despite the inevitable practical difficulties, seems to be the buffer stock. Western attitudes to international economic policy are so negative that the idea has been little considered except in response to the proposals of the less-developed countries, which imply a transfer of resources to the primary producers. The merits of that are not the concern of this article. But buffer stocks can be piled solely in order to stabilise their prices (or, less ambitiously, to prevent their prices from being suddenly raised or cut by a factor of up to six, with disastrous effects on economies in general and production of the commodities in particular); and pending wider international agreement, they can be piled by one or more importing countries, as Japan is piling them now. While this prudence by a single country may help to insulate it from instability, common action by wider groups is needed if stability is to be established in the international economy as a whole. The strongest countries would benefit from taking out this insurance against instability; the significance for the weaker ones would be great indeed.

The OECD countries already hold substantial stocks of oil. But oil, as OPEC has shown us, is a special case. It is widely accepted that the importing countries should strive to increase their levels of self-sufficiency in energy resources. Yet apart from the commercial development of oil where it exists, virtually nothing has been done about it. This paralysis of the will seems hardly credible, except on the assumption that laisser-faire will provide. Numerous measures have been proposed in the European Community and the OECD. It is action on some of them that is now required. President Carter's emphasis on the need for an American energy policy is an encouraging step in this direction.

Because such measures for the stabilisation of commodity prices and the security of energy supplies were not taken before 1973, a number of countries still have deficits that have proved too big to be amenable to the available instruments of adjustment. It is possible that adequate revaluation by the stronger countries, together with such reflation as, given the limitations of their existing policy systems, they are able to undertake without restarting inflation, would have been enough to

reduce the weaker countries' deficits to manageable proportions. The difficulty is that the stronger countries have failed to co-operate in this way, and there is still no sign that the Germans and Japanese will do so, despite their continued balance-of-payments strength. Some sympathy had been expressed earlier for their reluctance to reflate so long as they fail to provide themselves with the policy instruments that will render price stability compatible with full employment and economic growth. Their failure to revalue is harder to condone; for revaluation is significantly counter-inflationary for them, and, given the ratchet-like asymmetry in movements of wages, is also an uninflationary means of adjustment for the deficit countries and for the international economy as a whole.

Since devaluation by the weak is insufficient and revaluation or reflation by the strong not adequately applied, the weaker countries must deal with their deficits by either deflation, borrowing or trade restrictions. With unemployment at 5 per cent and investment extremely low, deflation is a two-edged sword, cutting out the chances of economic growth as much as inflation. A change in the terms of international lending is therefore appropriate, towards the encouragement of new economic management as well as monetary stringency, and towards the direct promotion of industrial investment.

The Kissinger proposal for an OECD ' safety net ' to support OECD countries finding it hard to raise funds commercially was strongly advocated by the United States government but foundered in Congress. The Downing Street summit of the seven major industrial nations last May agreed on the provision of new international credit facilities. But there is no sign of any intention to link the provision of international credit with policies to revive investment and industrial growth.

Failing international lending on sufficiently constructive terms, or adequate revaluation and reflation by the stronger countries, the weaker ones face the alternative of intensifying deflation or imposing import restrictions to remove their deficits. Still deeper deflation would have immense disadvantages. Higher unemployment with no end in sight and further declines in industrial investment would lead many people to conclude that the existing economic system cannot satisfy their needs; and the change that followed could be violent in terms of the disruptive and wasteful destruction of a system if not of physical violence. Import quotas are a truly harmless device in comparison with this. They are recognised, in the GATT and the IMF, as a legitimate way to correct unusual deficits. Their renunciation by the deficit countries in the OECD has been sensible only on the assumption that the surplus countries would bear their shares of the global deficit. By continuing to do the reverse, and shifting the whole of the deficit and

more on to the weak, the stronger countries went far towards making the OECD agreement untenable. Quotas, or other methods of controlling trade flows, should be accepted as a legitimate means of correcting large and intractable deficits, not subject to retaliation, on the condition, which should also apply to loans, that the deficit country makes progress with the strengthening of those economic policies that are likely to make its economy viable over the longer term.

While the discussion of import quotas in general remains unorthodox, if not taboo, the Multi-fibre Arrangement has been renewed and there is serious discussion of arrangements to bring stability to some other industries such as ships and steel. Provided they allow for the expansion of trade and steady change in patterns of production, such arrangements seem wholly beneficial. Once the disruptive exporters understand that limitations are going to be imposed, it should be possible to make market-sharing and minimum-price agreements with them to stabilise the capital-intensive industries which are causing such dissension among the industrialised countries at present.

A reduction of the instabilities in the economy should help to make money more stable. But the monetary upsets of the past decade will have repercussions for some time to come, and more stabilisers in the international money markets are likely to be necessary. This might include stronger means of influencing the Euromarkets, of which a parallel Community currency could be, for Europeans, one method; and a more effective exchange control by Germany (and hence, perhaps, by the Community as a whole) and the United States.

**How to secure the necessary reforms**

The stronger countries have, up to now, despite the formidable problems of the 1970s, been reluctant to envisage any major reforms of the international economic system. Neither Germany nor the United States has favoured the changes suggested above. The new American administration is considering a number of changes in policy. But there is no sign that it will promote the necessary international measures, or develop the kind of new economic management at home that could prevent the Keynesian boom from leading to inflation followed by a monetarist slump. In Germany there has been no change in policy, although there now seems to be more readiness to accept that, apart from the issue of reflation, it might be necessary to consider some new policy approaches.

Feeling doubtless that their position is too weak for any other posture, the deficit countries have simply followed the lead of the strong, or, to be more precise, accepted the lack of any constructive lead from them. Such passivity is increasingly hard to justify. The

weaker countries are more conscious of the weight of the problems and should therefore be readier to seek solutions. If the strong refuse to take the initiative, the weak can at least have a try.

Their efforts should, in the first instance, be directed towards persuading the strong to accept new policies in the multilateral bodies such as the European Community, the OECD, IMF and the GATT. Agreement by the British, French and Italians on a broad policy programme could have influence, within the Community, on the Germans, particularly on issues where the new American administration is considering a more active policy. The Community could then promote such policies within the international institutions, and at the economic summits at which the Americans and Japanese are present.

Persuasion, however, may not be enough; and the weaker countries should not remain passive if the stronger countries are not at once persuaded. While common action by the Community and in the wider international bodies should be the aim, some of the policies can be adopted by one or a few countries acting on their own initiative. This can, as was suggested earlier, be done with buffer stocks. But the weaker countries are inhibited by their indebtedness from spending much on buffer stocks at present, or from promoting policies such as lending on more constructive terms or establishing an international fund to promote industrial investment.

If neither persuasion nor separate initiatives prove sufficient, the countries with persistent deficits may be forced to grasp the nettle of import restriction. They should do this with all possible diplomacy, so as to avoid retaliation by the strong or the adoption of restrictions by countries which do not need them. It should also be done in a way designed to be compatible with the European Community, the IMF and the GATT, all of which envisage restrictions by countries with a pressing need for them. It should be done, as it was in the OEEC, in a way that provides for controlled liberalisation and expansion of trade by the deficit countries as they recover their equilibrium. Finally, it should not be necessary to do it at all, as there are more constructive ways to resolve the deficit countries' problems provided that the stronger countries show the necessary degree of co-operation. But the nature of nations being what it is, the possibility remains that the stronger will not co-operate and the weaker will be forced into some such course.

This is not likely to happen to Britain, as we move into surplus during the coming year, thanks to the quickening flow of North Sea oil. But Italy and some other countries may well have to go down this road; and if they do, it will be up to Britain, as a newcomer among the surplus countries, to do what it can to ensure that the

stronger countries do not retaliate. Even if the weaker countries are not forced into such a corner, however, the need for radical reforms to the international system will remain, to squeeze out the instabilities and lay the foundations not only for price stability but also for full employment, investment and growth. With its new-found international viability, Britain should not forget the hard lessons it has learnt as a deficit country, but should use its best efforts to promote the new methods of international management that are required, both in the European Community and in the wider international organisations.

# ETHICS AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY

## THE THIRD MARTIN WIGHT MEMORIAL LECTURE *

*Michael Howard*

THERE has perhaps been no teacher in the field of international politics in our time whose approach to his subject was more deeply serious than that of Martin Wight—more serious, or more erudite. There have been many specialists more influential, more articulate and, regrettably, more prolific in their publications. Wight left behind him a lamentably small number of writings, enough to give only a mere glimpse of the qualities which so awed his pupils, his colleagues and his friends. It is thus all the more necessary that those of us who did have the privilege of knowing him should recall and retail as much as we can of his personality—of the moral force which he brought to intellectual questions, of the profound, sombre questioning which characterised his work.

Wight was a philosopher in the oldest and best sense of the word: a man who sought and loved wisdom. He was also a scholar in the oldest and best sense: a man who loved learning. He was above all a deeply committed Christian. He never forgot—and I think quite literally never for a moment forgot—that in the field of international politics one is dealing with the very fundamentals of life and death: with the beliefs, the habits, the structures which shape moral communities and for which it is considered appropriate to die—and, worse, to kill. He saw his subject neither as the interaction of abstract state-entities nor as the equally abstract legal and structural problems of international organisations, but as the exercise of crushing responsibilities by statesmen in an infinitely complex world; the conduct of policies for which the ultimate sanction might have to be war And war was no matter of heroics or war-gaming, but the deliberate infliction, and endurance, of extremes of suffering as the ultimate test of the validity of human institutions and beliefs. The work of some American 'behaviourists', who sought to reduce the vast and tragic tapestry of human affairs to elegant mathematical formulae was not simply repellent to him. It was unintel-

* Given at Chatham House on January 12, 1977.

ligible. He could not understand how people could do such things. He refused even to discuss it. For him, International Relations did not consist of a succession of problems to be solved in conformity with any overarching theory. Rather, like the whole of human life, it was a predicament: one to be intelligently analysed, where possible to be mitigated, but if necessary to be endured—and the more easily mitigated and endured if it could be understood. In his acceptance of the ineluctably tragic nature of human destiny he was a thinker in a European tradition going back to that classical antiquity in which his own learning was so deeply rooted.

To superficial appearances Wight presented something of a contradiction. He accepted the fact, as he saw it, of 'Power Politics'. The brief study with this title which he wrote under the auspices of Chatham House in 1946 has been recently revised, enlarged and edited with an introduction by Professor Hedley Bull, and will soon be republished.[1] It is an almost defiantly traditional work, disdainful both of Liberal Utopianism and of the contributions of the behavioural scientists to the subject. It expounds the mechanisms of power politics in the international system without praise or condemnation: this is the way it has been, he implies, and there is no reason to suppose it could be otherwise. But at the same time he was a Christian pacifist and a conscientious objector, and no one who met him could be in any doubt of the profundity and the unshakeable firmness of the convictions on which his pacifism rested.

In actuality there was for him no contradiction. In a world of evil one must face the fact of evil and the need, in face of that fact, for the unfortunate Children of Darkness to be wise in their generation. In such a world statesmen and soldiers have responsibilities and duties which they cannot and should not seek to evade. Nevertheless in such a world it is the duty of some Christians to bear witness to a transcendent loyalty; and those on whom this duty is laid will know it in their inmost conscience and must fulfil it, irrespective of consequent embarrassment or hardship. Martin Wight's burning sincerity fused the apparent contradiction—not, probably, without much inner anguish—into a single coherent philosophy; one which provided an analysis of the world predicament as much as a guide to his own actions.

Wight was in fact a Christian pessimist, as were so many of that generation which had seen the hopes of the Locarno era wither, and who grew to maturity under the shadow of the vast menaces of the 1930s. Even the menaces of the 1950s, the perils, as they appeared at the time, of nuclear holocaust, never loomed so large in the eyes of contemporary observers. Those perils could be, and indeed have been

[1] By Leicester University Press and Penguin.

kept at bay by prudent statesmanship. The nuclear danger is predictable and controllable. But the 1930s saw the emergence of forces of irrationality which it would be neither inappropriate nor hyperbolic to call forces of *evil*: unpredictable, uncontrollable, still only partially understood. These forces fitted into the world picture neither of the Liberal humanists nor of the Marxists. Both of these schools were children of eighteenth-century rationalism and nineteenth-century radicalism. Each believed in its own way in inevitable progress towards world democratic systems and had welcomed the overthrow of the militarist autocracies of Central Europe as obstacles to the gradual convergence of mankind towards unity and peace. But in Fascism one was dealing with something consciously beyond reason and defiant to reason—something of which no secular ideology had hitherto taken account.

Christianity, unlike Liberalism or Marxism, did provide an explanation; not the cheerful liberal humanitarian Christian teaching which read little into the Bible except the Nativity and the Sermon on the Mount, but the teaching which digested all the implications of the Old Testament, including the prophetic books, before turning to the New, which emphasised that the Gospels themselves were full of uncompromisingly dark passages, and which faced the fact that at the centre of the Christian religion, as of no other great world religion, was the symbol of agonising and unavoidable suffering. The Christian eschatology, long disdained by liberal humanists even within the Church itself, once again became terrifyingly relevant to human affairs. The works of Charles Williams, of C. S. Lewis, and—drawing on yet wider sources of Manichean myth—of J. R. Tolkien were deservedly popular as allegorical commentaries on the events of the time. And the teachers who best provided an adequate framework for understanding were the philosophers and the theologians—Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer, Karl Barth, Tillich—who accepted uncomplainingly the remoteness, the inscrutability of God, who saw the focus of Christianity as the Passion rather than the Sermon on the Mount; men for whom the march of humanitarian, utilitarian liberalism, including its change of gear into Marxian socialism, had simply been a long excursion into the desert in pursuit of a mirage.

In the light of such a philosophy the accepted explanations of the problems of international politics and the causes of war all appeared inadequate to the point of superficiality. The received wisdom among liberal thinkers of the 1920s was that wars in general, and the First World War in particular, had been caused precisely by the operation of 'power politics' which in their turn reflected the prejudices of a militaristic ruling class and the interests of capitalist investors and armaments manufacturers. The solution lay in the abandonment of

power politics conducted by means of secret diplomacy, and the adoption instead of programmes of collective security, arbitration, disarmament and the resolution of differences through open and reasoned discussion at the League of Nations. The problems which called for solution were those arising from the inequities of the Paris Peace Settlement, which was far too tainted with the evils of the old system. If only Germany could be reconciled and the injustices done to it undone, then a new world order, a new era in the history of mankind, might be expected to dawn.

These ideas were reiterated in a deliberately simplistic form by publicists—E. D. Morel, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, H. N. Brailsford, Leonard Woolf—who with some reason saw their first duty as the re-education of that public opinion on which they relied to make their dreams come true, but which had repeatedly shown itself vulnerable to stubborn fits of atavistic xenophobia. Few of them were as naïve as sometimes appears from their writings. The complexity of the problems of international politics was certainly not underrated by the founders of Chatham House. This group included not only such outstanding idealists as Lord Robert Cecil and Philip Noel-Baker but 'realists' of the stamp of Eyre Crowe and Neil Malcolm and such scholarly specialists as James Headlam-Morley and Arnold Toynbee; men who had discovered at Paris how terribly under-equipped the Allied statesmen were to deal with the tangled problems which victory had dumped in their laps, how vast was the distance which separated popular expectations from practical realities, and how important it was for the future peace of mankind that judgment on foreign affairs should be formulated on a basis of widely-shared expert knowledge.

Yet in broad terms these men certainly shared the aspirations of the liberal idealists. There was a broad ethical consensus that international politics should be conducted, not with the aim of maximising the national interest, but in order to enable mankind to live in a community of mutual tolerance and respect, settling its differences rationally, resolving its conflicts by peaceful means. This could best be achieved by the creation and management of international institutions, in particular the League of Nations; and by the education of public opinion in loyalties wider than narrow, old-fashioned patriotism. And finally Britain's own national affairs should be conducted in accordance with a Kantian categorical imperative, to provide an example for other nations and to smooth the path towards the development of a higher national community based on the rule of law. They would have accepted that it was their task to transcend the old order based on national power and to create a new one based on consent. It was very appropriate that the Royal Institute of International Affairs should have found a

permanent home in the house once occupied by Mr. Gladstone at Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square.

But what this generation did not fully appreciate was how far these values, the fine flower of Victorian Liberalism, was tied up with a social order and national institutions which might continue to need power, and in the last resort *military* power, for their survival. All had supported the Allied cause during the Great War on the not unwarranted assumption that its defeat would be a catastrophic setback to the progress of liberal ideas. All believed that responsibility for the war rested very largely with the militaristic ideology rooted in the quasi-feudal monarchical social order in Central Europe whose destruction had removed a serious obstacle to world peace. What was harder for them to appreciate was that the destruction of that order would not make easier the work of peace-loving bourgeoisie such as themselves, but infinitely more difficult: that it would create a vacuum to be filled by warring forces of revolution and counter-revolution out of which regimes would arise far more ferocious than those they had replaced—regimes even less susceptible to reason or enamoured of an order based on consent. It was the tragedy of the League of Nations, that consummation of a century of striving and dreaming, that it was founded at a moment when it could not hope to operate successfully except as the executive organ of a group of like-minded nations prepared in the last resort to enforce their decisions by precisely those mechanisms of military power which its very existence was intended to render obsolete.

The lesson was not lost on the men who had to reconstruct the international system after the Second World War. They were more modest in their aspirations—more modest also, it must be admitted, in their talents. The new generation, at least in Britain, produced no one to equal the vigour and vision of the surviving veterans, Toynbee, Webster, Lionel Curtis, Philip Noel-Baker. The officials and the statesmen—Strang, Jebb, Cadogan, Bevin—were the equals if not the superiors of their predecessors; but there were no seers to inspire them, no prophets of a new order. Only one new academic figure of any eminence had been tempted by wartime experience to reflect with any degree of profundity on the state of the world—Herbert Butterfield; and he did so in terms which echoed the teaching of Reinhold Niebuhr across the Atlantic, and which were to provide a continuing influence on Martin Wight. There were certainly no British thinkers who felt that the world was now theirs to mould; who would claim, as Dean Acheson was to claim, that they were present at the Creation. Perhaps the failure of the first creation was too fresh in all their minds. But what *was* dominant in their consciousness was the impotence,

almost one might say the irrelevance, of ethical aspirations in international politics in the absence of that factor to which so little attention had been devoted by their more eminent predecessors, to which indeed so many of them had been instinctively hostile—military power: power not necessarily to impose their standards upon others (though that, in the re-education of the defeated enemy, was not irrelevant) but simply to ensure the survival of the societies in which those ethical values were maintained. And to the vulnerability of such societies and their value-systems a sad procession of emigré scholars and statesmen from Central and Eastern Europe bore eloquent witness—both before and after 1945.

This realisation of the impotence of ethical principle to operate unaided in a world of power does much to explain the speed with which the world rearmed after 1950. The spirit of historical irony will record that it was Mr. Attlee and his colleagues, not excepting Sir Stafford Cripps, the men who had voted and spoken so eloquently in the 1930s against power politics and great national armaments, who now took the decision to equip the United Kingdom as a nuclear power; that the Minister of Supply responsible for the construction of the atomic bomb was Mr. John Wilmot—the same John Wilmot whose election for the constituency of East Fulham in 1934 had convinced Stanley Baldwin of the impossibility of persuading the country to accept a major rearmament programme; and that the Secretary of State for Air in 1947, when the Air Ministry began to design the V-bombers which would deliver the bombs, was that most tireless and dedicated advocate of disarmament, Mr. Philip Noel-Baker. And in the United States liberals of equally impeccable antecedents, men who had throughout their lives fought against American entanglement in the old world of power politics, now helped to build up an armoury of terrifying strength in order to 'defend the Free World'.

It is easy enough either to deplore this apparent volte-face as a shameful betrayal of principle, or to sneer at it as a belated acceptance of the facts of life. But both reactions arise from an attitude towards political morality—indeed, towards social action as a whole—which has, although very widely shared, proved throughout history to be misleading. According to this view, actions are to be judged against a single scale which runs from the pole of 'power politics' at one end to that of 'ethical action' at the other. Ethical considerations are held *automatically* to enfeeble power; considerations of power are regarded as unavoidably sullying ethics. It is an attitude no less popular with professed 'men of the world' and 'realists' than it is with idealists and reformers. The reluctance of liberal critics seriously to examine the technical problems faced by the military—a reluctance as evident today as it was in the 1930s—is paralleled by the scepticism with which a substantial number of officials, soldiers and 'defence

experts' regard the relevance of ethical factors to the problems which they face. War, they say, is war. Business is business. What needs to be done, has to be done.[2]

The assumption that the exercise of coercive power is in itself fundamentally immoral, and that involvement in power relationships automatically vitiates ethical behaviour, is natural enough. How can good ends be served by evil means? How can one get peace by preparing for war? How can all the mechanisms of military power—the disciplining of soldiers, the development of weapons, the training to kill, the posing of threats, to say nothing of the awful actuality of warfare, shocking enough in the pre-nuclear age, inconceivable today—how can such activities conceivably contribute to ethical goals? Is not the whole 'power system' alien to and irreconcilable with any ethical objectives except those of the barbarian—and in adopting it even to fight barbarians, is one not becoming a barbarian oneself? To adopt the methods of coercive power—and economic can be as debasing as military power—is *in itself* considered to be unethical, to debase the cause which those methods are intended to serve.

Are ethics and power in fact such poles apart? Most of us in practice do not consider that they are, and within our own experience we can normally reconcile them without too much difficulty. But this may simply be the result of our own moral obtuseness and intellectual laziness. To provide a satisfactory conceptual synthesis is not so easy. The long debate over *raison d'état*, which Sir Herbert Butterfield took as the subject of the first Martin Wight Memorial Lecture,[3] has never been properly concluded. The tradition that led through Plato and Machiavelli to Hegel, by which all contradictions were resolved in service to a State which was itself the highest value since it made possible all other values, disastrously popular as it became in Germany, has never been acceptable to Anglo-Saxon Liberals—although the Marxist variant which for 'State' would substitute 'Revolution' succeeded in attracting some of them in the 1930s. But perhaps a clue to a more satisfactory formula can be found in the work of another German thinker, albeit one who is seldom regarded as an authority on ethical questions: Karl von Clausewitz.

Clausewitz did not indeed deal with ethical questions as such. He did not fundamentally question the crude Machiavellianism of

[2] Although in my experience, in this country at least, defence specialists are more likely to be concerned about questions of ethics than are 'peace researchers' and liberal reformers about the problems, either fundamental or technical, of military or any other kind of power. It is significant that association by universities with the Ministry of Defence in this country, or with the Pentagon or the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States, is regarded by many students as being immoral almost by definition, and one is regarded as extremely naive if one ventures to ask why.

[3] Given at the University of Sussex on April 23, 1975.

eighteenth-century politics: the Grotian Law of Nations he dismissed as 'certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom'. But on the relationship between war and politics he did, as we know, have interesting and original things to say; and these may provide useful guidance in any consideration of the relationship between power and ethics.

Clausewitz's theory was teleological. In warfare, every engagement was planned to serve a tactical purpose. These tactical purposes were determined by the requirements of strategy. The requirements of strategy were determined by the object of the war; and the object of the war was determined by State policy, the State being the highest embodiment of the values and the interests of the community. Thus the objectives of State policy ultimately dominated and determined military means the whole way down the hierarchy of strategy and tactics. War was not an independent entity with a value-system of its own.

For Clausewitz State policy was the ultimate mover and justification, the criterion by which all other actions were to be judged—which in itself would make his doctrine as it stands unacceptable to the liberal. But what if one introduces one further, and ultimate, step in the hierarchy, to which State policy itself should be subordinated—the ethical goal? The State itself then becomes not an end but the means to an end. It has a dual role. It exists primarily to enable its own citizens to realise their ethical values; but it exists also to make possible an *international* community of mankind, whose values and interests are ultimately determinant, not only of State policy as such, but of all the means, military and otherwise, that are used to implement State policy.

Such a pattern goes beyond that 'Grotian' concept of international relations of which Hedley Bull spoke in the second Martin Wight Lecture last year[4]; for although in the Grotian formulation States are governed by a 'Law of Nations' which is based partly on a reflection of the divine order and partly on prudential considerations of self-preservation, they need no justification for their policy beyond the requirements of their own existence. They accept a law of nations as man accepts the laws of a just society: because his own needs dictate that he should do so. But in the Clausewitzian formulation, as we have elaborated it, State policy would be determined by and judged according to the needs of the international community. In the same way as war, if it were not directed by State policy, would be 'a senseless thing

[4] Reprinted in *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, July 1976, pp. 101–116.

without an object', so State interests and State policy would make no sense and have no justification if they were not shaped in accordance with the overriding needs of mankind. As military power is subordinated to and guided by State policy, so State power should be subordinated to and guided by ethical norms. The relationship would then become one, not of irreconcilable opposition between mutually exclusive poles, but of hierarchical subordination of means to ends.

That all sounds very fine as a theory. In practice, unfortunately, it settles very little. Having stated his own theory, Clausewitz identified the fundamental problem about its application. The military means should always by definition be subordinated to the political object, true: but the military had its own requirements. It had to work according to its own inner necessities. Only the military specialist could determine whether the goals set by policy were attainable, and if so what the requirements were for attaining them. Military affairs had, as Clausewitz put it, their own grammar, even if they were subordinated to political logic; and the grammar was intricate and ineluctable. Armed forces require bases, and those bases may only be available in countries with which one would, for ethical reasons, prefer not to be allied. National industry, on which military capacity is based, may require access to raw materials available only from countries which are equally politically embarrassing. The successful conduct of the most just and defensive of wars may demand alliance with States whose price is the support of war aims which flatly contradict all one's own normative values—as did those of Italy in the Treaty of London in 1915, that last and most notorious example of power politics and secret diplomacy. Yet rather than yield to Italian demands on Slav territory, would it have been *morally* preferable to have waived the Italian alliance, leaving the Central Powers with their hands free to deal with Russia, and thus prolonging the war if not risking outright defeat?

One can multiply examples endlessly; let me concentrate simply on one. In 1935 there occurred a superb opportunity for Britain to shape its policy in the service of an ethical objective: the implementation of its obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations by imposing penal sanctions upon Italy in order to deter or punish its aggression against Abyssinia. Not only was the crime unambiguous: the criminal was highly vulnerable. Public opinion, in the 'Peace Ballot', had recently expressed itself in favour of mandatory sanctions, even at the risk of war. The case might have been deliberately created to test the effectiveness of that new system of collective security and the rule of law which had been brought into being since 1918 to replace the old chaotic system of power politics. It would have been a perfect example of the use of coercive means to attain political ends.

We can now see that there were many reasons why the British government flinched from the test; but certainly not the least was the uncompromising and unanimous opposition of those experts in military grammar, the Chiefs of Staff. Within the power structure which it was their duty to operate there were two far more serious threats, not simply to the rule of law in international politics, but to the security of Britain and its Empire: the growing power of Nazi Germany and the increasingly open aggression of Japan. To risk even successful war against Italy would have been to enfeeble the already pathetically weak fleet available to deter Japanese attack in the Far East, and to antagonise a potential ally whose help was, in the eyes of France if not of Britain, indispensable in containing the German threat. The military grammar appeared unanswerable; it was to be that, rather than the ethical imperatives of collective security, which determined State policy.

In retrospect one can say that even in their own terms the military grammarians may have got it wrong. Faced with the real prospect of war Mussolini might very easily have retreated; his catastrophic humiliation would probably have imposed a high degree of caution both on Germany and Japan; a pattern of peace-keeping would have been successfully established. But the arguments of the grammarians could not simply be overridden. The ethical imperative could not be, in Clausewitz's words, 'a despotic lawgiver'. In the last resort the statesmen were, as ever, faced with a balance of imponderables, with problems to which there were no clear-cut ethical solutions.

To say, therefore, that State policy should be subordinated to the ethical imperative as strategic considerations should be subordinated to State policy does not get us very far. The world of power remains stubbornly autonomous; the suzerainty of ethics may be of quite Merovingian ineffectiveness. Moreover such a formulation can lend itself to the crudest of casuistical justification of all coercive means in terms of the ethical end—of police torture of political dissidents in order to preserve a stable and orderly society, of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to preserve the stability of Eastern Europe, of the 'destabilisation' of Chile to maintain the stability of the Western hemisphere, of the secret bombing of Cambodia to maintain the independence of South Vietnam. Because such actions may be dictated by the grammar of coercive power, they cannot—any more than can terroristic destruction of life and property or intimidatory guerrilla massacres—be *justified*, i.e. made in themselves ethical, by an ethical object. The dimensions of power and of ethics remain stubbornly different.

Indeed, so long as we think of power and ethics in terms of

*dimensions,* we may not go too far wrong. Dimensions do not contradict one another, nor can they be subordinated to one another. They are mutually complementary. Political activity takes place in a two-dimensional field—a field which can be defined by the two co-ordinates of ethics and power. The ethical co-ordinate (which we may appropriately conceive as vertical) indicates the purposes which should govern political action: the achievement of a harmonious society of mankind in which conflicts can be peacefully resolved and a community of cultures peacefully co-exist within which every individual can find fulfilment. The horizontal co-ordinate measures the capacity of each actor to impose his will on his environment, whether by economic, military or psychological pressures. Movement along this co-ordinate, the increase or decrease in coercive capability, has *as such* no dimension of morality, any more than does any elevation of moral standards necessarily involve an increase in one's power to implement them.

Effective political action needs to take constant account of both dimensions. To concern oneself with ethical values to the total exclusion of any practical activity in the dimension of power is to abdicate responsibility for shaping the course of affairs. To accumulate coercive power without concern for its ethical ends is the course of the gangster, of St. Augustine's robber bands. Indeed it could be argued that each of these unidimensional courses is self-defeating; that the co-ordinates, if indefinitely prolonged, become circular. Obsession with ethical values with no concern for their implementation is ultimately unethical in its lack of *practical* concern for the course taken by society; concern for coercive capability without the legitimisation of moral acceptance leads ultimately to impotence, and disaster at the hands of an indignant and alienated world. Thus political action, whether in the international or any other sphere of activity, needs to be *diagonal.* Ethical goals should become more ambitious as political capability increases. The political actor, be he statesman or soldier, needs to grow in moral awareness and responsibility as he grows in power. The moralist must accept that his teaching will not reach beyond the page on which it is written or the lectern from which it is expounded without a massive amount of complex activity by men of affairs operating on the plane of their own expertise. The more ambitious and wide-ranging the ethical goals, the greater the power-mechanisms required to achieve them.

In pursuing his diagonal course the statesman is like a pilot reading a compass bearing from which he must not diverge in either direction if he is to achieve his goal. Too rigorous a concern for moral absolutes may reduce or destroy his capacity for effective action. Yet to ignore such norms entirely may gain him short-term advantages at the cost

of ultimately reducing his capacity to operate effectively in a world made up, not of robber bands, but of States functioning as moral as well as military entities, whose authority is as dependent on moral acceptability as on coercive capability. He may have to commit or authorise acts which, as a private citizen, he would deeply deplore. No one involved, for example, in the repatriation of Soviet troops from British-occupied Europe to Russia immediately after the Second World War could have felt anything other than distress bordering on misery at the need for such action. But in the political dimension the object of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union in order to achieve yet wider ethical objectives—the peaceful settlement of Europe and of the world as a whole—had to be regarded as mandatory. To call attention to the ethical problems created by such actions is appropriate and necessary; but they cannot be condemned on such grounds unless account is taken of the political dimension as well.

Acton was being less than fair to the world of politics when he declared that power tends to corrupt. What does tend to happen, as I suggested earlier, is that the grammar of power, so intricate, so compelling, becomes for those who operate it a universe in itself—as indeed for the moralist and the reformer, the ethical objective can become an exclusive obsession which makes him disdain the tedious and murky problem of how to attain it. Yet perhaps there is a kind of gravitational force against which statesmen have consciously to fight, which keeps their activities always closer to the horizontal co-ordinate of power than to the vertical one of ethics, which constantly weighs down their efforts to maintain the diagonal. Overloaded political decision-makers and members of huge bureaucracies have enough to contend with in day-to-day management of affairs without constantly searching their consciences as to the ethical implications of their actions. That makes it all the more important that their ethical perceptions should be internalised and operate automatically and continuously. Government departments seldom carry a chaplain on the establishment to provide an ethical input into policy-making.

The appropriate response of the political moralist to the world of power must therefore be not to condemn but to enlighten, to understand, and to acknowledge and accept that the Children of Darkness have a painfully-learned wisdom in their own generation which is deserving of genuine respect. As Niebuhr put it, ' Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises '.[5] As a thinker whose

[5] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York: Scribner, 1949; first publ. 1932), p. 4.

ideas were deeply rooted in ethical values, Martin Wight knew that even he could make no serious contribution to the study of international politics without first attaining a full understanding of the coercive factors operating within it. But he never ceased to look beyond these 'uneasy compromises' to the ultimate goal of full and final reconciliation.

# SOVIET POLICY IN THE OCTOBER MIDDLE EAST WAR—I *

*William B. Quandt*

DETENTE between the United States and the Soviet Union was widely acclaimed as both the major goal and a significant accomplishment of the foreign policy of President Nixon's first four years. More recently, however, detente has come under increasingly severe criticism, not so much because of its desirability, but rather because of suspicions that the Soviet Union is not living up to its end of the implied relationship. One of the key examples cited by sceptics of detente has been Soviet behaviour during the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973.[1]

That drama-filled crisis, complete with Soviet threats of intervention, a world-wide American military alert, an oil embargo and large-scale resupply of arms by both super-powers in the midst of the war, has been cited as evidence that detente is not much different from cold war. The list of charges brought against the Russians by American critics of detente is easily drawn up. Moscow provided arms to Egypt and Syria before the outbreak of hostilities and thus provided the means for offensive warfare; the Russians apparently knew beforehand of the Arab plan to attack Israel and did nothing to prevent the war; the Russians rushed weapons to their friends during the fighting, thereby prolonging hostilities; Soviet propaganda supported the Arabs in the use of the oil weapon against the West; Mr. Brezhnev, after summoning Dr. Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate a ceasefire designed to save the Egyptian Third Army, subsequently threatened military intervention when fighting continued. Some would go so far as to argue that the Russians planned and instigated the October war. And the list can be extended, including rather lurid, though false, accusations that the Russians delivered nuclear weapons to Egypt during the war.

* This study was originally prepared as a report for the RAND Corporation, R-1864, under a contract from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author.

[1] See, for example, Foy D. Kohler, Leon Gouré and Mose L. Harvey, *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Detente* (Coral Gables: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974); Gil Carl AlRoy, *The Kissinger Experience: American Policy in the Middle East* (New York: Horizon Press, 1975); Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Great Detente Disaster: Oil and the Decline of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); and Walter Laqueur, *Confrontation: The Middle East War and World Politics* (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Books; London: Wildwood House, 1974).

Whether the Russians were or were not guilty of violating agreements with the United States in October 1973, or of ignoring the requirements of detente politics, clearly depends on one's expectations and definitions.[2] A full analysis of the issue would require information about the motives of Soviet decision-makers in order to answer the question of whether considerations of detente in any way affected policy choices. Such a study cannot be done with available data. This report will therefore not try to label Soviet policy during the most recent Arab-Israeli war, but rather to describe it as accurately as possible and to analyse it as far as evidence allows. The evaluative task requires at a minimum a firm empirical base, which has thus far been lacking. In addition, predictions of Soviet behaviour in future Middle East crises must be based on a clear understanding of how the Russians have in fact behaved in the past.

## The background to Soviet Middle East policy after 1967

Ample evidence exists that the lesson the Soviet leadership learned from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was that their clients were incapable, in the absence of Soviet help, of fighting Israel in a full-scale war without running serious risks. Thus, after 1967, Soviet policy was initially aimed at achieving a political settlement of the conflict, the essential ingredient of which would be the return of the territory captured by Israel in 1967. The Russians, unfortunately for their purposes, had little direct influence over the Israelis and could not hope to persuade them to withdraw for less than full peace. Nor could the Russians press the Arabs to agree to ' full peace ' before an Israeli commitment to withdraw from their territory. Only the United States was capable of influencing Israel to compromise, but it was by no means obvious how this could be achieved.

Meanwhile, Egyptian and Syrian demands on the Russians for arms and diplomatic support rose to new heights, particularly after President Nasser decided to launch the ' war of attrition ' in 1969. By early 1970, the Russians were prepared to go to considerable lengths to ensure that Egypt would not collapse in the face of fierce Israeli counter-attacks, and by mid-1970 the Russians were directly engaged in the air defence of Egypt. At the peak of the crisis in July, at least four Soviet-piloted aircraft were shot down by the Israelis.

[2] The two most explicit agreements that the Soviet Union would appear to have ignored were (1) the third article of the agreement on ' Basic Principles ', signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, in which the two parties committed themselves ' to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions '; and (2) the agreement of June 22, 1973, in which the signatories pledged themselves to ' act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations '.

As the Egyptians, and probably the Russians as well, had hoped, the United States responded to this mounting danger by intensifying its own diplomatic efforts, including a proposal by the Secretary of State, William Rogers, late in 1969, for virtually complete Israeli withdrawal in the context of an overall political settlement. The outcome preferred by the Russians seemed closer in the summer of 1970 than it had the previous year, and the policy of deliberately escalating the conflict was certainly one of the main reasons. The victory, however, was short lived. The Egyptian violations of the August ceasefire, in which the Russians acquiesced, and the Jordan crisis in September, soon brought an end to the American diplomatic effort and led to a strengthening of the American-Israeli relationship.

During this first phase of Soviet policy after the 1967 war, arms supply and diplomatic efforts went hand in hand. There is no evidence that the Russians saw the use of force by the Arabs as incompatible with a political settlement. Despite intervening developments in American-Soviet relations, this remained true in 1973. The war of attrition had been supported generously, but the ceasefire in August 1970 had also been acceptable to Moscow, although not to the point where the Russians were prepared to help enforce the standstill provisions of the ceasefire on which Washington and the Israelis were insisting.

Throughout 1973 the Soviet leadership appeared to remain sceptical of the Arabs' ability to conduct successfully a full-scale war for the recovery of their lands. Such an effort could obviously be dangerous, not only for the Arabs, but also for the Russians. If the Arabs did poorly, Soviet prestige and credibility as an ally would be in jeopardy; pressures could rise for direct Soviet involvement to save the situation; such involvement carried the risk of confrontation with the United States, and that the Russians were apparently not prepared to contemplate. Even an Arab success on the battlefield entailed risks, since an imminent Israeli defeat might lead to American intervention or an Israeli resort to nuclear weapons. Once again, the dilemmas facing the Soviet leadership would be acute.

After the death of President Nasser on September 28, 1970, the position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was exposed to considerable pressure. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, was openly antagonistic towards the Russians, beginning in the spring of 1971 when he unravelled a plot for a coup d'état in which he perceived the Soviet hand. Later that year he helped President Numeiri of the Sudan to crush a communist attempt at a coup, and by early 1972 he was publicly criticising the Russians for colluding in the American-Israeli design to freeze the Middle East in a 'no war, no peace' situation. In particular, Sadat attacked the Russians for withholding what he termed 'offensive weapons'.

**Political differences and the Soviet supply of arms**

The primary issue in dispute between Sadat and Moscow does not seem to have involved the quality of Soviet weaponry. With few exceptions, the Egyptians were receiving virtually every type of equipment that they were capable of using effectively.[3] In some instances, the Russians simply did not produce weapons with the characteristics that the Egyptians sought. For example, the Russians did not manufacture a jet fighter bomber comparable to the American-made Phantom jet used by the Israelis. The more serious problem, it would seem, arose from what the Egyptians sensed as the Russians' unwillingness to assist the Arabs in preparing for and carrying out a future war.[4] If they were generous in providing arms, the Russians were distinctly reserved when it came to their own military participation in the conflict. A group of prominent Lebanese politicians visiting Moscow in September 1971 was told that the Russians would help the Arabs, but would not fight in their place.[5] In the spring of 1972, on the eve of President Sadat's trip to Moscow, the editor of *Al-Ahram*, Mohamed Heikal, wrote:

> When the Soviet Union feels that we speak about an objective we can achieve, it will then save itself from sleeplessness caused by our rushing into something without calculation in which we take two strikes and halt and then raise our voices asking it to interfere.[6]

In July 1972, Sadat finally decided that dramatic action was necessary to break the stalemate. If the Russians could not guarantee Egypt against military defeat, then their presence there was more of a problem than it was worth. It prevented Sadat from dealing diplomatically with the United States, it worried the conservative Saudis, and it exposed Sadat to severe domestic criticism, especially from within the army. Thus, the Russians were asked to withdraw the bulk of their 15,000 to 20,000 advisers and technicians.[7] This led to a serious strain in Egyptian-Soviet relations, but not to a complete break. By October, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Aziz Sidqi, visited Moscow, the anti-Soviet General Sadiq was dropped as Minister of War, and soon arms

[3] The most authoritative Arab source on Egyptian-Soviet relations during this period is Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (London: Collins, 1975), especially pp. 160–184. Heikal contends that Sadat was genuinely irritated by what he perceived as the Russians' unnecessary delays in delivering some types of equipment.

[4] See the argument developed by Abraham S. Becker, 'The Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1970–1973', in Abraham Becker *et al.*, *The Economics and Politics of the Middle East* (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 83–84.

[5] *New York Times*, September 17, 1971.

[6] *Al-Ahram*, March 24, 1972.

[7] Uri Ra'anan has put forward the argument that the Russians were not asked to leave Egypt, but rather that they chose to do so when the policy of deep involvement there no longer provided sufficient gains to justify its continuation. See 'The USSR and the Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-making Process', *Orbis*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Fall 1973, pp. 946–977.

began to flow once again. In joint communiqués, the Russians continued to refer to the Arabs' right to use ' all means at their disposal for the liberation of Arab territories seized by Israel in 1967 ', a formulation first used earlier in the year. By the time Hafiz Ismail, Sadat's adviser on national security affairs, visited Moscow in February 1973, the Russians were apparently willing to meet most Egyptian arms requests. In April, Sadat declared himself satisfied that the Russians were doing as much as they could, given their continuing commitment to a political settlement.[8]

From the Soviet perspective, the supply of arms remained an essential element of policy. The Arab demand was no doubt always greater than the Soviet supply, but on the whole the Russians were forthcoming. At a minimum, the Russians needed to be responsive to arms requests as a part of their political relationship with the Egyptian and Syrian regimes. A super-power can only deny arms to a client so many times without damaging its reputation and influence. In any future hostilities the Russians certainly wanted to avoid the accusation that they had engineered an Arab defeat by withholding arms. If war was inevitable, it was in the Russians' interest that their allies should not be humiliated and that Soviet arms in Arab hands should not be outclassed by American arms in Israeli hands. This had as much to do with super-power competition as with Middle East politics. And finally, if there was to be a test of strength in the Middle East, which seemed quite possible, it was preferable to have arms in place than to be called on to deliver them in the midst of fighting.

Despite political differences, then, the Russians continued to supply arms to Egypt and Syria during the early months of 1973, in the knowledge that the Arabs were seriously considering resort to force at some undefined time in the future. During this same period, however, the Russians reportedly continued to advise caution, arguing that war was a serious and dangerous business, that it required careful planning and that a political solution still offered better hope of achieving Arab goals.[9]

[8] See Sadat's revealing interview in *Newsweek*, April 9, 1973, p. 11.

[9] Author's interview with a high Egyptian government official. Soviet opposition to an Arab-initiated war against Israel was certainly not based on principle. Such a use of force would qualify in the Soviet lexicon as a ' just war '. The tone of the Soviet position in 1973 may have resembled that taken by the Central Committee Secretary, B. N. Ponomaryov towards the Syrian Communist Party's political programme in May 1971, when he warned that war, ' without preparation, would lead to the liquidation of progressive [Arab] regimes ' and ' could also lead to a confrontation between Soviets and Americans '. (From *Al-Raya*, June 26, 1972, as translated in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Autumn 1972, pp. 188–202.) Sadat's version of Soviet policy notes that during his April 1972 talks in Moscow, Brezhnev agreed with him that a political solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be achieved without a military move. But Brezhnev nonetheless warned him on at least four occasions before October 1973 not to attack Israel within the pre-1967 borders. (Interviews in *Al-Hawadith*, March 19, 1975; and *Al-Anwar*, June 27, 1975.)

There is no evidence that the Russians went beyond this somewhat reserved attitude towards an Arab policy of resorting to force. The hypothesis that the Russians took the initiative in planning the October war, and instigated the Arabs to attack in order to advance Soviet global objectives, simply does not stand the test of evidence or plausibility. First, the Arabs did not need to be prodded; they were well ahead of the Russians in their desire to fight. Second, the Arab response to such a Soviet initiative would surely have been to try to extract a Soviet commitment to intervene in order to ensure the success of the venture. The Russians could no more make such a commitment in 1973 than in 1972, and without it a policy of instigating an Arab attack would lack credibility. This is not to say that the Russians were unmindful that a Middle East crisis, whatever its risks, might also present them with opportunities elsewhere, especially in Europe, and that they would do well to capitalise upon such possibilities. But the October war was not decided by the Russians, even though it clearly could not have been planned or initiated without the arms they supplied. Whatever the degree of Soviet co-operation in some aspects of military planning, it seems clear that the initiative for the war lay with the Arabs.[10]

### The question of Soviet foreknowledge

In late April and early May 1973, signs began to accumulate of an impending Egyptian military offensive. Israel took the possibility seriously and ordered a limited mobilisation of reserves. Nothing happened. But the following month in San Clemente, Brezhnev warned Nixon at length that the situation in the Middle East was very explosive and that further delays in launching a diplomatic initiative would result in war.[11] Subsequently, the Russians were to remind Nixon that

[10] During the war, the Israelis claim to have captured some evidence that suggested direct involvement of the Russians in drafting or approving the Egyptian and Syrian war plans. The documents, in Arabic and Russian, were several months old, however, and may simply have been normal contingency plans. Closer to the actual date of attack, the Russians reportedly did provide the Egyptians with current photographs, taken by satellite or MIG-25, of Israeli installations in central Sinai. This may have been part of routine intelligence exchanges with the Egyptians. Finally, the Israelis point to the fact that in the months before the war, a small number of advanced Soviet weapons systems were sent to the Middle East, such as the BMP-1 armoured personnel carrier, the SA-9 surface-to-air missile, the BRDM-2 armoured vehicle, the SU-20 aircraft, the Kelt anti-radiation missile, and late model T-62 tanks. The implication is that the Russians, knowing that war was coming, wanted to see how some of their advanced equipment would perform in actual combat. If all of the above allegations are true, it would suggest that the Russians were prepared to co-operate in military planning, although it would not prove that they instigated the October war. As with the supply of arms, some degree of responsiveness to requests for help in military planning is the price of maintaining a healthy political relationship.

[11] Brezhnev's warning, like those of King Faisal, was seen as an attempt to get the United States to bring pressure on Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967.

they had in fact forewarned him that the Arabs were planning to go to war.

By September 1973, the Soviet position towards an Egyptian-Syrian military campaign against Israel can be summarised as follows:

> The Russians were aware that serious preparations were being made for hostilities at an undetermined, but probably early, date in the future.
>
> The Russians were probably sceptical of the enterprise, but did not want it to result in a military fiasco for the Arabs. Therefore ample quantities of air defence equipment, anti-tank missiles and a few SCUD missiles were being delivered to deter Israeli attacks on Cairo.[12]
>
> The Russians did not take the initiative in pressing the Arabs to resume hostilities. The basic decisions were made in Cairo and Damascus.[13]

Until mid-September 1973, the likelihood of Arab-Israeli hostilities in the immediate future appeared to be relatively slight. During September, however, several events took place that probably increased Soviet sensitivity to the possibility of an outbreak of fighting. During the second week of September, President Sadat, President Assad of Syria and King Hussein of Jordan met in Cairo in a series of talks designed to bring Jordan back into the Arab mainstream and to consolidate military co-ordination between Egypt and Syria. On the day following their meetings, September 13, Israeli aircraft engaged the Syrian air force in unusual circumstances, and 13 Syrian planes were shot down.

In the aftermath of the loss of the Syrian aircraft, a well-orchestrated campaign began in the Syrian, Egyptian and Lebanese press casting doubts upon Soviet willingness to help its friends in the Arab world in the face of Israeli aggression. Rumours were circulating, as part of what may have been a deliberate misinformation effort, that Syria had placed restrictions on the Soviet advisers in Syria and that soon they might be expelled altogether. Such questioning of Soviet intentions must have been particularly painful for the Russians at a time when their inability to prevent the overthrow of President Allende in Chile was already a major embarrassment to their position in the Third World. It is tempting to speculate that the Russians may have believed that the Americans, behind the mask of detente, had engineered the over-

[12] Marvin and Bernard Kalb claim that on September 25, Soviet transports carrying SCUDs entered the Mediterranean en route to Egypt. (See *Kissinger*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1974, p. 454.) *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (Nov. 5, 1973, p. 12) gives the date of the SCUD shipments as September 12. Authoritative Israeli sources date the shipments from June 1973, if not earlier.

[13] Ra'anan (*op. cit.*, pp. 971–73) has argued that the Russians were instrumental in both planning and initiating the October war. He offers a hypothetical eleven-point

throw of the Marxist regime in Chile, and that now Saudi Arabia, the Americans' closest friend in the Arab world, was reportedly offering Damascus vast sums of financial aid if President Assad would only do to the Russians what Sadat had done in July 1972. In any event, the Russians refused to go along with the misinformation campaign, if such it was, and instead stoutly denied any strains in relations with Syria.[14]

If the Russians had been actively colluding with Egypt and Syria to instigate hostilities on October 6, then one would have expected them to avoid giving any hints of the impending attack. After all, the Arabs had learned the value of a surprise attack from their experience in 1967 and were going to great lengths in the latter part of September and early October to mislead Israeli and American intelligence services.[15] If Israel were to conclude that an Arab attack was imminent, a decision for a pre-emptive airstrike and immediate mobilisation of reserves could be anticipated. This might well rob the Egyptians and Syrians of any hope of military success.

If, instead of being active partners in planning a campaign against Israel, the Russians remained sceptical of the outcome of such a venture, one might expect a somewhat more ambiguous policy. On the one hand, arms would continue to be delivered, perhaps even on an accelerated schedule, to ensure against subsequent charges that the Russians had engineered the Arabs' defeat by withholding vital supplies; but the Russians would not wish to be more visibly associated with what must have seemed a risky enterprise. If the Arabs were determined to act, Moscow would not try to prevent them, nor would it publicly reveal their intentions; at the same time, the Russians seem to have wanted to be in a position to avoid being drawn into the war against their will. Above all, the war must appear to be the primary responsibility of Egypt and Syria.

It was this latter posture that the Russians adopted when they apparently concluded, on October 3, that hostilities were imminent.[16]

plan as a possible scenario guiding the decisions of Soviet policy-makers both before and during the war. An alternative interpretation which plays down direct Soviet collusion in the preparations for war, is found in a carefully documented manuscript prepared for the Center of Strategic Studies, Stanford Research Institute, by Galia Golan, entitled, 'The Soviet Union and Egyptian-Syrian Preparations for the Arab-Israeli War of 1973', n.d.

[14] Golan, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[15] Apart from the rumours of an impending break in Syrian-Soviet relations, the Arab misinformation effort apparently included a diversionary guerrilla attack on Soviet Jews crossing Austria en route to Israel. This might serve to preoccupy Israel during the crucial days before the attack. The Palestinian group responsible for the attack was Saiqa, under Syrian control.

[16] The Kalbs (*op. cit.*, p. 453) claim that Sadat told Brezhnev on September 22 that the war would begin on October 6. This theme has sometimes been reinforced by reference to a story in *L'Unita* (Sept. 21, 1973), which claimed that Sadat paid a secret visit to Bulgaria during this period. There is no other evidence that such a

Until that date, the Russians, like anyone else carefully watching the signs of military build-up along the Canal and on the Golan front in the last week of September, must have felt that war could happen. Early in October (the 1st according to Heikal, the 3rd according to Sadat), the Egyptian President decided to see the Soviet ambassador to give him the message that a breach of the ceasefire was likely. The precise date and the scale of the fighting were not, however, revealed.[17] Vinogradov reportedly returned to see Sadat on the evening of October 4 with a message from Brezhnev. In Heikal's account, Brezhnev acknowledged that the decision to fight was Sadat's to take and that the Soviet Union would support him as a friend. He did, however, request permission to withdraw Russian civilians and their families from Egypt. Sadat was reported to have been puzzled by the request, but reluctantly consented.[18]

As Sadat apparently thought at the time, the Soviet decision to evacuate civilians was perplexing. It clearly ran the risk of signalling to the Israelis and Americans that war was about to break out. The Israelis might then react by mobilising or launching a pre-emptive strike, in which case the Arabs would be sure to blame Moscow for revealing their plans. Fortunately for the Russians, neither Washington nor Tel Aviv correctly read the signal.

If the evacuation cannot easily be interpreted as a deliberate signal to the United States that war was imminent, how then is it to be understood? [19] Perhaps it was the result of Soviet bureaucratic routines. When war threatens, dependents are evacuated; no one thought that this might tip off the Israelis, as it almost did.[20] This would imply a lack of co-ordination or a short-sightedness in Soviet policy which, while possible, was not apparent later on in the crisis. Possibly, the Russians were anxious to emphasise that they would not become directly involved

meeting ever took place. Walter Laqueur argues that Sadat probably informed Brezhnev by letter on September 22; see *op. cit.*, p. 72. Once again, however, there is no convincing evidence that this occurred.

[17] Heikal, *op. cit.*, p. 25. The exact time of the Egyptian-Syrian attack was not set, according to Heikal, until October 3. (*Ibid.*, pp. 29–31. Sadat's speech, Sept. 15, 1975.)

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35. Sadat's version of these events is carried in an interview in *An-Nahar*, March 1, 1974, and in his September 15, 1975, speech. He gives October 3 as the date of his meeting with the Soviet ambassador in which he mentions the likelihood of impending hostilities, adding that President Assad told the Russians of the precise time of the attack the following day, October 4.

[19] Some analysts have put forward the hypothesis that the Russians, hoping that war would be avoided, tried to pass a discreet signal to Washington and Tel Aviv by evacuating dependents on October 4. Presumably, the conclusion would be drawn that the Russians knew war was imminent; Israel would react by ordering full mobilisation; and then, as had happened during the previous spring, the Arabs would back off. To have made a more overt signal to the United States or Israel, of course, would have been seen as betrayal by the Arabs. While intriguing, this hypothesis seems to go too far in interpreting the significance of the evacuation.

[20] See Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement, October 1973* (Boston: Little, Brown; London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), pp. 48–50.

in the hostilities. This message, if intended, was most likely directed at Washington, with the hope of preserving the benefits of detente; but it might also have been directed at Sadat and Assad, reminding them not to expect the Russians to intervene directly if their enterprise ran into trouble.

### Soviet policy during the war

Hostilities began at 2.00 p.m. on October 6 when Egyptian and Syrian forces launched their combined offensive. The Russians had anticipated the outbreak of fighting by sending up another intelligence satellite that day, although the Soviet Mediterranean fleet remained spread out in a normal pattern. Soviet ships in Egyptian and Syrian ports moved away from the area of conflict. In contacts with the United States that day, the Russians adopted a generally co-operative stance, although neither super-power had as yet defined a policy on the convening of a meeting of the UN Security Council.[21]

The more extraordinary aspect of Soviet behaviour on this first day of hostilities took place in Cairo. There, according to Sadat, the Soviet ambassador, V. A. Vinogradov, came to see him six hours after the war had begun. Vinogradov's message was reportedly that the Syrians were prepared to accept an early ceasefire and that the Russians endorsed this policy. Sadat was incredulous, queried the Syrians himself, and angrily told Vinogradov, when the ambassador returned the following day with the same request, that he was misinformed about Syrian intentions.[22]

Several interpretations of this demarche by Vinogradov can be made. First, it is possible that it did not happen exactly as the Egyptians have alleged. Second, Syria may, in fact, have favoured an early ceasefire at the end of the first or second day, and the Russians may have agreed just before the outbreak of the war to support such a policy. That would have left Syria in a comparatively good military position. In view of the Syrian military strategy, it seems quite likely that the Syrians did hope for an early ceasefire. If true, this would suggest a higher degree of Syrian-Soviet co-operation than that which existed between Cairo

[21] Marvin and Bernard Kalb, *op. cit.*, p. 462. Kissinger spoke to Dobrynin several times on October 6: once just before the outbreak of hostilities, at 7.00 a.m.; again in the mid-afternoon; and finally at about 10.00 p.m.

[22] Sadat interview, *Al-Hawadith*, March 19, 1975; Sadat's speech, September 15, 1975; and an interview in *Al-Jumhuriyyah*, October 24, 1975. Mohamed Heikal provides a detailed account of these exchanges, giving more emphasis to the second meeting on October 7. At that time the Soviet ambassador reportedly told Sadat that the Syrians had been in touch with Moscow about their heavy tank losses, and the Russians had urged them to turn to the Iraqis. He also repeated that the Syrians would not object to a ceasefire. Sadat then sent a message to Assad arguing against a ceasefire and received a denial from Assad the next day that he had ever made such a request of the Russians. See Heikal, *op. cit.*, pp. 209, 212–215.

and Moscow. Third, one account alleges that the Russians misunderstood Assad's position and therefore misinformed Sadat.[23] Fourth, the Russians may have expected a rapid deterioration of the Arab military position and were hoping to arrange an early ceasefire in place that would prevent that occurrence. They may have had reason to assume that the Syrians would not oppose this stand, since the Syrian military strategy, unlike the Egyptian, was clearly geared to a short war. In contrast to subsequent Soviet ceasefire efforts, this one did not grow out of American-Soviet talks, but rather seems to have reflected Soviet apprehensions, if not a tacit understanding with the Syrians.

On balance, the Soviet effort to get a ceasefire in the first two days of the war seems best understood in terms of Soviet-Syrian relations and Moscow's desire not to become militarily involved. A short war would minimise dangers. The Syrians, if successful, might recover some territory, as would the Egyptians. The shock of the war alone might stimulate the Americans to press the Israelis through diplomatic channels for further concessions after the war. The Egyptian plan for a long war was much more dangerous. It could lead to an Arab defeat, once the Israelis mobilised and recovered from their surprise. And it seemed designed to maximise the risks of super-power confrontation, which might suit Egypt's needs, but not necessarily Moscow's. Finally, Moscow had little reason to feel grateful towards Sadat, whereas Assad remained on friendly terms. When presented with the fact that war was imminent, the Russians seem to have decided to throw their weight behind the Syrian concept of a short war rather than the more risky Egyptian strategy of a prolonged conflict.[24]

During the second day of the fighting, the Russians maintained a

[23] This is the interpretation contained in a document attributed to Vinogradov, published in the Libyan-financed Beirut newspaper, *As-Safir*, and reprinted in the organ of the Lebanese Communist Party, *An-Nida*, April 17, 1974. The authenticity of the document has been questioned, although it does contain a number of plausible details. An Egyptian official, in an interview with the author, did give some credence to this version. According to his account, the Syrians, just before the war, had discussed with the Russians a plan for a short period of fighting in which an effort would be made to seize the Golan Heights. This would be followed by a rapid effort to achieve a ceasefire that would allow the Syrians to hold on to their military gains of the first day or two of fighting. The report of this conversation reached Moscow as the war broke out, and the Russians took it as an indication of Syria's current position. Thus they approached Sadat to determine his attitude towards a ceasefire, but were quickly disabused of the idea, particularly when the Syrians denied that they wanted a ceasefire. Heikal (*op. cit.*, pp. 208–209) gives October 5 as the date for Assad's talk with the Soviet ambassador in which he discusses an early ceasefire. A second high Egyptian official stated in an interview that Moscow and Damascus may have both favoured an early ceasefire out of a fear that the Egyptians would fail to cross the Canal and establish a strong position on the east bank. Were this to have been the case, the Syrians might have been left to face the full weight of Israeli power unless an early ceasefire could be arranged.

[24] Sadat seems to subscribe to this interpretation and has added information that the Syrians were planning for a short war, while Egypt envisaged a long one. (Interview in *Al-Jumhuriyyah*, Oct. 24, 1975.)

posture of relative restraint. In addition to repeating to Sadat the request for a ceasefire, they ostentatiously moved their ships away from the zone of conflict to a point south-east of Crete. In reply to a message from Nixon, Brezhnev agreed, late in the day of October 7, to a meeting of the Security Council, which in the American view would serve to pre-empt a call by the General Assembly for an immediate Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines as part of any ceasefire resolution.[25] The first official public Soviet reaction to the war came in the evening in a relatively mild statement that made no mention of the United States, instead blaming the outbreak of fighting on Israeli intransigence, which had prevented a political solution.[26]

Soviet behaviour remained generally restrained throughout October 8. By this time it was apparent that the Arabs had done better on the battlefield than had been anticipated, especially on the Egyptian front. On the Syrian front, however, the Israelis were beginning to launch a severe counter-attack, and Syrian forces were already being pushed back towards the 1967 ceasefire lines. Contacts with the United States were close and generally co-operative throughout the day, although the Russians did not subscribe to the suggestion of John Scali, US ambassador at the UN, that a ceasefire should be established on the basis of the status quo ante, a position which was clearly unacceptable to the Arabs as long as they held territory beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines.

In a toast delivered during a lunch for the Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, on October 8, Brezhnev spoke of Soviet support for '... a fair and lasting peace ... and guaranteed security for all countries and peoples of the area which is so close to our borders'.[27] That evening in Washington, Kissinger made reference in a speech to the need for Soviet restraint in the Middle East if detente were to survive. Up to that point, however, he had no specific complaints about Soviet behaviour. From Kissinger's perspective, the Russians had not gone beyond the bounds of detente politics.

It seems fair to assume that the Soviet leaders were coming under pressure from Arab sources to adopt a more forthcoming posture. Certainly Sadat had not hidden his displeasure at the initial Soviet ceasefire initiative. Now, with the Syrian front rapidly crumbling, President Boumedienne of Algeria apparently appealed for active Soviet support.[28] In reply, Brezhnev sent a letter to Boumedienne, received and released by the Algerians on October 9, which struck an

[25] Kalb, *op. cit.*, p. 463.
[26] Tass, Oct. 7, 1973 (16.59 GMT).
[27] Kalb, *op. cit.*, p. 466.
[28] *The October War: Documents, Personalities, Analyses and Maps*, ed. by Riad N. El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas (Beirut· An-Nahar Press Services SARL, *c.* 1973), p. 24. Boumedienne, one may recall, played a similar role in the June 1967 war.

ambiguous note.[29] Brezhnev began by insisting that Egypt and Syria should not remain alone in the battle and urged Algeria to 'assist and support on the widest scale' the two confrontation states. But immediately thereafter, Brezhnev referred to the 'complexity' of the present situation, which seemed to suggest that there were limits on Soviet ability to aid Egypt and Syria directly. Read as a reply to Algerian pressure for active support, the Brezhnev letter seems to put the burden on the Arabs to help one another, while offering only modest hope of a direct Soviet role. Instead of providing an inducement to other Arabs to join the battle, Brezhnev seems to be excusing himself from taking the lead, although an implied Soviet promise to replace any arms diverted from Algeria to the other Arab fronts may be read into the message. It is noteworthy that the Russians have never referred to this letter publicly; that they were not the ones to release the text; and that they have not treated it as an example of their high-minded aid to the Arabs in their moment of need.[30] Once again, the Russians appear to have preferred to maintain a posture of non-involvement as long as possible.

(*To be concluded*)

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 156–157, for text of Brezhnev's letter.
[30] Other letters were reportedly sent by Brezhnev to Arab leaders at about this time, but no texts are available.

# WHITEHALL, WASHINGTON AND THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

*Christopher Andrew*

THERE is no area of defence policy on which British and American official views are at present as sharply divided as the role of the intelligence services. The American Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, the Church Committee (of which Vice-President Mondale was a member), concluded in its report last year: 'There is a clear necessity, after thirty years of substantial secret activities, for public debate and legislative decisions about the future course of our intelligence system.'[1] The official British view is precisely the opposite. That view was recently reaffirmed by the British embassy in Washington. When questioned by a congressional sub-committee on the British practice of intercepting all telegrams entering and leaving the United Kingdom, the embassy gave the traditional dusty answer: 'It is not in accordance with Her Majesty's Government's policy to comment on such matters.'[2] This article is not in accordance with Her Majesty's Government's policy either.

Those branches of government most concerned with the intelligence services—the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Defence Ministry—do not like British intelligence work, past or present, general or particular, to be debated in parliament, discussed in the press, or researched in the universities. Debate in the Commons is more or less prevented by the conventions of the House; discussion in the press is discouraged by the D notice system; research in the universities, even on the past record of the intelligence services, is made as difficult as possible by denying access to even their earliest files. The official British view is that the past and present functions, cost, and effectiveness of the intelligence services do not form a proper subject either for polite patriotic discussion, or for parliamentary debate, or for academic research. My own view, within limits which I shall discuss later, is that they do.

The role of the intelligence services is, quite simply, too important *not* to be discussed. Their role is more vital now than it has ever been before in peacetime. Secret intelligence is essential now not merely,

[1] United States Senate, *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities*, April 26, 1976, Vol. I (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 14.
[2] *The Times*, Sept. 28, 1976.

as in the past, to the organisation of the Western defences but also—as will be argued later—to control the arms race, and to maintain peace in the Middle East and other areas where local conflicts are most likely to involve the major powers. Even if secret intelligence were of only trivial rather than primary importance to the Atlantic Alliance, the role of the intelligence services would still represent a necessary subject of public concern. For if intelligence work were less than vital, the enormous intelligence budget would be one of the greatest financial scandals of our times. All governments, of course, conceal from their subjects the sums spent on their intelligence services by accounting methods which, if employed by public companies, would lead to prosecution. The Church Committee concludes, however, that American intelligence activities account for about 3 per cent of the total federal budget: more than the total government budget of many countries of the Third World.

Most of this enormous sum is spent on intelligence collection. And it is intelligence collection which provides the supreme example of the ability of the superior technology of the Atlantic Alliance—in particular of the United States—to compensate for the enormous advantage in numbers of the Warsaw Pact. Nato's inferiority to the Warsaw Pact in numbers of intelligence personnel is far greater even than its inferiority in tanks or in land forces. The best estimates of Russian 'operational personnel' engaged in foreign intelligence put their numbers at at least five times the combined total of their American and West European counterparts. Russia's secret service is enormously and notoriously labour-intensive, and it is in the nature of the Soviet autocracy that it should be so. Surveillance of Russians as well as foreigners is at the heart of, and not a mere adjunct to, the Soviet political system. But as the world of intelligence collection becomes daily more capital-intensive than labour-intensive, so the Russian advantage in numbers declines steadily in importance. The United States now spends on intelligence gathering by machines seven times what it spends on intelligence gathering by human beings. And it is the machines rather than the humans which give American intelligence its lead over the Russians. The Church Committee ended its investigations cautiously confident that, because of the United States 'wide lead in capacity for technological innovation', future scientific advances are likely to widen, rather than narrow, that lead.[3]

The role of humans in intelligence collection will no doubt decline still further. Defence attachés, in particular, are increasingly recognised as more of a liability than an asset. When General Donald Bennett became Director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency in

[3] Senate, *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 364.

*1969, he dismissed 38 attachés outright for incompetence. Defence attachés as intelligence gatherers belong to a by-gone world of gentlemen amateurs.* As Callwell, the British Director of Military Intelligence, put it at the end of the last century, the most agreeable part of the work is the opportunity it offers 'to visit at the public expense parts of the world which one might otherwise never have seen'.[4] The United States, by its policy of drawing most of its defence attachés from officers about to retire, seems to have drawn the same conclusions. The post of defence attaché may be useful preparation for retirement. It may even be mildly useful for military liaison purposes in friendly countries. But the intelligence community would probably be better off without it.

Even professional spies are on the decline. The increasing sophistication and importance of photographic and electronic intelligence has been matched by a growing awareness of the deficiencies of human intelligence gatherers. The limited range of human eyes and ears compares rather poorly with the ability of spy satellites to provide accurate aerial reconnaissance from a height of a hundred miles and the ability of signals interception devices to eavesdrop from much greater distances still. Worse still, spies can never be entirely trusted. Significantly, the most useful spies—like Philby and Penkovsky—tend to be recruited from the opposition's own intelligence service. Contrary to the impression created by their recent misdeeds, the CIA's agents in the field have declined steadily in numbers for the past decade.[5] Spies will not disappear altogether. But their decline will doubtless continue. Their future uses lie perhaps more in infiltrating terrorist groups than in penetrating foreign governments. The United States owes its lead over the Russians in intelligence collection not to its men out in the cold but to its machines (and, to be fair, to the men who make and run them). In the short term at least, that lead appears secure.

The greatest achievement of the new technology of intelligence collection has been to make possible control of the arms race. Secret intelligence has now succeeded, where open diplomacy has failed, in providing a system of arms inspection without which arms *control* of any kind is doomed to failure. Twenty years ago President Eisenhower proposed to the Soviet Union a so-called 'open skies' system of arms control, by which each side would be free to check the level of the other's armaments by aerial reconnaissance. Russia refused as it was bound to do. The Gulag archipelago looks no prettier from the air than from the ground. Thanks to spy satellites, however, the open skies policy is now a reality. A system of arms control has in effect been imposed

[4] J. Gooch, *The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c.1900–1916* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 9–10

[5] H. Scoville, Jr., 'Is Espionage Necessary for Our Security?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3, April 1976, pp. 482–495. Senate, *Final Report, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 437.

by the West upon the East. The East indeed now recognises some of the benefits of the very system it formerly opposed. The economic strains imposed by its enormous military budget and inefficient agriculture have brought the Soviet Union to see the advantages of a system of arms control which avoids the publicity attendant on open methods of inspection. As early as 1963 (only three years after Gary Powers's U-2 was shot down over Russian territory) satellite surveillance was already tacitly accepted by the Soviet Union. By its signature of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, which provides for verification by what are euphemistically termed ' national technical means ', Russia formally sanctioned the principle of aerial inspection which it had formerly denounced. Without satellite surveillance the SALT talks would be unthinkable. The success of those talks, in the short term, will depend on the willingness of both sides not to begin production of weapons (such as the cruise missile) which cannot be adequately monitored by present systems of surveillance. In the longer term the future of arms control will depend on the ability of the technology of surveillance to keep pace with the technology of nuclear attack.

American intelligence surveillance by satellite, SR-71, and lower-flying aircraft is also crucial to the peace of the Middle East. By the Sinai agreement of September 1975 an electronic early-warning system and aerial surveillance by the United States were made the basis of the peace-keeping arrangements.[6] After each surveillance mission, the United States provides reconnaissance photographs to Israel, Egypt, the UN commander, and—unofficially—to Russia. Both Egypt and Israel arrange minor violations of the Sinai agreement from time to time to keep American intelligence on its toes. (A senior American official is said recently to have congratulated the Egyptians on devising a field hospital which could also be used as a missile launcher.) Russia doublechecks by satellite and MiG-25. The use of great power intelligence surveillance to keep the peace in the Middle East is likely to form the model for extinguishing bushfires in the future before they develop into great power conflagrations.

The achievements of American signals intelligence, though less publicised than those of aerial surveillance, have probably been no less remarkable. The National Security Administration (NSA) controls perhaps the largest computer complex in the world and an interception network manned by 80,000 men around the globe. Its budget is twice that of the CIA, and no doubt many times that of its British equivalent, GCHQ Cheltenham. NSA plays a crucial role in two kinds of early-warning system. First, it gives almost instantaneous warning of Russian

[6] N. A. Pelcovits, *Security Guarantees in a Middle East Settlement* (Beverly Hills, London: Sage, 1976).

missile launches.[7] Second, its ability to penetrate the communications systems of developing countries provides an important source of advance knowledge of conflicts in the Third World. The record of this second early-warning system is an uneven one. But there have been some notable successes. American (and probably British) intelligence forecast with considerable accuracy the events leading to the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and the birth of Bangladesh. Signals intelligence made a notable contribution also to the success of the first round of SALT in 1972 and the agreement not to build anti-ballistic missile defence systems. NSA's temporary success (helped by Soviet enciphering errors) in decrypting Soviet communications gave American negotiators much the same insight into their opponents' bargaining position which the breaking of the Japanese code had given an earlier generation of negotiators at the Washington Conference of 1921.[8]

The very success of American intelligence collection has, however, created two problems. First, the enormous cost and sophisticated technology of modern intelligence collection systems has left Nato almost as dependent on the United States for its intelligence cover as for its nuclear cover. The information on the military dispositions of the Warsaw Pact continuously provided by the vast American network of aerial and electronic surveillance is an essential element in Nato's strategic planning. It is a powerful deterrent also to surprise attack. There is little prospect, however, that Nato's dependence on American intelligence can ever be removed. The standardisation of Nato's weaponry may yet occur sometime in the twenty-first century. But the integration of Nato intelligence will not. Intelligence services may co-operate from time to time but they do not really trust each other and they cannot afford to do so. Unhappily, the intelligence services of the strongest European Nato power are also the least reliable. The British and American intelligence communities operate on the probably accurate assumption that part at least of West German intelligence is actually a sub-division of East German intelligence. But even British and American intelligence, though co-operation between them is relatively close, cannot really afford to trust each other. As a senior Washington spook has recently—and rather elegantly—put it: 'There are no friendly [intelligence] services; there are only the [intelligence] services of friendly powers.'

[7] To quote Lieutenant General D. O. Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency: 'Spies take too long to get information to you, [satellite] photographs as well. NSA is intercepting things as they happen . . . We know in five minutes that a missile has been launched. This kind of intelligence is critical to the warning business'. David Kahn, 'Big Ear or Big Brother?', *New York Times Magazine*, May 16, 1976, p. 64 (an article on the NSA of much greater interest than the editor's sensational title suggests).

[8] *Ibid.* On the Washington Conference of 1921 see the memoirs of the first head of the American Black Chamber (the ancestor of NSA), Herbert Yardley, *The American Black Chamber* (London: Faber, 1931).

**The information explosion**

The second problem created by the success of modern intelligence collection is, paradoxically, its very success. In 1966 the Cunningham Report on Foreign Intelligence Collection Requirements concluded: 'The information explosion has already gotten out of hand, yet the CIA and the [intelligence] community are developing ways to intensify it . . . The quantity of information is degrading the quality of finished intelligence'. The problem of too much raw intelligence doubtless afflicts the Russians, with their passion for bugging, in an appropriately acute form. But for the past decade the same problem has arisen, at least intermittently, in the United States. American intelligence analysts nowadays face what one of them has called 'an all-source glut: millions of words daily from foreign radio broadcasts, thousands of embassy and attaché reports, a stream of communications intercepts, cartons of photographs, miles of recorded electronic transmissions—and a handful of agent reports'.[9]

The problems of the 'all-source glut' have been particularly severe in the Defense Intelligence Agency. Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements told the Defense Panel on Intelligence in January 1975: 'In every instance I know about where there was a horrendous failure of intelligence, the information was in fact available to have averted the problem. But the analysts and the system didn't allow the raw data to surface.'[10] Though its record is better than the DIA's, the CIA has also found difficulty in coping with the information explosion. Both Washington's most striking recent intelligence failures—the failure to anticipate the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 and the Cyprus coup in July 1974—derived more from a surfeit, than from a shortage, of raw intelligence. On this subject the Select Committees on Intelligence of both the Senate and the House of Representatives reached almost identical conclusions. In September 1973, according to the report of the House Committee:

> . . . the National Security Agency began picking up clear signs that Egypt and Syria were preparing for a major offensive . . . [But] NSA's warnings escaped the serious attention of most intelligence analysts responsible for the Middle East. The fault may well lie in the system itself. NSA intercepts of Egyptian-Syrian war preparations in this period were so voluminous—an average of hundreds of reports each week—that few analysts had time to digest more than a small portion of them.[11]

[9] Senate, *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 274–5, 343 and 537. H. Rositzke, 'America's Secret Operations: A Perspective', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 53, No. 2, Jan. 1975, p. 338.

[10] Senate, *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 345.

[11] Cited by Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

It is precisely in a crisis that the problems of the 'all-source glut' are at their most acute, and that current intelligence reporting is most likely to seize on the latest, rather than the best, raw intelligence. To quote the Church Committee:

> In a crisis situation [a redundant use of the new vogue word 'situation'] analysts tend to focus on the latest piece of evidence at the expense of a longer and broader view. Intelligence community staff saw this tendency as one reason why the Cyprus coup of July 1974 was not foreseen.[12]

The problems posed by the information explosion in the American intelligence community do not require, for their solution, any enlargement of the community. They require, instead, a renewed concentration by the CIA on the mission for which it was established thirty years ago. The Agency was founded in 1947 for the principal purpose of co-ordinating and analysing foreign intelligence for American policy-makers. The cold war, however, quickly established different priorities. Fear of communist expansion drove the intelligence community to the neo-Marxist conclusion that its main purpose was not to interpret the world but to change it. By 1950 the CIA's main energies had been diverted into 'covert operations'. The early successes of those operations, which included in 1953–54 the comparatively painless removal of unfriendly regimes in Iran and Guatemala, confirmed the Agency's change of character. By the end of Allen Dulles's term as Director of Central Intelligence (1953–61), the ascendancy of covert operations over intelligence analysis was so complete that the CIA's own analysts were not consulted in planning the Bay of Pigs invasion. Thanks at least partly to the jealousy of the rest of the intelligence community, the CIA had also failed to fulfil its intended role as intelligence co-ordinator. Government departments proved reluctant even to supply the information needed for the CIA's main intelligence forecasts (the 'National Intelligence Estimates').[13]

The Bay of Pigs fiasco persuaded President Kennedy to reaffirm the original objectives of the CIA. With the President's support, Dulles's successor, John McCone (DCI, 1961–65), began a determined attempt to reassert both the priority of intelligence analysis over covert operations and his own role as co-ordinator of the whole intelligence community.[14] The missile crisis of 1962 and the vital role played in it by

[12] Senate, *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 443.

[13] The most reliable, though not the most sensational, histories of the CIA are those by Anne Karalekas, based on at least part of the CIA archives and published in Vol. IV of the Final Report of the Church Committee; and by a former Deputy Director of Intelligence, Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Washington: Acropolis, 1976).

[14] Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–98. The CIA's Deputy Director of Plans (a euphemism for covert operations) continued, however, to make preparations for the assassination of Castro without informing McCone until August 1963.

aerial surveillance, signals intelligence, and more conventional espionage (in the form, notably, of Penkovsky) represented a triumph for the new intelligence regime. Under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, however, the CIA's main energies were once again diverted into covert operations. Both Presidents viewed the Agency 'primarily as an instrument for the execution of White House wishes by secret methods'. Much of the CIA's current intelligence reporting and future 'estimates' was simply ignored. In particular, its realistic—and pessimistic—'estimates' on the Vietnam War had a negligible effect on government policy. 'Vietnam', concludes the Church Committee, 'may have been a policy failure. It was not an intelligence failure.' [15]

The declining status of the DCI (both a cause and a consequence of McCone's resignation in 1965) reversed the move towards intelligence co-ordination begun in 1961. The intelligence community entered the 1970s as a series of overlapping agencies, each competing for the attention of the policy-makers. Each agency came to feel, in the words of Richard Helms (DCI 1966–73), that 'it's got to have a publication that arrives in the White House every morning'. As a result, 'not only are analysts swamped with information, but the consumers also are inundated with intelligence reporting, both "finished" and "raw" . . . There is simply too much to read, from too many sources.' While current intelligence reporting during the Nixon era tended to become decreasingly effective because of its sheer bulk, longer-term analysis and 'estimates' suffered from growing neglect.[16]

Watergate will, however, probably prove to have had an even more salutary effect on the intelligence community than the Bay of Pigs fiasco thirteen years earlier. The immediate consequence of the affair was inevitably traumatic. The series of sensational—and even more sensationalised—revelations of civil liberties infringed at home and disreputable covert operations abroad (for which, however, the executive bears the main responsibility) both demoralised and distracted the intelligence community. '1975', writes one of its former deputy directors, 'was virtually a lost year for the CIA'.[17] The longer-term consequence of the post-Watergate investigations has, however, been to remind the executive, Congress, and the intelligence community of the purposes for which the CIA was founded thirty years ago. The report of the Church Committee (far more impressive than that of the House Select Committee which became bogged down in procedural and other wrangles) provides a sober (though not quite complete) assessment of the extent of past misdeeds. It also reasserts the priority of intel-

[15] Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 216. Senate, *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 268–69; Vol. IV, p. 95.
[16] Senate, *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 275. Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 199 and 216.
[17] Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

ligence analysis over covert operations and the need for greater co-ordination to cope with the revolution in intelligence collection.

A further great merit of the Church Committee's report is that it recognises not merely the legitimacy, but also the necessity, of public and parliamentary discussion of the role of the intelligence services in the interests of the intelligence community itself. The report pokes gentle but legitimate fun at the contrary official British view. It expresses the hope that the United States will not surround its intelligence services with the obsessional secrecy of the Russians, the Chinese, or ' our British brethren '.

There are, of course, obvious limits to public discussion of the intelligence services. A completely public system of accountability is incompatible with the very idea of a secret service. The Church Committee accepts that both the collection techniques and the human sources employed by the intelligence services must remain secrets of state. It follows that other information which might indirectly betray those sources and techniques must also be kept secret. But the cult of secrecy which still surrounds the British intelligence services goes far beyond what is desirable, what is necessary, far beyond even what is justifiable. The proposals of the Church Committee on public disclosure offer guidelines not merely for the United States but also for the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. The most ludicrous aspect of the British cult of secrecy is that it surrounds not merely the present but the past. Not to put too fine a point on it, the cult of secrecy is held to require a falsification of the historical record. None of the British official historians of the Second World War was allowed to make any reference to the activities of the codebreakers at Station X in Bletchley Park, even though those activities were sometimes of decisive importance. It seems probable, for example, that the defeat of the U-boats in the North Atlantic in 1942–43 was due chiefly to Bletchley's ability to pinpoint the position of the U-boat supply ships by decrypting German communications.[18]

The cult of secrecy extends further back in time than Bletchley. It extends right back to the origins of the modern intelligence services shortly before the First World War. Not merely are the past records of the intelligence services themselves kept secret. The proper functioning of the intelligence services is also held to require a limited bowdlerisation of even the earliest cabinet minutes available in the Public Record Office. The sceptical reader is invited to consult the entry on the ' Secret Service ' in the index to the cabinet minutes for the years immediately after the First World War. He will discover, at the appropriate point

[18] Peter Calvocoressi, ' The Value of Enigma ', *The Listener*, Feb. 3, 1977, pp. 135-36. Patrick Beesly, *Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939–1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977).

in the alphabet, simply a blank area from which even the heading 'Secret Service' has been removed.[19] The expurgation of the archives —or 'weeding' as it is playfully called in government circles—has been most extensive perhaps in the case of the interwar Foreign Office files.[20] Happily, enough intelligence material survives in a few unweeded collections of private manuscripts (such as the Lloyd George papers, preserved from the weeders by Beaverbrook's prompt purchase) to indicate at least the kind of documents which Whitehall believes that historians must not see.

It appears to be the intention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which probably bears most of the responsibility for the weeding of the interwar files, that historians should invent an interwar world in which British Foreign Secretaries did not read the intercepted telegrams of foreign governments and there was no organised British espionage network abroad (except, possibly, in the most hostile of foreign powers). But in the real interwar world, British Foreign Secretaries did have access to large numbers of intercepted diplomatic telegrams, and the SIS, at least in the 1920s, did organise espionage even in the United States.[21] To pretend otherwise is rather pointless. Such revelations may once have been considered mildly embarrassing. Now they are no longer even that. It is scarcely credible either that revelation of the intelligence records of the Second World War would put at risk the security of the United Kingdom and the Atlantic Alliance. The expurgation of the British official archive on behalf of the intelligence services is at least a mild affront to the liberal values to whose defence the intelligence services are committed.[22] Histories of the Soviet Union by Soviet historians are, by their suppression of embarrassing episodes, a source of legitimate mirth among British historians. Soviet historians are, however, entitled to at least a degree of levity

[19] See, for example, the Public Record Office index (no. 27766) to the Cabinet Conclusions for the period November 1919 to December 1921. Different filing methods make weeding of most later Cabinet records somewhat less conspicuous.

[20] The *methods* of the weeders have, however, grown more scrupulous over the years. Sensitive files for much of the interwar period were subjected to a silent censorship. Nowadays slips are inserted to record the removal of documents. It is probably also true that fewer files are withheld altogether than in the past. By a recent ministerial decision the intelligence records of the Whitehall government departments (though not of the intelligence services) are, in principle, to be made available under the thirty-year rule. There remains some doubt as to the interpretation of this principle. Many wartime files of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre are still withheld without explanation (Beesly, *op. cit.*, pp. 261–2).

[21] The main purpose of British espionage in the United States was 'to watch the development of preparations for chemical warfare'. On British interception of diplomatic telegrams, see Christopher Andrew, 'The Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet Relations in the 1920's', Part 1, forthcoming in *The Historical Journal*, Vol. XX, No. 3, 1977.

[22] That is not to say that there is no case at all for weeding. There will, for example, always be a case for withholding certain kinds of documents, such as census records, in order to protect the privacy of the living. But there is no general justification for withholding the records of the intelligence services.

when they read British accounts of, say, Anglo-Soviet relations between the wars which do not mention British espionage in the Soviet Union or British interception of Soviet communications.

**Reasons for the cult of secrecy**

There are, perhaps, three main reasons why the honourable and intelligent men who run the Cabinet Office, the FCO, the Defence Ministry, and the intelligence services, seek to preserve about their purposes, powers and budget a degree of secrecy which is both morally indefensible and contrary to the interests of the intelligence services themselves. The first is that all government bureaucracies, however honourable and intelligent the men who compose them, are doomed by an iron law of history to attach a grossly inflated importance to the confidentiality of their past as well as present business. As recently as 1959 Lord Hankey, Cabinet Secretary for more than twenty years and the very soul of official discretion, was threatened by Macmillan, at the instigation of Bridges and Norman Brook, with prosecution under the Official Secrets Act if he dared to publish extracts from his diary *for the First World War*.[23] The traditional intelligence service view of what constitutes an official secret was neatly summed up in the evidence given to the Franks Committee in 1971 by the then head of MI5: 'It is an official secret if it is in an official file.'[24]

The second reason for the excessive secrecy which surrounds the British intelligence services is the obsession with secrecy for its own sake—whether necessary or unnecessary—which almost all those engaged in intelligence work necessarily contract as a kind of occupational disease. Malcolm Muggeridge derived from his years in British intelligence the lesson that 'nothing should ever be done simply if there are devious ways of doing it': 'Secrecy is as essential to [British] intelligence as vestments and incense to a Mass, or darkness to a Spiritualist séance, and must at all costs be maintained, quite irrespective of whether or not it serves any purpose.' Philby bewildered his first wife by writing love letters on tissue paper to enable her to eat them. Why she might wish to eat them was never explained.[25]

A third reason for secrecy about intelligence activities is the eccentricity of international law. The interception of diplomatic messages is strictly forbidden by a series of international conventions. The interception of diplomatic messages is, however, one of the main activities of the NSA, of GCHQ Cheltenham, its English equivalent, and of similar *cabinets noirs* in all the major powers. This does not, of course, mean that there is anything wrong with the activities of NSA and

[23] S. Roskill, *Hankey, Man of Secrets*, Vol. III (London: Collins, 1974), pp. 613–19.
[24] *Franks Report*, Cmnd. 5104, Vol. III (London: HMSO, 1972), p. 249.
[25] M. Muggeridge, *Chronicles of Wasted Time*, Part II (London: Collins, 1973), pp. 122–3.

GCHQ: simply that, in this respect as in others, international law fails to reflect the realities of international relations.

The reasons advanced above for the obsessional secrecy which surrounds British intelligence do not, of course, represent an adequate justification for that secrecy. The future role and past record of the intelligence services require both public discussion and academic research for three reasons. They require it, first, to prevent the abuse of power. The creation of the Church Committee was a direct consequence of the discovery during the Watergate affair of very substantial abuse of power by the American intelligence community. I do not suggest that the cupboards of British intelligence contain any recent skeletons of comparable size. The little that is known of its activities since the Second World War suggests the opposite. Power, however, still corrupts, and unchecked power is always in the end abused. Indeed the prewar history of the intelligence services provides a number of examples of distinctly unconstitutional behaviour, though in at least one instance (the SIS's relations with Churchill) we have reason to be grateful for it. Even today the falsification of the historical record on behalf of the intelligence services represents a minor but still deplorable abuse of power. Nor am I persuaded that the case for the indiscriminate vetting of foreign telegrams by GCHQ—never approved by parliament and traditionally concealed from the public though not from foreign governments—is much stronger than the case for, say, the indiscriminate vetting of foreign telephone calls. That kind of criticism is, of course, traditionally regarded in Whitehall as hopelessly naïve, if not inherently subversive. Among the latest MPs to complain about the exaggerated use of message interception is, however, Ronald Bell QC, whose awareness of the Red Peril is well up to traditional right-wing standards.

The lack of a proper and publicly acknowledged system of accountability for the intelligence services inevitably lends itself, at least potentially, to the abuse of power. The comment of the 1963 Denning report on MI5 applies equally to the other main branches of British intelligence: 'The Security Service in this country is not established by Statute nor is it recognised by Common Law. Even the Official Secrets Acts do not acknowledge its existence.' Neither the objectives of the intelligence services nor their past record are debated, even in the broadest terms, in parliament either on the floor of the House or in committee. By tradition they are not even discussed by the whole cabinet, but tend to become the preserve of a few senior ministers. At present the government view appears to be that neither the system of accountability to which the intelligence service is subject nor the justification for that system can be made public even to parliament. It

when they read British accounts of, say, Anglo-Soviet relations between the wars which do not mention British espionage in the Soviet Union or British interception of Soviet communications.

**Reasons for the cult of secrecy**

There are, perhaps, three main reasons why the honourable and intelligent men who run the Cabinet Office, the FCO, the Defence Ministry, and the intelligence services, seek to preserve about their purposes, powers and budget a degree of secrecy which is both morally indefensible and contrary to the interests of the intelligence services themselves. The first is that all government bureaucracies, however honourable and intelligent the men who compose them, are doomed by an iron law of history to attach a grossly inflated importance to the confidentiality of their past as well as present business. As recently as 1959 Lord Hankey, Cabinet Secretary for more than twenty years and the very soul of official discretion, was threatened by Macmillan, at the instigation of Bridges and Norman Brook, with prosecution under the Official Secrets Act if he dared to publish extracts from his diary *for the First World War*.[23] The traditional intelligence service view of what constitutes an official secret was neatly summed up in the evidence given to the Franks Committee in 1971 by the then head of MI5: 'It is an official secret if it is in an official file.'[24]

The second reason for the excessive secrecy which surrounds the British intelligence services is the obsession with secrecy for its own sake—whether necessary or unnecessary—which almost all those engaged in intelligence work necessarily contract as a kind of occupational disease. Malcolm Muggeridge derived from his years in British intelligence the lesson that ' nothing should ever be done simply if there are devious ways of doing it ': 'Secrecy is as essential to [British] intelligence as vestments and incense to a Mass, or darkness to a Spiritualist séance, and must at all costs be maintained, quite irrespective of whether or not it serves any purpose.' Philby bewildered his first wife by writing love letters on tissue paper to enable her to eat them. Why she might wish to eat them was never explained.[25]

A third reason for secrecy about intelligence activities is the eccentricity of international law. The interception of diplomatic messages is strictly forbidden by a series of international conventions. The interception of diplomatic messages is, however, one of the main activities of the NSA, of GCHQ Cheltenham, its English equivalent, and of similar *cabinets noirs* in all the major powers. This does not, of course, mean that there is anything wrong with the activities of NSA and

[23] S. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, Vol. III (London: Collins, 1974), pp. 613–19.
[24] *Franks Report*, Cmnd. 5104, Vol. III (London: HMSO, 1972), p. 249.
[25] M. Muggeridge, *Chronicles of Wasted Time*, Part II (London: Collins, 1973), pp. 122–3.

GCHQ: simply that, in this respect as in others, international law fails to reflect the realities of international relations.

The reasons advanced above for the obsessional secrecy which surrounds British intelligence do not, of course, represent an adequate justification for that secrecy. The future role and past record of the intelligence services require both public discussion and academic research for three reasons. They require it, first, to prevent the abuse of power. The creation of the Church Committee was a direct consequence of the discovery during the Watergate affair of very substantial abuse of power by the American intelligence community. I do not suggest that the cupboards of British intelligence contain any recent skeletons of comparable size. The little that is known of its activities since the Second World War suggests the opposite. Power, however, still corrupts, and unchecked power is always in the end abused. Indeed the prewar history of the intelligence services provides a number of examples of distinctly unconstitutional behaviour, though in at least one instance (the SIS's relations with Churchill) we have reason to be grateful for it. Even today the falsification of the historical record on behalf of the intelligence services represents a minor but still deplorable abuse of power. Nor am I persuaded that the case for the indiscriminate vetting of foreign telegrams by GCHQ—never approved by parliament and traditionally concealed from the public though not from foreign governments—is much stronger than the case for, say, the indiscriminate vetting of foreign telephone calls. That kind of criticism is, of course, traditionally regarded in Whitehall as hopelessly naïve, if not inherently subversive. Among the latest MPs to complain about the exaggerated use of message interception is, however, Ronald Bell QC, whose awareness of the Red Peril is well up to traditional right-wing standards.

The lack of a proper and publicly acknowledged system of accountability for the intelligence services inevitably lends itself, at least potentially, to the abuse of power. The comment of the 1963 Denning report on MI5 applies equally to the other main branches of British intelligence: 'The Security Service in this country is not established by Statute nor is it recognised by Common Law. Even the Official Secrets Acts do not acknowledge its existence.' Neither the objectives of the intelligence services nor their past record are debated, even in the broadest terms, in parliament either on the floor of the House or in committee. By tradition they are not even discussed by the whole cabinet, but tend to become the preserve of a few senior ministers. At present the government view appears to be that neither the system of accountability to which the intelligence service is subject nor the justification for that system can be made public even to parliament. It

is doubtful whether this view represents a deeply considered position. It is probably no more than an inherited attitude, but it is none the less tenaciously held. The Church Committee proposes both new legislation to define the role of the intelligence community and at least annual review by Congressional committee. These proposals deserve consideration on this side of the Atlantic as well. They ought not to be—as they appear to be at present—beyond the competence or inclination of parliament even to consider.

The second reason why the role of the intelligence services requires public discussion is so that the public may realise that they are actually necessary. To quote the Church Committee once again: 'This disclosure process is an important step toward achieving the national consensus required if our intelligence system is to enjoy essential public support'.[26] The British government has yet to realise that, so far as its defence policy is concerned, public discussion *is* an inevitable condition of public support. It believes that Nato and a large defence budget are necessary to the defence of the West, but it makes only the most perfunctory attempt to explain why. It believes that the intelligence services are vital to national security, but it attempts to inhibit public discussion altogether.

And yet the growth of international terrorism during the last quarter of the twentieth century will make public support for the intelligence services absolutely essential. As the dreadful day of the terrorist with a nuclear device in his suitcase draws gradually and inevitably closer intelligence surveillance of potential terrorist groups will have to be increased. And it is essential that that increased surveillance should have the support of an informed public opinion. The deliberate attempt at present to keep public opinion as *un*informed as possible undermines public support for the intelligence services in two deplorable ways. First, it encourages a majority of the public to regard intelligence work as trivial rather than essential, as a relic of the by-gone age of the Orient Express. Second, among those of a radical—and sometimes only mildly radical—disposition, it encourages the view of the intelligence services as a sinister conspiracy designed to undermine, rather than to preserve, civil liberties. That conspiracy theory, recently raised to remarkable dimensions in Tony Bunyan's *The Political Police in Britain*,[27] is growing visibly in popularity. The present fashion for 'participation' and 'open government', whether desirable or not, is not in the short term reversible. The only alternative to a public informed about the intelligence services is a public misinformed about and suspicious of them.

[26] Senate, *Final Report*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 14.
[27] London: Friedmann, 1976.

Third, the intelligence services, like all other branches of government, require the stimulus of external criticism of at least their past record to keep themselves efficient. The obvious lesson of history is that all intelligence services, if left to their own devices, spend too great a proportion of their resources on intelligence collection and too little on analysis.[28] There is no reason to suppose that the other intelligence services of the Atlantic Alliance have learned this lesson very much more successfully than the American. They have not learned this lesson because they do not know their own history. And they do not know their own history because they have prevented that history from being written. At least one of the reasons for the preparation of extensive British official histories of both World Wars has been to ensure that the lessons of experience were learned. But an official history of British intelligence during the Second World War, even for use within the government, was not commissioned until a quarter of a century after the war was over. By keeping itself in a state of dismal ignorance about its past use of secret intelligence, the government has needlessly deprived itself of the lessons of experience. It has a simple solution readily to hand. Let it open its archives.

There is, of course, not the slightest chance that the British government will ever willingly make possible either academic research on the past record of the intelligence services or public debate on their future role, any more than, say, some Oxbridge colleges will ever willingly agree to admit women. In both cases traditional prejudices are so deeply ingrained as to be invulnerable to rational argument. Both the government and Oxbridge, however, will be forced reluctantly into the twentieth century by the examples of others: male Oxbridge colleges by the example of mixed Oxbridge colleges, the British government by the American example. What will force the hand of the British government will be the example of the Carter administration.

President Carter has—not surprisingly—discovered since taking office that the public disclosure of intelligence activities is a more complex problem than it appeared to be during his election campaign. He announced at his second press conference: 'I have adopted a policy, which I am not going to leave, of not commenting directly on any specific CIA activity.'[29] Like his predecessor, President Carter is now anxious to stem the continuing haemorrhage of classified information provoked by the scandals of the Nixon era. But the broad lines of the new administration's policy on the intelligence community have not

[28] See, for example, Christopher Andrew, 'Déchiffrement et diplomatie: le cabinet noir du quai d'Orsay sous la Troisième République', *Relations Internationales*, Vol. III, No. 5, 1976.

[29] Presidential press conference no. 2, Feb. 23, 1977 (USIS, Feb. 24, 1977).

changed. It accepts the need for an informed public opinion and for a system of congressional as well as executive supervision.

The American intelligence community is now accountable both to the Intelligence Oversight Board, appointed last year by President Ford, and to the Select Intelligence Committee of the Senate. To both committees President Carter has promised 'complete access to any operation conducted by the intelligence forces'.[30] On the question of public disclosure, the new Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Turner, has promised 'a serious and continuing effort to avoid over-classification of information and even [to] attempt selectively to publish unclassified information which is of high interest and value to our citizens'.[31] The publication of the CIA world energy report on April 18 this year is one example of that policy. After Admiral Turner's evidence to the Senate Intelligence Committee on April 27, the United States now seems likely to become the first nation in the world to reveal its total intelligence budget.

The attempt to draw what Vice-President Mondale has called 'that terribly difficult line between security and liberties' is bound to provoke some disagreement among those who try to draw it. Moderate positions are necessarily more difficult to define than extreme positions. A middle way between the extremes of total disclosure and almost total non-disclosure, represented respectively by *Time Out* and by Whitehall, is none the less emerging in Washington. It is idle to suppose that its emergence will have no repercussions in Whitehall. The British parliament and public will sooner or later claim the same freedom of information as their American counterparts. And under the Carter administration it may even be sooner rather than later.

[30] Presidential press conference no. 3, March 9, 1977 (USIS, March 10, 1977). Six committees of the House of Representatives (a number President Carter is anxious to reduce) concern themselves, inter alia, with various aspects of intelligence activities. But the House has not yet followed the Senate in establishing an intelligence oversight committee.

[31] *Congressional Quarterly*, Feb. 26, 1977, p. 350.

# THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN COMMUNISTS

*R. E. M. Irving*

WITH the Italian Communists partially in power—Giulio Andreotti's Christian Democratic government being dependent on their benevolent neutrality—and the French Communists poised to participate in a Popular Front government if the combined Left—the Socialist Party (PS) plus the Communist Party (PCF)—wins the forthcoming general election (due by March 1978), it is appropriate to compare and contrast the European policies of the two major Communist parties of the European Community. What exactly is their attitude to integration, and where does integration come on their list of priorities? How seriously should one take the apparent enthusiasm of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) for 'Europeanism' and the PCF's apparent devotion to 'Gaullist' nationalism? Are we perhaps about to see the emergence of a powerful 'Euro-communist' bloc in the European Parliament when (or perhaps one should say *if*) that body is directly elected in 1978? And if such a bloc were to emerge, what would it mean for the European Community in particular and for international relations in general? Would a 'Euro-communist' bloc, or even loose alliance, be more likely to be a factor for stability, strengthening the democratic and social-reforming aspects of the Community, or would it perhaps be a de-stabilising element, upsetting the Soviet Union by encouraging demands for Dubcek-like liberalisation in Eastern Europe, whilst at the same time weakening the Western Alliance by encouraging Mansfield-type demands for reduced American commitment to Nato? Crystal-ball gazing is not the objective of this article, but an examination of the nature of the Italian and French Communist parties, together with their past pronouncements on European integration, can provide some clues as to their likely future political orientation in this area of foreign policy.

It is important to say something first about the nature and recent evolution of the PCI and PCF, because their European policy can only be understood in the specific context of political developments in Italy and France and in the general context of changes in the international system. Two factors would seem to be of particular importance. First, the Italian and French Communists both now claim to have a 'vocation for government': they have moved a long way from the negative

opposition characteristic of the Stalin period of the cold war; they now state that their objective is to change society (in company with like-minded parties) by parliamentary means, and to respect the decisions of their electorates both before—and, more important, after—they come to power. In order to pursue this parliamentary path to power, both parties have inevitably had to face up to the realities of the political situation in their own countries and in Western Europe as a whole, and to renounce the purely obstructionist tactics characteristic of their ghetto period.

The second factor of importance is that in an era of detente between the super-powers and of polycentrism—or at least quasi-polycentrism—in the Communist world, it has been possible for the PCI and PCF to develop their own roads to socialism without at the same time denying their birthright, i.e. their broad commitment to 'proletarian internationalism' and to Communist ideology. It is true that this attempt to ride two horses simultaneously has resulted in contradictory foreign policy statements and has periodically strained relations between the Kremlin and the Italian and French Communist parties, but the present balancing act would have been inconceivable had the Communist world remained monolithic. The Communist church, however, now has two popes and several cardinals, and the important question as far as this article is concerned is how far the French and Italian cardinals are prepared to go in the development of their national churches. There is considerable evidence that whilst neither Enrico Berlinguer, the PCI's Secretary-General, nor Georges Marchais, the PCF's Secretary-General, has any wish to cast himself in the role of a Luther, both—especially Berlinguer—are determined to adapt their parties' policies to the political circumstances of present-day Western Europe, realising that the social and economic climate in which they are operating is very different from that of Russia in 1917 or of Eastern Europe in 1945–48.

**The 'Italian road to socialism'**

The PCI is the largest and most powerful Communist party in the non-Communist world: it has 1·8 million members, polled 12·6 million votes at the general election of June 1976, and has increased its percentage of the vote at every election since the war (its largest gain being from 27·2 per cent in 1972 to 34·4 per cent in 1976).[1] But perhaps the most important thing about the party is that it is very *Italian*. The spiritual father of the PCI may be Marx, but its matrix is the political and social culture of Italy, and the essence of that culture is *trasformismo*, defined by one recent commentator on Italian politics as 'the mutual penetration

[1] For a detailed analysis of the 1976 election, see M. Clark and R. E. M. Irving, 'The Italian General Election of June 1976', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 1976–77, pp. 7–31.

of disparate and even opposing positions. . . . [*trasformismo*] blurs distinctions between politicians and their views, . . . defuses conflicts, discourages fanaticism and brings issues down to human levels, prevents exaggeration and makes compromises possible '.[2] In other words, purist, black-and-white political solutions are alien to Italian political culture, or, to put it another way, the traditional political concepts of Left and Right have limited value as tools with which to analyse the Italian party system. Doubtless, in part, this unique system is an historical and religious legacy: Italians have suffered many invasions over the centuries and have learned to compromise for the sake of survival, and at the same time the Roman Catholic Church has imbued its followers with a ' pessimistic ' view of life in this world, where no perfect solutions can be expected from those ' born in sin '. Thus compromises and coalitions, the intermeshing of cultures and traditions, and a general tendency to blur the distinction between political expediency and political morality, are all characteristics of the Italian political system.

These aspects of Italian political and social culture were absorbed by the PCI from the start, and there are now clear signs that they in turn are affecting the nature of the PCI. The party's first leader and greatest theoretician, Antonio Gramsci, realised that—at least in the short term —some sort of compromise would have to be made with Catholicism if the Communists were going to come to power. His successor, Palmiro Togliatti, agreed to the Lateran Pacts (which give the Catholic Church a privileged position in Italy, particularly in education) being written into the Republican Constitution of 1948. And since October 1973 the official objective of the PCI has been the *Compromesso Storico* (' historic compromise '), defined by the present Secretary-General of the party as ' an understanding, a political alliance, between Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats and other anti-Fascist popular forces both of Catholic origin and of lay and democratic tradition, in order to give the government of the country a wider basis of consent and the strength and authority needed to overcome the crisis and enable Italy to make progress '. In other words, pragmatism, not ideological purity, lies at the heart of PCI thinking, and has done so for most of its history. This pragmatism has been as characteristic of the party's foreign as of its domestic policy, and is of particular relevance to its European policy; indeed, the PCI's outright opposition to the Atlantic Alliance and European integration in the decade 1948–58 now appears as an aberration from its general tendency to view almost all problems in an essentially pragmatic way.

Another characteristic of the PCI, which has considerable bearing on its foreign policy, is its commitment to pluralism. It is true that critics

[2] Hansjakob Stehle, ' The Italian experiment and the Communists ', *The World Today*, Vol. 33, No. 1, Jan. 1977, p. 12.

of the party have rightly observed that there is very little internal democracy in it, but the party's willingness to debate issues relatively openly (for a Communist party) goes back to Gramsci and *Ordine Nuove*,[3] was encouraged—especially in his later years—by Togliatti, and continues today in the party's theoretical journal *Rinascita*, and to a lesser extent in its daily newspaper *L'Unità*. Two quotations by the party's last two Secretaries will suffice to illustrate this point. In 1969 Luigi Longo, regarded by many as a rather hardline traditionalist, told the twelfth Congress of the PCI that the objective of Italian Communists was 'a pluralist society based on popular consent; . . . a decentralized, non-bureaucratic society, where there will be freedom of religion, culture, science and art; freedom of expression and information, and the free circulation of ideas. These will be the characteristics of Italian socialism, flourishing amidst a plurality of parties and social organizations, being very different from socialism as developed up to now. Italian socialism will correspond to the traditions and will of our people'. All this is a far cry from the centralised, bureaucratic state socialism characteristic of the Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe, but of course the credibility of such a position is open to question.

The PCI's commitment to pluralism has, however, a fairly long history, and indicates that the party has abandoned the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (implicit within which is the idea that the party leadership always knows best). The party's commitment to pluralism also suggests that it believes that a socialist —and ultimately communist—society can be achieved by winning its battles in the market-place of ideas, rather than by violent revolution or simply because communism is an 'inevitable' historical development. This commitment, of course, makes the PCI look very much like a northern European Social Democratic party, but Berlinguer has recently denied that this is so. In his view the party is Communist because it goes beyond the 'reformism' of Social Democratic parties: 'It is our task to make *real* changes step by step in the economic and social structure of the country until we have *radically* changed the ruling class [my emphases] . . . This transformation must take place in full freedom and democracy, within the framework of the Republic's constitutional principles and norms, with respect for and stress on autonomy and pluralism and with the constant participation of the people'.[4]

These comments on the PCI inevitably amount to a rather shorthand

[3] For a recent analysis of the ideas of Gramsci and the early years of the PCI, see Martin Clark, *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution that Failed* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1977).

[4] Speech made at mass PCI rally in Naples, Sept. 19, 1976; cited by Stehle in *The World Today*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

analysis of the nature of the party,[5] but in the context of the PCI's foreign policy it is important to emphasise that we are dealing with a party which has a fairly long and consistent record of commitment to pluralism and to a specifically Italian road to socialism; and with a party which has frequently stressed the need to accommodate itself to the cultural and religious traditions of Italy and of Western Europe as a whole. Berlinguer's proposals for a ' historic compromise ' with Italian Catholics and for the gradual achievement of a democratic, socialist, integrated community of European nations should, therefore, be regarded, not as a sudden volte-face, but as the logical outcome of long-term developments in Italian Communism.

**' Communism in French colours '**

The French Communist Party, on the other hand, is a much more recent convert to the tenets of Euro-communism, and in view of its many recent—not to mention past—tergiversations there is good reason to judge its domestic and foreign policies with more scepticism, or at least caution, than those of the PCI. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the PCF has changed its policies considerably in the last few years. In the aftermath of the Presidential election of 1974 the French Communists went through a period of severely strained relations with François Mitterrand's Socialist Party, but the Communists now seem determined to pursue their Popular Front strategy after all, and one consequence of this is that they have had to make some concessions to the Socialists. On the issues of pluralism and human rights, for example, the PCF, after back-tracking from its original condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, has recently been even more critical of Soviet and East European practices than the PCI. However, there is no doubt that the PCF is even more rigidly and undemocratically organised than the PCI, and as a result the PCF leadership can make quite dramatic changes in policy at short notice. Certainly, on past evidence, its foreign policy is more likely to change quite suddenly than that of the PCI.

The French Communist Party is well organised: 400,000 members are organised in a rigid vertical structure controlled by a self-perpetuating central bureaucracy, headed by a 17-man Politburo and five-man Secretariat, with Georges Marchais at the top of the pyramid. It is also electorally important, having polled one quarter to one fifth of the votes at all general elections since the war. But it remained in a political ghetto from 1947, when the Communists were evicted from the govern-

[5] For more detailed discussion, see two recent studies, Neil McInnes, *The Communist Parties of Western Europe* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1975), and Donald Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., *Communism in Italy and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

ment as the cold war gelled, to 1965, when they joined the Socialists to vote for Mitterrand in the Presidential election. The alliance prospered at the general elections of 1967 and 1973 (there was an electoral pact at the former, and an electoral pact and Common Programme at the latter), and in 1974 the Popular Front parties came within an ace of returning Mitterrand rather than Giscard d'Estaing to the Elysée.[6] And yet many non-Communist voters of the Left continued to distrust the PCF, finding it hard to believe that this once most Kremlin-bound of Communist parties could really have changed its coat and become to France what the PCI is to Italy. In March 1977, however, an important change occurred, for at the municipal elections the Socialists voted with almost as much discipline at the second ballot for Communists as Communists have for a decade voted for Socialists. The PCF had apparently at last come in from the cold, and if the French electorate were to vote in a comparable manner at the next general election, the Communists would find themselves in government—admittedly in coalition with the more powerful Socialists—for the first time since 1947. It is, therefore, appropriate to ask how far the PCF really has changed, and, if it has, in what ways the changes are likely to affect its foreign policy.

In the first place, the PCF now seems firmly committed to governing in alliance with the Socialists, and this means that it will almost certainly be prepared to modify its foreign policy to bring it more in line with that of the Socialist Party.[7] One caveat about the alliance should, however, be mentioned. As recently as May 1974, i.e., immediately after the near-success of the Union of the Left at the Presidential election, the PCF suddenly launched its campaign for a *front national,* the objective of which was to bring Gaullists and 'other patriots' into alliance with the Union of the Left on an anti-Atlanticist (i.e., anti-American) platform.[8] The Socialists feared that such a *rassemblement* would swamp the Union of the Left; the Gaullists showed no interest in the proposal; and the Russians did not like it either, suspecting that a revival of anti-American chauvinism in France would upset detente. Moreover, the electorate appeared to reject it, as Communist candidates lost ground to Socialists at the important by-elections of September 1974. In October 1974 the PCF dropped its proposal for a *front national* as abruptly as it had embraced it, and embarked instead on six months of vituperation against the Socialist Party. The only reasonable explanation

[6] See Jack Hayward and Vincent Wright, '"Les deux France" and the French Presidential Election of May 1974', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 3, Summer 1974, pp. 208–36.

[7] View expressed, for example, by Professor Serge Hurtig of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques on BBC, March 21, 1977.

[8] For details about this stratagem, see N. McInnes, *Euro-Communism* (Beverly Hills, London: Sage, 1977), pp. 31–33.

for both campaigns seems to be that the Communists, realising they were losing ground to the Socialists, were determined to reassert their predominance on the Left either within the framework of a large, ill-defined *front national* or by emphasising their distinctiveness vis-à-vis the Socialists by attacking them. In the event both stratagems failed, and the PCF resorted to co-operating, albeit sullenly at times, with the Socialists, realising that the only way to power was in co-operation with the non-Communist Left. The important point to note is that unexpected shifts in policy can still be made by the PCF leadership without apparently upsetting the party's rank and file. What has happened before can doubtless happen again, because, although the PCF dropped the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (Marx's euphemism for the dictatorship of the party leadership) in February 1976, there is no doubt that Marchais and his hand-picked *apparatchiki* have retained firm control over the party and its policies. This suggests that, although the PCF's European (or any other) policy is liable to be somewhat volatile, there is at least considerable scope for flexibility: it now seems certain, for example, that the Communists will defer to the Socialists over direct elections to the European Parliament.[9]

One area in which the PCF has changed significantly, and apparently decisively, in recent years has been over human rights, and this change is important because it marks a clear-cut shift towards a Euro-communist position, i.e., the PCF has shown that it is willing to take an 'independent' Communist line even at the cost of incurring the Kremlin's displeasure. A decade ago this would have been unthinkable, and even as recently as 1975 there were doubts about the extent to which the PCF was really prepared to distance itself from the Kremlin for the sake of pursuing its own electoral interests in France. The French Communists were certainly much more slow to criticise Stalinism than were the Italians, and in the early 1960s reacted hesitantly to growing divisions in the Communist world, of which the Sino-Soviet dispute was the most obvious manifestation. The French Communists were too loyal to the memory of Stalin ever to publish Khrushchev's secret report of 1956, cataloguing the Soviet dictator's crimes, and when reference was made to the report it was always in the context of a chapter which was closed, a strange aberration in Soviet history now confined to the past.

The PCF made a major break with its tradition of loyalty to Moscow for the first time in 1968, when it condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but, unlike the PCI, it refused to condemn the repression which occurred in the subsequent period of 'normalisation'. In 1974 the French Communists openly condemned the banishment of

[9] See below, p. 419.

Solzhenitsyn, but refused to join the Italians and Spaniards in a joint West European Communist criticism of Soviet policy towards intellectuals in general. By 1976, however, the PCF appeared to have finally broken with its Stalinist past. It openly criticised abuses of power in the Soviet Union on several occasions late in 1975 and early in 1976, particularly over the detention of the Russian mathematician, Plyouch, in a psychiatric hospital. In November 1975 Marchais joined Berlinguer in issuing a joint statement pledging the French and Italian Communist parties to respect 'liberty of thought and expression, of the press, of meeting and association, the right to demonstrate, the free movement of persons inside and outside their country, the inviolability of private life, of religious liberties, and the total freedom of expression of currents of thought and of every philosophical, cultural and artistic opinion'. The statement concluded: 'The French and Italian Communists favour the plurality of political parties, the right of opposition parties to exist and to put forward their case, the free formation of majorities and minorities and the possibility of their alternating democratically, the lay character and democratic functioning of the State and the independence of justice.' [10]

Then at their National Congress in February 1976 the French Communists deleted the phrase 'dictatorship of the proletariat' from their party statutes.[11] This was an important decision, because the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was Marx's way of saying that once a Communist party was in power it would not voluntarily leave it, or at least not until a fully Communist society had been established, at which point, Lenin claimed, the organs of state would 'wither away', having become obsolete in a society without conflicts. Here again Marchais was taking an important step towards the Euro-communist ideas of the Italian and Spanish Communist parties. Marchais elaborated his commitment to a pluralist party system by stating that 'at every stage the political majority and arithmetical majority must coincide'.[12] This statement was made in the context of discussion of the Portuguese revolution, and amounted to a condemnation of Alvaro Cunhal's 'Stalinist' Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). At the Portuguese elections of April 1975, Cunhal's PCP won only 12·5 per cent of the votes, and on this slender basis the PCP claimed that it had a right to 'lead the revolution'. The Portuguese Prime Minister, Brigadier Vasco Goncalves, was known to be sympathetic to the ideals of the Communist Party, and a minority of Communists managed to occupy important positions in the government, media and universities. This attempted Leninist-style infiltration of the

[10] *The Times*, Nov. 19, 1976.
[11] *Le Monde*, Feb. 5, 1976.
[12] *Ibid.*

key positions of government collapsed in October. As regards the PCF's attitude, it can only be said that the party sat on the fence throughout 1975, while the Italian and Spanish Communists, like the Socialists throughout Western Europe, condemned the Portuguese Communists for their attempt to seize power and 'lead the revolution' from a minority position. Cunhal had, of course, been supported by Moscow, so that when Marchais recanted and condemned the Portuguese Communists in February 1976, he was in effect criticising the Soviet leadership. Moreover, in the same month the Communist daily, *L'Humanité*, published a series of articles criticising the Soviet Union for its refusal to respect basic human rights in spite of the Helsinki Agreement of August 1975.[13] Then, in June 1976 at the pan-European Communist conference in East Berlin, Marchais declared his commitment to 'profoundly democratic socialism', including freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of creation and publication, freedom of assembly and association, and the right to strike.[14] The inclusion of the right to strike was significant, as it was omitted in the PCF's *déclaration des libertés* of May 1975.[15]

It seems clear that the PCF has—at least for the time being—adopted an Italian-style 'independent' posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and if this continues to be the case, the party may well follow the Italian Communists in adopting a more flexible, pragmatic attitude to developments in the European Community.

## The European policy of the PCI and PCF

The Italian and French Communists, like their Soviet comrades, at first totally opposed the setting up of the European Community, which they saw essentially as the 'economic base' of the Western Alliance. If the EEC was successful, they contended, it would merely strengthen capitalism and Nato, and so increase East-West tension and perpetuate the division of Europe into blocs. But within five years of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 the PCI began to change its attitude to the European Community, arguing that the economic integration of Western Europe was an irreversible development, and that the task of the Communists was to control that development by ensuring that the Community evolved as a powerful, democratic and socialist organisation. In the 1970s the Italian Communists have increasingly argued that in an age of internationally integrated (or at least interdependent) economies socialism cannot be built in one country, but must be established transnationally—in the first instance at the regional level through organisations such as the European Community. In other words, the PCI

13 McInnes, *Euro-Communism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–17.
14 *L'Humanité*, July 1, 1976.
15 See *Le Monde*, May 17, 1975, for the full text of the *déclaration*.

argues that the 'Italian road to socialism'—the party's much-quoted slogan—makes sense only in the context of a 'European road to socialism'. In contrast, the French Communists have adopted a much more nationalistic and critical attitude to the Community: unlike the Italians, for example, they opposed the entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC and until recently were adamantly against direct elections to the European Parliament. However, in practice, the PCF has begun to modify its hard-line opposition to the Community.

As regards the PCI, the turning point in its attitude to the EEC occurred in 1962 for the very practical reason that Italy's 'economic miracle' was at its zenith in the years 1957–62, and it was impossible for the Communists to deny that the new markets open to Italian refrigerators, washing-machines and motor-cars had had something to do with the country's rapid economic development. Giorgio Amendola, one of the party's chief spokesmen on European affairs and now president of the Communist group in the European Parliament, stated at a conference on Italian capitalism in March 1962 that:

> Our attitude of criticism of the EEC, although a politically responsible one, was accompanied by an erroneous overestimation of the economic difficulty which would have followed the application of the Community regulations and by an underestimation of the new possibilities for the expansion of the Italian economy which arose out of the initial formation of a European Market. In fact it is in the interests of the working class to favour an economic development which will allow the Italian economy to acquire competitive capabilities in the international market. Technical progress and the modernisation of the Italian economy are exigencies which must be supported in the context of a policy of democratic development and not of preservation of the backward positions of minor groups of the Italian bourgeoisie. Inevitably the EEC contributes to the processes of capitalist centralisation and concentration, causes crises of readjustment, and sweeps away concerns which are working on excessively high unit costs. But all this necessitates the development, on the part of the working class, of a 'European' struggle, in full agreement with the working forces of the other EEC countries against the monopolistic forces which control the executive organs of the EEC.[16]

This statement has been worth quoting at some length, because it

[16] G. Amendola, *Lotta di classe e sviluppo economico dopo la liberazione* (Rome: Riuniti, 1962), p. 86; cited by Donald Sassoon, 'The Italian Communist Party's European Strategy', *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 3, July–Sept. 1976, p. 255. (Translation slightly amended.) I am indebted to Sassoon's article for much of the analysis contained in the next five paragraphs.

contains the essence of the PCI's analysis of, and attitude to, the European Community since that time: in effect, Amendola sees economic integration as an inevitable and irreversible development, and therefore the problem is how to turn it to the advantage of the working class, how to ensure that the means of production are controlled by the mass of the people so that a socialist society can be developed in Western Europe.

This endorsement of the European Community—albeit a Community which would have to be changed in the interests of the working-class—marked a decisive break with the Soviet line. Moreover it was supported at the tenth Congress of the PCI in December 1962, and by the Communist-controlled CGIL trade union confederation, and, more important, by Togliatti in his famous last will and testament, the Yalta Memorandum of August 1964. In that document Togliatti laid great emphasis on the theme of 'unity in diversity' within the Communist movement: while condemning the traditional form of unity based on expulsions from a monolithic movement, he emphasised the need for bilateral and multilateral contacts between the various Communist parties as they moved towards socialism in their own countries, but he also emphasised the need for the development of *regional* Communist groupings, mentioning as examples Western Europe and Latin America. Here, in effect, was Togliatti calling for a Euro-communist grouping, and it was clear from the context of his remarks that he envisaged this grouping developing within the countries of the Common Market in the first instance.

Over the next decade the PCI's foreign policy spokesmen, Giorgio Amendola, Gian Carlo Pajetta, Sergio Segre and Ugo Pecchioli, developed what amounted to a strategy for Europe based, first, on the concept of a 'phasing out of the blocs', leading in the distant future to some form of total rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe, and, secondly—and this aspect of the strategy is much more immediate—the development of close co-operation between West European Communist parties to ensure that the EEC evolves as a democratic and socialist Community.

The first part of the strategy, i.e. the 'phasing out of the blocs', inevitably brought the PCI face to face with the problem of the Atlantic Alliance. The official policy of the party until late in 1974 was based on the slogan, 'Italy out of Nato; Nato out of Italy', but as early as 1969 Luigi Longo, then Secretary-General of the PCI, had stated at the party's twelfth Congress that the unilateral dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance was not the party's aim, as this would prejudice detente by introducing a period of instability. From 1972 onwards Berlinguer frequently stated that the PCI was neither against the United States, nor against the Soviet Union, but merely *for* detente and the gradual

dissolution of the bloc system. Finally, in an important statement in December 1974, Berlinguer announced that the PCI would not demand the withdrawal of Italy from Nato if the party came to power: 'Insofar as Italy is concerned we do not pose as a precondition the problem of the withdrawal of Italy from the Atlantic Alliance . . . We believe that the Italian government must not propose to undertake a unilateral action which would alter the military strategic equilibrium between the Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Pact'.[17] This commitment has since been reaffirmed on various occasions by Berlinguer, Amendola and Napolitano.[18] However, doubts understandably remain as to the meaning of the commitment. The likelihood is that if the Communists were in a full coalition with the Christian Democrats they would use all their influence to reduce Italy's defence expenditure, and in April 1977 Lombardo Radice, a senior member of the PCI central committee, refused to entertain the possibility that the Warsaw Pact could ever attack Nato and argued that any war between the Soviet Union and Italy was therefore out of the question. If, on the other hand, Nato attacked the Warsaw Pact, the PCI would support the Soviet Union.[19] This evasive reply about the meaning of the PCI's commitment to Nato exactly reflected the attitude taken by Gian Carlo Pajetta in a similar interview in May 1976.[20] Berlinguer, however, has hinted that membership of Nato will help the PCI to pursue its particular version of socialism without risking Soviet intervention.[21]

However, the second part of the Italian Communists' European strategy, their commitment to a democratic and socialist European Community, has not been hedged about with evasiveness. Spokesmen such as Silvio Leonardi, one of the PCI's experts on the EEC and a member of the European Parliament, have argued that the EEC has suffered from developing so far only as a 'negative' customs union. This development has benefited the large multinational corporations and has led to the concentration of capital in certain parts of Europe, but what is now needed is 'positive' integration, i.e. the development of regional, social, transport and energy policies, all of which (except transport) are of crucial importance to Italy. However, if such common policies are to be developed—and the PCI increasingly emphasises that they must be if the Community is to develop in a socialist direction[22] —it is essential for the Community to have powerful institutions which

[17] Berlinguer Report to thirteenth Congress of PCI.
[18] E.g. *La Stampa*, Feb. 1 and 5, 1976; *Corriere della Sera*, June 10, 1976.
[19] *The Times*, April 2, 1977, and *Encounter*, May 1977, Vol. 48, No. 5.
[20] *Corriere della Sera*, May 30, 1976.
[21] *Corriere della Sera*, May 15, 1976; view repeated on TV on same day.
[22] Indeed, party spokesmen now seem to regard it as self-evident that an Italian advance to socialism is only a real possibility in the European context; *cf.* Alfredo Reichlin in *Rinascita*, July 25, 1975, and Giorgio Napolitano in *La Politique du Parti Communiste Italien* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976), pp. 83–87.

are answerable to the European electorate. Hence the PCI's strong and repeated emphasis on the need for direct elections to the European Parliament. As early as 1969 Silvio Leonardi called for direct elections,[23] and more recently Giorgio Amendola made the same point in an interview in *The Times*: 'We Italian Communists support the decision to elect a European Parliament, even although the absence of one simple electoral law, based on a proportional representation system, stands in the way of obtaining a democratic result. However, the expression of the people's will may provide impetus for the democratic transformation of the European Community.'[24] The PCI has not demanded increased powers for the Parliament, believing that these will follow from the dynamics of the new situation. The party's main arguments in favour of a directly elected Parliament are, first, that it will lead to the diminution of the powers of the Council of Ministers—seen by the PCI as an undemocratic body which pays all too little attention to the interests of the weaker members (including, of course, Italy) and is moreover increasingly dominated by West Germany—and, secondly, that the 'positive' and 'dynamic' common policies which the party wants will be demanded by a parliament representing all the regions and classes of Europe, particularly of course the less favoured ones which lack a voice in the present institutional machinery.

The French Communist Party's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and to European integration has always been, to say the least, much more *nuancé* than that of the PCI. Indeed, its attitude to Nato is, and always has been, distinctly hostile, and although the party claims that it would not try to withdraw France unilaterally from the Alliance, it would be strongly opposed to France rejoining Nato's military structure.[25] Moreover, in 1969, when the point was reached when any member of the Alliance could withdraw on giving a year's notice, the PCF pressed for 'non-renewal'. Perhaps it is significant, however, that the party has been silent on this matter since the signing of the Common Programme with the Socialists in 1972. As far as European integration is concerned, the French Communists seem to be moving in fits and starts towards the position held by the Italians, but on balance they have been much less European-minded. Nevertheless, there have recently been signs of change, and it is perhaps not too fanciful to suggest that the PCF is going through a similar evolution to that of the PCI. The PCF has reached the point where it constantly emphasises the concept

[23] Speech to European Parliament, Dec. 11, 1969.

[24] *The Times*, Feb. 1, 1977.

[25] See, for example, James E. Dougherty and Diane K. Pfaltzgraff, *Eurocommunism and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977), and Donald Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, *The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 37–59.

of 'Communism in French colours' (comparable to the PCI's slogan 'the Italian road to socialism'), and there is evidence that the PCF is looking with increasing favour on 'independent European', or Eurocommunist, ideas, which have so far been more enthusiastically espoused by Berlinguer and Carrillo than by Marchais.

The PCF was totally opposed to the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community (together with the Gaullists, the PCF ensured its defeat) and the European Economic Community. It regarded the ECSC and EEC essentially as economic props for the Atlantic Alliance. It also took a strongly nationalistic and anti-German line in criticising any steps towards a 'supranational', integrated Europe. The PCF was indeed an unswerving defender of the Kremlin line throughout the 1950s and 1960s. But as it pursued its objective of coming to power with the Socialists, it gradually modified its criticisms of the European Community. The turning point occurred in 1972, for although the French Communists maintained their traditional line by opposing British entry into the Community at the referendum of April 1972, in the Common Programme of June 1972 they stated that a Popular Front government would 'participate in building the European Economic Community, its institutions and its common policies, with the will to act to free it from the domination of large capitalist enterprises, to democratise its institutions, to support the demands of workers and to orientate the achievements of the Community in their interests'.[26] It is true that this commitment is full of vague clichés: nevertheless, as far as the French Communists were concerned, it marked a sharp break from their hitherto wholly critical attitude towards the EEC. A year later Marchais and Berlinguer committed their respective parties to 'constructive participation' in the European Community, as well as to regular contacts between the West European Communist parties with a view to working out joint European policies and initiatives.[27] In 1975 the first French Communists entered the European Parliament, and later in the year Marchais and Berlinguer, meeting in Italy, stated that their objective was to encourage all democratic and left-wing forces to work together within the Community: 'It is our profound conviction that, whatever may be the differences between the various countries of the European Community, and however great their differences may be, there is not a single one of these countries in which the policy of the workers' movement could detach itself from certain common features belonging to a strategy of effective advance towards socialism in the whole of Western Europe.'[28] The

[26] *Programme commun de gouvernement* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972), p. 177.
[27] *Le Monde*, May 13-14, 1973.
[28] *The Times*, Nov. 18, 1975.

language is vague, but the decreasingly antagonistic attitude of the PCF towards the Community is apparent.

More recently, that is, in 1976–77, the French Communists have continued their 'double-standards' approach to both Euro-communism and European integration. In February 1976, for example, Marchais—unlike Berlinguer—refused to attend the Soviet Communist Party's Congress in Moscow and in the same month, at the PCF's twenty-second Congress, the concept of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was dropped. Both these steps emphasised the more 'independent', Euro-communist side of the PCF, but at the twenty-second Congress Marchais also made a strong attack on American imperialism and on the supranational aspects of the EEC.[29] Again, at a press conference on June 9, 1976, Marchais stated that he had doubts about the value of large-scale Communist conferences such as the pan-European conference of twenty-nine parties which was due to take place in East Berlin at the end of the month.[30] This was a 'Euro-communist' attitude, for the more independent Communist parties saw the pan-European conference largely as a means by which the Soviet Union could reassert its authority over the Communist movement. At the same press conference, however, Marchais emphasised the need for France to maintain its independence, and criticised the French government for showing signs of aligning itself more closely with Nato, for example, in military exercises. Then, at the pan-European conference, Marchais made a strong defence of human rights and said that France would 'remain a member of the Atlantic Alliance' until the stage was reached when the 'dissolution of the antagonistic blocs' was possible, but he also reverted to the old Communist slogans about the Atlantic Alliance being an American imperialist organisation, and claimed that West European capitalism was on the verge of collapse.[31] Thus again Marchais appeared to be both upholding the tenets of Euro-communism and attacking the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. It has been suggested that the best explanation for this attitude is that Marchais wants both to maintain his alliance with the Socialists and also to try to win over some Gaullists to the PCF.[32]

This curious mixture of French chauvinism and Euro-communism has been very noticeable in the PCF's attitude to the European Parliament. On the one hand, it has been sending representatives to the Parliament since 1975 and forms a joint parliamentary group at Strasbourg with the Italian Communists. On the other hand, Marchais made a very blunt

[29] *Le Monde*, Feb. 5, 1976.
[30] *Le Monde*, June 10, 1976.
[31] *L'Humanité*, July 1, 1976; for an analysis of the pan-European conference, see Milorid Popov, '"Eurocommunism" and the pan-European conference', *The World Today*, Vol. 32, No. 10, Oct. 1976, pp. 387–92.
[32] See, for example, N. McInnes, *Euro-Communism*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

attack on the EEC at the twenty-second Congress in February 1976: 'France's sovereignty is being torn from her morsel by morsel . . . The fate of our peasants is decided today in Brussels, that of our money in Washington; that of our nation will be decided tomorrow, if the people does not take care, in Luxembourg, or rather in Bonn, by the general staff of the forces of reaction and the multinational trusts of Atlantic Europe.' [33] This rhetoric against the European Community was continued at a press conference in June 1976, when Marchais claimed that direct elections to the European Parliament would be 'a crime against France',[34] and in January 1977 when *L'Humanité* emphasised that both the PCF and Communist trade union confederation, the CGT, were against direct elections, because they would strengthen the institutional machinery of an organisation run by and for 'the great monopolies . . . The only right and proper objective for Europe is to respect the sovereignty of each nation within an economic structure which benefits the working classes in all'.[35] Yet, in spite of attacks such as these on the European Community, Marchais joined Berlinguer in Madrid in March 1977 in stating that their two parties would continue to work closely together on all matters of common interest to the West European Communist parties,[36] and in April 1977 Marchais stated that the PCF was not after all opposed to a directly elected European Parliament provided its powers were in no way increased.[37]

## Conclusion

The development of a quasi-independent form of Communism, i.e. Euro-communism, is arguably the most important single development in Communism since the Sino-Soviet dispute. But what exactly this development means for the future of the European Community is not yet clear. It has been remarked that the way to judge a Christian is not merely to count up the number of times he goes to church, but to study the way he behaves at other times. So French and Italian Communist party statements about pluralism, human rights and a West European 'road to socialism', can in the last analysis only be judged when, and if, the French and Italian Communists come to power. As far as the PCI is concerned, it can be said that the party has 'gone to church' on the issue of European integration and that its deeds suggest that its commitment to achieving a socialist Western Europe through the machinery of the European Community is sincere. A question mark still hangs over the distinctly 'Gaullist' PCF, whose 'church attendance' is more recent and whose conduct at other times

[33] Cited, McInnes, *Euro-Communism*, *ibid.*, p. 26. (Translation slightly amended.)
[34] *New York Times*, June 4, 1976.
[35] *L'Humanité*, Jan. 4, 1977.
[36] *The Guardian*, March 4, 1977.
[37] *Le Monde*, April 19, 1977.

is tinged with traditional subservience to Moscow and a peculiarly French mixture of Jacobinism and chauvinism. Moreover, a further question mark hangs over both parties with regard to their organisation: so long as they remain committed to Leninist ' democratic centralism ' in their internal affairs, it is legitimate to query their commitment to democracy and pluralism in society as a whole.

In their European policy, of course, both parties have taken electoral considerations into account. The Italian Communists want to govern with the Christian Democrats, who are firm supporters of European integration,[38] and the French Communists are aiming to form a Popular Front government with the Socialists, who are also strong supporters of the Community although less enthusiastic about the Atlantic Alliance. It seems unlikely, however, that electoral considerations have alone determined the recent evolution of the European policies of the Italian and French Communists. Certainly, in the case of the Italians, their commitment to work for a pluralist form of socialism on the European stage is a logical development from their long-established commitment to an ' Italian road to socialism ': as many of their spokesmen have pointed out, the party's emphasis on regional polycentrism is wholly consistent with its emphasis on national polycentrism.

At present the PCF appears to be much less interested than the PCI in working for a socialist Western Europe through the institutions of the Community. But it has undoubtedly become a much more ' independent ' party in recent years, distancing itself from Moscow over human rights and dropping the phrase ' dictatorship of the proletariat ' from its statutes. Moreover, there are signs that ' independent Communism ' has a momentum of its own: the more the Western parties emphasise the importance of civil liberties, the more they are bound to come in conflict with the Soviet Union, whose system of government is in the last analysis based on a denial of certain human rights. And the more the Western parties stress their commitment to pluralism and their willingness to work in coalition with liberal-democratic parties, the harder it will be for them to back-track once in power. Lenin's famous remark, ' Tactics, comrades, tactics ', should not be forgotten. But it seems that the recent evolution of the Italian and French Communists towards Euro-communism and a more positive approach towards European integration is strategic rather than merely tactical.

[38] See R. E. M. Irving, ' Italy's Christian Democrats and European Integration ', *International Affairs*, July 1976, pp. 400–16.

# THE EEC AND THE MEDITERRANEAN: IS 'GLOBAL' POLICY A MISNOMER?*

*Loukas Tsoukalis*

THE attempt made by the European Community in recent years to put into effect its so-called 'global Mediterranean policy'[1] has coincided with a series of major politico-economic events in the area which were bound to have a direct influence on relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries. The energy crisis and the strengthening of the OPEC countries brought about a shift in the balance of power towards the south. This has been symbolised by the setting up of the Euro-Arab dialogue, despite the apparent hesitation of Community countries, and the North-South dialogue which involved the Western industrialised countries, the oil-producers and the developing countries. On the other hand, the role of Algeria, one of the most radical members of both OPEC and the Arab League, as spokesman for the Group of 77, has had a positive effect on Community attitudes. At the same time, the fall of the dictatorships in Portugal and Greece and the death of Franco opened up the prospect of a further enlargement of the Community towards the south and therefore turned the EEC's Mediterranean policy into a policy addressed mainly to the Arab countries of the area. Finally, while the global Mediterranean policy was limited to economic measures, the Political Co-operation mechanism of the Nine[2] was set up and issues like the Middle East, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Portugal and Spain appeared frequently on the agenda. The object of this article is to draw a provisional balance sheet of the EEC's global Mediterranean policy, to examine its origins and the interests behind it, its application and the influence of external events, and finally to offer some tentative suggestions about the future.

* I would like to thank the officials of the EEC Commission who provided me with a great deal of information and material, and William Wallace for his useful comments.

[1] In the language of Brussels, 'global' in this context means a uniform Community policy towards the following 17 countries of the Mediterranean area: Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia.

[2] The procedures of Political Co-operation grew out of the agreement at the Hague summit of December 1969 to pave 'the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow' by establishing regular meetings of Foreign Ministers outside the framework of the Community. The procedures themselves were formulated by a committee of Political Directors of national foreign ministries, under the chairmanship of M. Davignon, and began operation in November 1970. Since then an extensive structure of working groups has developed, held together by direct telex links among foreign ministries, and by frequent meetings of Political Directors and Foreign Ministers.

Although the growing interest in the Mediterranean has recently been coupled with a tendency to regard it more and more as a political and economic entity, it would be a serious mistake to consider the seventeen countries of the area as a homogeneous bloc. In reality, political, economic and social differences are enormous. Political regimes range from feudal monarchies, such as Jordan or Morocco, to different brands of socialism, as in Yugoslavia or Syria. Christian and Moslem societies coexist and the past history of the area is a dividing rather than a unifying factor.

A distinction with both a political and an economic basis can be drawn between the European countries of the area and those belonging to the southern tier. From a political point of view, the countries of the northern Mediterranean differ from the rest in their relations with the Community because, according to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, they are eligible for full membership. This has a definite influence on the attitudes and policies of both sides. Moreover, there is a clear difference in levels of economic development between the countries of the northern and southern Mediterranean. This is shown in Gross National Product figures, levels of industrialisation and the type of exports sent to the Community. Industrial goods make up 51 per cent of northern Mediterranean exports, while the corresponding figure for the southern tier is 36 per cent, excluding petroleum products.[3] Among the southern European countries, Albania and Yugoslavia do not belong, at least politically, to the first group, while Turkey is on the margin both politically and, even more, economically. On the other hand, Israel belongs only geographically and politically to the southern group since it has the most advanced economy of the whole area.

The heterogeneity of the area must make any policy covering all seventeen countries both limited and precarious. The question is whether, from the point of view of Brussels, or even from Bonn or London, there are any important factors distinguishing the Mediterranean from the rest of the world—or from the Third World, to use a term which applies to most of the seventeen countries. The first obvious factor is the strategic one, which is partly explained by geographical contiguity. The Mediterranean provides the link with the Middle East and Africa and therefore with sources of oil and other raw materials. The presence of the American and Soviet fleets in what is now only euphemistically called *Mare Nostrum*, and the possibility of a confrontation between them, which is strengthened by the tension in the

[3] Commission des Communautés Européennes, *Les Rélations entre la Communauté et les Pays du Bassin Méditerranéen* (Communication de la Commission au Conseil), SEC (72) 3111 final, Brussels, Sept. 1972, Annex 2. In 1974 only 11·3 per cent of total exports from the Maghreb and the Mashrek countries, excluding Lebanon, to the EEC were in industrial goods (Commission information sheets on the agreements recently signed).

Middle East, has made the EEC countries more aware of the need to define some form of policy for the area. The contrast between the present situation and the time when the Mediterranean was divided into spheres of influence belonging to the big European powers illustrates the tremendous change in the role of the latter countries in world politics. Finally, the recent political changes in southern Europe and the likelihood of further ones in the future, coupled with the ever-changing situation in the Middle East, have increased West European interest in the area.

The second factor is oil. In 1974, 18·5 per cent of the Nine's crude oil imports came from the Mediterranean, of which 64·8 per cent came from Libya and another 27·7 per cent from Algeria.[4] If it is true that the security of oil supplies is one of the main considerations behind the EEC's Mediterranean policy, then the fact that Libya is one of the two countries—the other being Albania—which refuses to enter into any form of agreement with the Community, introduces a further limitation on global policy. But the Mediterranean is not only an important producer of oil; a substantial part of Middle East oil is transported along its shipping routes.

Political observers usually attach undue importance to the above two factors at the expense of others. The significance of the Mediterranean as an outlet for the EEC tends to be underestimated. In 1974, 9·2 per cent of all EEC exports, including intra-Community trade, ended up in Mediterranean countries. This was of the same importance as the whole of the North American market plus Japan. But trade is by no means evenly distributed among the seventeen countries of the area. Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece absorbed as much as 42·8 per cent of all EEC exports to the Mediterranean. Trade relations between the two sides were also characterised by a serious imbalance. In the same year, exports from the Mediterranean countries, with the exception of Libya, covered only 59·2 per cent of their imports from the Community.[5]

The EEC countries also have strong investment interests in the area, mainly concentrated in southern Europe and, for France, in the Maghreb countries as well. Finally, almost all immigrant labour in the Community, with the exception of immigrant workers in Britain, comes from the Mediterranean countries. According to official statistics, which underestimate the real figure because of illegal immigration and families excluded, there were about 6·5 million foreign workers in the EEC countries in 1974.[6] They have sometimes been referred to as the tenth,

[4] On the basis of data found in OECD *Statistics of Foreign Trade*.

[5] On the basis of data found in *Eurostat—Monthly External Trade Bulletin*, 4–1976.

[6] Joseph Sassoon, 'Labour and Capital Movements in the Mediterranean Area', *Lo Spettatore Internazionale*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan.–Mar. 1976, Table 1, p. 25.

non-voting, member of the Community. The existence of immigrant labour has certainly contributed to the economic growth of EEC countries with a labour shortage; it has also provided their governments with a wider margin of manoeuvre in their demand management policies.

To consider the interests and policies of the Community as a whole with respect to the Mediterranean countries, only conceals the wide differences which have developed among the Nine. Before the 1973 Middle East war, the difference between pro-Israeli and pro-Arab members was an important dividing factor. Moreover, the degree of political and economic importance of the Mediterranean for EEC members varies widely between say, France and Italy on the one hand, and Ireland, Denmark or even Britain on the other. The situation is made even more complicated because those countries which are most interested in an opening to the south, namely France and Italy, are also those which stand to lose most from any concessions made to the Mediterranean countries for their agricultural exports. Last but not least, American opposition to the EEC's preferential agreements with Mediterranean countries certainly did not help to strengthen the cohesion of the Community.

### Advantages for the Mediterranean countries

Let us now examine the relationship from the Mediterranean angle. With the exception of Spain and Portugal, which are ex-imperial powers —the Ottoman empire, particularly in its latest period, conforms much more to the general rule rather than being an exception—all the remaining countries of the area have in the past been either directly colonised or brought under the sphere of influence of France, Britain, Italy and to a lesser extent Germany. Nowadays the area is politically and strategically dominated by the two super-powers, while West European countries play a secondary role. With the political changes in southern Europe and the applications for full membership from Greece and Portugal—the Spanish one being in the pipeline—the European Community seems to have acquired a new political dimension. It is seen by the new democratic regimes as an important pole of attraction, towards which their foreign policy has been directed, as well as a factor making for political stability. Meanwhile, the Arab countries have tried to persuade the Community countries to exercise their political influence in order to help bring about a settlement of the Middle East conflict, after the common declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers in November 1973. With the advent of the Carter administration and the likelihood of some shifts in American foreign policy in the area, it is difficult sometimes not to feel that the Community countries may prove to be, to their detriment, 'plus royalistes que le roi lui-même'!

If the Mediterranean countries are not dependent on the EEC in a strategic or purely political sense, they are definitely dependent economically. An average of more than 50 per cent of all Mediterranean exports go to the Community. This average conceals considerable differences among the various countries. Thus the figures are much higher for the Maghreb and Cyprus. This dependence is further exacerbated by the fact that the economies of these countries, particularly those of northern Africa, specialise in producing a small number of agricultural goods, like citrus fruits, wine and olive oil, which are mainly destined for the markets of Western Europe. Because of this specialisation, these countries have to import large amounts of basic foodstuffs. This type of economic structure is mainly the result of their colonial past when production was geared to the needs of the metropolis. They are also dependent on the EEC for foreign investment, tourism, aid and for exporting their surplus labour.

The economic relationship between the two sides is a typical case of a centre-periphery relationship. The centre provides technology, sophisticated industrial goods and capital. The periphery offers markets and raw materials, including unskilled labour. It is not only that industrial goods cover a much higher percentage of EEC, as opposed to Mediterranean, exports; the type of industrial goods exported is also important. Mediterranean industrial exports, such as textiles, shoes, tinned fruit and tomato concentrates, require little processing. The economic relationship between the EEC and the Mediterranean can also be presented in terms of a vertical division of labour.

The above is characteristic of relations between North and South on a world scale. As far as the EEC is concerned, what differentiates the Mediterranean area from the rest of the Third World are political and strategic factors and the area's relative economic importance as compared to other parts of the world. Only limited economic instruments are so far available to the Community in its external policy. This immediately sets very restrictive boundaries around any form of 'global Mediterranean policy'. Moreover, it has proved very difficult to reconcile internal economic pressures and external demands. The Mediterranean countries would like to secure export outlets for their agricultural products and for their nascent industries. In addition, they need foreign investment, technology and aid. The main problem arises in opening EEC markets to Mediterranean exports. The types of industries which are usually associated with the first stage of industrial development, and which are characteristic of the Mediterranean countries, are exactly those industries in which the advanced capitalist countries have lost their comparative advantage. Therefore, strong pressures for protection arise within the developed countries. A typical example is the

textile industry. Moreover, the main agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries are also included in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the Community. This means that protection and preferential treatment are accorded to EEC producers through a combination of different methods: customs duties, reference prices, quotas, safeguard clauses and 'voluntary' observance of market discipline.[7] The Community has been continually faced with the dilemma of either satisfying the demands of Mediterranean countries for export outlets or accommodating the interests of farmers from the Mezzogiorno and the south of France. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that the latter include the poorest regions within the Community itself.

By the end of 1972, when the first serious attempts were made to formulate a global Mediterranean policy, the Community had concluded agreements with twelve of the seventeen countries of the area. These were nothing more than a series of bilateral deals completely lacking any common guidelines for Community policy. They ranged from very comprehensive and complicated association agreements to non-preferential trade deals based on the principle of what is euphemistically called the Most Favoured Nation treatment by both sides. Their contents depend mainly on the country concerned and the time the agreement was concluded.[8]

Thus, relations with Greece were determined by an Association agreement signed in Athens in 1961. This was the most comprehensive agreement ever signed by the Community with a third country. It envisaged the creation of a customs union, the harmonisation of economic and agricultural policies, financial aid and common institutions.[9] The Athens agreement, together with the one signed with Turkey in 1963 and followed by an additional protocol put into effect in 1973, reflected not so much economic factors as wider political and strategic considerations, together with a strong American interest in integrating these two countries closer into the Western alliance.

The Greek and Turkish experiments were not repeated. Later agreements were basically limited to trade. Detailed timetables were avoided as well as elaborate institutional structures. In the period between 1963 and 1969, two limited trade agreements were signed with Israel and Lebanon. Then, in 1969, the Community signed two Association

[7] John S. Marsh, 'The Common Agricultural Policy and the Mediterranean Countries' in Avi Shlaim and G. N. Yannopoulos, eds., *The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

[8] For a historical account of EEC agreements with the Mediterranean countries, see Stanley Henig, *External Relations of the European Community* (London: Chatham House/PEP, 1971); Joseph Loeff, 'La Communauté Elargie et l'Espace Méditerranéen' in H. Brugmans *et al.*, *La Politique Economique Extérieure de la Communauté Européenne Elargie* (Bruges: De Tempel for the College of Europe, 1973); and the country studies in Shlaim, Yannopoulos, *op. cit.*

[9] See also G. N. Yannopoulos, *Greece and the European Economic Communities: The First Decade of a Troubled Association* (Beverly Hills, London: Sage, 1975).

agreements with Morocco and Tunisia. The title was rather misleading and a remnant of the Treaty of Rome. The agreements were only of a commercial nature and limited to five years. The following year, preferential trade agreements were signed with Spain and Israel. In a rather strange way—which, however, was typical of the EEC habit of relating quite unrelated subjects—the agreement with these two countries formed part of a package deal which, on the one hand was intended to satisfy the pro-Israeli members of the Community—Germany and Benelux—and on the other, the strong French interest in associating Spain with the EEC.

In 1970, a non-preferential trade agreement was also signed with Yugoslavia. Another similar agreement was signed in 1973. Both did not go much further than guaranteeing Most Favoured Nation treatment by both sides. Finally, in 1973, agreements were signed with another five Mediterranean countries. These included Association agreements with Malta and Cyprus, with a timetable for the reduction of tariff barriers for a five-year period. The possibility of an eventual customs union was also mentioned. Preferential trade agreements, also for a five-year period, were signed with Egypt and Lebanon. Moreover, as part of the agreement signed with the other EFTA countries, a free trade area agreement was concluded with Portugal.

The agreements signed up to 1972, with the possible exception of the one signed with Greece, could have only a very limited effect on exports from the Mediterranean countries.[10] One reason was that the importance of concessions in the industrial sector—already limited in most cases—was further reduced by the restrictive application of the Community rules of origin and the existence of the so-called ' sensitive ' products. Moreover, at least as far as the countries of the southern Mediterranean were concerned, tariff concessions were not sufficient to bring new dynamism to a stagnating industrial sector. If they had been, one would have to assume that the problem of underdevelopment in these countries is not essentially a structural one. Moreover, one has to take into account the oligopolistic nature of most markets already controlled by firms in the developed countries. On the other hand, reductions in customs duties could not have much effect on Mediterranean agricultural exports, given the fact that they were offered on condition that EEC reference prices were respected. After all, reference prices have

[10] See also country studies in Shlaim, Yannopoulos, *op. cit.* In an attempt to quantify the impact of tariff preferences granted to the various Mediterranean countries, McQueen has concluded that Greece, Morocco, Tunisia and Spain made substantial gains from the agreements for their exports to the EEC. But the method used is open to criticism and moreover the period covered for the last three countries is too short for any valid conclusions to be drawn. See Matthew McQueen, ' Some Measures of the Economic Effects of Common Market Trade Preferences for the Mediterranean Countries ' in Shlaim, Yannopoulos, *op. cit.*

proved to be a much more efficient system of protection than customs duties.

In September 1972, the Commission put forward proposals for a global Mediterranean policy.[11] This was both a reflection of a growing dissatisfaction with previous policy—if a series of unco-ordinated responses to external stimuli can be called a policy—and a response to the emergence of new factors. It was believed in Brussels that relations with the Mediterranean countries could no longer be determined by the type of piecemeal approach adopted so far. There was a need for a jointly agreed set of rules and criteria which should govern Community policy towards the area. This was very much a French idea which reflected French and also Italian worries about having to make increasing concessions in the agricultural field through negotiating separately with each Mediterranean country. The enlargement of the Community also made it necessary to revise agreements or sign additional protocols in order to incorporate the new members into the old agreements. This was also seen by the Commission as an opportunity to decide on a new common policy.

Growing American hostility to the proliferation of preferential agreements, particularly when these involved an element of reciprocity on behalf of the Mediterranean countries, also played an important role. Moreover, if the Community wanted to assert its independent political role in the world, strategic, political and economic considerations made the Mediterranean one of the first priorities. Although in more recent years oil has become extremely important, in both a direct and an indirect way, at the time of the formulation of the global Mediterranean policy it did not seem to play a very significant role.

**The Commission's objectives and guidelines**

The Commission's proposals of September 1972 consisted of three main elements. The first objective was the creation of a free trade area in industrial goods between the EEC and each of the Mediterranean countries. The Community would reduce tariffs to zero by 1977. Almost full reciprocity would be demanded from the relatively more developed countries of the northern Mediterranean. For only a small number of sensitive products the timetable for creating a free trade area would be extended to 1985. For the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and the Mashrek (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria), the timetable would be extended even further.

Given the existence of the CAP, free trade in agricultural goods was simply out of the question. The Commission envisaged some concessions by the Community, which would mainly take the form of a

[11] Commission, *Les Rélations entre la Communauté et les Pays du Bassin Méditerranéen*, *op. cit.*

reduction in customs duties. It also asked for concessions on the export of EEC agricultural goods to the Mediterranean. The last element in the Commission's proposals concerned co-operation. Technical and industrial co-operation was envisaged between the two sides, while the Community would give financial aid to the relatively less developed countries of the area. The Commission also proposed to try to find a common approach to the problem of immigrant labour.

The principle of a global policy towards all Mediterranean countries was adopted by the Heads of Government at the Paris summit in October 1972. The following month, the main guidelines of this policy, based on the Commission's proposals, were adopted by the Council of Ministers. Concrete proposals for relations with each particular country were supposed to be made later. The guidelines for a global policy did not concern relations with Greece and Turkey which were determined by the two Association agreements. They would apply to any new agreement and to the revision of old ones whenever these were due for renewal. Priority was to be given to negotiations with Spain, Israel and the Maghreb, and the objective set by the Commission was that the new agreements would be put into effect by January 1974.

Despite this optimistic objective, the first agreement, with Israel, was not signed until May 1975 and it was followed by one with the Maghreb countries in April 1976. In January of this year agreements were signed with Egypt, Syria and Jordan and a similar one with Lebanon was initialled in February. At the same time, an additional protocol together with a financial protocol were signed with Israel. The delay was due to three main factors: the internal haggling and extremely slow and cumbersome decision-making mechanism of the Community; the unacceptability of the EEC's original proposals to the Mediterranean countries; and political events—the Middle East war, the oil crisis and the consequent strengthening of the Arab countries.

It took the Council of Ministers about eight months to agree on a mandate for the Commission to start negotiations with Spain, Israel and the Maghreb countries. In the later stage, much more time was spent in intra-Community bargaining, with proposals going backwards and forwards between the Commission, the Council and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), than in actual negotiations with third parties. 'The practice of unanimity, the influence of pressure groups, political abstention and the slowness and unwieldiness of the procedure make the Community an inefficient and unsympathetic negotiator'.[12]

[12] Gian-Paolo Papa and Jean Petit-Laurent, 'Commercial Relations between the EEC and the Mediterranean Countries: An Analysis of Recent Trends in Trade Flows' in Shlaim, Yannopoulos, *op cit*., p. 268.

The two main issues which arose in the negotiations with the Mediterranean countries were the question of reciprocity in the dismantling of tariff barriers and the concessions to be made by the Community for Mediterranean agricultural exports. In the negotiations with the Maghreb countries, demands for reciprocity were finally abandoned by the EEC, at least for the initial period of the agreements. The same arrangement was later made with the four countries of the Mashrek. On the other hand, the conclusion of a free trade area agreement with Spain would be extremely difficult, if negotiations are ever resumed in order to resolve the present anomalous situation pending Spain's entry into the Community. The Community's insistence on the creation of a free trade area in industrial goods, including a number of exceptions for 'sensitive' Spanish exports, with only a few concessions in the field of agricultural exports, would prove unacceptable to the Spaniards. Why should Spain be expected to accept such an agreement when about half its exports to the Community, as opposed to less than 10 per cent of EEC exports, are in agricultural goods? [13]

The question of concessions for Mediterranean agricultural exports proved very difficult in negotiations with the Maghreb countries—the traditional suppliers of the French market—and Israel. Italy protested that while the CAP offered a high degree of protection for the agricultural products of the northern members of the Community—cereals and dairy products—the protection offered for fruit, vegetables and processed products was extremely weak. It also asked for compensation to be paid to its farmers as a result of concessions offered to Mediterranean countries, a demand which was immediately resisted by the German Federal Republic.[14]

The agreements finally signed with the Maghreb and the Mashrek countries envisaged free access to the EEC market for all industrial goods from these countries with a few exceptions of so-called sensitive products, namely refined petroleum products and cork products from the Maghreb as well as phosphate fertilisers, textiles and aluminium

[13] A critical appraisal of the Commission's 1972 proposals can be found in Wolfgang Hager, 'The Community and the Mediterranean' in Max Kohnstamm, Wolfgang Hager, eds., *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community* (London: Macmillan for the Institut de la Communauté Européenne pour les Études Universitaires, 1973), pp. 211–214; and in Avi Shlaim, 'The Community and the Mediterranean Basin' in Kenneth J. Twitchett, ed., *Europe and the World: The External Relations of the Common Market* (London: Europa for the David Davis Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1976), pp. 87–95.

[14] At the end of 1976, the Pizzuti report, dealing with the problems of agriculture in the Mediterranean areas of the Community, was presented to the members of the Commission. It dealt among other things with the effects of Mediterranean agreements, before the application of the global policy, on Italian and French producers, and made some suggestions for the internal organisation of markets for particular products. In the meantime, the Commission had been asked to present a report on the Mediterranean policy and to make concrete proposals in order to meet the preoccupations of certain member countries.

from the Mashrek, to which ceilings on imports would or could apply for a limited period. A reduction in customs duties was offered for Mediterranean agricultural exports as well as quotas for wine exports from the Maghreb, always on condition that the rules applying to the organisation of the EEC market were respected. Moreover, all concessions were subject to safeguard clauses. On the other hand, no reciprocity was demanded at least for an initial period of five years. In the field of co-operation, a specified amount of financial aid was offered to each individual country, while separate clauses provided for the treatment of immigrant workers from the Maghreb in the Community. In all the agreements particular attention was paid to industrial and technical co-operation. It remains to be seen whether anything concrete will emerge out of this list of good intentions written into the agreements. Finally, all the agreements signed so far within the context of the global Mediterranean policy are of unlimited duration and subject to periodic re-examination by both sides.

The agreement signed with Israel in May 1975 was very much along the lines of the Commission's 1972 proposals. It centred around the creation of a free trade area in industrial goods by 1985 with Israeli tariffs being reduced more slowly than those of the Community. The reduction of EEC customs duties on Israeli agricultural exports was granted, while similar concessions from the Israeli side were much more limited. It is interesting to note that while the Maghreb countries were offered an 80 per cent reduction of customs duties for their exports of citrus fruits, the concession offered to Israel was of the order of 60 per cent, despite the fact that one of the objects of the painstaking exercise of negotiating new agreements was precisely to end the offers of different concessions to individual countries. When the additional protocol and the financial protocol were signed in February 1977, limited financial aid was offered to Israel and provisions were made for technical and industrial co-operation. This arose out of the Community's desire to keep some form of balance between the Israeli agreement and those signed with Arab countries.

A protocol signed with Malta in March 1976 extended the island's existing association with the Six to the Community's three new members; it also included agricultural trade between the two sides and provided financial assistance by the EEC. But a new agreement will be needed to bring about a complete customs union. In addition, the agreement concluded with Portugal in 1972 was extended by the signature of a trade protocol—additional concessions were made by the EEC in order to help Portuguese exports—and a financial one. During 1976, after having agreed on the overall ceilings to be applied to loans coming from the European Investment Bank and the Community

budget, long intra-EEC discussions finally led to a decision on the allocation of these amounts among the various Mediterranean countries.

There are still seven countries which have not so far signed any agreement since the EEC adopted its new global policy. Albania and Libya do not seem to be interested in establishing closer institutional links with the EEC. Relations with Greece are determined by the Association agreement of 1961 and negotiations on Greece's full membership of the Community have already started. The present institutional framework of relations between Spain and the EEC is very anomalous. The trade agreement of 1970 was for six years and was made largely obsolete by the enlargement of the Community in 1973. Preliminary discussions on a free trade area agreement reached an impasse and later were broken off after the execution of Basque nationalists in September 1975. But the death of Franco and the steps taken towards democratising the regime completely reversed the situation. The new Spanish government informed the Community that it was no longer interested in signing a co-operation agreement within the context of the global Mediterranean policy since its intention was to apply for full membership once the necessary democratic reforms had been made inside the country. Nevertheless, an adaptation of the 1970 agreement is still needed to take account of the 1973 enlargement of the Community.

The EEC is then left with three different and extremely difficult cases, Cyprus, Turkey and Yugoslavia. It does not seem very likely that a new agreement will be signed with Cyprus so long as the island's political problems are not solved. Relations with Turkey had reached a complete stalemate and there was a serious probability that the Turks would unilaterally renounce the Ankara agreement. But there seems to have been a breakthrough at the meeting of the Association Council in December 1976. The problem stems partly from the fact that Turkey is on the margin between the northern and southern tier of the Mediterranean in both political and economic terms. A new agreement on the basis of those recently signed with the Arab countries may present the only solution, at least in economic terms. Finally, there is Yugoslavia whose policy of non-alignment, highly strategic position, strong political and economic links with Eastern Europe, high degree of dependence on the West while at the same time being the second largest Mediterranean market for EEC exports, make a rather formidable combination. The political links, not to mention the economic ones, between the Community and Yugoslavia will probably be strengthened in the near future. In the economic field Yugoslavia, because of its non-aligned status, would like to sign a 'non-preferential' agreement which would be as preferential as possible!

The EEC's global Mediterranean policy has been limited to economic measures, since these are the only ones available to a Community which

has always pretended that a distinction between High and Low Politics is possible. But the Political Co-operation mechanism provides an institutional framework for consultation procedures on foreign policy among the Nine. The situation in the Middle East emerged immediately as one of the three main topics of discussion, together with the European Conference on Security and Co-operation and relations with the United States.[15] The Yom Kippur war of October 1973 was a difficult test for the efficiency of political co-operation among the Nine and the results were less than mediocre. Serious differences among the European countries came into the open while the influence of the two super-powers left very little room for manoeuvre by any outside party.

The Arab countries exerted pressure on the Community to play an independent and active role in the Middle East and the energy problem. This was highlighted in December 1973 at the Copenhagen summit conference with the arrival of uninvited Arab ministers 'who had taken literally the Community's claim to speak as the voice of Europe and came to discuss "the future of Mediterranean co-operation" with the Nine'.[16] But this did not lead very far. The Nine were divided on energy, with the Eight finally following Dr. Kissinger's initiative and joining the International Energy Agency, while France tried to play its own separate tune. The only fairly concrete thing to emerge later was the Euro-Arab dialogue in which the Community was rather hesitantly involved. Although the Arab countries were keen on stressing the political aspects of the dialogue, the EEC insisted on limiting it to commercial, financial and technical questions. A General Committee was set up to discuss general questions and to supervise and co-ordinate the work of seven groups of experts each one dealing with a particular field of co-operation.[17]

At the Tunis meeting of February 1977, agreement seems to have been reached on at least four concrete issues: the setting up of a Euro-Arab centre for the transfer of technology; the undertaking of three joint agricultural development projects in Sudan and Somalia; the signing of a multilateral convention for investment protection; and another convention covering contract conditions.

The Euro-Arab dialogue has developed into a hybrid between the Political Co-operation mechanism and strictly Community affairs, with the Commission not only being involved but actually playing a very active role in it. In fact, the Commission tends to consider the dialogue as a kind of model which might also be applied to other political

[15] William Wallace and David Allen, 'Political Co-operation: Procedure as Substitute for Policy', in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb, eds., *Policy-Making in the European Communities* (London: John Wiley, 1977), pp. 232–235.

[16] Annette Morgan, *From Summit to Council: Evolution in the EEC* (London: Chatham House/PEP, 1976), pp. 18–19.

[17] *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 5–1976, pp. 6–12.

co-operation issues. Most EEC countries are still not convinced of the usefulness of the dialogue itself, as opposed to good old bilateral relations, although no one would be prepared to end it. It would not be a gross exaggeration to say that the main supporters of the Euro-Arab dialogue are the Commission on the one hand and the Secretariat of the Arab League, together with the poor Arab countries, on the other. But, at the same time, the dialogue, as a symbol of the increased power of the Arab countries on the international stage, must have influenced considerably the course of negotiations for the conclusion of agreements with the Maghreb and Mashrek countries and the Community's willingness to make additional concessions.

Apart from the Middle East and relations with the Arab countries, a great deal of time and attention has been devoted within the Political Co-operation mechanism to Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Portugal and Spain. In one case, Portugal, the Community seems to have succeeded in influencing the course of events by using economic leverage combined with political pressure coming mainly from West Germany and the German Social Democratic party.

### Limitations of the EEC's Mediterranean policy

The first obvious conclusion to draw about the EEC's global Mediterranean policy is that the term used gives an exaggerated idea of what it is actually all about. First of all, the policy has only been about trade and aid. The EEC started with rather unrealistic assumptions about the globality of its approach and the actual contents of its policy. Both had to be modified in the course of the negotiations. In view of the heterogeneity of the Mediterranean countries, it would be wrong to place too much emphasis on the word 'global', unless one simply meant that the Community undertook to conclude co-operation agreements, the contents of which would differ although the ultimate objective, however theoretical, would be the creation of a free trade area between the two sides.

Although in the agreements signed with the Maghreb and Mashrek countries, together with the Lomé Convention, the Community has gone much further than other Western industrialised countries in offering free access to the industrial exports of these developing countries without any reciprocity, it is not very likely that these agreements will have much influence on the exports from the countries concerned, at least in the near future. The reason is simply that they have very few industrial products which can compete successfully within the Community market. It could be argued that these agreements do not offer any additional advantages to the Arab countries of the area than those already offered under the Generalised Preferences Scheme; it is

unlikely that they will be able to exceed very much the quotas offered under the latter scheme. But a very important element in these agreements is their unlimited duration, so that in the long term the concessions they offer could provide a strong stimulus for the process of industrialisation, if the right policies are adopted at home. Algeria and the other Maghreb countries are more likely to benefit than are the Arab countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. In a country like Tunisia, which adopted an 'open door' policy towards foreign investment in 1972, the free access for industrial exports in conjunction with the provision for industrial and technical co-operation between the two sides is emphasised as an important factor in favour of industrialisation. On the other hand, Israel is the country that can benefit most from the opening of the EEC market to its industrial exports. But it had to accept reciprocal tariff concessions which may aggravate its already large trade deficit with the Community.

The most serious problem in all the negotiations has been the concessions for Mediterranean agricultural exports. This will be aggravated when the Community is further enlarged, mainly by the entry of Spain, since the agricultural production in Greece and Portugal will only have a marginal influence on EEC production of 'problem' products. If Spanish production is added to present Community production, without taking into account Spain's enormous unused potential, then the EEC will considerably reduce its requirements for imported citrus fruits, approach self-sufficiency in vegetables and olive oil and be in danger of creating a wine ocean as opposed to a small Franco-Italian wine lake. This would have important repercussions on the exports of these products from the southern Mediterranean countries.

But self-sufficiency in certain products does not have very much meaning if it is not related to a particular level of prices. One typical example is olive oil, self-sufficiency in which does not mean a great deal in view of its present high price in relation to that of other vegetable oils. Moreover, a major reform of the CAP is long overdue and further enlargement will make it even more urgent, unless one imagines that butter mountains will melt into wine lakes. Instead of trying to fix intra-EEC exchange rates irrevocably, or block further enlargement in order to give some extra breathing space to the CAP in its present form, it is high time that the Community seriously considered the possibility of reforming the CAP.

The countries of the southern coast of the Mediterranean—Morocco and Tunisia are typical examples—also have an interest in diversifying their agricultural production with more emphasis placed on basic foodstuffs. One main problem of the area is that too many countries specialise in too few products, for which markets are not so easy to find. Joint

planning between the two sides would help to bring about the necessary diversification and would also facilitate a gradual process of readjustment within the Community itself to make room for products from outside for which a comparative advantage no longer exists. This applies both to agricultural and industrial products. The transfer of investment and technology would play an important role. At the same time, diversification would help to increase economic interdependence and complementarity which would be beneficial to both sides. Commission officials, for example, have often expressed their interest in seeing soya produced in the Mediterranean in order to reduce the Community's dependence on American exports.

Another idea, often stressed by M. Cheysson but with no concrete results so far, has been the signing of long-term contracts with Mediterranean countries for the export of Community agricultural products.[18] This would on the one hand help the Community to dispose of surpluses and be a major step towards an active export policy, which the EEC has never had, while on the other hand, it would guarantee the security of supply and stable prices necessary for planning in the developing countries of the area. A first attempt was made with a long-term supply contract with Egypt for the export of wheat, sugar, beef and dairy products, which finally fell through because of an apparent mishandling of the negotiations and the negative reaction of Germany and Britain. With Mr. Gundelach as the Commissioner responsible for agriculture, the chances of such ideas materialising in the future seem to have increased.

The prospect of a further enlargement of the Community in southern Europe has turned its global Mediterranean policy mainly into a policy towards the Arab countries of the area plus Israel—a very interesting combination! In a sense, this would institutionalise a clear distinction, which already exists in both political and economic terms, between the northern and southern tier. On the other hand, the economic problems of the developing countries of the area will not be solved simply by the creation of free trade areas. The most important factor will certainly be their internal economic policies. In addition, joint planning and constant co-operation between both sides will prove more beneficial than just free access to industrial exports when there are very few goods to be exported; and when these do become available they are likely to create strong resistance from various EEC pressure groups, unless studies are undertaken and plans made for a gradual readjustment within the Community itself.

Since the EEC's Mediterranean policy will be concentrated on the north African and Middle East countries, it must be closely connected

[18] Also mentioned in 'Stocktaking of the Common Agricultural Policy', Supplement to *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 2-75, p. 32.

with the state of the Community's relations with the Arab countries. This immediately introduces both the Euro-Arab dialogue and High Politics in general, the separation of which from economic issues cannot last for very long. The Community will have to make some difficult decisions in the near future. Relations with the Mediterranean countries provide a major challenge to the EEC's external relations. They could serve as a model for North-South relations and as a catalyst for the formulation of an active Community foreign policy.

# REVIEWS

## CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

**Mathematical Theory in Soviet Planning:** Concepts, Methods, Techniques. By Alfred Zauberman. *London, New York: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 464 pp. £17·00.*

THIS large book, not to be confused with the author's small one *The Mathematical Revolution in Soviet Economics*[1] to which it is in many respects complementary, will interest many different kinds of economist. The theorist will be able to trace in detail the development of Soviet mathematical economics in the past twenty years, during which the subject has again become acceptable in the Soviet Union after the lapse of a generation, and will learn about the new concepts, methodology and approaches in the theory of planning which have emerged during this period. The econometrist will be able to find out, at least on the theoretical plane, what Soviet economists are doing in his special field. And since Dr. Zauberman does not restrict himself to Soviet authors but writes at length on similar developments in Eastern Europe and in the West, the supporter of mathematical planning, traditional planning or no planning at all will find in the book much food for thought.

The plan of the book is novel and highly successful. Dr. Zauberman organises his treatment round a small number of major topics, to each of which a chapter is devoted. There are two parts, dealing respectively with some problems in mathematical planning and with the control-theoretic approach to planning. Part I contains five chapters: efficiency pricing; decomposition theory, concerned with the decentralisation of decisions in a complex system; the new theory of economic growth; appraising the efficiency of investment; and the stochastic approach to planning. Part II contains two chapters: the control-theoretic problem; and the impact of control theory on Soviet economics and planning theory.

The book itself is structured and systematic. Each chapter is divided into numbered sections followed in most cases by appendices. Comments and references are contained in numbered footnotes at the end of each chapter. In spite of this, it is not an easy book to read from cover to cover and is better regarded as an invaluable work of reference. The main reason, I think, is the immense amount of works considered, which despite Dr. Zauberman's helpful thumbnail sketches of their contents cannot always be fully comprehended without a reference back to the original. A subsidiary reason is that there is neither an integrated bibliography nor an index, so that if one loses a writer one may have some difficulty in finding him again.

Let us now make a tour of the seven chapters. In conducting this tour I shall do scant justice to Dr. Zauberman's erudition and concentrate on the main issues to which each chapter is addressed.

[1] London, New York: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1975. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1976, p. 76

Chapter 1, on efficiency pricing, is built around Kantorovich's work on the optimal organisation of production. This started with a small book entitled *Mathematical Methods in the Organisation of Planning and Production* (1939), which sets out a mathematical method, linear programming, for analysing the problems of efficient production in non-market situations. This method depends on a correct specification not only of the technical conditions of production but also, more importantly, of the aims which the non-market productive process is supposed to satisfy. In simple cases, such as the best way to cut materials, with which Kantorovich was initially concerned, the aim is usually simple and uncontroversial. The position is very different in national planning, where the aim is certainly not simple, seldom uncontroversial and often ill-defined. However, the treatment of market situations in Western economics has comparable difficulties since its efficiency propositions depend on simplifying assumptions such as perfect competition, the absence of externalities and so on. Thus, whether we start from an arbitrary statement of aims or from an idealised statement of the institutional set-up, we encounter difficulties as soon as we agree to be less arbitrary or less idealised. Dr. Zauberman does not raise these issues, being mainly concerned with the development of Kantorovich's ideas and with the replacement of his static treatment by a dynamic one.

Chapter 2, on decomposition theory, is concerned with the breaking up of a system into components, or sub-models, which allows us to apply the principle of divide and conquer to the immense complexity of the real world. Dr. Zauberman suggests that this is advocated basically for computational reasons. I believe that other, and perhaps more important, reasons are involved: the demands of data processing, which become unmanageable in large monolithic systems; and the unsuitability of the simple building blocks of an economy-wide model to the detailed modelling of its component branches. There is also the question of confidentiality, which crops up in all regimes. I can see no reason in principle why, subject to an agreed exchange of information which would protect the confidentiality of the branches, those branches should not operate their own sub-models, thus relieving the central model-building staff of requiring detailed knowledge that they cannot be expected to possess.

Chapter 3 is concerned with the new theory of economic growth. An early Soviet writer on this topic was Feldman, whose model, full of insights, of almost fifty years ago was introduced to English readers in Domar's *Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth.*[2] After Feldman there was the usual pause before the subject was taken up again. Dr. Zauberman brings out the large number of distinguished Soviet economists and mathematicians who have contributed to growth theory in recent years. Many of the ideas put forward have a close affinity with those developed by such writers as Neumann, Bellman and Morishima. There is little reference to Ramsey's pioneering article on saving but a great deal to the work of later Western writers who took inspiration from Ramsey. Soviet writers, it would seem, consider that short-term policy should not impede the path to the turnpike but are not much concerned with the ultimate capital stock and its composition, which is indeed very hard to specify in the long run.

Chapter 4 discusses investment appraisal, the criterion to be used and the selection of projects once the criterion is given. Clearly, in any discussion

[2] London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

of costs and benefits it makes a good deal of difference whose costs and whose benefits we take into account, how far we are prepared to go in considering indirect benefits, what our attitude is to discounting time and so on. Dr. Zauberman is largely concerned with the alternative treatments of these questions proposed by Soviet and Western economists and introduces at some length the views of Polish economists, in particular Lange and Kalecki. Although Novozhilov is mentioned, I could not find, somewhat to my surprise, any reference to his treatise of 1967 which subsequently appeared in English as *Problems of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Optimal Planning.*[3]

Chapter 5 deals with the stochastic approach to planning. After a short introduction, there is a general section by Professor Tintner on the problems of replacing deterministic models by stochastic models. He also considers stochastic programming and stochastic control theory. This section contains a number of useful examples. Dr. Zauberman then takes up the story with an account of the contributions of Soviet authors to these new fields. And this brings us to the end of Part I.

Chapter 6 opens with the central questions of control theory, namely: (i) do we have the means to exercise the control we have in mind; (ii) do we have the information to work out how to manipulate these means; and (iii) do we know enough to ensure that our manipulations will result in stability. The discussion covers a wide range, including contributions by mathematicians, physicists and engineers, so that this chapter is of interest not only to economists. This is to be expected, since control theory was at first developed largely with engineering applications in mind. Although the main purpose of the chapter is to present Soviet contributions, Western authors also receive a good deal of attention; thus, for instance, there are many references to Bellman's work as well as to Pontryagin's.

Chapter 7 is devoted to the usefulness of these ideas in economic planning. Theoretically speaking, the developments described in this chapter are of the greatest interest but in the present state of the art, which does not have a very long history, I think they seek to build too much into the model and leave too little scope for the calculation and discussion of alternatives. I think a distinction should be made between the control of theoretical models in the light of a simple and tractable utility function and control as it presents itself to a policy maker in the world we live in. It is this aspect of control theory that has interested Western economists such as Tinbergen. By his method one can set the values of a certain number of targets and work out the instrument values (and the values of the other endogenous variables) which are compatible with hitting the targets. Thus the model does not attempt to specify what 'society' is supposed to want but leaves the matter open to debate and experimentation in the workshop, without requiring the experiments to be carried out *in corpore vili.*

This brings me to the end. I think we all owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Zauberman for a book of great erudition, which not only introduces us to the work of many Soviet scientists but also uncovers the large extent of common ground that exists in what might be supposed to be an excessively controversial subject.

*King's College, Cambridge* RICHARD STONE

[3] White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1970.

**The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950–1975.** By Feroz Ahmad. *London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1977. 474 pp. £12·00.*

TWENTY-SEVEN years have now passed since Turkey made the traumatic transition from a single-party regime to a competitive parliamentary political system. The experiment has not been without its failures, but what impresses one about contemporary Turkish history is the robustness of multi-party politics in Turkey, as compared to the experiences of other developing countries. There is thus a serious need for a reliable and up-to-date overall survey of Turkish politics since the Second World War. Feroz Ahmad has evidently aimed to fill this gap with his well-researched and informative book.

After a useful introduction, which gives interesting background on the process which led to the Turkish Republic's first free elections in 1950, the author tells the story of the 'Menderes era' of the following ten years. He draws attention to some of the more generally neglected aspects of this period, such as the methods and degree of control which Menderes had over his own followers, the effects of their electoral failures on the opposition Republican People's Party, and Menderes's relations with the military in the earlier part of the decade. This leads him into a discussion of the factors behind Menderes's removal by the armed forces in 1960, and the effects of this upheaval. It was the professors, he suggests, who may have 'transformed the *coup* into a revolution' (p. 162) by endowing the subsequent return to civilian politics in 1961 with new constitutional and economic institutions, intended to prevent the monopolisation of political power by the majority party.

The effects of these and other changes have been seen over the last sixteen years, in which the parliamentary system has at least survived, if at the cost of repeated governmental instability and a second dose of indirect military rule between 1971 and 1973. Feroz Ahmad supplies us with an absorbing account of these tangled developments. He is critical of the army's intervention in 1971, recognising that the liberal press originally welcomed it as a blow against Demirel, but that by 1973 it was sharply resented. Many of the organs of opposition had been circumscribed or stifled, 'but not a single social or economic problem of basic significance had been seriously tackled' (p. 310). He carried his narrative on to the autumn of 1975, charting the rising star of Bülent Ecevit, and the unstable situation which emerged after the indecisive election of 1973. His book closes with a useful chapter on religion and politics since 1950, and a summary of the main developments during this period in Turkey's foreign policy.

Feroz Ahmad's approach to his subject is a generally pragmatic one: some readers may regret his failure to link his account to political development theory, but such a treatment would have obliged him to reduce the sheer amount of information his book contains. Nevertheless, the chapters in which he deals with the economy do seem somewhat sketchy (there is no summary of overall income growth during the whole period, for instance) and occasionally misleading. Strictly speaking, he is correct in stating that 'the target of 7 per cent [growth rate] for the GNP was not achieved' in the 1960s (p. 278), but the shortfall was actually only 0·3 per cent, which hardly counts as the failure he implies. Elsewhere, his narrative is made more difficult to follow by his tendency to summarise several years' events in one chapter and then go into greater detail on different aspects of the same

story in subsequent chapters. For example, he describes the Justice Party's election victory of 1965 on page 191, but it is not until page 234 and subsequently that a newcomer to the subject would learn of Demirel's election to the leadership of the party in 1964, or the changes that this brought to party policy. At the same time, his book remains a useful source of reference on a fascinating, if sometimes perplexing, topic.

*University of Durham* WILLIAM HALE

**The Finnish Dilemma:** Neutrality in the Shadow of Power. By George Maude. *London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 153 pp. £6·00.*

SUCCINCT, controversial, and eminently readable, this monograph is the best of recent efforts by scholars and diplomats to describe and analyse postwar Finnish foreign policy. The Finnish dilemma to which the author refers would arise if an extreme crisis between the West and the Soviet Union were to develop in Europe. In the light of the 'note crisis' of 1961, which raised the spectre of military negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union and which may well be the dividing-line for postwar Finnish foreign policy (p. 23), Finland's withdrawal from an extreme crisis in Europe is seen as improbable if not impossible. Finnish foreign policy has, therefore, been engineered on the basis of active neutrality whose cornerstone is the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, signed with the Soviet Union in 1948, to stop the emergence of conflicts and to prevent crisis escalation.

The author argues his case well, although the overall effect is somewhat marred by his surprising treatment of President J. K. Paasikivi, the chief architect of Finland's postwar foreign policy. Paasikivi is described as an opportunist whose sympathy in 1918 and 1940–41 rested with Germany (pp. 5, 10 and 26). Moreover, one is an 'apologist' for Paasikivi's foreign policy if one states that his attitude towards Russia, Tsarist and Soviet, was consistent (pp. 5 and 24). The author's assertion that Paasikivi was not consistent is more than controversial. No evidence is presented to suggest that Paasikivi, unlike many other Finnish politicians, ever considered Russia an 'hereditary enemy' (*perivihollinen*), even in 1918 and 1940–41. Paasikivi argued with justification twenty years ago that he had consistently supported the principles contained in his notes from 1940–41 about the relationship of the Grand Duchy of Finland with Tsarist Russia:

> The guiding foreign policy principle held by us, by members of the Old Finn Party, was the avoidance of disputes with Russia. Our rationale was simple. Finland's neighbour, Russia, was a Great Power. The fact that Finland was not at that time independent by international law, that Finland enjoyed only internal independence, autonomy, does not really change matters. Russia's preponderance of strength was overwhelming. We had to do more than find a modus vivendi. We had to develop good relations, so that Russia would not only tolerate Finland's special position but could in fact conclude that it was Russia's best alternative.[1]

[1] *Paasikiven Muistelmia Sortovuosilta* (Helsinki: Söderström, 1957), vol. 1, p. 79.

The author's treatment of Paasikivi's successor to the presidency, Urho K. Kekkonen, is equally surprising albeit more in tune with contemporary political reporting. Kekkonen is portrayed as a one-time opportunist with a penchant for haranguing the Finnish people (p. 18). The author's emotions about Kekkonen may stem from the feeling that there is a direct link between Kekkonen's efforts to mould a successful foreign policy and an asserted, but not documented, one-sided presentation by the Finnish mass media of events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (pp. 18, 48–49 and 92). It may well be that this negative view of the Finnish president explains why the author refuses to acknowledge, let alone accept, President Kekkonen's repeated statement, public and private, that he abstained and was not one of three members of parliament who voted against the 1940 peace terms of the Winter War with the Soviet Union (pp. 26–27).

In spite of these shortcomings, the monograph is a fine piece of work and should be widely read. In less than two hundred pages the author presents complex political and economic matters in lucid fashion without falling into the pitfall of superficiality.

*Syracuse University, New York* JOHN H. HODGSON

**International Agencies: The Emerging Framework of Interdependence.** By Evan Luard. *London: Macmillan for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1977. 338 pp. £14·00.*

SINCE the Second World War there has been a notable increase in the number and size of international organisations dealing with the sort of issues—economic, social, and technical—which are widely regarded as non-political. Perhaps partly on account of this designation, many students of international relations are happy to remain almost totally uninformed about the work of these bodies. Other factors contributing towards this attitude are a lack of interest and expertise in the subject-matter of such organisations and probably also the feeling that to spend time on them would imply a regression to the heavily institutional approach to the study of international relations which was characteristic of the interwar period. This, however, is an unfortunate state of affairs. It tends to focus attention on international conflict to the exclusion of those co-operative endeavours on which states are quietly engaged within many institutional contexts, and on which the smooth conduct of much day-to-day international business depends. In mitigation it might be said that a great deal of the writing in this area is very detailed and (for the novice) abstruse, and frequently concentrates on legal or organisational questions. But now, with the appearance of Mr. Luard's book, this plea can no longer be advanced.

The heart of the book consists of fifteen chapters with the following titles: postal services; telecommunications; sea transport; air transport; space; the sea-bed; the Antarctic; meteorology; energy; labour; health, social policy; trade; money; and development. Their structure is more or less the same. After surveying the history of co-operation in the area concerned, the author sketches the framework of the contemporary international agency (or agencies) which deals with it, discusses the agency's chief activities and problems, and considers what, in this field, might and should be expected of the future. The emphasis throughout is on the functions and work of

international agencies rather than their formal arrangements and procedures. And it is all very non-technical and readable, Mr. Luard displaying his skill in the clear distillation of large quantities of involved material. Certain themes recur: the way in which problems attracting governmental attention at the domestic level a generation or so ago are now having to be discussed internationally; the trend from bilateralism to multilateralism; the recognition that the maintenance of adequate standards across frontiers may require international help; and the manifestation in almost all areas of the division between North and South. (So much for 'non-political'! ) A separate chapter outlines and comments on the attempts to co-ordinate the work of the agencies, and another summarises the ways in which they try to persuade governments to conform to the majority view, these techniques being assembled under the headings of legislation, confrontation and implementation.

Now and then the author will probably furrow some brows. Throughout he writes of international agencies as constituting 'international government', and his brief justification of the term will not satisfy everybody. Such other concepts as are introduced are handled very shakily, with the 'interdependence' of the book's title receiving no attention whatsoever. And what is being said about international agencies' place and impact on the wider international scene is by no means evident. In the foreword—called 'The Quiet Revolution'—they are said to have wrought 'a considerable transformation of international politics' (p. vii). But on the book's last page there is a call for 'a conscious dedication to the goal of internationalism' so that 'political as well as functional co-operation will be advanced' (p. 328). It is a pity there is such a large loose end. However, while some of the topping and tailing may have fallen short, there is no doubt that this is an exceedingly useful book. It does what it sets out to do in a workmanlike and most effective manner, and will greatly benefit students of international co-operation. As they read it (usually, one regrettably suspects, only through the good offices of a library) they can hardly fail to reflect on the extent of their debt to Mr. Luard.

*University of Keele* ALAN JAMES

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

**Interdependence:** The European-American Connection in the Global Context. By Gerhard Mally. *Lexington: Heath for the Atlantic Council of the United States. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 229 pp. £10·30.*

THIS book begins with an account of the causes of interdependence which are claimed to lie in technical developments in communications, transport, weaponry; in increasing national interpenetration in terms of investment, inflation, unemployment; and in intensifying global problems of pollution, population growth, diminishing mineral and other physical resources. This location of its causes leads to an exposition of the manifestations of interdependence which include strategic bipolarity, ideological tripolarity, diplomatic pentagonality, the resource quadrangle and polycentrism. These

forms of interdependence (or *I* as Dr. Mally sometimes terms it) may be subsumed under a typology of antinomies of which these are examples: positive (the Atlantic alliance) and negative (Nato and the Warsaw Pact); functional (Universal Postal Union) and ideological (Comecon); voluntary (the constituent states of the United States) and coercive (the Baltic states and the Soviet Union); total (the United States and Canada) and partial (the United States and the Soviet Union); and so on. The author holds problems of interdependence to be problems of appropriate management so he sets out a spectrum of possible types of multilateral decision-making, from bicameralism and weighted representation to non-voting consensus formation. The book's first section is completed by a more empirical chapter which briefly epitomises the nature of global interdependencies in the security system, the ecosystem, the economic system and the political system, this last being in effect the United Nations.

The second section of the book claims to deal with interdependence at the regional level, first by discussing the problems of Nato in the context of the search for security through arms control and detente and, second, by outlining the structures and contemporary vicissitudes of the OECD, the IMF and the GATT. Added to these is a short passage on the energy crisis and the International Energy Agency. The third part of the book, more contemplative in tone, considers designs for the future of the American-European connection. Atlantic union, European union, Atlantic partnership and Atlantic community contain possibilities of conflict but the author concludes on the final page of his text that these images are ' by no means mutually exclusive as long as future moves toward European unity and Atlantic co-operation are synchronised and complementary, rather than competitive and conflicting ' (p. 143). The volume is filled out with a large number of principally statistical appendices relating to world energy supply, trade among OECD countries and suchlike.

The obvious merit of this book, its brevity, is marred by a style which makes it seem long. Three weaknesses of conception also constantly undermine the reader's attention to the text. First, its heavily emphasised architecture vainly attempts to serve conflicting functions. On first approach the book seems to be a scholastic treatment of concepts of interdependence; then it becomes a survey of current international problems as a whole; it ends by revealing itself to be a tract on the future of the Western circle of states. The more this unsteady pile is buttressed with jargon, statistics and discourses on method the more inelegant it becomes. Second, interdependence is taken to denote such a wide range of global and regional connections as to become virtually a synonym for international relations as a whole. By this profligacy the author effectively empties his subject of distinctive meaning. Third, the postulates of different kinds of interdependence must intermingle with the postulates of different kinds of statehood, yet Dr. Mally makes virtually no inquiry into these difficult and fundamental conjunctions. By thus cutting himself off from the traditions of political thinking and fixing upon interdependence as a series of purely practical problems amenable to managerial solution, the author, for all his expert knowledge, commits himself to a course which can only lead to banal and tautological conclusions.

*University College, Cardiff* ROY E. JONES

**The Organization and Promotion of World Peace: A Study of Universal-Regional Relationships.** By R. A. Akindele. *Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Books Canada.) 209 pp. £10·50.*

THE proliferation of regional organisations during the last thirty years or so has been in marked contrast to the hoped for global approach to international co-operation which witnessed the birth of the United Nations in 1945. The often troubled relationship between the United Nations and those regional bodies created primarily for dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes and collective self-defence is probed by Dr. R. A. Akindele, Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Ife, Nigeria.

Dr. Akindele begins by analysing the various legal formulas which have been devised for reconciling the competing claims of universal and regional approaches to the promotion of peace—pointing out that at least in theory the pre-eminent position of the world organisation is usually emphasised. From his survey of regionalism under the League of Nations system during the period 1919–39, he concludes that such *local* arrangements as the provision in Article 21 of the Covenant on the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, and the later emergence of regional security pacts, like the Little Entente and the Locarno guarantees, on the whole did not upset the constitutional balance established in favour of universal principles.

The bulk of Dr. Akindele's book, however, is concerned with regionalism and the United Nations. He investigates the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the Charter devised at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and follows this by examining whether membership of such bodies as Nato, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation are consistent with obligations under the United Nations Charter. Dr. Akindele then concentrates on unravelling the question of United Nations and regional jurisdiction in the pacific settlement of disputes. He does this by looking at several case studies: three concerned with the OAS—Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1960) and the Dominican Republic (1965); the Arab League and the Lebanon (1958); Nato and Cyprus (1963–64 and 1974); and four involving the OAU—the algerian-Morocco border dispute (1963), the various Ethiopian-Somali-Kenyan border disputes between 1964 and 1973, the Congo crisis of 1960–64, and the Nigerian civil war of 1967–70. After this he focuses on regional enforcement action and collective self-defence; covering such examples as the OAS's involvement in the Cuban and Dominican problems of 1960 and 1962 respectively, the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the OAU and the general issue of colonialism and self-defence. The final chapter assesses the contribution of regional institutions to world order, focusing on such vexed issues as co-ordination problems between different international organisations and regional domination by powerful states. Not surprisingly, and despite his own apparent preference for global arrangements, Dr. Akindele concludes that under the United Nations system, national interests and other political considerations have meant that more often than not states have adopted regional solutions to international problems.

Although clearly written, Dr. Akindele's book, like many others which have grown out of PhD theses, is very closely, almost tediously, argued and sometimes difficult to follow. Nevertheless, on the whole it is a useful con-

tribution to the literature on regional organisations and the United Nations which could well be consulted by students interested in this aspect of international relations.

KENNETH TWITCHETT

**Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations.** Vol. IV: Dag Hammarskjöld 1958–1960. *659 pp. $28.10.* Vol. V: Dag Hammarskjöld 1960–1961. *592 pp. $34.40.* Edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1975.* Vol. VI: U Thant 1961–1964. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson. *1976. 708 pp. $34.40.*

IT is a pleasure to welcome three more volumes of *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations,* a series which has established itself not only as an authoritative source for all serious students of the subject but also as a singularly convenient reference tool for anyone who requires an admirably arranged, indexed and edited account, in official terms, of major United Nations developments. The latest volumes fully maintain the high and spacious standards of presentation which marked their predecessors.[1] They are a model of clarity and accuracy, easy on the eye, and not much too heavy on the hand, a credit to publishers and editors alike. It has obviously meant a great deal to the series to have the services as editors of such dedicated and singularly well-informed UN 'hands' as Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote. Regrettably, Wilder Foote died just after the completion of Volume 5. His place in relation to Volume 6 was taken by Max Harrelson, the Associated Press correspondent at the UN for almost the whole of its life up to 1972, and as such a very well-informed observer of the Organisation's functioning.

It is not to be expected that these semi-official collections can add much in the way of unpublished material to what we already have from the fluent pen of Dag Hammarskjöld. Until we reach the boundaries of whatever turns out to be the UN equivalent of the thirty-year rule we can hardly hope for more than the rather generous amount of 'revelatory' material which such studies as Brian Urquhart's *Hammarskjöld*[2] have already made available to us. There are, in this sense, no surprises in these volumes. There are, however, many items which a study of the merely official records would not throw up. One of the most valuable features of this series are the transcripts of the Secretary-General's press conferences and informal remarks, occasions on which Hammarskjöld was especially prone to think aloud in adumbrating his philosophy, institutional or private. His endlessly fertile mind can be seen in action here on an extraordinarily wide range of topics; one only regrets that his interlocutors so seldom rose to the intellectual level of their sparring partner.

The *Papers* are also much enriched by the inclusion of those lectures and addresses on public occasions, academic or otherwise, at which Hammarskjöld was such a master. Such was the 'Development of a Constitutional Framework for International Cooperation' delivered at Chicago in 1960, or the justly famous Oxford lecture on 'The International Civil Servant in Law

[1] Vol. I (1969) reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1970, p. 753; Vol. II (1972) reviewed July 1973, p. 524; Vol. III (1973) reviewed Jan. 1975, p. 140.
[2] London: Bodley Head, 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1973, p. 524.

and in Fact' delivered at the height of the crisis in the Secretary-General's office itself. On a different, but hardly less revealing, plane is the reprint of his article, 'A New Look at Everest',[3] in which Hammarskjöld the mountain-lover describes his sensations at being flown amongst the Himalayan peaks during a visit to Nepal. But of course the core of these collections is always the papers that record the transactions of the day-to-day business of the UN itself. Read continuously, in relation to any single issue, they convey a remarkable cumulative impression of a highly disciplined, patient and disinterested intellect at work, a precision instrument of extraordinary delicacy placed without reservation at the service of the international cause. Quite apart from the issues at stake, it is a pleasure to watch the concentration and acumen of such diplomacy, isolated and silhouetted, so to speak, as it is here in these collections.

To move from the refinements and subtle shadings of Hammarskjöldian diplomacy to the direct, clear outlines of U Thant's is to abandon the subtleties of the West (or at least the North) for the scrutability of the East. 'The problem of the Congo is not as complicated as it has been made out to be in certain parts of the world. I think it is plain if we try to get at the root of the matter' (Vol. 6, p. 191). Thus U Thant on the issue of revenue payments by the Union Minière. Or broadcasting on Radio Moscow, August 30, 1962: 'Let me be candid. When the Soviet foreign policy did concern itself with what was happening in the rest of the world—for instance in the Congo—it did so out of fear and suspicion' (Vol. 6, p. 215). Neither before nor since has a Secretary-General spoken out in such frank terms to a Soviet audience.

Indeed, just as the cumulative effect of Hammarskjöld's papers is to leave the reader with an enhanced appreciation of his intellectual and moral range, so no less the frank and open diplomacy of U Thant, whether dealing with the press, the public or his diplomatic colleagues, testifies to his courage and simplicity—a simplicity which owes nothing to naïveté and everything to faith and disinterestedness. If the Congo operation (to which the greater part of Volume 6 is devoted) eventually emerged successfully from its frustrations and harassments, it is to U Thant's directness and unswerving insistence on principle that the ultimate credit is due.

The responsibility in these volumes of converting a mere sequence of speeches, statements, reports and aides-mémoire into a series of coherent accounts has been the most significant and creative service rendered by the editors. They have been generous with their expositions, not only in the form of admirable introductions to each volume, but also in the provision of commentaries and background on individual items or themes. When it is remembered that one editor in particular, Andrew Cordier, was himself a central figure in much of the UN operations reported here, no one is likely to underestimate the significance of these authoritative *obiter scripta*. Many of them indeed, on matters which could hardly be so frankly exposed at the time, for example the circumstances surrounding the resignation of the Swedish commander of the UN Yemen Observation Mission, Major-General von Horn, constitute source material of first-hand importance, and everywhere they help to recreate the background of events and opinion without which the relevance or meaning of the documents themselves would

[3] *National Geographical Magazine*, vol. 119, no. 1, Jan. 1961, pp. 87–93.

often be lost. At the same time there is very little evidence of special editorial pleading for the cause of the Organisation and none for the individual actors concerned. It is indeed hard to see how in general such annotation could be better done. It sets a model and a challenge for succeeding volumes.

*New College, Oxford* H. G. NICHOLAS

## DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

**Developing the ICBM:** A Study in Bureaucratic Politics. By Edmund Beard. *New York, Guildford: Columbia University Press. 1976. 273 pp. $18.75.*

A LARGE proportion of current research on American defence policy is based on the assumption that the key to it all is to be found in the process by which new weapons are conceived, developed and procured. In consequence there are now very few weapons of the postwar American arsenal that have not provided the subject for at least one scholarly biography. Most of the studies point to the crucial significance of the attitudes of the sponsoring service as to whether a particular project will collapse or flourish. Added confirmation for this generalisation is provided by Edmund Beard in this study of the early history (1945–54) of the United States intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programme. He asks the interesting question: ' Why is it that it took so long for the US to develop an ICBM? ', and answers it by suggesting that the main obstacles were not technological but were to be found in ' organizational structures and belief patterns '. His argument, which is effectively and convincingly developed, centres on the deeply-held beliefs of the Air Force chiefs that the strategic bombardment mission ought to be the sole responsibility of the Air Force and that manned aircraft were, and would remain, the best available means of fulfilling this mission. In the early postwar days it was felt that ICBMs, while an interesting possibility in the long term would be too cumbersome and costly to have any operational value in the foreseeable future. Therefore improvements to manned bombers had the highest priority when it came to the allocation of research and development (R and D) funds. Since little money was spent on ICBMs, the technology did not advance, despite the fact that military and industrial personnel working on ICBM projects were becoming increasingly optimistic that the technical problems could be solved. But in 1953, Trevor Gardner, working as a special assistant for the Secretary of the Air Force on R and D matters, became convinced of the importance of ICBMs and alarmed at the relatively slow progress being made by the United States compared with the Soviet Union; it was only then that the programme proceeded with any urgency.

Beard argues, on the basis of his study, that the picture of the contemporary military as ' bold innovators ' is inaccurate and that decisions on new weapons systems are too important to be left to the generals. Although both these points have force, they need to be qualified. First, the cult of technology did not fully grip the Pentagon until the late 1950s and early 1960s. This was after the period covered by Beard. Indeed, the technological enthusiasm of the later period was in a large measure stimulated by the experience of the ' ICBM race ' and the dramatic Soviet ' first ' of Sputnik I. It was also a consequence of the growth of strong

R and D units in the military, with a stake in perpetual innovation and the gradual relaxation of budgetary restraints. Second, it is probably misleading to contrast so strongly the flawed and parochial judgment of military men to the objective advice that might come from a 'technologically respected independent agency with access to all necessary information'—Beard's proposed remedy to the decision-making problem. With the attachment of the airman to the manned bomber we are talking of a notable cultural phenomenon that is distinct from military attitudes to other weapon systems, and it should also be recognised that the history of independent agencies indicate that they have not always been as objective as Beard might wish.

*Chatham House* L. FREEDMAN

**Guerrilla:** A Historical and Critical Study. By Walter Laqueur. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1977. Boston: Little, Brown. 1976. 462 pp. £8·95. $17.50.*

IN the wake of China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Portuguese Africa, where guerrilla movements have been most prominent in postwar history, it has become fashionable to exaggerate the military and political power of popularly-based guerrilla forces, to assume that guerrillas fighting a 'revolutionary' or 'people's war' cannot be defeated by regular government forces. Similarly, it is often thought that contemporary guerrilla doctrine and strategy sprang from the caves of Yenan in the 1930s, and that the application of Maoist theory in other parts of the world by other guerrilla groups resulted in their success. The historian Walter Laqueur, disturbed by what he calls a vast overgrowth of mythology, sets out to demythologise guerrilla warfare by examining its theoretical, historical and practical bases.

His basic premise is that in order to understand guerrilla warfare, one has to write its history. The result is *Guerrilla*: a broad and wide-ranging sweep through history. The whirlwind—albeit comprehensive—tour takes the reader from Biblical times, through feudalism and the Middle Ages, and into the eighteenth century. More detailed attention is given to developments in the century after Napoleon, which, in Laqueur's consideration, holds the roots of much of twentieth-century guerrilla doctrine and practice. Fully half of *Guerrilla* is devoted to an examination of movements in the twentieth century, particularly in the postwar era, and ends with an examination of urban guerrilla movements which have emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Laqueur's focus is always on the motivations of guerrillas and on the conditions that determine the success or failure of a guerrilla movement. His conclusions focus on the decline of guerrilla warfare because of the gradual disappearance of two key factors that have traditionally helped guerrilla movements: foreign domination and liberal-democratic governments. Those conditions which led to guerrillas' successes in the postwar era are no longer present, signalling the end of an era.

Because at the outset Laqueur eschews a belief in the viability of a rigid comparative approach to the study of guerrillas, it is perhaps not surprising that he ends his encyclopaedic study by noting that there can be no systematic theory that will explain the causes, conditions, successes or failures of the eighty-six guerrilla wars that have occurred since 1775; that there are few viable comparisons to be made about the sixty-one

postwar guerrilla groups studied. In short, Laqueur claims, there can be no etiology of guerrilla warfare. He does, however, offer twelve 'common patterns' to 'help in understanding why guerrilla wars have occurred in some conditions but not in others, and why some have succeeded and others have failed'. The insights that *Guerrilla* offers into this politico-military phenomenon, and the panorama of over two millenia of guerrilla warfare which it presents, make this trenchant book a pathfinding work.

*McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada* KIM RICHARD NOSSAL

**Brassey's Artillery of the World:** Guns, howitzers, mortars, guided weapons, rockets and ancillary equipment in service with the regular and reserve forces of all nations. Edited by Shelford Bidwell with Brian Blunt and Tolley Taylor. *London: Brassey's. 1977. 274 pp. £18·50.*

DURING the 1970s there has been a growing interest within strategic studies in conventional weapons. This can be attributed to a number of factors: the search for alternative doctrines now that parity in strategic nuclear weapons between the super-powers has been firmly established; the major advances in conventional weapons technology of recent years, mainly the produce of the American experience in Vietnam; the evidence from the October 1973 Middle East war of new patterns of warfare, with particular interest being stimulated by the roles played by anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. It is also being recognised that artillery has been neglected in the past in favour of the better-known weapons of the combat zone—tanks and tactical aircraft. There is now no excuse for such neglect for Brassey's have produced a clear, authoritative, well-illustrated and comprehensive guide to the artillery of the world, covering everything from field guns and howitzers, through anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to coast artillery. In a field of some technical complexity there are useful explanatory sections as well as a glossary.

*Chatham House* L. FREEDMAN

**RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1976–77.** Edited by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London. *London: Brassey's. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Seeley Service and Cooper, London.) 377 pp. £12·00.*

PART 1 of this annual entitled 'Strategic Review' will probably be of greater interest to the readers of this journal than the second which deals with modern weapons technology. It contains fourteen signed articles on a wide range of subjects. James Bellini, formerly of the Hudson Institute in Paris, writes on national defence policy and arms sales, Alvin J. Cottrell on Iran and the Central Treaty Organisation, John Erickson on the Soviet military effort in the 1970s and Peter Janke on transnational terrorism. The civil wars in the Lebanon and Angola and the situation in Northern Ireland in 1975 are also reviewed. Part 3 surveys defence literature of the year and contains a chronology covering June 1975–May 1976.

*Chatham House* D. H.

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

**The Arena of International Finance.** By Charles A. Coombs. *New York, London: John Wiley. 1976. 243 pp. $12.95. £7·50.*

**The Dilemmas of the Dollar:** The Economics and Politics of United States International Monetary Policy. By C. Fred Bergsten. *New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1975. 584 pp.*

Two important contributions to the fast-growing literature on the international monetary system and its management could hardly be more different. Coombs's book is a historical narrative; Bergsten's a prescriptive polemic. Of the two, Coombs's is the most likely still to be read in the 1980s, even in the 1990s, for its frank eye-witness testimony; but Bergsten's could conceivably have a more immediate impact on international monetary diplomacy, primarily because of his influence as Assistant Secretary at the United States Treasury under the Carter administration, and because his ideas probably closely coincide with those prevailing at such influential centres of policy discussion in the United States as the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations.

'Charlie' Coombs (as he is universally known) was head of the Foreign Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in the 1950s, and from 1961 until his early retirement in 1975, was the Senior Vice-President directly responsible for all United States Treasury and Federal Reserve operations in the international gold and foreign exchange markets. He has already served monetary historians well by recording semi-annually in the FRBNY's *Monthly Bulletin* all important developments in the foreign exchange markets and the operations of the Federal Reserve in them. Now he has told the story of those crucial fifteen years in a more personal and colourful style, giving hour-by-hour accounts of the successive crises he has handled and some brilliant thumbnail sketches of the other leading characters in the story—Roy Bridge, for example, the Bank of England's chief foreign exchange operator, is 'a small dapper man with a thin grizzled moustache, intelligent gray eyes, and the air of an experienced old cat quietly appraising an unwary mouse'. But though apparently candid, he is rarely critical: the geese at Basle were mostly swans, it appears, and you have to read between the lines to see when Coombs covertly thinks X was arrogant or Y obstinate. And in the narrative, he adopts the cunning strategy—also used by Horsefield in the first volumes of the International Monetary Fund's official history [1]—of dealing in much greater detail with more distant events while sliding rather quickly over more recent and controversial ones.

Yet certain judgments come out loud and clear. The chief one, perhaps, is that any finance minister, and any strategy of monetary diplomacy, that ignores or underrates the forces of the market, and the fundamentally political character of monetary policy, is deluded. 'Fiscal policy, incomes policy and national security policy often prove far more decisive in shaping the fate of national currencies than monetary policy, which is then dragged along in the train of other decisions made at the highest political level' (pp. 198–199). How true—whether of British, French, or indeed of American

[1] *The International Monetary Fund 1945–1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation* (Washington: IMF, 1969).

policies in recent years. A corollary to this observation is that any plan requiring co-ordination of national monetary policies, whether ad hoc or in deference to general 'guidelines' is, in political terms, a foolish dream. (The carefully documented story also makes it clear—as recollection based only on reading newspapers does not—how often the speculators were bested by the central bankers who, if they had time and resources enough, often got back the money they put out in market-management.)

Coombs's fairness to European points of view is particularly rare and refreshing. And he is quite uncompromising in his biting criticism of the Nixon regime for its indecisiveness, incoherence and irresponsibility. 'Benign neglect' was not so much a deliberate strategy for the devaluation of the dollar (as recommended by Haberler in 1968) as the expression of internal frustrations in the White House and of an almost paranoid sense of persecution at the hands of America's allies. Coombs believes—and his judgment should carry weight—that the Connally bombshell in August 1971 was unnecessary as well as wantonly destructive of goodwill towards, and confidence in, the United States as chief manager of the international monetary system. Nearly the whole trouble in 1971, he says, originated in American trade deficits with its three closest associates—Canada, West Germany and Japan. 'Yet no Federal Reserve representative attending the BIS meetings in 1970/71 was ever asked to urge on senior Japanese officials the importance of revaluing the yen . . . [there were] no official American approaches to them at the time for a revaluation of the yen' (pp. 210–11).

In short, Coombs's narrative yields nuggets of valuable information and insight to the experts: but general readers will also find it readable and instructive—even entertaining. His concluding judgment is also worth quoting: 'Governments can escape neither the necessity of deciding for themselves what exchange rate is appropriate . . . nor the equally compelling necessity for reaching temporary agreements with their major trading partners. . . . Money does not manage itself, no more so internationally than in the domestic markets' (p. 239).

Such practical wisdom based on years of experience as monetary manager and negotiator might usefully serve as a yardstick against which to check some of Bergsten's policy recommendations. Unlike Coombs, Bergsten has not spent much time outside the United States and his experience in what Coombs (with understated scorn) calls the 'complex of White House advisers', lasted only from January 1969 to May 1971. The main influences on his thinking, as he makes clear, have been academic; Richard Cooper is his idol. And his purpose in writing at length about the international monetary system is to inquire into 'the effects of alternative monetary arrangements on the national interests of the United States' by analysing 'the costs and benefits of the alternatives to the United States in applying a number of economic and political criteria to each' (p. 3). Thus, though the final chapter ends on a panglossian up-beat, stressing the advantages to other countries of his proposed reforms, the motivation throughout is frankly and specifically national. What the long introductory chapters on the history of the international monetary system and the nature of national power and national goals in international monetary relations lead slowly up to is a detailed scheme for the conversion of existing dollar reserves into Special Drawing Right (SDR) accounts under international management by the IMF (but without the present requirements on reconstitution).

For Bergsten, the advantage of such a scheme is that it would be more stable than the present non-regime of managed floating, yet would allow the United States to spread the burden of management. But at the same time he argues that reform must allow other countries to pursue a diversity of domestic monetary goals, leaving the sovereign right to determine exchange rates with national governments. This 'principle' of monetary reform, however, is balanced by an equal emphasis on the need for 'guidelines' to set limits to the flexibility allowed under managed floating. When it is seriously suggested that the guidelines might be reinforced by a system of sanctions, including discriminatory import controls, against recalcitrant governments (p. 527), the suspicion dawns that the whole scheme may be a soft sell for American monetary hegemony—the iron hand of the dollar concealed inside a velvet, SDR glove. For, as the earlier chapters make clear, Bergsten's thinking (like that of Calleo, Gilpin and a good many other American political economists) is much influenced by British experience and by the apparent damage done to the British economy by sterling's long reign as the chief reserve currency in the international system. This is taken as a dreadful warning of the problems of dealing with a dollar overhang (i.e., an excess of liabilities to depositors over American reserves). Any solution which looks like relieving the United States of this burden is therefore welcome. The IMF solution, which allows the United States to continue to exercise the lion's share in decision-making, while subjecting the other animals to collective discipline, is naturally attractive in American eyes. As Bergsten concludes, his scheme would 'stop the slide in the benefit-cost ratio to it [the US] of the international roles of the dollar—a ratio which has long since turned negative and certainly would continue so in the future—by sharply reducing the role itself and placing its remaining portion on a fully protected basis' (pp. 557–558).

The political point glossed over in Bergsten's persuasive advocacy, is that the United States would acquire greater freedom to devalue and thus to maintain its jealously guarded trade surplus, and yet would preserve its privilege of paying foreign debts with self-created dollars. Converting post balance into SDRs would not totally preclude other countries from accumulating new dollar balances. Moreover, because of its predominant influence and decision-making power in the IMF, the United States under this scheme would be under no strong pressure from its partners to provide the three requisites perceived by Kindleberger as essential to successful and acceptable monetary hegemony—discount facilities to the financial system, an open market in the trade system and counter-cyclical capital outflows in the credit system. Since aid could be provided by the simple issue of SDRs through the IMF to developing countries, the United States would also avoid the tiresome necessity of asking Congress before satisfying the claims of the Group of 77. And, consciously or unconsciously, the key point overlooked by Bergsten is that once accepted, the conversion of dollar balances into SDRs would be difficult to reverse against the wishes of the United States. Yet there would be nothing to stop a future Secretary of the United States Treasury taking just as cavalier an attitude to the IMF as Connally did in 1971. According to one of the executive directors, Connally made it clear from the first that he regarded the Fund 'as a museum in which anything that wasn't stuffed already ought to be' (Coombs, p. 219).

In short, from a non-American point of view, the only true dilemma

('a position that leaves only a choice between equal evils'—OED) is that facing the other participants in the international monetary system. Their problem is whether to continue to run the risks inherent in the present precarious and unstable system or to accept a more managed regime but one which, to judge by Bergsten's arguments, the United States would only support if it visibly served its own rather narrowly conceived national interests. Meanwhile, the debate will certainly continue and Bergsten's analysis will be a useful guide to anyone wishing to understand Washington's policies.

*London School of Economics* SUSAN STRANGE

**Energy, Inflation, and International Economic Relations.** By Curt Gasteyger, Louis Camu and Jack N. Behrman. *New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 238 pp. (Atlantic Institute Studies II.) £9·10.*

THE interaction of energy, inflation and international economic relations promises to be an absorbing topic. However, the present book will disappoint those who rely on titles to convey contents. *Energy, Inflation, and International Economic Relations* are offered as three separate, distinct and—frankly—somewhat unrelated studies, different in structure and function, presented by different people under different circumstances. They are published under the auspices of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, of whom Pierre Uri is presumably a senior representative; although he contributes a useful foreword to the book, he remains otherwise unidentified.

The first of the three sections is 'The Western World and Energy', certainly an idiosyncratic label for a collection of conference papers of which two of the least redundant deal with 'The Energy Policy of the Soviet Union' and 'China's Energy Policies'. Curt Gasteyger, editor of the section, opens with the observation that 'If a prize for unpredictability were to be awarded, no doubt the present energy situation would win it. Over the last six months its pace of change has accelerated to a degree that makes yesterday distant history and the present an unreliable guide for tomorrow'. Too true: and matters are not helped by failing to give the date of the conference at which these papers were presented. It was, however, apparently late in 1973; as a result, the proceedings here are of interest mainly to historians, as a manifestation of the thinking accompanying the turmoil then freshly breaking over the world of energy policy. Another paper describes 'A New Challenge to the European Community'—it makes poignant reading three years later, when the challenge has been comprehensively ducked.

The second section offers 'Spotlights on Inflation', as discussed at a Geneva meeting of the Atlantic Institute—again on a date unspecified. It is introduced with a comment from Louis Camu which is worth pondering: 'We bankers and economists have a very difficult task today. We belong to the happy class of experts. We are professionals who used to know exactly what we were talking about. Recently, however, things have changed, and we have become like the political scientists who freely admit that they are bewildered by what is going on in the world today'. Meaning no disrespect, it is at least possible that the conviction of the said 'professionals'

that they used 'to know exactly what we were talking about' is one of the root causes of present confusion. Unfounded confidence in matters as complex as the human and political implications of economics has been revealed as dangerous hubris, a stultifying influence which has made recent changes the more surprising and dismaying because they have failed to fit the theory. Financiers and economists are overdue for some discomfiture. It is, however, unfortunate that their discomfiture is accompanied by much more serious side-effects on many who have no illusions about finance or economics.

For this reason the third section, 'Toward a New International Economic Order' is much the most satisfactory part of the book. It is the work of one man, Professor Jack Behrman of the University of North Carolina and it dates from June 1974, a precision which is welcome, given the pace of subsequent developments. Professor Behrman also leads off with a provocative keynote: 'One of the slogans of World War II was that the war was being fought in order to achieve a just and durable peace. But as some of the pundits said at the time, we have rather created a "just endurable peace"'. Professor Behrman insists that 'A durable peace is a matter of economic justice—an economy that answers, in a manner that is ethically acceptable, the critical questions of who *owns* what, who *does* what, who *decides* what, who *uses* what, who *serves* whom, and who *receives* what'. His detailed and thoughtful analysis of these fundamental questions is a genuine and valuable contribution to the resolution of this most urgent of problems. His concluding words give the flavour of his treatment:

> 'Co-operative action by business, government, labour and consumers (or the public) is required, reflecting the changing goals of the society, including the increasing concern to remove the injustices in the present system. The first step is to recognize the significance of the changes in values which are placing equity and justice on a par with efficiency and material progress. By this action every policy toward reforming the international economy would be aimed at achieving not only efficiency but also equity, which alone can gain acceptability for the new system'.

It is an ironic reflection on the differing approaches here demonstrated, that the one which is anchored firmly in time should also be unquestionably the most enduring.

WALTER C. PATTERSON

**Development without Dependence.** By Pierre Uri. *New York: Praeger for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 166 pp. Pb: £3·25.*

**Meeting the Third World Challenge.** By Alasdair I. MacBean and V. N. Balasubramanyam. *London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre. 1976. 272 pp. (World Economics Issues Vol. 3.) £10·00.*

**Strategy for Development.** Edited by John Barratt *et al. London: Macmillan for the South African Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 324 pp. £10·00.*

THESE three books have in common the fact that they appear with the approval of well-known institutions, and little else. Pierre Uri, having

achieved fame as the architect of the European Community, has now turned his attention to the relationships between the Third World and the industrialised countries. In doing so he adopts a characteristically realist position. The aid programmes of the 1950s and 1960s he argues, met only a fraction of the total problem of the growing gap between rich and poor countries. The continued existence of this gap is both inhumane and a threat to world peace. A transfer of resources is necessary, but must be in the framework of a basic overall strategy and way of thinking. However Uri has no simple solution, no blueprint to offer either the rich or the poor nations. He begins by dismissing the idea that the Third World will be able to exert power by controlling supplies of raw materials and fuels to the industrialised states. The two largest industrialised nations, the Soviet Union and the United States are also major producers of raw materials, and so are Canada and Australia. Neither can the too exclusive dialogue of the Alliance for Progress be taken as the formula for success, as 'privileged relations have often turned into conflicts' (p. 6). The answer is to develop a series of multiple relations in which all the industrialised countries and possibly the socialist bloc take part together. This concept is examined in the context of the oil price revolution and the situation in which a chasm has opened between countries with indigenous energy and commodities and those without. Pierre Uri argues that development planning should be based on future population growth and its relationship to national agricultural bases. The growth of population in the industrialised countries has stabilised, in the Third World it is still increasing. The author believes that private investment should be adapted to meet Third World needs, that monetary systems should be stabilised and that the industrialised countries should find ways and means of stimulating imports of manufactured goods from the developing countries.

As would be expected, Uri has written a provocative and challenging book. He does not wave a magic wand over the problems created by the differences between the prices of what developing countries import and export. In his view, 'the equilibrium reached by the industrialised world translates the whole surplus of oil producers into a deficit of the poorest countries' (p. 161). Inter-relationships are the key to understanding the contradictions of the development process.

*Meeting the Third World Challenge* is yet another soundly researched publication from the Trade Policy Research Centre. Like Pierre Uri the authors are concerned with the new situation created by the oil price increases of 1973–74. They see in the demand for a New International Economic Order and a programme of action to go with it, a challenge to the leadership of the Third World from the nations of the Third World themselves. The source of this challenge lies in the diversity of the developing nations in resources, population and potential for advance. In formulating a response to the challenge, 'political factors appear to be a key constraint in most spheres of activity in which the state engages' (p. 97). Although the economic policies followed in the postwar restructuring were not successful, they laid the base for outward-looking policies in such countries as Brazil and India. The authors discuss the content of development economics from the neo-classical model with its emphasis on savings rates and capital accumulation through to current concepts of technology transfer models. They conclude that 'the aid relationship in the past has often proved unproductive in terms of economic development' (p. 155), but maintain

that aid and technical assistance have a useful role to play in improving development prospects. In reviewing trade prospects for the developing countries the authors state that it is in the long-term interests of the industrialised countries to remove restrictions on trade in primary products, and the processing and manufacturing fields which discriminate against the Third World exports. Economic integration between groups of developing countries is seen as raising the possibility of setting up industries which would otherwise be uneconomic. However, the authors believe that the static theoretical gains of 'trade creation' familiar in the literature on customs unions are unlikely to be significant, and the past experiences of developing countries in setting up customs unions or free trade areas have not proved very successful. The volume ends with a number of prescriptions for policy. Particular mention must be made of the selected bibliography on development problems which, in addition to being comprehensive, provides a concise summary of the content of each work listed (pp. 252–266).

*Strategy for Development* contains papers given at a conference held at Jan Smuts House in Johannesburg in December 1974. The papers which consider agricultural and industrial problems on the basis of specific experience are perhaps the most useful. Of these the paper by Robert E. Baldwin on 'The Industrialisation Programme of the Philippines' and Gavin Maasdorp on 'Industrialisation in a Small Country: The Experience of Swaziland' are particularly interesting.

RICHARD BAILEY

**Development Co-operation:** Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee. OECD 1976 Review. Report by Maurice J. Williams. *Paris: OECD. 1976. 271 pp. Pb: $16.25. £8·00. F65.00.*

**The Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries.** OECD. *Paris: OECD. 1976. 140 pp. Pb: $5.50. £2·40. F22.00.*

FOR specialists in development finance and other forms of aid to developing countries, the annual review by the Chairman of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been required reading since its inception in the early 1960s. Indeed, one of the standard tests for assessing and reviewing other books in this field is the extent to which the author has familiarised himself with the DAC's concepts and statistics.

In the 1960s, the authority of the Review rested on the DAC's status as the body representing virtually all the significant aid-giving countries, since China, the Soviet Union and the East European countries, which were not members, accounted only for a very small proportion of the total flow of resources. Towards the end of the decade, however, it acquired a significant standing in its own right, both as the best and most detailed source of statistical material and as an authoritative discussion of the policy issues which currently concerned the international development community as a whole. Time and again, as successive issues came to the fore in this community, it was the staff of the DAC Secretariat, acting with growing independence from the donor countries that they formally served, who succeeded in identifying a practicable way ahead. The fact that their work did not have the forceful rhetoric of the United Nations, or the intellectual

creativity of parallel academic work, should not be allowed to hide the scale of their achievement.

The latest Review is as distinguished as its predecessors. That in itself is remarkable, for the DAC no longer represents directly the most significant elements in the flow of resources to developing countries. Indeed, its stock-in-trade, which consists of the conventional bilateral aid programmes of the Western countries, now accounts for a proportion of the total flow hardly greater than the proportion originally provided by the communist countries when the DAC came into existence. It has to be assessed, therefore, by its performance of its other functions, as a forum for the discussion of policy issues, and as an increasingly sophisticated analysis of the total flow of resources.

It is in the second of these functions that most specialists in development finance will find the 1976 Review particularly useful. A chapter on 'The Changing Structure of Flows to Developing Countries' pulls together a number of recent trends—notably the growth of Eurocurrency lending to developing countries and the rise of the OPEC countries as sources of aid—which others with less ready access to the data have hitherto been unable to assess fully. This chapter is supported by a more detailed country-by-country and even agreement-by-agreement analysis of the OPEC countries' aid programmes, an excellent example of the DAC's painstaking and careful investigative work. Taken together, these two chapters constitute by far the best analysis of recent trends that has yet appeared.

It is anomalous, perhaps, since neither of the two main factors in the changing nature of resource flows to developing countries falls directly within the DAC's formal area of coverage. Certainly, there are some intriguing questions to ask on how it is that the DAC Secretariat has succeeded in collecting better data on OPEC flows than other reporting agencies more directly concerned. Anyone who has a professional interest in knowing which countries are doing what, however, will probably not worry about the anomaly, but simply be grateful for a useful job well done.

The 1976 Review is less satisfactory in its other function, as a discussion of policy issues. This is perhaps the first Review, at least since 1967, in which the Chairman in his opening chapter has wholly and unquestioningly identified himself with the consensus among the established community which runs the big spending programmes of the international development agencies, and he is diminished thereby. It should be remembered, however, that his predecessor, too, took some years before he found his own independent voice. Time will show.

One important element in the changing composition of flows to developing countries has been increasing use of official and private export credits, which have grown more rapidly than the traditional aid programmes, though less rapidly than the new aid programmes and Eurocurrency lending. An advantage of export credit from the borrower's point of view, as compared with the restrictions of bilateral aid, is the greater freedom it gives him to shop around, looking at the credit aspects of competing offers alongside price and quality; and under current conditions the terms of much export credit, provided the gains are not snatched back in excess prices, must be regarded as highly concessionary. But borrowers have usually found it difficult to exploit this advantage, because the mechanical complexity of export credit made it difficult to arrive at a true comparison. In this respect,

borrowers were at a disadvantage compared with the export credit agencies themselves, who tended to draw heavily on confidential comparative analysis undertaken by the OECD.

The OECD's decision to publish its comparative work, though admittedly in summary form and without any analytical commentary, must be regarded as a generous and constructive action. Virtually all export credit facilities are governed by fairly rigid rules. The rules tell you, if you know them, what is the least you can expect, and how to present your proposal in order to get it. (The rules do not tell you how much you can improve on that in negotiation, or what arguments to use, but that is something which no document could do, since it is more a matter of experience.)

The OECD's study describes the basic rules of each member country's export credit financing facilities. As such, it provides the would-be negotiator with a basis from which to start. It provides no more than that—certainly not a do-it-yourself guide to export credit—but it is a useful beginning. Unfortunately, however, the rules change rather rapidly; both the formal rules, and the unspoken rules on what forms of cheating are more or less permitted. To overcome that problem, the OECD should develop the precedent it has set, and turn its study of export credit financing into an annual report on the commercial financing of exports of equipment, to be used in parallel with the DAC Review, which is bound to remain primarily concerned with aid.

*University of Sussex* JOHN WHITE

**Oceanic Management:** Conflicting Uses of the Celtic Sea and Other Western UK Waters. Report of a conference held at University College, Swansea, Sept. 19–22, 1975. Edited by M. M. Sibthorp and M. Unwin. *London: Europa for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. 1977. 220 pp. £10·00.*

IN the spring of 1972, the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies undertook a series of comprehensive studies of the waters around the British Isles. The first result of this enterprise was a publication on the management of the North Sea.[1] The second study focuses on the different issues that affect the use of the marine resources of the western side of the United Kingdom, mainly the Celtic Sea. It consists of the report of a Conference on Oceanic Management, held in September 1975 under the auspices of the Institute. Several experts presented papers (later discussed by a large group of specialists) on ten different aspects of ocean management: economics and mineral extraction; commercial fisheries and conservation, pollution and the change of biological balance; scientific research, law, shipping and defence. A few papers ('Sand and Gravel Deposits in Western UK Waters', by J. E. Wright (pp. 11–18), and 'Changes in Marine Biological Balance—A Biochemical Approach', by Colm ÓhEocha (pp. 82–90), for example) are extremely specialised. Most of the papers, however, attempt to illustrate their often highly technical arguments by examples taken from the marine environment—not only of the Celtic Sea, but also of the North Sea, which considerably widens the range of conflicts under discussion.

[1] M. M. Sibthorp, ed., *The North Sea: Challenge and Opportunity* (London: Europa for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1975). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1976, p. 92.

In view of what has happened since the conference took place almost two years ago, the speakers not only showed profound knowledge of the facts, but also a great deal of political far-sightedness. When Ian Fells, in his brilliant essay on 'Constraints in Energy Planning' (pp. 124–34), suggests 'that the availability of North Sea oil has prevented us from looking rigorously at what really needs to be changed in our economy—how our exports are faring' (p. 130), and advocates an urgent development of alternative sources of energy by co-ordinating the British and EEC approach (p. 133), one hopefully wishes that our politicians, industrialists and trade unionists will in the end gain such an insight! The current disputes over quota restrictions for certain species of fish, mesh size regulations, fish farming and a sharp reduction in the British fishing fleet, are already anticipated in Richard Murray's paper on 'Problems and Prospects of the British Commercial Fishing Industry' (pp. 27–33). He also points out the need to start looking for alternative species of fish, such as blue whiting and silver smelt, and quotes some interesting attempts to discover trade and consumer reactions in terms of marketing and taste (p. 31): this has yet to be brought to the attention of the British manufacturing industry!

All the contributions to the long and often controversial discussions provide additional points of view, further information ('statistics show that fishery production from the Baltic has risen substantially during the period when the pollution has increased', p. 98), and link the various points made in previous talks.

To summarise, 'although it was not possible in the time available to arrive at any decisions as to the best methods of solving the conflicting interests' (p. xv), one hopes that this valuable collection of instructive and far-sighted essays and talks will receive widespread attention and stimulate further discussion.

*Chatham House* ANGELIKA VOLLE

## LAW

**Law among Nations.** An Introduction to Public International Law. 3rd. edn. By Gerhard von Glahn. *New York: Macmillan Publishing; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 763 pp. £9·50.*

**Anatomy of International Law:** A Study of the Role of International Law in the Contemporary World. By J. G. Merrills. *London: Sweet and Maxwell. 1976. 106 pp. £3·00. Pb: £1·20.*

PROFESSOR VON GLAHN'S work is an introductory textbook supplemented by moderately extensive, eminently lucid, case commentaries in abstract (or nutshell) form. Written by a political scientist, particularly, one imagines, for an American audience, it is not intended for use primarily in law schools. In these senses the book is probably unique to the British reader. The author himself acknowledges (see preface to the first edition [1]) that it is untypical of introductory works, which he categorises as commentaries, case books and combinations of cases and extensive editorial notes. This caricature of available material is idiosyncratic and incomplete. Professor von Glahn omits the *source* book. Dr. Harris has rightly cornered the

[1] New York: Macmillan, 1965; 2nd edn. publ. 1970.

market, at least in the United Kingdom, in this respect.[2] Intended to be relatively self-contained, the present volume must be seriously weakened by the omission of a variety of primary source material. The scheme then is a trifle gothic. Unfortunately this ethos tends to cloud the text. Thus in the preface we are told that the book's title has been chosen deliberately albeit that 'Jurists may smile at such a concept since to them law must stand above its subjects'. This does scant justice to the jurist, who may be forgiven his more likely reaction to the following, offered without argument: 'Is international law really law? . . . The correct view, however, is that international law should be regarded as true but imperfect law' (p. 7).

The third edition has been up-dated to February 1975. The chapter on the high seas has therefore been revised and there are changes, inter alia, to the sections on Namibia (South-West Africa), sovereign immunity, the width of the territorial sea and the definition of aggression. One useful feature of the book is the inclusion of a 200-page section on the laws of war. Unfortunately the vagaries of the academic year usually preclude consideration of this aspect in introductory courses. The author sensibly acknowledges that the use of force is here to stay. Still, it is a pity that a more rigorous appraisal could not have been offered of that intransigent contemporary problem, the activities of irregular forces, which are considered in less than two pages of text (pp. 552–53). Hijacking likewise apparently warrants only two pages (pp. 328–29), and here the discussion proceeds little further than the Tokyo Convention of 1963. Fortunately, however, as elsewhere, the reader is directed to further reading materials. The law of the sea accounts for only thirty-five pages of text and again slight regard is paid to recent developments. The chapter on recognition fails to consider the circumstances in which courts might acknowledge at least the existence of unrecognised governments. The author exhibits a certain schizophrenia in his citation of English cases (see, for example, pp. 115–16) and the reader would surely find it helpful to be directed to Francis Deak's *American International Law Cases*[3] and O'Connell's two volume *International Law*.[4] In sum, there is something inherently heterodox in this pot-pourri. Its appeal and place, at least in the United Kingdom, must be severely circumscribed, though it is a useful commentary on United States law and practice.

Mr. Merrills's *Anatomy of International Law* is published in the *Modern Legal Studies* series. The idea of the series is the provision of concise but comprehensive, inexpensive, personal statements on specialist areas of the law, usually considered, if at all, as part of larger textbooks. The author's subtitle 'A Study of the Role of International Law in the Contemporary World' explains the purpose of this volume, which is of a kind more usually associated, in monumental form, with American writers. In ninety-eight pages of text Mr. Merrills explores the nature, functions and significance of international law in a manner refreshingly divorced from sentimentality. The system is seen to be unique in that it is states themselves which make the rules which bind them, which interpret them and which are responsible

[2] *Cases and Materials on International Law* (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1973).
[3] New York: Oceana, 1974.
[4] 2nd edn. London: Stevens, 1970. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1971, p. 590.

ultimately for securing their observance. The law serves to allocate competence, to further the common interests of states and maintain the peace. The system works. The greater part of the law is regularly observed since states require a framework in which to conduct everyday intercourse. Emphasis on disputes, where the law is apparently disregarded, obfuscates the fact that even here it serves to control and contribute to the solution of the dispute. One feature which emerges is the materiality of the extreme diversity of states. This is seen particularly in traditional attitudes to the judicial settlement of disputes and in contemporary challenges to accepted law at the Law of the Sea Conference. A second feature is the similarities which emerge between international and municipal law in both content and function, and even the most commonly accepted difference, compliance, is shown to be less than complete.

Of course the work is not intended to be a textbook. Rather it seeks to provide 'a broader perspective' (preface). Nonetheless, the reader will find potted accounts of aspects relevant to the argument, for example criminal jurisdiction (pp. 34–36), global and regional organisations (pp. 43–48) and the Covenant and Charter (pp. 52–59). The text is augmented by suggestions for further reading, though it was disappointing not to find reference to Hinsley's *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*[5] and Professor Manning's *The Nature of International Society*,[6] which still reads as elegantly as ever, nor even to any of the standard articles on the legal character of international law.

Many undergraduates and others will find this little work illuminating. One wonders, however, whether the exigencies of publishers' restrictions have not diminished unduly the results of Mr. Merrills's unquestioned talents. A more scholarly or sophisticated analysis might then have resulted. For example, the author's third general conclusion, 'the ominous inability of states to evolve effective controls over the use of force' (p. 97), is not a particularly remarkable insight. The reviewer did not find the publisher's method of type composition, employed to contain costs, contributed to the text. It does indeed give 'a different appearance to the page' (see publisher's note). It contracts it and blurs it.

*University College of Wales, Aberystwyth* CLIFFORD HALL

**The Law of the Sea: US Interests and Alternatives.** Edited by Ryan C. Amacher and Richard James Sweeney. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 196 pp. $9.00. Pb: $4.00.*

THE final session of the UN Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS), began in May and conjectures as to the consequences of failure, and indeed what constitutes success beyond the signing of a lowest common denominator treaty, if even that can be attained, have more frequently been heard. This book is a collection of papers and discussions at a conference in 1975 (i.e. before the United States extended its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to 200 miles) and sponsored jointly by the American Enterprise Institute and

[5] London: Cambridge University Press, 1963. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1964, p. 82.

[6] London: Macmillan, 1975 (reissue). First publ. London: George Bell, 1962; reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1962, p. 374.

the United States Treasury. It claims, justifiably, to represent a broad spectrum of views drawn principally from lawyers, economists, government and business interests, although one participant observed that if it had been held at the American Society of International Law the questions would have been discussed in different terms. Most maritime issues were fully discussed but, as one might expect from the provenance of the conference, defence and deep-sea mining were well to the fore.

The group found difficulty in determining the interests of the United States, given the conflicts between uses as well as users of the sea, the doctrine of the freedom of the seas as against the solid economic benefits the United States itself may derive from an EEZ, and the possibility of trade-offs, both maritime and in terms of wider political objectives. Linkage strategy was invoked but with no very clear conclusion about what was to be linked and with whom, since there are many conflicting and cross-cutting interests, as was shown, for example, in the Group of 77 between land-locked and coastal states.

Some speakers questioned the value of these self-perpetuating international conferences, the logic of which dictates that some kind of convention should emerge as justification. Would not the United States fare better with the status quo, relying on bilateral treaties and trade-offs, since these may still be necessary even if a convention is signed? It was objected that too much has been attempted at UNCLOS and that there was no necessary connection between agreement on deep-sea mining and unimpeded passage through straits. What virtue was there in such a huge package?

A useful attempt was made to quantify the interests of the United States, more particularly its adherence to the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. A case study was made of the cost of shipping oil from the Persian Gulf to the United States in the unlikely event of restrictions being imposed on passage through straits newly created by the EEZ of coastal states. But there are many variables including Project Independence, and the authors admitted that it was difficult to quantify political objectives.

Interpretations of the phrase 'common heritage of mankind', as applied to marine resources and enshrined in the draft convention, exemplify the differences in attitude between the United States and spokesmen of the developing world, particularly on the issue of deep-sea mining and who should receive its benefits. The participants, fearing cartelisation, urged that there was no economic case for an international authority in this field and that the interests of consumers were insufficiently heard, not least in the developing world itself.

In conclusion, it is not surprising that while some participants feared the failure of UNCLOS, others dreaded its success.

*Chatham House* AUDREY PARRY

**Sea Power and the Law of the Sea.** By Mark W. Janis. *Lexington: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 99 pp. £6·90.*

THIS is a brief survey of the naval instruments and policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom, as the principal naval powers. The components of their navies and building programmes are described, and these navies and other naval forces around the world are placed in five categories in descending order of power. The role of straits and the

extension of maritime limits by coastal states, and the possible influence on them of the UN Law of the Sea Conference, are discussed. But the study adds little to existing literature.

*King's College, London* J. E. S. FAWCETT

**Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:** A World Survey. 5 vols. Edited by Willem A. Veenhoven assisted by Winifred Crum Ewing. *The Hague: Nijhoff for the Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies.* Vol. 1: *1975. 582 pp.* Vol. 2: *1975. 555 pp.* Vol. 3: *1976. 579 pp.* Vol. 4: *1976. 568 pp.* Vol. 5: *1976. 589 pp.*

THIS survey, sponsored by the Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies, of which the editor-in-chief is chairman, contains ninety-two studies, with about the same number of contributors. All except six of the studies are directed to a particular country or region: the more general studies deal with anti-Jewish discrimination since 1945; 'quota hiring in higher education'; gender or sex discrimination; military governments in communally divided societies; and the UN and human rights. Forty countries are represented, some several times in different aspects: thus India, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union receive twenty-six studies between them.

Geographically, the set is justly described as a world survey, there being no significant culture or social system unrepresented. There is a suggestion by one reviewer that there is in the whole enterprise an imbalance of approach, with a subtle element of apologia for some regions, particularly South Africa. It is true that, for example, Cuba, Mozambique and the Soviet Union are chastised, often in loaded language, while two of the three studies of South Africa are somewhat complacent. On the other hand, the third study of South Africa factually demonstrates the 'institutionalised inequality' and refuses any condonation. Further, racial discrimination in Rhodesia is amply exposed and there are critical accounts of discrimination in, for example, Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The contributors have in many cases particular knowledge, from background or direct experience, of the situations they describe; and there is a reasonable coherence of method between the studies. A recurring feature is the problem of contemporary violence in many societies, sparked off by oppression or discrimination, and it is described in a study of 'Pessimism in Australian Race Relations', in these words that have general implications:

> Our white philosophy in a democratic system is that effective democracy is equated with stable democracy, that is, that violence is pathological to the system of governance . . . violence is, in many ways an integral facet of western societies, especially frontier societies such as this. . . . That black people see violence as a legitimate political weapon is a reality. One can deplore it, attack it, and wish it were not there, but it is there and we have to learn to comprehend it, even appreciate it.

These volumes are a valuable collection of information and analysis, from which many useful comparisons can be made as guides to social policy. A defect is the absence of any index.

*King's College, London* J. E. S. FAWCETT

**Human Rights in Europe.** By A. H. Robertson. 2nd rev. edn. *Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1977. (Distrib. in USA by Humanities Press.) 329 pp. £9·95.*

WHEN the first edition of this book was written in 1962* only seven applications had been declared admissible by the European Commission of Human Rights, two cases had been referred to the Court and three to the Committee of Ministers. By the end of 1974 the numbers had risen to 140, 15 and 20 respectively. Dr. Robertson, formerly Director of Human Rights at the Council of Europe, has therefore had to do a considerable amount of revision. The result is a detailed study of how the European Convention on Human Rights has operated from when it came into force in 1953 until the end of 1974 with information on some cases considered by the Commission in 1975.

*Chatham House* D. H.

## ORIGINS AND COURSE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

**Grand Strategy.** Vol. 1: Rearmament Policy. By N. H. Gibbs. *London: HMSO. 1976. 859 pp. £19·00.*

**Naval Policy between the Wars.** Vol. 2: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930–1939. By Stephen Roskill. *London: Collins. 1976. 525 pp. £12·00.*

PROFESSOR GIBBS's work, though chronologically the first, is the final volume to appear in the Official History of grand strategy in the Second World War.[1] His task has been a daunting one: to survey the whole of the interwar period, and especially the years after 1933, in order to discover the origins of the grand strategy pursued during the war itself. He has sought to focus as far as possible on what was relevant to military strategy. But he has had to face an almost insuperable difficulty: how to avoid being drawn into writing a general history of British interwar defence and foreign policies. Hence we have a familiar recital of much of the purely diplomatic history of the 1930s—Abyssinia, the Rhineland, the quest for agreement with Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Again, there are many passages on the policies of armed services, particularly relating to the early 1930s, which, though of intrinsic interest, have little obvious relevance to the state of the armed forces in 1939, still less to grand strategy in the Second World War. In attempting to draw on so wide a canvas, Professor Gibbs has thus inevitably produced a work largely devoid of a central theme. But given the diligence and skill with which he has endeavoured to compress a vast quantity of primary material into the pages of a single volume, he is certainly entitled to admiration as well as sympathy for the extent of the remit given him by those responsible for the overall planning of the series.

Professor Gibbs also deserves our sympathy in that during the period

* Manchester: Manchester University Press; New York: Oceana, 1963. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1964, p. 701.

[1] Vol. 2 by J. R. M. Butler (1957). Vol. 3, Part 1 by J. M. A. Gwyer, Part 2 by J. R. M. Butler (1964); reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1965, p. 302. Vol. 4 by Michael Howard (1972); reviewed Oct. 1972, p. 633. Vol. 5 by J. Ehrman (1956); reviewed Jan. 1957, p. 93. Vol. 6 by J. Ehrman (1956); reviewed April 1957, p. 214.

when the Official Histories were being written, a thirty-year rule was introduced for public access to the official records. Undoubtedly his work would have had much more impact if it had appeared ten years ago or if the fifty-year rule had remained in force. Now, alas, much of what he has to reveal has already appeared in numerous recent 'unofficial' monographs about the 1930s. Above all, his qualified defence of Neville Chamberlain is now quite familiar. We already recognise the weight of the case against his being the invertebrate or gullible figure of legend. We know, too, how important were perceptions of military weakness in underpinning the search for appeasement. It is indeed a measure of how far revisionism has gone since the introduction of the thirty-year rule that Professor Gibbs's judgments on the importance of military weakness seem, if anything, to be too much tempered by his advancing the case for the old orthodoxy as represented by Anthony Eden. Professor Gibbs, it is true, sees much merit in Thomas Inskip's lucid challenge to Eden:

> The plain fact which cannot be obscured is that it is beyond the resources of this country to make proper provision in peace for the defence of the British Empire against three major Powers in three different theatres. . . . I therefore repeat with fresh emphasis the opinion which I have already expressed as to the importance of reducing the scale of our commitments and the number of our potential enemies (p. 293).

But the author also sees fit to offer this rather unconvincing defence of Eden who resisted the Chamberlain-Inskip line of seeking to detach Italy and perhaps Japan from Germany:

> In the long-term, however, Mr. Eden's judgment was surely correct. Mussolini, with his dreams of empire, was bound to be jealous of Britain's influence in the Mediterranean, and could be successfully negotiated with only from a position of strength. . . . The problem of Japan was more complicated. Nonetheless, Mr. Eden was also surely right to argue that she would not necessarily go to war because her Anti-Comintern partners decided to do so (p. 404).

The fact is that Eden's optimistic standpoint was only justified by events in the short term and then only because Hitler changed the rules. By forging his deal with Moscow in 1939, the latter destroyed the Anti-Comintern Pact and thus ensured that neither Italy nor Japan would go to war for Danzig. Both Chamberlain and Halifax, with admirable consistency, maintained that the forging of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact thus served British interests. Presumably Professor Gibbs, like Eden, would disagree.

A more narrowly focused approach to the 1930s is Captain Roskill's second volume of interwar naval history.[2] He once again triumphantly succeeds in making his complicated and highly technical story both intelligible and readable. Unlike Professor Gibbs, he does not attempt to compress too much into one volume. On the contrary, he recognises instinctively how much political and diplomatic background is essential to an understanding of the Admiralty's problems and he has sufficient self-discipline not to stray beyond this line.

[2] *Naval Policy between the Wars. Vol. I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919–1929* (London: Collins, 1968). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1968, p. 745.

Captain Roskill in effect covers one aspect of Professor Gibbs's subject. But despite the greater detail, Captain Roskill's account is usually the less dry. For technical matters are skilfully blended with diverting accounts of the human qualities and frailties of those involved in shaping British naval policy. This three-dimensional aspect of Captain Roskill's account may owe much to his willingness to rely not merely on official archives but to explore many collections of private papers, some in the United States.

For the Royal Navy the 1930s were sombre years. They began with an unwelcome Naval Disarmament Agreement. Then came the Invergordon Mutiny, whose course is authoritatively outlined for the first time by Captain Roskill. (He brings greater enlightenment in one chapter than several writers have managed in full-length books.) Then, as hopes for international disarmament faded, came the struggle for rearmament against a Treasury which, perhaps rightly, did not wish to jeopardise a precariously maintained economic recovery. Rivalry with the other armed services was also inevitably a feature. Finally, we see the Admiralty seeking to minimise British naval involvement in the Abyssinian and Spanish conflicts and preparing for war against Germany and maybe other countries.

Possibly Captain Roskill, diligent in research as he has been, could have given us somewhat more detail on Anglo-German naval relations during these years. Instead of devoting quite so much space to the domestic controversy about naval aviation and to the various international disarmament conferences, he could perhaps have concentrated rather more on the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 and its aftermath, making use of the extensive German sources. But this is a mere quibble. Taken as a whole, this is a most worthy addition to the author's many previous volumes of modern naval history.

*Polytechnic of North London* DAVID CARLTON

**British Air Policy between the Wars: 1918–1939.** By H. Montgomery Hyde. *London: Heinemann. 1976. 539 pp. £15·00.*

IT seems odd and irrelevant to begin with balloons. Soon, however, we are sailing past the first passenger-carrying flight of the Montgolfier brothers in 1783 (cargo: a sheep, a cock and a duck), past Gambetta's famous aerial escape from besieged Paris and onwards via the Wrights to a safe landing, on page 21, at the outbreak of the First World War. If Mr. Hyde's introduction has been self-indulgent, his next twenty pages lay the foundations for a long and painstaking book. In his review of the transformation of the Royal Flying Corps into the RAF between 1914 and 1918, the two great themes emerge which necessarily, thereafter, dominate the orchestration of his opus: internecine conflict between the Services (in particular, the Admiralty and the Air Staff), and a sustained commitment to bomber aircraft as the prime war-winning instrument.

Mr. Hyde is emphatic that this book is a record of policies. Perhaps the best test of a policy is to begin by examining its effect. 'Britain's first-line strength in September 1939 was not much more than one third of that of the *Luftwaffe*, while her reserves were less than half of Germany's' (p. 502). In that first line the bombers were pathetic—Battles and Hampdens—with no developed method of identifying targets at night, no de-icing devices, weak and inefficient bombs. Defendants of the Air Staff point to the heavy bombers

just coming on stream, but they were coming too late: had there been a 'shooting war' in the winter of 1939, Mr. Hyde concludes, 'Bomber Command would have been incapable of launching anything in the nature of an effective strategic bombing offensive against Germany'. And yet the main thrust of the Air Staff's thinking during the two interwar decades had been wholly and militantly in favour of a counter-offensive by bombers. Considered as a system for preparing a nation for war, it may be described as a policy without a product, for which Mr. Hyde provides the explanations but cannot furnish an excuse.

The chaos of German air policy (so vividly illuminated, for example, in David Irving's biography of Field Marshal Milch, *The Rise and Fall of the Luftwaffe*[1]) has often been adversely criticised, and Mr. Hyde, who is strong on personalities and the interplay between politics and practice, might well have compared more exhaustively the peacetime aberrations of the two future belligerents. That is to say, since he is telling a story of missed opportunities, myopia in high places, short sight and self-interest, he might have pointed out more forcibly that we were not alone in this.

And a good thing too, for as he re-treads the well-worn path with unhurried pace and a remorseless attention to detail he reminds us (summarising Andrew Boyle's biography[2] with amplification and reservation) that without Trenchard the RAF might have withered and died in the early 1920s; that the bitter debates in those years over the defences of Singapore left us, in 1942, with a base whose defencelessness was the product not of objective thought but of blind inter-service jealousy; that the plethora of plans, now for expansion, now for treading water, which bedevilled the Air Staff in the 1930s was a failure of blinkered politicians insufficiently enlightened by their professional advisers (the presence of Ellington as Chief of Air Staff from 1933 to 1937 was evidently a disaster); and that the event which has led to so much purple prose, the performance of a just adequate handful of Spitfires, Hurricanes and their pilots in the Battle of Britain, was due not to far-sighted professional airmen but to the maligned Inskip who, in his minute of December 9, 1937, successfully challenged the entrenched doctrines of the Air Staff with a single sentence and fought his case through Cabinet. 'The role of our Air Force is not an early knock-out blow—no one has suggested that we can accomplish that—but to prevent the Germans from knocking us out'. In other words, Mr. Hyde makes it plain that (granted the money available at the end of 1937) we should, if the Air Staff and not Inskip had prevailed, have possessed in the summer of 1940 more squadrons of second-rate bombers and fewer resources in first-rate fighters. This is not a warming thought.

Inskip is also a reminder that at least a few of the Frocks did the state some service: Balfour rescuing a moribund RAF, Swinton, Hoare—even Hoare. Mr. Hyde documents their contributions carefully, to offset against Baldwin's lethargy, Chamberlain's self-delusion and the dead hand of Simon. But he is perhaps less penetrating about other civilians, since he does not bring out sufficiently the extent to which the main elements on which we came to rely in the air war, the good fighters, the best bombers, radar, beam navigation, were the achievement of private aircraft manufacturers and

[1] Boston: Little Brown, 1974.

[2] *Trenchard* (London: Collins, 1962).

scientists working sometimes in advance of, and sometimes even counter to, official doctrine.

Nor is he always invulnerable over particular facts. Can it really be maintained (p. 419) that the Spitfire was the fastest fighter in the Second World War? And there is one baffling lapse. A footnote on page 462 denies in detail the proposition that Desmond Morton, from his vantage point at the Industrial Intelligence Centre, assisted Churchill in the 1930s with information about German rearmament in the air. 'I am convinced', says Mr. Hyde, 'that it is wrong'. In his introduction he thanks Martin Gilbert for reading his proofs. Yet in Gilbert's own introduction to his recent fifth volume of the Churchill biography [3] he makes it plain in general (as he does in detail in the text) that Morton was a constant and beneficial feed, quoting a Churchill letter to Morton of October 15, 1947: 'When I read all these letters and papers you wrote for me and think of our prolonged conversations I feel how very great is my debt to you....' Something has slipped.

Still, this is a most valuable survey full of well-marshalled material and pervaded, above all, by Trenchard's long-range vision. Others had to adjust its focus but he, above all, kept Britain air-worthy. And who, in 1921, prophesied that 'we may yet see governments living in dugouts and holding Cabinet meetings in the bowels of the earth'? It was Trenchard forecasting Storey's Gate.

RONALD LEWIN

**The Abolition of War:** The 'Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914–1919. By Keith Robbins. *Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 1976. 255 pp. £5·00.*

THIS is a meticulously-researched anatomy of the 'peace movement' in Britain between 1914 and 1919, based on Professor Robbins's doctoral thesis, and written with his characteristic precision and care. The Great War of 1914–18 had a devastating effect on the diverse collection of politically and religiously motivated groups and societies who in 1914 were opposed to war. It presented them with a number of painful choices, and brought them face to face with complex questions of moral and political philosophy which threw some groups into disarray and stimulated the creation of fresh organisations.

As pacifists worked out a set of responses to the first phase of the war, the military situation worsened, throwing up new challenges, the most serious of which was conscription. Professor Robbins shows us how the different groups responded in a variety of ways to the government's increasingly stringent recruitment policies, from the uncompromising opposition of some members of the No-Conscript Fellowship—notably Clifford Allen and Bertrand Russell—to the confused reactions of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Equally mixed feelings greeted the early proposals for a League of Nations and for a negotiated peace. Only when the efforts of the peace groups to influence government policies had failed, when the war had been fought to a finish, and when the peace treaties had been negotiated, were the leading pacifist campaigners able to unite on a common platform—hostility to the peace settlement of 1919. This time, in marked contrast to their wartime experiences, their campaign against it was successful. Their view that the peace treaties were immoral and unjust, and that the League of Nations

[3] *Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 5· 1922–1939* (London: Heinemann, 1976).

was flawed because it was based on an alliance of victorious powers, gained widespread support and was increasingly echoed as memories of the war faded. Ironically, such attitudes contributed to the emergence of a fresh set of challenges in the middle and late 1930s which threatened to engulf pacifists once more in a cauldron of military conflict and personal turmoil.

While Professor Robbins's study will appeal mainly to specialists in the field of twentieth-century history and international relations, it touches upon a number of political and moral dilemmas of a general nature, such as the circumstances in which pacifists should support the use of force by the state or by an international organisation. In focusing upon the ways in which various peace groups tried to resolve this and other questions, Professor Robbins reveals the difficulties lying in the way of organised political and religious anti-war agitation in wartime, and the problems of formulating coherent political and ethical responses to complex international issues. The result is a monograph of considerable historical interest.

*University of Lancaster* RUTH HENIG

**Mussolini's Roman Empire.** By Denis Mack Smith. *London, New York: Longman. 1976. 322 pp. £7·50.*

CASSIUS said of that other builder of a Roman empire:

> . . . He sees the Romans are but sheep;
> He were no lion were not Romans hinds.

Mussolini saw his Italians as sheep only at the end, when things had gone irretrievably wrong and he blamed them for it. But in the earlier days when he first began to dream of empire, his propaganda represented them as a race of noble warriors whom he was training to become the greatest people in the world. War alone would release all their energies, and the idea of war became a distinguishing mark of Fascism.

By the early 1930s, with domestic affairs established in accordance with Fascist tenets and the Lateran Pacts concluded, Mussolini began to seek for some prestige victory on a wider scale. He had at first condemned imperialism, claiming that Fascism was not for export. But his ideas changed, and 'the expansion of Fascism in the world' became official policy. Perhaps a more cogent reason nearer home was Hitler's advent to power in 1933: Italy had better expand towards Africa quickly, because its troops might be needed on its own Austrian frontier. So the Ethiopian campaign was launched and won with relative ease, if at vast cost. That ease gave Mussolini the illusion that wars could always be short. His second venture, in Spain, dragged on too long for his liking. But it did not prevent him from setting his sights next on Albania. By that time the Axis had been forged. War in Europe was imminent, and the long-built-up Fascist myth of Italian encirclement in 'mare nostrum' demanded that Italy should take part in it beside Germany. The short-war illusion still persisted; and so, unprepared, incredulous of possible defeat, Italy embarked on June 10, 1940 on the war that was to put an end to the empire and to Fascism.

Denis Mack Smith traces this story in detail with all its attendant interplay of foreign policy motives. He makes his readers feel how the whole idea of empire was built up on a myth based on Mussolini's own self-deception, but orchestrated by his magisterial skill in propaganda. Up to 1936, when

Ciano took over foreign affairs, except for Grandi's brief period of office in 1929–32 Mussolini was his own foreign minister, and when war came he took supreme command of all the services. But he had no technical skills in military or economic matters; he had never taken much notice of what others told him, especially if the news was bad; and so the service chiefs' requests for more arms, equipment, even clothing for the Russian campaign, went unheeded—indeed it was months before the country was put on something approaching a serious war footing. In fact, as Mr. Mack Smith ends, 'He had got used to living in cloud-cuckoo-land, where words and not facts mattered' (p. 282).

There has been a vast literature about Fascism in Italy, mainly of course in Italian (the bibliography in Mr. Mack Smith's book runs to twenty pages), while in English the foreign policy of the 'empire' period is covered in such general works as Kirkpatrick and Fermi and, for the Axis in particular, by Deakin and Elizabeth Wiskemann. But students will welcome this book, which pulls the whole story together in a way that is at once scholarly and eminently readable. Incidentally, while Mr. Mack Smith refers to Ciano's diaries as 'the most fascinating and useful source for Mussolini's declining years', among all the proliferation of Italian memoir-writers one name is strikingly missing—Grandi, one of the few survivors of that drama still living in Italy today.

MURIEL GRINDROD

**Origins of the War in the East:** Britain, China and Japan 1937–39. **By** Aron Shai. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 267 pp. £9·50.*

IN recent years, British Far Eastern policy in the decade before the outbreak of the Second World War has been extensively discussed in books and articles by such writers as Thorne, Lee, Endicott and Trotter. These volumes, however different in their approach, have very considerably advanced our understanding of the factors which shaped British policy towards China and Japan in this period. They provide a yardstick against which to measure any new contribution and it has to be stated that, so judged, Dr. Shai's new book does not significantly advance the discussion. In part this is because it is not quite clear what he is trying to do—*Origins of the War in the East* is a curious title to choose for a study which is not concerned either with the origins of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war of 1937 or with that between Britain and Japan in 1941. As the subtitle indicates, the subject is in fact the triangular relationship between Britain, China and Japan from 1937 to 1939. The author boldly states that his book seeks to answer questions, listing them on page 11 in rapid succession. They include such central concerns as: 'What were the decisive factors and considerations which determined British policy? What was the rôle Britain played in the Sino-Japanese war?' At the end, however, the answers are not so readily apparent. While the main phases of diplomacy are adequately considered, and the complexities of economic and financial policy to some extent unravelled, the style is not easy to read. The conclusions seem chiefly to take the form of further questions, culminating in 'Was the British Government ever, at any stage of the conflict, prepared to stand by its own principles and its moral obligation to the people of Asia? Were not all the difficulties, both real and imagined, adduced as excuses for inaction?' (p. 247).

That is how matters are left. There is, it is true, a certain amount of flirtation with the concept of 'appeasement' and talk of a 'Far Eastern Munich' (though it turns out to be unnecessary), but there is no serious attempt to discuss Britain's European position and hence to decide whether 'excuses' or 'reasons' are indeed appropriate. It must also be added that the range of documentary and secondary material used in this study is less impressive and comprehensive than that already used by the earlier writers previously mentioned.

*University College of North Wales, Bangor* KEITH ROBBINS

**Deterrent Diplomacy:** Japan, Germany and the USSR 1935–1940. Edited by James William Morley. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1976. 363 pp. $21.90.*

IN 1962–63, a team of Japanese scholars produced, in seven volumes, a series of highly-important studies dealing with aspects of their country's policies in the twelve years or so before Pearl Harbour, under the title, *Taiheiyō sensō e no michi: kaisen gaikō shi.* For non-Japanese-speaking students of the period, this material has up to now remained frustratingly unavailable, except for those who, like the present reviewer, were fortunate enough to visit Columbia's East Asian Institute, where James Morley and his colleagues were kind enough to permit access to a typescript translation of the work.

Now, however, matters are to be greatly improved, for the volume under review is the first in a series of five in which a substantial portion of the original Japanese text is being published in translation, together with valuable introductions, by the East Asian Institute. It is an undertaking that will put many students in the debt of Professor Morley and his collaborators.

The first volume contains three studies: of Japan and the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, of the confrontation between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1935–39, and of the Tripartite Pact of 1940. Each of the essays, based on a detailed examination of a wide range of Japanese material, offers a number of important points, which were new when the work first appeared. For example, there are disclosures concerning the role played by the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, Major General (as he was in 1936) Ōshima Hiroshi, in the formulation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, that were not uncovered by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. The same essay also underlines the extent to which, in 1936, members of the army's High Command, as well as the Foreign Ministry, remained anxious to arrive at a modus vivendi with Britain—a factor that should make students of London's Far Eastern policies in the 1930s look again at some of the assumptions they have tended to make concerning the Chamberlain-Fisher attempt to develop a more flexible approach to Anglo-Japanese relations.

The second of the three essays is taken up with the Soviet-Japanese crises that occurred on the northern, eastern and then western borders of Manchuria between 1937 and 1939, and it is fascinating to be able to set the Japanese side of things against what Professor Erickson has already provided for the Soviet Union in his study of *The Soviet High Command.*[1] It becomes clearer than ever, for example, that in the fierce military clashes of 1938 and 1939, Japan suffered a considerable setback, and that in these brief battles the

[1] London: Macmillan, 1962. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1963, p. 611.

potential of the Red Army was demonstrated to an extent that was maske for many Western observers by the course of the better-known war betwee the Soviet Union and Finland that followed.

As for the final study, of the formulation of the Tripartite Pact betwee Japan, Germany and Italy in 1940, it contains material which reinforce the evidence presented in the volume edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpe Okamoto, *Pearl Harbour as History*,[2] of the extent to which policymaking i Tokyo had come to rest on a confused and faction-ridden basis. In additior it reveals, for example, how the Foreign Minister in Tokyo, Matsuoka managed, by means of a secret exchange of letters with the Germa ambassador, to reserve his country's freedom of decision, despite pledge contained in the public text of the treaty.

The volume is excellently edited for the most part, although it is surprisin to find that a mis-dating of Hitler's 'Hossbach' address to senior militar and civilian officials in November 1937 has not been weeded out after a this time. It represents an essential source for Western students of th international history of the Far East in the 1930s.

*University of Sussex* CHRISTOPHER THORNE

**British Foreign Policy in the Second World War.** Vol. V. By Sir Llewelly Woodward in collab. with M. E. Lambert. *London: HMSO. 197ℓ 542 pp. £10·00.*

THE final volume of the late Sir Llewellyn Woodward's magisterial offici history has been posthumously completed by Margaret Lambert. Like th first volume, and in contrast to the intervening ones, it has a real unity c theme—it is about the steps taken to conclude the war. Although during th three years covered—September 1942 to July 1945—Britain was actin consistently as one of the Big Three, it was through force of circumstance rather than lack of foresight that it exhausted itself through the resultin over-extension. In fact, although for obvious reasons the British governmer was preoccupied with the German issue and, somewhat less so, with th proposed United Nations Organisation, it accepted, although rather reluc tantly, Britain's very limited role in the Far East. Significantly, Churchi did not take part in the Yalta meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin o the Far East which is therefore not documented.

The volume starts with Gladwyn Jebb's memorandum on a 'Four Powe Plan' which envisaged the continuation of Britain's world role, but th decision on this was taken only after a serious consideration in the Foreig Office of the option to abdicate as a great power, which was rejected largel because the outcome was considered to be likely to lead to Britain becomin an American, Soviet or German satellite (p. 5). The postwar order wa considered before victory seemed to be assured only because the Britis officials had to react to the early American postwar plans which envisage a settlement amounting to no less than a *pax Americana.*[1]

The accounts of the conferences from Quebec to Potsdam do not ad

[2] New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1974. Reviewed in *Internationa Affairs*, July 1975, p. 460.

[1] The details of the actual debate in the Foreign Office can be found in *The Memoir of Lord Gladwyn* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972. Reviewed in *Internationa Affairs*, Oct. 1972, p. 637.

anything substantial to what is already known and will, no doubt, be supplemented by further details from the full documentation now open to the public. Sir Llewellyn's account will, however, retain its great value as a clear and detailed account of British foreign policy of the period, useful both for organising more detailed documentary research and for providing the British angle on historical accounts taking a global or another national angle.

*University of Southampton* J. FRANKEL

**The Appeal that was Never Made:** The Allies, Scandinavia and the Finnish Winter War 1939–1940. By Jukka Nevakivi. *London: C. Hurst. 1976. 225 pp. £7·00.*

THE appeal that was never made was the appeal by the Finnish government to Britain and France to send an expeditionary force to take part in its war with the Soviet Union. If it had been made, the Allies would have tried to land a force at Narvik and send a brigade group down the railway, through Sweden, to operate in northern Finland against the Russians. In the process the Allied troops would have taken possession of the Swedish iron-ore fields and cut off supplies to Germany, which for the more rational planners in the Allied camp was the real point of the plan. Dr. Nevakivi's book studies the genesis and development of this plan, and the reactions to it in Finland; it shows how the Allies moved from indifference to Finland's fate at the beginning of the Winter War to a realisation that Finland could hold out, given supplies and encouragement, and that this could be used, in Churchill's words, as 'a lever' to stop the supply of iron-ore to Germany and to open up a second front in Scandinavia against Germany. But thereafter the Allies became the victims of their own planning, some of their leaders forgot that saving Finland was only a pretext, and made the rescue of Finland a major objective of Allied policy, hence the plan to send an expeditionary force. They were saved from this folly by the Finnish leaders most of whom were able to recognise that the Allied offer of assistance was worthless in military terms, and could be a political disaster for Finland. Dr. Nevakivi shows that at the end, even Allied leaders like Chamberlain had come to realise the unwisdom of what they were proposing, and were relieved when the Finns allowed them to back out of their plan.

The main outlines of this affair have been well known for some time and Dr. Nevakivi has no radically new interpretations to offer. The importance of his book is that it is the first scholarly study in English which has used the British cabinet papers; that as an official in the Finnish foreign service he has had access to Finnish sources not quoted previously; and that while he was a visiting professor in Paris he was able to look at French archives, which have not been available before, although he was not permitted to quote from them. Even so, Dr. Nevakivi is able to describe the French contributions to Allied policy in a more informed and authoritative manner than previous writers on the subject. He has used these advantages to produce a very readable analysis of his subject; there is much informed discussion of the motives of the participants and an interesting assessment of the prospects for the expedition if the Finns had made their appeal. Non-Finnish readers will find the quotations from Finnish sources that are usually inaccessible

to them particularly valuable and will be grateful for the details of exactl what Anglo-French assistance to Finland during the Winter War, bot official and unofficial, amounted to, and what it was worth to the Finns. Th is a book that does credit to Dr. Nevakivi for his scholarship and enterpris and to his British publishers who have enabled the non-Finnish speakin community to gain access to his work.

*University of St. Andrews* A. F. UPTON

**The North African Landings 1942:** A Strategic Decision. By Keith Sain bury. *London: Davis-Poynter. 1976. 215 pp. £5·00.*

THIS is a volume in the series on the politics and strategy of the Secon World War, edited by Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling. As suc it has been written to fit in with the aim of the series—to explain wh various operations took place, and how they were related to the war as whole; and the author has also had to work within the limits of space impose on contributors. Many readers will therefore still wish to refer to Micha Howard's *Grand Strategy*, vol. IV,[1] where the same subject is treated a greater length; and specialist readers will also bear in mind the author own note that he has been unable to make use of American, French c German manuscript sources, so that the book is to some extent writte from a British point of view. Nonetheless, given these limitations, M Sainsbury has scored a distinct success. The book proceeds systematically an clearly from an exposition of the main elements in British and America strategy in 1941 to a review of the significance of French North Afric then to an analysis of the 'Arcadia' conference of December 1941–Januar 1942, and a discussion of the prolonged debate on whether or not to car out a North African landing. It concludes with a brief account of th campaign, and a useful summing up of the consequences of the operatio There are few surprises along the route, and judgment on the book mu largely depend on how far the author has got the emphasis right an brought illumination to a familiar story. From this test it emerges well. Fc example, the author reminds us of the importance of Wavell's appointme as the first Supreme Allied Commander, with all that followed from th step. He makes the valuable point that Hopkins (and perhaps also Roosevel saw a landing in Europe in 1942 as a concession to the Soviet demands fc a 'second front', and thus as an alternative to meeting Soviet territori demands in eastern Europe. He gives an admirably clear description of th final decision for North Africa, and demonstrates its inevitability, given tha the British would not accept a cross-Channel operation in 1942 and th Roosevelt was determined that American troops must somehow get int action against the Germans in that year. He makes an interesting—thoug not wholly convincing—case that Darlan's presence in Algiers in Novemb 1942 was not accidental. The final summing-up is particularly well done, wit its emphasis on the criteria by which the wisdom or otherwise of the Nort African operation may be judged. On the other side, there is not sufficie emphasis on the crucial importance of how quickly, after the initial landing the Anglo-American forces could reach the Tunis-Bizerta area, to forestall a Axis counter-move. (The Darlan deal can only be understood against th

[1] London: HMSO, 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1972, p. 633.

background of the vital need of haste, as well as the desire to save casualties.) Also, the summing-up contains no examination of the point (raised earlier in the book) about the saving of shipping secured by opening the Mediterranean —a crucial strategic question.

The notes are full and useful; but the maps are barely adequate.

*University of Liverpool* P. M. H. BELL

**Resistance:** An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism 1940–1945. By M. R. D. Foot. *London: Eyre Methuen. 1976. 346 pp. £6·95.*

M. R. D. FOOT has written an ambitious, brave and stimulating book. It is ambitious because he has set out to cover the whole field of resistance in Europe from 1940–45—the motives, modes, techniques and achievement of resistance, the various British, American and Soviet secret organisations in contact with resisters, the individual (and often competing or conflicting) resistance movements in the individual countries, the results obtained and what Mr. Foot calls ' the real impact ' of the whole undertaking.

For the general reader, this wide and sweeping approach, interspersed with vivid snapshots of incidents or persons, is bound to be both attractive and thought-provoking. Each will wonder: What would *I* have done in these circumstances, under these pressures? For those who have special interest in one particular section of resistance, it may provide a useful mental jolt, making them look beyond a somewhat parochial concern with complex details to broader horizons.

Mr. Foot is brave because most of the vast and very varied area he has set out to explore has never yet been accurately mapped. Much vital evidence and documentation is non-existent or unavailable, and war-time passions, prejudices, loves and hates still live on in those who were in contact with resistance, however remotely. So the area is scattered with minefields, and an apparently dependable fact or solid judgment is always liable to blow up in the explorer's face. Mr. Foot is bound to undergo this experience, but is obviously prepared to make good use of it to elicit fresh facts or to deepen judgment.

Disarmingly, he does not conceal his own loves and prejudices. Among European countries, he is clearly most strongly attracted by France, and, as the official historian of SOE's work in France,[1] is most authoritative when writing about French resistance. In the inter-service rivalry, even antagonism, between SOE and the Secret Intelligence Service, his allegiance is naturally enough with SOE. But perhaps he is going a little too far when he writes: ' there did seem to be something, sly, wry, waspish in the manner of a lot of S.I.S.'s staff ' (p. 307).

Finally, the book is stimulating in that it provokes a strong urge to question, to contradict, to argue back—in fact to use the book as the starting-point for a free-for-all discussion. Why has Mr. Foot not tried harder to analyse the motive forces that drove ordinary men and women into anything so deadly and dangerous as anti-Nazi resistance? Why did so many idealistic and intelligent young people, throughout Europe, turn to the communists rather than other political groups—except, of course, in the countries immediately

[1] *SOE in France: An Account of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940–1944* (London: HMSO, 1966). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1966, p. 693.

bordering the Soviet Union where patriotism conflicted with the attraction ( communism? How far could Stalin in fact control the communist resister was he in practice in any stronger position than the British were in the rather unsuccessful efforts to control the movements with which they were i contact? There is a good deal of indirect evidence on this point. And ho important were links with outside backers—SOE, the American OSS ( the Russian NKVD—to the resistance? Was praise in a BBC broadca: worth more or less than an arms drop?

Mr. Foot may perhaps develop these themes in later work on resistanc( It is to be hoped he will—not, as he rightly contends, that any stereotype pattern of character or behaviour of resisters is likely to be discovere except, as in the Dutch saying which he quotes, that live fish swim again: the stream (p. 320). If he does continue his exploration, he might find usefı material in the British Foreign Office, War Office and Chiefs of Sta documents now available. Though SOE documents are officially withhel( except for those dealing with France to which Mr. Foot had access for h *SOE in France*, the available documents do contain a good deal of inform: tion about SOE's relations with European resistance movements and abo1 the War Cabinet's and Chiefs' of Staff estimate of their value. These woul fill out, and provide a check on, the memoirs and secondary works which M Foot has used, together with personal contacts and conversations, as h chief source.

His present book contains some slips which, if rigorous standards of exa( scholarship are applied, are unfortunate; but it is understood that these aı being ironed out in future impressions of a work which is certain tö t widely read and to evoke fresh interest in an endlessly fascinating an controversial subject.

ELISABETH BARKER

**The Historian as Diplomat:** Charles Kingsley Webster and the Unite Nations 1939–1946. By P. A. Reynolds and E. J. Hughes. *Londor Martin Robertson. 1977. 198 pp. £7·85.*

THIS work records the hopes and fears of a distinguished academic in th exciting but infuriating world of real politics. Charles Webster's unconceale ambition was to ' penetrate ' the Foreign Office and induce that redoubtabl body to accept his views on suitable machinery for international peac( keeping. In this, thanks largely to my support, he may fairly be said t have succeeded. Those interested in his vivid account of battles long ag might, however, read it in conjunction with my own *Memoirs* [1] which perhap put the Diary into better perspective. (Cadogan hardly mentions Webstei Eden not at all.)

I was not indeed jealous of the ' Prof ', as he seems sometimes to sugges After all, he was in no sense the rival of an official who was only to happy to make use of his expertise. Nor is it disputed that the gradu: modification of the various Foreign Office papers (mostly drafted by m after consultation with all and sundry), and notably the original ' Fou Power Plan ' (not printed among the annexes to his book), so as to ge them rather more into harmony with the idea of a world organisatioı

[1] London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oc 1972, p. 637.

resembling in many ways the old League of Nations, was to a large extent his work.

Still, Webster did not change the official attitude—that is to say the attitude of the officials—quite as much as he thought. I myself started off with a prejudice against anything based on the model of the League of Nations of which, contrary to what Webster suggests, I had had very considerable and highly depressing direct experience. Short of an inconceivable World State, no peace-keeping machinery could in my view possibly succeed unless the major powers were prepared to work in some sort of harmony.

The 'Prof' did not really dispute this but he placed all his hopes on a clause obliging any power, however great, to accept the judgment of a majority of a World Council, including all the other great powers, on any dispute to which it might be a party. I agreed to embody this principle in our final paper for discussion at Dumbarton Oaks because, after all, it was irreproachable; but I was not surprised when it did not figure in the corresponding American paper, still less when it was omitted from the Soviet counterpart. Frankly, I never believed that the United States Senate would agree. If so, any document accepted by the Administration and then repudiated by the Senate—as in 1919—would have been an unmitigated disaster.

Our eventual paper was a very good one, but it was a miracle that we managed to get some ministerial approval. Churchill, disdainful of the work of officials, refused to read it; Eden accepted authorship rather petulantly and Cadogan, eventually a tower of strength, was distracted by his war work and only focused the point of a long document with many groans and accusations of poor drafting. Still, there it was, approved at least by the admirable Dick Law in his Interdepartmental, and by Mr. Attlee in his Cabinet Committee. Much of it was later embodied *totidem verbis* in the Charter.

Webster recounts how just after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference opened he persuaded the Americans to accept our voting thesis after all (p. 43). This was a great feather in his cap and he was perhaps rightly outraged when Denis Capel-Dunn, the brilliant representative of the British Chiefs of Staff, and I went about uttering dark heresies—perhaps not entirely (as he hints) without some intention of pulling his rather sensitive leg (p. 45). But it is hard that in his irritation he should accuse me of being an historical ignoramus! After all, it was he who in 1922 was on the Board that awarded a First to a promising pupil of Namier's with a considerable knowledge of nineteenth-century history. Nor is he right in suggesting that I was weaned away by him from Churchill's 'regional' heresies. On the contrary before he joined us I had been their foremost critic. On the other hand, I am grateful to Webster for apparently acknowledging that I was chiefly responsible for helping to invent, and for pushing through behind the scenes, the famous 'Yalta Voting Formula', without which there would have been no United Nations.

Anyhow, the summing up of the 'Prof's' note by Professor Reynolds and Mr. Hughes seems to me to be about right and the whole work is well worth reading, if only to illustrate the fact that coping with politicians is a pretty difficult art. The 'Prof', I think, recognised this, more especially when he was worsted in argument by the dreadful, but clever, Herbert Evatt at San

Francisco (p. 68) and when Eden tore up a beautiful speech of his on the grounds that it was 'Ciceronian' (unrecorded). Ah, well. When we contemplate the United Nations today some might even agree with a despairing thought of mine when things look black (duly recorded by the 'Prof' on page 55) that a sort of 'NATO plus' system might have been better! In any case there is no doubt that this work will arouse much interest in academic and indeed in official circles.

GLADWYN

## WESTERN EUROPE

**A Wider European Community? Issues and Problems of Further Enlargement.** By Geoffrey Edwards and William Wallace. *London: Federal Trust for Education and Research. 1976. 83 pp. Pb: £2·00.*

THIS monograph concludes by offering the reader a stark choice: 'Further enlargement may mark the end of the road begun at Messina in 1955. Alternatively, it may force the existing members to face up to those awkward choices between different paths towards European unity which they have in recent years so determinedly evaded' (p. 77). However, in view of all that the authors say, one cannot help thinking that the latter alternative is more than a little remote. Despite the authors' admirable objectivity, they are clearly happier about the political spin-offs of further enlargement than they are about the economic ones. On the one hand, membership of the EEC is seen by those that seek it as a mantle of political respectability bestowed only on the chosen few. On the other hand, from the point of view of the Nine, the inclusion of Greece or Spain in the Community is seen as a kind of insurance policy against future lapses into dictatorship. The authors are wisely hesitant to predict the internal political development of potential members, but even their tentative conclusions have been borne out by recent events. In particular, the efforts of the Spanish government to walk a tight-rope between the legacy of Franco, and the pressure to 'democratise' has, if anything, been more perilous than the authors envisaged. It is especially true in Spain that the 'pull' of the Community is forcing the pace in domestic politics. The enthusiasm with which the Council of Ministers has welcomed the Greek application, and entertained others, is largely a reflection of political considerations.

The economic implications of enlargement are less straightforward and less obviously advantageous. Hence the doubts of the Commission. In particular, the redistributive policies like the Regional Development Fund and Social Fund would come under immense strain as a result of further enlargement. But the authors are unwilling to go so far as to say that this strain would, in fact, be intolerable and lead to the Community's collapse:

> To those who are at present net beneficiaries from the budget, the prospect of increased demand and relatively static budgetary resources conjures up a particularly gloomy picture. To those who are major contributors, or who will be in the near future (such as the UK), the prospect is of increasing pressure for rising commitment of funds to countries with which their domestic electorates identify with [sic]

> only weakly, and to projects for which their electorates have little sympathy (p. 52).

How much better if the authors had used cannon balls and not grapeshot for this particular broadside! Will taxpayers in Todmorden care a fig for peasants in Crete? The gulf between the richest and poorest parts of the Community is widening now. Further enlargement would serve only to accelerate this process unless there was a quite unprecedented willingness on the part of the rich countries to make sacrifices in the name of European unity. Likewise, the choice between *profondissement* and *élargissement* is (as the authors note) largely illusory since the Community is doing neither at the moment.

In sum, the authors suggest that further enlargement is going to be the Community's crucial test. Either the challenge will prove too great and the Community will atrophy; or it will provide the necessary impetus for radical revitalisation. The force of the authors' own arguments does not encourage optimism. The Community of the 1980s is likely to be 'wider but weaker' —if nothing worse.

*Queen's University of Belfast* E. MOXON-BROWNE

**Northern Ireland:** A Time of Choice. By Richard Rose. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; London: Macmillan. 1976. 175 pp. (AEI Foreign Affairs Study 33.) £6·95. Pb: $3.75. £2·95.*

**The Irish Triangle:** Conflict in Northern Ireland. By Roger H. Hull. *Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1976. 312 pp. £9·40.*

WHEN Richard Rose produced *Governing Without Consensus*[1] he achieved that rare feat: a work that was, at the same time, very good social science and eminently readable. In *Northern Ireland: A Time of Choice,* he has achieved the latter. Picking up the theme that he developed in the earlier book, he has produced what might be termed a layman's guide to the problems of Northern Ireland. He is primarily concerned with analysing the period following the Ulster Workers' Council strike, the action which brought down the power-sharing experiment. It was after that debacle that the British government 'concluded . . . that it could not govern Northern Ireland without taking the views of Ulster men into account' (p. 72). A constitutional convention was elected in which the new members were more representative of those who elected them (in terms of social background) than the House of Commons is of its electorate. But the problems confronting the Northern Ireland convention were, as Rose so clearly describes, considerably more difficult to resolve than in an assembly working within clearly defined rules accepted by all. The convention turned out to be a forum from which spokesmen for the different political groups were able to restate the positions they had held all along; hence, the convention failed. But with the failure of the convention, he argues, politics have, once again, passed to the non-elected elements in the province and the danger here is that 'in a volatile situation, the case for a waiting game is weak' (p. 136). His general conclusion is pessimistic. He argues, as he has previously done, that no solution

[1] London: Faber and Faber, 1971.

exists in terms of a government which has general consensus. Instead, the best that can be achieved is a solution which a majority supports and is capable of being maintained. Alas, he offers no solutions, but this is still a useful work. It is not, however, as worthy as *Governing Without Consensus*.

Mr. Hull's work is quite different. While focusing on Northern Ireland, he attempts to summarise the prevailing views about that province from the perspectives of those located in Dublin, London and Belfast, hence, the title of his book. He is, unfortunately, unsuccessful in his effort. This is not to suggest that the book is wholly uninteresting, for this is not so. When Mr. Hull, a lawyer, deals with relevant areas of international law, and how these areas may apply to Northern Ireland, the book is helpful. This is especially so when he considers questions of insurgency, belligerency and the rules of war. His notions about revolution, however, are weak.

The major flaw of the book is found in that aspect of it that is bound to cause the greatest difficulty. The summaries of views of the three points of the triangle are simplistic and frequently unmindful of the differences that are to be found at each of the points. Although he admits at the outset that by taking this approach he is, perhaps, masking those differences, this frank admission is not sufficient to excuse the faults in the analysis that follows. Another fault follows on from some of Mr. Hull's assumptions. He begins his book with the assertion that all conflict is 'tragic' (p. 3), a position that is surely impossible to maintain yet typical of remarks throughout the book. Another example suggests that 'revolution is so easily exported' (p. 124). Compare this with the Maoist doctrine that revolutions can neither be exported nor imported.

His brief conclusion proposes a two-step 'solution' to the problem. He argues with great confidence that 'although this proposed two-stepped solution will appear naive to some readers, it is workable' (p. 265). Step one involves ending terrorism (how this is done is unclear) and bringing in an international peace-keeping force to maintain order, a proposal which has been made before and not taken too seriously. The second step requires the ending of separate schools for Protestants and Catholics, a proposal which has also been floating around for a long time. What is so worrisome about the second step is the possibility of greater contact between children of the two religious communities breeding more, rather than less, antagonism. They may find that they genuinely do not have much in common.

*University of Lancaster* A. S. COHAN

**Broadcasting and Democracy in France.** By Ruth Thomas. *London: Bradford University Press in association with Crosby Lockwood Staples. 1976. 211 pp. £6·00.*

LET it be said bluntly. French news and public affairs broadcasting has, with honourable exceptions, achieved the unenviable reputation of being the most mediocre, servile and incoherent of any liberal democracy. There have been promises of liberalisation, and occasional spells of relaxation, but in moments of difficulty broadcasting has invariably been looked on as an arm of government. In her competent and lucid study, Ruth Thomas shows the early establishment of governmental ascendancy and its subsequent

operation. She describes the structures of broadcasting and the ways i which the controls and pressures have operated, and she records many c the struggles for greater freedom between broadcasters, administrators an politicians. She ends with an account of the 1974 reforms.

The story is told deftly and astringently. It breaks no really new groun and is really rather overdependent on that invaluable yet far from omnisciei or infallible source, *Le Monde*, but many English readers will value the wa in which Miss Thomas pieces together so many individual incidents t convey the confusion as much as the exploitation which has so lon characterised the system. She makes few mistakes, though she is rathe weak on the earlier years, and she perhaps underestimates the importanc at certain periods of the greater licence enjoyed by the *périphériques* an the extent of the means employed to domesticate them. It is clear from he account that successive governments treated ORTF much as they treated wide range of public and para-public organisations, held in tutelage an administered by able and energetic technocrats in the interests of th government of the day. The results of this system, when applied to bank: nationalised industries or local government, have been widely admired. Bu they were unmitigatedly baneful when applied to an activity like broac casting, which in a democracy must in some way or another be able t stand at arm's length from government.

It is perhaps inevitable that with unflagging liberalism Miss Thoma casts governments as villains of the piece. Yet if they must undoubtedl take the prime blame, they were not alone in attempting to turn broad casting to their personal advantage. Not all the broadcasters were a committed to genuine balance and fairness as one might wish, and as Mis Thomas usually seems to accept. And as with press seizures during th Mollet government, there was really remarkably little reaction from th wider public. In short, Miss Thomas's account not only says somethin about government and broadcasting in France, but about one of the sadde weaknesses in the French liberal tradition. But the implication that th survival of a free broadcasting system depends on public attitudes as mucl as on politicians' behaviour points a moral far wider than the French case

*University of Keele* MARTIN HARRISON

**The End of French Predominance in Europe:** The Financial Crisis of 192 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan. By Stephen A. Schuker. *Chape Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1976. 444 pp. $18.95.*

DIPLOMATIC history, although often pronounced dead, refuses to lie down Proof of its vigour is to be found in Stephen A. Schuker's highly readabl and deeply researched study of French policy in the 1920s. The book draw on governmental and private archives in France, Germany, Britain and th United States. In addition, banking and business collections have bee consulted. It should prove the definitive work on the subject.

The author argues that France's post-1918 predominance masked profoun weaknesses. In particular, France lacked the economic and demographi resources to sustain itself as a world power. Without allied help it coul not uphold the peace settlement. The turning point in its fortunes was th financial crisis of 1924 leading to the adoption of a new reparations settle

ment, the Dawes Plan, which ended the economic and military occupation of the Ruhr and excluded the use of sanctions in the event of future German defaults. Though France retained its military lead until the mid-1930s its political independence was sharply circumscribed after 1924.

The value of the book lies in the close analysis of the interplay and interchange of economic and political issues. France's heavy dependence on Anglo-American finance to protect the franc was largely the result of fiscal mismanagement and an outdated tax system. With time and goodwill sound finances could have been restored. In the event, the fall of the franc was decisive in undermining the success of the Ruhr occupation and in obliging France to accept a new reparations agreement. The Dawes Plan was a substantial revision of the Versailles Treaty.

French opinion blamed the financial crisis on a 'foreign conspiracy'. However, the author has found no evidence of foreign governments plotting against the franc. What, then, was the explanation of the crisis? There were three main reasons. First, to many observers the franc appeared over-valued and had been vulnerable since 1921. Secondly, the enormous cost of restoring the war-damaged areas seemed, in the context of a chronic budget deficit, a source of weakness. Thirdly, there was the political uncertainty surrounding the Ruhr occupation. After a year of occupation France was no nearer to receiving German reparations payments. In one crucial respect American bankers played a central role in the outcome of the crisis. The final provisions of the Dawes Plan were necessary to gain endorsement by the American banking firm, J. P. Morgan, of large loans to Germany.

As well as providing a full and clear picture of a highly complex episode, the work also throws fresh light on the attitude of Raymond Poincaré, the French Prime Minister. Poincaré is commonly presented as the embodiment of a harsh and nationalistic France. In reality he was much less intransigent and vindictive than supposed. As late as mid-November 1922 he threatened to resign rather than carry out the Ruhr occupation. Even when the occupation began his objective was modest—to make conditions so unpleasant for German industry in the Ruhr that the Germans would fulfil their treaty obligations.

The author and publishers are to be congratulated on the design and quality of the book. Source references and helpful biographical notes are sited at the foot of the page. British publishers please note.

*University of Bradford* ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

**The Emerging European Enterprise:** Strategy and Structure in French and German Industry. By Gareth P. Dyas and Heinz T. Thanheiser. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 337 pp. £12·00.*

SINCE the work of Chandler and Scott it has been an interesting question whether the stage model which they developed of the evolution of the large corporate enterprise in capitalist societies would be valid outside the United States. This book provides strong evidence for the conclusion that a slightly more sophisticated version of the model is indeed applicable in France and Germany. By analysing the evidence from the one hundred largest firms in each country, the authors are able to show that, with a

considerable time lag, the major enterprises there have by and large evolved in the same way as in the United States. They have moved in the direction of a divisional structure, in which each division oversees the product until it is sold, and away from a departmental structure in which the department was confined to a sharply-limited and well-defined function. This has been accompanied by a movement towards a greater diversification of products within the enterprise.

The related development in the United States, a growth in the number of major firms whose products are related, not by the use of common raw materials or by technological similarities in the manufacturing process, but only by the managerial expertise which superintends their manufacture or the marketing effort which sells them, is not, however, so marked in France and Germany. There are also differences between France and Germany themselves in the sample, partly explained by the differences in the overall composition of industrial output, which must inevitably be reflected in the nature of what the largest one hundred enterprises in each country produce. In Germany there are more companies in the sample which have not diversified because there are more large enterprises in metal manufacturing and engineering which still require the commitment of large resources and fixed assets to the actual manufacturing process in order to run at an economical level. Both in Germany and in France diversification is still more common among products which require a basically similar technology.

In spite of the important role played by American firms of management consultants in shaping the new divisional structures, there must also remain a number of questions, not easily answered by the type of research on which this book is based, about the extent to which in practice French and German divisional enterprises do function like their American counterparts rather than merely copy their organisation plans. The authors, in what is a good, clearly-written, sensible and interesting book, make no attempt to skirt around or minimise these difficulties. It is right that they should not; for the questions of who and how many make the decisions in major corporate enterprises lie at the heart of any model of the development of the enterprise and, indeed, of 'capitalism' itself. Both authors are sceptical about the real degree of independence which divisional managers in France and Germany exercise compared to their American counterparts. There remains a strong impression that major decisions and an inordinate amount of power to make or mar even the biggest corporate enterprises still lie in an extraordinarily small number of hands, and these not always the surest and most able.

*UMIST, University of Manchester* ALAN S. MILWARD

**Die SPD und die Wehrfrage 1949 bis 1955.** By Udo F. LÖWE. *Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. 1976. 185 pp. Pb: DM16.00.*

UDO LÖWKE'S book represents one of the best volumes in the series 'Theorie und Praxis der deutschen Sozialdemokratie'. There are two major reasons for its quality: it represents a case study of a particularly interesting period of the history of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and is a

condensed and completely revised version of an earlier book.[1] The book is concerned with the SPD's attitudes to the defence issue during the period 1949–55, that is, until the Federal Republic was granted full sovereignty.

For the SPD leadership the issue of rearmament was closely, indeed intimately, linked to the national goal of reunification. Its particular policy positions were not based on negative and unconstructive opposition but were rather an expression of the over-riding priority given to reunification. The rearmament issue was therefore partly a debate about priorities; it was also a debate about what was possible. This perspective led the SPD to reject the two concrete steps towards a West German defence contribution: the incorporation of the Federal Republic in the proposed (but abortive) European Defence Community and later, as a substitute, in the Nato alliance. Whilst these rejections led to doubts about SPD interest in defence issues, SPD criticisms of Adenauer's policy were essentially of a tactical nature. Adenauer's methods were rejected because they involved too many concessions of vital German interests. Three preconditions were specified by Schumacher as a basis for a German defence contribution: there must be strategic guarantees of an 'offensive' defence by the Allies of German soil, a commitment to national self-determination and equality of status for the Germans, and finally a combination of military defence with 'social defence' (social security) each useless without the other. Löwke illustrates how well the strategic and national arguments of Kurt Schumacher, the SPD chairman, were received by Adenauer's own military advisers with whom Schumacher had regular and sympathetic contacts. Whilst there was agreement on basic principles with the government (integration in the West, rejection of communism and political neutrality), tactical differences polarised into fundamental disagreements.

One can, of course, remain sceptical about whether Schumacher's tougher methods would have led to different results to those procured by Adenauer. The reality of the determining influence of the Allies on German foreign policy was ignored, and correspondingly the position of Germany was over-estimated. Korea was the decisive factor in German rearmament, establishing the primacy of security policy over reunification. The SPD failed to appreciate the significance of this new factor and its effects on public opinion. Before and even more after Schumacher's death the SPD was thrown on the defensive, increasingly lacking a plausible and clear conception. Greater emphasis was then given to the concept of collective security for a reunified Germany (as an alternative to the policy of reunification through Western strength) and to the non-alignment formula. Both remained vague, productive of internal contradictions within the SPD, and revealed the substitution of a legalistic conception of international politics for a concept of political power. They placed too much faith in the working of a system of international law under the protection of the United Nations and underestimated its unacceptability to the two power blocs to whom it threatened greater insecurity in Europe. This SPD policy formula is interpreted by Löwke in terms of the problems of party unity; the issue raised powerful emotional reactions in the party which did not facilitate systematic analysis. Whilst it may have been a source of spiritual strength to the party, it was, as both Fritz Erler and Helmut Schmidt have

[1] *Für den Fall, dass . . . Die Haltung der SPD zur Wehrfrage 1949–1955* (Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1969).

recognised, an electoral weakness because the party appeared to ignore the immediate security needs of the population in favour of distant visions.

Löwke has provided a survey of the development of, and problems posed by, the SPD's defence policy which can be recommended to students of German politics. The analysis is concise and lucid, the judgments well balanced.

*University of Liverpool* KENNETH DYSON

**Germany and Poland:** From War to Peaceful Relations. By W. W. Kulski. *Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1976. 336 pp. Pb: $9.95.*

GERMAN-POLISH relations have been one of the most tragically important issues of European history, above all in the twentieth century. It is therefore heartening that Professor Kulski can now produce an account that is able both to draw a line and to show a credit balance.

After an introductory summary, his concern is with relations since the Second World War. With commendable brevity he traces the origins of the Oder-Neisse line and its acceptance at Potsdam. Thereafter he goes into considerable detail in describing the changing attitudes of Western Germany. The initial Adenauer assumption was that American military superiority would inevitably produce German reunification and the consequent reincorporation of the Polish-held territories. Even when this hope faded, the policy of Adenauer and his immediate successors was to negotiate the isolation of Eastern Germany and, to some extent, Poland for the self-same purpose. It took Brandt, both before and after he became Chancellor, to inject realism into the eastern policy. East Germany and Poland were inevitably opposed to change and were firmly supported by the Soviet Union. The Western powers were losing interest. Before 1968 opinion in West Germany was already softening, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia introduced more realism—and also forced the Russians themselves to mend their western fences.

The main result was the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, signed in 1970 and finally ratified in 1972. The Soviet Union renounced the use of force against West Germany and accepted a more reasonable four-power agreement covering Berlin. West Germany agreed to the Oder-Neisse line. Despite memories and suspicions, Poland joined the deal. And in 1973 West Germany gave practically full recognition to East Germany. The account was in balance. Whether it will remain so, or whether the West German stratagem (of agreeing to the Oder-Neisse as a frontier only on its own behalf and not that of an ultimately united Germany) will upset it, remains to be seen.

Professor Kulski introduces some of the wider questions of East-West relations. But it is the paradox of his book that it spends too much time on them, yet gives them too little importance in determining German-Polish relations. He is also a little thin on the Polish side and somewhat repetitive about Germany. Essentially his book is descriptive, useful for surveys of changes and digests of debates. There are factors he barely touches, for example, the impact of West Germany's economic miracle on its foreign policy-making. And he seems hardly aware of the influence of the Common Market.

*New University of Ulster, Coleraine* W. V. WALLACE

**Die Jurassischen Separatisten:** Eine Studie zur Soziologie des ethnischen Konflikts und der sozialen Bewegung. By H. P. Henecka. *Meisenheim am Glan: Hain. 1972. 320 pp. (Studia Ethnologica, vol. 3.) Pb: DM69.50.*

**Why Switzerland?** By Jonathan Steinberg. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 214 pp. £4·95.*

DR. HENECKA'S book (based on a Heidelberg thesis) is an important one, and has been claimed in Switzerland as the best study of the Jura problem to come from the pen of an outside observer. The French-speaking and Catholic parts of the former Prince Bishopric of Basle were incorporated in the Swiss canton of Berne in 1815, and for the past 150 years have been intermittently on the verge of rebellion. Like Ireland's relationship with Britain, the Bernese Jura constitutes an implicit indictment of a form of government that is otherwise acknowledged as second to none in excellence and in democratic qualities. And of the Swiss cantons, Berne is, justly, the most proud of its governmental tradition.

Dr. Henecka attempts to place the Bernese Jura in the framework of socio-ethnological theories, and to regard it as an 'ethnic' problem. But the picture he places in this frame is a straight historical analysis, and it is this narrative that is commended to the English reader (p. 37f.)—apart from the brief discussion of parallel situations in Fribourg, Valais and Grisons, which are interesting because they have not led to physical violence and have been contained within the rules of a democratic legal system. The interest of the Jura lies in the melancholy story of the success of terrorist threats, and the failure of legal means, in securing a settlement. It now seems likely that a separate (French-speaking and Catholic) canton will be formed, with its own discontented minorities, a canton whose political yearnings will be concentrated on detaching the (Protestant) southern French-speaking Jura from Berne. This completes the parallel with Ulster.

Mr. Steinberg is a historian from Cambridge. Among other things, his book brings Henecka's narrative up to date. The theme which gives the reply to the book's title is that the Swiss have 'always' (p. 190) operated on principles which are utterly democratic, 'the people, they think, are themselves'. He is here referring to the Schwyz *Landsgemeinden*. He adduces, but ignores, evidence to the contrary. Already on page 7 we are told that the popular assemblies of the mountain cantons 'were conservative but democratic, though not in the modern sense. Rousseau's "general will" was not quite what emerged from the *Landsgemeinden* where . . . electoral bribery and corruption were the rule, and where the *Hintersässen* (copyholders) had no vote at all'. Leaving aside the infelicitous translation, it is typical of Steinberg's method to regard the 'rule' (corruption) as a mere aberration, and the form, the 'bottom-based' principle of government by the ancient families of free peasantry as the support for his generalisation. Sometimes whole periods, for example, the generation before 1914, are regarded as untypical because they do not support Steinberg's liberal doctrine, and there is some ambiguity as to whether modern Switzerland is to be deplored for its lack of traditional cohesion or applauded for its dynamism. But in a sense, the theme, the identity or loss of identity, of Switzerland does not matter. The writer is honest with us, and gives us the opportunity to form our own judgment. What I like most is his sympathy with the muddled young generation of Switzerland, and his discussions of dialect, the army, and economic affairs.

Steinberg's close contact with the most attractive of Switzerland's minorities, German-speaking liberal Roman Catholics (in the countryside, or semi-countryside, of Solothurn and Lucerne) is interesting and unusual.

*University of Leicester* C. J. HUGHES

**Social Structure in Italy:** Crisis of a System. By S. S. Acquaviva and M. Santuccio. Trans. by Colin Hamer. *London: Martin Robertson. 1976. 236 pp. £8·65.*

**Italy in the 1970s.** By John Earle. *Newton Abbot: David and Charles. 1975. 208 pp. £6·50.*

POSTWAR social changes in Italy were to some extent masked by the seeming stability of government under the Christian Democrats, with the Communist Party in opposition making only gradual advances. The student uprisings of 1968–69 were a pointer, but the differences between them and the more violent and spectacular disorders of February 1977 in Rome and even in that communist stronghold, Bologna, show how far questioning of the established order has accelerated in the past ten years.

Such change and questioning, common to all the advanced countries in this 'age of uncertainty', has special features in Italy. The authors of this book, two sociologists from Padua University, see its roots in the whole structure of Italian society as it emerged after the unification. This was a Mediterranean, male-dominated, family-centred society in which Catholicism played an important role and power rested mainly in the ownership of land. Industrialisation came late, and even until the Second World War this was a predominantly agrarian society. Another special feature in Italy, the historical and geographical difference between North and South, became accentuated as the North became increasingly industrialised. The decline of agriculture after the war led to a massive shift of Southerners to the North to seek work in industry. They also came to Rome to swell the bureaucracy, bringing with them the values of their clientèle-orientated society. Advancing technology ousted traditional craftsmanship. The land took on a new significance as a possible area for speculation. The mass media, impinging alike on rich and poor, purveyed ideas of a different, consumer-orientated world where the old values could be questioned. Education in schools and universities, far from helping the young to find their way in this new world, clung to the old standards and formulas. By the mid-1970s young people found themselves unprepared, unemployed—and in revolt.

This book deals schematically with this changing society, showing by means of tables and sometimes over-complicated diagrams how the alterations in structure and in power-systems and value-systems have come about. It is not easy reading, and while presumably intended in the first place for foreign readers (the book had not yet been published in Italy when it came out here) it really calls for a pretty good knowledge of Italian conditions today in order to interpret some of the nuances. Without the Italian text, it is difficult to tell how far some of the verbal infelicities are due to the translator; for instance, he and the authors together make heavy weather of *ceto* (p. 10), and *coldiretti* are almost unrecognisable as 'direct growers'—in Earle they emerge, more simply, as 'peasant farmers'. But it is a thought-provoking and rewarding work about a vital subject.

John Earle's little book is less ambitious in depth but broader in scope. It also describes a society in crisis, but his aim is rather to give a general picture of present-day Italy, its institutions, political parties, and economic and foreign policies. He gives names and faces to the personalities who appear in *Social Structure in Italy* under such classifications as 'entrepreneurs' or 'intelligentsia'. Chapter 4, 'Behind the Façade', dealing with such matters as pressure groups, scandals, and the Mafia, includes a helpful guide through the labyrinth of the plots against the state of recent years. His most useful chapters are those dealing with the economy (Mr. Earle has been for several years the Rome economic correspondent of *The Times*). Dealing as it does with current affairs, this perceptive book has inevitably already in some cases been overtaken by events: a postscript brings us up to the end of 1974, thus including the effects of the world oil crisis and the referendum on divorce, which marked the beginning of the Christian Democrats' decline. Behind that were, as Mr. Earle ends, 'the years of parasitical waste and mis-spending, resulting from the shadier side of political management. . . . The power of too many people was rooted too firmly in it' (p. 189).

MURIEL GRINDROD

**The Holy See and the International Order.** By Hyginus Eugene Cardinale. *Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe. 1976. 557 pp. £17·50.*

THE diplomatic weight of the Holy See in the contemporary world derives from the spiritual influence of the Roman Catholic Church on its millions of adherents (forming their general attitudes to such matters as population policy or East-West detente) and not, as often in the past, from its temporal power as well as its spiritual claims. The spiritual claims of the Papacy—which especially in the sphere of education are of tremendous political importance—are nonetheless felt to depend for their effective expression on the continuance of temporal power in the form of the world's smallest sovereign state and its apparatus of international diplomatic representation. These considerations, and the occasional exercise of Papal diplomacy in a mediatory fashion, make the study of Vatican 'politics' absorbing and important.

The mingling of spiritual claims and political structures, however, can also make the study of Vatican politics ambiguous. Thus Archbishop Cardinale's book presents itself less as a work of analysis than as an uneasy combination of reference material and apologetics. The introduction tells us that the author's aim 'is to demonstrate that in making use of a worldly institution such as diplomacy, the Church is not inspired by a Machiavellian sense of "successful cunning", but by a deep pastoral desire to contribute, even at international level, to the defence of the rights of God and of man, and to the promotion of justice, peace and brotherly collaboration between the States of the world' (p. xv).

This defensive purpose (sustained in the comment throughout the book) prevents the author from any serious attempt to deal with criticisms, either general or specific, of Papal diplomacy. They are cited here and there, simply to be refuted by the reaffirmation of good intentions. The air of unreality—we breathe the ultramontane atmosphere of philosophical and legal abstractions rather than walk through the corridors of power—is heightened by the extraordinary number of misprints in the book

(including those listed in an errata slip) and the text's unsure grasp of English. The latter is hinted at in the very title of the work, and is embarrassingly confirmed on every page.

*The Holy See and the International Order* contains very useful technical data and many dates, explains with care the legal position of the institutional Roman Catholic Church, the Holy See and Vatican City in the context of canon law and international law, and supplies some valuable documentary material for students of the Vatican. This includes in the appendices (pp. 309–471) texts of key agreements between Italy and the Holy See, the Constituent Laws of the Vatican City State, the protocol for the official visit of a head of state to the Pope, and a list of visits by heads of state to the Sovereign Pontiff between 1922 and 1975.

GEORGE BULL

**Spain in Crisis:** The Evolution and Decline of the Franco Régime. Edited by Paul Preston. *Hassocks: Harvester Press. 1976. 341 pp. £6·50.*

THIS collection of ten essays appeared at what was in many respects a very useful moment, within a few months of General Franco's death, when many people not previously much concerned with Spain wanted a serious introduction to that country's recent history and present prospects. That function it fulfils better than any other book on the market, for it covers a range of aspects of Spanish society, exploring each seriously and at a high standard of exposition and factual accuracy. Some chapters (notably those on the Church and on economic policy) can be seen as streamlined versions of works already published by their authors elsewhere,[1] but others make new contributions. The editor's chapter on the opposition is an admirably concise presentation of a very complex topic, while Salvador Giner in his chapter on the universities illuminates an area which will grow in importance as our distance from the Franco period increases. Essays on the armed forces by M. G. García and on the Catalan question by Norman Jones do not perhaps offer anything startlingly new to specialists, but the former corrects the common misconception that a regime headed by a general is ipso facto a military regime, while the latter reminds the reader that Catalans have been scarcely more satisfied than Basques in their relationship with Madrid, notwithstanding the fewer column inches devoted to them beyond the Pyrenees.

One of the difficulties with a work like this is to decide whether the chapters are envisaged as adding up to a rounded portrait of the period or whether they are simply a collection of essays on a common theme. In the absence of a disclaimer, I incline to think the first was intended, and if that is so, the book is not a complete success. It opens with Herbert Southworth arguing for the continuing importance of the regime's fascist heritage. He makes some telling points, but his definition of fascism seems to alter in the course of the chapter and he thereby leaves an impression of even greater immobilism than actually characterised the Franco regime. This impression is not wholly corrected in later chapters, for important sectors of Spanish society are left in the shadows. Landowners and employers of labour are seen from the perspective of the peasantry and of

[1] Norman B. Cooper, *Catholicism and the Franco Regime* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975); Joan Clavera *et al.*, *Capitalismo español: de la antarquía a la establizacion (1939–1959)*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Editorial Cuardernos para el Diálogo, 1973).

the working class and remain two-dimensional villains. Changing attitudes among the expanding ranks of white-collared employees are hardly examined at all. Since it is on political moderation among these groups that must rest so many of the hopes of the King and others for a plural democracy in Spain, the absence of analysis of their position may contribute to the rather gloomy prognosis for peace in Spain which one deduces from the book. Not that the contributors are so injudicious as to commit themselves to prophecy, but those who read this book—and it deserves many readers—may be a little unduly surprised at the time that has elapsed since Franco's death without the balloon going up.

*University of York* J. W. D. TRYTHALL

**Migration and Development:** A Study of the Effects of International Labor Migration on Boğazliyan District. By Nermin Abadan-Unat *et al.* *Ankara: Ajans-Türk Press. 1976. 386 pp. Pb: TL55. English version obtainable on request from Dr. P. J. C. van Dijk, Institute of Social Science, IMWOO, Molenstraat 27, The Hague 2003.*

**Turkish Workers in Europe 1960–1975:** A Socio-Economic Reappraisal. Edited by N. Abadan-Unat. *Leiden: Brill. 1976. 424 pp. (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East, Vol. XIX.) Fl.160.00.*

THE first of these books is a summary of a study of the effects of migration on a small district in Turkey, Boğazliyan. The research was conducted by a joint Turkish-Dutch team at the national, regional and village level. Government officials, trade unionists, businessmen, co-operative leaders, villagers and returned migrants were interviewed and surveyed. The result is a fascinating insight into the process and impact of migration on one district of Turkey. The book is remarkably coherent, and essential reading for those researching in this subject.

It appears from this careful research that many of the presumed economic benefits of migration have been, in the case of Boğazliyan, either non-existent or insubstantial. The team's findings would warrant a diminished enthusiasm for international migration as an aid to the economic development of poor countries in general and Turkey in particular.

Turkish migrants tend to be rather more skilled than the average worker, and to come from the more developed western regions. Once abroad, migrants seldom receive training, often working in less-skilled jobs than those they previously held. This confirms the findings of the Abadan Survey of 1964. It seems that the poor German of migrants is a significant dis-incentive to employers and migrants alike to provide and to participate in training schemes. (This is in contrast to the experience of Algerian workers in France.[1])

While migrants' remittances rose from $107 million in 1968 to $1,400 million in 1974 (market prices, p. 101), the trade deficit grew also. In 1968 remittances accounted for 40 per cent of the trade deficit, in 1974, 63 per cent. Generally remittances were not used productively, but frittered away on luxury goods, weddings, a new house, or spent speculatively on a tractor, a plot of building land or a taxi. Part of the explanation for this waste of potential investment funds lies in the poverty of official

[1] See M. Trébous, *Migration and Development, The Case of Algeria* (Paris: OECD, 1970).

policy on migration in general and the disposition of remittances in particular. Industrial development was effectively stifled by the short-term lending policies of banks. Village development co-operative schemes failed as a consequence of either a lack of capital or managerial expertise or 'confidence' in ventures which required at least five years' financial support before positive returns were enjoyed. By purchasing tractors, small shops or taxis migrants sought to create individual employment opportunities, and for each one their choice was rational. But jointly their efforts led to the market being swamped by petty traders, taxi drivers and small shops. As a result many small enterprises failed. Superficially, remittances stimulated a form of economic development, but 'should the tide of remittances once begin to ebb it is invariable that this pseudo-development will soon be revealed for what it is' (p. 325).

The sudden influx of cash into Boğazliyan district triggered off a boom in house and land prices and inflation in basic commodities and food. As migrants' savings were used to buy tractors or farm machinery, agricultural techniques became more capital intensive. The demand for unskilled labour, to clean or harvest crops, diminished and it was this same group, the least skilled, who suffered most from domestic inflation: they were too poor to migrate, and found their poorly paid job opportunities disappearing. 'The severest losers [from migration] have been non-migrant low income farmers . . . while high income groups have migration, [the migration of others] to thank for substantial increases in their income in recent times' (p. 321).

The team's many surveys included 127 returned migrants. Most of these were, in terms of the process, 'failures', who had not found work abroad and who expressed a wish to migrate again, this time hoping for better luck (p. 308). Only 5 per cent intended to become industrial workers in Turkey, and so it seems that the myth of the 'pool of skilled labour', ready to man domestic industrial development, is questioned.

Summarising the team's findings, Professor Abadan-Unat sees little evidence to support the argument that migration helps a poor country like Turkey to develop (Ch. 10). On the contrary, in the absence of a coherent strategy of economic development which harnesses the benefits of migration, it seems that a migration of the kind Turkey has experienced is likely to lead to an increased external dependence, domestic inflation and a depleted work-force: in short, migration seems likely to encourage permanent underdevelopment.

The second work under review, *Turkish Workers in Europe 1960–1975*, looks at the problems and prospects of Turkish workers and host nations in Europe, and includes a consideration of historical, social, economic and political factors. It is a work which readers should dip into rather than read as a whole; besides its broad scope, variations in the quality of contributions at times make reading arduous. The fifteen authors tackle a multitude of issues, some practical, some theoretical, often overlapping each other, and occasionally seeming to lack sufficient time to get to grips with the more important points they cover. This is unfortunate, as the aims of the work are sound, and would warrant a wide readership. The latter it may not have, for several reasons, one of the more significant being the book's price.

In her introduction, the editor, Nermin Abadan-Unat, presents a balance sheet of Turkish migration to Europe between 1960 and 1975, and finds the current account to be heavily in the red. Professor Abadan-Unat develops

further a theme familiar to readers of other works, 'the unequal relationship between centre and periphery nations' (p. 4). An account is given of the practical consequences of workers' remittances which include: domestic inflation; increased imports; increased demand for special skills in the construction industry; and disproportionate infrastructural outlays. The list is depressingly familiar.

In the concluding article, Gunter Schiller, a firm and eloquent advocate of the 'centre-periphery' model of economic development, describes Turkey as being in the peripheral area, and thus likely to remain poor in the long run. However, the key to change lies with 'centre' nations, and the author advocates a change of strategy in those countries towards migration, which 'will create a number of new problems for peripheral countries too'. He goes on to say: 'Only a strict adherence to the principles of democracy and social equality, of self-determination and human rights and of international solidarity, especially of the workers, can possibly gain a victory over all tendencies to perpetuate a welfare gap between the central and peripheral countries in Europe' (p. 284). Measured by this criterion, Turkey's economic prospects cannot be good.

*University of Durham* CLIVE A. SINCLAIR

**The Gecekondu:** Rural Migration and Urbanization. By Kemal H. Karpat. *Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 291 pp. £14·00.*

THE word *gecekondu* may be roughly translated as 'put up in the night' and is the Turkish term for the squatter shanties which have spread like a rash around the major cities of Turkey, as in many other developing countries. At first sight, these settlements are likely to strike the visitor as squalid evidence of poverty and the failure of officialdom to provide the settlers with basic amenities. Yet, as Kemal Karpat explains in his illuminating book, for their inhabitants, who are mostly first-generation immigrants from the countryside, the Turkish shanty towns are the focus of hope and initiative, and a powerful means of acculturation into the urban, national society. He bases his conclusion on a detailed survey carried out in the late 1960s among the inhabitants of three squatter settlements near the fashionable Istanbul suburb of Rumelihisar.

Physically, the squatter districts are likely to improve over time as the original primitive hovels are converted into sturdier houses of brick, concrete and tile. Eventually, the squatters can use their voting power to induce the authorities to provide water, electricity, paved roads and the precious title deeds which turn them into property-owning townsmen. Professor Karpat examines this process and adds much valuable information on the economic and social life of the settlements. He notes, for instance, that those districts which are settled by migrants from a single rural area (as in the case of two of the settlements he surveys) are likely to preserve more of their rural cohesiveness and to cope more successfully with the problems of urban life than the mixed, 'anonymous' districts. At the same time, urbanisation produces striking changes in the migrants' political preferences.

The importance of the settlers' links with their rural origins leads the author to consider the impact of migration on their native villages.

Frequently, the migrants provide financial support for rural self-help schemes, while their remitted earnings are an important boost to village incomes. Villagers with urban experience have been moving into positions of leadership in rural life. While Turkey's overall population has grown at 2·5 per cent or more per annum over the last twenty years, the population of the emigrants' villages has slumped dramatically—by as much as 25 per cent in one case mentioned (p. 178).

Professor Karpat's book is perhaps over-burdened with statistical tables, but it is also enlivened by direct quotations from the survey interviews. At the same time, one wonders whether his generally optimistic tone will be justified by future developments. During the late 1960s, for example, the crime rate in the settlements was well below the urban average; by the early 1970s, when he paid a return visit, it had already begun to creep up, in spite of physical improvements. Will the city-born generations, who lack direct experience of the harshness of rural life, be less hopeful than their forebears and more inclined to express their frustrations in violence? If so, then the *gecekondu* settlements may become more like the truly depressing slums of the West.

*University of Durham* WILLIAM HALE

## USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

**A History of Soviet Russia.** By Adam B. Ulam. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 312 pp. Pb: £5·00.*

PROFESSOR ULAM combines a wealth of factual detail with a racy style, projecting one forwards and back, so that the past and future constantly meet in the historical present he is describing. His book, while offering nothing new by way of insight or information, reads easily. The preface claims that the main emphasis is on internal and foreign policies, but foreign policy seems to dominate, and sometimes even to motivate domestic policy. Thus the only reason offered for the purges is the 'potent factor of the international situation' (p. 121). The domestic policies he does deal with are the economic policies, the intra-party struggles of the succession crises, the purges and short sections of cultural history. Very little social history is included, which is a pity because few histories, general or specialised, deal with that aspect of Soviet life.

The book is divided into ten chapters. It begins with the February revolution and gives equal length to the revolutions, the civil war, the New Economic Policy and the 'Third Revolution'. The chapters lengthen as the years of the purges are reached, followed by the Second World War, the cold war, the Khrushchev era and the collective leadership. There is a short, rather inconclusive conclusion. The tone of the book is measured. Without refraining from criticism, the author avoids hysteria at all times. He gives a level-headed assessment of the motives and relative advantages of detente, and discusses realistically such emotive matters as the problems and prospects of dissidents, anti-semitism and Jewish emigration.

One wonders who the readership is intended to be. While Professor Ulam's erudition is beyond dispute, he does not display it in the footnotes. In the few that he provides, he cites secondary Western sources, with only a few exceptions. The reader cannot refer back to the full texts of speeches

by Soviet leaders from which Professor Ulam quotes. On the other hand, he does take for granted a considerable knowledge of contemporary European history. If the book is intended for students, no guidance is offered for further reading or deeper study of a particular period. There is no bibliography. And if the student has just patiently mastered the difference between party and state institutions, the reference to 'the Central Committee's (i.e. its Secretariat's) Commissariat of Agriculture' (p. 95) will spin him or her back into utter confusion, however illustrative the phrase may be of the reality of lines of authority in the Soviet Union.

*University of Surrey* MARGOT LIGHT

**The Origin of the Communist Autocracy**: Political Opposition in the Soviet State, First Phase 1917–1922. 2nd edn. By Leonard Schapiro. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 397 pp. £10·00.*

SINCE its first appearance in 1955[1] this work has become something of a classic in its field. For this reason alone a second edition is to be welcomed. The fact that it can be reprinted unaltered after twenty-two years speaks for itself. The author has added only a six-page preface to this careful and detailed study of the political and ideological rivalry between the parties of the Russian left (in particular the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries) from 1917 to 1922.

In attempting to unearth the roots of Bolshevik dictatorship Schapiro gives due weight to factors such as wartime exigency and the way in which the sense of scruple shown by Lenin's rivals finally played into his hands. But Schapiro attributes the nature of communist autocracy chiefly to Lenin's character, stressing his unique combination of determination, clarity of vision, incisiveness and skill in ideological manipulation. Most telling of all, perhaps, was Lenin's refusal in 1921 to contemplate a political (as opposed to economic) reconciliation with the country at large, even when civil war no longer posed a threat to Soviet power:

> he had a chance of burying past enmities and of carrying the vast majority of the country with him in an attempt to build up ruined Russia on the basis of co-operation and legal order, and not of the dictatorship of an unpopular minority. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that a greater man than Lenin would have seized this chance. . . . He was a great revolutionary, but not a statesman (p. 360).

What Schapiro criticises most sternly in Lenin's character is his arbitrary illegality. In this respect his view has remained unchanged since 1955. In the preface to the first edition he argues that 'without the restraining *ne plus ultra* of law and independent judges it is very tempting for any government to sacrifice first the majority to a minority, then to-day to to-morrow, and finally one generation to future generations' (p. x). He concludes the preface to the second edition with an echo of this idea: 'If once law . . . is turned into an instrument of arbitrary rule (and therefore destroyed) the position of the individual is beyond hope. In this respect, at all events, there was no difference between Lenin and Stalin (p. xxi).

[1] London: George Bell for the London School of Economics.

This last point has acquired a new significance with the appearance of *The Gulag Archipelago* [2] and *Lenin in Zurich*.[3] The decision to produce a second edition has been taken in the light of Solzhenitsyn's confirmation of Schapiro's claim that 'arbitrary illegality was inherent in the very nature of the régime created and maintained by Lenin. . . . The fact that the scale was much smaller under Lenin is certainly important; but it does not destroy the continuity between Lenin and Stalin' (p. xvii).

*University of Hull* MALCOLM CHAPMAN

**Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture:** The Virgin Land Programme 1953–1964. By Martin McCauley. *London: Macmillan in association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. 1976. 232 pp. £10·00.*

IN this study Mr. McCauley describes in detail how the balance of Soviet agriculture was tilted eastwards under the tempestuous leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. The facts of the change are already well enough known. Less clearly appreciated are the underlying motives, and the principal results, of this transformation of the Soviet agricultural scene, as well as the pressures on the man in charge.

With the drive for industrialisation in full swing, the Soviet leader must have been acutely aware of the basic imbalance in the country's food supplies. In 1953 grain production and livestock numbers were both under the pre-revolution totals, but population as a whole, and especially the numbers living in towns, were rising rapidly. How could he keep his promises to industry's new labour force, of rising living standards, better housing, a more varied diet, the honouring of which was the mainstay of his continuing political power? In Mr. McCauley's terms, only by implementing these promises without delay, and at any cost.

Speed being of the essence, Mr. Khrushchev felt obliged to move eastwards to uncultivated lands, rather than choose the less risky, but slower, option of investing more capital in the traditional farming areas of the western regions. Having done so, he faced formidable problems, to an exposition of which the writer devotes much of his book. They include such vital factors as: a hostile climate, with extreme weather conditions and a constant threat of drought; a shortage of skilled labour; the high susceptibility of the whole area to wind and water erosion; an inadequate transport network. Mr. Khrushchev's determination to go ahead immediately with his plans, despite the insufficiency of the capital funds required to solve these problems completely, meant that the extra grain was produced at greater expense. Kazakhstan grain, for example, cost 20 per cent more than the national average in the decade 1954–64. As late as 1960, milk, meat, pork and wool from the Central Asian region cost two to four times as much to produce as in the older agricultural areas (p. 149).

Mr. McCauley includes in his study an interesting section on farming in the dry farming zones of North America and Australia, which suffer from the same climatic and soil handicaps as are encountered in Russia's virgin lands, but which operate at a higher technological level and produce more cheaply (pp. 170–173).

[2] London: Fontana, 1976; first publ. Collins, 1974.
[3] London: Bodley Head, 1976.

Although the writer gives full coverage to the drawbacks and inadequacies of the drive eastwards, he concludes that the policy was justified in the long term. It improved the pattern of Soviet agriculture by removing the main burden of producing grain from areas not ideally suited to this culture, thus permitting them to switch to fodder and other crops more favourable to their soil and climatic regime (p. 96). In addition, and very importantly, it gave support to the official policy of autarky by reducing, if not yet entirely eliminating, the import of grain from abroad in years of bad harvests, thus protecting the country's hard currency reserves (pp. 211–212).

Covering as he does the political as well as the economic aspects of the virgin lands campaign, Mr. McCauley presents his readers with a vast amount of information in a relatively short space, which does not make for easy reading, but which will be of value to the specialist. The general reader will be impressed yet again by the immense strain and effort imposed on the bulk of the Russian people by the simultaneous implementation of the industrialisation drive and the campaign for increasing the amount of the country's marketable grain.

MARGARET MILLER

**Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR.** By Frederick C. Barghoorn. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 229 pp. $12.95.*

THIS book bears all the hall-marks of an American policy-related study—something on which it is indeed freely admitted to be based. Thus while it carries with it the imprint of a respected scholar's knowledge and analysis of the Soviet dissident movement, it is aimed more practically at swaying American official policy in a particular direction. One is left in no doubt as to what one should conclude from the analysis.

Briefly, the desired response is a rejection of detente played according to rules called for, or laid down, by the Soviet leadership. Rather, it is suggested, we should take note of those Soviet dissidents (figures who, it is admitted, have more in common with the ethos of the liberal democratic West than with that of the socialist East) who have written on foreign policy and its domestic implications. These writers have indicated that genuine international detente is impossible while the Soviet regime restricts human rights at home--that, in fact, foreign policy is largely shaped by the internal political culture and character of the regime. If it is predatory at home, can it be other than aggressive abroad? If it is unwilling to respect the rights and freedoms of its own citizens, how much less will it value the rights and freedoms of others?

These are indeed pertinent questions, and yet, to some extent assume that ideas of what constitutes detente are, in all aspects, shared in common by both sides. This seems to be quite false. A reduction of the chances of open armed conflict may well be shared, but it is by no means obvious that attitudes are, or ever will be, alike in a number of other areas. The human rights issue is the central case in point. To the West this implies essentially individual human freedoms (of speech, assembly, carrying arms and so on), while to the Russians it more frequently involves collective human rights (to work, freedom from poverty and inflation and so on), positions stemming from the differing historical heritages and ideological stances of

the United States and Soviet Union. Abuse of the ideals has been common enough on both sides, with the subjugation of Negroes and deportations of Indians not at all dissimilar to the cases of the Latvians and Crimean Tartars—each affecting both individual and collective rights and freedoms. The problem lies less in the respective practices than in the degree to which even the very ideals of individualism and collectivism can be accommodated within the same framework. In essence, it is the old argument over the relative limits of freedom and authority in a new guise. Indeed, it has often been claimed, in respect of the Soviet Union, that as long as it retains such a vast territory, with a multinational population and a commitment to economic planning, some form of firm central control and regimentation would appear to be the only hope in holding it all together. As such, however hypocritical some of its attitudes may be, it would seem quite unrealistic in practice to expect the Soviet government to alter its emphases in internal policy to suit Western hopes. The Soviet leadership's fears of the American leadership's aspirations to undermine communist regimes are no less real than those of their American counterparts—and both are well founded on past experience.

Scepticism about the likely gains of detente are thus both justifiable and, perhaps, only realistic in view of the quite different interpretations of the term in important areas of policy. Barghoorn is by no means unaware of this distinction. However, his views and recommendations are essentially, and naturally, those of official American self-interest, just as much as they are the goals of dissident individualists in a collectivist system.

*University of Sheffield* JULIAN BIRCH

**Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution.** By H. Gordon Skilling. *Princeton: Princeton University Press under the auspices of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto. 1976. 924 pp. £31·30. Pb: £10·50.*

**Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe:** The Czechoslovak Example. By Jiří Pelikán. Trans. by Marian Sling and V. and R. Tosek. *London: Allison and Busby. 1976. 221 pp. £5·25.*

THE title of Professor Skilling's book is a little provocative. The gradualist, non-violent nature of the changes in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the concern of the reformers with political procedures and the absence of barricades deprived the movement against Stalinist socialism of the romantic image of revolution. Nor does this movement conform to many, though it does to some, definitions of revolution. Yet, as Professor Skilling persuasively argues in his conclusion, the programme which had emerged by August 1968 appeared to be leading towards 'a continuing sequence of individual reforms, each drastic in its own sphere and reinforcing one another, the cumulative effect of which would have been a metamorphosis of the entire system' (p. 835).

Although Professor Skilling's study is focused on the period between January and August 1968, that is, from Alexander Dubček's accession to the First Secretaryship of the Czechoslovak Communist Party until the meeting of that Party's Central Committee ten days after the Soviet invasion, the scope of his book is much broader than a study of Czechoslovak communism in crisis. In an important section of his book which

deals with 'The International Context', some light is thrown too on the other Warsaw Pact states as the author explains and assesses the differing responses of each of them to what was happening in Czechoslovakia. Indeed in his consideration of the reasons for the invasion, Professor Skilling challenges some of the myths which arose over alleged divisions within the Soviet leadership.

The book begins with an analysis of the conflict within Czechoslovak communism between authoritarianism and subservience to Moscow on the one hand and the influence of Czechoslovak traditions and democracy on the other. If the 1950s saw the dominance of the former, the 1960s witnessed open conflict between the two, with a temporary victory for national communism in 1968 and the reimposition of the authoritarian, pro-Soviet strand after Dubček's fall. The crisis of the 1960s is given detailed attention before its outcome, the Prague Spring, is examined in what is the most comprehensive account to date. Any attempt at summary must fail to do justice to this book. Suffice it to say that the author offers a clear, step-by-step account of developments, a lucid analysis of the reforms in every sphere (the party, law, the economy and Czech-Slovak relations receiving particular attention), a judicious evaluation of contending political and social forces, and the section on 'The International Context' already referred to. His assessment is based not only on Czech, Slovak and other East European sources but on many of the critical studies which have appeared in the West (although the book by Zdeněk Mlynář, a leading reformer and Secretary of the Czechoslovak Central Committee in 1968, appeared after completion of the manuscript, a summary of his analysis of the reform movement is included as one of the appendices). An epilogue covers the period between the end of August and the removal of all reformists from positions of power and influence, and a conclusion includes Professor Skilling's thoughts on the significance of the reformist period, and its place in Czech history.

It is an excellent book, carefully researched, clearly and logically structured. Individual chapters on clearly specified topics can be read on their own by those interested in particular areas. There can be no doubt that this book will be accepted as the standard source in future studies of the 1968 reforms in Czechoslovakia.

A few errors need to be mentioned. Dubček was elected to the office of First Secretary of the Slovak Central Committee in 1963 and not in 1964 as stated in footnote 5 on page 47. At the same time he was raised from candidate status in the Praesidium of the Czechoslovak Central Committee (which he had held since the Twelfth Party Congress at the end of 1962) to full membership, and not a year later as stated in footnote 28 on page 54. The Reading Conference on Czechoslovakia was in 1971, not 1969 as stated in footnote 103 on page 448. (It is given correctly in other references.) On page 612, the word 'than' appears to have been omitted where the sentence should read that data on workers and collective farmers suggests that they were 'hardly less favourable to reform *than* the national average'. On pages 308–9, common sense suggests that the Czechoslovak leaders reported their Soviet counterparts at Čierna not to have insisted on the *reimposition* of censorship rather than 'the ending of censorship' as written. Finally, I found myself somewhat confused by the information, on page 795, that of the Slovak Central Committee elected in August 1968, only sixteen were

'carryovers' from that elected in 1966. This does not seem to correspond to the more detailed information in footnote 95 on that page. From that information it would appear that only sixteen full members of the 1966 Central Committee remained in the Slovak Party's highest organs either as full members, candidate members or as members of the Supervision and Auditing Commission in August 1968. In fact seventeen of the full members in August 1968 seem to have been elected to the highest organs of the party two years earlier. These mistakes, however, are exceptional in a book of the highest quality.

Jiří Pelikán's book differs markedly from Professor Skilling's detached, objective study. His 'essays' on the development, aims, and actions of the Czechoslovak Socialist Opposition reflect his commitment to the principles of the Prague Spring. However, in style, vocabulary and content they are likely to appeal to a more limited, if more committed, audience. Of greater interest are the fourteen documents included as a documentary appendix. These range from the Ten-Point Manifesto presented in August 1969 to Czechoslovak state and party authorities in protest at the increasingly repressive policies pursued by the post-Dubček leadership, to the letter of condolence from Alexander Dubček to the widow of his former colleague, Josef Smrkovský, in January 1974, when he was prevented from attending Smrkovský's funeral. It is a pity that the standard of translation throughout this book is not better.

*University of Liverpool* GORDON WIGHTMAN

**W Cieniu Katynia (In the Shadow of Katyn).** By Stanisław Swianiewicz. *Paris: Institut Litteraire. 1976. 359 pp. Pb: F50.00.*

THIS important and absorbing book, published by the largest Polish publishing house outside Poland, is the dramatic life story of a Polish economist; it is also a unique testimony to the crime of Katyn. Born in 1899 at Dynaburg (Russian, Dvinsk; Latvian, Daugavpils), the author was educated at a Russian *gimnazya* in Orel. His higher education at Moscow University was interrupted by the revolution of 1917. In Polish uniform he took part in the 1919–20 campaign which, by stopping the Soviet march westwards, guaranteed to the restored Polish state two decades of independence. Having graduated in 1924 from Wilno University, he joined the university's teaching staff and soon held the chair of economics. Mobilised in 1939 as a lieutenant in an infantry regiment, he fought against the German invaders. On September 29 he was captured near Jarosław by the Soviet army which had been occupying 'their' part of Poland as stipulated in the secret partition treaty signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939, by Ribbentrop and Molotov.

In November Professor Swianiewicz was sent to Kozelsk, one of three internment camps holding altogether 15,000 Polish army regular and reserve officers, police officers, judges, professors, writers and other members of the Polish intelligentsia. At Kozelsk all the inmates were thoroughly interrogated by officers of the NKGB (now MGB) under the command of the suave General V. M. Zarubin. Swianiewicz is convinced that the disbandment of the Kozelsk camp in April 1940 was made at Zarubin's suggestion: of the 4,500 inmates, 4,300 were sent to Katyn, while 200 were lodged at a special camp at Gryazovets. The two other camps (Starobelsk and Ostashkov) were liquidated in a similar way: of a total of 10,500 inmates,

only 248 qualified to go to Gryazovets. Where the rest were slaughtered remains a mystery.

Swianiewicz survived almost miraculously because somebody included his name in the Katyn list while somebody else informed Moscow that this presumed 'spy' should be specially investigated. When the latter recommendation was discovered, Swianiewicz was already on one of the many NKGB trains carrying Polish officers from Kozelsk to Gnezdovaya, the nearest station to the Katyn Forest. An NKGB colonel took him from the train of the condemned and sent him to Smolensk prison, but after a few days Swianiewicz found himself in Moscow in the notorious Lubianka prison, the headquarters of the NKGB. His life was not yet safe, but he was the only Polish officer to leave a Katyn train before the massacre.

During a seven-months-long inquisition Swianiewicz discovered that the main evidence of his 'spying' was two books published in Polish, *Lenin as Economist* (1930) and *Economic Policy of Hitler's Germany* (1938); also a Soviet intelligence report on his meetings with Professor Theodor Oberländer, a Nazi director of the *Institut für Osteuropäische Wirtschaft*, and Swianiewicz's public statements, made before 1939, that the historic Polish-Lithuanian Union should be restored. As the charge of 'spying' could not be proved, the accused was not shot; in February 1941 he was sentenced to eight years forced labour at a camp in northern Russia. His health being poor, he would have died if he had not been saved by Hitler's aggression against Russia. 'Amnestied' in August 1941, Swianiewicz joined the staff of the Polish Embassy at Kuibyshev but was soon sent to Jerusalem and later to London.

Swianiewicz is convinced that the murders at Katyn and other places still secret were decided upon by Stalin, while Beria, the Commissar for Home Affairs (NKVD) and Merkulov, the Commissar for State Security (NKGB) were the chief executioners. Stalin came to the conclusion that whatever the outcome of the 'imperialist war', he would have no use for the 14,500 patriotic and educated Poles who were impervious to the Marxist-Leninist distortion of socialism: therefore they had to die. This mass murder was, and still is, considered by the Kremlin leadership to have been a stern act of Soviet *raison d'état*. That is why neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev blamed Stalin but stuck to the lie that the Germans were responsible for the Katyn crime. All the world knows that the Nazi leaders in occupied Poland committed monstrous crimes. Strangely enough, it was in May 1940 that the Nazi order 'Operation A-B, liquidation of the Polish leadership' became operational, but at that time a distance of 350 miles separated Katyn from the Nazi-Soviet partition line.

Being a good Christian, Professor Swianiewicz tells his story without rancour. As a man trained in scientific observation, he guides his readers with commendable objectivity through the gloomy and fantastic maze of a totalitarian state at war with another one of a similar type. He is also an excellent raconteur. His book is full of striking observations and revealing conversations with dozens of fellow prisoners, sometimes Soviet army officers or economic planners, or even prominent foreign communists such as Mátyás Rákosi. This reviewer believes that an English translation of this book—perhaps shortened a little—would be highly desirable. It could even be a best-seller.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

## MIDDLE EAST

**The War of Atonement.** By Chaim Herzog. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1975. 300 pp. £6·00.*

**Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War.** By Michael I. Handel. *Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jersusalem. 1976. 67 pp. (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 19.) Pb: $1.00.*

OVER three years have elapsed since the Yom Kippur War and two years since this clear and soldierly account by General Herzog was published, and it is now possible to see the events of that extraordinary campaign in perspective. It was a war as limited as a formal tournament, played in a restricted area and when the Israelis trespassed outside it they were brought smartly to a halt by the sponsors of both sides. Both sides refrained from using strategic bombing against each others' population centres, for very good reasons. The tank battles were the greatest in history, except for Kursk. The Arabs were able to deploy a large array of sophisticated weapons aimed at neutralising the apparently invincible Israeli combination of tanks and strike aircraft, and this, taken together with a mass deployment of armour and armoured infantry on the Soviet model provided a practical test in the field of Soviet tactical doctrine. The Arabs were able to achieve sufficient surprise to throw Israeli mobilisation out of gear, and for a brief moment it appeared that the frontier defences had cracked open and that the SAMs and Swatters and Saggers had ushered in a new era of warfare. Once more it was shown that the best weapons in feeble hands are no match for skilled and determined soldiers. The new-fangled guided missiles were suppressed by the old-fashioned method of shooting up the operators, and the great killer of tanks proved to be once again the tank gunners in the Israeli tanks: the Syrian and Egyptian armour was defeated everywhere and the 1st Tank division alone, in a morning's battle in Sinai, lost 93 tanks to three Israeli. The Egyptian infantry, retrained and revitalised, fought with great courage, especially in the defence, and their self-sacrifice removed the tarnish of earlier defeats, but the Arab higher command on both fronts was simply incapable of controlling operations on such a scale or at the speed required to defeat such oponents.

Herzog was twice Director of Military Intelligence in Israel, and he devotes a chapter entitled 'Eyes They Have and See Not' to the failure of the Israeli government to react in time to the clear evidence of an impending Arab attack. The simple explanation is that there was a failure in communication at one stage and, faced with the agonising prospects of premature mobilisation and the political consequences of a pre-emptive strike on world opinion, the Israelis hesitated to the point of extreme peril.

Mr. Handel, rejecting simplicity at all costs, offers an analysis in the modern style, based on communication theory, embellished with flow diagrams and buttressed with no fewer than 90 references. (He has also succumbed to the maddening habit of accompanying the text with a flow of additional commentary in the footnotes.) Any competent worker in the intelligence field would agree, without any recourse to this imposing apparatus, that information can be distorted during the process of evaluation, that single items, however impressive, are unreliable and require confirmation and that users are frequently blind to the 'signals', as he terms the

information (Pearl Harbour, Barbarossa, Arnhem, Ardennes, 1940 and 1944). Surprise, it is true, is easier for the side possessing the initiative: the aggressor. We all know this, nor is it an original thought that often men of strong character and high ability in command allow their hopes and fears and sometimes their personal relationships with the purveyor of intelligence to distort their judgment; or clarify the process by calling this barrier to reality ' noise '.

Nothing in the way of prediction can ever be certain, but the worst dangers in the horrible scenario exemplified in the diagram facing page 11 can be avoided by designing a proper organisation for collection and evaluation, with adequate independent checks and access by specialists to those taking decisions, so that everything does not have to go through the filter of the general staff structure, where loud ' noise ' often exists. Handel is much concerned with ' intentions ', where certainty is impossible: this is the field of probability, and unquantifable at that. This is why in intelligence it is wisest to stick to ' capabilities '; in concrete terms strength, ' order of battle ', weapons, dispositions, logistics, troop movements and variations in signal traffic. What is surprising in so difficult a field is not the number of failures but how often in the ordinary run of things the barriers of secrecy can be pierced. It is worth nothing that in Handel's selected reading list of 52 items there is no mention of an intelligence *success*, of which there have been many.

These criticisms are not made to refute accusations against the effectiveness of intelligence, but to emphasise the narrow factual base of Handel's arguments. They may not be lightly dismissed, but when he passed from theory to discussion of the actual case (pp. 40–61) he is really very good.

General Herzog has provided an account of the October war which is scrupulously accurate and free from national bias. It can be treated as a work of reference. To it Mr. Handel has added a valuable appendix.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

**From the Cold War to Detente.** Edited by Peter J. Potichnyj and Jane P. Shapiro. *New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 223 pp. £13·00.*

**Arms for the Arabs:** The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East. By Jon D. Glassman. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976. 243 pp. £8·75.*

BOTH these books represent contributions to the growing literature on Soviet foreign policy in the postwar period. The work edited by Potichnyj and Shapiro is the sixth of eight volumes of papers from the First International Slavic Conference held at Banff, in September 1974. Unlike many collections of conference papers, the book represents a balanced and coherent set of essays around two central themes—the origins of the cold war and the nature of detente. On the first subject, the articles by Walter Clemens and Thomas Hammond analyse the Western perception (and misperception) of Soviet intentions in Central Europe and the influence which the atomic monopoly exerted on the formulation of American foreign policy after 1945. The interesting work by Stephen Markovich examines the extent to which the Americans were largely unsuccessful in using aid to influence Yugoslavia's

foreign policy after 1948. Of the chapters in this section, the one by William McCagg deserves particular mention for the author's original and perceptive analysis of the limits on Stalin's power imposed by his failure to control the Party's revival after 1944. McCagg's findings question much of the 'conventional wisdom' about Stalin's primacy and his relationship with the Party during this period.

In the second section, on detente, Steven Rosefielde's excellent article on Soviet postwar trade policy examines the relationship between Soviet-East European economic relations and East-West trade, concluding that the Soviet Union's increasing reliance on the West for labour-saving technology will serve to further undermine Soviet relations with its Comecon partners. Four of the articles in the section deal explicitly with the effect of detente on Eastern Europe, while a further essay by Robert Horn on 'Detente "Myths" and Soviet Foreign Policy' considers the validity of various widely-held Western views about Soviet attitudes towards detente. While Horn's conclusion might have been strengthened by the use of more vigorous methodological techniques such as content analysis, one does nevertheless certainly agree that these views, or detente 'myths', tend to be widely held and to obfuscate the shifts and subtleties in both Soviet and American foreign policy. Two of the 'myths' whose validity Horn questions are first, the view that detente precludes conflict or competition and secondly, the belief that detente has been and is being pursued by the Soviet Union out of offensive motives.

Interestingly enough, these two views about detente are mirrored in the second book under review here. Jon Glassman seeks to analyse the nature and objectives of Soviet involvement in the 1956, 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. He is eminently well qualified, since he served in the United States Embassy in Moscow, and when preparing this study conducted research at Harvard and interviewed officials in Israel's defence ministry. His book is interesting, well written, lucid and uses many Russian sources. But one is left wondering whether Glassman has made full use of his obvious advantages and talents. One continually gets the impression that he has set out to 'prove' the Soviet Union's basic aggressiveness and has, as a result, left many stones unturned and many arguments rather shaky and unsubstantiated. Glassman starts out by posing the question: 'was detente not, in fact, a "cover" masking genuinely aggressive Soviet intentions?' (p. 2). The answer is provided two hundred pages later when Glassman concludes that 'the historical record seems to indicate that Moscow was particularly prone to raise its military involvement in the Middle East in times of warmer relations with the West' (p. 191). In reaching this conclusion, the author has tended to overestimate the Soviet Union's support for the Arab cause against Israel and underestimate the extent to which Soviet policy was formulated in response to the dynamics of a situation that was constantly developing.

Thus, on page 1, the author tells us that before, and during, the October war, Western statesmen had 'witnessed the absence of overt Soviet opposition to the massive Egyptian and Syrian surprise attacks on Israeli forces; the Soviet reluctance to restrain arms shipments to the combatants; the large-scale battlefield introduction of technically advanced weaponry . . .' and so on. One would not dispute Glassman's account of Soviet actions, but would only add that the United States was not standing idly by, but was reacting in kind. Indeed, the Russians would maintain that they did not initiate the

resupply of the combatants (p. 130), nor were they solely responsible for the prolongation of the war (p. 131). And with regard to the author's contention that Egypt fired *Scud* missiles manned by Soviet crews at Israeli troops on the west bank of the Canal on or after October 22 (p. 137), this claim is not supported by any of the other major sources, including Western journalists who were in the Canal zone at the time. Glassman makes this and other contentions solely on the basis of his interviews with unnamed officials in the Israeli Ministry of Defence. He fails to put forward either the Soviet or the Arab view. Indeed, surprisingly, not one Arabic source (with the exception of Heikal's *The Cairo Documents*[1]) is quoted in the entire book.

These points are raised not in an effort to prove that the author is 'wrong' or 'right', but rather to underline the difficulty and even futility of trying to 'prove' anything when it comes to super-power activity in the Middle East. What is surely more important is to understand why each party believes itself to be right and sees itself as merely reacting to a dynamic situation. However, one should not underestimate this book. In addition to the chapters on the 1956 and 1967 wars, which were based on more solid research, it provides the reader with a thorough and intelligent exposition of the view held by many in the United States and in Israel of the Soviet Union's intentions in the Middle East.

*University of Southampton* KAREN DAWISHA

**The Arab Left.** By Tareq Y. Ismael. *Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 1976. 204 pp. $15.00. Pb: $5.95.*

PROFESSOR ISMAEL'S new and very useful book is concerned with the ideological development of 'Arab nationalism' over the last three decades and with the parties and organisations that initiated and sustained this development. The main thesis of the book is that 'Arab nationalism has been transformed from the relatively conservative, tradition-based impulse to sovereignty and unity of the early twentieth-century Arab nationalists to the complex leftist ideologies of contemporary Arab nationalists' (p. ix). The study endeavours to illustrate and substantiate this thesis.

The book contains seven chapters of analysis and five lengthy appendices of documentary material. Chapter I serves as an introduction by expounding on the main thesis of the book. The author argues that the traumatic experience of the 1948 Palestinian war fostered a transformation of Arab nationalism into 'a nationalism dedicated to fundamental social change to achieve the objectives of freedom and unity' (p. 13). The following four chapters examine the ideologies and activities of four important leftist nationalist forces which emerged in the era after the Second World War: the Ba'th, the Progressive Socialists of Lebanon, the Arab National Movement (ANM), and Nasserism. The remaining two chapters analyse the increasing penetration of Marxist-Leninist thought into Arab nationalist ideology, particularly in the wake of the June 1967 war.

The author's analysis of the Ba'th combines an admirable mastery of this party's somewhat perplexing ideology with a thorough knowledge of its turbulent history. However, the analysis of the post-1968 period concentrates

[1] Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973.

rather excessively on the Iraqi party, paying scant attention to the conflicting ideological tenets and political activities of the Syrian counterpart. Indeed, the author seems somewhat blasé about this and related conflicts which have plagued the Ba'th since its inception, such as the conflict between the leftists and rightists; between the regional and national commands; between the civilian and military factions; and between Islam and the Ba'th's professed securalism.

Nasserism and the ANM have also suffered from structural fragmentation and internal conflicts. In the case of the former, Jacqueline Ismael (the author of the chapter on Nasserism) contends that the Nasserist appeal to various classes and to competing value orientations has divided the movement 'into a multiplicity of groups, collectivities and organisations' (p. 82). Similarly, the ANM of the 1950s had, by 1970, fragmented into no less than eleven separate organisations. Moreover, whereas the mother organisation was an unashamedly rightist movement, lacking even 'the social reformist tendencies that characterised nationalist trends at that time' (p. 62), its eleven infants include such avowedly Marxist groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the various liberation fronts of South Arabia.

Two main points emerge from the book. First, there has certainly occurred a movement from right to left in Arab nationalist thinking. The author offers four reasons for this transformation: the effect of the June 1967 defeat; the gradual disillusionment with the old nationalist parties; Western, and particularly American, support for Israel; and the influence of the Vietnamese war of liberation on developing countries in general. The second point which emerges from the analysis is the constant and almost inevitable fragmentation of Arab nationalist forces. Unfortunately, however, the author does not advance an explanation for this phenomenon, an oversight which should not detract from the value of this very useful book.

*University of Southampton* A. I. DAWISHA

**The Ba'th Party.** A History from its Origins to 1966. By John F. Devlin. *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. 1976. 372 pp. (Hoover Institution Publications 156.) $11.95.*

IT might be over-dramatic to call this book a tragedy, but it makes depressing reading. The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party has been in nominal existence for over thirty years, and, says the author, 'Ba'thism is still a going concern' in parts of the Arab world (p. 324). Certainly regimes calling themselves Ba'thist rule Syria and Iraq; but, as he shows, this has been achieved at the cost of a deep schism and of abandoning most of what the party's founders (who were expelled by the Syrian faction after its coup d'état in February 1966) had claimed to stand for.

Mr. Devlin shows, in painstaking but seldom vivid detail, how a party of Syrian intellectuals, founded in 1944 and devoted to the cause of 'one Arab nation with an eternal mission', was brought first, to co-operate with some of the military groups that have been the most decisive force for political change in the Arab countries since 1949, and secondly, after failure in the Fabian task of permeating the thought and action of these groups, to reconstitute itself around military nuclei of its own. Power was thus

achieved in 1963, both in Iraq and in Syria; but at high ideological cost. The party which twenty years ago claimed above all others to stand for unity, and to represent a genuine impulse towards a rather unclear form of social democracy, is now chiefly associated with national rivalry in the Fertile Crescent, with military juntas and powerful minority groups—though Mr. Devlin would argue that the Syrian Ba'th at least has some solid achievements of a socialist flavour to its credit and has not entirely lost touch with its origins.

The original Ba'thists failed to establish a mass following in Syria before soldiers moved to the front of the stage; from this book it would seem that they scarcely tried. Probably they were also handicapped by the rapid ending of the French presence; a prolonged liberation struggle might have endowed them with a heroic myth that would have been useful in offsetting the allure of Nasserism. As it was, they had no choice but to compromise, and they lost every time.

The author, an intelligence analyst for the CIA, has written a solid and well-researched book that will be useful to a limited readership. Perhaps it is unreasonable to complain that it is also an unexciting book. But personalities, issues and events that made a considerable splash here seem dry and colourless; remembering how much more interestingly parts of the story have been covered by Malcom Kerr, Patrick Seale, Peter Mansfield and others, one misses any flavour of immediate contact.

*University of York* J. S. F. PARKER

**Change in Tunisia:** Studies in the Social Sciences. Edited by Russell A. Stone and John Simmons. *New York: State University of New York Press. 1976. 333 pp. $30.00.*

THIS book contains a number of essays on aspects of social change in Tunisia since independence. In spite of the wide range of subjects, which vary from a technical discussion of high-yielding wheats to a survey of middle-level manpower in Tunisia, the book has a unity, and its editors link the sections in a helpful and unobtrusive way. Whether they are justified in claiming that Tunisia can be a model for other developing countries is doubtful, but the book shows the difficulties of modernisation even when government and people are reasonably predisposed towards it.

The section on agriculture brings out many of the problems. Some experiments had been made during the colonial period, and after independence a serious attempt was made to improve methods, crops and distribution. This is discussed in 'Farming in the Lower Medjerda Valley' by Roderic William Dutton and 'The Adoption of High-Yielding Wheats' by Malcolm J. Purvis. These two articles, together with Thomas E. Daves's and Herman van Wersch's contribution on 'The Results of Agricultural Planning in Tunisia 1962–1971', point to the difficulties. Much agricultural thinking was dominated by the colonial experience, and although new ideas were introduced they produced disappointing results. The attempt to centralise information and monitor the progress of experiments was frustrated because local farmers could not complete forms or failed to return them.

Indeed the need for trained manpower at every level of society is possibly the main theme of the book. In 'Political Generations', Mark A. Tessler and Mary E. Keppel show how rapidly education developed; primary education

embraced 90 per cent of the infant population within ten years of independence, secondary education quadrupled in the same period, and those receiving university education increased from 2,000 to 10,000. The same authors point out the political significance of this programme: 'Changes in education have been qualitative as well as quantitative and this is part of the second revolution, a cultural revolution. Under Bourguiba's dynamic leadership the decade following Tunisian independence witnessed a vigorous and calculated attempt to persuade the populace to abandon what the President referred to as "outmoded beliefs"' (pp. 73–4). The way in which governments can manipulate social change is clearly illustrated in Elizabeth Mueller Mahjoub's interesting article on 'Role of a Change Agent in the Process of Introducing Population Education'.

There has been an increased use of Arabic and of interest in the culture of Islam, but one of the less happy results of the educational programme seems to have been the growth of class divisions between the highly educated and the less well educated in the second generation. The article by Tessler and Keppel makes perceptive comments on the unifying effect of opposition to the French in the first generation of politicians and the problems which are now emerging. The book ends with a sobering article by James Allman on 'Social Mobility after Independence' which promises serious unrest in the future.

Alone in this book, but worthy of mention because it makes rewarding comparisons with work done on Algeria, Morocco and the Middle East, is Ellen C. Micaud's 'Urban Planning in Tunis'. Here again a finger is pointed at further problems in Tunisian development.

*University of Aberdeen* ANN WILLIAMS

**Mudros to Lausanne:** Britain's Frontier in West Asia 1918–1923. By Briton Cooper Busch. *Albany: State University of New York Press. 1976. 430 pp. $30.00.*

PROFESSOR BUSCH has written a trilogy that is, basically, about the British defence of India against threat from other European powers. The first two volumes cover relatively simple issues.[1] The first and simplest covers French, German and Russian challenges in the Persian Gulf before 1914; the second deals with the quarrel between London and Cairo on the one hand, and the government of India on the other, as to what was to happen after the War to Arabia and the Arab lands. This, the third volume, begins in the same vein. It describes the steps taken to ward off a German or Turkish dash for the Indian prize. For a while, a British line of defence is drawn from Constantinople along the Black Sea to the Caucasus, and thence, growing more tenuous with every step eastwards, via Dunsterville at Baku and Malleson, astride the Transcaspian railway, to an east end in Afghanistan.

But almost at once snags appear within the line as well as beyond it. Within it, rising nationalism in Persia and Afghanistan defeats old British methods. Beyond it, events in Russia and Greece warp British plans. The voice of India, insistent at the start that a Khilifat movement cannot be contained unless Turkey is left with some standing and possessions, grows fainter as the

[1] *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894–1914* (1967) and *Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914–1921* (1971) (Berkeley, London: University of California Press).

book progresses and finally sinks to a subdued background murmur. By the time the powers meet to sign a treaty at Lausanne with a Turkish *ghazi*, or victor, ranking as their equal, the questions at issue are all, except the future of Mosul, in Europe or Asia Minor. Mosul is the one point that does not get settled.

The simile on which a confusing tale is based is that of a tide. First it floods into Turkey, Russia and the Eastern marches; then it slackens as Kemal raises his flag. Finally, it ebbs everywhere as the Turkish nationalist movement outbids the puppet government at Constantinople that had signed the abortive Treaty of Sèvres. Problems such as statehood for Armenia, Georgia and the Kurds complicate the scene.

When a brave author, snapping his fingers at the watchful severity of colleagues each of whom is expert on one part of his tale, attempts to record in a sweeping sequence movements that sway the destinies of two continents for decades, he should always be applauded. This is what Professor Busch has tried to do, and up to a point he has succeeded. A single picture, backed by immense reading and careful footnotes, has been sketched out. But it has been done by means of snapshots so diverse that the joins between them cannot be papered over, even by an adept. We must be thankful to have between a single pair of boards and in only 430 pages so much of a confusing story. It ends with British endeavour to keep Turkey out of the arms of the Bolsheviks, British surrender to Turkish, Persian and Afghan nationalism, British disdain for Greek folly, and a British retreat, for the defence of India, to a line running from Haifa to Mosul, Baghdad and Basra—one much more manageable than that contemplated, indeed manned, at the end of the war.

The book would have been improved by better maps. It is fittingly dedicated to Christina Phelps Harris and Raymond Sontag, two good scholars, both now dead, who would have commended the effort that their pupil has made to cover an immense area in which both of them worked with distinction.

ELIZABETH MONROE

**Middle East Annual Review 1977.** Edited by Michael Field. *Saffron Walden: Middle East Review Co. 1976. 400 pp. £7·00.*

THE third edition of this yearbook and the first to be edited by Michael Field, contains nine signed articles dealing with various political and economic problems followed by country-by-country surveys. The area covered stretches from Mauritania in the west to Pakistan in the east and from Turkey in the north to Somalia in the south; it includes Cyprus but omits Israel. A great deal of useful and up-to-date information is provided, but the inclusion of so many advertisements and the omission of page references to individual countries in the contents page sometimes makes it difficult to locate.

*Chatham House* D. H.

## AFRICA

**International Aid and National Decisions:** Development Programs in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. By Leon Gordenker. *Princeton: Princeton University Press under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 1976. 190 pp. £9·10.*

PROFESSOR GORDENKER sets out to examine international aid to three neighbouring African countries—Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia—in order to ascertain how much influence multilateral donors have on recipient governments. Clearly this is an important but rather neglected topic. 'As I was observing international organisations and directing research', the author points out, 'I remarked a paucity of description and analysis based on close observation of the administration of the programs so acclaimed in the ever more frequent international assemblies.'

The book begins by outlining the structure of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the major multilateral organisation involved in technical assistance, and then looks at how the UNDP deals with the governmental administration in the African countries under consideration. Three projects are selected for detailed examination—valley surveys of the Lower Shire (Malawi), Wami-Pagani (Tanzania) and Luangwa (Zambia)—and considerable information is presented to show how the projects were actually formulated. The author then examines the role of multilateral agencies in advising the governments of Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia.

Gordenker concludes that international aid agencies appear to have relatively little influence on the governments they assist. The influence that was discernible was usually limited to attempts at resolving practical difficulties associated with particular projects. There was little evidence that multilateral donors were using their position to encourage governments to work towards more generalised goals.

This book is disappointing, however, because of its rather narrow scope. It focuses on three countries, with little attempt to generalise about conditions outside East Africa, and it concentrates on the UNDP with hardly any mention of other multilateral donors. The period considered is limited to the 1960s, the immediate post-independence years, and there is insufficient discussion as to whether the conclusions are still valid today. The three case studies on river surveys are informative, but few details are provided on other UNDP aid projects. Finally, there is insufficient consideration of the forces influencing the multilateral donors or the foreign economic interests which play such a dominant role in the economies of the three countries under review. Yet, despite the narrow focus of the book, it still provides considerable inside information on how the national and international bureaucracies function in three African states.

MARTIN BAILEY

**Ghana and Nigeria 1957–70:** A Study in Inter-African Discord. By Olajide Aluko. *London: Rex Collings. 1976. 275 pp. £5·50.*

THIS is an intelligent and careful survey, based essentially on the press and on other public sources, of relations between the two leading anglophone West African members of the Commonwealth (though the Commonwealth itself hardly features in the book). Its central theme is how the aspirations for co-operation expressed by the newly independent regimes were frustrated

by disagreements over the alignments and tactics most likely to advance African interests in the international community. In part the two countries were separated by the strength of their initial drives to assert distinctive national identities. A sadly interesting chapter describes the break-up of functional institutions for West African co-operation in the later years of colonial rule; only the West African Examinations Council survives, a testimony to the enduring strength of cultural colonialism. Dr. Aluko also shows how much friction has at times been caused by the expulsion from Ghana of Nigerians who had emigrated in earlier days of greater economic opportunity; modern diplomacy seems to have provided less satisfactory means of protecting these stranger communities than older mechanisms which antedate colonial rule.

But the basic cause of discord seems to have lain less in any profound conflict of national interest than in the diverging ideological goals and contrasting political styles of successive regimes in the two countries. Dr. Aluko shows how an ironical switching of roles took place after the military coups of 1966, since when Nigeria has increasingly adopted radical pan-African approaches formerly characteristic of Dr. Nkrumah. However, a concluding chapter notes a considerable improvement in relations since the advent in Accra of General Acheampong and the National Redemption Council (which does not appear to have taken place long before the main text of this book was completed). Dr. Aluko's distinction between 'conservative' and 'radical' attitudes, never a very profound analytical instrument, seems now to be growing increasingly irrelevant. It would be interesting to hear Dr. Aluko on the prospects for co-operation within the Economic Community of West African States.

*University of Aberdeen* JOHN D. HARGREAVES

**Nigerian Politics:** The People's View. By Margaret Peil. *London: Cassell. 1976. 209 pp. Pb: £1·65.*

**Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana.** By Robert M. Price. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1975. 261 pp. £9·75.*

IN these instructive books, two American-trained sociologists look at the problems of government in two West African states. Each book leans heavily on a sample survey of attitudes: neither sample seems adequate numerically, and the Nigerian one is admitted to be 'more geographically limited than desirable'. Each author regularly quotes respondents, and occasionally the voice of West Africa comes through nicely. But many of the *dicta* are too glib, too close to what the author wanted to hear. The Nigerian study makes great play with 'letting the poor man's voice be heard'—'I have tried to confront the "experts" with the people' (p. 17); but what comes through is universal, folksy in tone and lacking the characteristic quirks of Black Africa. The Ghanaian study is a shade pedestrian, being based on a doctoral dissertation, and the ritual invocation of a theoretical framework in the opening pages can be profitably skipped. It includes some statistical analysis of attitudes, which is up to a point convincing. The Nigerian study is more ambitious and livelier and, as befits a volume from an established 'expert' (*pace* the disclaimer), makes more general points without worrying too much about evidence.

Dr. Price wants to know why the Ghanaian civil service is so inefficient and corrupt, at least in public estimation; but yet popular, in the sense that everyone, including the severest critics, wants to recruit themselves, their brothers or sons, into the service. He makes his conclusion sound pessimistic: politicians and bureaucrats are still so bound up in the traditional family system that no immediate change to impersonal efficiency in administration can be foreseen—short of cultural and political revolution, presumably. Dr. Peil on the other hand wants to show that the present-day political and administrative system in Nigeria, warts and all, is the product, not of elites, expatriate or home-grown, but of the Nigerian masses and their changing aspirations; it is therefore, it seems, forgivable. At the end of her book she believes that she has 'demonstrated that Nigerian public opinion is informed, pragmatic and rational'; so all is now and henceforth for the best in the Nigerian world. Her optimism extends to looking forward to instability. 'Stability involves the maintenance of the *status quo*, and this is precisely what millions of Nigerians do not want' (p. 196). It is difficult to lose as a tipster if your philosophy is to scoff at the experts and recommend backing all the horses. Still, even if popularist Panglossism is not much of a philosophy, the experts were never very expert at forecasting. Neither of these books seems to this expert reviewer a great deal more than the informed and experienced personal attitudes of the experts who wrote them; but even that is very well worth having. Both books are thought-provoking about changes in attitudes among expatriate scholars as well as among West Africans. Ghanaians are perhaps not as universally cynical, self-seeking and hidebound as Dr. Price thinks; Nigerians, though they do farm peanuts, perhaps not quite as close to President Carter's image of the typical American elector as Dr. Peil believes. But these books are worth adding to the corpus of literature by expatriate experts, some of it deeply sensitive and highly knowledgeable, concerning the comforts of the traditional past in Africa and the agonies of the emerging present.

*University of Liverpool* P. E. H. Hair

## ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

**The Moral Economy of the Peasant:** Rebellion and Subsistence in South-east Asia. By James C. Scott. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1976. 246 pp. £10·80.*

Professor Scott, who obtained much of his academic education at the distinguished Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin, defines what he calls—rather quaintly—the Asian cultivators' *moral economy* as 'their notion of economic justice and their working definition of exploitation' (p. 3). He is rightly impressed by the 'safety-first' principle of pre-capitalist 'subsistence ethic' and by the dangers inherent in the taking of risks on the part of those who live close to the margin of subsistence. The cultivator tries to minimise his exposure to natural and man-made disaster rather than to maximise his financial return. A stable real income is thus 'a more powerful goal than achieving a higher average income' (p. 34), which may in fact disguise great fluctuations from year to year. Though this has been stated before, it is good to have the sociologist's findings

restated, if for no other reason than to balance the views sometimes expressed by the purely market-orientated economist.

The author's somewhat romanticised 'model of equity and justice', in which everybody is supposed to have his place, was rudely disrupted by the instability caused by 'the social dynamite of the colonial transformation' (p. 56)—or so Professor Scott believes. By his own admission (p. 58), the author's discussion of colonial change is a rough sketch rather than the outcome of a thorough empirical inquiry into the effects of colonial rule, commercial farming, exposure to the forces of the world market and the replacement of personal loyalties by contractual relationships. Whilst conceding that all was not well in pre-colonial times, the author sees the metropolitan powers as the chief villains of the piece. Had he looked more closely at the historical evidence instead of concentrating on the brief, though highly unsettling, time of the great economic depression of 1929–32, he might have found ample evidence of exploitation of the worst kind in pre-colonial Asia, not least in Lower Burma and Cochinchina—the areas which served him for his case studies. In fact, it is somewhat questionable whether the 'leviathan' of the colonial state did any greater violence to the 'moral economy of the subsistence ethic' than its predecessors or successors.

Professor Scott expressly limits his study to such cases of rebellion as those which occurred in the 1930s in the rice-exporting areas of the Irrawaddy and Mekong deltas. He declares himself 'not concerned with the broader question of peasant revolution' (p. 194). He thus excludes from his analysis the impact which Lenin's and Mao's strategies and tactics have had on the communities of cultivators in South-east Asia. This seems a rather regrettable omission at a time when some of Asia's small cultivators and tenants are in a state of revolt against their post-colonial rulers. The leaders of these underprivileged groups are too preoccupied with some current injustices to ruminate about those of the colonial past.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* W. KLATT

**Merchant Banking in the Far East:** An Examination of the Development, Operation and Future of Merchant Banking in Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. By Michael T. Skully. *London: Banker Research Unit. 1976. 284 pp. Pb: £30·00.*

MUCH of the discussion of the recent phenomenal increase in commercial banking activity in developing countries has been conducted at the somewhat abstract level of global analysis of total flows, with a focus on developing countries' increasing aggregate debt. Less has been written at the operational level, analysing or even merely describing the changing practices of individual banks, or the problems encountered by particular borrowers, such as local public utilities or development finance corporations, as they learn to absorb the new forms of financing that have become available.

One of the few sources of more concrete description of what goes on has been *The Banker*, together with its associated Research Unit. The Research Unit's earlier *Banking Structures and Sources of Finance in the Far East*,[1]

[1] London: Banker Research Unit, 1975. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1975, p. 613.

was a pioneering work. It was marred, however, by a lack of analysis, a rather slapdash approach, and a lack of consistency in the presentation. All three faults are remedied in the present, more narrowly specialised work, which focuses on one of the most striking developments in the area, namely the growth of a wide variety of consortium arrangements generically if rather misleadingly classified as ' merchant banks '.

The work is most useful in two respects: first, its description, on a country-by-country basis, of the types of business on which these institutions have embarked, with a discussion of what has or has not worked, and why; second, purely as a reference work, its listings of the institutions involved convey more useful information than the necessarily sparse details in reference works with a wider coverage.

It is less useful in its attempt to give the context. That the overall political and economic analysis should be at an uninformative level of generality is perhaps acceptable in what is intended as a specialist work; but it would have been useful to have a more precise discussion in terms at least of the broader development of banking in these countries. In the South-east Asian countries, at least, the broader and the narrower developments are inextricably intertwined. But perhaps that would have required more time than the five or six months' travelling which the author allowed himself.

With that minor reservation, financial specialists with an interest in the area should find it a useful work. One must hope so, since at the price it is hardly a book to be bought just for a quick read. Even in such a utilitarian work, however, surely there is no excuse for a style which borders on illiteracy.

*University of Sussex* JOHN WHITE

**The Asian Development Bank:** Diplomacy and Development in Asia. By Po-Wen Huang Jr. *New York: Vantage Press. 1975. 210 pp. $7.95.*

THE Asian Development Bank (ADB) was launched in 1966. There has long been a need for an informed and detached book-length study of this institution and its working. Unfortunately this book does not, in this reviewer's opinion, fulfil this need. The author has master's and doctoral degrees in International Relations from Yale, and is now an international investment banker with a Hongkong-based merchant bank affiliate. The dust-cover to Dr. Po-Wen's book claims that it will be ' of primary interest to financiers, civil servants, economists, political scientists and men of affairs ' and ' will also provide fascinating and engrossing reading for anyone wishing to gain further insight into the problems and dynamics of foreign aid, international organizations, and economic development in Asia and around the world '. Sadly, this is gross over selling. Although the reader who knew nothing beforehand about the ADB could learn something about its gestation, expanding membership and public policies, the book has overtones of a public relations exercise, with too much of journalese, anodyne comment and bland generalities. There is, however, a useful bibliography.

*Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London* PETER LYON

**Nehru.** By B. N. Pandey. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 499 pp. £6·95.*

PROFESSOR PANDEY has written an excellent biography of Pandit Nehru, scholarly yet eminently readable and exceedingly fair. The Nehru who emerges is very different from his father Motilal, or indeed from anyone else on the Indian scene. Sensitive and vain, the young Nehru acquired his ambivalence to the West during his formative years in England when he often felt snubbed because Indian princes were given preferential treatment over him at school and university. Already in England he used to flee from conflict into abstraction, a habit which never left him and which explains why, despite his great power as prime minister, he remained unable to cope with the practicalities of organisation, politics or administration.

Much of the documentation is new and casts an interesting light on Nehru the man. He was a bad husband and what Professor Pandey says about Kamala, the slighted, neglected and long-suffering wife of India's first, and mother of its third, prime minister, makes one increasingly eager for a biography of that very remarkable woman. Professor Pandey is the first biographer to make the Nehrus come to life; it is therefore a pity that he has allowed courtesy to suppress the impact on Hindu-Moslem relations of the way in which Nehru's sister was prevented from eloping with a Moslem, or to omit the key role played by Lady Mountbatten in persuading Nehru to accept an amended plan for the transfer of power.

Professor Pandey feels that the upsurge of the Moslem League owes a great deal to Nehru's calculated indifference to the legitimate demands of the Moslem Leaguers in 1937 as well as to Nehru's inability to comprehend India's communal problem. As he confessed to Jinnah, 'most of my interests lie in other directions . . . I feel as if I was an outsider and alien in spirit'. Professor Pandey is, indeed, the first Indian historian to do Wavell justice by recognising that he had India's interest at heart. Nor did Nehru understand China, despite Sardar Patel's early warning that China would lay hands on certain tracts of India's Himalayan territories.

This book depends considerably on the copious and intimate correspondence exchanged between Nehru and his sister. Nehru's letters to Mrs. Pandit are extraordinarily revealing, not only of his world view but also of his private concerns. Thus, it is interesting to learn that Nehru was worried because 'Indu [Indira Gandhi] revolves round herself; self-centred, she hardly thinks of others'; nine years later he complains again that his daughter is 'assertive' and that she suffers from a complex of insecurity. In view of Mrs. Gandhi's emergence to power, it is interesting to note that Professor Pandey finds great similarities between her and Chou En-lai. Both, according to him, are cool, calculating, ruthless and without attachment to continuity; and they both share a French educational and cultural background.

Like his daughter, Nehru was assertive. He had a superiority complex which made him patronising and insensitive to the reactions of the Afro-Asian leaders whom he often treated with a mixture of unconcealed arrogance and contempt which was truly Edwardian. What Professor Pandey does not explain adequately is Nehru's extraordinary charisma, not only for the Indian masses but also for the British *New Statesman* intelligentsia. There was more to Nehru than even this book reveals.

Finally, one technical point which needs correcting in the next edition: the captions under the maps on pages 16 and 293 are inversed.

TAYA ZINKIN

**Gandhi and Civil Disobedience:** The Mahatma in Indian Politics 1928–34. By Judith M. Brown. *Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 414 pp. £15·50.*

JUDITH BROWN has written an accurate and remarkably objective account of Indian politics between 1928 and 1934 and of the role of Mahatma Gandhi in the Indian National Congress during that period. She depicts with skill the two main elements in Gandhi's complicated character—a genuine, uncompromising idealism, combined with superb tactical skill. The idealism led him to regard *satyagraha* not just as a means to independence, but even more as the path to the reform and regeneration of Indians individually and as a nation. The other element in his make-up gave him an astonishing degree of political flexibility which enabled him to extricate himself from untenable positions. Whenever temporary conditions made it impossible for him to control the independence movement effectively, he detached himself from responsibility and concentrated on the social reform which was to him as important as political activities. This enabled him, without compromising his principles, to remain in the public eye and maintain his unique personal position. He was always at least sure of the adulation of the masses, though as the writer observes, they did not necessarily heed his exhortations.

Congressmen were often chiefly concerned with local matters, which made it impossible for them to support Gandhi in his approach at any given time to the problem of co-operation or non-co-operation with the Government of India. The strength of his position thus varied from time to time; it was greatest when a confused Congress needed him as a cohesive force, or when the government felt that there was nobody else with whom it could negotiate. His influence was at its peak in 1931 after the Salt March, but there was strong opposition inside the Congress to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, and the militant Jawaharlal Nehru never ceased to press privately for direct action against the government. Gandhi was also at this time distressed over his failure to bring the Hindus and the Moslems closer together and he seemed therefore anxious not to attend the Second Round Table Conference unless his status there could be recognised as unique. In the end, the author points out, he went to the Conference from a position of weakness and achieved little.

It is a moot point whether his fast to secure amendment of the Communal Award strengthened or weakened his influence, but the Civil Disobedience Movement which, perhaps against his own judgment, he sponsored in 1932 never really took off except in certain areas. From this time onwards his influence was considerably eroded. In 1934 he withdrew from the Congress, to concentrate on ' constructive work ' and, as the author puts it, abandoned a role which had proved redundant for his contemporaries.

It is rare to find a book about Gandhi written with so little emotional bias and Judith Brown is to be congratulated on marshalling all these facts with so much skill, clarity and objectivity.

PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS

**The Politics of South India 1920–1937.** By Christopher John Baker. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 363 pp. £11·00.*

THE new school of Indian historiography, to which Dr. Baker belongs, focuses attention on provincial rather than national politics. Books such as

the one under review and David Washbrook's *The Emergence of Provincial Politics: The Madras Presidency, 1870–1920*,[1] to which it is virtually a sequel, do more than add detail and deepen the perspective of the picture of modern Indian history which we already know; they bring to light political and social processes which suggest that substantial parts of the canvas will need to be repainted.

Dr. Baker examines in detail the politics of the Tamil and Telugu-speaking parts of the Madras Presidency from the inauguration of Dyarchy to the first elections under the 1935 Government of India Act. Those were the years when the Madras government found that if its policies were to be carried out, it had to come to terms with the necessity to elicit the political co-operation, first, of a small and largely urban elite and, latterly, of far larger sections of the population, when the political aspirations of the governed were vastly extended in response to the national movement and government initiatives. The steady rise, and then spectacular and rapid decline, of that odd constellation of interests, the Justice Party, is carefully analysed and Dr. Baker throws considerable light on the complex tale of how power at the provincial level was secured and exercised at a crucial stage of the progress towards independence.

As an account of Madras politics, based on the presupposition that politics is about who gets what, when, and how, this book is a most impressive contribution to our understanding. But there is more to politics than that, and the weakness of the book is the scant attention given to ideological matters. Anti-Brahman feeling in South India long antedates the 1920s, and was certainly not something thought up by the British to hobble Congress, or conjured out of thin air by a few self-interested Justice Party leaders. It has roots at least well back into the nineteenth century and was far more widely diffused and politically significant during the 1920s and 1930s than Dr. Baker allows. The dominance of the Justice Party coincided with the period when it could present itself as the sole standard bearer of non-Brahmanism; its decline came when Congress could rival that claim. This is not, of course, the whole of the story, but it needs to be put alongside the factors which Dr. Baker so ably documents.

The penetrating account of the social and political consequences of the depression is probably the most original and illuminating part of this scholarly book. Old patterns of social control were loosened, new social groups whose position had become even more precarious sought political means of defending themselves, and the more recent style of caste politics came into being. For this and other reasons, Dr. Baker's book provides an indispensable complement, and at some points a corrective, to the writings of Irschick, Hardgrave and the Rudolphs on modern Madras politics.

*University of Sussex* DUNCAN B. FORRESTER

**The Role of Foreign Financial Assistance to Thailand in the 1980s.** Edited by W. Lee Baldwin and W. David Maxwell. *Lexington, Farnborough: Heath. 1976. 167 pp. £6·00.*

RECENTLY there has been disillusion among developing nations at the effect of transfers of capital from the developed world, whether this has come through bilateral agreements or via international agencies like the

[1] London: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

One of the larger recipients of foreign financial assistance in the last two decades has been Thailand, and the volume edited by Baldwin and Maxwell is a useful assessment, in the light of past experience, of the needs of that country for further external assistance. The volume incorporates edited versions of papers presented at a seminar held in Chiangmai in June 1974 by a group of eminent Thai economic planners, including Dr. Puey Ungphakorn and Dr. Snoh Unakul, and representatives of foreign aid agencies in Thailand. The presentation is rather uneven, with some papers being printed only in summary form, but each paper is followed by comments from the participants which add a useful perspective.

A dominant figure in the seminar was clearly Dr. Puey and an initial discussion between him and Dr. Snoh outlines the general theme of the first part of the book, an assessment of Thailand's future aid requirements in the context of development aims for the 1980s. A summary of development objectives and receipt of foreign aid in the 1960s and early 1970s in the papers of Phisit and Sakda show aid mainly oriented towards capital-intensive projects in circumstances of a still essentially favourable population-resource ratio and with the country under the United States defence umbrella. Aid of this type, favouring the foreign investor and the Thai business elite, is felt by the participants generally to be inappropriate to the new development aims of greater regional and personal equality of opportunity and income in the Thailand of the 1980s which will still have a rapidly increasing population but will hold a more neutral political position in the face of continuing internal insurgency. If Amara's dire scenario seems a rather bleak and static assessment, his words emphasise the need for re-orientation of the foci for aid.

The book's second section deals with narrower issues of how aid should be used in individual sectors of the economy. Rural development projects, road building, education and private foreign investments affecting the industrial sector all receive attention. Here again the inappropriateness of much capital-intensive aid is stressed. Although it is difficult to agree with some of Supachai's evidence on education benefits, his and other writers' call for the development of human resources and a rationalisation of the structure of government has much to recommend it.

The book's final sections provide a further general discussion and a rather platitudinous conclusion by the editors, neither of which adds greatly to the preceding analysis. Nevertheless the work as a whole provides a valuable insight into perceptions of the whole aid programme, not least through the copious statistical material presented. It is perhaps sad that recent developments in Thailand should have denied the country the services of at least one of the participants and that the basis upon which others founded their comments may also have been eroded.

*School of Oriental and African Studies, London* HARVEY DEMAINE

**Indonesia's Elite:** Political Culture and Cultural Politics. By Donald K. Emmerson. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 303 pp. £10·15.*

THE cultural diversity of the Indonesian archipelago was only encapsulated politically when the Dutch consolidated the bounds of their administrative

control. This process of encapsulation was not impartial in terms of political benefaction but served to reinforce the position and syncretic values of a predominantly Javanese bureaucracy at the expense of the adherents of orthodox Islam. That imbalance was disturbed somewhat during the Japanese occupation and the period of national revolution, but from the attainment of independence political change was accompanied by a restoration of a pattern of cultural dominance exemplified by the present administration of President Suharto. Professor Emmerson has inquired with scholarly diligence and sensitivity into the cultural politics of modern Indonesia and his conclusions have an interesting relevance to the Suharto administration's prospects for viability.

By cultural politics, the author means the contentious process of seeking an authoritative choice between rival visions of the future. He asserts that such a process will arise when cultural differences are politicised and political differences are cast in cultural terms. Such was certainly the experience of Indonesia during its first decade of independence. The author's focus is on the elite of Indonesia whose experience and orientations are drawn from a sample of twenty senior officials in the central administration and twenty members of the national parliament (before the 1971 elections). The central question to which he addresses himself through intensive interviewing is whether society splits the state or whether the state (reflecting an identifiable elite culture) unites society. The significance of the two samples is that the officials are far more representative of a syncretic Javanese culture in which attachment to Islam is nominal, whereas the parliamentarians are more representative of cultural diversity, including attachment to an orthodox Islam. The purpose of the exercise is to judge to what extent a correlation exists between the political outlook of the members of each sample and their cultural/political affiliation and experience. Emmerson concludes that despite different attitudes to order and conflict on the part of the two samples, they are joined by distinctive elite values. To this somewhat unexceptionable assessment is added the pertinent judgment that an unassimilated Islamic factor persists within elite political culture and is likely to remain as a potential source of tension in cultural political terms. He justifies this judgment by an analysis of the abortive attempt by the Suharto administration to implement a uniform marriage law which provoked Islamic reaction. The volume concludes with an incisive critique of the failings of the Suharto government's attempts to depoliticise cultural conflict which have encouraged by default an alternative class conflict.

*London School of Economics* MICHAEL LEIFER

**The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence:** India and Indochina. By Allen S. Whiting. *Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press for the Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan. 1975. 299 pp. $15.00.*

IN search of the 'calculus of deterrence', Professor Whiting follows up the theoretical work of Bruce Russett[1] and Alexander George[2] in

[1] 'The Calculus of Deterrence', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. VII, No. 2, June 1963.

[2] A. L. George and R. Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

attempting to 'infer what general strategy underlies persistent patterns of behavior aimed at persuading a perceived opponent that the costs of his continuing conflictual activity will eventually prove unacceptable to him because of the Chinese response' (p. 201). Much of the stimulus for the study derives from Alexander George's 'continual prodding for more conceptual and theoretical linkage between government analysis and academic research' (p. ix). As a result of Whiting's State Department experience from 1961 to 1968, he brings many valuable new insights into the darker corners of the pre-1971 Sino-American relationship in this process.

Five of the eight chapters are devoted to a progressively more detailed analysis of events leading up to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, relying primarily on the methodology of communications analysis. The contents of Chinese verbal interactions with India are selected primarily from domestic and external media transmissions and a few closed Chinese documents, such as the *Kung-tso T'ung-hsün* and *Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui*, and related to the strategic context of suspected Indian collusion with the super-powers. Following a brief examination of explanatory hypotheses of their behaviour and the military options open to the Chinese, the conclusion is reached that deterrence failed and that 'mutual miscalculation resulted in a war that neither side wanted' (p. 169).

In the sixth chapter, on deterrence in Indochina, regarded as partially successful, non-verbal signalling, for example, the shooting down of United States aircraft intruding into Chinese airspace, is shown to have had greater significance than verbal interaction. The comparative analysis of the cases of Korea, India and Indochina in the penultimate chapter highlights a consistency in the use of graduated verbal escalation by means of various cue phrases and posits a strict timetable of weekly gradations for tactical moves and enemy response and monthly gradations in the strategic moves before armed intervention. The author eschews any comment on the failure of American deterrence of North Vietnam in his final chapter on retrospect and prospects and omits any reference to the contribution which he and George, by their evaluations of the mistakes made in American policy in Korea, made to prevent similar miscalculations of Chinese intentions in Indochina.[3] Conversely, Chinese experience of American behaviour in Korea and the availability of these books to their own intelligence analysts could hardly help—the excesses of the Cultural Revolution aside—but contribute to increased Chinese rationality in effective communication in the 1960s. This likelihood was increased by the fact that the Chinese leadership remained largely constant throughout this period. In the concluding sections a certain anxiety is expressed about the future in view of the juxtaposition of considerable nuclear capacity in the hands of new Chinese leaders with an environment of unsettled boundary disputes with two nuclear powers (the Soviet Union and India) on land and a number of lesser states at sea.

A major strength of the study lies in the insights it provides into the painstaking nature of governmental analysis. Among the lessons that can be derived from this study, which claims to be 'for laymen and specialists' (p. xiii), is the fundamental sensitivity which Chinese govern-

[3] A. S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960); A. L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its Aftermath* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

ments of all descriptions have shown to any and every threat to their territorial integrity and the corresponding risks they are prepared to take to preserve this at all costs. The rationality of Chinese response is in no small way linked to the control exercised from the top down to the border guard detachments, which contrasts markedly with the American and Indian command structures in 1950 and 1962. The layman also needs to be aware of the risks inherent in subsuming any Chinese calculus of deterrence within any Western rationalisation of deterrence theories.

*University of Sussex* J. W. M. CHAPMAN

**The Chinese Communist Treatment of Counter-Revolutionaries: 1924–1949.** By Patricia E. Griffin. *Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1976. 257 pp. £10·50.*

**Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist China.** By Alan P. L. Liu. *Santa Barbara, Oxford: Clio Press. 1976. 205 pp. £8·45. Pb: £4·10.*

THE great output of books and articles on Communist China seems to be becoming more and more specialised. Gone are the comprehensive tomes dealing in one broad survey with the whole panorama of Chinese politics or whatever, and in their place we have much more narrowly-focused studies giving in-depth treatment of particular topics over a limited period of time.

Here are two splendid examples, adding greatly to our understanding of Chinese Communist society. Patricia Griffin's study of the treatment of the so-called 'counter-revolutionaries' spans the years before the Communists came to power, years when their practices and techniques were being formulated and refined. Her book forms part of a series sponsored by Harvard Law School on legal systems of East Asia, and is based mainly on Chinese materials.

One does not often think of the legal system in present-day China as being much more than an extension of Communist Party controls over the populace, subject to the vagaries of Party policies, and not essentially dissimilar from the equivalent system in the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Here, however, in six tightly-organised chapters, and with the aid of twelve sample statutes in the appendices, we are given a very clear picture of the bureaucratic legal structure that evolved from the Kiangsi Soviet onwards.

Of course, students of China are aware of the rather nebulous position that law traditionally occupies in that country. Miss Griffin emphasises the 'flexibility' that has characterised the Chinese Communist approach, meaning essentially that methods and norms have varied over time, and from place to place. Direct involvement of the people in the legal process through the Communists' famous mass-line techniques has very much qualified the meaning of legality. 'To gain popular support the CCP interpreted law as the wishes of the masses' (p. 146). Flexibility of this order involved a consequential problem of stability within the system, whether the wishes were those of the masses or of the Party. Moreover, the Political Security Bureau, or secret police, were quite independent of judicial procedures or jurisdiction.

Many interesting aspects of later Communist rule are seen here in genesis —the use of prisons for production and education (or re-education), labour

camps and thought reform. 'A Communist soldier told of groups of troops in Kiangsi, and later in Yenan, sitting around campfires in the evenings discussing standards of conduct and methods of winning popular support. These small-group discussions may have been the origin of criticism and other thought-reform techniques' (p. 132). The book is very well written, most informative and easy to read.

Alan P. Liu's book has a broad title, but it is actually about Red Guard activities in the Cultural Revolution, in the years 1966–68. The title indicates his intention, which is to impose a social science treatment on the factual data. For non-Americans, some of the terms used, such as 'elite legitimation' or 'the igniting function of norms' (p. 77), will present the usual difficulties. But the theoretical framework for a study of conflict is got out of the way in the first fifteen pages. We are then treated to a fascinating examination of political behaviour and its underlying rationale among Chinese youth groups in conflict in the Cultural Revolution.

We now know that this strange episode was a kind of civil war in China, in which tanks, anti-aircraft guns and even planes were used by opposing forces, as well as spears and beer bottles. Professor Liu relates the details but handles the mass of data with skill, never losing sight of his theme, relating group conflict to the prevailing political culture. A central issue throughout was the nature of authority, its source and the pattern of communication with it. Not, one might think, an issue confined solely to Communist China.

The last chapter, on conflict resolution and pacification, highlights the intriguing problem of how you halt a movement that has developed a momentum of its own, and how to reimpose an authority that can command respect after it has broken down. Clearly, law and order has not been easy to establish in the years since 1968, and at the end the author surmises, 'When Mao dies, submerged tensions among the Party elite may again surface. The radical minority might then appeal to discontented groups for support in a struggle for power' (p. 188). How right he was!

*University of Hull* VICTOR FUNNELL

**Wind in the Tower:** Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution 1949–1975. By Han Suyin. *London: Jonathan Cape. 1976. 404 pp. £6·50.*

'LIKE Antaeus, he touched the earth and was strong again, vital with the spirit of his people.' This description (p. 157) of Mao by Han Suyin sums up this whole book, which is the second volume of a 'sympathetic' biography of the old Chinese despot.[1] It is an extraordinary melange, in which the author employs all her novelist's skills, and her very feminine enthusiasm, to defend Mao against all his detractors in China and outside it.

Unfortunately, in dealing in this volume with the troubled years of power since 1949, she wades way out of her depth. Anyone might be foxed by the charges and counter-charges of the Cultural Revolution, by the late-discovered misdemeanours of long-respected members of the Communist Party hierarchy, or by some of the puzzles that still surround such policies as, for example, the 'Hundred Flowers' campaign in 1957. Han Suyin skims

[1] *The Morning Deluge: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution 1893–1953* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1973).

blithely over this minefield with the maximum of quotations and a minimum of footnotes. She gives us a reconstruction of events, and a characterisation of people and policies, based upon extensive use of the hindsight provided by the Maoist mud-slinging in recent years. The Maoist version is naturally accepted uncritically, and so Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, P'eng Te-huai and many more appear in these pages as traitors, 'revisionists', right-wing, and consigned to well-merited oblivion. If the book had not stopped in 1975, it would have been interesting to see what Han Suyin made of the recent arrest of the 'gang of four', and Madame Mao in particular, who here receives some praise.

That said, however, the book is easy to read, and for the general book-buying public it will provide some hours of entertaining reading on a currently fashionable subject. Not that that excuses a deal of misinformation, such as that Chou En-lai was one of the 'Twenty-eight Bolsheviks' led by Wang Ming (p. 214), or that accounts of Chinese atrocities in Tibet stem solely from the Dalai Lama himself (p. 155). These are matters that are easily verifiable. Nor does it seem necessary for sixteen chapters in the list of contents to be given the wrong page number.

Nowhere will the reader find an answer to deeper questions concerning the Chinese Communist regime. What, exactly, was the nature of the power exerted by Mao in the top-most rungs of leadership? If his opponents were so well entrenched in the state and party and army bureaucracies, how was it that, for example, one Mao-inspired article in a Shanghai newspaper on November 10, 1965, could by December 30 produce a self-criticism from the Vice-Mayor of Peking in the opposition camp? Is it enough to be told that Mao had always fought against a KGB type of secret police apparatus (p. 378)? He certainly employed an elite army bodyguard.

Overall, and despite the avowed purpose of this book, it reveals the Chinese Communist regime as a seething sump of corruption and intrigue, from which much of the scum has floated to the surface in recent years.

*University of Hull* VICTOR FUNNELL

**North Korea's Foreign Relations:** The Politics of Accommodation, 1945–75. By Wayne S. Kiyosaki. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 133 pp. £11·55.*

THIS book surveys, as its subtitle states, North Korea's foreign relations over the whole thirty years of that country's existence. The author of such a work faces one problem above all: that what North Korea itself has had to say on the subject amounts to very little. Dr. Kiyosaki explains why this is so. There is, he says in his introduction, 'a feeling which runs deep in Pyongyang that it needs time and opportunity to set its own house in order without foreign encumbrances', but 'Pyongyang's subjectivity . . . must be understood not only as a key element in North Korea's attitude toward other countries but also as the basis of its undoing as a militant country given to periods of unpredictability' (pp. viii–ix).

Since North Korea's view of the world brought us in 1950–53 as near to a third world war as we have been, and is still a factor in any assessment of the chances of war at least in East Asia, the subject clearly calls for some study. The approach in this book is to work from North Korea's own

comments on the various phases of international relations as they have affected North Korea itself. The main phases are: the Stalin period, 1945–53, the Khrushchev period, 1954–64, the period when the Sino-Soviet rift came into the open, 1965–69, and the period of great-power detente, 1970–75. This book thus has at least one merit rare in books on North Korea, that it brings the reader virtually up to date.

There is much more that could be done than is done in this book to unravel the mysteries of North Korean policies, domestic as well as foreign, but only if one has a Scalapino-like devotion to the subject. It is unrewarding work unravelling what Kiyosaki aptly labels, the 'policy of deliberate obfuscation' (p. 94), or, to quote the closing words of this book, 'exposing the incongruity between his [Kim II Sung's] chosen image of omnipotence and his limited purchase over the forces that will always remain beyond his . . . control' (p. 114). Foreign ministries and intelligence agencies may be able to afford such studies. Academics will probably decide to leave them with this very able account.

*School of Oriental and African Studies, London* W. E. SKILLEND

**Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937–49.** Vol. I: 1937–38. *1975. 617 pp. A$12.00.* Vol. II: 1939. *1976. 548 pp. A$24.00.* Edited by R. G. Neale with the assistance of P. G. Edwards, H. Kenway and H. J. W. Stokes. *Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service for the Department of Foreign Affairs.*

THESE two bulky volumes open the first series of *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, an important new enterprise which will eventually provide a full survey of the theme since 1901. Sponsored by the Department of External Affairs in Canberra, its Editor is a former Professor of History who has had the benefit of support from a distinguished Editorial Advisory Board with Professor J. D. B. Miller as its Chairman.

Most of the selected documents come from the files of the Prime Minister's Department, the Department of External Affairs and the Defence Department in Canberra, but some collections of papers of former ministers and senior officials have also been drawn upon. Unfortunately, for the period under review (1937–39) the Editor found 'frequent gaps in the available material and insufficient information on how, when and by whom a given policy was initiated. Too often the sort of evidence which a historian would require either was not committed to paper or has since been lost' (Vol. I, p. xiii). Within such unavoidable limitations the documents have been meticulously edited. As Mr. Gough Whitlam states in his foreword to Volume I, 'This national, non-partisan project has been supported by all Australian Governments since it was first proposed in 1967 by the then Minister for External Affairs, Mr. P. M. C. Hasluck'. The documents appear in chronological order, but there is also a 'Subject List of Documents'.

Before the Second World War, Australian foreign policy was still in its infancy. The Commonwealth of Australia had no representatives of its own in foreign countries, apart from one Australian Counsellor attached to the British Embassy in Washington. For both information and advice it depended on London. However, in 1939 the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, favoured direct Australian diplomatic contacts with Washington, Tokyo and Chung-

king; but although eventually Australian legations were established there, the only new post created in 1939 was that of Australian High Commissioner to Canada. Although from 1935 onwards Australia had a Ministry of External Affairs with a Cabinet Minister and a handful of officials, decisions on foreign policy were taken by the Prime Minister, first J. A. Lyons and, after his death in April 1939, Robert Menzies.

From the last Imperial Conference in London in May-June 1937 to the summer of 1939, the Australian government favoured appeasement of Germany and Italy, its attitude going even further than that of the Chamberlain government. At the Imperial Conference, for instance, R. G. Casey, a member of the Australian Cabinet, suggested that Germany should in future be allowed a freer hand in Europe, particularly towards the *Anschluss*. Mr. Eden disagreed. In September 1938, Mr. Bruce, the able Australian High Commissioner in London,[1] welcomed a telegram Lyons had sent to Chamberlain as 'most useful and helpful as it strengthens appreciably necessity of strongest pressure on Dr. Benes and Czech government for maximum concessions to bring about settlement' (Vol. I, Doc. 248). After Munich Lyons expressed his great admiration for Chamberlain's 'initiative and courage in the face of extreme difficulties', adding significantly: 'As we have approved of your policy we have not thought it necessary to encumber you with our advice' (Vol. I, Doc. 278).

There are no documents at all here on the Spanish Civil War, although at the time this issue divided Australian public opinion deeply. It is only recorded that afterwards the Australian government, following the British example, recognised Franco's National Government. Even more striking is the omission of any comments by Canberra on the vital change of course by Chamberlain's government at the end of March 1939. Though the Australian government was informed it did not react to the momentous decision in London to abandon appeasement of Hitler and join with France in guaranteeing Poland against German aggression (Vol. II, pp. ix–x).

Understandably, the Australian Cabinet was more concerned with the dangers and problems in the Pacific region than with events in Europe. At the Imperial Conference it strongly favoured the conclusion of a Pacific non-aggression pact in which it was hoped that not only the United States, but also China, the Soviet Union and even Japan might participate. Nothing came of the project. Australia's deep concern about a possible Japanese advance in the Pacific and a consequent threat to its security, should Britain become involved in a war with Germany and Italy, runs like a red threat through the documents from May 1937 to the end of 1939. In April 1939 Robert Menzies put it succinctly in a broadcast: 'In the Pacific we have primary responsibilities and primary risks'. The problems of the Pacific were different from those of Europe. 'What Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the near north. Little given as I am to encouraging the exaggerated idea of a Dominion independence and separatism which exists in some minds, I have become convinced that, in the Pacific, Australia must regard herself as a principal providing herself with her own information and maintaining her own diplomatic contacts with foreign Powers' (Vol II, Doc. 73).

[1] Stanley M. Bruce, a former prime minister, was High Commissioner in London from 1933–45. He enjoyed the confidence of both Chamberlain and Eden. See the biography of him by Cecil Edwards, *Bruce of Melbourne: Man of Two Worlds* (London: Heinemann, 1966). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1966, p. 764.

In June 1937 Neville Chamberlain had admitted at the Imperial Conferenc that 'there was now the perpetual danger that trouble in Europe might b Japan's opportunity to take some steps to our disadvantage in the Far East He confessed that 'at present we should be quite unable to encounter such step' (Vol. I, Doc. 36). Again the Australian representatives asked the Britis Admiralty for assurances that in case of a war in Europe part of th British fleet would be sent in time to safeguard Singapore. Yet ther remained much uneasiness in Australian government circles. At the en of March 1939 the Australian Cabinet felt that 'on outbreak of Europea war and until German pocket battleships were eliminated from high seas i could not be anticipated any capital ships would be sent to Far East. In suc a case Australia might have to meet immediate attack from Japan' (Vol. I] Doc. 60). Three months later Chamberlain assured Menzies of the Britisl government's 'full intention to despatch a fleet to Singapore, should Japai join Germany and Italy against Britain'. Although the size of the flee would depend on a number of factors at the given moment, they intende 'to achieve three main objects: (1) the prevention of any major operatioi against Australia, New Zealand or India; (2) to keep open our se communications; (3) to prevent the fall of Singapore' (Vol. II, Doc. 113) Three months after the outbreak of the war in Europe Menzies told his Nev Zealand colleague, M. J. Savage, that in spite of new reassurances from th Foreign Office in London and of promises made by the British Admiralty there was 'still some real uncertainty about the position of Japan whicl might become more acute if Germany invaded Holland and the Netherland East Indies were cut off from their mother country' (Vol. II, Doc. 378) Soon afterwards R. G. Casey, then on a lengthy official mission in London cabled to Menzies that he thought 'the British Government's statement ensuing safety of Australia and Singapore are satisfactory', and he though it 'the wisest conclusion in our own and general British interest to senc special [Australian] division abroad at the earliest' (Vol. II, Doc. 384) Menzies relented and agreed to dispatch the first Australian Brigade Grouj overseas early in January 1940. Yet he also told Casey of 'the genera feeling' of the Cabinet in Canberra that 'there had been in this matte a quite perceptible disposition to treat Australia as a Colony and to mak insufficient allowance for the fact that it is for the Government of Australi to determine whether and when Australian Forces shall go out of Australia (Vol. II, Doc. 398).[2] Australia's foreign policy was beginning to come of age At the same time Menzies struck a fairly independent line in an exchang of views on war aims with the British government.

In both volumes a number of documents illustrate Australian concerr over economic penetration by Japan in the Pacific area, particularly ir Portuguese Timor, where Australian companies competed with Japanes business firms for oil concessions. In Australia itself the government hac earlier allowed a Japanese company to exploit the iron ore supplies o Yampi Sound in the north of Western Australia. But by May 1938 Mr. Lyon informed the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney that in the light of a report by the Commonwealth Geological Adviser, the Australian governmen

[2] In his autobiography *Personal Experience 1939–1946* (London: Constable, 1962) Lord Casey remarks that 'the first months of the 1939–45 War were a time of anxiety and uncertainty and some wishful thinking. The Dominions—now an old-fashioned description—were insufficiently informed of what it was all about and did not know what part they might be called upon to play' (p. 9).

felt obliged to prohibit completely the export of iron ore from Australia. When the Japanese government expressed deep concern about this adverse decision, the Australians promised to give financial compensation to the Japanese company. This attitude reveals the dual policy of containment and conciliation which characterises so much of Australia's approach to Japan towards the end of the 1930s.

ERNEST K. BRAMSTED

**A Time for Building:** Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951–1963. By Paul Hasluck. *Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Prentice-Hall.) 452 pp. £11·65.*

SIR PAUL HASLUCK, more widely known as Australian Minister for External Affairs and then as Governor-General, spent his first twelve years as a minister in the Department of Territories. He presents here an extraordinarily detailed and revealing account of his stewardship of Papua New Guinea from 1951 to 1963. Unlike British and French colonial ministers, Hasluck was able to concentrate his remarkable energies on small nearby areas. And unlike other Australian ministers, his passionate and comprehensive concern for detail led him, despite his frequent disclaimers, to usurp much of the role of his department head, as well as that of the Administrator of the Territory.

His story is one of substantial achievement and he presents the evolution of policy on all subjects in candid detail, frequently quoting from the minutes and memoranda which he issued. Despite Papua New Guinea's proximity to Australia, its extraordinarily rugged terrain and scattered, small-scale societies made administrative penetration exceptionally difficult. Apart from defence considerations, the territory had little to offer Australia and had attracted scant attention and investment. With little encouragement from fellow ministers, Hasluck obtained a steadily increasing flow of funds and manpower to develop social services within a framework of regionally balanced growth, and he laid the basis for the first steps towards higher education, localisation of the public service and self-government. He also restrained the appetite of a small group of vocal settlers for land, cheap labour and political power and he may well have forestalled development in Rhodesian directions.

But Hasluck's objectives were essentially assimilationist, in line with Australian assumptions about aboriginal development. He saw New Guineans as dedicated to individualism and he encouraged patterns of law, landholding, agricultural extension and local government which fit these preconceptions. He permitted few deviations from the inflexible public service traditions of Australia and consistently supported centralisation and specialisation at the expense of field co-ordination and intelligibility for Papua New Guinean communities. He explicitly refused to consider the relevance of British experience in colonial administration and decolonisation. The reader is left with the impression that Hasluck never recovered from the frustrations of his years as a public servant under Evatt and that he was determined to enforce on Papua New Guinea the orthodox principles of Australian public administration, no matter how inappropriate these might be.

Hasluck's account conveys the impression of enormous energy and intellectual drive harnessed to a very inadequate machine and he discusses at

great length, including a chapter on 'Exasperation at Delay', the shortcomings of his officials. But although he justifies the removal of the highly respected Administrator, J. K. Murray, for lack of initiative and responsiveness, he roundly belabours Murray's successor for the same failures over a decade without once suggesting that he might also have been replaced. There are other curious omissions. Hasluck's last year as minister was preoccupied with difficult negotiations over the reshaping of the public service, resulting in a highly unsatisfactory set of arrangements; they receive no mention. Nor do the events at Raluana and Navuneram, proto-nationalist reactions to the imposition of new institutions. Although Hasluck frequently refers to his eagerness to promote discussion, for instance through the creation of a senior officers' workshop, he fails to add that both the workshop and an official periodical were suspended when they produced unwelcome recommendations. All these omissions suggest that only those initiatives from below which fitted Hasluck's preconceptions could gain recognition.

Hasluck so dominated all policy-making concerning Papua New Guinea for such a long and formative period that it is difficult to overestimate the significance of his shaping hand. If he seems nagging, overbearing and humourless, his successors of the late 1960s proved much more so and their narrow economic priorities revealed Hasluck's humanism and genuine concern for Papua New Guinea, no matter how ethnocentric, as highly redeeming qualities.

*Australian National University, Canberra* J. A. BALLARD

## NORTH AMERICA

**Presidential Power and the Constitution:** Essays by Edward S. Corwin. Edited by Richard Loss. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 185 pp. £8·75.*

**The Tides of Power:** Conversations on the American Constitution. By Bob Eckhardt and Charles L. Black Jr. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1976. 225 pp. £6·60.*

**Congress against the President.** Edited by Harvey C. Mansfield Sr. *New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 200 pp. £8·25. Pb: £3·30. $5.95.*

**Managing Presidential Objectives.** By Richard Rose. *London: Macmillan. 1977. (First publ. New York: Free Press, 1976.) 180 pp. £8·95.*

A FEW years ago, a group of wealthy American campaign contributors interviewed candidates anxious to obtain their favours. Of the changes which these contributors wished to discuss, by far the largest number were proposed reforms in the mechanics of government. The crisis of the later Nixon years merely gave an additional impetus to the unremitting flow of books questioning the forms and effectiveness of American government. Is the Presidency too powerful? How can Congress be strengthened? Is the party system working satisfactorily? Can the bureaucracy be controlled? Three of the four books under review here are recent attempts to answer some, or all, of these questions.

The exception is the collection of essays by Edward S. Corwin, one of the most distinguished modern commentators on American politics, here edited with a useful short introduction by Richard Loss. Corwin died in 1963, and so missed the imperial presidency at its most purple, but these essays, ranging in date of publication from 1917 to 1956, show his concern at the steady growth of presidential power under the two Roosevelts, Wilson and Truman. And in his essay on Truman's seizure of the steel mills, he argues the by now fashionable case that the way to avoid presidential autocracy is for Congress to act more decisively in those areas where it is competent to do so, but has weakly given way to presidential initiative. All this is conventional enough, but Corwin's arguments are lucidly expressed, and imbued with a deep knowledge of constitutional history and law: all virtues notably lacking in much of the writing on political subjects produced today.

*The Tides of Power* is the transcript of tape-recorded conversations between Professor Black of Yale and his old friend and fellow Texan, Congressman Eckhardt. They are described as talking ' informally ', although it is difficult to believe that informal conversation was ever quite like this: in fact the book is far less shapeless than might be feared. The discussion ranges widely, from the defects of the party conventions to the limits of judicial power; but its core is the relationship of Presidency and Congress, with its related problems of veto, impoundment and executive privilege. It is at its most interesting when Eckhardt reflects, from the inside, on the strengths and weaknesses of a Congress which, for all its attempts at procedural reform, remains weak in party discipline and an unwieldy instrument of active, counter-presidential, government. It is still true, nonetheless, that Congress is the major institution which has done most to transform itself in recent years. *Congress against the President* is a collection of essays dealing with that transformation. Three main developments are apparent: first, the growing influence of groups of activist members, such as the Democratic Study Group and the Congressional Black Caucus; secondly, the increasing size and improving quality of committee staffs, particularly in the budget sector; and thirdly, the attempt to give more coherent direction to the majority by extending the power of the Democratic caucus and steering committees, while restricting the dominance of chairmen and senior members. These essays, although variable in quality, are generally detailed and informative, making this book the most obviously useful of the four to students of contemporary political events.

Professor Rose has produced a rather hybrid book, a study of the application of management techniques to American government strained through a political scientist's sieve. His description of the process of ' managing by objectives' (MbO) is conscientious, if scarcely lively, and he adorns it with more general reflections on the President's role which are, as one would expect, interesting and sometimes stimulating. As for MbO, doubts remain. If identification of priorities and progress-chasing are such notable innovations, the Federal bureaucracy must have been even more incompetent than was thought; and if the principal aim in introducing the new techniques was to strengthen centralised control in the Nixon White House, it was not necessarily conducive to the public good. What is more important now is to see whether, with Nixon and Ford gone, President Carter and the leaders of Congress can, despite institutional hindrances, establish that harmonious co-operation without which the separation of powers is merely

an excuse for governmental impotence. Professor Black argues that it is not the constitutional structures which are deficient, but the will to make them work. Americans must recognise that, in the long term, problem-solving will be achieved by willing the ends as well as by discussing the means.

*Emmanuel College, Cambridge* GERARD EVANS

**The Committee of One Million:** 'China Lobby' Politics 1953–1971. By Stanley D. Bachrack. *New York, Guildford: Columbia University Press. 1976. 371 pp. $18.70. £10·37.*

THIS is a thesis book, occasionally clumsy in presentation and self-conscious in style, but nonetheless of consummate interest. After a brief survey of the origins and impact of the 'China Lobby' in the late 1940s and 1950s, the core of the book is devoted to an account of the history of the Committee Of/For One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations. With the failure of its crusade in October 1971, it devoted its last efforts to support for Taiwan, and Bachrack ends his story with the death of Chiang Kai-Shek on April 5, 1975, his funeral being appropriately attended as an official American delegate by Dr. Walter Henry Judd, former congressmen, founder member and devoted supporter of the Committee Of One Million.

Bachrack has used the Committee's papers, which are deposited at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, but the origins of the Committee are still shrouded in some uncertainty. It seems to have originated in the mind of Nicholas de Rochefort, a French-born expert in psychological warfare. As the Korean armistice talks got under way at Panmunjom in 1953, de Rochefort wrote to the White House suggesting 'an offensive action of psychological warfare' against the admission of Communist China to the UN, on the lines of the 1950 Stockholm Appeal to ban the atomic bomb. At about the same time de Rochefort testified before Judd's sub-committee on the Far East and the Pacific. Bachrack's attempts to get access to this testimony have been denied. Reference to the CIA in some of the available documentation led him also to approach the Agency. These approaches also proved unprofitable, as was his law suit under the Freedom of Information Act. All that is clear is that the Committee Of One Million was organised in 1953, with Judd as one of its prime movers, and gained impressive congressional support from both liberals and conservatives. A New York public relations and fund-raising executive, Marvin Liebman, became its secretary. Liebman, with a reputation for being on the far right politically, had until 1945 been a member of the Young Communist League and the Communist Party of the United States. He was later probably associated with Zionist activities in the Mediterranean area and worked for the International Rescue Committee. It is not clear how he became associated with de Rochefort. An incidental question to which Bachrack gives considerable attention is the suppression in 1960, after publication had been announced and advance copies circulated, of Ross Y. Koen's *The China Lobby in American Politics.*[1] It finally

[1] New York: Harper and Row for the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1974.

appeared in 1974, coincidentally perhaps with the final transformation of American China policy.

Bachrack poses a number of questions. He suggests some possible answers. One of the strengths of the book, however, is that he manages, just, to avoid spectacular rhetoric and undocumented conspiracy theory.

*University of Keele* D. K. ADAMS

**Party Dynamics:** The Democratic Coalition and the Politics of Change. By Richard L. Rubin. *New York, London: Oxford University Press. 1976. 203 pp. £5.95.*

RUBIN's book contains much more interesting material than most attempts to study American voting behaviour. For he has not confined himself to minute analysis of small samples of the electorate in a particular presidential election; he takes into account the impact of the federal structure, which leads the major parties to choose different types of candidate in different regions and so to be differently perceived by the voters; and also that of the primary system, which gives extra weight in the choice of a party's candidate to its most committed and probably most extreme supporters, who are likely to repel rather than attract those undecided voters who determine the election result. In fact, Rubin justifies his title by laying stress on the interconnection between the preferences of the mass electorate, too often regarded as the sole variable, and the structuring of those preferences by the political elites who operate through the formal political institutions of party and country.

Occasionally the author carries this admirable concern rather too far. For example, he insists that civil rights could not become a central issue in presidential politics until 1936 when the Democratic Party had removed the requirement of a two-thirds Convention majority to nominate its candidate, which had given the South an effective veto. The point is important, but could be made much more briefly as he makes his points elsewhere. He demonstrates that the Democrats, once electorally a working-class party, have won the bulk of the rapidly growing suburban vote. He then shows that their Republican competitors are far stronger among usually Democratic suburban groups (such as Catholics, or labour union members) in the North-East than in the Middle West; demonstrates that their advantage is not due to the former being more conservative (the reverse is true); and traces it rather to the North-Eastern Republicans' propensity to nominate quite liberal candidates for the Senate and governorships, thereby altering the regional image of their party, which performs better there even when it runs thoroughly conservative candidates in presidential elections. Rubin brings out this familiar difference by analysing the voting records of Republican senators from the two regions; but he does not make clear why these Eastern liberals keep their hold on a right-wing Republican primary electorate.

The last quarter of the book concentrates on the problem of primaries, whose number and importance have increased especially in the Democratic Party (writes the author in 1975) as the leisured and issue-orientated middle class has stepped up its political activity and become more Democratic. More primaries, in turn, give such people an advantage over the traditional machine politicians and union leaders with greater appeal to the working

class—but an advantage in imposing candidates who are ideologically, rather than electorally, acceptable. The experience of 1976 shows that this very interesting and well-argued book, with all its valuable material, gives, like so many others, too much weight to recent events; for the Democratic primaries resulted (narrowly) in the victory of one of the supposedly handicapped centrists, while the committed ideologists wreaked most havoc on the Republican side.

*Nuffield College, Oxford* P. M. WILLIAMS

**America as an Ordinary Country:** US Foreign Policy and the Future. Edited by Richard Rosecrance. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 276 pp. $9.75. £7·30.*

WHEN Humpty Dumpty scornfully told Alice that a word 'means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less', he could well have been creating the first line of defence for the title of Professor Rosecrance's book, *America as an Ordinary Country.* By 'ordinary' or 'average', Rosecrance means that the United States 'cannot be expected to take on special responsibilities for world peacekeeping, to use her military force where others do not wish to become involved, to support the world economy and sustain an international financial structure organized around the dollar' (p. 11). If he is content with that criterion for 'ordinary', so be it; but then he must submit to Humpty Dumpty's further dictum that 'the question is which is to be master'.

At least along one dimension, there is reason to doubt whether the editor was master of his theme. Rosecrance implies that the challenge to America's assumptions about its abilities to control allies and constrain opponents has been a relatively recent phenomenon. And yet the reality would seem to be that despite the grandiloquent rhetoric of its leaders, the United States from the mid-1950s onwards has been constantly forced to adjust to the challenges to its postwar assumptions of dominance.

That the editor saw America's status reduced from 'the world's dominant power' to the 'world's greatest power' (p. 244) again neither justifies the book's title, nor more fundamentally does justice to the post-war history of American foreign policy. For while one recognises the traumatic and perhaps even catalytic impact of Vietnam, the 1971 Smithsonian Agreement and so on, the editor's sharp chronological divide between 'dominant' and 'greatest' creates a dichotomy which ignores the complexities of the past, pays little heed to the incremental process of adjustment over the last two and a half decades, and gives undeserved academic credence to the popular myth that the 'Kissinger era' marks a great divide.

Nevertheless, while there are weaknesses in the editor's conceptual point of departure, he has gathered around him nine other contributors who have produced an interesting array of 'think pieces' on American foreign policy. The quality is generally high, though there are some disappointments given the eminence of the authors. Alastair Buchan, while acknowledging that 'complexity' is the 'common enemy' (p. 37), does little to consider it in his prescriptive article on a United States-Soviet 'concert system'. Nor does Coral Bell, in her article on 'Detente and the American National

Interest ', seem to have kept pace with changes in strategic thinking or with the economic arguments involved in ' detente '.

A problem which must be expected in any publication dealing with ' forecasting ' is that events may have overtaken the actual publication of the work. Thus Kenneth Hunt's sound and wide-ranging survey of the Far East discusses the prospects of an American withdrawal from South Korea (p. 150) when it seems that President Carter has by now already made the decision. Pierre Hassner (' Europe and the Contradictions in American Policy ') and François Duchêne (' The United States and European Community ') have both written excellent essays on Europe, more or less in the context of past and future American foreign policy. However, it is Peter Katzenstein in an article concerning ' West Germany's Place in American Foreign Policy ' who grasps not only the dilemma of American relations with Europe as a whole, but also presents the best perspective of America's postwar evolution in the context of future options.

The last three essays before the editor's own concluding sections are concerned with the transition of America's economic role. The three authors, Leonard Silk, Robert Gilpin and C. Fred Bergsten, respectively provide interesting examinations of America's impact upon the world economy, the role of multinational corporations upon American foreign policy and the economic tensions between the United States and the Third World.

Ironically, it is the inclusion of these latter pieces which points to an underlying weakness of the book as a whole. The multi-dimensional perspective required to consider American foreign policy in the future does not lend itself to an easy separation of economic and strategic issues; nor for that matter does it allow for effective analyses on regional bases. 'The common enemy ', to borrow from Buchan, is ' complexity ', and the traditional approach which this work has taken to foreign policy loses what Katzenstein sees as the most distinguishing characteristic of the ' contemporary international system ', namely, ' the complexity of its structure and the rapidity of its changes ' (p. 134).

*University of Southern California* RANDOLPH C. KENT

**The United States and Burma.** By John F. Cady. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1976. 303 pp. (American Foreign Policy Library.) £11·90.*

WATCHING General Ne Win driving through the streets of Washington in September 1966 with Lyndon B. Johnson, I remember being struck by the unreality of the occasion. Sealed in a bullet-proof glass bubble, two men who had absolutely nothing in common drove hastily down Pennsylvania Avenue, acknowledging the sporadic curiosity of a lunchtime scattering of tourists and workers from government offices, who could obtain no details of the time and the route. It certainly comes as no surprise to learn, as Professor Cady indicates, that nothing was in fact achieved by the meeting. Indeed in this latest addition to a deservedly famous series, Professor Cady has managed to achieve a tour de force. Historically, the United States and Burma have had, and have, practically no effective contact with one another, and so, except for a brief period during the Second World War the story of their relations is terse. What Professor Cady does so well is to show how and

why Burma came to be so independent; and to make it a real and living country with a unique combination of problems and a definite strategy for dealing with them even though he is not at all sanguine about its value. The book's relationship to American foreign policy is, as he admits, contingent rather than actual, but it is a very solid book and no doubt American policymakers will be glad to have it on their shelves when the need comes. For a British readership, its moderate tone and critical stance towards a particularly ineffective aspect of colonial history will be entirely salutary.

*University of Southampton* PETER CALVERT

**Canada and the United States: Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations.** Edited by Annette Baker Fox, Alfred O. Hero Jr. and Joseph S. Nye Jr. *New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1976. 443 pp. $28.10. Pb: $8.70.*

THE editors of these seventeen essays make their purpose quite explicit: to develop transnational theory in the particular field of Canadian-American relations and thus test the more general hypotheses of an early work, Keohane and Nye's *Transnational Relations and World Politics* [1] (pp. ix and 4). After a chapter introducing (or recalling) the reader to certain key concepts (issues as distinct from problems; interdependence; politicisation and so on), the editors arrange the next fifteen chapters into three sections: National Attitudes; Issue Areas; and Integration, Institutions and Bargaining. This tripartite scheme has no obvious logic though it may make the sheer bulk of material more approachable. The range of subject-matter and styles is large; and individual essays deal, among other things, with Canadian public opinion on American investment and trade; the American-Canadian defence system; fishing rights and environmental pollution; the law of the sea; and the United States Congress in its handling of Canadian issues. More significant of the shape of the volume as a whole is the collection of essays dealing with American corporate power in its relations both with Canadian subsidiaries or independent businesses and the two federal governments (with some references to the provincial governments). A concluding chapter by Fox and Hero attempts to draw the disparate material together to demonstrate that 'state-centric relations represent only a very small aspect of the total relationship of Canada and the United States. . . .' (p. 420).

This is a challenging work. Not because the formal conclusion is so startling (surely few would dissent); but because of the level of critical engagement required of the reader. Swanson's essay, 'An Analytical Assessment of the United States-Canadian Defense Issue Area', shows the common mistake of believing the military to be apolitical; but its very real stimulus may be lost on the reader who cannot face its tortuous prose. (That Swanson's 'paradigm' differs from the model of his editors contributes to the difficulties: *cf.* pp. 188 and 199.) Conversely, Holmes's strangely entitled essay 'Impact of Domestic Political Factors on Canadian-American Relations: Canada' (which has the broadest historical and geographical perspective in the collection) mainly employs a simple narrative style which

[1] Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1973, p. 626.

contains a number of highly contentious concepts. A good example is Holmes's praise of the 'pragmatic, managerial types' of recent provincial premiers, in contrast to the 'old set of demagogic' (or 'provochial') ones, who are more solicitous of the 'national interest' (p. 29)—and this in a work exploring the validity of the state-centric model! The editors indeed prepare us for the 'particular interests and predispositions' of their contributors (though they are unanimous in deploring the Nixon presidency); but far more ominous in a work so avowedly theoretical is the acknowledgment of the 'imperfect fit' between the questions the editors suggest to the reader and 'the data in the articles' (p. 15). Yet this is only the beginning of the challenges presented to the reader.

The language of linkage, symmetrical and asymmetrical relations, interdependence, fills this volume; but the terms are ambiguously used. (Perhaps the collaboration which preceded the appearance of these essays is to blame: the authors were too complaisant with one another? See the preface.) Thus linkage may describe an objective relationship between dependent variables; alternatively it may record a subjective 'politicizing' of heterogeneous matters. Interdependence generally has a favourable connotation of mutual dependence and reciprocal benefit; but sometimes it is synonymous with an active condition of dominance or a passive position of subordination and dependence. These latter relationships are frequently described as asymmetrical functions of power, that of American forces over against Canadian forces. But a wider perspective in the authors might have led them to include more general models of dependence, particularly asymmetrical relations of the power within the two nation states rather than between them. (The selected bibliography is conceptually narrow and by concentrating upon liberal capitalist trade and development theory neglects even the tiny squints directed in other directions by Gilpin's contribution.)

Gilpin's analysis of 'Integration and Disintegration on the North American Continent' is the most ambitious essay in the collection. It deals with similar 'data' (*cf.* p. 15) to that treated by Wright and Molot; Litvak and Maule; and Leyton-Brown in their trio of essays on American corporate and financial activity and its impact on Canada; but Gilpin's true partners are Cox and Jamieson in their study of Canadian labour. Like Gilpin they adopt a model (ignored both by their editors and in the index) of central growth and dominance matched by peripheral decline and dependence; but unfortunately neither essay articulates the full promise of this hypothesis for escaping from the state-centricism which, paradoxically, is reinforced by these transnational explorations.

Transnational theory is advanced by its adherents as a more useful method of describing the political world than a state-centric model. But the theory also has a prescriptive force. In Holmes's essay, but especially in Nye's own contribution, 'Transnational Relations and Interstate Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis', North America is seen as an interdependent economic, strategic and cultural system, only one step away from a 'transnational sense of political community'. But, Nye concludes, 'the transnational world in North America is not a postnationalist world. The eagle may soar; beavers build dams' (p. 402).

The American Founding Fathers were great continentalists. They used metaphors drawn from nature and asserted the universality of American ideals to strengthen their arguments for particular governmental and eco-

nomic policies. The very real challenge and value of this collection of essays lies precisely in disentangling its programmatic content from the apparently objective and neutral analysis in which it is couched.

*University of Sussex* MICHAEL DUNNE

## LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

**Brazil: A Study in Development Progress.** By Stefan H. Robock. *Lexington: Lexington Books. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 204 pp. £8·85.*

THIS book is a comprehensive survey of the past and present economic and political factors which have determined Brazil's drive for development. Professor Robock is excellently qualified to undertake this task: he has been an economic adviser to the Brazilian authorities in various guises since 1954. His style of writing is limpid and the text is interspersed with pertinent statistical tables and frequently laced with humour; the most complex issues are analysed succinctly and impartially.

There are chapters on the Brazilian economic miracle; the Brazilian setting; the drive for development; sources of economic growth; the regions; the economy, trends, structure and prospects; the economy, foreign trade and finance; the fruits of economic growth; politics, parties and politicians; challenges for the future; and development lessons for others. Each chapter contains sections on issues and trends under the main headings. Of particular interest are the accounts of government enterprises in key business sectors in sources of economic growth, which shows how some of these have operated reasonably efficiently without suffocating official interference (pp. 50–56); the role of foreign investment in the same chapter which illustrates how direct investment has always been welcome in Brazil apart from the Goulart period (pp. 61–68); and income distribution in the fruits of economic growth (pp. 141–45) which demonstrates that the weight of evidence suggests that 'the rich are getting richer but the poor are also getting richer, even though the rich are gaining at a fast rate' (p. 143). The political chapter surmises that the present authoritarianism may last for some time (p. 168). Professor Robock concludes that 'despite the economic, social and political challenges, Brazil's long-range outlook is promising'; he states that 'there may be short-term interruptions in the momentum of the development drive and that the country has become increasingly dependent upon uncontrolled forces in the international environment' (p. 186).

Possibly the most interesting chapter is that on development lessons for others. Professor Robock produces convincing evidence to support the contention that the existence of a military government was not a prerequisite for the achievement of the Brazilian economic miracle. The high rates of growth since 1967 can be seen as part of a long-run pattern of steadily accelerating growth over at least the past half century, with the exception of 1962–67 (p. 190). He also makes the point that many policy decisions which contributed to the development successes of the past thirteen years were made between 1945 and 1964 and that external factors largely beyond the control of post-1964 administrations also helped (p. 191). In conclusion,

this study must qualify as one of the most easily digestible and arguably the most perceptive of the many that have been published on the remarkable Brazilian economic experience since March 1964; it is an indispensable *vade mecum* for the student of the country and an agreeable introduction to it for the general reader.

*Lloyd's Bank International* ROBIN CHAPMAN

**1964: Golpe ou Contragolpe?** By Hélio Silva with the collaboration of Maria Cecília Ribas Carneiro. *Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 1975. 492 pp. (Documentos da História Contemporânea, Vol. 62.)*

PROFESSOR SILVA has taken time off from completing his massive fifteen-volume documentation of the Vargas era to record the later and equally significant event in the history of contemporary Brazil, the 'revolution' of 1964. Like the 'Ciclo de Vargas' series,[1] it consists largely of extracts from speeches and press reports, depositions and statements by political and military leaders who took part in that incident and opinions by leading Brazilians on its historical significance. It is not an analysis and the author and his research team have limited their aims to a chronological synopsis of the events of 1964 and the views of participants about them.

The title is something of a misnomer. The bloodless events of the two days, March 31 and April 1, were neither a coup nor a counter-coup; they were more a rejection by the 'awakening giant' of Latin America of a socialist road to its future development. Far from being a struggle for power between rival political factions, or between the military and civilian parties, it was the culmination of what had been the slow-moving tide of a consensus of public opinion against the implantation of a model of government based on those of other countries, and of imported economic systems unsuited to the circumstances of Brazil.

In striking its own path into the future, Brazil has achieved remarkable success in the economic field. Its future political destiny based on a 'Brazilian model' is, however, proving more elusive.

Both the contents of this book, and the more recent revelations based on scrutiny of de-classified documents in the Lyndon Johnson Library about the role erroneously attributed to the United States in the 1964 revolution, have not served to clarify the events of those two dramatic days. Much remains to be revealed. The full story will not be known until the men directly involved decide to speak, especially General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the 'architect of the revolution' who afterwards became Marshal Castello Branco's *eminence gris*, and whose influential role continues today as Minister of the Civil Household in President Geisel's government.

While Professor Silva's book offers useful documentation as background, a definitive analysis is still awaited by Brazilians and international historians. Perhaps General Golbery will draw aside the veil when he leaves active public life. It would constitute a most valuable sequel to his *Geopolitica do Brasil* based on the lectures he delivered at the Superior Military College in the 1950s. As Brazil advances towards the status of an emergent world power—to borrow the phrase used by Dr. Kissinger when he was Secretary of State—such a study is eagerly awaited.

ROBERT DERVEL EVANS

[1] Publ. by Civilizaçao Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro.

**Squatters and Oligarchs:** Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru. By David Collier. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976. 187 pp. £7·65.*

THERE are now so many studies of Latin American shanty towns, that one can imagine the most studied of them taking out a collective subscription to the American Sociological Association. In spite of the publisher's attempt to intimidate readers (and reviewers) by printing glowing praise on the dust-jacket from high stars in Latin American studies, there is inevitably a demand for some new perspective to enliven the topic.

Fortunately, this book does provide such a perspective by carefully placing squatter settlements in the overall Peruvian political system. The question Dr. Collier sets himself is 'how is it possible that in a country as oligarchic and authoritarian as Peru there could be such a massive growth of squatter settlements around the nation's capital?' (p. 3). The answer, briefly, is that at times it has suited influential groups in the dominant class to allow them to develop. But not only do squatter settlements provide political backing for would-be populist leaders, their growth can also work in favour of the urban rich (equally ready to exploit ambiguous property law).

There are some fairly familiar data on the origins and size of settlements, and some, not always relevant, theorising about modernisation. But there is also a very interesting analysis of the role of government—of the total number of 208 settlements in Lima, the author estimates that the role of government was crucial in the formation of at the very least a quarter. And Dr. Collier demonstrates clearly how far policy towards settlements is consistent with the general policies of the very different governments that have ruled Peru since the Second World War.

This book has much to commend it. Dr. Collier writes concisely and well. His study illuminates Peruvian history in the last three decades, and is very revealing of the ambiguous and uncertain objectives of the present military regimes. By looking at squatter settlements in the overall political context he avoids the trap of repeating well-worn sociological analysis which, by isolating the communities and examining them as more or less self-sufficient units, diminishes their real political and social importance.

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* ALAN ANGELL

**Allende's Chile:** The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular. By Stefan de Vylder. *London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 251 pp. (Cambridge Latin American Studies 25.) £5·30.*

**Transitions to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case?** By Robert R. Kaufman. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 68 pp. (Sage Professional Paper in Comparative Politics 6.) Pb: £1·50.*

BOTH these studies are useful contributions to the understanding of events in Chile during the last decade, but in a sense both have failed in their declared purpose. Mr. de Vylder has attempted to examine the economic developments during the Allende administration with only a minimal reference to domestic and international politics. He does his best. For example, except for a note (p. 234) relating to the paralysis of road transport because of the truck

owners' lockout in October 1972, the machinations of the CIA are not mentioned until six pages before the end of the text (p. 214). Fortunately the author has not been too inhibited by his self-imposed limitation and has covered the domestic political developments sufficiently to make clear the main causes of the economic collapse of the Allende government. Among other things to emerge is the almost spectacular success of the Unidad Popular in 1971, even though it was achieved at the cost of depleting the reserves of foreign exchange and the bitter enmity of the upper and, increasingly, middle classes. Chapter 5, dealing with the inflation and stagnation of 1972 and 1973, ends with a significant passage:

> In many a modest Chilean family, however, the Allende years will be remembered as the time when the first school was built in the home village or *población* or when the poorly fed children of the family suddenly began to receive medical attention and half a litre of milk a day (p. 111).

Fruitless though it is to devote much attention to 'what might have been' it is impossible not to wonder whether the Allende administration could not ultimately have triumphed over its problems if the landowners and industrialists had not so ruthlessly opposed it, if the normal sources of international credit (including the World Bank) had not withdrawn facilities, if the world price of copper had not fallen and if the CIA and, apparently, Brazilians (p. 234) had not given financial backing to those prepared to create hardship and chaos in their opposition to the government.

Mr. Kaufman's purpose is to examine the pre-authoritarian situation which makes possible a successful transition to stable authoritarian-corporate regimes as in prewar Italy, Spain, Brazil and Peru, and then to relate the Chilean case to them. In fact, the comparison leads nowhere; as Mr. Kaufman says, '. . . the forces at work in the Chilean case appear increasingly ambiguous and contradictory'. He gives the impression of having some sympathy for the Pinochet junta. It was not enough to 'put Allende on an airplane to Cuba', he writes, it was necessary also 'to dismantle the entire institutional apparatus that had allowed him to come to power'; and he adds, '—a political exigency that is conveniently ignored by those who welcomed the coup but condemned its "excesses"' (p. 38). Mr. Kaufman contrives to avoid all reference to the CIA, although he does acknowledge that the American government and corporate officials 'contributed materially to the collapse of the Allende regime' (p. 56). Though he declares that it is not his intention to predict the future, it is clear that Mr. Kaufman does not think the Pinochet regime will be successful or achieve a continuing stability.

Mr. de Vylder's book is marred by an irritating use of the editorial 'we' and, surprisingly, by some poor editing. Mr. Kaufman is occasionally obscure. 'Looking at Chile through the prism of the framework', he writes, 'has afforded us a glimpse of several broad "slices" of Chilean history' (p. 58). Neither book has an index and both group the notes at the end. Of the two Mr. de Vylder's study is more likely to prove of continuing value.

J. A. CAMACHO

**Chile:** The State and Revolution. By Ian Roxborough, Philip O'Brian and Jackie Roddick with the assistance of Michael Gonzalez. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 304 pp. £7·95. Pb: £3·50.*

THIS book is a serious attempt, from a left-wing standpoint, to face the question of Allende's defeat. It is dedicated to 'all who fought for Socialism in Chile' and its theme is that 'Allende's faith in bourgeois legality was suicidal' (p. 264). While committed, however, the authors are never dogmatic, and the resulting book is scholarly and quite well written (even if occasionally slapdash with respect to footnotes and tabular material).

The analysis begins with a discussion of Chilean history (up to 1970) for which a dependency framework is adopted in an interesting way. However, this section is short and, some would doubtless argue, oversimplified. Some readers may feel that in their efforts to destroy the image of pre-1970 Chile as 'the England of Latin America' the authors go too far in the other direction and exaggerate its repressiveness. The main focus of the book, however, is the Allende regime, and here the most pressing questions are given detailed attention. These include the state of the economy and the effect of Unidad Popular's economic policies (freely conceded to be disastrous, although the conservative opposition must share the responsibility for this), and the strategy and tactics of the main protagonists—the political parties, the trade unions (and other industrial organisations) and the army. The authors, no doubt rightly, consider that, while American involvement in Chile was an important factor, the decisive opposition to Allende came from the Chilean state, supported by the middle classes who, so far from being won over by Allende's reformism (as the Communist Party had hoped), were eventually driven into the arms of the far Right.

Inevitably, however, the judgments made by a book such as this will be controversial. The authors are certainly effective in showing the difficulties and drawbacks that would have been attached to any genuinely 'moderate' or accommodationist policy towards the Christian Democrats. However, given the balance of forces within Chile, the eventual outcome may have been unavoidable. Allende was a minority president, hard-pressed to hold together a diffuse coalition, and probably incapable of ensuring that any coherent strategy was adopted by the Left, or the working class as a whole. After all, Allende was unable even to prevent the copper miners from striking against him at such a crucial time as April 1973. Moreover, the Chilean establishment (as the authors rightly say) despite having suffered a setback, was never defeated or disarmed. Under these circumstances, the revolutionary option, advocated in this book, appears unconvincing (at least to this reviewer), since it is difficult to see how the Chilean army could have been successfully subverted or intimidated by the Left. Whatever may be said about these conclusions, however, this book should certainly be read by those interested in Chile's 'Marxist experiment'.

*London School of Economics* GEORGE PHILIP

**Trade and Undevelopment:** A Study of the Small Caribbean Countries and Large Multinational Corporations. By Iserdeo Jainarain. *Georgetown: Institute of Development Studies, University of Guyana. 1976. 390 pp. Pb: $ Guyana 18.50.*

'TRADE not aid' has for too long enjoyed a favoured place in the rhetoric

of development. This study attempts to redress the balance for, although much has been written about multinational corporations, there has been little presentation of well-researched evidence of their actual effect on so-called 'developing' countries. A rewritten doctoral thesis, it argues a convincing case, centring on four economies, those of Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana and Barbados. Perhaps there is rather too much evidence and a risk of statistical indigestibility, but the introductory and concluding chapters provide a lucid survey for the student.

The hypotheses propounded say nothing especially profound or original, but are made significant not only in terms of the data but also because of the stress on size, defined in terms of population, area and national income. Although the study conclusively shows that this factor 'does not appear to affect the level of development' (p. 48), it does affect its pattern. Thus, the applicability of overlapping models of underdevelopment to these economies is significantly affected by their smallness. The enclave model, whereby the economy is merely an extension of another, is entrenched because of the small size of its market and a resultant lack of economically viable inter-industry linkages and manufacturing bases. The centre-periphery model, which emphasises that the growth rate of these periphery economies merely reflects the demands of the centre, highlights both the lack of adequate resources and these economies' susceptibility to external commercial and financial pressures deep-rooted in their colonial heritage. Lastly, the plantation model, characterised by foreign-owned companies producing commodity export products, becomes important when one considers the hypothesis that the rate of growth of a small country is very largely dependent on such exports.

Is 'localisation' the answer? Unfortunately, the various moves towards degrees of public ownership has done little to affect structural dependency. But the question of a change in *functional* dependency—a position derived from particular governmental policies based on alternative ideologies as currently attempted in Jamaica and Guyana—is largely ignored. A pity.

*North Staffordshire Polytechnic* TONY THORNDIKE

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

**Who's Who in the United Nations and Related Agencies.** *New York: Arno Press. 1975. 785 pp. $65.00.*

BIOGRAPHICAL directories of people associated with the UN have not been published at all regularly (apart from the official annual lists of Delegations and Permanent Missions) and this book should be most useful to those working in the UN field. Biographies of those directly involved in the UN are listed alphabetically, together with the chief media correspondents, officers of United Nations Associations and principal representatives of non-governmental organisations. Details include education, marital status and languages spoken. An analysis of the UN organisation, its offices throughout the world and an index of those included by nationality are among much supplementary material. The information does not go beyond the end of 1974 and some misprints and a few inaccuracies are noticeable.

*Chatham House* S. M. G. C.

**Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights.** Vol. 18: 1975. *The Hague: Nijhoff. 1976. 454 pp. Fl.150.00.*

THIS yearbook, which is somewhat shorter and less expensive than in recent years, follows the usual pattern. Part 1 contains basic texts and general information, Part 2 the decisions of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers, and Part 3 deals with the treatment of the Convention in the national parliaments and courts of the member states of the Council of Europe. The appendix contains a select bibliography and includes articles in periodicals.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**The World of Learning 1976–77.** Vols. I and II. 27th edn. *London: Europa. 1977. 1992 pp. £24·00 (UK). £30·00 (overseas).*

THIS welcome new edition of a standard reference book contains the names, addresses, staff and other details of over 24,000 universities, libraries, museums, learned societies and other educational bodies all over the world. After a short section dealing with some 400 international organisations, the information is arranged by country, Afghanistan to Zambia, and is completed by a comprehensive index of institutions.

*Chatham House* D. H.

## NEW PERIODICAL

**Disasters:** The International Journal of Disaster Studies and Practice. Vol. 1, No. 1. 1977. Editor: John Seaman. *Published by Pergamon Press for the London Technical Group, in one volume of four issues yearly. Subscription £24·44, $40.00, post free. Orders to the Subscriptions Manager, Pergamon Press, Headington Hill Hall, Oxford OX3 0BW.*

THIS new journal will be devoted to the problems involved in the prediction, prevention and relief of disasters. It will have a multi-disciplinary approach and will include papers which improve understanding of why disasters happen, describe advances in the application of the scientific method to disaster-related problems, and provide analytical descriptions of the human impact of disasters.

## OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

BAUER, Theodore W. and MOULTON, Harland B.: *International Issues and Perspectives.* Washington: National Defense University, Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 1976. 294 pp.

BREMER, Stuart A.: *Simulated Worlds*: A Computer Model of National Decision-Making. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1977. 249 pp. £12·50.

LABARR, Dorothy F. and SINGER, J. David: *The Study of International Politics*: A Guide to the Sources for the Student, Teacher and Researcher. Santa Barbara, Oxford: Clio. 1976. 211 pp.

MYLONAS, Denis: *La Genèse de l'Unesco*: La Conférence des Ministres alliés de l'Education (1942–1945). Brussels: Bruylant in collaboration with the Centre de Recherches sur les Institutions Internationales. 1976. 495 pp. Pb: Bel.frs. 2,900.

SEWELL, James P.: *UNESCO and World Politics*: Engaging in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 1975. 384 pp. £10·80.

SLOSS, Leon: *NATO Reform: Prospects and Priorities.* Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. 1976. 66 pp. (Washington Papers, Vol. III, No. 30.) Pb: £1·50, $3.00.

## DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE: *Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament*: Twenty-fourth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. New York: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. 1976. 70 pp. Pb: $2.50.

LEGAULT, Albert and LINDSEY, George: *The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance*, rev. edn. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 283 pp. £10·15. (First publ. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1974; reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1975, p. 544.)

PRANGER, Robert J., ed.: *Detente and Defense*: A Reader. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 445 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 40.) Pb: $4.50.

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

ABSHIRE, David M.: *International Broadcasting*: A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy. Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. 1976. 90 pp. (Washington Papers, Vol. IV, No. 35.) Pb: £1·75, $3.00.

ACKROYD, Carol, MARGOLIS, Karen, ROSENHEAD, Jonathan and SHALLICE, Tim: *The Technology of Political Control.* Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1977. 320 pp. Pb: £1·25.

ALIBER, Robert Z., ed.: *The Political Economy of Monetary Reform.* London: Macmillan. 1977. 270 pp. £10·00.

BORNSTEIN, Morris, ed.: *Economic Planning, East and West.* Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by John Wiley, Chichester.) 329 pp. $17.60, £8·80.

BRITTAN, Samuel and LILLEY, Peter: *The Delusion of Incomes Policy.* London: Temple Smith. 1977. 254 pp. £6·50. Pb: £3·00.

DE GRAUWE, Paul: *Monetary Interdependence and International Monetary Reform*: A European Case Study. Farnborough: Saxon House. 1976. 118 pp. £4·95.

DIKSHIT, Ramesh Dutta: *The Political Geography of Federalism*: An Inquiry into Origins and Stability. Madras: Macmillan Company of India. 1975; London: Macmillan. 1976. 273 pp. £7·95.

FRENKEL, Jacob A. and JOHNSON, Harry G., eds.: *The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments.* London: Allen and Unwin. 1976. 388 pp. £15·00.

GALBRAITH, John Kenneth: *The Affluent Society.* 3rd rev. edn. London: André Deutsch. 1977. 287 pp. £4·95. (First publ. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1958; reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1959, p. 84.)

GILLESPIE, John V. and ZINNES, Dina A., eds.: *Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research.* New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 430 pp. £22·20.

GUPTA, K. R.: *GATT and Underdeveloped Countries.* Delhi: Atma Ram. 1976. 364 pp. Rs. 60.00.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE UNCTAD/GATT: *Operating a Trade Information Service*: A Handbook for Developing Countries. Geneva: International Trade Centre. 1975. 178 pp. Pb.

MATTHEWS, William H., ed.: *Outer Limits and Human Needs*: Resource and Environmental Issues of Development Strategies. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. 1976. (Distrib. by Almqvist and Wiksell.) 102 pp. Pb: Sw.kr. 45.00.

MORRISON, Thomas K.: *Manufactured Exports from Developing Countries.* New York, London: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 108 pp. £10·00.

MOTHNER, Ira: *Understanding Population.* New York: Ford Foundation. 1976. 39 pp. Pb.

OECD: *The Measurement of Capital*: The Methodology of Capital Stock Estimates in OECD Countries. By Michael Ward. Paris: OECD. 1976. 148 pp. $6.50, £3·20, F 26.00.

PAYER, Cheryl, ed.: *Commodity Trade of the Third World.* London: Macmillan. 1975. 192 pp. £8·50.

ROBBINS, Lord: *Political Economy: Past and Present.* A review of leading theories of economic policy. London: Macmillan. 1976. 203 pp. £5·95.

THIRLWALL, A. P.: *Keynes and International Monetary Relations*: The Second Keynes Seminar held at the University of Kent at Canterbury 1974. London: Macmillan. 1976. 126 pp. £5·95.

WARNECKE, Steven J. and SULEIMAN, Ezra N. eds.: *Industrial Policies in Western Europe.* New York, London: Praeger. 1976. 249 pp. £10·20.

WORLD BANK: *World Tables 1976*: From the Data Files of the World Bank. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 1977. 552 pp. £18·00. Pb: £6·75.

## LAW

*Annuaire Français de Droit International XXI 1975.* Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 1976. 1,388 pp. F 295.00.

INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: *Annuaire Vol. 56*: Session de Wiesbaden 1975. Basle: Editions S. Karger. 1975. 595 pp.

MUTHARIKA, A. Peter: *The Regulation of Statelessness under International and National Law: Texts and Documents.* Dobbs Ferry: Oceana. 1977. 258 pp. $60.00.

REISMAN, W. Michael and HESTON, Burns W., eds.: *Toward World Order and Human Dignity*: Essays in honor of Myres S. McDougal. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1977. 603 pp. £15·00.

VAN ASBECK, F. M.: *International Society in Search of a Transnational Legal Order.* Selected writings ed. by H. F. van Panhuys and M. van Leeuwen Boomkamp. Leyden: Sijthoff. 1976. 604 pp. Fl. 110.00, $41.50.

## WESTERN EUROPE

ARCHER, Clive, ed.: *Security in Northern Europe.* Report of a conference held at the University of Aberdeen, April 12–14, 1976. Aberdeen: Centre for Nordic Studies, University of Aberdeen. 1977. 80 pp. Pb.

BARTHEL, Konrad: *Friedrich der Grosse in Hitlers Geschichtsbild.* Wiesbaden: Steiner. 1977. 42 pp. (Frankfurter Historische Vorträge 5.) Pb: DM 16.00.

CARTER II, Edward C., FORSTER, Robert and MOODY, Joseph N., eds.: *Enterprise and Entrepreneurs in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century France.* Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976. 207 pp. £9·35.

CLARK, Martin: *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution that Failed.* New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1977. 255 pp. £8·00.

CORNER, D. C. and STAFFORD, D. C.: *Open-end Investment Funds in the EEC and Switzerland.* London: Macmillan. 1977. 254 pp. £15·00.

DENTON, G. R. and COOPER, J. J. N., eds.: *The European Economy beyond the Crisis*: From Stabilisation to Structural Change. Bruges: Collège d'Europe. 1977. 409 pp. (Cahiers de Bruges New Series No. 35.) £8·00, Bel.frs. 800.

DOUGHERTY, James E. and PFALTZGRAFF, Diane K.: *Eurocommunism and the Atlantic Alliance.* Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc. 1977. 66 pp. Pb: $3.00.

FREYMOND, Jacques with collab. of GALVANI, Nadine: *La Suisse et la Diplomatie Multilatérale.* Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales. 1976. 302 pp. Pb: Sw.frs. 45.00.

HARSGOR, Michael: *Portugal in Revolution.* Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University Washington. 1976. 90 pp. (Washington Papers, Vol. III, No. 32.) Pb: £1·50, $3.00.

HILDEBRAND, Klaus: *Das Deutsche Reich und die Sowjetunion im Internationalen System 1918–1932*: Legitimität oder Revolution? Wiesbaden: Steiner. 1977 40 pp. (Frankfurter Historische Vorträge 4.) Pb: DM 16.00.

LANDES, David S., ed.: *Western Europe*: The Trials of Partnership. Lexington: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 406 pp (Critical Choices for Americans, Vol. VIII.)

MCINNES, Neil: *Euro-Communism.* Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington 1977. 80 pp. (Washington Papers, Vol. IV, No. 37.) Pb: £1·95, $3.00.

MAYER, S. L. and KOENIG, W. J.: *The Two World Wars*: A Guide to Manuscript Collections in the United Kingdom. London, New York: Bowker. 1976 317 pp. £12·50.

MEDLICOTT, W. N., DAKIN, Douglas and LAMBERT, M. E., eds.: *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, First Series Vol. XX*: German Reparation and Allied Military Control 1922; Russia, March 1921–December 1922 London: HMSO. 1977. 970 pp. £23·00.

MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP: *The Armenians.* By David Marshall Lang and Christopher Walker. London: Minority Rights Group. 1976. 24 pp. (Report No 32.) Pb: £0·45.

MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP: *Cyprus.* London: Minority Rights Group. 1976. 28 pp (Report No. 30.) Pb: £0·45.

OECD: *France* (Economic Survey). Paris: OECD. 1977. 66 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10 F 10.00.

OECD: *Italy* (Economic Survey). Paris: OECD. 1977. 65 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10 F 10.00.

OECD: *Switzerland* (Economic Survey). Paris: OECD. 1977. 62 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10, F 10.00.

RONZITTI, Natalino, ed.: *La Politica Estera Italiana*: Autonomia, Interdipendenza, Integrazione e Sicurezza. Rome: Edizioni di Comunità for the Istituto Affari Internazionali. 1977. 378 pp. Pb: L 8000.

SCHIEDER, Wolfgang and DIPPER, Christof, eds.: *Der Spanische Bürgerkrieg in der internationalen Politik (1936–1939)*. Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung. 1976. 341 pp. Pb.

SHARP, Robin and WHITTEMORE, Claire: *Europe and the World Without*. London: Oxfam Public Affairs Unit. 1977. 49 pp. Pb: £0·50.

TRIFFIN, Robert, ARON, Raymond, BARRE, Raymond and EWALENKO, René: *L'Europe des Crises*. Brussels: Bruylant. 1976. 171 pp. Pb: Bel. frs. 477 (Belgium), Bel. frs. 450 (elsewhere).

VAUGHAN, Richard: *Post-War Integration in Europe*. London: Edward Arnold. 1976. 211 pp. (Documents of Modern History.) £5·95. Pb: £2·95.

ZHIVKOVA, Ludmila: *Anglo-Turkish Relations 1933–1939*. London: Secker and Warburg. 1976. 132 pp. £5·00.

## USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

BARON, Salo W.: *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets*. 2nd rev. edn. New York: Macmillan Publishing; London: Collier Macmillan. 1977. (First publ. 1964.) 468 pp. £11·25.

BUNDESINSTITUT FÜR OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN, eds.: *Sowjetunion 1975–76*: Innenpolitik, Wirtschaft, Aussenpolitik: Analyse und Bilanz. Munich, Vienna: Hanser. 1976. 308 pp.

FRENZKE, Dietrich: *Rumänien, der Sowjetblock und die europäische Sicherheit*: Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der rumänischen Aussenpolitik. Berlin: Berlin Verlag. 1975. 249 pp. (Politogische Studien Band 3.) Pb: DM 28.00.

HORELICK, Arnold L., JOHNSON, A. Ross and STEINBRUNER, John D.: *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy*: Decision-Theory-Related Approaches. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 79 pp. (Sage Professional Paper in International Studies 29.) $3.00, £1·50.

LISANN, Maury: *Broadcasting to the Soviet Union*: International Politics and Radio. New York, London: Praeger. 1976. 199 pp. £9·10.

LOEBL, Eugen: *My Mind on Trial*. New York, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1977. 235 pp. £5·95.

MEHTA, Vinod: *Soviet Economic Policy*: Income Differentials in USSR. New Delhi: Radiant. 1977. 134 pp. Rs. 45.00.

TURNOCK, David: *An Economic Geography of Romania*. London: Bell. 1974. 319 pp. £6·25.

YEGOROV, P. T., SHLYAKHOV, I. A. and ALABIN, N. I.: *Civil Defense: A Soviet View*. Washington: US Government Printing Office under the auspices of the US Air Force. 1976. (First publ. Moscow, 1970.) 374 pp. (Soviet Military Thought 10.) Pb: $3.45.

## MIDDLE EAST

ABIR, Mordechai: *Persian Gulf Oil in Middle East and International Conflicts*. Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University. 1976. 35 pp. (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 20.) Pb: $1.00.

BINDER, Leonard, ed.: *The Study of the Middle East*: Research and Scholarship in the Humanities and the Social Sciences. A project of the Research and Training Committee of the Middle East Studies Association. New York, London: John Wiley. 1977. 648 pp. $31.25, £19·25.

COMAY, Michael: *UN Peace-Keeping in the Israel-Arab Conflict, 1948–1975*: An Israel Critique. Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University. 1976. 84 pp. (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 17–18.) Pb: $1.00.

DEVORE, Ronald M.: *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*: A Historical, Political, Social and Military Bibliography. Santa Barbara, Oxford: Clio. 1976. 273 pp.

FABIAN, Larry L. and SCHIFF, Ze'ev, eds.: *Israelis Speak*: About Themselves and the Palestinians. New York, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1977. 258 pp. Pb: $5.00.

HAWRYLYSHYN, Oli with MARTENS, Andre, PINDYCK, Robert S. and HAMZA, Mouheb-Eddine: *Planning for Economic Development*: The Construction and Use of a Multisectoral Model for Tunisia. A project of the International Institute of Quantitative Economics, Sir George Williams University, Montreal. New York, London: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 201 pp. £12·95.

HOROWITZ, Dan: *Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders*. Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University. 1975. 30 pp. (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 16.) Pb: $1.00.

RÉZETTE, Robert: *The Spanish Enclaves in Morocco*. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines. 1976. 188 pp. Pb.

SHAPIRO, Yonathan: *The Formative Years of the Israeli Labour Party*: The Organization of Power 1919–1930. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 282 pp. (Sage Studies in 20th-century History 4.) £7·00.

SID-AHMED, Mohamed: *After the Guns fall Silent*: Peace or Armageddon in the Middle East. London: Croom Helm. 1976. 144 pp. £5·95.

UNCTAD/GATT: *The Oil-Exporting Countries*: New Market Opportunities for other Developing Countries, Vol. I: Saudi Arabia. Geneva: International Trade Centre UNCTAD/GATT. 1976. 133 pp. Pb.

## AFRICA

ADAMOLEKUM, 'Ladipo: *Sékou Touré's Guinea*: An Experiment in Nation Building. London: Methuen. 1976. 250 pp. (Distrib. in USA by Harper and Row.) 250 pp. (Studies in African History 12.) £5·00. Pb: £2·95.

BOZEMAN, Adda B.: *Conflict in Africa*: Concepts and Realities. Princeton, Guildford: Princeton University Press. 1976. 429 pp. £19·10. Pb: £8·70.

CENTRE D'ÉTUDE D'AFRIQUE NOIRE DE BORDEAUX: *Année Africaine 1975*. Paris: Pedone. 1976. 704 pp.

CRONJÉ, Suzanne, LING, Margaret and CRONJÉ, Gillian: *Lonrho*: Portrait of a Multinational. Harmondsworth: Penguin in association with Julian Friedmann. 1976. 316 pp. £6·95. Pb: £1·50.

INSTITUT FÜR AFRIKA-KUNDE. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde im Verbund der Stiftung Deutsches Übersee-Institut. 1976.

*Kooperation in Afrika*: Dargestellt am Beispiel der Regionen Ostafrika, südliches Afrika, Zentralafrika und Maghreb. By G. Baumhöeger, G. M. E. Leistner, J. P. Breitengross and K. Schliephake. 232 pp. (Arbeiten aus dem Institut für Afrika-Kunde (Heft 5.) Pb: DM 25.00.

*Der Wirtschaftsraum Senegambien*. By Michael Burisch. 79 pp. (Heft 9.) Pb: DM 10.00.

*Unabhängigkeit der Transkei*: Zur völkerrechtlichen und politischen Problematik, dargestellt an der Frage der diplomatischen Anerkennung der Transkei durch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. By Leonhard Harding. 101 pp. (Heft 4.) Pb: DM 14.00.

*Rhodesien 1975–76*: Analyse und Dokumentation zum Konflikt im Rhodesien-Simbabwe. By W. R. Kirkman, C. Legum and H. D. Lass. 241 pp. (Heft 7.) Pb.

*Wandel in Südafrika*: Stabilisierung oder Überwindung der weissen Minderheitsherrschaft. Ansatzpunkte für Konfliktlösungsstrategien und Grundlinien eines Lösungsmodells. By Reinhard Rode. 217 pp. (Heft 10.) Pb: DM 16.00.

*Libyen*: Wirtschaftliche und soziale Strukturen und Entwicklung. By Konrad Schliephake. 140 pp. (Heft 3.) Pb: DM 14.00.

LÜHRING, Joachim: *Urbanisierung und Entwicklungsplanung in Ghana*: Eine wirtschafts- und sozialräumliche Untersuchung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Entstehung, Problematik und Überwindung innerstädtischer und regionaler Ungleichgewichte. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. 1976. 212 pp. (Hamburger Beiträge zur Afrika-Kunde Band 20.) Pb: DM 39.80.

METROWICH, F. R., ed.: *Towards Dialogue and Detente*. Sandton, South Africa: Valiant. 1975. 139 pp.

OBUDHO, Robert A. and WALLER, Peter P.: *Periodic Markets, Urbanization and Regional Planning*: A Case Study from Western Kenya. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood Press. 1976. (Distrib. in Europe by Westport Publications, London.) 289 pp. (Contributions in Afro-American Studies 22.) $25.00.

O'MEARA, Patrick: *Rhodesia*: Racial Conflict or Coexistence? Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1975. 217 pp. £5·75.

SMITH, David M., ed.: *Separation in South Africa*: People and Policies. London: Queen Mary College, University of London. 1976. 76 pp. (Occasional Papers No. 6.) Pb. £1·00.

STEEL, William F.: *Small-Scale Employment and Production in Developing Countries*: Evidence from Ghana. New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 235 pp. £13·60.

## ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

AHMAD, Waheed, ed.: *Letters of Mian Fazl-I-Husain*. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab. 1976. 672 pp. Rs. 75.00.

AYOOB, Mohammed: *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh*: Search for New Relationship. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs. 1975. 185 pp. Rs. 30.00, $10.00.

BLAKER, Michael K., ed.: *Japan at the Polls*: The House of Councillors Election of 1974. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 157 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 37.) Pb: $3.00.

BUCK, James H., ed.: *The Modern Japanese Military System*. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1975. 253 pp. (Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution and Peacekeeping, Vol. V.)

CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION: *Asia and the Pacific*. London: HMSO. 1977. 52 pp. Pb: £0·90.

DUNBAR, William: *India in Transition.* Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. 1976. 79 pp. (Washington Papers, Vol. III, No. 31.) Pb: £1·50, $3.00.

HINTON, Harold C.: *Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States.* Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. 1976. 96 pp. (Washington Papers, Vol. IV, No. 34.) Pb: £1·75, $3.00.

JAIN, J. P.: *After Mao What?* Army Party and Group Rivalries in China. London: Martin Robertson. 1976. (First publ. New Delhi: Radiant, 1975.) 276 pp. £7·45.

MITCHELL, Richard H.: *Thought Control in Prewar Japan.* Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 226 pp. £9·35.

MONGIA, J. N., ed.: *Readings in Indian Labour and Social Welfare.* Delhi: Atma Ram. 1976. 804 pp. Rs. 100.00.

OECD: *Australia* (Economic Survey). Paris: OECD. 1977. 66 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10, F 10.00.

*Pakistan: Past and Present.* A comprehensive study published in commemoration of the centenary of the birth of the founder of Pakistan. London: Stacey International. 1977. 288 pp. £18·00.

SCAGEL, Robert F., ed.: *Mankind's Future in the Pacific*: The Plenary and Special Lectures of the Thirteenth Pacific Science Congress Aug. 1975. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 1977. 198 pp. Pb: $6.95.

SPANN, R. N. and CURNOW, G. R., eds.: *Public Policy and Administration in Australia: A Reader.* London: John Wiley. 1976. (First publ. Sydney: John Wiley, 1975.) 586 pp. £19·55, A$36.15. Pb: £12·70, A$23.50.

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI): *Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina War.* Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell. 1976. 119 pp. Sw. kr. 76.50.

VAN GINNEKEN, Jaap: *The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao.* Trans. by Danielle Adkinson. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976. (First publ. Amsterdam, 1974.) 348 pp. Pb: £1·25.

VEDAVALLI, R.: *Private Foreign Investment and Economic Development*: A Case Study of Petroleum in India. London: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 222 pp. £11·00.

WEI, Wou: *Sino-Korean Trade Competition*: An Econometric Analysis. Taipei: Asia and the World Forum. 1977. 138 pp. (Asia and the World Forum Monograph Series 1.) Pb: NT$40.00, $1.50.

## NORTH AMERICA

ADAMS, D. K., ed.: *Diplomacy, Detente and the Democracies*: Lectures to mark the Bicentenary of the American Revolution, and in honour of David K. E. Bruce, given in the University of Keele by The Lord Home of the Hirsel, Roy Jenkins and George W. Ball. Keele: David Bruce Centre for American Studies, University of Keele. 1977. 48 pp. Pb: £1·25, $2.50.

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (AEI): *The President's Powers*: Should the Power of the Presidency be significantly curtailed? Washington: AEI for Public Policy Research. 1974. 92 pp. Pb.

AEI: *Review*: 1976 Session of the Congress and Index of AEI Publications. Washington: AEI for Public Policy Research. 1977. 67 pp. (Legislative Analyses 1.) Pb: $2.00.

Board on Science and Technology for International Development Commission in International Relations, National Research Council: *The Role of US Engineering Schools in Development Assistance*. Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Academy of Engineering. 1976. 30 pp. Pb.

Bogart, Leo (abridged by Agnes Bogart): *Premises for Propaganda*: The United States Information Agency's Operating Assumptions in the Cold War. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 250 pp. £9·00.

Free, Lloyd A.: *How Others See Us*. Lexington: Lexington Books. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 113 pp. (Critical Choices for Americans, Vol. III.) £7·05.

Griffith, Ernest S.: *The American System of Government*. 3rd rev. edn. London: Methuen. 1976. 204 pp. £4·90. Pb: £2·30. (First publ. London: Methuen, 1954; reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1954, p. 399.)

Higham, Robin, ed.: *Intervention or Abstention*: The Dilemma of American Foreign Policy. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1975. 221 pp. $14·75.

Knoke, David: *Change and Continuity in American Politics*: The Social Bases of Political Parties. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976. 192 pp. £9·20.

Kristol, Irving and Weaver, Paul, eds.: *The Americans: 1976*. Lexington: Lexington Books. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 370 pp. (Critical Choices for Americans, Vol. II.) £9·40.

Lees, Francis A.: *Foreign Banking and Investment in the United States*: Issues and Alternatives: London: Macmillan. 1976. 165 pp. £6·95.

McFarland, Andrew S.: *Public Interest Lobbies*: Decision Making on Energy. Washington: AEI for Public Policy Research. 1976. 141 pp. (National Energy Study 14.) Pb: $3.00.

Niemi, Richard G. and Weisberg, Herbert F., eds.: *Controversies in American Voting Behavior*. San Francisco: Freeman. 1976. 543 pp. £9·80. Pb. £4·80.

Petersen, Gene B., Sharp, Laure M. and Drury, Thomas F.: *Southern Newcomers to Northern Cities*: Work and Social Adjustment in Cleveland. New York: Praeger in co-operation with the Bureau of Social Science Research Inc. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 269 pp. £13·60.

Rohde, David W. and Spaeth, Harold J.: *Supreme Court Decision Making*. San Francisco, Reading: Freeman. 1976. 229 pp. £7·20. Pb: £3·60, $5.95.

Snowman, Daniel: *Kissing Cousins*: An Interpretation of British American Culture 1945–1975. London: Temple Smith. 1977. 342 pp. £6·50.

Winters, Toby L.: *Deepwater Ports in the United States*: An Economic and Environmental Impact Study. New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 199 pp. £13·50.

## LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Andrade, Victor: *My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia 1944–1962*. Ed. by Cole Blasier. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1976. 200 pp. $11.95.

Edwards, Jorge: *Persona Non Grata*: An Envoy in Castro's Cuba. Trans. by Colin Harding. London: Bodley Head. 1977. (First publ. in Spanish 1973.) 275 pp. £6·95.

GALL, Pirie M.: *Municipal Development Programs in Latin America*: An Inter-country Evaluation. New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 124 pp. £11·10.

GEISER, Hans J., ALLEYNE, Pamela and GAJRAJ, Carroll: *Legal Problems of Caribbean Integration*: A Study on the Legal Aspects of CARICOM. Leyden: Sijthoff for the Institute of International Relations, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago. 1976. 275 pp. Fl. 53.00, $20.00.

HALPERIN, Ernst: *Terrorism in Latin America*. Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. 1976. 90 pp. (Washington Papers, Vol. IV, No. 33.) Pb: £1·50, $3.00.

MACON, Jorge and MAÑON, Jose Merino: *Financing Urban and Rural Development through Betterment Levies*: The Latin American Experience. New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 147 pp. £12·60.

## GENERAL HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

EDWARDS, Roger: *Deutsche Fallschirmjäger und Luftlandetruppen 1936–1945*. Trans. by Volkhard Matyssek. Oldenburg: Stalling. 1976. (First publ. London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1974.) 159 pp. DM 26.00.

MARDER, Arthur: *Operation 'Menace'*: The Dakar Expedition and the Dudley North Affair. London: Oxford University Press. 1976. 289 pp. £7·50.

MARQUAND, David: *Ramsay MacDonald*. London: Jonathan Cape. 1977. 903 pp. £12·50.

PIEKALKIEWICZ, Janusz: *Arnheim 1944*: Deutschlands letzter Sieg. Eine Bilddokumentation. Oldenburg: Stalling. 1976. 112 pp. DM 29.80.

# BOOKS REVIEWED, JULY 1977

# INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOUNDED IN 1922

OCTOBER 1977

PAGE



*Published quarterly for the*

**ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

*by the*

***OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS***

*CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE*

**Ian Smart** is Deputy Director and Director of Studies at Chatham House.

**Louis Turner** is a Research Fellow at Chatham House.

**James Bedore** is a Research Assistant at Chatham House.

**William B. Quandt** is Associate Professor of Political Science, on leave from the University of Pennsylvania.

**John Marsh** is Professor of Agricultural Economics at the University of Aberdeen.

**John F. Coverdale** is Associate Professor of History, Northwestern University, Illinois, and author of *Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War* (1975).

**Nancy Balfour** was the editor of the American Survey of *The Economist* until 1973.

*Editor*

Wendy Hinde

*Editorial Office*

Chatham House, St. James's Square, London SW1Y 4LE

Tel. 01-930 2233

*All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor*



*The Editor is ready to consider suggestions for articles that might be suitable for publication in* International Affairs. *It is advisable to write a preliminary letter before sending a complete manuscript.*

The Annual subscription for *International Affairs* is £7·50 (UK), $22 (USA), £9·50 (elsewhere), post free. Orders may be placed with any bookseller or newsagent or direct with the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD. Tel. 01-450 8080.

 ISSN 0020-5850

# INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

VOL. 53 OCTOBER 1977 NO. 4

# BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TO 1985

ONE of the principal elements in the current Chatham House programme is a three-year assessment of the external policy options facing Britain during the period up to 1985. The study, which began in 1976 and is supported by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust, involves the extensive discussion of papers by individual experts, both in a Main Study Group, composed of leading scholars and practitioners of private and public external policy, and in a succession of short-term Specialist Groups, set up to examine certain specialised subjects in more detail. From time to time, it is intended to publish immediately specific papers which have been written or revised in the light of those discussions, but which continue to commit no one except their particular authors. A number of these will appear in *International Affairs*. The following article, summarising the conclusions of one analysis prepared for the British Foreign Policy project, is the first of these contributions.

## I: BEYOND POLARIS*

*Ian Smart*

AS Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II reviewed her Fleet at Spithead in June 1977, the absence of four vessels from the precisely ordered ranks was as much remarked as the presence of 113 others. Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent was not on parade; the Polaris force was busy elsewhere. If that was symbolic, it was an ambiguous allegory: the figures of vigilance and scarcity standing side by side. Nothing could have argued more persuasively the exiguous character of the British deterrent than the fact that no part of it could be spared to greet its Queen.

The Polaris submarines will have no second chance to celebrate a royal Jubilee. Long before the next occurs, the force will have passed into history. The question is whether it will leave an heir. When the century ends, will Britain still have a strategic nuclear deterrent? And, if it does, what sort of deterrent will it be?

The present British deterrent force consists of four submarines, equipped to fire ballistic missiles and powered by nuclear reactors, which are known as SSBNs. Each carries 16 Polaris A3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (2,880 statute

* This article summarises the conclusions of a detailed study entitled *The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent: Technical, Economic and Strategic Issues*, copies of which are available from Chatham House. Orders, with a remittance for £4, should be addressed to the Publications Officer at the Institute.

miles). Of the four SSBNs, *Resolution* was commissioned in 1967, *Repulse* and *Renown* in 1968, and *Revenge* in 1969. All make use of American experience and components, but were designed and built in Britain. Their missiles, however, were made in the United States, whence they were purchased in the aftermath of the Nassau Agreement of 1962. Only the 'front ends'—the nuclear war-heads and the immediately associated re-entry vehicles (RVs)—are British-made.

In port, or anywhere else on the surface, an SSBN offers an obvious and vulnerable target. If the British force is to be a reliable instrument of retaliation, and hence deterrence—and it would be ridiculous to see it in any other light—it follows that its effective units, at any time, are those which are submerged, within range of appropriate targets, and capable of firing at them. Had the originally planned fifth SSBN not been cancelled in 1965, there would always have been two boats thus 'on station'. As it is, when allowance is made for 'long re-fits' and routine maintenance, the force is so small that there are times when only one is available.

Even one SSBN with 16 Polaris SLBMs represents a potential destructive power 150 times greater than that exerted at Hiroshima. Given the nature of the British deterrent, however, there is effectively no intermediate point between that awesome capacity and zero. A nuclear deterrent which is known not to be able, at all times, to perform its threatened function of retaliation is clearly negligible. Yet, if any one of the four British boats were to disappear from the Navy's establishment, there would be periods in which none was 'on station' at all. It is crucial, therefore, to know when any of the SSBNs will cease to be an operational unit, since that point must also mark the end of the force's deterrent sufficiency. The British deterrent has no margin.

The present British force would cease to be effective if any of the four SSBNs were lost at sea, as a result of clandestine and hostile action, of error or of accident. Alternatively, it would lose its effectiveness if a potential adversary—which essentially means the Soviet Union—became justifiably confident either of preventing the Polaris force from responding to an attack or of rendering its response innocuous. Failing either event, the force must in any case become ineffective as soon as the irreparable attrition of any component removes one of the four boats from service.

The first of these possible routes to dissolution represents a real and worrying risk, but the risk is neither new nor obviously increasing. By implication, British governments have been betting against the hazards of the sea for the last twelve years, since the decision to cancel the fifth SSBN. The second possible route is a different matter. If Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces were able to find and destroy any

SSBN, if Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems were able to intercept and destroy any SLBM, or if the Soviet civil defence organisation were able to reduce to triviality the retaliatory damage the British force might inflict, then the present British deterrent would clearly be innocuous. At present, there is no serious reason for concern. The salt water of the deep ocean continues to offer more shelter to the hunted than help to the hunter. The Soviet ABM system is permanently restricted to the Moscow area alone by the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty, and has not even been built up to the limits there set. The Soviet civil defence organisation is impressive on paper, or to those whose strategic analysis is limited to the sand table, but has much less significance in practical terms. Complacency, however, would be out of place. Progress is being, and will be, made with new techniques for detecting both the sound and magnetic effects of submerged submarines. New methods of disabling ballistic missiles in flight are being studied. The 1972 ABM Treaty might be abrogated or amended. There is no obvious reason why improvements in nuclear deterrent forces should not keep pace with such countervailing changes. The point is that some such improvements will be necessary if deterrence is to be sustained. In Britain, the Polaris Improvement Programme has already, since 1973, developed a new warhead system for British SLBMs, capable of countering certain Soviet defensive techniques more effectively. Further improvements in both SLBMs and SSBNs are possible. At some stage, however, it must become too difficult or too expensive merely to refurbish the Polaris force in that way—possibly because the submarines themselves cannot be made any quieter or any less disruptive of the earth's magnetic field. At that stage, only a newly designed force will be able to balance technical progress on the other side of the equation.

Just when that point of technical obsolescence will come for the Polaris force is impossible to predict precisely. One can only say that a strategic system of this sort which preserved its effectiveness by means of incremental improvement for more than, say, a quarter of a century would be quite exceptional.[1] That being so, technical obsolescence, for Polaris, may well arrive at about the same time as material obsolescence—which represents the third possible route to the force's dissolution.

At some point, some effectively irreplaceable component of the Polaris force will simply wear out. Most components can, in fact, be replaced. Some, such as the SSBN hull, cannot. The British SSBN hulls were designed for an operational life of twenty years, which would imply scrapping the first boat, *Resolution*, in 1987. Having been carefully maintained and husbanded, they have, in fact, withstood operational use

[1] The American B-52 strategic bomber aircraft was introduced in 1955, and will remain in service well into the 1980s, but has only been enabled to do so by the production of new aircraft to progressively improved specifications.

strikingly well. Some might last for thirty years or more. Both costs and risks increase, however, with time. Especially since the failure of any one hull will eliminate the whole force as a constantly reliable deterrent, it would be folly to assume that the operational life of all the hulls can be extended beyond the early 1990s: that is, beyond about twenty-five years from commissioning.

The case of the Polaris SLBM is more complicated, politically as well as technically. Just over 100 SLBMs have been bought from the United States; Britain has never had any capacity to build them itself. The bodies of the missiles, given proper handling, have a very long life. Their solid-propellant rocket motors do not; even newer storage techniques can only prolong the useful life of the propellant to a limited extent. The British force depends, therefore, on the continuing availability of major SLBM components, including motors, from the United States. The Polaris Sales Agreement of 1963 ostensibly commits the United States to provide such support in perpetuity. The last American SSBN with Polaris missiles is expected to leave service, however, in 1984–85, to make way for new submarines with much larger Trident missiles. Formal obligations notwithstanding, it may be as rash to think that the American government will altruistically maintain a major Polaris production capacity beyond 1985, for Britain's use alone, as it would be to assume that the British government will then take on the heavy cost of either maintaining such a capacity in the United States or duplicating it in Britain, especially when the British SSBNs concerned face obsolescence in the early 1990s. All the available evidence converges, therefore, to suggest that, by some time in the early 1990s, both Britain's submarines and their missiles will reach the end of the road.

As Britain confronts that prospect, the question to be answered is whether the Polaris force should be replaced and, if so, by what. And that is a question which must be answered, in part if not in whole, by omission if not by commission, within the next two or three years. If there is to be a successor force, it will, in at least some respects, be more complex. That being so, at least twelve years, and possibly more, is likely to elapse between the time when the process of design and research begins and the time when a new force is operationally deployed. The point is a complicated one, and cannot be examined in detail here. Some abbreviation of the development and production period might, for example, be possible, but every such abridgement is likely also to represent a curtailment of the available replacement options. If the British choice is to be the best and freest possible, it must be made, therefore, in at least some sense, by about 1980. Any delay beyond that time will entail increasing constraints, increasing costs and increasing risks.

Returning to the original question, it is quite possible to give an absol-

ute and negative answer. It is permissible, in other words, to assert that, for reasons which are neither technical nor economic, but rather ethical or political, Britain should not, on any account, seek to replace the Polaris force. That is a legitimate assertion, which many would make and which effectively ends the discussion. Only those who would make it, indeed, can escape from what follows with regard to technical, economic and strategic considerations. In contrast to a decision, on general grounds, to abandon the deterrent, any decision to provide a replacement for Polaris, if it is to be rational, must be based on an assessment of the relative costs and benefits of doing so. An assertion that Britain must replace the Polaris force without regard to costs is unworthy of discussion. With the sole exception of an absolute 'no', therefore, all answers to a question about replacing Polaris have to be preceded by a careful analysis of the strategic purpose in doing so, of the technical options available, and of the costs attached to each. Once more, there is no space in this summary text to set out all the options and costs in full. All one can do is to indicate a sequence of questions which have to be addressed and to offer an illustrative selection of answers which might be given.

**The strategic purpose of a British deterrent**

The first question must be about strategic purpose. The term 'deterrent' already implies that any British force will only be used to threaten retaliation against an aggressor. But who is to be deterred from what kind of aggression, and with what level of probability? Should we assume that, by the 1990s, it will be the Soviet Union alone which Britain will wish to deter by a threat of nuclear retaliation? What possibility is there of aggressive threats by other powers, including perhaps new nuclear-weapon states? And what is to be deterred? Is it only an unprovoked attack on British territory? Or is it attacks upon British dependencies, British assets or British allies as well? Is it only a nuclear attack which is at issue, or attack by conventional forces as well? Most important of all, is Britain to assume that, in the 1990s, its strategic nuclear forces will be measured only as a 'contribution to NATO's strategic deterrent', as consecutive Defence White Papers have asserted of the Polaris force? Or should the future (or present) purpose of a deterrent be assessed in terms of the possibility that Britain, at some critical moment, may stand alone?

To illustrate, rather than expound, the kind of answers that might be given to those questions, my own view is that there is no purpose, for the foreseeable future, in contemplating the need for Britain to deter any power except the Soviet Union by nuclear means, that it is only the contingency of a Soviet nuclear threat to British territory (or to the

territory of a political federation including Britain) which can usefully be considered, and that the only credible justification for a British nuclear deterrent must assume that an effective American nuclear guarantee may not, in some plausible circumstance, be available. Others will disagree. Some kinds of disagreement are palpably unimportant; a force capable of deterring the Soviet Union may well, for instance, deter a wide range of other potential adversaries. Other kinds of disagreement are notionally more significant, but may imply future events which are below a useful threshold of probability. A coup d'état in Washington might, for example, produce an urgent American nuclear threat to Britain's security; as with an invasion from Mars, however, the contingency may not seem probable enough to warrant heavy expenditure. Yet other views contrary to my own may be both significant and exigent. The main thing is that the questions should be answered. The mere habit of maintaining the Polaris force is no reason, by itself, for spending money on replacing it.

Once a substantial and sufficiently specific strategic objective has been identified as requiring a new nuclear deterrent, the next question to be addressed concerns the kind and the extent of the damage which that future British force must threaten in order to exert its deterrent influence. The Polaris force has commonly been described as an 'anti-city' deterrent, threatening to retaliate by killing civilian citizens of an aggressor state. The threat is not negligible; the nuclear warheads fired by, say, two British SSBNs might kill anything up to 15-20 million people in the Soviet Union. Even one SSBN could effectively hold 10-15 million Soviet citizens hostage. In fact, however, the threat is still more extensive than that alone may suggest, since, with only slightly different targeting, the same force could also destroy anything up to a quarter of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity. The *level* of threat presented by the existing force might well be thought, therefore, to suffice for any successor intended to deter a rational Soviet leadership from attacking Britain.

It does not follow that the *kind* of threat allegedly conveyed by the Polaris force is the only one which it or a successor deterrent might make. It would be ludicrous to design any British force to attack Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles in their underground silos. Such weapons are too numerous, dispersed and various for any relatively small nuclear force to challenge, even if there were no other objections to such a policy. There are, however, many special and sensitive targets in the Soviet Union, as in any other industrial country, which even a small British force can credibly threaten, such as electricity generating stations (including nuclear reactors), transport 'choke points', naval bases and large radar installations. As things now are, the argument that Soviet leaders, hardened by experience or ideology, may not be deterred only by a threat to civilian population is largely,

therefore, irrelevant. One question for any new British deterrent force would be whether the existing ability to threaten non-population targets should be enhanced.

The most difficult problem to be resolved in selecting potential Soviet targets for a Polaris replacement is undoubtedly the problem of Moscow. Only the Moscow area is surrounded by an ABM defence: 64 missile launchers with a range of at least 200 miles. That defence could do almost nothing against a large American missile attack, but its capability against a much smaller British force demands attention. Some British Polaris warheads might well penetrate it, but, to do so, it would probably be necessary to aim most of the existing British SLBMs at the Moscow area alone. Any replacement deterrent, if based on ballistic missiles, would have to face the same problem; Moscow's ABM defence could be overcome, but only at a price. Moreover, analogous obstacles would confront any replacement of a different kind, since the Moscow area is also thickly protected by anti-aircraft defences which a deterrent based on manned aircraft or cruise missiles would have to overcome. As the defensive pattern indicates, Moscow is a target of very high value from the Soviet point of view, not only as a national capital but also as the heart of a highly centralised political, ideological, administrative and economic system and as the focus for the largest concentration of industrial capacity in the country. It can credibly be threatened, even by a relatively small deterrent force, but the price of presenting that threat is high, since it demands both more numerous and more sophisticated deterrent weapons. Whether to pay that price would be another and important question for the designers of a new British force.

### What kind of force?

Even that brief discussion of the targets for a future British deterrent begins to beg questions about the technical character of that force. What, in fact, is the plausible range of technical deterrent options open to Britain for the 1990s, and which option is to be commended? What should be the 'delivery vehicles': that is, the things which are finally to carry the nuclear weapons to their targets? And from what 'launch platform' should the delivery vehicles be fired: that is, from what kind of parent vehicle or base?

To take delivery vehicles first, the idea of a small deterrent based only on dropping gravity bombs from aircraft is less than convincing. Present Soviet air defences include about 2,650 interceptor aircraft and 10,000 surface-to-air (SAM) launchers. Some attacking aircraft *might* penetrate, but the chances are too small to command confidence. Even

the United States has dropped plans for the new B-1 bomber, as it abandoned the famous XB-70 bomber in the 1960s. For Britain, therefore, the delivery vehicle would have to be some sort of missile: a ballistic missile, such as Polaris, whose warheads re-enter the atmosphere from space at hypersonic speed, or a cruise missile, which manoeuvres within the atmosphere at much slower speed but flies at a very low altitude in order to make interception more difficult. President Carter has recently decided that the United States should deploy the latter type, while also retaining 1,710 of the former. For Britain, unlikely on grounds of expense to select more than one type, the choice between ballistic and cruise missiles is already emerging as one of the most contentious issues in future strategic policy.

If the delivery vehicle has to be a missile, whether ballistic or cruise, the five kinds of launch platforms worth considering are static land bases, mobile land bases, manned aircraft, naval surface vessels and submarines. From each, either type of missile might, in theory, be fired, which means that there are ten broad technical options to assess. A multitude of criteria then come into play. Of these the main ones fall under five headings: survival, reliability, penetration, effect and cost. Measurements of survival indicate the probability that a particular delivery vehicle on a particular launch platform will escape the effects of a pre-emptive nuclear attack. Reliability is concerned with the proportion of delivery vehicles which can be depended upon to work as planned. Penetration refers to the proportion of those that do work which can be expected to get through any defences and reach their targets. Effect measures the damage which the weapon concerned will cause if it arrives. Cost means cost. In very simple terms, therefore, let us take a delivery vehicle with one nuclear warhead of a given size which has a 60 per cent chance of surviving a pre-emptive strike, a 90 per cent reliability, and a 50 per cent chance of penetration and which, with the relevant proportion of a launch platform and all other related systems, costs £1 million. Then let us take another weapon with an exactly similar warhead which has a 70 per cent chance of survival, an 85 per cent reliability, a 75 per cent chance of penetration and a net unit cost of £1·5 million. It turns out that the cost of each delivered warhead is then over £3·7 million in the former case but under £3·4 million in the latter, so that the latter, although originally more expensive, is the ' better buy '.

Unfortunately, the reality is less simple. Instead of five calculations to make for each of the ten main options, there are literally thousands. Worse still, many of them are not measurements but guesses. The relative ability of different launch platforms or delivery vehicles to withstand enemy counter-measures is as much a matter of judgment as

computation—as is the reliability of a particular piece of equipment in combat, rather than laboratory, conditions. Estimates of costs are arguably even more imaginative. Moreover, because we are looking ahead to the uncertain strategic environment of the 1990s, both judgment and computation are the offspring of speculation. Even to set out all the options and variables would demand, therefore, a large computer programmed by a team of novelists. Once more, it is impossible to do more here than offer personal views as an illustration, and to do so, moreover, in curt terms.

Ballistic missiles in static land bases, in manned aircraft or in naval surface vessels are not, I believe, worth serious attention in the British case, largely on grounds of survival but, especially in the case of manned aircraft, also on grounds of cost. Ballistic missiles in mobile land-based launched platforms may be more attractive, but they are unlikely to be adopted because of their cost, their questionable reliability and the difficulty of locating such socially-undesirable neighbours. (Dartmoor? The Highlands? The Lake District?) If the delivery vehicle is to be a ballistic missile, therefore, the chances are that, like Polaris, it will have to be based in a submarine.

Cruise missiles, as their advocates never tire of pointing out, are in this respect, more flexible, principally because they are smaller. Static land bases again look rather vulnerable, but any other sort of launch platform for them might find its advocates. If developed as planned in the United States, they could, for instance, be fired from the 21-inch torpedo tubes of submarines. Alternatively, an aircraft such as a Boeing 747 could carry and launch up to 100 of them. Having been launched, they could then, as planned, fly at about 675 mph at an altitude of 100–200 feet for up to 2,500 miles, presenting a very small radar target, and eventually arriving within 50 feet of their targets. Being much smaller and, in some respects, simpler than long-range ballistic missiles, they should also, to cap it all, be cheaper.

It is possible that strategic cruise missiles will have some advantage over ballistic missiles (except in submarines) in terms of survival, principally because they are smaller and easier to conceal. Their other advantages are less obvious. Their operational reliability is unmeasurable, simply because there so far exist only a few incomplete and partially tested prototypes, but there is no reason to think it will be greater than that of ballistic missiles. Their ability to penetrate defences will almost certainly be less. Even if the very complicated American guidance systems now being developed can be perfected, cruise missiles, however launched, will be inherently more vulnerable than ballistic missiles, in any foreseeable future, to detection and destruction in flight. They are also likely to be at some disadvantage in

terms of effect. A single cruise missile could carry a nuclear warhead of any size, but it is likely to be much less effective than a single ballistic missile as a means of delivering several warheads on widely separated targets, and also likely, in foreseeable circumstances, to have a shorter effective range.

Against this, it is frequently argued that the far smaller predicted cost of cruise missiles outweighs all else. Unit costs of anything from £300,000 to £1,200,000 each, at present prices (but without nuclear warheads), have been suggested for a fully-developed strategic cruise missile, as against perhaps more than £2 million for a ballistic missile similar to Polaris. That, however, ignores development costs. It also takes no account of the cost of providing launch platforms and all supporting services or of keeping a sufficient number of weapons protected against pre-emptive attack and available at all times. Finally, it does not reflect the fact that, given their potentially lower probability of penetrating Soviet defences, many more cruise missiles than ballistic missiles would have to be launched to achieve a given effect.

Taking all factors together, my own judgment, again as an illustration, is that there is likely to be little difference between the cost to Britain of developing and producing the ballistic missiles needed to inflict a given amount of damage on the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the cost of developing and producing enough cruise missiles to achieve the same effect—and that any difference there may be will not necessarily work to the advantage of the latter. Many disagree.[2] Some who do so have simply not done their homework. Others, however, base their disagreement on more solid ground, arguing that, even if it cost as much to develop and produce a British force of cruise missiles as an effectively equivalent force of ballistic missiles, far less would have to be spent on providing launch platforms for the former, since they could be fired from existing surface ships or submarines, from Britain's V-bombers, from patches of concrete, from furniture vans, or even, it has been suggested, from Concorde, whereas new ballistic missiles could only be fired from new and expensive submarines. The argument is serious, but not simple. The chances are that a small deterrent consisting *only* of cruise missiles would, in fact, have to be based either in manned aircraft or in submarines (or both). Using manned aircraft, which is what the United States at present intends, would be ruinously expensive for Britain, principally because such a deterrent would never be entirely credible by itself unless some of the aircraft were always in the air. Using submarines looks better, in the British case,

[2] See, for example, James Bellini and Geoffrey Pattie, *A New World Role for the Medium Power: The British Opportunity* (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1977), pp. 37–42.

but, for various reasons, would also cost a great deal. The argument, therefore, remains unresolved—and, at present, unresolvable. If it were plausible that Britain, in the 1990s, would deploy a deterrent consisting of several different kinds of weapon, variously based, there might, indeed, be a case for including both ballistic and cruise missiles—as the United States proposes to do. If only one kind has to be selected, it should not come as a surprise if, despite the currently fashionable affection for cruise missiles, the choice falls on another generation of SLBMs.

If it is true that there would probably be relatively little difference between the total cost of a new deterrent composed of ballistic missiles and that of one based on cruise missiles, the next question to be asked is whether Britain can afford that cost. The final answer depends, of course, on the relative benefit one hopes to achieve by serving whatever strategic purpose was originally defined. The absolute costs are not, however, irrelevant. With pathetically little relevant information publicly available in Britain, in contrast to the United States, one might suspect that this means plucking figures from the air. Some more or less useful basis nevertheless exists for an approximate calculation, even if the results can only be summarised here. Within reasonably narrow limits, we know, for example, how much it cost to procure the present Polaris force, with all its support services, how much was spent on developing and producing its original nuclear weapons and on the subsequent Polaris Improvement Programme, and how much the force now costs to operate. Using these and other figures as a basis, and drawing heavily upon the much fuller public evidence of American experience, we can at least make a start.

**Counting the cost**

If Britain has to design and test a new deterrent, as well as operate and maintain it—as it did not have to do with Polaris—a long shopping list has to be taken into account. Whatever kind of missile is chosen, for example, a new research and development programme has to be mounted. Because Britain has no recent experience of developing or producing its own strategic missiles, that programme has to include, moreover, a number of unfamiliar elements, such as the design and testing of long-range guidance systems and the formulation of reliable high-energy propellants. Completely new production capacity must also be created, for missiles and for other components. Britain, in addition, has no facilities of its own for testing either missiles or nuclear warheads; all recent tests have been carried out in the United States. A new system for command, control and communications may also have to be provided, and some new means may have to be found of

obtaining intelligence on potential Soviet targets and defences. And so on.

Cutting a long story short, the best estimate one can make at the moment, subject to all provisos about frailty, is that, if Britain began in 1980 to develop and produce a new deterrent, based on SSBNs and SLBMs, which would be roughly as effective in the 1990s as Polaris is today, the total cost, in 1976 pounds, might plausibly be between £2,200 and £2,900 million, spread over some twelve years, with the peak annual spending coming in about 1987–88 at between £385 and £515 million. During the same period, incidentally, the cost at 1976 prices of operating and maintaining the existing Polaris force and keeping it up to date would probably average just over £140 million a year, adding something like £1,680 million to the total 12-year bill. If the defence budget were to remain at the present real level throughout that period—a big 'if'—this would mean that annual expenditure on a new deterrent would range from almost nothing to a maximum of between 6 and 8 per cent of the total budget, while the present force would take another 2 to 2·5 per cent each year. That may not seem an enormous price to pay for a strategic deterrent. If the defence budget were to remain constant in real terms, however, let alone decline, all new expenditure on strategic nuclear forces would have to be offset by equivalent cuts in spending on conventional forces. One of the hardest questions to be answered, indeed, is what other part of Britain's defences should be sacrificed in order that Polaris may be replaced. Nor is any technical alternative to an SSBN/SLBM force likely to provide relief. If a deterrent for the 1990s were to be based not on SLBMs but on cruise missiles, a different calculation would have to be done, but its 'bottom line', for the reasons stated earlier, would not be all that different, and might well, on quite plausible assumptions, show a total cost some 20 per cent. higher.

One further question is immediately prompted. If Britain obtained the Polaris system extraordinarily cheaply as part of an international bargain, why should the economical road to deterrence not again be an international one? Why not buy another missile from the United States? Why not co-operate with France in the development and production of a new system?

Those questions open up a whole vista of international politics which cannot possibly be explored properly in this article, primarily concerned, as it is, with technology and economics. There is no doubt, however, that buying another deterrent 'off the shelf' from America would be the cheapest option of all (although even the original Polaris force, excluding its operating expenses, cost Britain something like £1,600 million at 1976 prices). Where there is a doubt is about the ability and

willingness of any American administration, now or in the future, to imitate the extraordinary episode at Nassau. If Britain does decide to replace Polaris, the possibility of such imitation should, no doubt, be explored. It should not be assumed that the exploration would be entirely welcome in Washington or that the outcome would be a new Nassau Agreement. For myself, I would rate the probability of such an outcome rather low, while by no means excluding the possibility that a lesser degree of co-operation with the United States might cut Britain's costs if it went ahead with developing its own system. As to co-operation with France, the possibility exists, as it has existed for at least fifteen years. The problems and obstacles also still exist, and, although their character has evolved, I would not be inclined to attach significantly less weight to them today than I did six years ago.[3] As in the American case, the technical and economic arguments for collaboration are reasonably clear-cut, but less crystalline politics stand obstinately in their way—obstinately enough to indicate that, if Britain is to replace the Polaris force, it must be prepared to plan, at least, on the basis of accomplishing that aim by itself.

The issue of collaboration begins to carry the debate into the arena where it will eventually be resolved: the arena of politics. A deterrent is, after all, a political instrument, at least in the sense that psychology is the other face of politics. That aside, we who must decide whether Polaris is to be replaced will need to consider the effect on a broader spectrum of relations with the Soviet Union and its allies of a decision to do so or not. As the discussion of collaboration illustrates, we must also judge the effect of either decision on relations with the United States, whether as potential collaborator or as actual nuclear protector. Indeed, it would be naïve to suppose that any decision about a new British deterrent can fail to imply some opinion of the United States as the ostensible ultimate guarantor, in all conceivable circumstances, of Britain's survival. Nor can it fail to imply, if less directly, a view of our European allies and of Britain's European role. Will a renewal of Britain's strategic nuclear capacity be seen as a reinforcement of our national commitment to Western Europe's collective security, or to its closer integration? Or is it more likely to be seen as a gesture of persistent independence, seeking to mark us off qualitatively from all our European Community partners except France? Conversely, will a decision not to replace the Polaris force be seen as a further diminution of Britain's status within Europe, especially vis-à-vis France, as the only remaining strategic nuclear power? Or will it, against the

[3] *Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation* (Adelphi Paper No. 78) (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).

background of a restricted defence budget, be interpreted as a sign of our determination to maintain the size and effectiveness of our conventional military forces in the European theatre?

All these are important questions, the answers to which should influence, even if they should not determine, the British decision. One may be forgiven for suspecting, however, that they may be less influential in the end than answers to the questions which a decision about replacing Polaris will assuredly raise in the domestic political context. However much one may regret that a decision of this importance for international policy should come to depend on the outcome of an almost ritualised dialogue between occupants of domestically entrenched positions, the most one can, perhaps, hope for is that the dialogue, on this occasion, may be both wider and better informed than its predecessors in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.

One aspect of international politics which is likely to enter into the domestic debate, and which will in any case have to be considered by anyone planning a new British deterrent, is the effect on that plan of possible new arms control agreements. What happens, for example, if the current negotiations produce an agreement to ban all nuclear tests? Can Britain, having been a party to the negotiations, stand aside, as France has stood aside in the past, in order to build and test a new force? What would be the effect on Britain's options, to take another example, if the United States and the Soviet Union were to agree to abandon cruise missiles or to limit their maximum range to, say, 500 miles? Would it be politically feasible for Britain to ignore that fact? Such specific arms control contingencies can be multiplied. Yet, arguably, none is likely to be more important than the broader relationship between the general objective of arms control and a decision about replacing Polaris. Whatever hopes of provoking imitation may exist, deciding not to replace the force would be unlikely to have any significant effect on the policies or attitudes, in that context, of other countries. Deciding that it is to be replaced would certainly, however, attract some international criticism, especially but not only from nonaligned countries, on the grounds that it was an act of ' vertical proliferation '. The prospect of such criticism is hardly determinant, but it cannot be ignored.

Once more, the arms control implications of the Polaris decision need another article. The advantage of referring to them here, even briefly, is that the reference brings us back, as it should, to where we started: to the strategic purpose of acquiring a new deterrent. There is no natural law which says that, because Britain has seen a need for a strategic nuclear deterrent in the 1960s and 1970s, it must have a need for a new deterrent in the 1990s. It may do. The question of strategic purpose must,

however, be addressed *ab initio*, and without regard to the fact that the Polaris force exists. It is, indeed, the crucial question, to which all discussion of international political relations or domestic economic pressures should be subordinate. It is also a question which has to be addressed quickly. That, in fact, is the final message: that, even if the early 1990s feel far away, we stand, for this purpose, on their eve. Unless the development of a successor deterrent begins within the next three years, it may well not be ready by the time that the currently excellent British Polaris force reaches the end of its life. Three years to debate and define Britain's future strategic needs and priorities in this patently critical area is hardly too long.

# SAUDI AND IRANIAN PETROCHEMICALS AND OIL REFINING:

## TRADE WARFARE IN THE 1980s? *

*Louis Turner and James Bedore*

PESSIMISM amongst the world's economic statesmen has seldom been so noticeable since the end of the Second World War, with worries about inflation, Third World indebtedness and structural unemployment well to the fore. In addition, the relatively long slump from which the world is slowly emerging has allowed a series of strains in the international economy to reach levels of intensity which are forcing policy makers to make the first serious retreats from the liberal trading regime created in the aftermath of 1945. This article looks closely at two industrial sectors and suggests that oil refining and petrochemical production are in the process of joining industries like cars, steel, shipbuilding, textiles and electronics as battlefields on which exporters and importers quarrel over the speed with which non-traditional producers can replace more established ones. The distinctive feature of the two sectors we have chosen is that they mark the first time that the oil-producing world will find itself seeking markets for its industrial products. The odds are that countries such as Saudi Arabia will be surprised and resentful if the industrialised world treats their products as it has treated those from recently industrialised states like South Korea, Hongkong, Taiwan and (perhaps stretching the meaning of 'recent') Japan. The pessimists will note that Western policy makers are increasingly convinced that the balance between the world's supply of, and demand for, oil will become steadily more critical during the 1980s thus raising the spectre of trade and oil diplomacy becoming hopelessly intertwined as far as our two sectors are concerned.[1]

Whatever the merits of our speculations about political developments

* This article arises out of a Chatham House project on Middle Eastern industrialisation which is being financed by the Ford Foundation.

[1] Forecasters are not fully unanimous about when world demand for oil will outpace supplies. The Central Intelligence Agency has recently predicted a supply crisis in the early 1980s (*Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, April 25, 1977, pp. 7–8). A subsequent Congressional study suggests the crunch could come as late as the mid-1990s (US Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, *Project Interdependence: US and World Energy Outlook Through 1990* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, June 1977, publication no. 95-31) ).

in the 1980s, it is clear that the oil producers are now investing in the refining and petrochemical sectors at a rate which is almost certainly not justified by likely movements in world demand over the next decade, but which will lead to the centre of gravity of these two industries being given a hefty wrench in the direction of the oil-producing world. The logic behind these moves is that countries which have succeeded during the 1970s in winning substantial control over crude production are now seeking to upgrade the value of their exports by moving into downstream industries—in other words, industries that are closer to the markets. Investment in refineries clearly falls into this pattern, while petrochemical complexes can feed either off the by-products of the refineries or off natural gas, for which they have had past difficulties in finding profitable uses.[2]

As befits the two largest oil producers within OPEC, Saudi Arabia and Iran have the most ambitious plans for these two sectors, and it is instructive to look closer at the plans of these two contrasting countries since they are the most spectacular instances of a trend found throughout the oil-producing world.

At first sight, Saudi Arabia does not appear a particularly promising place for capital-intensive industries such as refining or petrochemical production. With a population of at most 6·5 million people, its domestic demand for such products is small; until recently the country has been a predominantly nomadic society, and thus it desperately lacks the skilled manpower needed to construct and run such plants; markets are far away in Europe, North America and Japan; physical disadvantages, such as heat and water shortages, again make the country a less than ideal location for such investment. However, even if we ignore some not entirely insignificant domestically-oriented refineries, there are export-oriented plans to build three major refineries (Petromin is to join forces with Mobil, Shell International and a Texaco-Socal partnership); four ethylene-based petrochemical complexes (in which Mobil, US Shell, Dow and Exxon will join with another Saudi agency, the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, otherwise known as SABIC); and a methanol plant (SABIC plans to join an American-Japanese group which includes W. R. Grace, Mitsubishi and C. Itoh).[3]

[2] Our project also looked at the development of steel industries based on gas as an energy source.

[3] A brief summary of the way the petrochemicals industry works may help the lay reader at this point. Crude oil is converted in refineries to petrol (gasoline) and a number of other products. Some of the latter, such as naptha, can be used as a 'feedstock' and converted into a handful of 'building blocks' such as ethylene, which can then in turn be further processed into intermediate products and then into end products such as plastics or paint. Building blocks such as ethylene can also be produced from natural gases such as ethane.

Iran seems a more promising site for industrialisation. First, its population of 35 million provides both a large reservoir of indigenous labour and a home market of sufficient size to support exporters as they enter the tricky world of foreign marketing. Secondly, the country is some years ahead of Saudi Arabia in its general level of industrialisation with, for instance, petrochemical output already standing at $200 million in 1976. As befits a country of this size, Iranian plans are more concerned with satisfying domestic markets than are those of Saudi Arabia, though exports are also intended. In the refining sector, the National Iranian Oil Company is expanding the old Abadan refinery and building four smaller ones; planning has recently been revived for a major export-oriented refinery with the Japanese; the National Petrochemical Company has joined Mitsui in the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company to build an extremely large complex at Bandar Shahpur; it is also considering a wholly-owned aromatics venture at Abadan and will increasingly switch its attention to downstream projects which will convert the chemical ' building blocks ' from these plants into higher-value intermediate and end products.

Perhaps not all the projects listed above will come to fruition. Although a number of the Iranian projects are actually under construction, the fate of the aromatics venture is still in question and the firmness of the Japanese government's commitment to the export refinery still has to be tested. Saudi developments are far more problematic. Construction is certainly proceeding on the infrastructure needed at the two main centres for industrialisation (Jubail and Yanbu) and on the scheme for gathering the gas needed by many of the projects under discussion. However, none of the foreign partners has yet made an irrevocable commitment to construct any plants. They are still restricting themselves to detailed studies of the engineering and marketing feasibility of the ventures.

The motives of these foreign partners are not immediately clear since, on any conventional economic analysis, the projects to which they are being asked to commit themselves are quite obviously going to need significant subsidies to compete on world markets. First, construction costs will be relatively high. One study, drawing on Aramco's experience with large construction projects in Saudi Arabia, argues that project costs there run some 66 per cent above those of similar projects on the Gulf coast of the United States.[4] We have heard this figure challenged quite convincingly by informed observers who argue that Aramco has never had to watch its costs particularly closely; that Saudi Arabia is no more inhospitable an environment than large parts

[4] David M. Wallace, 'Saudi Arabia Building Costs', *Hydrocarbon Processing*, Nov. 1976, pp. 189–196.

of the Third World where plant constructors are disappointed if they cannot keep costs within 25–50 per cent higher than American ones; and that costs can be controlled in Saudi Arabia and Iran by prefabricating considerable parts of the plants and floating them into the relevant coastal sites, thus reducing the problem of relying on inexperienced local, or expensive expatriate, labour forces.[5]

Secondly, even after the plants are constructed, it would appear that their operating costs will also run considerably higher than those of similar plants in the industrialised world. The productivity of the local labour force will be very much lower than that of Western equivalents and the problems of maintaining highly complex plants will be serious. Saudi Arabia's past experience with its ventures into small-scale industrialisation gives an indication of the problems at one extreme. The country's first venture into fertilisers, through the Saudi Arabian Fertiliser Company, resulted in a plant which for its first couple of years ran at around 30–40 per cent of its rated capacity because of design inadequacies; a small refinery in Riyadh has operating costs between five and six times those of an equivalent plant in Western Europe. On the other hand, these are not typical of the giant, extremely sophisticated, projects which are now under discussion. In Saudi Arabia's case, at least, the day-to-day operations will be controlled quite closely by the foreign partners, and here the record of Aramco's long-established 500,000 barrels per day refinery at Ras Tanura shows that a relatively simple refinery, run by a mixture of expatriates and a Saudi work force which has learned all its industrial skills on the one plant, can operate consistently at around full capacity within Saudi Arabia. However, the new projects being considered are on a yet higher level of complexity and thus much more vulnerable to disruption as experienced personnel get stretched too thin by the sheer scale of the two countries' industrialisation efforts. One estimate from within Saudi Arabia suggested to us that the operating cost there of a world-scale petrochemical complex could run between 60–80 per cent above Western levels. This may be too pessimistic, but we certainly assume that for the first wave of Iranian and Saudi Arabian export-oriented projects, both capital and operating costs will be distinctly higher than those of the industries they are trying to replace elsewhere in the world.

Thirdly, transportation costs should again act as some deterrent to these investments. But it is difficult to be too definitive about the exact

[5] For further details about floating plants see *European Chemical News* Survey on 'Storage and Distribution', May 20, 1977, pp. 16–18. We are not sure what impact agents' fees have on costs within these two countries. We have been left with the impression that in general between 10–15 per cent of Iranian contracts and 20–25 per cent of Saudi contracts go in commissions and other 'expediting' payments. We have not heard it alleged that any of the deals discussed in this paper are subject to such payments.

npact of these since the shipping market is particularly volatile. here is no overwhelming problem with many intermediate petro-nemical products. A number of them, such as styrene, are already egularly shipped across the Atlantic, and the distance between the fiddle East and Southern Europe is roughly equivalent. There would e much more difficulty in exporting ethylene, which requires re-igerated shipping and specially-built reception terminals in the im-orting countries. It is thus imperative that countries like Saudi rabia and Iran should ensure that the satellite plants built round their hylene crackers should come on stream as fast as possible since they e unlikely to find a market for ethylene by itself. The transportation f refined oil products is also something of a problem. Since they are w-priced compared with petrochemical products, the transport conomics are particularly crucial, and there is a feeling in the industry iat the Middle Eastern refineries will call for the development of ant product tankers along the lines of the giant crude carriers. owever, product tankers of this size are still untested, and there must e considerable doubt whether public anxiety in the industrialised world oout their environmental impact will let them be used economically. n balance, then, it would appear that transportation costs will not be l that significant for many downstream petrochemical products, but iould prove a major hurdle in the development of profitable export iarkets for refined oil products. Obviously, some of these disadvan-iges will decline in importance as the experience gained in this first ave of export-oriented plants is applied to the planning of further ivestments. However, for the moment, the comparative disadvantages icing their plans look severe.

This will not discourage the governments concerned since in both untries there is a belief expressed by the Shah when he talks of he noble hydrocarbons' which are too versatile to burn and which ight to be turned into higher-value products at least in part for the od of the world community. At the same time, both countries' leaders e only too aware that their oil will run out one day (even Saudi rabia's) and that now is the time to be building the industries on which ieir economies will have to rely as crude oil production falters. Both iow that if they cannot create heavy industries based on petro-iemicals and refining, they cannot create them at all. These are per-ctly understandable political beliefs which are echoed in oil-producing irts of the industrialised world, such as Norway, Britain, Alberta id Alaska, which also have to debate the correct ways of using iscoveries of oil and gas.

At the same time, neither government is going to pour limitless ipital into these two sectors should their economics be demonstrably

hopeless. The Iranians now have important budgetary constraints as their spending catches up with what now promises to be relatively slow-growing oil income for the next few years. The Saudis have few financial worries,[6] but they are reacting against foreign businessmen who are profiteering at their expense; they have plenty of good economists in Riyadh; and they can point to a number of important decisions in which they have deliberately turned their back on prestigious but profligate ventures. Thus they have severely pruned back their plans in the steel sector; they rejected a General Motors assembly plant which would probably have needed a perpetual subsidy; they deliberately decided to stretch out the gas-gathering project which is central to their industrialisation policy, but whose initial rapid implementation was starting to strain the country's managerial and infrastructural resources.

**Plenty of natural gas and capital**

However, do these Middle Eastern oil producers have any comparative advantages to outweigh the disadvantages listed above? The biggest single apparent advantage is the availability of hitherto unprocessable natural gas. As late as 1974, 67 per cent of the gas produced by the five leading Middle Eastern oil producers was simply flared,[7] and, once one takes into account non-associated gas reserves (i.e. gas recoverable in its own right and not simply as a by-product of oil production), then Iran, whose reserves could well be the world's largest, is in a particularly impressive position.

Since this gas is now grossly under-utilised, it is tempting to argue that it can be made available to industrial projects at virtually no cost, and there is little doubt that many policy makers in the region still think in these terms. However, gathering, transporting and separating the gases which have previously been burned is proving an extremely expensive operation. The Saudi scheme was orginally planned to cost $4 billion, but is now generally believed to be likely to cost at least $16 billion to complete—and this kind of figure is hardly a 'nil cost'. Again, once the gas is gathered, it immediately has a number of alternative values since it can be used in a variety of processes each giving a different rate of return. There are indications, for instance, that the most profitable use of Iranian gas would be to reinject it into the country's ageing oil fields in order to prolong their active life.[8] But the

[6] We discuss ways in which the Saudi surplus may disappear in 'The Industrialisation of the Middle Eastern Oil Producers', *World Today*, Vol. 33, No. 9, Sept. 1977, pp. 326–334.

[7] *Petroleum Economist*, July 1976, p. 250.

[8] T. R. Stauffer, 'A New Ruhr Without Water?', paper presented to the 'Conference on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in International Politics', Teheran,

existence of relatively plentiful supplies of gas does mean that its price can be manipulated to overcome some of the cost disadvantages suffered by Middle Eastern petrochemical and refining industries. We have been told that gas prices of between 30–60 cents a million Btu should make most of them viable. This compares with prices such as $1.50 a million Btu which gas exporters like Algeria can currently command.

The second comparative advantage benefiting Saudi Arabia is having plenty of capital. This means that its policy makers are not unduly worried about building from scratch the two new industrial ports, Jubail and Yanbu, in which the export-oriented projects will be located. They are also able to help their foreign partners by providing loans for, say, 15 years at 2 per cent per annum for up to 70 per cent of the project costs—terms which are virtually impossible to find anywhere else in the world.[9]

The final (and most controversial) comparative advantage of the Middle East is the relative freedom of the area from environmental worries of the intensity which is making it difficult to site refining and petrochemical plants in Japan, much of the United States and the Rhine Valley in Europe. This is not to say that either Iran or Saudi Arabia will consciously become a 'dirt haven', for they are aware of the dangers that the Gulf is already facing from pollution, have started (in the case of Iran) to protect historic cities such as Isfahan, and are both starting to suffer from car exhausts. Nor have we found evidence that any of the foreign partners discussed in this paper are primarily motivated by a desire to escape environmental constraints elsewhere in the world. It is clear, however, that the tightening of environmental regulations has been making brand new, or 'Green Field', ventures increasingly difficult in large parts of the industrialised world, and it is not surprising to find American oil companies involved in refinery ventures in the Middle East since it is clear that none of these giants would have been able to get permission for new North American refineries at any time over the last ten years, given the strength of the environmental and anti-Big Business movements on that continent.

On balance, however, it still looks as though the foreign partners involved in these projects will be taking a gamble if they do participate in them. Both countries will find it difficult to price gas at the levels suggested to us as necessary for the viability of these ventures. For one thing, there will be inter-agency disputes within the host countries, with the gas-producing agencies unhappy about being forced

March 25–27, 1975 (mimeo). Fereidun Fesharaki, *Development of the Iranian Oil Industry* (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 178–181.

[9] Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

to subsidise other parts of the economy. Secondly, both countries have been OPEC members long enough to know that manipulating gas prices like this is a form of back-door competition with other OPEC producers. Then again, if we are right that feedstock prices will have to be subsidised, there will always be the danger that later governments will reverse their policies, thus destroying the viability of the projects. Finally, industrialised governments will be alert to the use of subsidies and they could use this issue to restrict the access of the ventures' products into industrialised markets.

Despite all this, it is clear that the foreign partners are pressing ahead in most cases even if they are still leaving escape routes open. It would now be a major surprise if the Shell and Mobil projects did not enter their construction phases in the fairly near future. Some of the other projects in Saudi Arabia might eventually disappear, but then it is already clear that they will have to be stretched out into the 1980s and, perhaps the 1990s because the amount of incidental activity at Yanbu and Jubail (the bringing in of gas and oil pipelines; the building of gas separation plants, etc.) will make it impossible to build the four petrochemical complexes and three refineries simultaneously (in any other part of the world it would be impossible as well). So there is plenty of time for partners to change their investment strategies, or for the Saudi government to decide that it may have been straining the country's social fabric by trying to industrialise too fast. (Some commentators see the current debate within the Saudi royal family over who should be next in line to the throne after Crown Prince Fahd as showing a certain polarisation between 'modernisers' and 'traditionalists'.)

The most active single foreign partner is not a company, but the Japanese government, which has spearheaded Mitsui's entry into Iran, gone a long way towards getting Mitsubishi and a variety of other Japanese companies into a couple of Iraqi ventures and been very active in trying to win a Japanese stake in the Saudi plans. (Mitsubishi originally considered one of the Saudi ethylene projects and rejected it, but was forced by the Japanese government into reconsidering it.) This diplomatic-cum-commercial drive on the region should be seen in the context of Japan's vulnerable feelings about resource availability which first led to the 'petro-diplomacy' of the early 1970s aimed at winning more secure supplies of crude oil from the Middle East, and is now geared to integrating Japanese companies much deeper into the area's economy.

The other foreign partners are the Western companies which are dealing with Saudi Arabia on their own initiative. The overwhelming impression with which we have been left is that executives in the relevant companies are fully aware of the economic arguments against

the ventures they are considering, but prefer to view them almost as 'loss-leaders' (though they will make profits if they can) which will buy them entitlements to Saudi crude (Dow Chemical, for instance, will get entitlements to 250,000 barrels per day of crude as part of the petrochemical deal it is discussing [10]). It is certainly no accident that Shell and Mobil are the two companies furthest along with their negotiations because they are the two 'majors' which have always been relatively short of crude. At the same time, it is now conventional wisdom that, in Exxon's words: 'the policies of Saudi Arabia will be the key' to the future of the world's oil industry,[11] so, it is only good tactics to buy goodwill by taking part in Saudi Arabia's industrialisation plans. Certainly, the interest of the oil companies exceeds that of more traditional chemical companies. This may be because of historical links with the area, or simply because they have more risk capital available. There are some indications that the oil company partners may be considering the tactic of tying the sale of crude to commitments to buy certain quantities of refined products or petrochemicals. This would ease some of the problems of trying to sell such products on price and quality alone.

### The danger of over-capacity

In isolation, the plans of these two countries are not overwhelmingly important. One can reasonably assume that Saudi Arabia's second petrochemical complex will be coming on stream around 1985, thus giving it around 1·5 per cent of the world's likely ethylene capacity. Iran could be looking at world markets to take a smaller quantity of intermediate products, with its domestic demand eating fairly fast into its exportable surpluses. At the same time, the two countries combined will probably have between 2–3 per cent of world refining capacity.

This increase in their productive capacity could be ignored if it was not for a number of additional factors. First, their activities are being mirrored in an investment surge throughout the oil-producing world. If we take the Arab oil producers in isolation, we find they have plans in hand for raising their share of world refining capacity from 3·5 per cent to 8 per cent by 1985; in the case of ethylene production, the Middle Eastern and North African states could well increase their share of world capacity from 1 per cent in 1976 to 6 per cent in 1990.[12] Arab spokesmen have seen their refining plans as implying a 'modest' improvement in their share of the world production,[13] but it is hard to

[10] *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, Feb. 28, 1977, p. 11–12.
[11] *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, March 28, 1977, p. 3.
[12] *The Economist*, July 2, 1977, p. 69 citing *Chemical Insight*. *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, June 13, 1977, p. 2; June 27, 1977, p. 4.
[13] *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, June 13, 1977, p. 2.

think of any relatively technologically-complex industry which has made as rapid a shift away from the industrialised world as these two industries will do if investment intentions are carried into practice.

However, the Middle Eastern and North African states are not the only newcomers to these international markets. For instance, Western Europe is just seeing the start of an import surge of chemical products from Eastern Europe, as a result of plant construction carried out there during the 1970s under so-called compensation or buy-back agreements, whereby the constructor (mostly West European companies) is repaid in products from the plant that has been built. Products from fifteen such deals with the Soviet Union alone will be looking for markets over the next five years,[14] and in industry voices are already being raised to warn about the damage these might do to West European industrial interests. The controversy will increase during 1978 when Occidental's $20 billion deal with the Soviet Union will require the marketing of just under one million tons of ammonia, urea and potash.

On top of all this, the challenge from non-traditional suppliers, such as Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, is being aimed at industries which are already running at well below capacity in many parts of the world. This is not so much a problem for North America as for Japan, whose ethylene plants were running at 70 per cent capacity early in 1977, and, above all, for Western Europe which is for geographical reasons the prime target of the new petrochemical exporters.[15] One respected industrial observer has suggested that European demand during the 1980s could be met by the equivalent of twelve new ethylene plants, despite the fact that there are more than thirty existing producers in Western Europe, with others emerging in Scandinavia, Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Mike Hyde's picture of a Europe about to become a sink, awash with products from numerous new sources, does not augur well for the prospects of the projects we have been discussing here. He estimates there could be 55 per cent overcapacity in world ethylene plants by the mid-1980s.[16]

Over-capacity on such a scale would automatically bring political problems. How could these problems be reduced? First, the traditional companies of the industrialised world might cease to invest in certain sectors of these industries, allowing non-traditional producers, like Saudi Arabia and Iran, to specialise in the more basic parts of them. The companies would concentrate on high-value, more sophisticated

[14] *European Chemical News Chemscope*, July 22, 1977, pp. 4–12.
[15] *Nihon Keizai*, May 15, 1977.
[16] M. C. Hyde, 'Middle East Chemical Development—Impact on European Markets', paper presented to the European Chemical Marketing Research Association, Madrid, Oct. 13–15, 1976 (mimeo). See also *The Economist*, July 2, 1977, p. 69.

products. This is the strategy that liberal economists would expect, but it will not really be until the round of corporate planning decisions to be taken about 1980 (which will determine the fate of projects coming on stream around 1984–85) that we shall see the extent to which this may happen. There are some grounds for suspecting that many companies will be reluctant to leave all the new investment in certain areas to new producers, because the security and quality of feedstock supplies matters greatly to chemical companies, and cannot always be compensated for by low prices. What seems most likely is that these companies will start by taking perhaps 10 per cent of their feedstock and intermediate needs from these newer sources, increasing this proportion as they find suppliers whom they can trust. This will justify some further investment in the industrialised world, however ambitious the plans of the oil producers may be.

A second way in which some of the potential over-capacity might be reduced could be by the oil producers themselves co-ordinating their investments and scrapping some of the more marginal projects. This possibility should not be dismissed out of hand, since the Shah has certainly been taking an active interest in the problem, and OPEC would have considered the issue earlier this year if the bitterness created at the OPEC meeting at Doha in December 1976 had not made it necessary to give precedence to reconciling the two camps on the price issue. On the other hand, there are reasons for doubting if such co-ordination could ever count for much. National prestige is heavily involved, a petrochemical industry being as much a symbol of modernity as a national airline or a steel industry. Moreover, there is not yet a great deal of awareness that a problem may exist, since the Arab world, at least, believes that world demand for petrochemicals is going to grow some 2–3 per cent faster each year than relatively optimistic Western observers believe likely—and a higher apparent growth rate seems to justify a relatively ambitious investment programme.

On the other hand, some rationalisation of projects will probably come. First, there are officials in the oil-producing world who now accept that some wastage of projects is inevitable. Secondly, as budgetary constraints grow for all countries except for the handful on the Arabian peninsula, some projects will be dropped for strictly financial reasons. Thirdly, there are signs of co-operation between Middle Eastern states. A number of the Arab states have worked, through the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), to set up Arab shipping and ship-repair companies. States around the Gulf have formed a Gulf Industrial Organisation to help in co-ordinating investment on the Arab side of this sea. Finally, the Kuwaitis are now claiming that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain

and Oman have agreed to participate in a petrochemical complex planned in Kuwait.[17] Whatever the fate of this particular venture, we suspect that there will be more multinational ventures like this, which will allow governments to drop some of their more marginal plans.

A third possibility is that consumers and producers will get together to co-ordinate their investment plans, and there is some slight movement in this direction within the Euro-Arab dialogue which was initiated early in 1974. Specifically, the overall dialogue has spawned a refining and petrochemical sub-group, in which the two sides are exploring the issues raised in this article. At their most recent meeting, in June 1977, the Arab side presented a paper listing the existing refining capacity of Arab League member countries and their expansion plans. Their spokesmen indicated that they would expect the European participants (a mixture of national and EEC officials, trade associations and industrialists) to help the Arab side market those products which could not be absorbed within the Arab economies. The European position has been to stress the need for complementary investment in the refining sector (it was suggested the Arabs could concentrate on desulphurisation and pre-cracking) and the two sides have spent the summer exploring what 'complementarity' could mean for them both. They may possibly find some mutually acceptable idea of how this concept might apply to the refining sector, but one is left with the suspicion that there is only very limited ground on which the two sides can agree. After all, the Arabs still hope to see a major shift within the industry in their favour, and there are no real signs that the Europeans are yet ready to accept (or have even considered the full implications of) such a development. There is a contradiction, for instance, between the fact that the EEC members (with the exception of France) have been working within the International Energy Agency to devise emergency allocation schemes in case crude supplies are again interrupted, as in the autumn of 1973, and that they should be discussing an actual increase in their dependence on the Arabs within the refining and petrochemical sectors. Disruption of crude supplies can be counteracted by substituting relatively similar crudes from different destinations, but, as the products in question become more highly processed, it becomes more difficult to find substitutes should the flows be broken.

We would therefore expect consumer-producer co-ordination of investment to have only a limited role in curtailing the amount of investment made in the sectors in question. Where it may have a role is in educating both sides as to what the markets of the 1980s are really

[17] *Middle East Economic Survey*, June 27, 1977, p. 5.

likely to be. The fact that the Arabs' estimates of market growth in the 1980s have come under heavy attack may lead them to be more cautious. On the other hand, the fact that the Arabs, like other oil producers, are so obviously determined to capitalise on their good fortune in having plentiful supplies of hydrocarbons, even if this means that the products have to be forced on a reluctant world, may make some Western investors more reluctant to become involved in the sectors of these industries which are most susceptible to entry by Middle Eastern oil producers.

**Europe's emerging protectionist lobby**

However, on balance, we tend to be pessimistic, believing that the expectations of the two sides cannot be entirely reconciled. The United States is starting to be concerned about the security aspects of becoming more dependent on imported refined products—the Federal Energy Administration is considering the issue, and the Senate Energy Committee was due to hold hearings on the problem in the late summer. Within Europe there are signs of an emerging protectionist lobby. In late 1976, France's CFP and Elf, Italy's ENI, Belgium's Petrofina and Germany's Veba called for action to strengthen the European refining market. The EEC Commission responded with a plan for rationalising the industry, which was aborted when the British refused to consider a policy which might restrict their freedom to insist that a high proportion of North Sea oil should be refined on their own soil. But the true significance of these moves is that it was the smaller, less internationally-diversified companies which have been calling for help. On the other hand, the ex-majors which have very good access to North Sea oil, or have been hopefully ensuring continued access to Saudi oil by entering petrochemical and refining joint ventures in that country, proved less interested in Community action.

There will be similar splits within the corporate sector as the issue of petrochemical imports grows in importance. Obviously, companies such as Shell, Mobil and Exxon will have a vested interest in ensuring that the products from their Middle Eastern ventures can find a home in markets in the industrialised world. Against them could be ranged a wide spectrum of those companies which could lose by such imports. Already the Italians have raised the question of petrochemical imports from the oil-producing world at the level of the EEC's Energy Council, and as the issue grows in importance we see no reason why companies like ICI, the German chemical giants and even BP (which seems to have concentrated on its North Sea and Alaskan developments at the expense of making significant precautionary investments in the Middle East)

might not tacitly go along with the smaller chemical producers when they call for some form of controls on imports from areas such as the Middle East and North Africa.

But putting up quotas or tariff barriers against Middle Eastern products will be particularly difficult for the Europeans. For one thing the EEC has already signed agreements with North African countries, such as Algeria, which are rapidly freeing the latter's exports of refined oil products from any entry barriers, and it would be extremely embarrassing to renege on such deals. Secondly, some Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran and, particularly, Saudi Arabia, are going to be extremely important throughout the 1980s and 1990s as a source of energy. If they should tie the export of crude to the acceptance of refined oil or petrochemical products, it would be very difficult to refuse. It also goes without saying that a country like Saudi Arabia will wield considerable financial power for much of the coming decade and that any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict may well need Saudi diplomatic assistance. It is therefore going to be difficult for any European, American or Japanese government to antagonise the Saudis by banning their exports.

At the same time, however, whatever concessions are made to the Arab world will be at the expense of other countries with which the Community has trading relations. Any deal struck with the Arabs will have to be at the expense of imports from Iran, Eastern Europe, Spain, Greece, or even the United States, which has been a substantial trans-atlantic exporter for some time.

The more we think about this problem, the more we feel that no single deal can be struck with any set of producers, but that a series of bilateral deals will eventually be made to regulate the speed with which the new exporters come on to world markets. For all its faults, the model of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) looms large. This has been an attempt to strike a balance between the new producers' need to expand their sales and importers' need to protect their established industries by allowing the former to increase their sales by, on average, 6 per cent per annum. The agreement has run into trouble during the recent world slump in textiles (for which it was not designed) and may not be renewed. However, just as it is the EEC which has been most exposed to the challenge of non-traditional textile production, taking 72 per cent of the growth of world textile exports between 1973–76,[18] so it is the same economic grouping which is expected to be willing to take the bulk of the surplus chemical production being considered in the regions adjacent to it.

[18] *The Economist*, July 16, 1977, p. 111.

In some ways, the arguments for European restrictionist measures in the petrochemical and oil-refining arenas should be less politically potent than in the textile case. Most obviously, the two former industries are at the capital-intensive end of the industrial spectrum, while textiles are much more at the labour-intensive end, which should make their lobbies less powerful than the textile one. Again, as stressed elsewhere in this article, there are strong political arguments for coming to terms with the oil-producing states and, given the likely development of oil markets, Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Iran are going to be formidable opponents should Brussels give in to the temptation to raise trade barriers against them.

On the other hand, as long as those countries' petrochemical and oil-refining industries need levels of subsidies probably not found in the textile case, running down the European industries to make way for these products is going to be a controversial business. Again, the fact that these are relatively high technology industries means that the industrialised world's policy makers are not yet as psychologically prepared to sacrifice their future as in the case of textiles, which have long been in decline—and the development of North Sea oil and gas has given the British government, at least, a strong interest in expanding the European share of such industries. Finally, there is the security issue, which may well decline in importance as the two-way trading relationship between the industrialised world and the Middle East becomes more firmly established. For the moment, however, the memory of 1973 remains, and the need to protect the industrial world from the political fall-out from any future Middle Eastern crisis will remain a high priority, ensuring that petrochemical and oil products from that area will not have a trouble-free entry into world markets.

# SOVIET POLICY IN THE OCTOBER MIDDLE EAST WAR—II *

*William B. Quandt*

BOTH on the Syrian-Israeli front and in Moscow, October 9 was a critical day. On that day the Israelis, who the previous day had fought an intense battle in the northern Golan area and had launched an unsuccessful counterattack on the Egyptian front, decided to undertake a campaign of strategic bombing of Syrian targets.[1] In addition, the decision was made to press beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines in the direction of Damascus. By noon, Israeli aircraft were bombing the Syrian Ministry of Defence, the Air Force staff building, the radio station, the Homs oil refinery, and, inadvertently, the Soviet cultural centre in Damascus. At least one Soviet citizen was killed, which prompted the Russian UN representative, Mr. Malik, to denounce Israeli aggression.[2]

Presumably in response to the rapid deterioration of the military situation on the Syrian front,[3] which must have been accompanied by urgent appeals from the Syrians for Soviet assistance, the Soviet leadership seems to have made its decision to begin an immediate airlift of military supplies to Syria and Egypt.[4] Mr. Brezhnev delayed talks with the visiting Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Tanaka, that day and failed to appear at a scheduled luncheon. At this point, Brezhnev may have anticipated that the Americans would soon be sending arms

* This study was originally prepared as a report for the RAND Corporation, R-1864, under a contract from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author.

[1] Zeev Schiff, *October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973* (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1974), pp. 148–149.

[2] Despite the vehemence of Malik's denunciation of Israel, no direct threats were issued until later in the fighting.

[3] Although the Russians had brought down *Cosmos 596* on October 9, it is doubtful whether satellite reconnaissance was the primary means of intelligence on the course of the battle. More reliable sources would have been the Soviet advisers with the Syrian forces, agents' reports, public statements by the Israelis and information from the Syrians themselves. The Russians obviously took care to ensure satellite coverage of the area during the fighting, but the returns were probably not very great in terms of contributing to tactical decisions. Possibly of greater importance was the intelligence collection ship (or ships) maintained offshore in the eastern Mediterranean to intercept communications.

[4] Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (London: Collins, 1975), p. 214, states that on the evening of October 8, the Soviet ambassador telephoned Sadat to tell him that an airlift of arms would soon begin. If so, the events on October 9 would have emphasised the urgency of going to Syria's help.

to Israel in response to urgent requests, but he had no information that such a decision had been made. The first release of a limited amount of equipment to the Israelis, to be flown by commercial Israeli aircraft, was only made on October 9, and was not generally known until the following day. It was not until October 13 that President Nixon authorised United States Air Force aircraft to fly arms directly to Israel. Thus it is hard to see the Soviet arms decision as a reaction to American rearming of Israel.

Meanwhile on October 9, President Podgorny was talking to the visiting Iraqi Foreign Minister, and was most likely urging Iraq to send troops to the Syrian front.[5] Iraq no doubt insisted on Soviet military aid as a quid pro quo, and within a few days, on October 13 and 14, Soviet aircraft delivered about 450 tons of matériel to Baghdad.[6]

The tangible results of the decisions taken on October 8 and 9 in the Kremlin were seen on October 10. By the end of that day, 21 AN-12 transport aircraft, each capable of carrying approximately 10 to 12 tons, had reached Syria. No aircraft flew to Egypt that day.[7] In addition, several reports refer to Soviet ships, loaded with war matériel,

[5] Heikal (*op. cit.*, p. 218) states that the Russians strongly urged the Iraqis to support Syria, and acceded to the Iraqi request to put pressure on Iran to end the conflict on Iraq's eastern borders so that troops could be sent to Syria without risk of Iran's exploiting the situation. Heikal (*op. cit.*, pp. 218–219) also says that on October 9, Vinogradov once again asked to see Sadat and discussed a ceasefire, still implying that the Syrians would accept. Later that evening, in a talk with Heikal, Vinogradov was reportedly quite concerned about the collapse of the Syrian front.

[6] On October 10, the Iraqi government announced that it was sending forces to the Syrian front; they entered battle in strength on October 12–13, with very poor results.

[7] The date of the beginning of the Soviet airlift has been the subject of some controversy. Roger Pajak ('Soviet Arms and Egypt', *Survival*, Vol. 17, No. 4, July/Aug. 1975, p. 170) gives October 7 as the date, citing *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1973, as his source. Schiff (*op. cit.*, p. 107) states that the airlift began on October 8, but gives no source. *The Yom Kippur War*, by the Insight Team of the *Sunday Times* (London: Deutsch, 1975, p. 276), and Walter Laqueur (*Confrontation: The Middle East War and World Politics*, New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Books; London: Wildwood House, 1974, p. 166) argue for October 9, but seem to rely on a single newspaper account. Golda Meir, in her speech on October 16, refers to the airlift beginning on October 10; so does Kissinger in his press conference on October 25. Marvin and Bernard Kalb (*Kissinger*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 468–470) give October 10 as the date that the airlift began, but erroneously state that 21 AN-22s flew to Damascus that day. In fact, 21 AN-12s, with one fifth the capacity of the AN-22, did fly to Damascus on October 10. This was the first hard information received in Washington of a Soviet airlift. In this report, the figures on tonnage delivered on each day of the airlift and sealift are approximate calculations based on data available in a variety of public sources and confirmed in crosschecks with other sources. Tonnage is calculated at approximately 10 tons per AN-12 and 50 tons per AN-22. Golda Meir, in her speech of October 16, gave a generally accurate and detailed accounting of the airlift until October 15. Her figures were 125 AN-12s to Syria; 42 AN-12s and 16 AN-22s to Egypt; 17 AN-12s to Iraq. According to my calculations, this would account for deliveries of approximately 2750 tons of equipment. Brezhnev, according to one source, told Boumedienne on October 15 that the Russians by that date had delivered 4000 tons on 280 flights. (See Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974, p. 286.) It should be noted that the actual composition of the Soviet deliveries is not known, only the approximate tonnage.

actually sailing through the Bosphorus, or arriving in Latakia on October 10.[8] In order to ensure continuous satellite coverage of the Middle East, *Cosmos 598* was launched the same day.

The date of the beginning of the military resupply effort by air and sea, as well as its size and composition, is important in determining the degree of Soviet collusion in the Arab decision to launch the war and in judging the issue of foreknowledge. While a conspiratorial interpretation obviously cannot be disproved by the facts of the resupply effort, it seems possible, from a logistical standpoint, for the Russians to have acted as they did on relatively short notice. Sadat's version of Soviet foreknowledge is not incompatible with the pattern of military resupply, given the date on which it began and its size.

**Talks on a ceasefire**

Parallel to their stepped-up involvement in military resupply, the Russians reportedly also began to shift their diplomatic position on a ceasefire. Initially the Russians had favoured an early ceasefire in place, but, when Egypt rejected that proposal, Moscow had reverted to an endorsement of the Arab position that any ceasefire must be coupled with a call for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. Throughout this period, the American and Israeli position was that any ceasefire must be coupled with a withdrawal to the pre-hostilities lines. By October 10, the Russians, in private talks with American officials, were speaking favourably of an immediate unconditional ceasefire.[9] Talks on a ceasefire between the United States and Russia began in earnest about this time, as the American position began to shift to a simple ceasefire, and shortly thereafter the two super-powers agreed that a third party should introduce a resolution in the Security Council for a ceasefire in place. According to the Russians, the Egyptians would go along, provided some face-saving device were available, such as a UN consensus. The Russians seemed to believe, however, that Sadat would be reluctant to submit to a joint American-Soviet appeal for a ceasefire. In any event, the Russians were obviously reluctant to associate themselves publicly with a position that would fall short of Arab expectations and which Sadat had already rejected. Thus the idea arose, and was agreed upon in American-Soviet talks, of asking Britain to introduce a ceasefire resolution immediately, with no provision for withdrawal. The Israelis, under pressure from Washington, were re-

[8] The Kalbs (*op. cit.*, p. 470) refer to two Soviet transport ships sailing through the Bosphorus on that day. Golda Meir, in her October 16 speech, referred to one Soviet vessel with heavy equipment arriving in Latakia on October 10, presumably the first since the beginning of the war.

[9] Kalbs, *op. cit.*, p. 469.

luctantly prepared to comply, hoping perhaps to trade additional Syrian territory for lost ground in Sinai in the talks after the ceasefire. By October 12 everything seemed to be in place for a standstill ceasefire. But the British, fearing the Arab reaction, insisted on double-checking with Sadat, and on the morning of October 13 the British ambassador in Cairo was told unequivocally by President Sadat that Egypt would not accept a ceasefire unless there was a provision for full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. Thus, the American-Soviet-supported initiative collapsed.[10]

Meanwhile, the Russians were pressing ahead with the second track of their policy of military support for their clients, a policy aimed at preventing an Arab defeat that could lead to demands for Soviet intervention, thus risking an American-Soviet confrontation. On October 11, the airlift to Syria continued at approximately the same level as on the previous day, and in addition five large AN-22 transports, capable of carrying between 40 and 60 tons, flew to Cairo. Perhaps fearing that Dayan was serious in his barely veiled threats to march on Damascus, the Russians also placed three airborne divisions on alert; all seven had already been in an increased state of readiness.

The following day, October 12, the airlift increased slightly in size, with a total of about 700 tons flown to Egypt and Syria. By now, and for the next two days, Egypt was receiving more aid than Syria, perhaps because of greater need and perhaps in order to influence Sadat to accept a ceasefire. While the motives behind the Soviet resupply effort remain a matter of speculation, it does not seem implausible that the supply of arms during the fighting was meant to ensure against a military setback and, at the same time, to persuade Sadat to accept a ceasefire. This, after all, was precisely the way in which the United States used the supply of arms to the Israelis. An alternative explanation, also consistent with the data, would stress that the magnitude and direction of the supply effort were dictated primarily by logistical necessity and military need, not by political considerations.

In addition to the airlift, the sealift was beginning to make itself felt. Before the October war, a steady flow of arms had been reaching Syria and Egypt by ship throughout 1973. In an average month, at least seven Soviet ships unloaded military equipment in Syrian and Egyptian ports. It is possible that the first ships to reach Latakia and Alexandria were part of this normal flow. But on October 13, three

[10] Kissinger, in his interview with Mohamed Heikal, editor of *Al-Ahram*, gave a partial account of this ceasefire initiative. The interview was published in *Al-Anwar*, Nov. 16, 1973, and was translated in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Winter 1974, pp. 210–226. The interview, apart from a few flourishes typical of Heikal, seems to be genuine.

ships carrying about 7,000 tons of equipment passed through the Bosphorus, a high rate of delivery that was not reached again until October 20. MiG-21s and SA-6s were also reportedly being unloaded in Alexandria after the 2½ to 3-day transit from Odessa.[11] A Soviet freighter was sunk by Israeli bombing that same day in the Syrian port of Tartus, prompting a violent Soviet warning to Israel and an invocation of the need to respect the freedom of the seas. This somewhat shriller tone in Soviet pronouncements was accompanied by the first Soviet accusations of American involvement in the war on Israel's side.[12]

Sadat's rejection of a ceasefire in place on October 13, prompted most likely by his decision to launch an offensive the following day, happened to coincide with the entrance of Iraqi troops into battle on the Syrian front. A small Soviet airlift to Baghdad began that day and continued until October 14. Airlifted supplies to Syria and Egypt dropped

Date of transit through Bosphorus

Total tonnage: Oct. 7–20 41,000
Oct. 21–23 22,000
63,000

[11] Israeli sources claim that the Russians must have stored a great deal of equipment in Odessa before the war. Some of the equipment captured by the Israelis came from Warsaw Pact stocks, and must have been moved by rail from Eastern Europe to Odessa well before the outbreak of the war.

[12] However, Tass did carry, on October 13, the State Department's denial of reports that American pilots were flying for Israel.

off considerably on the 14th, from about 300 tons to Syria on the previous day to a low of 90 tons; and from 450 tons to Egypt on the 13th to 275 tons. Air deliveries to Egypt remained at this level on October 15, about 325 tons, and fell to the lowest point of the airlift on October 16, with only 175 tons. Kosygin's arrival in Cairo that same day may not have been viewed by Sadat as an adequate compensation for the slow-down in deliveries, especially after the major military setback in Sinai on October 14. The military importance of the airlift has probably been overstated by most analysts. A few hundred tons of equipment were not likely to make much difference to either side in the high-tempo war that was being fought in the Middle East. In any event, stocks of most critical items were very high in both Egypt and Syria before the war, especially in the case of heavy equipment. In only one case did the Israelis note that the airlift affected the course of the fighting on the ground; at one point in the fighting on the Golan front, on about October 10, the Syrians cut back drastically on the rate of SAM firings, presumably because of shortages; within hours, Soviet aircraft were flying to Damascus, and the next day the Syrians were once again amply supplied with SAMs. Apart from its military importance, however, the airlift was politically significant as a tangible sign of super-power support.[13]

In something of a repeat performance of his role during the 1967 war, Algeria's President Boumedienne visited Moscow on October 14 and 15, reportedly pleading for increased Soviet aid.[14] According to Arab sources, the Russians were quite tough in the bargaining over aid until Boumedienne offered to pay for the arms in cash. He immediately arranged for payment of $200 million worth of equipment, half for Egypt and half for Syria. Arms deliveries to Syria picked up on October 15, reaching a high point of about 550 tons that day and 475 the next. Finally, on the 17th, a significant increase in the airlift to Egypt took place as well, reaching 750 tons.

Once again the Russians combined the intensified delivery of arms with a renewed effort to reach a ceasefire. The key stimulus must have been the outcome of the Egyptian offensive in Sinai on October 14. In a departure from the cautious strategy pursued since the beginning of the war, Sadat ordered his armoured forces to advance beyond the

[13] To keep the tonnage figures in perspective, one should note that a medium tank weighs approximately 40 to 50 tons, a truck several tons, and a bomb about a quarter of a ton. According to Egyptian sources, during the first hour of artillery firing on October 6, the Egyptian army used 300 tons of ammunition, an amount equivalent to the average daily deliveries by air to Egypt from October 11–16.

[14] After the 1967 war, Boumedienne flew to Moscow and is alleged to have censured the Russians for their cautious behaviour, blaming it on adherence to the doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence'. Brezhnev reportedly replied: 'What is your opinion of nuclear war?' Heikal, *Al-Ahram*, Aug. 25, 1967.

protection provided by the integrated air defence system. This gave the Israeli air force an opportunity to strike at the Egyptian forces without much danger. Israeli tanks could also engage in the type of manoeuvre warfare at which they excelled. The results were devastating. At least 200 Egyptian tanks were destroyed in a single day.[15]

As the Arab military position began to unravel, Soviet propaganda struck a new theme by referring to the Arabs' possible use of the oil weapon. In subsequent days, this became a major theme, and the Russians publicly endorsed the OAPEC decision of October 17 to reduce oil production and the subsequent decisions to embargo deliveries to the United States. Soviet encouragement, however, almost certainly had nothing to do with the Arab decision, in which Saudi Arabia and other anti-Soviet Arab regimes played the key role. Apart from associating themselves with the Arabs, the Russians, by endorsing the use of oil as a weapon, were probably hoping to strengthen the Arab front in order to avoid a situation in which Soviet intervention might be required to prevent a total collapse. In addition, the Russians no doubt

**Table 2**

Total Soviet Airlift to the Middle East

Total tonnage delivered
1400
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
October 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Total deliveries Oct. 10–23: 12,500 tons (approx.)

[15] The Russians de-orbited *Cosmos 598* on October 15, which may have provided some intelligence on the scope of the Egyptian defeat.

anticipated, and hoped to gain from, the chaos that an oil embargo was bound to bring in the industrialised capitalist countries.[16]

Propaganda and private diplomacy were not completely in tune by October 15. The anxiety revealed in the propaganda appeared in private talks as a renewed willingness to work for a ceasefire. Such an initiative appeared to be essential if the Arabs were to avoid another military defeat at the hands of Israel. Also, by October 14–15, American arms were being airlifted to Israel in quantities which came close to matching Soviet air deliveries to the Arabs. Thus, the Russians decided to send Mr. Kosygin to Cairo for talks with President Sadat. By now Sadat was clearly perceived by the Russians as the key to the outcome of the war on the Arab side, and henceforth they devoted most of their attention to Cairo in terms of both military supplies and diplomatic consultations. While the Russians had apparently co-ordinated their policy more closely with Syria than with Egypt at the outset of the war, Damascus was now treated as a virtual appendage of Cairo for purposes of arranging a ceasefire.

Kosygin's mission is still shrouded in secrecy, but it is clear that he must have had a mandate to press Sadat for an early ceasefire, possibly offering arms as an inducement and some form of Soviet assurance that Israel would not be allowed to take advantage of a ceasefire as had occurred in 1967.[17] Before Kosygin's departure from Moscow, a small Israeli armoured force had crossed the Suez Canal on the night of October 15. Whether this was known to the Russians by the time Kosygin arrived in Cairo on the afternoon of October 16 is not clear. But they did appear to be better informed than the Egyptians about the dangers of the unfolding military situation.[18]

[16] In so far as the Russians did gain from the October war, it was primarily in non-Middle East contexts that they did so, and not as a result of anything that they directly did. The disarray in Nato, strains between the United States and Japan, the economic impact on the capitalist world of the oil price increases and the embargo, were all net pluses. The Russians even managed to make monetary profits by selling oil to Western Europe at the new OPEC price.

[17] The Kalbs (*op. cit.*, p. 480) give an account of Kosygin's proposal, drawing on a Yugoslav press account. The plan reportedly involved a ceasefire in place; Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, 'with minor modifications'; an international peace conference; and a US-Soviet guarantee of the agreement. (See also *The Yom Kippur War, op. cit.*, p. 369.) The Yugoslav Foreign Minister was in Cairo at this time proposing a ceasefire to Sadat; thus, the Yugoslavs might have been in a good position to learn about any Soviet proposal carried by Kosygin. Heikal's version of the talks is found in his book, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–246.

[18] Several sources indicate that the Russians undertook important military moves in this period. Schiff (*op. cit.*, p. 196) says that on October 13 part of the staff of the headquarters of the Soviet airborne divisions was transferred to Syrian military headquarters at Katana. *The Yom Kippur War, op. cit.* (p. 409), carries a similar account, including the allegation that one Soviet airborne division was transferred to an airfield outside Belgrade. No confirmation for these stories is available. On October 17, however, the Turks noted four 'fully loaded' Soviet landing ships passing through the Dardanelles, according to *New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1973. Heikal (*op. cit.*, pp. 235 and 246) says that Kosygin had brought with him an expert in aerial photography, and

Kosygin met Sadat on the evening of October 16, shortly after Sadat had delivered a speech in which he rejected the idea of a ceasefire, but in which he made complimentary references to the role of the United States. According to Sadat, no talks were held on October 17.[19] Airlifted supplies, however, did increase to an unprecedented level that day, and in the next two days another 1,500 tons of supplies were brought in by air. On October 18, Kosygin had his last of five meetings with Sadat, and general agreement on a strategy for seeking an end to the war was apparently reached. That day the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, hinted at a new approach to a ceasefire in talks with Kissinger when he spoke of an immediate end to the fighting, to be followed by a withdrawal in stages to the 1967 lines.[20]

**Negotiations in Moscow**

Kosygin left Cairo early on the morning of October 19.[21] Before leaving Cairo, he had Sadat's explicit acceptance of a ceasefire in place.[22] At about 10.00 a.m. Washington time on October 19, the Russians conveyed an urgent message to President Nixon in which they called for immediate talks on ending hostilities. Brezhnev reportedly suggested that Kissinger should come to Moscow or, alternatively, that Gromyko should travel to Washington. Nixon and Kissinger agreed that the Secretary of State should fly to Moscow and he left shortly after midnight on October 20. The first session of the talks began immediately after Kissinger's arrival that evening. The initial Soviet position was that of supporting a ceasefire coupled with a call for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, in accordance with the known Arab position.

In talks with Kissinger on the following day, however, Brezhnev readily changed his position and accepted a simple ceasefire in place, plus a call for negotiations between the parties leading to the implementation of UN Resolution 242.[23] The language of a UN Resolution was

that in one session on October 18 with Sadat, he showed him that more than 270 Israeli tanks were on the west bank of the Canal. Sadat, in his speech on Sept. 15, 1975, refers to Kosygin's use of the Israeli crossing of the Canal as a form of pressure to get him to accept a ceasefire.

[19] Sadat interview, *Akhbar Al-Yawm*, Aug. 3, 1974.

[20] *The Yom Kippur War, op. cit.*, p. 370; the Kalbs (*op. cit.*, p. 481) state that on the evening of October 18, Dobrynin gave Kissinger a draft of a ceasefire resolution that still called for full Israeli withdrawal.

[21] Moscow Radio, Oct. 19, 1973, stated that Kosygin returned that day to the Soviet Union, although some sources have alleged that he proceeded from Cairo to Damascus and Baghdad.

[22] Sadat interview, *An-Nahar*, March 29, 1974. In an interview with *Al-Hawadith*, April 26, 1974, Sadat said that he became aware of the Israeli threat on the west bank of the Canal only at 1.00 a.m. on October 19, at which time he conveyed to Kosygin his consent to a ceasefire in place. In his speech on Sept. 15, 1975, Sadat gives approximately the same chronology, but suggests that the physical and emotional collapse of his Chief of Staff played a part in his decision to accept a ceasefire.

[23] Kosygin did not participate in the talks with Kissinger in Moscow.

agreed to by the late afternoon and shortly afterwards the Security Council was called into session to vote on Resolution 338, jointly sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union.[24] The resolution was approved in New York after midnight on October 22, and the ceasefire was scheduled to go into effect twelve hours later.

In order to gain Egyptian acceptance of a ceasefire, the Russians apparently offered not only promises that they would act to ensure Israeli compliance, but also seem to have implied that an American-Soviet guarantee of Israel withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 had been obtained.[25] The Egyptians subsequently referred to such a guarantee on several occasions and appeared to be bitter at what, in retrospect, was clearly a deliberate Soviet overstatement. Needless to say, no such guarantee existed.

As part of their own commitments, however, the Russians seemed to have taken some steps to strengthen their position in case the ceasefire did not save the Egyptians or Syrians from imminent danger of defeat. Intelligence collection activities were stepped up, including another *Cosmos* launch on October 20 and a MiG-25 flight along the Egyptian-Israeli lines a few hours before the ceasefire was to go into effect.[26] During the tense period following the ceasefire, on October 23, the Russians also altered the alert status of their airborne divisions. Finally, a Soviet freighter passed through the Bosphorus on October 22 en route to Alexandria, where it arrived on October 25. Rather ominously, neutron emissions, which indicated the presence of nuclear weapons on board, were monitored.[27] Whether this was intended as some form of signal to the United States that the Russians would not allow the Egyptians to be defeated by the Israelis is unknown. Since the Soviet squadron is equipped with nuclear weapons, it is possible that the freighter was supplying the fleet before proceeding to Alexandria.[28] Or

[24] The UN Resolution 338 stated the following:
The Security Council:
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

[25] Sadat refers to such guarantees in *An-Nahar*, March 29, 1974.

[26] *Ha'aretz*, Oct. 23, 1973.

[27] Kalbs (*op. cit.*, p. 488); the Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger's press conference, *New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1973; Kissinger press conference, Oct. 25, 1973.

[28] The strength of the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean rose from about 60 ships to more than 90 during the crisis. Its behaviour, according to Admiral Bagley (*US News and World Report*, Vol. 75, No. 26, Dec. 24, 1973, p. 28) was not 'overtly aggressive'. The Russians took care to avoid incidents at sea. 'On the whole, their overt posture was restrained and considerate.' But, noted Bagley, the Sixth Fleet was 'targeted for instant attack from multiple points'.

perhaps the Russians, expecting the Americans to monitor the ship's nuclear cargo, were engaging in psychological warfare aimed at convincing Washington of the need for an early end to the fighting. And, finally, it is possible that the ship did not have nuclear weapons on board. In any event, there is no reliable evidence that nuclear weapons ever entered Egypt, and it is virtually certain that the Russians did not turn over the control of nuclear warheads for SCUD missiles to the Egyptians.[29]

The two days following the ceasefire were critical ones for the Soviet leadership. Their credibility with Egypt, and also with Syria, which had not yet formally accepted the ceasefire, was on the line, especially as fighting continued and Israeli forces moved towards completely surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. Memories of 1967 must have been revived. Then, Israel had conquered the Golan Heights after the Syrians had agreed to a ceasefire. The Soviet response, on June 10, had been to threaten military intervention if Israeli forces continued their advance.

During October 23, Soviet media expressed irritation at Arab critics of the ceasefire, such as Colonel Qadhafi of Libya, as well as sharp disapproval of Israel for not respecting the UN Resolution. In contacts with officials in Washington, the Soviet ambassador was also critical of the Israeli violations, but he and Kissinger were nonetheless able to work together that day on restoring the ceasefire.[30]

The next day, October 24, was filled with mixed signals. On the one hand, tensions appeared to be subsiding as the ceasefire gradually took hold. Syria finally accepted Resolution 338; the number of Soviet military flights to the Middle East dropped off suddenly; and Mr. Dobrynin, in talks with Kissinger in the afternoon, seemed to be adopting a constructive tone concerning a peace conference and establishing a UN peace-keeping force. On the other hand, President Sadat, apparently fearing the destruction of the entrapped Third Army, made a public appeal for joint American-Soviet intervention to guarantee the ceasefire. Dobrynin, who in his meeting at 4 p.m. with Kissinger had expressed Soviet disapproval of the idea of a joint force, reversed this position several hours later, stating that the Russians would support such a force if other UN members were to call for its creation.[31]

At about 9.30 p.m. Dobrynin telephoned Kissinger with an urgent message from Brezhnev for Nixon. The text, which he read carefully to

[29] Several sources have claimed that American aerial reconnaissance was able to identify nuclear warheads in the vicinity of SCUD missiles in Egypt. There is no reliable information that nuclear weapons of any sort have ever been introduced into Egypt by the Russians.

[30] Kalbs, *op. cit.*, p. 488.

[31] *Ibid.*

Kissinger over the telephone, began by noting that Israel was continuing to violate the ceasefire, thereby posing a challenge to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Brezhnev then insisted on the need to 'implement' the ceasefire resolution and 'invited' the United States to join Moscow 'to compel observance of the ceasefire without delay'. The third paragraph was the most threatening:

> I will say it straight, that if you find it impossible to act together with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. Israel cannot be allowed to get away with the violations.

In closing, Brezhnev said simply: 'I value our relationship.' [32] President Nixon's reply, at the recommendation of Kissinger and Schlesinger, was to order a stage 3 worldwide military alert of American forces.

It is impossible to know on the basis of available evidence whether the Russians were in fact contemplating large-scale military intervention to save the Egyptian army. Although seven airborne divisions were on high alert and transport aircraft were available, it is hard to imagine the Russians sending 50,000 to 100,000 troops to Egypt. A smaller, more specialised contingent, however, under the guise of 'peace-keeping' forces, might have been as effective at deterring further Israeli advances and in carrying supplies through to the Third Army. On October 25, before the super-powers had successfully reached agreement on another ceasefire resolution in the United Nations, the Russians did in fact dispatch a small contingent of seventy 'observers' to serve as part of the UN force. In addition, between six and nine Soviet combat ships in the Mediterranean began to move from their rendezvous point near Crete in a south-easterly direction. Two amphibious landing craft were included in this force. When the crisis subsided by noon Washington time on October 25, the ships changed course. Thus ended the acute American-Soviet confrontation over the Middle East.

While any interpretation of the Soviet threat to take 'appropriate steps unilaterally' to compel Israel to respect the ceasefire must remain speculative, it is clear that the Russians were worried about the consequences for their regional position of the defeat of Egypt's Third Army. To prevent this from happening, the Russians acted so as to convince the United States that it ought to bring pressure on the Israelis to stop, as well as to move on their own if necessary.

From the evidence available, it seems unlikely that the Russians ever contemplated a massive military intervention. But even a small force sent to Egypt in its moment of peril might have yielded significant

[32] *New York Times*, April 10, 1974, p. 9. The Kalbs (*op. cit.*, pp. 489–490) quote the same third paragraph and give the same chronology as that used here.

dividends. After all, it would not take very many Soviet troops to help dissuade the Israelis from marching to Cairo or Damascus. Nor would it take very many to mount a resupply effort to the entrapped Third Army. Nor would the risks of confrontation with the United States be large unless the Russians were to commit their forces to offensive operations against the Israelis. Thus, it seems plausible that the Russians did contemplate sending a small force to Egypt. When the United States reacted strongly by ordering the alert, and by pressuring Israel to stop its advances, the risks of intervention increased and the need for it declined. Without loss of face, the Russians could back down, claiming that the United States had ' over-reacted ', which is not an unfair characterisation of the alert. Many in Washington agreed, adding only that the ' over-reaction ' was deliberate.

## Conclusions

There are several lessons to be learned from Soviet behaviour and policy in the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. First, the Soviet leadership demonstrated an impressive ability to follow the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East and to adapt decisions to the course of events on the battlefield. Within less than 24 hours of each of the critical turning points in the crisis, the Soviet leadership appeared to have been aware of the significance of the events, to have reached a decision to act, and then to have actually executed the decision.[33] For example, shortly after learning that hostilities were imminent, the leadership, for whatever reason, ordered the evacuation of dependants and advisers from Egypt and Syria and took steps to ensure that information on the Middle East would be available on a priority basis. Once hostilities had begun, within six hours the Russians had taken a unilateral initiative aimed at achieving a rapid ceasefire that would leave the Arabs with their limited gains without risking defeat. Presumably the Russians shared the American and Israeli assessment of the likely outcome of a prolonged war, hoped to help the Syrians preserve their early gains, and were determined to avoid a situation in which they would be called upon to intervene. Although the Syrian position never did completely disintegrate, it was true that a ceasefire on October 7 or 8, for example, would have left the Syrians in control of some of the territory lost in 1967. Even the Egyptian position on the ground at the time was much better than it proved to be on October 22, the day the ceasefire was finally voted in the UN. But the Egyptians were not ready to stop fight-

[33] This level of ability may not be particularly surprising, but it does tend to cast doubt upon theories of Soviet decision-making that emphasise rigidities stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy, the conspiratorial mentality of the decision-makers, or the distorting effects of ideology.

ing at such an early date, and the Russians were not prepared publicly to oppose them. In a variety of ways, however, particularly from October 10–12, and again during the Kosygin visit to Cairo from October 16–19, the Russians kept pressing for an end to the war. In this aspect of their policy, they came closest to living up to the expectations of detente politics, at least as interpreted and conveyed to them by Kissinger and Nixon. The two architects of detente on the American side did not view the Russians as delinquent in this aspect of their behaviour.

On the Syrian front, the critical period of the war was October 8–9, as the Israelis pushed the Syrian forces back to the 1967 ceasefire lines and beyond, and began strategic bombing deep within Syria. The Russians clearly hoped to prevent further Syrian losses, and as part of a policy of helping Syria they launched an airlift of military equipment on October 10 and encouraged Iraq to join the battle. This aid may have helped somewhat to stabilise the Syrian front by October 13–14, by which time the focus of the war was shifting to the Egyptian front.

In Sinai, the critical moment of the war came on October 14, when the Egyptians suffered a major defeat, and on the night of October 15, when an Israeli force crossed to the west bank of the Suez Canal. On the basis of the defeat on the 14th alone, the Russians must have foreseen the danger to the Egptian position, for within 36 hours Kosygin was on his way to Cairo to urge Sadat to accept an end to the fighting. As the size of the Israeli force on the west bank grew, Kosygin's appeal for a ceasefire must have gained greater and greater weight with Sadat, who seemed very slow in drawing the appropriate conclusions from the military developments of October 14 and 15.

A second lesson of the war is that the Russians have a well-developed and responsive airlift and sealift capability. Perhaps some contingency planning had been done for speedy deliveries of military equipment to the Middle East from the moment hostilities seemed imminent on October 3. Some equipment must have been ready for rapid delivery before that date. In any event, the airlift was clearly managed in reponse to both political and military considerations. Syria, where the needs were initially greatest, received the first infusions of aid. The airlift to Egypt was considerably larger, and may have been partly used as a form of inducement to get Sadat's agreement to a ceasefire. At one point Iraqi participation seemed important to help stabilise the Syrian front, and on October 14 Iraq received more supplies by air than any other country. Within overall constraints set by logistics the pattern of resupply seems to reflect a mixture of military and political considerations.

The Soviet sealift capability, although much greater than the air-

lift capability, is by its nature slower and less responsive. Several seaborne shipments of arms were probably in the pipeline when hostilites erupted on October 6. It was not until October 13 that an upsurge in Soviet shipping to Egyptian and Syrian ports can be noted, but the sealift did not really reach its peak until the last days of the fighting, from October 20 on. The quantities of arms that were carried by ship, of course, dwarfed the airlift, and by the end of hostilities more than five times as much equipment had reached Egypt and Syria by sea as by air. The surge in seaborne deliveries came just as the war was ending, with one third of the total tonnage shipped during the war passing through the Bosphorus between October 21 and 23. By this time the airlift was no longer of much use and was discontinued on October 24.

The Soviet airlift during the war was responsible for the delivery of about 12,500 tons of equipment. The sealift delivered nearly 63,000 tons. The composition of the deliveries is, of course, not precisely known. The sealift continued well after the ceasefire, resulting in the rapid rebuilding of the Syrian army and air force, and a somewhat slower resupply of the Egyptian forces. Throughout most of 1974, 1975 and 1976 the Egyptians received very little military equipment directly from the Russians.

The third noteworthy aspect of Soviet behaviour in the October crisis is that Moscow treated President Sadat as the key actor on the Arab side after the first few days. Soviet-Syrian relations had certainly been better than those between Moscow and Cairo, and there is evidence that the Russians geared their initial policy to Syrian needs, and yet it was Egypt, the more powerful country, that ultimately received most Soviet attention. In particular, the Russians dealt almost exclusively with Sadat on the ceasefire issue after the war had begun, to the point where President Assad claimed that he had not even been informed before the UN call for a ceasefire on October 22.[34] According to reliable sources, the Syrians were preparing for a major counterattack on October 23, which the Russians reportedly went to some lengths to prevent once the ceasefire had been voted in the Security Council.

Finally, Soviet behaviour in the October war suggests a sensitivity to shifts in the balance of forces as a major factor in making decisions. Some observers have detected a master plan governing the Russians' behaviour in the October war, but it appears more plausible that policy was bounded by several general principles, and, within that framework, it was primarily events on the ground that determined specific

[34] President Assad's speech on October 29, 1973, makes this point.

decisions. The general principles that can most readily be discerned were a desire to retain credibility as a super-power patron with both Egypt and Syria; a determination to avoid full-scale confrontation with the United States; and probably a generalised wish to profit in non-Middle Eastern arenas from the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Each of these guidelines pulled Soviet leaders in somewhat different directions. Some indicated caution and restraint; others implied involvement and militancy. It is probably safe to say that some key individuals in the Soviet hierarchy were inclined to support an aggressive policy and that others favoured greater restraint. Grechko and Shelepin, generally identified as among the most sceptical of the value of detente, seemed to have been most anxious to place the October war in the context of an anti-imperialist struggle.[35] Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Gromyko, by contrast, were more disposed to work towards joint solutions on a ceasefire with the United States.

The Russians, of course, did not act in the crisis according to textbook rules of detente politics as understood by many Americans. On occasions, Soviet propaganda was inflammatory; the delivery of military equipment may have prolonged the fighting; the threat of unilateral intervention at the close of the war brought the super-powers to a point of near confrontation. And yet the Russians, for whatever motives, clearly did try to work for an earlier ceasefire than the Arabs were prepared to accept; and they were prepared to endorse a UN Resolution that called, for the first time, for negotiations between the parties to the conflict.

This mixed record suggests that the Russians, in an acute crisis such as that of October 1973, are likely to see force and diplomacy as complementary rather than as opposing courses of action. In their view, it is not inconsistent to follow a policy of favouring a 'political settlement,' while at the same time delivering the means to launch a war; nor is it inconsistent to work for a ceasefire while mounting an airlift and sealift of military equipment to clients engaged in actual hostilities. What the Russians were not prepared to do was to see their relations with Egypt and Syria destroyed by their unwillingness to help the Arabs recover their territory in a war that the Russians had repeatedly termed as justified. In large measure, this had to do with the position of the Soviet Union as a super-power. Its prestige was clearly on the line. At the same time, the Russians were not anxious to become directly involved in the fighting, with all the dangers of confrontation that this held. To this end, they remained in close con-

[35] Grechko's views were reportedly echoed in *Krasnaya Zvesda*; Shelepin's in *Trud*. Galia Golan, in an unpublished manuscript, has gone into this issue in considerable detail.

tact with the United States throughout the war and, from the perspective of the White House, they seemed generally co-operative in efforts to achieve a ceasefire in place.

The basic rule governing Soviet policy-making in an acute crisis would seem to be use enough force to retain credibility with one's friends and clients; to engage in enough diplomacy to ensure that the crisis does not lead to super-power confrontation. The proper balance of these two key ingredients will be determined by the behaviour of the United States, internal Soviet politics and, very importantly, by the actual course of events in the crisis area.

(*Concluded*)

# EUROPE'S AGRICULTURE: REFORM OF THE CAP *

*John Marsh*

AGRICULTURAL issues have played a large part in the development of the European Community. In the 1950s they helped to discourage British participation in the Common Market. In the 1960s agricultural policy became the most active area of common decision-taking as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was established. In the 1970s the process of enlargement has involved much discussion about agriculture. Today the admission of Greece, and possibly of Spain and Portugal, again raises sensitive agricultural matters.

The CAP brings agriculture within the Common Market by regulating trade with third countries and by maintaining the internal price level of key agricultural products. In addition, the policy promotes the structural improvement of the industry through payments made under the 'guidance' section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). Total payments from this fund to maintain prices and support structural improvements absorb very much the largest share of the Community's budget, some 74 per cent in 1977. Even so, Community-financed support represents only part of all the official aid given to farmers. In 1975 payments from national governments were equivalent to twice the amount financed through the CAP. In addition to budget payments, the CAP brings about a transfer of incomes from consumers to farmers whenever the price at which imports are available is below the prices fixed within the Community. Sometimes, as in 1973 and 1974, the direction of this transfer has been reversed for some products. But in general the effect of the policy has been to keep prices higher than they would otherwise have been.

The goals set out by the founders of the Community for the CAP (Article 39 of the Rome Treaty) included improved productivity and thereby improved incomes for those working in the industry, stable markets, regular supplies and reasonable prices for consumers. The performance of the industry since 1958 might be thought to reflect a measure of success in these directions. Productivity has risen, fewer men are employed and more is produced. The price level has been

* This article is based on a talk given at Chatham House on July 12, 1977.

more stable than world prices and, as the British discovered when their sugar supplies were interrupted in 1974, the Community has enjoyed regular supplies. Prices, although high by world standards, have generally risen less within the Community of Six than within, for example, Britain. Beyond the detailed aims set out in Article 39 the policy has allowed a fourfold increase in intra-Community agricultural trade. This gives some practical content to the claim to have brought agriculture into the Common Market.

These are substantial achievements and it may seem inappropriate to urge reform. However, there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction with some aspects of the present arrangements. Among the defects which many people today find in the CAP are: (i) Its inability to cope satisfactorily with monetary disequilibria. Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) have enabled countries to maintain internal price levels unchanged despite changes in exchange rates. This has some drawbacks. Production is encouraged but consumption is not stimulated in countries whose currencies appreciate. In countries with weak currencies consumption is sustained but production is made less profitable. Thus the MCA makes the attainment of equilibrium within the Community more difficult and distorts the use of resources. The MCA is paid to or by EAGGF. Insofar as a net importer's currency loses value, this causes an open-ended drain on the fund. Administratively, MCAs are cumbersome to control, add to uncertainty and may provide unintended windfall profits. (ii) The existence of surpluses. These are often fairly modest in relation to total production or consumption, but they are costly to the budget. Further, the sale of food abroad with the aid of Community subsidies is offensive to consumers and disruptive to world trade. (iii) The continuing low incomes of some farmers. Although the CAP makes a large net transfer to the industry, the incomes of small farmers, who predominate in continental Europe, and of farmers in difficult hilly or mountainous areas, have tended to lag behind incomes in other sectors. (iv) The policy pre-empts too large a share of the Community's budget in a manner which tends to sustain the status quo rather than promote improvement.

The need to negotiate price levels within the CAP has provided an annual opportunity for discontent to surface. Agreement has often been reached with difficulty and in some instances apparently with acrimony. Such an atmosphere does the Community no good. Greater political unity, more effective policies to cope with unemployment and inflation, and Community solidarity may be impaired if the principal business of Ministers in Council seems to be a wrangle over agricultural prices. This paper advances five suggestions which are intended to contribute to a purposive reform of the CAP. The object is not to dismantle

what has already been achieved but to adapt to the realities of the present stage of Community development and to foster an environment in which fuller co-operation may be encouraged.

**1. A Community trading price**

Conceptually, when the Ministers decide prices at the annual review they fix minimum price levels for key products for producers and consumers throughout the Community. These prices are enforced by intervention if threatened by domestic over-supply, and by variable import levies which prevent cheaper goods from abroad gaining access to the Community below a 'threshold price'. The system allows for some price differentiation to take account of local supply and demand and of transport costs between markets. In addition, within the price range between the intervention level and the threshold price (which is fixed at a level which will not undermine target prices fixed by the Council) the internal market of the Community is free to move. Since different market situations can coexist within different areas of the Community, this allows a limited spread of prices.

In practice, this degree of difference has been exceeded. One cause has been the arrangements for transition during which members who joined in 1973 raised their internal price level to that of the Six. To allow this to happen while trade took place at Community prices, taxes were imposed on sales from new members to the Six and subsidies provided on goods moving in the opposite direction. During the transitional period these Accessionary Compensatory Amounts (ACAs) have been gradually diminished and are due to disappear in 1978.

A more persistent cause of price difference has been the MCA which came into being as a result of changes in exchange rates, and allows trade to be carried on at Community prices despite differences in the real price level within member states. At times the difference between Britain (internal prices below Community official prices) and Germany (internal prices above Community official prices) has been more than 40 per cent. Such differences reflect profound contrasts in the experience of the member states concerned. In Britain, a depreciating currency has been one aspect of rapid inflation, high levels of unemployment and a large deficit on external account. Food prices have been seen as central to a prices and incomes policy which has sought to control inflation through limiting the rise in personal earnings. Increases in the price of food especially reduce the real income of the poorest citizens. Inevitably, these increases generate claims for higher wages, more generous pensions and improved social benefits. If increases are conceded to the poorest, differentials become eroded and the general willingness to accept wage restraint is reduced.

In Germany, relative success in containing inflation has been associated with an appreciation of the deutschemark. This should have reduced prices specified in units of account but paid in deutschemarks. Farmers, however, resist such an automatic reduction, pointing to the fact that prices of other goods have risen even if they have done so less than in other countries. Thus there is pressure on German governments to mitigate the consequences of the success of their industrial economy for farmers. They can do so by using the MCA.

The present system allows, however reluctantly, for governments to accommodate domestic price policy to domestic pressures when currencies change in value. This is untidy, but it represents a necessary concession to political realities. At its present stage of development, the Community leaves responsibility for economic management in the hands of member governments. Within that responsibility food prices and farmers' prices have a special significance. Since the Community is still some way from accepting the responsibilities of full economic union, it may be fortunate that some measure of independence in food and farmers' prices has been attained.

It is suggested that, building on this precedent, the prices fixed by the Council of Ministers should be those that will prevail for trade between Community countries. The mechanisms for maintaining these 'trading prices' would be as at present, variable import levies on purchases from third countries and intervention to support the domestic market. Member governments would agree to buy or sell at these prices, but they could allow internal prices to deviate if they wished to do so. A condition would be that any deviation was wholly financed from the national resources of the country concerned. Thus, for example, Britain could subsidise food prices whilst Germany might subsidise farmers.

Provided the cost of 'deviations' from the trading price falls wholly on national accounts, it should in principle be possible to permit a variety of ways of helping consumers or farmers to coexist within the Community. For example, direct subsidy payments to maintain farm incomes, subsidies on particular food items or to particular consumers, deficiency payments which raised farmers' receipts, and grants designed to reduce specific costs, might all be permissible. It would be important to ensure that all support should be visible and known to the taxpayers of the country concerned. This, however, leaves a great deal of discretion to governments. For example, higher food prices enforced by border taxes would represent a cost to consumers which could be calculated in terms of the difference between the Community trading price and the internal price level. In a society in which consumers are

increasingly articulate, this seems unlikely to be a recipe for unlimited agricultural support.

Those who devised the existing policy may regard this suggestion as heretical. They could point out that it would legalise long-run and potentially growing distortions in the use of agricultural resources throughout the Community as a result of varying levels of government support. This is an important argument but it would carry more conviction if there were an authentic prospect of the current system achieving an undistorted pattern of resource use. The realities are quite different. Prices are fixed at politically determined levels and are unable to respond to changes in supply or demand within the Community or in the world market. The existence of MCAs ensures that Community money finances further distortion, discouraging production in countries with weak currencies and encouraging it where revaluation has occurred. At present member countries support their farmers from their own budgets in ways which are different and to differing degrees.

The suggested system would allow prices to be supported at different levels, but the Community would bear the cost of any excess output in one member state only to the extent that the trading price exceeded world prices. If this trading price fell when supply exceeded demand in the Community, the cost to governments of supporting surplus production would increase. At the same time consumers within the Community might expect to receive some benefit. Since the trading price would not be a 'social' price, the political possibilities of adjusting it in relation to the economic situation would be greater than under the present system. In the event, this more open system of differentiation might well involve less distortion than occurs at present within the CAP.

There are, too, some positive benefits from this suggestion. First it would relieve the Community budget of MCA payments and receipts. Further savings might flow from a greater flexibility of the trading price which would discourage surplus production. Second, discussion would focus on how much the Community should produce itself and how large a measure of protection it should accord to its farmers. This ought to be a debate about Community economic interest, not simply the outcome of competing internal social problems. Third, the Community would be better placed to embark upon discussions with third countries about agricultural trade. Finally, it would place agriculture in a position analogous to that of other industries where indirect taxes are remitted or imposed at the frontier and national governments provide industrial subsidies. This is an imperfect state of affairs, but it reflects a general need for the Community to evolve a common approach to economic policy. Agriculture shares in this and it is a

mistake to believe that a common price can exist for one sector when member states are being pulled in different directions by differences in the rest of their economies. Moreover, the move towards a trading price need not involve any lessening of Community concern with the social problems of farmers. These, however, would now have to be approached through the social fund and compete there with other social needs for assistance.

**2. A global standard quantity system**

A hazard encountered by any policy which seeks to maintain a given level of market price is that the quantity supplied at that price may not match the quantity demanded. In the Community, shortfalls in supply are made up by imports, and, except at periods of exceptional world shortages, have caused no problems since supplies have been available at the threshold price. When farmers produce more than can be sold within the Community at the prices fixed, more difficulty arises. The quantity remaining unsold can be purchased by official agencies or exported with the aid of subsidies to third countries. Such activities, which maintain the prices of goods commonly described as ' surpluses ', account for about 90 per cent of expenditure under the CAP. Most of this expenditure has been incurred in support of a small number of products, notably dairy products and cereals.

The surpluses of the dairy sector, which have proved most costly, represent a special problem. They are often described as structural. There are too many producers in an industry which has experienced improved productivity and stagnating demand. Many of these producers are small, unable to shift their resources to other activities and only partly equipped to apply new and improved techniques. As a result, social priorities prevent a reduction in price which would cut incomes, and it is generally assumed that a solution can only be found as, in the fullness of time, many of these small milk producers gradually leave the industry. This analysis is dangerous. By attempting to maintain prices for small farmers, larger producers may be assured returns which encourage further investment. As a result, milk may be produced for which there exists no market at current prices within the Community. The distinction suggested above between a trading price and the price governments may pay to farmers, which might include elements of income support, could help towards a more coherent pricing strategy, but the severity of the problem is so great that more direct methods seem likely to be needed.

It is proposed here that when the Council fixes a trading price for each product it supports, including milk products, it should indicate a

maximum quantity, 'a global standard quantity', which it is prepared to underwrite through intervention or export subsidy. When goods are offered for intervention, or export restitutions are requested, only part of the full payment due would be made, say 80 per cent. At the end of the season the quantities seeking support in this way would be added up. If the total was within the ceiling set, those who have sold into intervention or claimed export restitution would receive the full amount to which they were entitled. If the total exceeded the quantity set, final payment would be reduced so as to limit the payment from the Community budget to the amount which would have been due had the quantity offered been within the maximum permissible level. For practical purposes this might be fixed as the global standard quantity multiplied by the difference between the intervention price and the average price at which goods were available c.i.f. at the Community's ports during the period. Such a system would mean that when there was a surplus, farmers would not be assured of the full intervention price. It would also involve additional administrative work, although this might be reduced if the minimum quantity which could be sold into intervention or granted export subsidy were set at a high level. This would channel official transactions through the trade and reduce the number of transactions involved.

The benefits of applying a global standard quantity are substantial. They may be summarised as follows: (i) Surplus production would be discouraged from the outset. When deciding how much to produce, farmers would have to take into account the overall state of the market. (ii) When surpluses occurred, consumption would be encouraged to the extent that farmers preferred to accept a modest reduction in the price they received *now* rather than await an uncertain and deferred final payment. This would encourage the market to clear itself. (iii) The cost to the Community's budget would be reduced, although there would still be a substantial commitment if domestic and world prices should collapse. The extent of this commitment would hinge on the standard quantity agreed, the level of world prices and the amount for which farmers sought official support. (iv) Farmers would be protected from a collapse of the market. They would also be assured of the initial payment and, unless production greatly exceeded the standard quantity, a substantial secondary payment. Although not wholly predictable, prospective large surpluses can usually be foreseen. (v) The determination of a standard quantity could form a helpful element in the Council's debate on agriculture. In addition to issues relating to the availability of food from Community and world markets, the Council would have to take a view on such matters as its commitment to food aid and stock-

holding policies. Thus, the relationship between agricultural policy, the interests of the Community as a whole and trade with the rest of the world would be more clearly perceived.

### 3. A basket method of valuing the unit of account

The unit of account used within the Community has different definitions for different purposes. For example, the agricultural unit of account has been defined in terms of the joint float currencies, whilst the unit of account used for payments to the EEC budget is still based on Smithsonian parities. This is untidy and it has some obvious drawbacks. Germany, for example, argues that the unrealistically high value of the pound sterling and low value of the deutschemark used in valuing the unit of account for budget purposes, exaggerate its contribution to the Common Budget. The proliferation of units of account may also lead to confusion. It could be difficult to unwind this situation. Britain and Ireland, for example, might be expected to resist any implied increase in the real size of their contribution to the Common Budget. From the point of view of agricultural policy, however, there is much to be said for the Commission's current proposal that the unit of account should be fixed in relation to a weighted basket of all currencies. The merits of this suggestion gain in force if MCAs are to be reduced or removed.

Within a basket system, prices specified in units of account would be adjusted in all currencies in response to a change in the exchange rate of any one member country. Thus, if the pound sterling depreciated, unit of account prices in pounds would be raised, but since the unit of account would be worth less in other currencies, prices in deutschemarks, francs, lire and so on, would also be reduced. Such a development would contribute to equilibrium both in the agricultural markets and in the foreign exchange market. It would better represent the notion of a 'community' by distributing the process of adjustment to economic imbalances more widely among members. One implication would be that the size of adjustments in exchange rates required to restore any one member to external equilibrium would be reduced. As a result, the price-increasing or price-decreasing effects of keeping internal prices in line with the Community trading price, when exchange rates had to change, would be smaller.

### 4. Structural investment in reducing the cost of food production

The CAP has directed its main attention to price policy. Since 1968, however, it has developed an increased concern with structural policies designed to facilitate the modernisation of farms, the retraining or

retirement of some farmers and the provision of special aid to 'less favoured areas'. These developments reflect the belief that price policy alone cannot adequately resolve the income problems of many poor farmers. High prices lead to unsustainable surpluses. Lower prices reduce the revenues of those whose living standards are already low. Understandably, the criterion for structural aid has tended to focus on the income potential of improved farms. Loans or grants are provided on the basis that the farm development scheme will raise the incomes of those employed to a level comparable to that of other workers in the same area.

Although this emphasis is understandable, it is unfortunate. It distributes new resources in the form of capital on the basis of the returns which might be generated by employing the existing labour force. From the point of view of the Community as a whole the return on such Community investment is smaller than it need be. A greater return from subsidised investment would be attained if it were deployed where the risk-discounted rate of return were greatest. In agriculture, returns to the Community can often be realised only in the form of lower production costs. New investment may add to the productivity of existing resources so that a given level of output can be sustained with less land and fewer men. The benefit to the economy is in part cheaper food and in part extra production in sectors which employ resources released from agriculture. Such a benefit is diffused throughout the whole economy, improving the position not only of those who acquire additional capital but of consumers as well.

By shifting the criterion of support for structural improvement from income maintenance towards greater efficiency in the use of resources, the CAP could claim that its structural policies were of demonstrable benefit to all members of the Community. Such a redirection would only be possible if other means were used to safeguard the incomes of vulnerable farmers. However, since the main responsibility for income maintenance could more safely be left to national governments if the trading price system outlined above were applied, the possibility of pursuing greater efficiency does exist.

At the moment, improved productivity in agriculture may seem undesirable in the light of the high level of unemployment in most Community countries. It must be a major goal of economic management to ensure that such levels of unemployment prove temporary, but it may well be that the very rapid rate of job creation experienced in the 1960s will not recur. In such a less buoyant economy, in which adequate food supplies already exist, the far-reaching issue must be faced: should extra capital be channelled towards agriculture at all?

Investments are likely to release labour. Possibly the best hope for agriculture and for other sectors is that extra investment should occur outside agriculture, thus creating new non-farming jobs. No simple answer can be given, but it is important that agricultural structural policy should be seen in the context of regional and industrial policy for the Community as a whole. In this way the concept of economic efficiency is more likely to include an objective consideration of social costs and benefits, as well as private returns and budgetary costs.

**5. International stockholding**

The sudden explosion of world cereal prices in 1973 and 1974 revealed the fragile nature of the world's trading system when stocks came to represent too small a proportion of annual production and consumption. Inevitably, whilst prices were high, there was a growing interest in attempts to secure greater stability through some form of international stockholding policy. Discussion at many international meetings has emphasised the need to create internationally co-ordinated stocks, but little has been done. By 1977 the recovery of cereal supplies and a tendency for world prices to ease have lessened the urgency of such measures, at least in the eyes of importing countries. The Community has, however, an enlightened self-interest in promoting an international stockholding policy. Such a policy could provide a more stable world price level which would enable a more open trading relationship with the rest of the world to be developed. It could also provide an assurance of supplies so that the need to foster costly Community production in order to be more self-sufficient in particular items would be reduced. In addition, it could enable the Community to contribute in kind or in cash to ' fire brigade ' relief to developing countries.

These are important benefits which should dispose the Community favourably towards international stockholding policies, but the difficulties should not be underestimated. Among the questions which have to be faced are: (i) Who pays for the stocks? At the moment producers pay involuntarily. (ii) How stable should prices be? Some price movement is essential if markets are to function. (iii) Can public and private stocks co-exist? Should the main thrust be towards stocks owned and controlled by the state or towards encouraging the private sector to hold larger stocks? (iv) Are stocks in other countries reliable if shortages occur on a world scale?

These questions emphasise that stockholding policies are unlikely to prove easy to negotiate. At most they cannot make more than a modest contribution to a satisfactory world agricultural market. However contrived, they require some readiness to modify internal policies in

relation to underlying shifts in world supply and demand. So far the Community has refused to discuss the reform of the CAP in international negotiations on the ground that it is an ' internal ' matter. Such an approach is not consistent with meaningful discussion of a coordinated stockholding policy. It is hoped that the suggestions made in this paper, which have the effect of separating, to some extent at least, the trading issues from problems of a social character, may help the Community to discuss its own trading price and stockholding policy more constructively. In this way it might play a more responsible and positive role in world agricultural markets.

# SPAIN FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY

*John F. Coverdale*

FROM the moment of Franco's death until the first general elections, on June 15, 1977, both professional politicians and large sections of the Spanish people focused their attention and hopes primarily on the transformation of the political system. After 40 years of authoritarian government, and more than a decade of substantial economic progress, Spaniards pinned their hopes on political liberalisation and showed surprising willingness to let social and economic changes wait until the political issues were settled.

Some parallels might be drawn with Turkey, Brazil and Venezuela; but recent Spanish political experience is essentially unique in the annals of contemporary politics, and paradoxically demonstrates that ' Spain is different ' even when it is adapting itself to the political pattern of the rest of Western Europe. It has found the path from authoritarian rule to a more liberal and democratic form of politics without experiencing defeat in war, foreign intervention or revolutionary upheaval. This process has been carried out from above, under the direction and control of the direct heirs of the Franco regime.

Thus far political transformation has not been accompanied by major social or economic change. A new generation has displaced the old, but power is still largely in the hands of conservatives. The professional classes and the owners of the new industries, who are closely tied to their European counterparts, were becoming increasingly influential during the final decade of the Franco regime. Now they have won control over national political life. Although the left has shown considerable strength, a modernised right remains in power.

The economic transformation of the 1960s contributed to the rise of the new holders of political power and helped create a large body of moderate opinion, favourable to liberalisation but wary of adventures. During the last decade of the Franco regime, Spaniards also gradually won greater freedom of expression, but scarcely any increase in participation. This created an inherently unstable situation. Either more participation or tighter controls on opinion were clearly necessary.

Shortly after Franco's death in November 1975, King Juan Carlos chose to retain Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister. The decision, made under heavy pressure from the right, was a grave disappointment

to the proponents of liberalisation. Arias's new government, though more liberal in composition than its predecessor, was still very closely identified with the Franco regime. But despite widespread disappointment with the slow pace of change, the months after Franco's death were surprisingly calm. The front known as Democratic Co-ordination united virtually the entire left-wing opposition to fight for a speedy transformation of the political system. It spoke stridently about a 'democratic clean break', but in fact showed considerable patience.

Under constant prodding from Democratic Co-ordination, Arias finally presented a programme of political reform in April 1976, but he insisted that all changes must come from above and explicitly rejected the opposition's repeated appeals for a constituent process. The first of his reform measures, legalisation of political meetings, passed the Cortes with deceptive ease. The next step, legalisation of political parties, met with much more resistance. During two days of acrimonious debate, the right castigated the proposal as a direct attack on Franco's legacy and as opening a door to Marxism.

On balance, the Arias government represented an attempt to retain for the government as much discretional control as possible, while taking those measures of liberalisation and democratisation required by internal pressure and by the international situation. Under Arias, Spain moved slowly towards a pre-democratic situation, but whether it would ever have reached a democracy must remain open to question. For in the midst of debate over the status of the Communist Party, King Juan Carlos finally decided that Arias's plans for reform were too narrowly conceived and his pace too slow. On July 1, 1976, he asked for his resignation. The leading liberal in Arias's government, the 67-year-old, José María Areilza, Count of Motrico, confidently expected to be named the second prime minister of the monarchy. Juan Carlos, however, was not anxious to work with him, and named instead a personal friend, Adolfo Suárez González, an able young pragmatic politician, of conservative bent but with few firm ideological commitments.

Adolfo Suárez, born in a small town of Castille in 1932, is the son of a state prosecutor. He studied law at the University of Salamanca and held a series of minor administrative posts in which he established close connections within the National Movement, the successor to the Falange as Spain's only recognised political organisation. He was named Governor of the province of Segovia in 1968. A year later, at the age of 37, he stepped up to the important position of Director General of Spain's state-owned television network, a position he held until June 1973. In March 1975 he became Sub-secretary of the National Movement and in December 1975 its Minister Secretary-General. Before his nomination as prime minister, Suárez was instrumental in forming

the UDPE (Democratic Union of the Spanish People), a group composed largely of former supporters of the Franco regime who felt the need for some liberalisation of Spanish politics to avoid violent change.

No sooner was Suárez's appointment made public than a number of Spain's 'liberal' politicians, casting him in the role of a villain destined to undo even the slight progress towards liberalisation made under Arias, announced that they would refuse to serve in his cabinet. The hostility of many of his former colleagues forced Suárez to recruit his cabinet among relative unknowns. The new cabinet represented a clear change of generation. The average age of its ten new members was 43 and the oldest of them was 52.

Faced with a difficult and deteriorating economic situation and with the problem of constructing a new political system to replace Francoism, Suárez deliberately chose to concentrate his attention on politics and to leave economic measures until later. Both the new prime minister and the King were determined to give Spain the freer, more democratic institutions most Spaniards wanted. They rejected, however, the opposition's contention that democracy could not be handed down from above and its call for a clean break with the Francoist past through the convening of a constituent assembly. Suárez opted to continue to work, as Arias had done, within the framework of the institutions established by Franco. The political problem was, then, extremely difficult: to devise a set of institutions sufficiently democratic to satisfy the country's demand for greater freedom and participation, to force the Cortes and other bodies held over from the Franco period to accept them, to keep the armed forces from blocking them, and to convince the opposition, or at least the public at large, that they were genuine enough to participate in.

The first step in Suárez's programme came after weeks of massive demonstrations throughout the country. At the end of July 1976, Juan Carlos granted, at the government's instigation, a broad but not all-inclusive amnesty. The initial enthusiasm which greeted the decree soon dissipated in the face of its excruciatingly slow application, but the amnesty did lend credibility to the government's claim that it wanted to close the books on the Civil War.

In mid-September Suárez presented a package of political reforms calling for a bicameral legislature with an upper house elected 'in representation of territorial units'. The proposal granted the Cortes power to write a constitution, but gave the King the right to bypass the Cortes altogether and submit any constitutional or other measure directly to a referendum. For several weeks it seemed that the right might gather enough strength to vote down the proposal, but the government applied considerable pressure and Franco's Cortes finally

demonstrated its characteristic willingness to approve any government proposal. The reform measures were submitted to a national referendum on December 15, 1976. The extreme right campaigned for a No vote, while democratic opposition groups, who approved the substance of the proposals but resented the government's having elaborated them without consultation, campaigned half-heartedly in favour of abstention.

In the first real test of strength, the diehard Francoists proved far weaker than anyone had imagined; only 2·6 per cent of the votes were negative. The government obtained a resounding success; 94·2 per cent of the votes were Yes, with 3·2 per cent blank or spoiled votes. Of the eligible voters, 77·8 per cent cast a ballot. The 22·3 per cent who abstained were heavily concentrated in the Basque country and in regions with an historic tradition of electoral abstentionism. The year 1976 had witnessed a three-sided struggle between immobilism, reform from above, and a 'clean break' with the past leading to reform from below. The results of the referendum demonstrated the victory of reform from above and greatly strengthened the position of both the government and the monarchy.

During the months following the referendum four questions dominated Spanish politics: the electoral law, the legalisation of political parties, a full amnesty, and public order.

Suárez largely ignored the opposition's demands for a right to participate in the elaboration of the electoral law. In mid-March he established by decree a system which greatly favoured the least populated provinces at the expense of the cities, and larger parties at the expense of smaller ones. These arrangements were designed to work to the advantage of the conservative centre right, and especially of the party Suárez was beginning to form.[1]

During the first eight months of the Suárez government, most major political parties existed without any legal status, since they refused to submit to the process of legalisation devised by Arias which granted the government great discretionary power. They demanded automatic legal recognition of all political parties as a precondition for participating in the elections; but the touchstone of the government's demo-

[1] Election for both houses is by direct, universal, adult suffrage. Little provision was made for absentee voting by Spain's numerous emigrant workers. The electoral districts are the 50 provinces. Each province has four senators. Voters choose their names from a list of candidates of all parties and independents. The four candidates with the highest number of votes are elected. In the lower house, each province has two deputies plus one for every 144,500 inhabitants or fraction thereof greater than 70,000. Parties present an ordered list of as many candidates as the province has deputies. The voter chooses the list he wishes to vote for, but cannot indicate preferences within the list. The seats are awarded within each province on a proportional basis (according to the rule of d'Hont) to the candidates of the parties in the order in which they were presented.

cratic goodwill was the legalisation of the Communist Party. Suárez and King Juan Carlos were reluctant to take this step, not because of potential Communist electoral strength, but because of strong army opposition. Early in February 1977, however, the government finally deprived itself of discretionary power in the legalisation of parties. Under the new legislation, applications for legal recognition have to be approved within ten days or sent to the Supreme Court for a decision.

This legislation was completely successful in its first goal of inducing the major political parties to accept legal status and participate in the elections. Without waiting to see what the fate of the Communist Party would be, all the other major political groups which had not yet done so immediately applied for legal status. The Spanish Communists, who had been gradually forcing their way out of clandestinity and into the mainstream of Spanish political life, also applied for legal status. The government immediately forwarded the case to the Supreme Court which, however, declared that it lacked jurisdiction in the case, thus forcing Suárez to make a decision. On April 9 he recognised the Communist Party.

This decision provoked the resignation of the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Pita da Veiga, the only remaining minister to have been named by Franco. After a stormy meeting, the Supreme Council of the Army approved a communiqué in which it noted that despite feeling ' some repulsion ' the army, out of patriotism, accepted the government's decision. The army's acquiescence was the result of the successful efforts of Juan Carlos and Suárez to gain control over the armed forces by replacing ultra-conservative commanders by more liberal ones. The King's close and friendly relations with senior military officers also helped to reassure them.

The amnesty granted in July 1976 did not extend to political prisoners held for crimes of violence. Repeated massive demonstrations, especially in the Basque country, demonstrated the need for further measures if a climate of reconciliation was to be formed for the elections. Early in March 1977, the amnesty was extended to all political prisoners who were not directly involved in violent crimes against persons. By May only 23 Basque political prisoners remained in jail, but the Basque country continued to be the scene of mass demonstrations in favour of total amnesty. On May 20, to guarantee a minimum of calm for the elections, and to insure that the Basques would not abstain as they had done in the December referendum, the government offered to allow those Basques who were still in prison to go into exile. The measure was successful.

The amnesty demonstrated the interplay of a moderately reformist conservative government, aroused public opinion, and an army hostile

to liberalisation. If the government had liberated in July 1976 all the prisoners it eventually set free, it would have met with stiff opposition from the extreme right and from the army. On the other hand, without strong continuous pressure, a conservative government like Suárez's would never have gone as far as it eventually did. Army opposition to sweeping pardons was disarmed by the gradual nature of the process, and by the steps taken during the intervening months to guarantee military discipline.

More bloodshed accompanied moderate reform from above in Spain than revolution from below in Portugal. Between Franco's death and the elections in June 1977, 67 persons died in political violence, either from Basque nationalists, the extreme left, the extreme right, or from police action. The violence in the Basque country, which stemmed from all four sources, came close to upsetting Suárez's plans. The kidnappings and shootings by the Basque terrorist group, ETA, were the work of a small minority, but it was bitter hostility between large parts of the population and the Civil Guards that frequently produced major violence when police tried to stop or control demonstrations, marches and strikes. The government did not fully control the police, who felt and acted like an occupation force in a hostile foreign country. Rightist 'executions' of leaders of the nationalist left, though less frequent than ETA's violence, contributed greatly to tension and insecurity in the region.

Outside the Basque country, violence was less continuous and less widespread, but still a major challenge. The months of December and January witnessed the kidnapping of the President of the advisory Council of State and of the President of the Supreme Council of Military Justice (reportedly by the extreme left-wing GRAPO) and the machine-gun slaughter of five labour lawyers in Madrid, this time by right-wing militants. In the face of this kind of violence, the King, Suárez, and the mass of the Spanish people demonstrated remarkable determination to institute a freer, more liberal system of government without revolution and without capitulating to demands from the extreme right for a return to the system of government which had guaranteed external calm during Franco's long reign.

## Party formation and the electoral campaign

In January a centre coalition called the Democratic Centre began to take shape. Suárez soon began to regard this group as a potential platform for his own campaign, and rapidly eliminated Pio Cabanillas and the Count of Motrico as potential rival leaders within the coalition. In return for his support, he demanded the right to place his own

candidates on the Centre's list. Some eighty relatively young men who had served the Franco regime in lesser positions in the bureaucracy and who were now reliable supporters of Suárez's reform from above were eventually placed by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, Suárez's right-hand man, at the head of the Centre's lists as independent candidates.

Although the other members had paid the price of admitting his candidates, right up to the last day for registering coalitions, the Prime Minister kept open the option of forming a group of his own, which would include the Centre and other elements as well. Only on May 4 did he announce on television his decision to run for the Cortes and that day the 'Centre Democratic Union' was officially registered, with Adolfo Suárez as its first candidate in Madrid. The Centre's campaign took maximum advantage of Suárez's popularity. Posters with enormous colour photos of the Prime Minister proclaimed 'A vote for the Centre is a vote for Suárez'. Unlike most other groups, it did not hold mass rallies. Its propaganda was low-keyed and determinedly un-ideological. Correctly perceiving that most of its potential voters did not want to think about the past, either to criticize or to praise it, the Centre tried to ignore Franco and the Francoist past of many of its candidates.

Despite the failure of Spanish Socialists to achieve complete unity, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party took 29·2 per cent of the popular vote. Had it united with the other Socialist parties, which won 4·5 per cent of the vote, the coalition might have been within one percentage point of the Centre Democratic Union and would have sharply increased the number of its seats. The Socialists' campaign capitalised on the personal charisma of their leader, the Andalusian lawyer, Felipe González Márquez, and relied heavily on their party's historical past, emphasising its ties with the great Spanish Socialist leaders of the early twentieth century as well as with the Socialist parties of contemporary Western Europe. The Socialist leaders have denied that they were financed by other European Socialists, but they received considerable technical assistance and advice from German Socialists. Their campaign rhetoric was far less radical than the party's platform, approved in December 1976, which defines the party's ideology as Marxian socialist and specifically rejects social democracy. There was little in the Socialists' campaign, however, that would offend a European Social Democrat. It projected the image of a reformist party, which represented the logical option for Spaniards who wanted a change in the political direction of their country without revolutionary adventures. The Socialists' electoral success was largely due to their well-run campaign, which appealed to moderates who wished a cleaner break with the past than Suárez could offer.

Communist electoral tactics were even more moderate and low-keyed than were the Socialists'. The party's chief objective was to win recognition as a legitimate actor on the political stage and to dispel the fears many Spaniards felt about it. As soon as it was legally recognised, it announced its acceptance of the monarchy. Party militants were ordered not to organise mass demonstrations celebrating their legalisation, and every effort was made to avoid provoking the army or the extreme right. During the campaign, Santiago Carillo preached his moderate brand of Euro-communism, and tried to avoid being associated with extremism. The party refused, for instance, to support a general strike in the Basque country during May on the grounds that it would needlessly increase tension in an already divided country. The most popular Communist electoral slogan announced that ' A vote for Communism is a vote for Democracy '.

At the other side of the political spectrum, the Popular Alliance's campaign was dominated by Fraga Irribarne. Completely abandoning his former claims to represent the moderate centre right, Fraga closely identified his group with the Franco regime and bitterly denounced the treason that was opening Spain to Marxism. Failing to recognise the country's intense desire for reconciliation and peace, Fraga preached a crusade which found little echo among the public. Its violent tone alienated many who might otherwise have considered the Alliance a party of order.

Another group which completely misjudged the mood of the electorate and misdirected their campaign were the Christian Democrats. They imagined they could win votes on the centre left, disdaining the centre right where their natural clientele lay. In a related mistake, they laid excessive stress on ideological purity and on having a clean record. Gil Robles adamantly refused to recognise the Christian Democratic credentials of groups he judged to be tainted with Francoist associations, thereby driving them into the arms of the Centre Democratic Union, which he himself refused to consider joining.

The campaign in Catalonia and the Basque country had characteristics of its own. In Catalonia most politicians carefully avoided appearing to be tied to national political groupings. The Socialist Party had proposed a federal structure for the country, but the leading Catalan Socialist, Juan Raventós, vigorously defended Catalonia's right to regain its autonomy and to reinstate the regional institutions it had enjoyed under the Republic. His long-standing defence of Catalonia's special status offset in the eyes of native Catalan voters the demerits of his alliance with the Catalan branch of the Socialist Party, while those ties won him many votes among the numerous immigrants in Barcelona's working class districts. The second most

important Catalan political coalition was the Democratic Pact for Catalonia, led by the banker Jordi Pujol and the economist Ramón Trias Fargas. Both are energetic partisans of Catalan autonomy. Their campaign centered on the immediate restitution of Catalonia's lost rights as well as a moderate centre-left social and economic programme calling for fiscal reform and greater emphasis on social welfare.

In the most strife-torn of the Basque provinces, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, the Basque Nationalist Party, which had dominated politics before the Civil War, retained an important position. Its campaign concentrated on demands for Basque autonomy, coupled with a conservative social and economic programme. In both provinces, the Spanish Socialist Party also ran a very active campaign, appealing to the working class and especially to the numerous immigrants from other regions. In the other two Basque provinces, Alava and Navarra, the Socialist Party and the Centre Democratic Union dominated the campaign, while the Basque Nationalist Party failed to generate any enthusiasm for its brand of conservative Basque nationalism. Voters who did not gravitate towards one of the two major national parties supported one of the numerous ultra-left splinter groups, most of which included a specifically Basque element in their platforms.

Access to television was perhaps the single most important factor in the campaign. Since Spanish television is state owned and operated, the opposition feared it would be used by the government to promote its own candidates. The government finally offered three ten-minute spots to any party that presented a full slate of candidates in twenty-five or more of Spain's fifty provinces. This certainly did not equalise opportunities among major parties, since the government had access to television in other forms, and it gave smaller groups little or no chance to present their message. The arrangements were, however, fairer than most had expected and aroused little complaint from the major political groups.

The elections were held on June 15 in an atmosphere of surprising calm, marred by few incidents. Numerous individual cases of irregularities occurred in the voting, but most of them were due to lack of familiarity with the process or to incompetence. The publication of the electoral results was very slow and erratic. The government seems to have deliberately delayed announcing the results in districts in which the Socialists had done exceptionally well until it had other results to offset them. Despite these delays, the final outcome was not distorted. On balance, the elections were the freest and most honest ever held in Spain.

Of all eligible voters, 78·3 per cent went to the polls (the highest percentage in any free Spanish election in the twentieth century) and

only 0·2 per cent cast blank ballots. Most voters resisted the temptation to support slightly more congenial ideological positions in order to concentrate their votes on groups which seemed likely to play a major role in the country's future. Between them, the Centre Democratic Union and the Socialist Party accounted for almost two thirds of the popular vote, and the four major parties took more than 80 per cent of the vote.

Election to Congress of Deputies, June 1977

| *Party* | *% Popular Vote* | *Seats* | *% Seats* | *Index of Over or Under Representation* *% Seats − % Vote* / *% Vote* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Centre Democratic Union | 34·7 | 165 | 47·1 | +0·36 |
| Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | 29·2 | 118 | 33·7 | +0·15 |
| Spanish Communist Party | 9·2 | 20 | 5·7 | −0·38 |
| Popular Alliance | 8·4 | 16 | 4·6 | −0·45 |
| United Socialists | 4·5 | 6 | 1·7 | −0·62 |
| Democratic Pact for Catalonia | 3·0 | 11 | 3·1 | +0·03 |
| Basque Nationalist Party | 1·3 | 8 | 2·3 | +0·77 |
| Catalan Christian Democracy | 0·7 | 2 | 0·6 | −0·14 |
| Independent Centrists | 0·7 | 2 | 0·6 | −0·14 |
| Left Democratic Front | 1·4 | 1 | 0·3 | −0·79 |
| Left of Euzkadi and other extreme left | 0·9 | 1 | 0·3 | −0·66 |
| Christian Democracy | 1·4 | 0 | 0·0 | −1·0 |
| Others | 4·6 | 0 | 0·0 | −1·0 |
| | 100·0 | 350 | 100·0 | |

The Centre Democratic Union not only won the largest share of the popular vote, but also benefited most from the workings of the electoral law. It won a majority or plurality in 36 of Spain's 50 provinces, but the geographic centre of the country was its stronghold. The Socialist Party also benefited from the workings of the electoral law. It ran best in the periphery and in the larger cities, winning a majority or plurality in 8 provinces including Barcelona and Seville. With 9 per cent of the vote, the Communist Party made a respectable showing. It owes 8 of its 19 seats in the Cortes to the Catalan Communist Party. The results may have been somewhat disappointing for the Communist leaders, but they undoubtedly achieved their primary goal of establishing the party as a legitimate participant in Spanish politics.

In the Basque country, the Socialist Party won the largest number of seats, 9 in all. The Basque Nationalist Party took 8 seats, as did the Centre Democratic Union. The election marked the appearance of significant left-wing nationalist forces in the Basque country, depriving the right of its historic monopoly of Basque nationalism. In Catalonia, virtually all the candidates were pledged to the defence of Catalan liberties. Raventós's alliance of the Catalan Socialist Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party won 15 seats, 11 in Barcelona. The second Catalan party, the Democratic Pact for Catalonia, won 11 seats, 6 of them in Barcelona. The Centre Democratic Union did better than expected, winning 9 seats. The Catalan version of the Communist Party followed closely on its heels with 8 seats. The election left no doubt that the population of Catalonia stands solidly behind demands for recognition of regional autonomy, and that the left dominates politics in Barcelona. Except in Catalonia and the Basque country, regional parties failed to win a single seat in the lower house of the Cortes. Regionalism found some acceptance among middle class intellectuals and among conservatives who hoped to use regional sentiment to offset the appeals of the Marxist left, but it failed to take root among the general population.

The elections for the Senate are more difficult to analyse since voters were free to choose among individual candidates, rather than only among parties, and since numerous special coalitions and alliances were formed at the provincial and regional levels. The most important facts are that the Centre Democratic Union won a small absolute majority of the 207 popularly elected senators, and that the King's appointment of 41 senators strengthened the ranks of the centre and the right.

The stability of the party system will be a vital factor in Spain's political future. The experience of other countries suggests that this first election may have established voter loyalties and drawn lines of demarcation which will not change easily. But an analysis of the particular conditions of the election reveals factors which may lead to considerable fluidity. After forty years of the Franco dictatorship, the elections had a certain air of being a referendum on the question of democracy. The vote for the Centre Democratic Union was largely an expression of approval of Suárez's efforts during the previous year to lead the country from authoritarianism to an elected parliamentary regime. It also reflected the ingrained habit of voting for those who already hold power. In the future, ability to solve the country's economic and social problems will become a decisive issue. If the Centre fails to provide adequate solutions, voters may well turn to other alternatives.

The short-term prospects for the internal stability and cohesion of the Centre Democratic Union are good despite its heterogenous composition. Suárez's overwhelming popularity and ability to distribute patronage, combined with the lack of attractive opportunities for alliances either on the right or the left, will probably hold the party together for some time. In the future, however, if Suárez begins to lose his popularity, a struggle for control of the party could easily lead to its break up.

The leadership of the Socialist Party is much more united than that of the Centre Democratic Union. Its great electoral success, however, is largely due to its having won the vote of many people whose commitment to socialism is very tenuous. Most of the party leadership is specifically Marxist in ideology, but this is certainly not true of its electorate. A large part of the Socialist vote in the June elections was a vote for change, rather than specifically for socialism. It remains to be seen what influence, if any, this mass of non-ideological voters will have on the party's orientation.

The Centre Democratic Union's 165 seats in the Congress of Deputies leave it 11 short of a majority. From the beginning both Suárez and Felipe González excluded the possibility of a coalition between the Centre and the Socialists. Suárez chose to form his cabinet entirely from the ranks of his own party. This means, of course, that to pass legislation he will need the votes, or at least the abstention, of deputies from other parties. Since, however, he cannot count on any of these groups as stable partners, his government seems destined to be a weak one. Suárez describes his new government as centre left, but it is far to the right of the original Italian centre-left governments. It contains no Socialists, and its Social Democrats are men of the centre rather than of the left. Several ministers have close personal ties with the world of powerful Spanish banks, and many are reformed servants of the Franco regime who would be classified as centre right in any other European country.

## Constitutional reform

The major task of the newly elected Cortes will be to give Spain a new constitution. Suárez would like to control this process as he controlled the reform until the elections. Rather than allow a commission of the Cortes to prepare a draft for debate, the government will present its own draft. Although it is still early to judge, Suárez's prospects for retaining control of the constitutional process seem dim. Any proposed changes will have to be approved by the Congress of Deputies in which the Centre Democratic Union falls short of a majority, and

which is not likely to accept docilely the government's constitutional texts.

The Socialists will attempt to reduce the prerogatives of the Senate, where they are weaker, and to vest real power in the Congress of Deputies. They will also demand revision of the electoral laws to decrease the current disproportionate representation of sparsely populated regions. It is not in the Centre's interest to concede these changes. But it will be difficult to resist the demands without appearing blatantly anti-democratic, something which both Suárez and King Juan Carlos are anxious to avoid.

The question of monarchy versus republic will probably be discussed. The left is ideologically republican, but recognises in the monarchy the best guarantee that the army will not intervene in politics. Most Socialists will vote for the republic, but many will be secretly relieved to see the monarchy win. The King now has the power to appoint the president of the government (prime minister), who in theory is responsible to him alone. He may also appoint the mayors of Madrid and Barcelona as well as 41 senators. The left and some parts of the centre will probably attempt to deprive him of these powers and define more narrowly some of his other prerogatives. Juan Carlos has no desire to be merely a figurehead monarch. He will probably abstain, however, from directly attempting to block reforms designed to reduce his power.

If Spain is to become truly democratic, holdovers from the Franco regime will have to be eliminated. The Law of Political Reform (December 1976) granted the power to make laws to the Cortes but did not exclude the continued use of decree-laws, which do not require its approval. Unless some limits are placed on these, the government could continue to be quite authoritarian and autocratic, even with a freely elected parliament. Existing legislation still allows the government to act in many circumstances with little or no regard for human rights. Freedom of the press, freedom from unreasonable search and arbitrary arrest, freedom of assembly, and many other basic liberties need further constitutional guarantees in addition to the abrogation of laws which limit their free exercise.

The prospects for a successful settlement of the question of regional autonomy have greatly improved since Suárez took office in June 1976. Army opposition seems much less formidable than it did a year ago. During the election campaign most groups and parties spoke favourably of federalism or of autonomy measures, and can now hardly contest the principle, although they may oppose specific measures. Spain may eventually adopt some form of federal structure, but for the short term it seems more likely that Catalonia and the Basque country will

receive something like the special autonomy they enjoyed under the Republic in the 1930s. Deputies from both areas are applying great pressure for immediate reinstitution of regional organs of government. Suárez's decision to make direct contact with the exiled president of the Catalan *Generalitat* seems to point towards restoration, although the government's initial political declarations were disappointingly timid on the question of regional autonomy. Socialist delegates will find it difficult to satisfy Basque and Catalan demands for fiscal autonomy without sacrificing transfers of resources from these wealthy regions to less developed ones. The problem is complicated in the Basque country by the weakness of Basque nationalism in Alava and especially Navarra. Basque nationalists demand the inclusion of Navarra in any future Basque region because of its physical size and its historic tradition as a separate kingdom, but very few Navarrese speak Basque and the province shows more enthusiasm for extreme left-wing causes than it does for Basque autonomy. Despite these real difficulties, if Suárez shows as much skill and sense of timing and balance in dealing with the regional issue as he did in dismantling Franco's political machinery, he should be able to settle it.

**Economic and international affairs**

The creation of an economic 'super-ministry' and the naming of Fuentes Quintana to head it, the selection of a respected Social Democrat, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, as Minister of Finance, and the large numbers of economists and financial experts among the senators appointed by Juan Carlos, indicate that he and Suárez are aware of the severity of Spain's economic problem and determined to do something about it. It will not, however, be easy to find a solution. Inflation has been running at about 30 per cent in 1977, and unemployment at 7 per cent. Spain's balance-of-payments deficit may reach $5 billion in 1977, and its foreign debt at the end of the year will be close to $13 billion, while gold and currency reserves are shrinking. Only painful retrenchment can restore some sort of balance to the economy.

Even before the new Cortes was convened, the government devalued the peseta by 20 per cent and a few days later imposed a three-month ceiling on prices, allowing increases only to compensate for rises in production costs. At the end of July it announced higher taxes, higher prices for petrol and transport, and wage controls. Whether these measures will succeed is doubtful. Price controls will be difficult to enforce, and wage controls may not work.

Spanish labour unions are in a state of flux as new institutions are created to replace Franco's obligatory, state-controlled vertical syndi-

cates. For the moment, at least, the Communist-dominated Workers' Commissions are the strongest labour organisation, followed at some distance by the Socialist-controlled UGT. Their co-operation is essential if wages are to be kept in line, but it is not clear whether the leadership is strong enough or well enough organised to guarantee stable wage levels even if the government offers sufficient inducement to make them try.

In exchange for their help in controlling wages, both Socialists and Communists will demand fiscal reform. Spain's tax system is inefficient and relies heavily on regressive, indirect taxes. Numerous special interest groups have carved out privileged positions for themselves which they will renounce only after long, hard struggles to shift reformers' attention elsewhere. It will not be politically easy for the Centre to undertake seriously thorough fiscal reforms, but unless it does so it can hardly expect Socialist or Communist co-operation in solving Spain's economic problems, many of which spring from structural weaknesses in the economy, aggravated by the unfavourable world situation. Even with goodwill on all sides and a considerable dose of good luck, they may well prove intractable.

Domestic political change is not likely to bring any immediate dramatic changes in Spain's foreign policy but in time important modifications may take place. On July 28 an official application to join the EEC was delivered in Brussels. Spaniards note with some bitterness that having complied with European demands for a change in their political system, they now find the Community reluctant to admit them on economic grounds. It seems unlikely that Spain will in the end be denied admission to the EEC, but the negotiations may be long and difficult.

The Suárez government has shown some cautious and hesitant interest in joining Nato, but has indicated that this is a question for the Cortes. Membership of Nato and transfer of American bases in Spain to Nato control would disarm some internal critics of the base agreements, but would certainly not satisfy the Socialists who wish to see the bases closed and Spain aligned with the neutral countries. If it does not join Nato, Spain will certainly insist on re-negotiating the base agreements, and over the course of the next few years the United States may well have to withdraw its military presence from Spain.

Spain has achieved remarkable success in its first steps towards a working democratic system after forty years of dictatorship. The process has been pushed forward from below, but controlled from above. While professing belief in popular sovereignty, the chief architect of the change has in fact ignored popular demands that did not fit his plans and has manipulated events to win support for schemes conceived

and implemented by the government. Like Bismarck and Cavour in the nineteenth century, Suárez is a conservative who has moved his country forward faster and further than anyone expected. The concrete successes he has achieved probably could not have been realised in any other way. It remains to be seen whether the way in which they were achieved will vitiate them in the long run. If the new system does not flounder in the face of the difficult problems it faces, and if truly democratic institutions are established, the Spanish experience could offer a valuable model for many Third-World countries at present governed by authoritarian regimes.

# BOOKS

## PRESIDENT CARTER'S INHERITANCE

*Nancy Balfour*

**In Our Time:** America from World War II to Nixon. By Godfrey Hodgson. *London: Macmillan. 1977. (First publ. New York: Doubleday, 1976.) 564 pp. £7·95.*

**Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream.** By Doris Kearns. *London: Deutsch; New York: Harper and Row. 1976. 432 pp. £6·95.*

**The Creative Balance:** Government, Politics and the Individual in America's Third Century. By Elliot Richardson. *London: Hamish Hamilton. 1976. 390 pp. £5·95.*

**Diplomacy for a Crowded World.** By George W. Ball. *London: Bodley Head. 1976. 356 pp. £5·00.*

TOGETHER these four books, all authoritative and informative, all well written and easy to read, draw the stormy background against which Mr. Carter came to office as President of the United States; they also sketch some of the actions which ideally he should take, even though all four were written before he appeared on the American political scene. Mr. Hodgson's lengthy study concentrates on America's 'time of trouble', the period from 1961, when President Kennedy took office, to 1972, when President Nixon was re-elected, and on the domestic impact of the Vietnam war. The key figure there is President Johnson, the remarkable subject of Professor Kearns's sympathetic but penetrating biography. In the course of the subsequent Republican administrations, Mr. Richardson headed successively four of Washington's eleven Cabinet departments, with an interlude from late 1973 to early 1976 during which he wrote this book and served briefly as Ambassador to the United Kingdom. He is thus uniquely well placed to suggest how the American government might be made more effective. Mr. Ball, a dedicated advocate of closer European union, left President Johnson's State Department because he could no longer stomach the Vietnam war; he is now one of President Carter's close advisers. It is clear that the advice he is giving is along the lines recommended in this book, which also contains an informed if partisan discussion of foreign policy under Dr. Kissinger.

The scandal of Watergate is outside the scope of all these books except Mr. Richardson's; he resigned as Attorney-General on a matter of principle connected with the case—the dismissal of the supposedly independent investigator, Mr. Archibald Cox—and deals with this aspect of the affair in detail. The misuse of power which led to Mr. Nixon's forced abdication might seem to be the final strain on the institution of the Presidency which, in Mr. Hodgson's view, had already been subjected to impossible burdens by America's defeat in the Vietnam war and by the failure to solve the

social and economic problems of the 1960s. But in fact the Presidency, and the other two branches of the American government, the Congress and the Courts, were all strengthened by the crisis: the outcome proved that the system of checks and balances still worked, that the Constitution was strong enough to prevail against the most insidious attack and that the American people, when sufficiently aroused, could still impose their moral principles on their political leaders. Indeed, Mr. Richardson thinks that Watergate may be as significant for governmental and political reform as the depression of the 1930s was for economic and social reform.

Certainly, paradoxical as it may seem, Watergate, assisted by the decency of President Ford, Mr. Nixon's immediate successor, began the essential task of restoring the confidence of the American people in themselves and in their government which President Carter has made his first concern. He began by walking home to the White House with his family after the inauguration and has continued to bring himself down to the level of ordinary citizens by fireside chats (not that many Americans have fireplaces nowadays), television phone-ins, frequent press conferences, informal state dinners, folksy visits to small towns—all in sharp contrast to the aloofness and secretiveness of his predecessors.

Mr. Richardson suggests other ways of drawing Americans closer to their government, of making them feel that they have direct influence on it and can participate in it. His suggestions include increasing the powers of the federal regional offices, devolving more functions on to state and local governments and community groups, and giving these more say in the spending of subsidies received from Washington. All these ideas were in fact put forward, and implemented to some extent, by Mr. Nixon; but he was never sufficiently interested to exert the pressure necessary to get more than a token degree of Congressional approval for them. Since such changes interfere with numerous vested interests, they have little appeal for Congressmen; this is one reason why President Carter may hesitate to take this particular path towards fulfilling his election promise to bring government closer to the people.

Another of his promises was to give priority to moral issues, something which is easy for such a truly religious man but which also appeals to the 'Middle Americans' who deserted the Democratic Party in the 1972 presidential election and did not wholly return to it in 1976, as is shown by the narrowness of Mr. Carter's victory in that year. Thus, while the new administration's open condemnation of other countries which do not safeguard the human rights of their citizens may seem ill-advised to the more sophisticated of its allies, in terms of American domestic politics it should pay dividends to Mr. Carter and in the long run to other countries too. It is undeniable that today the average American takes little interest in international affairs, partly as a result of disillusionment after the horror of the Vietnam war. To gain a constituency, says Mr. Ball, American foreign policy must have a moral content. Moreover, Mr. Carter's toughness on the matter of human rights appeals both to the extreme right and the extreme left. Neither group normally supports him, but both may now be induced to do so should an agreement with, say, the Soviet Union on arms limitation come before Congress. This is one way of beginning to re-establish a bipartisan foreign policy.

Other election promises which Mr. Carter has also followed up quickly, for internal rather than international reasons, were to cut sales of weapons to other countries, to control the spread of nuclear capability and to redirect

the foreign aid programme towards improving living standards in the underdeveloped world. All three moves are advocated in Mr. Ball's book and it is fair to presume that he is also encouraging President Carter's interest in Europe. It needs to be encouraged because other White House advisers are reported to have serious doubts about present political and economic trends across the Atlantic. Admittedly, Mr. Carter's most noticeable deficiency is his lack of knowledge of foreign affairs. Sensibly, he has chosen experienced men, notably Mr. Cyrus Vance and Dr. Brzezinski, to guide him, and sensibly he is making contact with statesmen in other countries before committing himself except when forced to do so by necessity—domestic in the case of human rights, foreign in the case of the Middle East, for example.

President Carter is aware that in any case he cannot exercise much influence abroad without a confident and united country behind him at home and this he does not yet have. It is not only a matter of establishing trust in government but also of establishing trust in himself as a leader. His standing in the public opinion surveys has been consistently good since he took office, well above his small margin of victory over Mr. Ford last November; however, he is rated more highly for his style than for his ability to get things done. This is not surprising, given the difficulty he has had in establishing a working relationship with Congress. Partly this is the result of his own sometimes abrasive personality. More important, however, is the fact that most of the Senators and Representatives who make up his party's very substantial majorities in both houses of Congress did better than Mr. Carter in their constituencies in last autumn's election and therefore do not have any reason to feel grateful to him. Moreover, most of Mr. Carter's rivals for the Democratic nomination were members of Congress; he was not the candidate preferred by the party hierarchy, but was thrust on it by the rank and file. In addition during the Watergate period Congress got into the habit of asserting itself and feels justified in continuing to do so. After all, power was being concentrated in the White House to what is now held to be an unwarranted extent long before President Nixon arrived there. Only if Mr. Carter can build up his own popular support will he get the co-operation from the Democratic Congress that a Democratic President has a right to expect. But in this respect his situation is already improving, as is shown by the speedy passage of the greater part of his energy programme; this was the only major piece of legislation introduced during the first six months of Mr. Carter's Presidency.

Unfortunately he is caught in an economic dilemma which may lose him the backing of the one cohesive group of voters—the blacks—without whom he would almost certainly have been defeated in 1976. They want (or at least the great poverty-stricken majority of them want) expensive social benefits—welfare reform, health programmes, urban renewal. All these are undoubtedly needed but in the present state of the economy there would not be enough money for them even if Mr. Carter had not committed himself to balance the federal budget by 1981. This is the commitment of a conservative businessman, which he is, but it is also part of his strategy (already being criticised by many economists) for reducing both inflation and unemployment to more acceptable levels—another of his election promises. As Mr. Hodgson points out (his chapters on racial problems are particularly valuable), there has not been a serious race riot in an American city since 1968; but the violent looting during New York's black-out in July is an ominous indication that a new round of such disorders may be imminent.

None of these books deals with the energy question, although it was known to all the experts some years before the Arab oil embargo in 1973 that America's economic expansion would soon be checked by a shortage of power unless new sources of energy were developed. Mr. Hodgson argues that the trauma which appeared in America during the period that he covers came in part from a realisation that its resources were not boundless and that therefore growth could not be relied on to overcome poverty in the long run. But there is little evidence of that realisation in the ever-rising figures for petrol consumption and oil imports (the cause of renewed concern about the balance of payments) or in the obstinacy of the Congressional opposition to Mr. Carter's proposed tax on petrol, intended to encourage economy in the use of fuel.

All this suggests that the change that has taken place in American values in the last few years may not have been as complete as Mr. Hodgson contends. He maintains that the liberal consensus established in the 1950s broke down when Americans were forced to recognise that there were no limits on what they could do both at home and abroad, but that the 'elite establishment' which ran the country in the 1960s consistently underestimated 'the energy, good sense and generosity of the majority of ordinary people'. He concludes on a note of hope that, if these can be harnessed, a new consensus can be built up. President Carter is well-qualified for the effort: he is an ordinary man himself, with all these qualities in good measure; he is a populist and a Southerner, drawing support from a broad constituency, both politically and geographically. But Mr. Carter still has to show that he can cope with the complexities of the American Presidency. Let us hope that they are not as great or as disastrous for him as they were for Lyndon Johnson.

# REVIEWS

## CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

**The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974.** By Dennison Rusinow. *London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1977. 410 pp £9·50.*

YUGOSLAVIA'S separate road to socialism, though it has become a commonplace of recent history, has seldom been mapped in any detail by historians, perhaps because it is an intractable subject demanding simultaneously a better grounding in ideology and economics, and a deeper knowledge of the Yugoslav scene than most of them possess. Dr. Rusinow is outstandingly qualified, both by formation and by seven years' residence, to meet this specification and to fill this gap. His book is the most comprehensive, and certainly the most perceptive, attempt in English to chart the route taken, from the breach with Stalin in the spring of 1948 until the 10th Congress twenty-six years later. Described by its author as 'a narrative history which attempts a synthesis' (p. 345), it may strike some readers as too heavily laden with the millstones of political science jargon. But these incrustations cannot efface the professionalism of the underlying scholarship nor the quality of the author's intuitive understanding of events. Indeed, at critical points in the narrative—the fall of Ranković in 1966 and the eruption of Croat chauvinism in 1971, to name but two of them—the evidence is marshalled with a sureness and clarity of expression that enhance the high dramatic quality of the occasion.

Dr. Rusinow's book focuses on the problem of a communist society seeking, under the assault of the Cominform, to differentiate itself from, and to create something at the same time more humane and more efficient than, the Soviet model. The expedients adopted—the experiments in industrial and local democracy, the encouragement given to the withering away of the state, the introduction of the market mechanism as the instrument of resource-allocation—combined to carry them far off their original course, reducing the country to virtual ungovernability and bringing it to the brink of civil war. The inherent difficulty of the attempt was increased many fold by the social stresses generated by the rapid growth of an initially backward economy and, most of all, by the unresolved problem of national identity and ethnic rivalry. Permeating all else was the dilemma of the sponsors of this hazardous venture, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—the choice between 'impermissible interference and political impotence' (p. 195).

Some Yugoslav Communists, notably the Serbian party leadership from 1969 to 1972, came by superhuman efforts within an ace of success in squaring this circle. It was a further, and perhaps unnecessary, tragedy that they, along with the deluded and vacillating Croat triumvirate, the new left and some of the newly-rich exploiters of market socialism's opportunities, were swept away in the wake of Tito's blanket reassertion of the Party's authority in December 1971.

Tito's own attitude during the preceding twenty years remains an enigma. He can hardly disclaim responsibility, having concurred in each of the compromises which, step by step, attenuated the ability of his party to control events. He threw over Ranković in 1966 for the sake of party unity but, in Dr. Rusinow's words, 'not because he really believed in the Reform' (p. 185). A mere twelve weeks before the showdown at Karadjordjevo in December 1971 he had pronounced himself 'most pleased' (p. 301) with what he had seen in Croatia. Yet, when the 'moment of truth' (p. 307) came, the thoughts uppermost in his mind were of proletarian dictatorship and democratic centralism. His conservative bent had never been a closely guarded secret. But the puzzle remains why he was, in the circumstances, prepared to go along for all those years with the advice he was getting from men like Kardelj and Bakarić, both of whom survived unscathed.

The blizzard of 1971-72 notwithstanding, much that is of value for the evolution of Marxist societies survives—more perhaps than Dr. Rusinow, ending his narrative in 1974, could include in the compass of his book. 'Yugoslavia's return to Leninism' (p. 393, n. 49) was a plausible enough headline then. Today, after the Berlin conference of 1976 and Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade thereafter, the 'Leninism' seems to have a strictly limited relevance to Yugoslavia's external policies. And at home the Party, in the 10th Congress and the 1974 constitution, has sought not to dismantle but to alter and control the structure set up by the reform. Power remains divided. The party has escaped from impotence and asserted itself, redressing the correlation of forces in its own favour, but it has shown no inclination, and certainly lacks the ability, to revert to running everything. Seen in this light, the 10th Congress looks less like a terminus than a milestone on a road whose end is not yet in view.

TERENCE GARVEY

## INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

**In Search of Global Patterns.** Edited by James N. Rosenau. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1977. 389 pp. £11·25.*

THERE exists a stereotype of contemporary (especially American) international relations theory and quantitatively-based empirical study which portrays it as little more than the mechanical—and often artificial—manipulation of statistical techniques. As Hedley Bull has said, such activities are open to the stricture that 'what is significant (in international relations) cannot be measured; and what can be measured is insignificant'. It is therefore immensely valuable and stimulating to be presented here with rich and varied evidence that essentially philosophical questions of values, motivations and utility have assumed a major role in the evolution of the field represented by Rosenau and his fellow contributors.

The book itself gathers together the papers produced for three conferences during 1973-74, all of which dealt self-consciously with aspects of the development and accumulation of 'scientific' knowledge in the international relations field. The first set of papers (Part I of the book) presents a series of what might be termed 'intellectual autobiographies', written by major figures in the behavioural and quantitative schools. Part II contains contributions to the second conference, which was addressed to the problem of

cumulation—to what extent has it or might it take place? Part III contains several proposals for further research, or for the consolidation of work already performed, in the specific field of comparative foreign policy, which were produced for the third conference.

Although these themes are by no means mutually exclusive, and the authors do not confine themselves rigidly to their particular topics, each section of the book highlights certain distinct aspects of the field. Thus, in Part I, we are given a rare and refreshing series of insights into the motivations and aspirations of those who have been most closely associated with 'scientific' approaches. Not only this, but we are given a picture of a scholarly community at once larger in scale, more complex in structure and more richly funded than any other. These insights are valuable to an understanding of Part II, especially with regard to the theoretical and philosophical tensions it illustrates. Although much of the debate here refers to the ideas of Thomas Kuhn—particularly the notion of 'paradigm change' in the development of scientific knowledge—it becomes clear that the 'revolution' of the 1960s constituted neither a complete refutation of the 'traditional' approach to international relations nor the construction of an integrated replacement for it. As a result, the language and assumptions of 'old' approaches have persisted in new forms, whilst the growth of tensions within the burgeoning scholarly community has prevented the creative integration of many of its activities.

These problems are illustrated, often quite dramatically, by the studies in Part III of the book. Although Rosenau claims in his concluding remarks that the comparative study of foreign policy has attained the status of a 'normal science', it is by no means evident that its exponents share the settled assumptions of any one paradigm or framework. It appears that 'islands of theory' and clusters of case studies still lack the integrating bond which can be provided by a common perception of the phenomena to be investigated. Nonetheless, this is a fascinating and rewarding—if inconclusive—collection which addresses itself to fundamental problems. Whatever one's judgment on the behavioural and quantitative movements in international relations, this book is an indispensable aid to an understanding of their origins and evolution.

*Lanchester Polytechnic* MICHAEL SMITH

**Recent Advances in Peace and Conflict Research:** A Critical Survey. By Juergen Dedring. *Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1976. 249 pp. (Sage Library of Social Research, Vol. 27.) £8·00. Pb: £4·95.*

THIS book is a brief summary, by a sympathiser, of the aims, methods and interests of peace and conflict research, i.e. the study of violent aspects of (mainly) international relations from pacifist perspectives. If the author's account of its aims is accurate, and it is more or less commended as such by two senior workers in the field, Professor Singer and Mrs. Boulding, in introductory notes, then peace research is in a bad way.

The root of the trouble, as so often with strongly ideological movements, is revisionism. Unreconstructed pacifists hold that even if men are willing to use violence (and to risk having it used against them) to achieve a desired end, they are always wrong to do so. The revisionists say that violence is

justified when used to right certain mis-allocations of wealth and power (which they shrewdly describe as 'structural violence', a sleight of tongue Madison Avenue might envy). A way of restoring unity that has some appeal to Mr. Dedring is through the suggestion that violence is caused by these same mis-allocations of wealth and power, whether between men, or classes, or states. The trouble with that is, as Mr. Dedring himself records in a part of the book which he seems to have forgotten about, that the most strenuous of efforts by peace researchers have unearthed no evidence, either from history or from the psychology laboratory, of any connection between violence and power or wealth differentials. Tactfully, Mr. Dedring does not dwell on the schism. The bulk of his book is devoted to describing the methods of peace research.

It is a characteristic of peace research that it has always provided a home for arcane, novel and, often, unsafe approaches to the study of violence. These are nearly always borrowings from better established disciplines and sometimes rather reckless borrowings at that. Anyone who has read even a little serious philosophy or psychology will be amazed at the confidence with which peace researchers talk about objective and subjective facets of reality and the nature of perception; even if it is more often the confidence of a donkey in a minefield than that of a skilful artist walking a tightrope.

But some borrowings have been more successful. Simulation of real events by small groups of role-players, borrowed from war colleges and business schools, and game theory, borrowed from economics, have flourished in the hands of peace researchers. So much so that peace researchers have made these methods their own and it is to their work that any scholar is well advised to look if he wishes to employ either for his own uses.

Mr. Dedring attempts something worthwhile but executes it badly. He deserves credit for his attempt to compress into a short volume an account of the main themes of current peace research. But he is far too uncritical of its weaknesses to have written much more than a calendar of what is going on. And bad proof-reading—an uncorrected error makes nonsense of his discussion of the key 'Prisoners' Dilemma' game—spoils the chances that the book will be taken seriously even as a minor work of reference, for which, as for calendars, proof-reading is of the essence.

*University of Lancaster* IAN BELLANY

**Structure of Decision:** The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites. Robert Axelrod (Ed.). *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1976. 404 pp. £17·40. Pb.: £6·90.*

THE papers assembled in this book attempt to state a case for tackling the important subject of the beliefs held by public decision makers, through the concept of the 'cognitive map'. Because of the interests of contributors like Ole Holsti and Michael Shapiro, as well as those of the editor, the substantive focus of the book is largely that of international relations.

A cognitive map is essentially a pictorial device for analysing the way in which the mind relates its major concepts together. The 'causal assertions' which a decision maker makes, both about his own values and about the behaviour of the real world, are described by means of symbols connected on simple flow-charts by arrows, and by labels which denote positive or

negative relationships between the concepts (i.e. the direction in which causation is seen to flow). The more ideas a decision maker has, and the more relations he sees between them, the more complex the diagram, which then ends up resembling a chart of railway tracks at Clapham Junction.

What is the use of all this? Axelrod claims that by X-raying the skeleton of a belief-system in this way we can more easily understand why certain policies emerged as they did (through tracing them back to their parent attitudes) and also predict responses to future events. Unfortunately, the five empirical chapters which are intended to substantiate this claim in fact demonstrate its limitations, being preoccupied with methodology and very thin on actual data and conclusions. Even where data is analysed, the focus is often on causation itself rather than on beliefs about causation, with confusion the result.

However, the more general conclusions of the book are, on the face of things, very relevant to the study of foreign policy. The picture that emerges from the mapping of attitudes in the British Cabinet's Eastern Committee in 1918, for example, is that of a decision maker who typically uses a very large number of images and beliefs, but on a simplified basis. He 'has more beliefs than he can handle' (p. 244) and so tends to make sense of them by being consistent even at the expense of the truth, or by ignoring the complexities of feedback mechanisms such as arms races (i.e. long-term effects). Anyone with a little knowledge of international relations will be able to think of behaviour for which these conclusions would be a plausible explanation.

But such insights are not new, and they can certainly be generated without the extensive apparatus of formal investigation displayed here—as Ernest May and John Steinbruner have effectively demonstrated.[1] If cognitive mapping were a reliable scientific procedure for predicting attitudes, its advantages would be obvious, but in fact it contains almost as much built-in subjectivity as any traditional analysis (and lacks the same potential for subtlety). To draw their charts of belief-systems, and to establish the interactions between different ideas, Axelrod and his partners partly themselves identified the key concepts, and partly relied on ad hoc panels of 'judges'.

This book is of interest because it calls attention to the overall logic (or lack of it) in the outlooks of those who make public policy. But the 'cognitive map' is at best only a useful teaching aid, for illustrating the implications that a change in one part of a person's outlook may have for the others. It is not going to revolutionise foreign policy analysis.

*London School of Economics* CHRISTOPHER HILL

**The Superpowers and their Spheres of Influence:** The United States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Latin America. By Edy Kaufman. *London: Croom Helm. 1976. 208 pp. £7·95.*

THE basic argument of this book is that the international political role of

[1] Ernest R. May. '*Lessons*' *of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*. (London: Oxford University Press. 1973.) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1975, p. 462.
John Steinbruner. *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1974.)

the countries which make up Latin America and Eastern Europe is determined more by their subordinate relationship to the United States and the Soviet Union than by their individual nationality. As a result, their external behaviour exhibits many similarities.

The author seeks to explain this 'general principle of behaviour formalised in an hypothesis' by setting up a rather confusing framework of different levels of power within the international political structure and subjecting these levels to a comparative systems analysis. He then attempts to prove his hypothesis by reference to statistics, but unfortunately his data is neither comprehensive nor up-to-date. Only one of the fourteen tables in Part I has sources later than 1970, and many tables bear witness to inadequate checking. Table 2, comparing data in Latin America and Eastern Europe, despite its heading, contains eight rather than seven Latin American countries as well as, mysteriously, Mongolia, while Table 6 contains a column of figures with no heading. The data given to prove economic stagnation is particularly unsubstantial: GNP figures for Latin America as a region only from 1950 to 1966, and GNP figures for a random selection of thirty nations for the year 1950, with projections for 1975, taken from a source published in 1964. Inadequate statistics coupled with incomplete footnotes, misspellings, no bibliography and an index which lists John Foster Dulles under Foster, do not help to 'verify interactions . . . in all fields: political, economic, cultural, scientific, technological, etc.' (p. 63). Instead they serve to irritate readers who are not by nature numerate, and therefore resent the effort they have made to understand a presentation which turns out to be lacking in accuracy, if not in depth.

This is a pity, as the brief second part sets out to show the consequences of this hypothesis and is, by contrast, an informed, readable and considered discussion of past, present and future policies of the super-powers towards Latin America and Eastern Europe. The predominant driving force in American and Soviet foreign policy is seen to be maximisation of power and for this reason middle-of-the-road measures by each super-power to preserve the status quo in its own sphere of influence seem most likely in the period of peaceful coexistence, with direct intervention resorted to only in cases of severe threat, and with a policy of tacit non-interference in each rival super-power's sphere of influence in order not to disturb the balance of power. Mr. Kaufman sees this as an historical continuation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Americas and of Tsarist Russia's Balkan interests in Europe, the latter somewhat complicated by Soviet ambitions for the spread of communism.

It is a depressing forecast. Locked into a dominant/subordinate relationship by the hegemonic drive of one super-power with the connivance of the other, the states of Latin America and Eastern Europe seem doomed to continue, in Johan Galtung's terms, as 'underdogs'. Even exceptions, such as Yugoslavia, Cuba, Romania, Peru, Albania and Chile under Allende, must follow certain prescribed rules of behaviour if they are to succeed as deviants, and they are viewed as transitory phenomena. It is, indeed, a 'sad conclusion' (p. 200).

*Chatham House* JUDITH GURNEY

**Refugees: A Problem of Our Time.** The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951–1972. 2 vols. By Louise W. Holborn with the assistance of Philip and Rita Chartrand. *Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press under the auspices of the Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge, Mass. 1975. 1525 pp. $45.00*

NEARLY forty years since her first writings on international work with refugees were published, Professor Holborn has produced a study of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which will serve as an invaluable work of reference. Written with the full co-operation of UNHCR, these volumes record the achievements of what is, in almost all but name, a specialised agency of the United Nations and one highly respected among the governments and voluntary organisations which are its necessary partners in humanitarian endeavour. This institutional history forms a natural complement to Professor Holborn's *The International Refugee Organisation: Its History and Work, 1946–52.*[1]

UNHCR has fared very differently from the ill-fated International Refugee Organisation (IRO). Its history is one of successful adaptation to a changing political and social environment as one international crisis succeeds another. 'Through its response to such emergencies it has served to reduce highly political tensions by its non-political action on behalf of refugees . . . The resulting growth of trust by governments in the UNHCR has led to the continuous expansion of its activities' (p. 1429). 'Task expansion', a rather suspect activity of some international organisations, has been wholeheartedly welcomed in UNHCR's case because it has moved into territory which no one else wanted but which *some* unit of the UN system had to occupy in response to human need.

This recognition of UNHCR's indispensability is most clearly seen in its designation as 'focal point of the UN system' for the co-ordination of several large-scale humanitarian operations. The Focal Point concept was first applied to UNHCR by U Thant in 1971 when millions of Bengali refugees fled from East Pakistan into India. It was next used by Kurt Waldheim when massive international assistance was required in southern Sudan in the aftermath of the fifteen-year civil war. Since then the versatility of UNHCR in a bewildering succession of widely differing 'combined operations' has amply justified its Focal Point designation.

Between 1951 and 1972 there were two other significant turning-points in UNHCR's history. In 1956 the General Assembly first explicitly authorised the High Commissioner to exercise his good offices. These were quickly to become an important adjunct to his two basic functions of legal protection and material assistance. In 1959–60 the generous response to World Refugee Year meant that the number of European refugees in need of UNHCR's services would henceforth be much smaller, while the Congo wars inaugurated a decade in which African refugees were to constitute a very high proportion of the world's total. Professor Holborn adds a further 'year of decision': 1957. This was the year in which the UN General Assembly 'explicitly recognised for the first time that the refugee problem was worldwide and that new and unforeseen refugee groups might continue to arise' (p. 468), and it accordingly broadened UNHCR's mandate. The new Programme was to be of indefinite duration, and was necessarily more flexible as well as wider in scope than the Refugee Emergency Fund (UNREF) which was liquidated at the end of 1958.

[1] London: Oxford University Press. 1956.

UNHCR had a difficult birth, with its first High Commissioner, Dr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, being elected by the narrow margin of 30–24 over the Director-General of the IRO. It was conceived in the political turmoil of the IRO's short life, and was given a deliberately restricted mandate in consequence. One of the secrets of its success has been its discreet diplomacy, never pushing an advantage too far nor straying from persuasion and protection into a more strident mode of operation. Another has been the continuity of key personnel: since Dr. van Heuven Goedhart's death in 1956 there have been only three High Commissioners (Auguste Lindt 1957–60, Felix Schnyder 1961–65, Sadruddin Aga Khan since 1966) and a relatively stable cadre of senior officials.

The quality of its leadership and field staff emerged in such trying conditions as the civil war in Rwanda. UNHCR's innovatory handling of this refugee problem forged links of confidence and increased co-operation with the Organisation of African Unity and its member states, which were to be utilised extensively over the years that followed. Since 1972 UNHCR's structure has been regionalised and the plight of non-African refugees, notably from Chile and Vietnam, has come to the fore. In retrospect, therefore, 1972 is the best cut-off point Professor Holborn could have chosen for this authoritative history.

*London School of Economics* NICHOLAS A. SIMS

## DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

**Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries.** Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz (Eds.). *Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1976. (Distributed in UK by John Wiley, Chichester.) 348 pp. £9·80.*

**The Last Chance:** Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control. By William Epstein. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 341 pp. £10·50.*

INDIA'S 'peaceful' nuclear explosion in May 1974 stimulated a resurgence of interest in nuclear proliferation as a major international problem. The concerned academic community was activated and began to generate numerous conferences and publications. From all this activity, two distinct approaches to this problem have emerged. One sees proliferation largely as a technical problem and is concerned with the spread of the potential to 'go nuclear' through the development and importation of the relevant technology, with the ostensible purpose of meeting future energy needs. In the Marwah and Schulz collection, based on a 1975 conference, only a couple of chapters are devoted to this side of the problem. They opt for a second approach, which takes the likely availability of the necessary technology to a number of key states for granted. The question then becomes political: will this nuclear potential be realised? This brings into the analysis such matters as domestic pressures, strategic perspectives, relations with super-powers and so on. Though this approach has much to commend it, it does involve certain problems. Since France and China (curiously neglected as case studies by writers in this area) did so, no other country has actually 'gone nuclear'. India is still nowhere near being a nuclear *weapons*

power. Consequently the analysis of 'near-nuclear' countries is inherently speculative. All the authors can do is spell out the factors that are likely to influence a future decision. Part of the difficulty is that many of the decisions of one country will be dependent upon those of others. This is recognised by two of the contributors—Robert Lawrence on the Indian Ocean and Steven Rosen on the Middle East, though Rosen's essay suffers from an over-reliance on concepts derived from the balance of terror between the super-powers.

The other surveys of individual countries are often interesting in themselves, and those on Brazil and Argentina fill something of a gap in the literature, but nothing exceptional emerges and the authors appear to have found it difficult to draw any useful generalisations from the exercise. The book does not get off to a good start, with the editors appearing to be a year out of phase as they talk, on the second page, of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war taking place in 1970 and the 1972 expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt taking place in 1971. Lawrence, in his essay, adds to the confusion by putting the Indo-Pakistan war in 1973.

William Epstein's book lacks the analytical sophistication of the Marwah and Schulz collection, but he gains enormously from the clarity of his convictions. Epstein is anxious to explore every possible means of impeding the continued growth of the world's nuclear stockpiles and attaching safeguards to commercial nuclear ventures. He brings to this effort the experience gained from two decades of work for the UN on disarmament matters. His method is to discuss with exceptional thoroughness the pitfalls and possibilities of all international activities and legislation pertaining to the problem of nuclear proliferation, from nuclear-free zones to the London 'supplier's club'. The result must become a standard reference work for all concerned with these issues. One example of the detail is a discussion of the difficulties that might arise from the fact that Byelorussia and the Ukrainian SSR have not signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty! Epstein approaches his task as an international lawyer rather than a political scientist. There is no investigation of the problem from the perspective of individual countries, nor is it suggested that the acquisition of nuclear weapons could ever be anything but a dangerous folly. It is seen as a problem that can only be comprehended and solved on an international level. This makes some of the prescriptions unconvincing. When Epstein notes, realistically but with some despair, the obstacles in the path of existing non-proliferation strategies, all he can suggest is an improvement in the world's moral climate.

*Chatham House* LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

**International Arms Control:** Issues and Agreements. Edited by John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler. *Stanford: Stanford University Press for the Stanford Arms Control Group. 1976. 444 pp. $18·50. Pb: $12·95.*

IF ambition were the key to success this volume would be a great success. In fifteen chapters it sets out to cover modern arms control negotiations from before 1914 to the current SALT II negotiations, taking in, along the way, the nature of strategic weapons, strategic doctrine, economic issues in arms control and nuclear proliferation. In order to encompass such a

range of material successfully the structure of the book would need to be of the highest order. It is not. This may well reflect the fact that the book is the product of the Stanford Arms Control *Group*—a somewhat heterogeneous body whose diversity of interests and approaches is reflected in the various chapters. The camel, it is said, was a horse designed by a committee, and similar problems beset this production. The editorial pen of Professor Burton, who integrated (sic) and edited the final draft, needed to be much firmer.

Perhaps the basic flaw of the book is the lack of any consistent framework—there is neither a consistent chronological approach nor a consistent conceptual approach. Either could have proved a satisfactory means of organising the vast volume of material, but the lack of consistency serves only to confuse and cloud some of the issues. The second basic flaw is the almost complete lack of consideration given to the total context of international relations. The result of this omission is that arms control and disarmament is seen very much as a process concerned with weapons alone. The many, and complex, reasons for the possession of arms, and the functions that they are perceived to fulfil, receive scant attention. The third flaw is the dearth of footnotes. For a book from an academic body, purporting to be of use to undergraduates amongst others, this is a serious deficiency, especially as the text often demands such additions—particular examples might be p. 41 and p. 155.

By contrast to these inadequacies, the to-and-fro of negotiations, the problems (at least on the American side) of reaching an approved negotiating position, and the domestic political influences on the negotiations (again, on the American side only), are well illustrated. This is especially so in the context of SALT I (chapter 9) where one suspects that at least one member of the group was a participant in the negotiations. But SALT I is a highlight, and the other chapters fail to reach the same standard, though the shortfall varies considerably. There is frequently an interesting narrative, but only rarely does one escape from the narrative to gain insights into the nature of the international system and the arms control process. And even the narrative varies in quality—thus it is difficult to reconcile the detail that tells us, vis-à-vis the Geneva Conference of the Committee of Disarmament, 'There are some 30 delegations, each with two people seated at a long table with other advisers behind them' (p. 162), with a discussion of the international arms economy that is given barely a single page (p. 243).

The book includes a splendid pair of appendices, occupying over 25 per cent of the total volume. One is on the 'Disarmament Forums' of the post-1945 period, and the other gives the texts of the major arms control agreements since 1945, plus the 1925 Geneva Protocol. (But one would have thought that the interwar naval treaties could have been incorporated, especially as they receive coverage in the text.)

Despite its deficiencies the book may fulfil a useful purpose. At a time when the traditional mode of arms control is becoming obsolete; when the distinction of weapon functions—for offence and defence, for strategic or tactical purposes—can no longer be so readily made; when technology *does* appear to be moving us into a new era, it might be appropriate to have a survey volume of this nature to examine the path of 'traditional' arms control.

*Lanchester Polytechnic* ROGER CAREY

**Guerrillas and Terrorists.** By Richard Clutterbuck. *London: Faber and Faber. 1977. 125 pp. £4·25.*

DR. CLUTTERBUCK, as the discreet profile on the dust jacket of this book does not reveal, served in the Royal Engineers, that nursery of military intellectuals, rose to the rank of major-general, and now studies, at the University of Exeter, the problems posed by revolutionary warfare. He has had first-hand experience of counter-insurgency operations in Malaya during the 'emergency' and has written a valuable study on the subject,[1] and three other books on urban guerrillas and terrorism. This one contains nine essays, six of which were delivered as the Lees-Knowles lectures in 1975–76. Dr. Clutterbuck is an academic, standing in the first rank of those who are concerned with this subject, but his approach also reveals the British staff officer, whose training has always insisted that mere analysis and description is not enough: study should end with a course of action. Typically, he offers here practical advice on protection against terrorism, the social and constructive work that can be done by military forces in the Third World, and 'Lessons from South-East Asia'. His predictions concerning the consequence of a firm or a weak stand against terrorist acts (pp. 14–15) have proved entirely accurate.

The same insistence in staff training on arguing from a basis of facts and statistical accuracy enables Dr. Clutterbuck to present his subject dispassionately without abandoning a moral standpoint; pointing out, for instance, that the annual homicide rate in Northern Ireland, although 'vastly greater than in Britain, is only one third of the annual homicide rate in Detroit'. Strict but acceptable precautions imposed by the United States authorities at airports cut the rate of hijacking of aircraft from fifty-eight in 1971–72 to four in 1973–76.

These essays are in fact primarily about terrorism, rather than guerrilla warfare, and rightly, for guerrilla warfare can be both just and waged legitimately, while terrorists are the enemy of all mankind. The Chinese proverb quoted at the head of the first essay is 'kill one, frighten ten thousand'. The counter-proposition, 'to kill one bad man must kill many good' (uttered by a Japanese officer when rebuked for his method of clearing snipers from a Shanghai suburb) is not morally acceptable; nor, really, is the deliberate sacrifice of hostages to prove that the terrorist game is not worth the candle. Dr. Clutterbuck suggests sensible and moderate policies concerning the police, the media, the public and tactics, but the real value of his book is for the general reader wishing to be informed: it is the clearest, calmest and most succinct account of a complex and emotional subject so far published.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

**Navies and Foreign Policy.** By K. Booth. *London: Croom Helm; New York: Crane Russak. 1977. 294 pp. £9·95.*

ONE commodity with which the staffs of the defence services of the Western democracies have been plentifully supplied since the Second World War is studies by academics of their purposes and functions. Some have been well written and provocative of thought regarding present-day rapidly changing

1 *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1963* (London: Faber, 1973)

conditions; but others appear to be by-products of the ever-expanding PhD industry which inflicts on us a stream of unreadable and unread studies of little use except to clutter the shelves of university libraries. The book under review comes under the latter heading. Mr. Booth, a lecturer in International Politics at the University College of Wales, has obviously read and pondered almost every book and article on his chosen subject to appear in recent times; but the result is a highly indigestible meal lumbered with clumsy sentences, North American jargon and really dreadful words like 'influenceability' (twice) and 'withdrawability' (pp. 31–32). Perhaps the author, who is plainly conscientious and studious, would do well to spend a little time browsing in the latest edition of Sir Ernest Gower's immortal work *The Complete Plain Words.*[1]

The book is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with such fundamentals as 'The Functions of Navies', 'Types of Navies' and 'Naval Happenings'; while in the second part he discusses 'Naval Capabilities' and reviews 'The International Context'. I found the latter by far the more satisfying, though the author is perhaps unlucky to have completed his book before the Russo-Cuban sea-supported invasion of Angola—which in my view is the response to the severe rebuff sustained by the Russians when they endeavoured to install missiles in Cuba in 1962 and President Kennedy showed a strong and steady nerve. Perhaps the spread of Soviet power around the African continent will make Mr. Booth think again about his perfunctory dismissal of the threat to the West should the Cape of Good Hope shipping route, by which some 60 per cent of our imports reach us, be severed (pp. 92–93).

There is in the first part a curious neglect of the functions and working of the Nato navies, which surely are the lynch-pin today of the maritime policy and strategy of the West. Though I cannot accept that it was chiefly dedication to 'spit and polish' that accounted for the Royal Navy's weaknesses in 1939 I agree that since 1945 that service 'generally overcame traditionalism and did as much as the country could have expected within its budgetary constraints' (pp. 156–57). The author's conclusion that, at a time of extending fishery limits and vast expansion of the extraction of oil and minerals from the sea-bed, navies will find themselves required to carry completely new responsibilities also seems to be proving true. Perhaps his most original idea is that because anti-submarine warfare measures have an unsettling influence on the nuclear balance of power, and a break-through in that field could have far-reaching effects, an endeavour should be made to abolish such methods of warfare (pp. 236–37). Yet, apart from the sheer improbability of the super-powers reaching such an agreement, a critical break-through in anti-submarine warfare is, for scientific and technological reasons, very unlikely.

In conclusion I may perhaps remind Mr. Booth (and his publishers) that a good book must be not only a pleasure to read but a pleasure to handle. This one is far from being easy reading; the paper and type are of poor quality, and the printing is 'unjustified' (i.e. no regular right-hand margin). Presumably this was accepted as a measure of economy; but it is extremely ugly, and the price of publication shows that economy has plainly not been achieved.

*Churchill College, Cambridge* STEPHEN ROSKILL

[1] 2nd edn. London: HMSO; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973. (First publ. London: HMSO, 1954.)

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

**The Poverty Curtain:** Choices for the Third World. By Mahbub ul Haq. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1976. 247 pp. $15·60.*

WHEN, in 1973, the Algerian summit conference of the non-aligned countries called for what has since come to be known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO), dissatisfaction was expressed not only with the structure of the global economy but also with past thinking about development alternatives. The heads of state and government asked that a special session of the United Nations General Assembly should be convened, to concern itself not only with the *international* aspects of development policy, such as aid, trade and finance, but also with alternative models and patterns of *national* development which are better suited to the needs of developing countries and more effective in eliminating mass poverty. As the present phase of NIEO negotiations stumbles to its close in Paris and Geneva, one notes with dismay that this broader concern with new perspectives on development has been lost in the shuffle. True, the ideas have infiltrated several Western bilateral aid agencies and even the World Bank; but, as Mahbub ul Haq points out, their effect in this connection can be only marginal. The one forum in which the issue of alternative patterns of development can still be raised as the cornerstone of future development policy before the end of this decade is in the formulation of the official strategy for the Third United Nations Decade for Development; but, if the DD1 and DD2 are any indication of how effective is the voice of the UN in shaping patterns of development, then it is hardly worth the effort. In sum, for the moment at any rate, the opportunity has been lost for a major conceptual and policy break-through. The legacy of the present phase of NIEO talks will be the stabilisation of export earnings, partial debt relief and a modest increase in official development assistance. Socio-economic structures, whether international or domestic, will be left intact.

As a development planner in Pakistan, an official of the World Bank, and as a spokesman for developing countries on many occasions, Mahbub ul Haq has earned the respect of intellectuals and officials in the West no less than in the Third World. And he has been as influential and effective as anyone in raising to our collective attention the issue of alternative models and patterns of development. It is distressing, therefore, that the three parts of his book, *The Poverty Curtain*, follow essentially the same progression from hopeful and innovative beginning to denouement and tired conclusion as do the NIEO negotiations which I have just outlined.

Part I, entitled 'New Development Strategies', is a critique (including a self-criticism by the author of his previous incarnation as liberal economist) of two decades of growth without development, of higher per caput income going hand-in-hand with an increase in the worst forms of poverty. The sources of this paradox include what ul Haq calls feudal economic structures in many developing countries, the emphasis in development planning on growth rather than composition and distribution of the national product, the stress on capital rather than project investment, reliance on market demand rather than setting fixed consumption and production targets that are based on human needs, and a combination of the worst features of capitalist and socialist modes of economic organisation, namely, 'weak economic incentives with bureaucratic socialism'. Ul Haq proposes a four point alternative perspective (pp. 35–36):

> We were taught to take care of our GNP, as this will take care of poverty. Let us reverse this and take care of poverty, as this will take care of GNP.
>
> Consumption planning should move to the center of the stage; production planning should be geared to it. *Thus,*
>
> > We must get away from the tyranny of the demand concept and replace it by the concept of minimum needs. *And,*
> >
> > The pursuit of elusive present-day Western standards of per capita income levels . . . must be replaced by the concept of a threshold income which each society defines for itself and which can be reached in a manageable period of a decade or so.
>
> The concerns for more production and better distribution should be brought together in defining the patterns of development.
>
> Employment should become a primary objective of planning and no longer be treated as only a secondary objective.

The international side of this approach to development rests heavily on the concept of 'self-reliance', which does not mean autarky—for that is out of the question for most developing countries even if it were desirable—but maximum reliance on indigenous national and Third World resources, cutting past dependent ties with developed countries, reversing the presumed relationship between trade and development, and a cautious and deliberate use of external assistance as support for, rather than the basis of, national development objectives. Ul Haq does not assume that it will be easy to redirect national and international development planning along these lines; as he points out, even collecting data on basic human needs poses a threat to the interests and alliances that benefit from the existing maldistribution of opportunities and resources. Nonetheless, he remains hopeful that there is now sufficient agreement on the inadequacy of old models, and enough pressures and incentives for change, that something may yet be done—politically a bit naïve, perhaps, but fair enough as a conclusion to Part I.

The rest of the book does not follow through on this conclusion. Part II is entitled 'Global Choices: Myths and Realities'. Its message is that the global problems posed by the so-called limits to growth, environmental degradation and population pressures are due to existing socio-economic arrangements and are not, at their core, 'physical' problems susceptible to 'technical' solution. If they are to be 'solved', he argues, it will be because of the types of socio-economic change he outlines in Part I. I happen to agree with ul Haq on this score, but would want to differentiate between short-term and long-term responses to these problems: surely he does not advocate that we simply wait and let the natural progress of things take care of them.

But the real disappointment comes in Part III, 'A New International Economic Order'. It is as though this part was written by an entirely different person, one who had not even bothered to read the first two parts of the book. Here, ul Haq dusts off the lexicon of the economic world federalist and speaks to us in his tired clichés. He recommends a World Development Authority, World Central Bank, International Trade Organisation, world central economic planning, expanded world trade, freer credit for poor countries, and so on—in short, central institutions whose purpose it would be to integrate developing countries more effectively into

the world economy albeit on terms more favourable to them than in the past. And he believes that more favourable terms are possible in the long run because of the bargaining power of the developing countries. This last argument is especially weak, as it rests on the completely misplaced and misleading analogy with the history of trade union organisation in the industrial countries during the last century. This analogy misses the all-important fact that labour did not convince management by rational argument or by the sheer power of their numbers. Rather, the *state* gradually changed the *framework* of industrial relations as it came more and more under the influence of new constituencies which an expanding franchise had brought into the political arena. There is no international equivalent of such a state, so that the framework of international 'industrial relations' largely reflects the needs and interests of 'management' and whatever concessions 'labour' can obtain. There may be 'intra-management' battles and the attempt may ensue to co-opt 'labour' for one side or another; there may of course be areas of mutual or overlapping interests between 'management' and 'labour'; and new recruits may enter the 'managerial' ranks. But these examples are a far cry from collective bargaining among equals, on the basis of rules that are determined and enforced by a superordinate state.

In sum, Mahbub ul Haq has managed to escape from the cognitive cul de sac of the liberal economist only to find himself in the intellectual dead-end street of the liberal political theorist. Nevertheless, this book is important because it was written by an intelligent and influential thinker who has taken the first step in the reformulation of an area of policy that is exceedingly important for the future of the planet. Let him continue, therefore, and derive his recommendations for international structural and institutional change from his insights into what must be done to construct and implement alternative patterns of national development.

*University of California, Berkeley, and Chatham House* JOHN GERARD RUGGIE

**Why Poor People Stay Poor:** A Study of Urban Bias in World Development. By Michael Lipton. *London: Temple Smith. 1977. 467 pp. £9·50.*

IN all developing countries farming is the largest sector of the economy and country dwellers form the largest section of the community. These facts notwithstanding, most public and private efforts enhance non-agricultural growth and thus favour urban interests. Those concerned with problems of development, past or present, have always been familiar with this phenomenon of the planners' urban bias and their antipathy to those cultivating the land. Indeed, Marxist and liberal economists alike have tended to consider the land as the main source of 'primitive accumulation'. As a result, the rural sector does not obtain its fair share of resources 'to meet generally accepted criteria of efficiency and equity' (p. 328).

Professor Lipton has set out to describe and analyse all aspects of the urban bias, which he sees as the prime reason why poor people stay poor. The author examines in great detail the disparity between urban and rural welfare brought about by patterns of land use, employment, investment, taxation, savings, prices, research, education and administration which invariably favour the urban elite and by comparison put at a disadvantage

those living in villages. In the course of his investigation, Professor Lipton leaves no stone unturned. His book does not make easy reading. In fact, the reader has to cut his way through much undergrowth. Some 350 pages of text are supplemented by twice as many notes and by 16 statistical tables. The diligent student thus finds himself constantly turning from the front of the book to the back and vice versa. The mental strain which this procedure causes could have been eased by the omission of some unnecessary detail. On page 89 the author regrettably declares himself unable to examine the ideology of rural-urban relations in development 'without writing another book'. A footnote tells the reader on page 372: 'I am doing this'. At times economy of presentation is a virtue worth respecting.

The contrast between urban and rural life styles and living standards is certainly worth examining in depth, and this the author has done. However, he tends to present his case without paying sufficient attention to certain economic, social and political features of urban and industrial development. The political alignment of urban elites with farming 'kulaks', fertiliser merchants and money-lenders seems to cut across the author's urban/rural dichotomy. Rural life, even on a tiny homestead, can be beautiful, but it may also be excessively squalid. Against this, urban enterprise, whether large or small, can be rapacious, but it may also become a source of rural welfare. Over-simplification can do more damage than good. Changes, such as multi-cropping, which can remove the curse of seasonality from mono-culture, and dairy farming, which can provide even the small man in the village with a daily income and thus make him feel in the market square like the holder of a credit card, deserve a place in any examination of why some poor people stay poor whilst others improve their status.

The student of contemporary agrarian issues is also likely to look in vain for an analysis of certain institutional changes. To be sure, these changes are far too slow in coming and they are not generally 'neutral to scale'; nor are they renowned for their rural bias. Even so, some of them, such as the slow loosening of traditional caste ties, can lead to alignments other than those which are bound to clash with rural interests. The temptation to accept Maoist or populist concepts of the inevitable conflict between town and country had better be resisted. However deplorable the neglect of the rural poor in most contemporary development programmes, the distribution of benefits is not wholly one-sided. As Professor Lipton rightly observes: 'Not all urban power centres are shortsighted and selfish all the time' (p. 329).

*St. Antony's College, Oxford* W. Klatt

**Technology and Underdevelopment.** By Frances Stewart. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 303 pp. £12·00.*

In the past few years Frances Stewart has published a number of papers on appropriate technology for developing countries, some of which have achieved the status of basic references on the issues to which they are addressed. Three such issues which come to mind are: (i) the conditions under which a given technology is superior by *any* criterion; (ii) the technological assumptions which constitute the frangible underpinning of much

recent work in cost-benefit analysis; and (iii) the self-reinforcing nature of technological dependence. Any book bringing this body of work together was bound to be awaited with high expectation, not only by specialists in the choice of technology, but also by specialists in related fields, whose work requires access to some sort of general guidance on technological issues. This review is written from the second of those standpoints.

*Technology and Underdevelopment* fulfils that high expectation. It is a major contribution to the literature. If, in what follows, I take issue with the author on a number of points, it is on the basis of the criteria appropriate to a book of that standing, i.e. criteria which demand the comprehensiveness of a ' standard work '.

Specialists in technology for developing countries can be broadly divided into three classes. There are the analysts, who concentrate on the theoretical determinants of technological choice. There are the romantics, who have concentrated on rural India, but who emotionally owe more to Oliver Goldsmith than to Gandhi. And there are the realists, whose case-work, most fruitful when economists and engineers have succeeded, against the odds, in working together, has been concentrated on the identification of specific and available alternative processes. Frances Stewart belongs unequivocally to the first category, but she has much respect for the third, and two chapters of her book constitute a not entirely successful venture in that direction. She pays lip-service in her footnotes to the romantics, but the text suggests that she has private doubts.

The rhythm of her book, however, is disconcerting. After a sensible introduction—the role of the economist, the interaction of macro and micro-decisions, the blurriness of developmental nomenclature—two marvellous chapters set the theoretical framework. Then come two chapters on ' inappropriate ' and ' appropriate ' technology, which are basically about national policy options, crisply argued, followed by a powerful chapter on technological dependence. But then the book suddenly goes off again into analysis of the global system, first in terms of the production of capital goods and then of developed/developing country trade. Both chapters are excellent, especially in their critical discussion of the literature, but they are out of place, they cover familiar ground, and they are occasionally tinged with the kind of technological determinism which in earlier chapters has been rejected. In short, she is slightly vulnerable to the criticism that her book is loaded more towards the role of technology in perpetuating *under*development, which is admittedly the word used in the title, than to the scope for using technology which *promotes* development. The remainder of the book is taken up with a survey of the literature and two case studies, of which more later.

The main conclusion of her introductory chapters is a cast-iron demonstration that reliance on unmodified imports of technology from developed countries, for example, through private investment, cannot solve the developing countries' problems of industrialisation. My only complaints here relate to style. Frances Stewart carries rigour to extremes. It is deeply impressive, but it leads her into a proliferation of diagrams, sometimes useful, but often an over-simplifying substitute for a point which really needs to be developed in clear and careful verbal exposition. (To be fair, by economists' standards her English is excellent, apart from a predilection for ' different than '.)

After the next two very good chapters related to technological options, her rigour serves her less well. When she comes to recommendations, there are sentences which begin with phrases like 'Some formula would be needed which. . . .' The immediate non-academic response would be 'What formula?', but perhaps that is a question which can only be answered in a specific operational context. After a warning against the dangers of seeking too rigorous a definition of 'technological dependence', she develops an argument which, though careful, seems to me to pay insufficient regard to the real dynamics of project development.

One could probably extend this list of slightly carping criticisms. But it is better, I think, to go to the main points on which I would take issue strictly from the standpoint of this review. First, on adaptation of technology, her somewhat determinist arguments seem to be refuted by recent Indian export successes. (She seems undecided between the wholely determinist Marxist arguments and the more pragmatic approach of a social democratic view, though her sympathies are clearly with the latter.) Second, on the cost of technology transfer, she makes all the familiar points, but does not really develop them into usable techniques of measurement. Third, though she makes a number of strong points about the tendency of technology to come as a package, she says very little about forms of financing, which in my view are a major factor in this. Fourth, my own bias would be to put less emphasis on global relationships. For instance, she sees the Lomé Treaty, justifiably, as a continuance of stratification. But she does not address herself to what I regard as the more interesting but also more narrowly institutional question of why the industrial chapter of Lomé remains a dead letter.

Fifth, her solutions tend to require co-operation between developing countries. She is well aware of the severity of this requirement, but stays safely at the level of broad generalities, when a deeper exploration of the more limited options implicitly opened up in Chapter 4 might be more useful. Sixth, her practical examples are sometimes unconvincing. For instance, she says that only a Renault 16 door can be fitted to a Renault 16. Perhaps the famous case of the DC3½ would be instructive, or the ingenuity of Indian taxi owners. Seventh, both in her survey of the literature and her two case studies, she has a tendency to try to extract support for theoretical generalisations, leaving open some tantalising questions about practical application. Eighth, a development banker wanting to finance the application of her work would have to work very hard to extract a putative cash flow from her figures. (This is one area in which I think the 'realists' are rather stronger.)

Her response to these points could legitimately be that she did not intend to write that kind of book. So I shall conclude with more positive points about the book as it stands. First, unlike many economists, Frances Stewart has a sense of historical process, of what is possible next. Second, although her survey of the literature and her case studies seem to me over-concerned with generalisation, the survey is indeed an excellent introduction to the scope of the empirical studies done, and her case studies show *in principle* what this approach can achieve. Third, although her approach is theoretical, it is indeed, with translation, usable, and I am quite sure that its application would significantly increase the returns on capital invested in the sectors which she discusses, but to substantiate that point would require a more extensive discussion of the literature. Finally, anybody in

the business of project development in developing countries should have this book with them all the time, as a work of reference and a reminder of the basic issues.

*University of Sussex* JOHN WHITE

**The Poverty of Power:** Energy and the Economic Crisis. By Barry Commoner. *London: Cape. 1976. 314 pp. £5·50.*

**Alternative Energy Strategies:** Constraints and Opportunities. By John Hagel III. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 185 pp. £12·25. $17·50.*

BARRY COMMONER's new book is concerned with the fundamental connections between the environmental, energy and economic crises of the last decade. Its thesis is that these crises can be traced to a 'single basic defect', essentially, that instead of the economic system being dependent, through the production system, on the ecosystem, the relationships have in practice operated the other way around.

Commoner says that it is illusory to expect the basic faults in the interaction of the three systems to be overcome by a 'rising level of production'. The productivity of the capital, in the energy sector in particular, he says, has been falling. This has contributed to a capital shortage which has been offset only by increased labour productivity, and thus by unemployment. But the process is self-defeating, because the capital so generated is used to finance increasingly capital-intensive production. Two 'chilling realities' follow: the rate of profit has been falling, and consumption must be reduced in the United States. The 'poverty' of the title now emerges. It is the inability of capitalism to survive except by reducing living standards. The book proceeds through an interesting, if curious, chapter on thermodynamics, to ones on oil, coal, nuclear and solar energy. Two chapters then consider the uses and price of power and the final chapter repeats the book's title.

In his last few pages Commoner breaks what he calls 'a long-standing taboo' (p. 258) on the discussion of a political system which 'at least in principle' could solve the problem he feels he has identified. The system, uniquely alarming to American readers, is, of course, socialism. Its virtue is seen as lying in its attachment to social values, and Galbraith is quoted in support of its relevance to the problems of both unduly strong and unduly weak industries. Commoner is naturally fully aware that 'between the image and the reality falls the shadow', and he therefore rejects the existing political forms of socialism in favour of wholly new ones still to be created. These few pages are perhaps as far as he thought he could go, given that he was writing for an American audience and that his professional competence is in environmental science. Even granted that he is aiming only to open a debate, one still wishes he could have gone further.

John Hagel's study was made under the auspices of the Petroleum Information Foundation in New York and has been revised and updated for publication. It begins with a review of trends in the world energy market, then in successive chapters surveys research and development in non-conventional crude oil sources, coal and coal conversion processes, nuclear energy and non-nuclear energy sources such as solar and geothermal energy.

Energy conservation strategies and constraints on energy strategies are then examined, and the book follows this by addressing three distinct scenarios: high-priced, limited high-priced, and total embargo on, crude oil imports. West European and Japanese prospects are reviewed and Hagel attempts finally to evaluate the various alternatives. He feels there is room for 'considerable optimism' as regards the long-term availability of the 'virtually inexhaustible' energy sources. The 'real difficulties' lie in the short and medium term (p. 154). The policy record of the leading energy-consuming nations does not make him confident, and he agrees with Commoner that, increasingly, capital-intensive energy production systems will strain capital markets. He also stresses the consequences of irreducible technological lead times. The environmental impact of energy techniques is acknowledged as a third constraint, but the reference to 'the need for a more effective integration of environmental legislation in the framework of a comprehensive energy strategy' is as far as this particular problem is carried here. There is, in fact, an interesting example of looking-glass language on page 153. 'The ecology movement', says Hagel, 'has a responsibility to consider the full impact of the legislation it supports and to propose alternative energy strategies that would minimise the adverse effect of this legislation'. No doubt this is true, but one is bound to observe that a similar, and equally undischarged, duty has always lain with the energy industries to justify short-term actions in terms of long-term realities.

Commoner's is a fast stroll of a book, with a considerable number of really rather broad-gauge statements and judgments. It stimulates and holds the interest but, to be completely persuasive, would need to be substantially more rigorous. Hagel's book is factually dense, but, inevitably in covering this enormous field, simplifications have evidently had to be made. Of the two books, Hagel's is the most thorough, Commoner's the most profound. Is it carping to wish that the detail of the one had been matched to the sweep of the other?

*University of Manchester* ROGER WILLIAMS

**The International Politics of Natural Resources.** By Zuhayr Mikdashi. *Ithaca, NY, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 214 pp. £8·75.*

DEDICATED 'To UN ideals', Professor Mikdashi's helpful study of the international politics of production and trade in certain natural resources is an admirable blend of sympathetic understanding for the Third World's sense of injustice and inequity with the cool analysis of the hard facts of economic and technological life that you might expect from a professor of business administration. For him, international politics—at least in this rather important aspect of the North-South debate—is not the conventional diplomatic exchanges between foreign ministers. It consists of a series of three-sided bargaining processes, in each of which transnational enterprises of different sorts and sizes play as crucial a role in determining outcomes as the governments of the exporting countries on the one side and those of the importing countries on the other. As a specialist on OPEC and the financial aspects of oil company-government relations in the Middle East, he starts with a summary account of the politics of oil which is as concise, cool and evenhanded as Dankwart Rustow's recent little

book.[1] This is followed by comparable analytical studies of the co-operative efforts by producing countries concerned with the production and trade of half-a-dozen assorted commodities—copper, iron ore, sulphur, bauxite, tin, uranium and (the only non-mineral) bananas. A large third part then explores some of the broad issues arising for the three parties out of investment in production for world markets: the terms and availability of investment insurance, arrangements for joint ventures and divestment, security of raw material supplies and the partition of tax revenues.

A tremendous lot of thought, knowledge and experience has been compressed into a short space and anyone wishing to make a start on some of the practical issues in the North-South debate could do a lot worse than begin here. Professor Mikdashi's careful conclusions may be popular neither with the OECD hawks, who still believe the developing countries are mugs enough to be fobbed off with rhetoric and resolutions, nor with the UNCTAD doves, who would prefer grandiose universal solutions to perversely particular problems. But both should heed this tough commonsense.

*London School of Economics* SUSAN STRANGE

**Economics and Demography.** By Ian Bowen. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1976. 168 pp. (Studies in Economics 10.) £5·95. Pb: £3·50.*

**The Modern Rise of Population.** By Thomas McKeown. *London: Edward Arnold. 1976. 168 pp. £7·95.*

BOTH these books have one feature in common: they attempt to make *general* statements about population, rather than deal with specific aspects of the subject or with local situations. Professor McKeown attempts an all-embracing explanation for the modern rise in population which he rightly characterises as a unique event in human history; Mr. Bowen concerns himself with the contributions that economists have made to the study of population and with the inter-relations between economic and demographic phenomena.

Professor McKeown argues that the modern rise in population was brought about by a decline in mortality, rather than by a rise in fertility. This decline in mortality, in turn, was caused by a change in environmental conditions, rather than by a change in the virulence of infectious diseases which contributed to high mortality in the past, or by advances in therapy. Improvements in hygiene and sanitary engineering helped to reduce the incidence of water and sewage-borne diseases, but the principal reason for the reduction in mortality, in his view, was an improvement in nutrition.

This bald summary does less than justice to Professor McKeown's erudition and argument. He produces evidence from a variety of fields to support his view and, as was to be expected from a distinguished practitioner in the field of community medicine, his discussion of the history of diseases and the measures available to combat them is particularly interesting. Nevertheless, one is left with a feeling of unease about some of his conclusions.

When Raymond Pearl wrote about population just before the war, he

[1] D. Rustow and J. Mugno, *OPEC: Success and Prospects* (New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1976; London: Martin Robertson, 1977.)

regarded it as obvious that the study of human population was a part of biology. This contention would be much less acceptable today, when it has become clear that although population growth is constrained within limits set by biological constants, these limits are wide and actual rates of growth are determined by social rather than by biological variables. It is by no means clear that it is possible to provide an all-embracing explanation which will account equally well for the very rapidly changing rates of growth of the populations of developing countries today, and the slower, though nonetheless very significant, changes which occurred in Western countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Whilst one would agree with McKeown that specific therapeutic and other medical measures had only a limited effect on changing rates of growth in Europe and other countries with a European culture in the past, this conclusion does not necessarily hold true for developing countries today, where a more advanced medical and public health technology has played a much bigger part than was possible 100 to 150 years ago.

Professor McKeown also underestimates the impact of social norms on fertility. Modern contraceptive techniques have made the limitation of fertility a much easier process and have incidentally brought about a situation where it is *technically* possible to change rates of growth very rapidly, though the obstacles to such change are social and psychological. But there were few societies in the past in which people did not make some attempt to regulate their fertility and not without success. The methods used may have been sexual abstinence within marriage, as Caldwell has suggested was the case in some African societies, or *coitus interruptus* or prolonged lactation. Though the two last methods may not be sufficiently reliable to protect individual couples against unwanted pregnancies, their aggregate effectiveness if widely used by different populations may be sufficient to depress birth rates.

None of this means that McKeown's primary contention that the rise in population was triggered by a reduction in mortality is wrong. But he is on shakier ground when suggesting that this reduction was a consequence of improvements in nutrition. This view is not supported by the experience of a number of developing countries today, where high rates of growth and some reduction in mortality coexists with a low nutritional state among the majority of the population.

One wonders whether it is really worth while to attempt to find a universal theory of population growth. If the contention that rates of growth are largely determined by social variables is correct, it follows that one would have to look to specific explanations in specific cases, rather than to one grand theory. Nevertheless, one is grateful to Professor McKeown for the attempt, which brings together much of his distinguished past work in the field and which ought to be read by all serious students of population.

Mr. Bowen is one of the small number of British economists who have taken an interest in population problems. It is strange that economists in the United Kingdom have paid so little attention to the subject—the situation is very different in the United States. However, unfortunately Mr. Bowen's book is disappointing. After a brief discussion of the world demographic situation at the present time, the author deals with the views of Adam Smith and Malthus and concludes with two chapters on 'Growth Economics and Population' and 'Population and the Environment'. The student will find little about recent work, in the United States and elsewhere,

attempting to apply the concepts of micro-economics to the explanation of fertility differences, and discussion of the macro-models which relate economic growth to population growth is very brief and not really sufficient. This is a pity, as sufficient work has recently been done on the subject to make an attempt to bring it together between the covers of one book very worth while.

*Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, London* E. GREBENIK

**Agriculture and the State:** British Policy in a World Context. Edited by Brian Davey, T. E. Josling and Alister McFarquhar. *London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre. 1976. 280 pp. £15·00.*

THIS is an important if uneven book on agricultural policy. Part of its importance lies in the attempt to apply formal quantitative methods to the analysis of agricultural policy questions. Part lies in the perceptive comments made by some of its authors on issues of current importance.

The book reports the results of a three-year research programme sponsored by the Trade Policy Research Centre on agricultural policy in the United Kingdom. The research was conducted in the Universities of Newcastle, Cambridge and London and involved three full-time research workers as well as substantial input from established workers at each of the three centres. The co-operative character of the initial studies is reflected in publication. Chapters are written by different authors, although some individuals were involved in more than one chapter and Professor Josling contributes two chapters and an appendix under his own name as well as being a joint author of three other chapters.

The result of this formidable intellectual input is a book which attempts to set agriculture in its international context, to discuss the role of British agriculture in the EEC and to explore the possibilities for action at a national and international level. An immediate response is that the quantitative work has been overtaken by events which make its application to current issues difficult. The authors have attempted to update material, but the recent rapid movements in price levels and exchange rates mean that the inescapable delays between writing and publication tend to defeat their efforts. All the authors recognise this problem. An especially interesting response is made in Chapter 6 by Josling and Hamway who argue: 'As with the previous chapters in the empirical parts of the volume, this chapter should not be regarded as a set of forecasts, but as an illustration of the types and magnitudes of income transfers generated by agricultural price policies within the context of the CAP' (p. 180). Professional economists will recognise the validity and importance of this approach. The danger is that those with a genuine concern with policy who are not professionals in the field may confuse 'illustrations' with 'forecasts'.

It is perhaps inevitable that some of the most helpful remarks about contemporary policy decisions are found in those chapters which owe least to empirical studies. For example, Chapter 1, written by Hugh Corbet, provides an excellent background to current international arguments. He points out that negotiations are not merely concerned with the further liberalisation of trade within an accepted framework of GATT rules. 'They are concerned with the rules as well' (p. 4). The discussion is con-

ducted principally in terms of the problems of temperate agricultural trade between developed countries and emphasises the risks to the international trading system should no agreement be reached in the Tokyo round of GATT discussions. It may be felt that greater weight should have been given to the problems of trade with developing countries, but it is refreshing to find the issues of agricultural trade between the major trading powers set out so clearly. The chapters which describe the empirical studies are written with commendable care to make them comprehensible to the non-technical reader. This is no small achievement and will help to make this type of work valuable to a wide group of interested parties. Many will find the diagrams presented by McFarquhar and Silvey of special interest (pp. 135–136). They show in simple form the results of various estimates of future farm production levels in the United Kingdom. As might be expected, estimates vary substantially. The accompanying commentary provides a useful background to the interpretation of this work.

Perhaps the most serious weakness of the book is the inadequacy of its examination of the political aspects of agricultural policy in the United Kingdom and the European Community. The importance of the consumer interest in the context of the British government's counter-inflationary policy may be more symbolic than numerical. In a European context the significance of the Common Agricultural Policy as an expression of the existence of the Community needs more emphasis. An attack on the agricultural trade policy of the EEC is seldom seen as an attempt to make things better for Europeans, more often it is thought of as an attack on the Community itself. The neglect of these and similar aspects of policy making detract from what is otherwise a competent and important piece of work. The Trade Policy Research Centre is to be congratulated on the stimulus it provided for this work. It is to be hoped that it will continue its interest in agriculture and possibly ensure that the gap between research findings and publication is shortened.

*University of Aberdeen* JOHN S. MARSH

**Foreign Trade and US Policy:** The Case for Free International Trade. By Leland B. Yeager and David G. Tuerck. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 295 pp. Pb: £3·95.*

**Technology Transfer and US Foreign Policy.** By Henry R. Nau. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 325 pp. £16·65.*

THE first of these two books offers the reader a detailed statement of the case for freedom of international trade. The impact of various forms of protection is also examined carefully. The level of the economic analysis is very sophisticated but the presentation is in purely verbal terms. In a book clearly aimed at a wider readership than economists the avoidance of an algebraic treatment is an advantage, but many readers might have found a diagrammatic treatment a help in following the arguments.

There can be no doubt that the arguments used in favour of protection are often weak. Nevertheless, the authors are perhaps too ready to dismiss some of the arguments for protection in certain special circumstances. In some ways this book reads more as a polemic for free trade than a serious

work of scholarship. It is argued, for example, that under modern conditions the old argument that some industries should be protected because of their vital role in time of war no longer holds. As the argument is developed in relation to the United States, this may be true. But if the United States has an overwhelming natural advantage in the production of military aircraft, can other Western countries be satisfied that they will always be allowed to get what they want from American sources?

Or could they accept with equanimity the development of an American monopoly in the computer field, knowing that the United States government might prevent the fulfilment of orders for installations of which it disapproved. Apart from the strategic argument, there is also the danger that a monopoly position will be ruthlessly exploited. The authors grossly underestimate the barriers to re-entry into a market if this happens. Finally, the difficulties of adjustment to free trade are underestimated. Moreover, the authors admit that some people will be hurt by the changing pattern of trade, but they come down against generous help being given to such people on the grounds that this would reduce incentives to adaptation. There is no real discussion of the special problems that would arise from the elimination of an industry which was localised and was an important sector of the local economy.

The second book deals with a more limited issue—the transfer of technology—but one that is of growing importance. (Free trade may be a topical question but the arguments have changed very little over more than a century.) The technology transfers considered include co-operation by American firms in the establishment of a truck factory in the Soviet Union, co-operation in energy research and development between advanced Western countries, the shift of bauxite processing to the country of origin, and the development of an appropriate agricultural technology for the Philippines.

Very different problems are raised by these different types of transfer. The setting up of the truck plant raised questions of the government's attitude to promoting development in the Soviet Union as well as the special difficulties confronting American firms working with the Russians. The energy research and development project involved internal administration problems for the United States as well as reluctance on the part of interests in all countries to pass on know-how that was likely to be of commercial value in the near future.

In the case of bauxite, countries like Jamaica are naturally anxious to secure some participation in processing instead of exporting the ore. American firms were being asked to take part in the establishment of processing plants in Jamaica without an equity control as in many overseas investments. In this case, too, there was another potential clash of interest in so far as the Jamaicans were seeking a faster extraction rate in the knowledge that technological developments, including the possibility of recycling, might reduce the value of their natural asset.

The attempt to develop a technology for the Philippines (existing American agricultural technology would have been quite irrelevant) ran into difficulties. The idea was to design a machine suitable for the rice farmers of the Philippines which could be produced locally by small manufacturers. The design was to be freely available, but the requirement that improvements made by manufacturers should also be freely available placed the smaller manufacturer at a disadvantage.

This book should provide those interested with a useful analysis of the problems involved in a field of growing importance.

*University of Dundee* J. M. JACKSON

**The World Trade System:** Some Enquiries into its Spatial Structure. By R. J. Johnston. *London: Bell. 1976. 208 pp. £5·85.*

**International Trade and Finance:** Frontiers for Research. Edited by Peter B. Kenen. *London: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 539 pp. £12·50.*

**A Generalized Theory of International Trade.** By Peter H. Gray. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 201 pp. £10·00.*

As international economic relationships multiply in number, diversify in scope and increase in salience, theories of international trade require re-thinking. Some economists and academics from related disciplines have begun to turn their attention towards the provision of a framework within which current realities can be better comprehended.

Johnston's analysis of world trade is an essay in the use of modern number-crunching technology by an economic geographer seeking to relate a mass of trade data with systems theory. The book is demanding, concise, well planned and stimulating. One deduces that the student of advanced economic geography is expected to cope with a spread of interdisciplinary concepts drawn from role theory, economic theory with special reference to growth, political theory with respect to trade bloc dynamics as well as the quantitative style of argument.

The spatial variable is naturally the focus of attention and the problem of quantification is recognised:

> Major difficulty was experienced in the measurement of inter-country differences, however. For many countries, notably small ex-colonies with primate urban systems, the choice of a single point to measure from was easy—the main town. But for a few large countries with a dispersed market—such as Canada and the United States—no easy choice was available (p. 72).
>
> and
>
> The great circle distances on the globe may differ quite considerably from those used in the interaction between two points. . . . Use of what is closer to an 'airline' distance than a 'freight' distance can clearly make predictions from models (14) and (15) invalid in the 'real world' (p. 73).

However, notwithstanding the difficulty of constructing and of understanding the models, there is great value in the exercise. The effort to operationalise leads to a discussion of the interplay between the size of a country, its location, terms of trade, transport costs and development level. The empirical thrust of this book will commend it to many who find trade theory to be too remote from observed realities.

The papers edited by Peter Kenen date from a Princeton conference of 1973 and cover a variety of theoretical and policy issues. The introduction to this volume stresses that its emphasis is on positive economics, 'the relationships between pure theory and quantification', and that it is a

complement to the volume edited by Bergsten, *The Future of the International Economic Order* [1], and not a competitor. There are four sections: Part I, 'Trade, Protection and Domestic Production'; Part II, 'Econometric Models of Trade and Payments'; Part III, 'Payments Adjustment and the Monetary System'; Part IV, a panel discussion—an overview and agenda—which is brief and thought provoking in its delineation of frontiers for research.

Assembled here is a distillation of the economists' literature through which one can follow the rather slowly changing interests of the positivists. The footnotes are copious, the discussions succinct, but there is a sense of worry—of wise men no longer at ease in the old dispensation, of an alien people clutching their gods. The Hufbauer paper on 'The Multinational Corporation and Direct Investment', for example, appends a 14-page bibliography, but the multinationals are not identified as an element of 'what we need to know' in the final panel discussion. Kindleberger says: 'I choose to think that the failure to dwell here on the multinational corporation was an oversight' (p. 528) Doubtless he is correct, but it is of course possible that a deeper dissonance continues to exist between the theoretical framework that economists are professionally interested in and the international economic events that non-economists would like to see tackled. After all, a large proportion of world trade is intra-company transfers.

Professor Gray's book is an attempt to build a generalised theory of international trade and the author is clear about what he wants: '. . . the philosophy underlying the generalised model is that theory is not an end in itself and can be useful only as a means to an end' (p. 9). Accordingly, Part I of the work, 'derivation', is concerned with modifying current orthodoxy and Part II, 'application', includes discussion of such issues as colonialism, commercial policy, direct investment and factor mobility. This dualism makes the book interesting for those who are concerned with the interplay between theory and policy in international economic relations. The author's view of the nature of this interplay is expressed in a couple of footnotes on pages 187 and 188:

> Despite Dr. Myrdal's distinction and the recognition of that distinction with a Nobel prize, it is probably true to say that his thinking has had little effect upon the thinking of mainstream economists.
>
> . . . Raul Prebisch has, like Myrdal, failed to leave a lasting impact upon international economic theory. Prebisch might have been able to be more influential among North American economists and perhaps less influential among Latin American policymakers had he seen fit to confront orthodoxy with an alternative specific frame of reference.

Professor Gray outlines what he sees as the main shortcomings of orthodox theory and suggests that three concepts must be introduced in order to generalise it and make it realistic. These three concepts are a time dimension through the use of period analysis, a three-part production [2], and three different types of goods, i.e. non-competitive, competitive homogeneous and differentiated.

[1] Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 1973. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1975, p. 71.

[2] $Q_i = s_i\, m_{ij}\, f_i\, (K,L,H,R,P)$ where s is the scalar determined by market size, m is the modifier that depends on national characteristics and f is the input mix function and K,L,H,R,P, are physical capital, labour, human capital, natural resources and proprietary knowledge respectively (p. 44).

Regrettably, however, there is a very uneven treatment of these three concepts. In particular, the significance and behaviour of the scalars and modifiers in the production function is not discussed at length. Analysis of the relationship between the proprietary knowledge of firms and the tribal customs of nations at various times is of the essence but would demand a different and much longer book.

*Bristol Polytechnic* FRANK GARDNER

**The Case for the Multinational Corporation.** Edited by Carl H. Madden. *New York: Praeger in co-operation with the National Chamber Foundation. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 212 pp. £13·70.*

**The Multinational Enterprise in a Hostile World.** Proceedings of a conference held in Geneva under the auspices of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, the Institut Universitaire d'Études Européenes and the Center for Education in International Management. Edited by Gerard and Victoria Curzon with Lawrence Franko and Henri Schwamm. *London: Macmillan. 1977. 147 pp. £7·95.*

BOTH these sets of readings could be retitled 'In Defence of Multinationals: Seven Authors in Search of a Theory'. However, such a judgment would be harsh, for in both books there is some good analytical work in areas where the unproven is often taken as axiomatic.

The Curzon readings appear to have been inspired by an unfavourable reaction to the UN's 'Eminent Persons' Report'[1] on multinationals. This volume concerns itself largely with the impact of multinationals in advanced host countries and with the relation of their activities to European integration. An interesting contribution by Dunning and Gilman on alternative host country policy prescriptions is marred by lack of attention to the assumptions behind, and implications of, the new concepts they introduce: the response coefficients of multinationals to host country policy and the extra degrees of freedom open to multinationals. This is followed by some rather uneven contributions in which recourse is made too often to inadequately stated oligopoly theory, and far too little attention is paid to the economics of multi-plant operation. Consequently, multinationals are castigated for setting up additional plants within customs areas rather than indulging in trade, and evidence is adduced relating to sub-optimal size without the niceties of definition or the touchstone of investigation. Similarly, the anti-trust contributions are weakened by the failure to discuss methods of market servicing and multi-plant operation as facets of firms' overall strategy. However, an interesting comment by Tumlir calls into question the institutional approach to multinationals on the grounds that it is atheoretical and prejudiced in favour of multilateral control of multinationals—it also pays no attention to law. Tumlir goes further to suggest ways in which international diplomacy and wrangling can be replaced by national law by the addition of several internationally agreed principles. This is an important and challenging contribution.

[1] *The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations* (New York: UN, 1974).

The section on multinationals and sovereignty is enlivened by Hellmann, who in an eminently sensible piece on government-multinational firm relations, suggests that the supposed inferiority of nation-states vis-à-vis multinationals is due to a lack of a strategic concept for nations to follow. Further international control at UN level will continue to be impossible because of the insuperable barriers to bringing together nations at different levels of development—less developed countries in particular do not wish to surrender newly-won sovereign powers. However, he ignores the advantages to the firms themselves (in reducing uncertainty) of nation-states having known and stable policies.

The Madden readings are concerned with the effects of American multinationals on both the source country and recipient economies; they are infused with a reaction against the Barnet and Muller polemic *Global Reach* [2] in which multinationals are cast as universal scapegoats. After a shaky start, Weston (' Do Multinationals overprice? ') challenges some myths on worldwide concentration, profitability and price-fixing by utilising some interesting new data on worldwide industrial concentration and price changes. The potential abuse of market power in small protected countries, however, clearly remains. Wells's review of the economic effects of multinationals in developing countries is reasonable and comes to the not unusual view that host country government policies, particularly on protection, are critical variables.

Hawkins's paper, on the structural changes in the American economy resulting from overseas investment, concludes that this has not meant a loss of diversity and resilience in the source country, and that more profound effects have resulted from the switch to a more service-based economy and from pressure on raw materials. Vernon's discussion of the power of multinationals in developing countries ends rather inconclusively with the view that multinationals should be made ' socially accountable ' at an international level. Richard Cooper suggests, in a piece on multinationals and planning, that discussions would be better directed to deciding how far governments should interfere with markets, particularly how far policy-induced national incentives to multinationals should be condoned. The most challenging paper in the volume is that of Horst, whose discussion of the taxation of American multinationals centres on the use of tax neutrality, which he defines as equalising the tax burden on domestic and overseas investments. He views current American tax law as favouring American exporters (through the tax device known as DISC) but also suggests changes in the method of calculating foreign tax credit for overseas investors, the elimination of tax deferral allowed on remitted earnings, and the end of tax exemption for earnings from less developed countries. His views are vigorously challenged in a lively discussion after the paper.

In short, laymen and serious researchers interested in multinationals will find something of value in each of these books, but despite the display of analytical skills, the latter group should be provoked into bemoaning the paucity of the theoretical underpinnings, which represents the major weakness of both books.

*University of Bradford* PETER J. BUCKLEY

[2] *Global Reach*: The Power of the Multinational Corporations. London: Cape. 1975. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1976, p. 261.

**The International Monetary Fund 1966–1971:** The System under Stress. Vol. I: Narrative. Vol. II: Documents. By Margaret Garritsen de Vries. *Washington: IMF. 1977. 699 and 339 pp. $11.00 and $6.00 or $15.00 the set.*

**Balance of Power or Hegemony: The Interwar Monetary System.** Edited by Benjamin M. Rowland. *New York: New York University Press for the Lehrman Institute. 1976. 266 pp. $10.95.*

**The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration.** By Loukas Tsoukalis. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1977. 192 pp. £8·50.*

**The Origins of International Economic Disorder:** a Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present. By Fred L. Block. *Berkeley: University of California Press. 1977. 282 pp. $14.00.*

**World Monetary Disorder:** National Policies vs. International Imperatives. Edited by Patrick M. Boarman and David G. Tuerck. *New York: Praeger. (Distributed in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 1976. 269 pp. £11·60.*

**Eurocurrencies and the International Monetary System.** Edited by Carl H. Stern, John H. Makin and Dennis E. Logue. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 413 pp. $12.00. Pb: $5.00.*

**The Economics of the Euro-Currency System.** By George W. McKenzie. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 141 pp. £7·95.*

**The Euro-Bank: its Origins, Management and Outlook.** By Steven I. Davis. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 125 pp. £6·95.*

THE International Monetary Fund is something of a rarity among international organisations. It not only rejects the more general, quiet-lifer view that a staid and anodyne annual report is perfectly adequate to put on record the institution's activities, it actually goes to considerable pains to produce official histories which try hard to relate these activities to the sometimes fierce and often complex international debates which were their context.

The first of these, edited by J. Keith Horsefield, appeared in three volumes in 1969 and consisted of a *Chronicle* written by the editor, a volume of special articles and one of documents. It covered a span of over 20 years from the first wartime planning discussions to the end of 1965. It has proved an invaluable reference book. Now his successor and former assistant, Margaret de Vries, has followed with an account of the next six years up to the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971. Though it looks much the same as the earlier history—and its price is even more heavily subsidised—the contents have been more ambitiously organised. Instead of the chronicle format, Mrs. de Vries has tackled in turn the main topics and issues that arose in the period. The argument over reserve asset creation, leading up to the Stockholm Agreement of 1968 and the allocation of the first issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), was the first of these and takes up well over a third of the narrative volume. Another substantial section deals with the Fund's part in and response to the series of international monetary crises that started with the sterling devaluation of 1967 and ended with the crisis precipitated and manipulated by the United States in 1971.

Writing on more troubled times and on more politicised issues than her predecessor, Mrs. de Vries has shown a truly acrobatic nimbleness in walking the official historian's tightrope. If there are occasional pregnant silences between the lines, she has still managed to present a coherent and readable account which puts the IMF in as favourable a light as possible while not offending the political sensibilities of any of the executive directors to whom her text had to be submitted. And by summarising the discussions at Executive Board meetings and the papers submitted to them, she has added very substantially to the source material available to other scholars and historians. Her treatment—to take just one example—of the Fund's dealings with the Bank of England and the British Treasury under Callaghan in 1967, under the crosshead 'Fund urges more stringent policies', is a masterpiece of calculated understatement (p. 442).

Tactful towards the British, is Mrs. de Vries perhaps a trifle impatient towards the French? To say that when General de Gaulle attacked the gold exchange standard in his famous press conference of February 1965 he was demanding 'an immediate return to the gold standard' (p. 61) is surely a bit of an over-simplification of what was (despite the simple-Simon language) a rather more subtle and politically-pointed position. This is also where the rather restricted selection of documents, which includes those produced by the Fund staff or resulting from negotiations between Fund members, does less than historian's justice to the voices of opposition. Horsefield, for example, included John Williams's key-currency plan along with the White, Keynes, French and Canadian proposals at Bretton Woods in his volume of documents. But one looks in vain in Mrs. de Vries's collection for the CRU (Composite Reserve Unit) proposals (referred to briefly in the text) put forward by Giscard d'Estaing, Bernstein and Roosa, all of which would have thrown useful light on the political issues underlying the reserve-asset creation debate.

M. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director until the Americans in effect sacked him in 1973, has the author's loyal admiration. (It will be interesting to see how the next IMF history—assuming that there will be one—will treat his banishment.) She argues that he has succeeded in bringing about a shift in the Fund's attitudes to developing countries (p. 634), and that, next to the SDR agreement, this was his greatest achievement. In the account of Fund policies on quotas, buffer-stock financing and compensatory finance there is some evidence of sympathy. But as the post-OPEC discussions showed, sympathy with technical assistance is not good enough. The fundamental conflicts over the management of the international monetary system remain. Here they are predictably played down, but they will have to be more squarely faced in the next history.

Two other very useful contributions to the now fast-growing literature on international monetary history are the Tsoukalis and Rowland books. The latter is a collection of half-a-dozen historical essays commissioned by the non-partisan Lehrman Institute of New York on the international monetary problems and relations of the interwar period. This is a subject poorly or superficially treated in most general history texts, and apart from the Kindleberger and Galbraith studies of the world depression there is a sad dearth of books for non-specialists. Most of the contributors deal from one perspective or another with the question suggested by the title and first posed in those terms by Kindleberger: Is world economic order best served when one country exercises hegemony over the system or when

power is shared among a plurality of authorities? Kindleberger, it will be remembered, thought the interwar system broke down for lack of leadership—Britain having proved unable and the United States unwilling to provide it. Calleo, sharing with Robert Gilpin a strong aversion to American imperialism, argues from these research papers that hegemony is not essential to world monetary order. He finds the system of negotiated relations among recuperating national economies that emerged in the 1930s superior to the 'doomed liberalism' of the 1920s (p. 250). But according to another contributor, Bruce Brittain, stability in the system was achieved in the 1920s, but more by good luck than good management since it resulted from a largely accidental co-ordination of national monetary policies. As Britain and France, pursuing inconsistent goals, increasingly diverged from each other, and as America pursued a misconceived contradictory monetary policy damaging to everybody, the 'strains of inconsistent policy thus caused the dissolution of the international monetary order'. In stressing the external impact of American domestic monetary management, Brittain implies that the balance-of-power or hegemony choice does not really exist. For the United States has a dominant role whether it is positively exercising leadership in the system or whether it is negatively acting as a drag upon it. Judith Kooker's contribution on French financial diplomacy in the interwar period also deserves mention, for, like Brittain, she usefully demonstrates the close connection between external and internal monetary problems and policies.

The question that Loukas Tsoukalis asks—and history is only really interesting when it is concerned with such rather large questions—is whether all the plans for European monetary union were doomed to fail, and whether therefore the whole neo-functionalist school of integration theory has been barking up the wrong tree. Just as useful, therefore, as the historical narrative of successive plans frustrated by unruly market forces, is his analysis of economic and political determinism and his explanations of relevant theory (both of economic theory for political scientists unfamiliar with economics and of political theory for economists unfamiliar with politics). The narrative starts with the first flush of innocent European enthusiasm in the late 1940s and ends with the regretfully pessimistic Marjolin report to the European Commission in 1975. This concluded that if there had been any movement since 1969 and since the first conception of the snake in the tunnel, it had been backward.

The study concludes that throughout the whole venture the EEC countries were vainly seeking to go beyond the limits set by underlying economic forces on the political decisions of advanced industrialised economies. 'In a world of growing interdependence, they feel more and more the need to use instruments of internal economic policy and the exchange rate, which, as the result of this very interdependence, are becoming increasingly ineffective' (p. 171). Reading Tsoukalis's account of the long-drawn-out debate between 'monetarists' and 'economists' it is hard not to be struck by the amount of pretentious, expensive and generally bad advice the Commission was given by the experts. Better by far to have listened to a sceptic like Aron whose caustic conclusions (in *L'Europe des Crises* for example [1]) were much more relevant to the fundamental questions posed, rightly, by Tsoukalis.

[1] Triffin, Robert, and others. Brussels: Établissements Emile Bruylant for Bibliothèque de la Fondation Paul-Henri Spaak, 1976.

Back to more general problems of the international monetary system with a semi-historical approach to current issues. Fred Block is a young American sociologist, a follower of Gabriel Kolko.[2] His approach is described by Kindleberger in a recommendatory blurb as 'radical-revisionist' and he does occasionally get carried away on the subject of American capitalism. To say, for instance, that American policy makers in their anxiety to build an open world economy after the war 'were more concerned about national capitalism in Western Europe than they were with a possible invasion by the Red Army or successful socialist revolution' seems a mild exaggeration, even if one agrees that the cold war version is only a very partial interpretation of postwar history. By 'national capitalism'—for which he claims Keynes as an early advocate—Block means the deliberate effort to insulate the national economy against the destabilising effects of international trade and capital movements, using state power for welfare objectives like full employment and economic security—what others would call neo-mercantilism. Just how he distinguishes national capitalism from the democratic socialism which is his ultimate ideal and why the former should be a stage on the road to this goal is never made very clear. But it does not matter greatly for Block is still worth reading for his historical analysis.

The originality of his book lies in his persistent, painstaking demonstration that it was always the balance of political and economic forces within the United States which determined its international monetary relations and the positions it took on the management of the international monetary system. For instance, when he points out the effect of cold war rearmament on American export industries and the consequent weakening of the free-trade lobby in Congress, it sounds no more than commonsense. But the point is that too few economists or political historians who have written about the same events have either seen these connections between domestic and external monetary/political problems, or if they have seen them, have bothered to explain them. Now that the United States, in order to regain its own freedom of action, has destroyed the Bretton Woods system it laboured so hard to create, Block argues that the key problem characteristic of advanced capitalist states is inflation. But he concludes, pessimistically, that the United States is unlikely to permit an effective system of joint management with Europe and Japan, and that the alternative development of supranational economic and monetary authorities (such as presidents of multinationals sometimes say they dream of in their more visionary moments) will be impossible because in practice neither the multinationals nor national governments will tolerate them—a conclusion that could well be demonstrated from the IMF official history.

Perhaps significantly, only one of the twenty contributors to *World Monetary Disorder* registered any objection to the book's title. There are some good pieces—Paul Volcker's on reform and David Meiselman on world inflation particularly stay in the mind. But the practice of indiscriminate publishing of fairly ephemeral conference papers at exorbitant prices is both persistent and deplorable. The organisers may like it because the book registers in catalogues under their names; the contributors seldom

[2] See *The Politics of War, the World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945.* (New York: Random House. 1968. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p. 331. *The Limits of Power, the World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1954.* (New York: Harper and Row. 1972.)

resist; the publishers find a captive market in the libraries. But readers would probably much rather the organisers took the trouble to place the best papers in journals while quietly forgetting about the rest.

Much the same comment applies to the less exorbitant collection of papers on Eurocurrencies. There are only five of these, given to a conference in October 1974 sponsored by the US Treasury and the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, but the volume is swollen by transcribed verbal comments as well as supplementary papers. The four issues treated are the effect of Eurocurrency business on national financial management; the functioning of international capital markets; policy issues under fixed or managed floating rates; and the question of control. There is no sign of much concern for the debt problems of developing countries. The book has a useful bibliography.

For general readers and students, a more practical contribution on this important aspect of the international monetary system is George McKenzie's short but comprehensive explanation of how the Eurocurrency loan—a natural innovation in a world of uncertainty—threatens to expose the international system to instability. He makes a very good point that the money supply estimates around which so much policy-making argument revolves are now really obsolete since they take inadequate account of the extra liquidity available through the Eurobanks from the Eurocurrency markets. McKenzie does not pose the issue quite as luridly as Fred Block who writes of the 'gradual tendency to self-destruct' in the system; but his message is not very different.

An interesting contrast to the academic economist's more Olympian approach, which may be more to the taste of business readers, is that of Steven Davis, an American banker with first-hand experience of the Euromarkets. He is naturally more concerned to advise bankers of the profits to be made and the risks they run, and to counsel prudence and the long-term view than to analyse the impact on the international monetary system. The advice is the more trenchant for relying heavily on direct interviews with Eurobank executives as well as on his own experience and reading. But the conclusions of the two studies do not conflict; the warning notes are clear. And while McKenzie points to the advantages offered to the United States government in its public financing strategies, Davis points to the comparative advantage to American banks (the larger ones especially) in profiting with impunity from the opportunities.

*London School of Economics* SUSAN STRANGE

**A Guide to International Monetary Reform.** By George N. Halm. *Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 1975. 126 pp. £7·00.*

**The Politics of International Monetary Reform—The Exchange Crisis.** By Michael J. Brenner. *Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Wiley and Sons, Chichester.) 144 pp. £9·60. $14.85.*

In the preface to his book Michael Brenner notes that the subject of international monetary affairs is not one that used to excite the interest of political scientists, who viewed it as an impenetrable intellectual territory. He suggests that the severe dislocations which the international economy

has suffered recently have exposed economic policy makers and monetary institutions as fallible and legitimate subjects for the attentions of the analyst of international affairs. Susan Strange's volume[1] on the politics of international monetary relations was published in the same year as Mr. Brenner's book and showed how valuable the view of the political scientist can be in increasing our understanding of international monetary problems. As Mr. Brenner comments, inhibitions about trespassing over academic boundaries are no longer justified; this is an obviously important subject, in need of continuing critical examination from both the theoretical and political points of view.

The two books reviewed here provide very readable examples of both these approaches. George Halm, whose first book *International Monetary Cooperation* was published more than thirty years ago, continues here his assessment of the International Monetary Fund's approach to the reform of the international monetary system, leading up to the proposals of June 1974 by a committee of the IMF's Board of Governors, the Committee of Twenty, which appeared as an 'Outline of Reform'. He provides background and critical comment on the problems of the role of gold, the dollar and the IMF, of international liquidity and Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). He points out what he considers to be the basic weakness of the par-value system and examines alternative approaches to a more flexible system of exchange rates, with useful additional chapters on the problems of a European Monetary Union and the less-developed countries.

Halm feels that the Committee of Twenty's recommendations on adjustment of exchange rates 'must be criticized for backsliding in the direction of greater rigidity' (p. 101), which would cause a reappearance of the large parity changes that led to the crises of the past and the need for reform. He advocates a system of managed floating, or of a gliding band. The British crises of 1976, which occurred while the authorities were attempting to manage the exchange rate, have not served to clarify the necessary solution to these problems and the mechanisms for managing a managed float are only now being worked out. We are still going through that 'transition toward an indeterminate future' which Michael Brenner, in his book, ascribes to the post-1973 situation. The IMF conference at Manila in October 1976 recommended that the Executive Directors should consider the best way to carry out the firm surveillance over members' exchange rate policies outlined in the Second Amendment to the IMF articles.

Debate on the merits of the different exchange rate systems continues, and support for stable par values continues to be part of contemporary discussion, especially within the EEC, so both George Halm's ability to explain in plain language its more technical aspects and Michael Brenner's attempt to shed light on the reasons why the parties involved in the 1973 exchange-rate crisis advocated the policies which they did, are welcome. Brenner sees this as an opportunity to analyse the process of collective economic decision making and to note 'the contradictory pressures placed on national leaders by the compulsions of domestic politics and the requirements of international stability' (p. xii). His analysis of the motivation of the parties involved is better for the United States than for other coun-

[1] *International Monetary Relations*, Vol. 2 of *International Economic Relations of the Western World 1959–1971*, edited by Andrew Shonfield. London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 1976. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1976, p. 617.

tries. We get a good picture of the personalities—Secretary Schultz, with his coterie of young 'free floating' economists, and Dr. Arthur Burns, of the Federal Reserve Board, a 'supporter of fixed exchange rates as the essential secure reference point of international commerce and finance' (p. 53).

This reviewer may only be indulging in well-worn British pique at finding Mr. Brenner firmly placing Britain 'well along in any discussion of national positions' (p. 61); but his decision to refer to those people, usually described by the press as 'finance ministers', as either '"Treasury Secretary" or "Economics Minister" interchangeably' (p. 10), does not help clarify his discussion when it covers European ministers. He does not explain the distinction between the civil service and political elements within the British Treasury, so that one feels his method of contrasting the attitudes of finance ministers and officials with those of central bank directors oversimplifies the internal structure of these organisations. More clarification of the national differences in both these areas could conveniently have been given in the section on crisis management where he examines national positions.

Two further small complaints are that while his book has excellent bibliographical references at the end of each chapter, which are of value to students, its index is so brief as to limit the book's usefulness as a reference volume, and its price will put it beyond the range of students, who would find it an enlivening addition to their reading on this subject.

*Chatham House* JOCELYN STATLER

## SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

**The Crucial Years 1939–1941: The World at War.** By Hanson W. Baldwin. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1977. 499 pp. £12·50.*

**The Last European War:** September 1939–December 1941. By John Lukacs. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1977. 562 pp. £7·95.*

HITLER and the Second World War would seem to be one of the few growth industries in the Western economy. Perhaps the vicarious experience of war, like alcohol and tobacco, acts as a drug. Notwithstanding the conviction that war is absurd audiences flock to the latest martial blockbuster while readers devour yet more biographies of Hitler. However, at a deeper level much more is involved than mass escapism. The re-thinking and re-enactment of the Second World War is an attempt to understand and to come to terms with a cataclysm whose effects are still felt over thirty years later.

These two books share a common theme: the years 1939–41 were a turning point not only in the history of the Second World War but in the history of Europe, marking as they did the demise of the European state system and the emergence of the global pre-eminence of the United States and the Soviet Union. This said, the authors' approaches are as like as chalk and cheese. Mr. Baldwin offers a conventional blow-by-blow chronicle of military and political events. After Henri Michel's *The Second World*

*War*[1] another general history is surely superfluous. Moreover the book is cliché-ridden and lacks balance. Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Hirohito and Churchill were 'inexorably a product' of their 'peoples' and of their 'times' (p. 18). As for balance, the war in Russia on which so much hinged in 1941 is given only one tenth of the book with one small map while the Pacific theatre in the few weeks from Pearl Harbour to the end of the year receives almost as much space.

By contrast Professor Lukacs is stimulating, challenging and original. He essays the history of Europe in this period, analysing the moral, political, economic and sociological impact of the war. Born in Hungary and educated in Hungary and England, Professor Lukacs does justice to central and eastern Europe—often neglected by Western historians. The theme of total war is explored with elegance and erudition. The author deploys a wide range of sources with great skill and cogency. The march of events is not neglected but over two thirds of the book is devoted to the movements and forces at work. Particularly skilful is the assessment of Pius XII's policy towards the Jews and Nazi Germany. Naturally, such a vast enterprise has flaws. The effort to reconstruct the sociography of Europe is little more than a collection of vignettes—partly for lack of space, partly because the specialist reconstruction remains to be done. Chapter 6 on the convergence of thought and belief attempts too much and becomes rather bitty. The footnotes, though frequently effective and fascinating, are over-abundant and contain enough material for another book. More important, they sometimes obscure instead of clarifying issues. For instance on page 86, note 23, we read: 'Here is a mystery. The newsreel film of the French armistice shows Hitler dancing a kind of silly little jig . . . The film was (and is) faked'. Later in the same note Professor Lukacs refers to a German diarist who saw the newsreel in October 1940 in Berlin with Hitler performing the same dance. He concludes: 'Were the Germans so stupid as to show the American version of the film . . . Are there two versions of the film? '. Then almost at the end of the book a brief footnote refers to the 'falsification' of the newsreel (p. 533, n. 16). But these are minor blemishes in a major work that deserves to be very widely read.

*University of Bradford* ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

**British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War.** By Elisabeth Barker. *London: Macmillan. 1976. 320 pp. £10·00.*

AFTER her contribution on 'British Decision-making over Yugoslavia' to *British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece,*[1] Elisabeth Barker has now widened her horizons to include Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. On the British side, Miss Barker has explored the major sources, such as the Foreign Office, Cabinet Office and Chiefs of Staff records. The principal gap consists of the files of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), which remain closed to scholars, but the author has been able to fill this to a limited extent by using SOE docu-

[1] London: Deutsch. 1975. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1976, p. 279.

[1] Auty and Clogg (Eds.). (London: Macmillan in assoc. with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. 1975). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1975, p. 641.

ments which appear in other departmental files, by interviewing and corresponding with former SOE operatives and by using some collections of private papers. She has also tried to round out the picture by using certain South-east European sources, some of which—like the valuable memoirs of the Yugoslav communist, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo—are not available in a Western language. In other words, the documentation is most impressive. The only criticism this reviewer would make concerns the use of British reports of the Hitler-Horthy conversation of April 1943 (p. 249) when the German record is available; and the only amplification the existence of an English version of the official history of the Albanian Party of Labour which Miss Barker cites in French.

While the book covers the whole of the Second World War and includes much that is new and interesting on the earlier phases of the conflict—notably an interesting account of the Yugoslav coup of March 27, 1941 which puts the British role in its true perspective—most readers will probably be more interested in the later stages, and especially in the process whereby Britain was compelled to cede all influence in the area, with the important exception of Greece, to the Soviet Union. By putting a map depicting the famous 'percentages agreement' of October 1944 on the dust jacket, the publishers would appear to share this view.

The fact that South-east Europe was liberated by Soviet rather than by Anglo-American forces was, of course, the main reason why Britain lost its influence in the region. As Miss Barker points out, 'It is wrong to think that by concluding the percentage agreement Churchill "abandoned" or "handed over" South-East Europe, except Greece, to Russia. The Red Army was already in military control of Bulgaria and Rumania and parts of Yugoslavia and Hungary before he concluded it on 9 October 1944. The agreement merely formalised an already existing situation, except that the original percentages, in so far as they had a meaning, under-stated actual Soviet predominance' (pp. 146–47). She suggests, moreover, that the die was cast as early as the Quebec conference of August 1943 as a result of the military decisions reached there, and in drawing attention to a neglected but significant aspect of the negotiations at the Moscow foreign ministers' conference in October of the same year, she shows how soon the Russians staked their claim to exclusive control of South-east Europe: 'they asked for deletion from a British draft of a Four-Power declaration of an undertaking that there would be joint action in all matters relating to "any occupation of any enemy territory and the liberation of other states held by the enemy". This seemed to show that Stalin was determined to keep his own hands free to act as he wanted in territory occupied by the Red Army, and that this was more important than trying to shackle the Anglo-Americans in territories they occupied' (p. 137). Perhaps the Soviet leader got the idea from Anglo-American behaviour in Italy.

The percentages agreement resulted from a growing awareness by the British that they were powerless to affect the issue outside Greece, although the Foreign Office argued in June 1944 that they should avail themselves of every opportunity to spread their influence in Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania and Hungary. 'This would need "careful handling . . . to avoid an open contest with the Russians . . . but in the long run it might be effective inasmuch as there are elements in those countries which will be frightened of Russian domination and anxious to reinsure with Great Britain. This,

indeed, probably applies to General Tito himself . . ."' (p. 141).[2] Despite this recognition of Tito's imperfect relationship with the Soviet Union, Miss Barker concludes a discussion of the Macedonian question by remarking that 'The weaknesses of Britain's war-time policy were lack of inside information about the inner workings of the Communist parties, a belief that the Communist world was monolithic, and a failure to understand that in the Balkans, Communists were swayed as much as anyone else by national passions and prejudices, or at least by the need to play on such feelings in their followers' (p. 203). She might have added that there was sometimes also a failure to appreciate the strength of the communists and the weakness of their opponents, as in Albania for example, where the British supported the Zogists under Abas Kupi until it was too late.

Thorough and well-argued though this book is, one could make two criticisms of it. The first concerns its structure. Miss Barker devotes separate chapters to individual countries and in spite of the cross-references, this sometimes tends to obscure the overall picture. The second may perhaps be regarded as unfair since it takes the author to task for not having written a different book. On the penultimate page, however, Miss Barker provides such a tantalisingly brief glimpse of the kind of economic and social system which Britain would have liked to see emerge in South-east Europe after the war that one wishes she had explored the matter in more detail. One of the defects of traditional diplomatic history, of which this book is an excellent example, is that it rarely strays from the military and political into the social and economic fields. But foreign policy almost invariably has a socio-economic dimension and it certainly produces socio-economic consequences. Both the dimension and the consequences deserve a much fuller treatment than they have received here.

*University of Leicester* GEOFFREY WARNER

**The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940–1944:** A History of the Mouvements Unis de la Résistance. By John F. Sweets. *De Kalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press. 1976. 260 pp. $12.50.*

RELATIVELY little has been published in English on the internal politics of the wartime resistance movements and any addition is therefore welcome. Professor Sweets has painstakingly worked his way through the archives of the Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale and the Bibliothèque Nationale; and if the upshot is very often to confirm assumptions already made from other sources, the work is none the less valuable for that. The author has concentrated on the resistance movement in the South of France; in successive chapters he surveys the early development of the movement, its social composition, the growing strength and evolution towards unity of the main groups, the gradual alignment of the united movement behind de Gaulle and its relations with the Gaullists, the traditional non-communist parties and with the Communists themselves. In a

[2] Incidentally, Miss Barker's account of the origins of this document is misleading. According to the official historian of British foreign policy during the Second World War, it was a direct response to Churchill's query to Eden on May 4, 1944, '. . . [A]re we going to acquiesce in the Communisation of the Balkans . . . ?' Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Volume III (London: H.M.S.O. 1971), pp. 115–16.

final chapter Professor Sweets considers the military role of the resistance in the liberation and its political role then and in the immediate post-liberation period.

As has been suggested, there are few revelations. It is not surprising to find that a movement which was based on opposition to Nazi Germany, Vichy and all they represented should have soon displayed a markedly anti-fascist, republican and radical coloration; that the leaders should have been, to begin with, mainly middle-class professional men, while the officer class in general stood aloof until after the total occupation of November 1942; or that working-class support only became really significant after Laval's introduction of forced labour in the autumn of 1942. It was to be expected, too, that the movement would gain in popular support as the prospects of Allied victory changed from remote to possible to probable—and in this respect also the end of 1942 marked a turning point: but the author brings out how relatively small was the percentage of the population actively engaged, even after this date.

In many ways the chapter dealing with the Communist Party (PCF) is the most interesting. The author stresses that, contrary to what one might have expected, the resistance movement in the unoccupied South was the more overtly political, while in the occupied zone, where the Communists were stronger, the emphasis was more on direct action against the Germans. Perforce perhaps, one might say. It is certainly a little difficult to accept readily the conclusion that the PCF became 'dedicated patriots after June 1941'. Indeed the very speed with which the Party turned from defeatism to active resistance at that point surely confirms that its actions were dedicated to the interests of Russia rather than those of France. It is clear too that the lack of effective military co-ordination between the PCF and the Mouvement Unis de la Résistance, if not the lack of political unity, was largely due to the former's unwillingness to surrender its cadres to non-communist leadership.

Sweets concludes that the most effective contribution of the resistance to the liberation was political rather than military, in that it effectively brought about the smooth transition from Vichy to Gaullist administration, presenting the reluctant President Roosevelt with a fait accompli. This may well be true and is the book's most interesting conclusion.

Two final points should perhaps be added. The author appears to rely solely on American and French documents and, judging by his bibliography, does not seem to have consulted very many British secondary sources or memoirs. This is surprising since ties between the British and French resistance were on the whole closer and of longer duration than those with the Americans. Also—a typical fault of a first book—the text is too heavily garnished with footnotes and references, not all of them essential. It is convenient to have footnotes at the bottom of the text, but not when they occupy a quarter or a third of a page. On that scale they should go at the back, or better still, be pruned.

*University of Reading* KEITH SAINSBURY

**'London-Regjeringa': Norge i Krigsalliansen 1940–1945.** Vol. I: 1940–1942: Prøvetid. By Olav Riste. *Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget for the Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling. 1973. 291 pp. Nkr. 65.00.*

DESPITE the enormous number of books and articles on the Second World War that have appeared over the past ten to twenty years, very little indeed has been written so far about the West European exile governments. Dr. Riste's book, the first part of what will ultimately be a two-volume work, is one of several signs that this gap is in process of being filled: others include the new series of Dutch Official Documents, and the decision by Sir William Deakin and his colleagues to convene a conference in London later this year devoted entirely to the problems of the exile governments.

Dr. Riste's contribution to the debate is virtually flawless. In many respects it should be seen as a continuation of his earlier book on Norway in the First World War.[1] In that war, Norwegian neutrality had been sorely tested: in this it was finally broken, and the Norwegian leadership, first in London, and then subsequently in Norway itself, was obliged to accept the fact that both sentiment and interest tied the country to the Atlantic community. Logical though the decision to opt for the West may now appear to have been, the process of adjustment to the realities of the international system was by no means easy, and it is greatly to Dr. Riste's credit that, while aware of the *forces profondes*, he has nevertheless managed to show how complex the process was for those actually involved in it.

The most difficult decision of all was undoubtedly the actual decision to go into exile. Two months of military reverses had done little to boost the morale of the members of the Labour Party government, led by Johan Nygaardsvold, and still less to raise the British in their estimation, and yet, with extraordinary courage, they decided to leave their country, some of them for the first time, in a couple of alien warships, with only slender hopes of ever returning alive. Their departure was by no means universally understood in Norway itself, and they themselves were not all that clear about its implications. It was obviously, at one level, a gesture of defiance against Germany; it was far less obviously a vote of confidence in Britain. Against the background of the fall of France, the threat of a German invasion of the United Kingdom, the Battle of Britain, and a political crisis in Norway itself in which representatives of the Storting came within an ace of making a deal with the Germans, Nygaardsvold and his colleagues had to decide how best to dispose of their not inconsiderable assets—a substantial merchant fleet, gold reserves, men and materials, and, by no means least, their status as the constitutional government of Norway. And they had to do this in a manner which would contribute towards the defence of their new home and ensure them some influence when Britain, and then the United States and the Soviet Union, discussed Nordic affairs, without compromising their links with their compatriots, or complicating their own eventual return to their homeland.

Dr. Riste describes the way in which they arrived at their decisions in considerable detail and with scarcely a wasted word. A specialist in military history, he reveals an ability, not always apparent amongst his colleagues, to discuss diplomatic, political and economic questions as convincingly as operational planning. His judgments on both men and matters are clear and

[1] *The Neutral Ally: Norway's Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; London: Allen and Unwin, 1965). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1966, p. 306.

fair. He is able, for example, to give a thoroughly sympathetic portrait of Halvdan Koht, the first exiled foreign minister, which in no way weakens his explanation of why Trygve Lie, the most outspoken advocate of the British alliance, opposed and eventually replaced him. The book is in sum a formidable achievement, and one can only look forward to the second volume.

*European University Institute, Florence* P. W. LUDLOW

**Nemesis at Potsdam:** The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans: Background, Execution, Consequences. By Alfred M. de Zayas. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1977. 268 pp. £5·95.*

BOOKS such as this which are inspired by righteous indignation deserve a respectful welcome. There can be no dispute that the eviction and resettlement of some 16 million people which occurred in Eastern Europe at the end of the war caused enormous suffering, though it may be argued that those of the 16 million who are still living are better off today than they would have been if they had stayed in their original homes. It is important that authors such as Mr. de Zayas should from time to time remind us of man's inhumanity to man. But, to make their case, they have to evade the fundamental problem of the relation between power and justice. Sad experience tells us that human beings will not always treat their fellows with brotherly love. It is an over-simplification to say that this is always due to malice: more often it arises from misunderstanding, fear for one's own security and discrepant ideas about the just or 'proper' relationship between groups. Are we therefore to impose our own ideas of morality? It was at any rate popularly supposed that this was what the Western democracies were doing in going to war with Hitler. But we only succeeded in beating him with the help of a society with totally different ideas and bringing about the very miseries which Mr. de Zayas describes.

The author's answer would be that possibly the West could not have prevented what happened in Eastern Europe, but at least we should not have palliated it. At one point he suggests that we could have influenced the Russians by cutting off supplies to them. This might have prevented them from beating Hitler or else have driven them to make peace with him: experience with the ending of Lend-Lease and with the Marshall Plan suggests it would have been most unlikely to make them act as we wanted. In any case public opinion in Britain and America would not have tolerated such a policy before 1946. Had Truman and Attlee refused at Potsdam so much as to consider the Oder-Neisse line, the conference would probably have broken up. With hindsight one may think that little would have been lost. Yet the happiness and prosperity of many more than 16 million would have been enhanced if the victors could have continued to work together. He is a bold man who will say that the Western statesmen should have taken the initiative in making this impossible earlier than they did. As Mr. de Zayas says in one of the passages where he tries to come to terms with the brutal facts, 'the cause of securing world peace clearly takes precedence over that of achieving local justice'.

Almost every page in this book contains a statement or judgment which it is impossible to accept without at least qualification. Had this not been so, the appeal to the conscience would have been proportionately weaker. All things to rive the heart are here. Let us hope that not all of them are vain.

MICHAEL BALFOUR

## WESTERN EUROPE

**Mediterranean Europe and the Common Market:** Studies of Economic Growth and Integration. Edited by Eric N. Baklanoff. *University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press for the Office for International Studies and Programs. 1977. 244 pp. (Mediterranean Europe Series II.) $13.50.*

UNLIKE many collections of essays, this one is of fairly even quality throughout; and the editor, Professor Baklanoff, has kept a firm hand on the contributors, with the result that all the chapters follow a uniform pattern—historical background, economic developments, impact of the EEC. The principal theme of the book is a bold one in that it assumes a 'Mediterranean region' with reasonably uniform and identifiable characteristics. Yet, without concealing the vast differences between the various Mediterranean lands, the authors manage to highlight some common problems in their various chapters—the dependence on agriculture; the export of migrant workers to the EEC; the influx of tourists with its obvious but seasonal impact on employment.

On the other hand, we realise at once what a diverse collection of countries the Mediterranean area embraces—the political divergence between Yugoslavia and Spain, the vulnerability of tiny Malta to changes in aid and trade, the poverty of Turkey whose per capita income is only one eighth of the West European average, and the rapid industrialisation of Greece and Spain in advance of prospective EEC membership.

What clearly emerges from the book, perhaps intentionally, is that the EEC is having a distinct, sometimes dramatic, effect on the lands of the Mediterranean littoral. But this impact is uneven and, ironically, the Mezzogiorno (which is part of the EEC) seems to be doing less well than Greece which is still outside:

> Southern Italy is the best available example to show that the benefits of economic integration do not accrue to each region uniformly. Free trade can reduce the ability of an impoverished region to compete effectively with a wealthier region. This has happened twice to the south: first, after unification in 1861, and second, after the establishment of the EEC in 1957 (p. 173).

This centre-periphery problem recurs again and again in the course of the book and while we are impressed at the growing interdependence of the EEC and the Mediterranean area, we cannot help feeling, at the same time, that the relationship is largely a one-way street favouring the EEC countries.

Among the several countries dealt with in the book, Spain stands out as a dynamic economy best able to withstand the centripetal forces of the EEC. Professor Baklanoff writes optimistically about Spain's smooth transition to parliamentary democracy, attributing it to the stake of the middle classes in a free market economy. In his scenario, entry to the EEC is seen as a goal (and reward) for achieving the 'decompression of the authoritarian system' (p. 204).

The last chapter in the book focuses on the totality of EEC-Mediterranean relations and discusses their 'coherence'. The writer correctly characterises the Mediterranean accords as 'the more or less random outcome of political trade-offs reflecting the special interests of the member states' (p. 216). The EEC's Mediterranean policy will be easier to implement in the future now that the political log-jam has cleared:

> So long as France obstructed an agreement with Israel, other governments, such as the Dutch, blocked accords with countries such as Spain or Algeria, whose interests France appeared to be defending. The point about the unacceptability of Spain's political system thus became not only a reflection of domestic politics and conviction but also a justification for a position taken partly to defend Israel's interests (p. 217).

But when all is said and done, the book concludes that the EEC is relatively impotent as an agent of integration between itself and the Mediterranean. Trade is only one activity carried on between countries; but tourism, migrant labour, and investment flows still lie largely outside the ambit of the Community. The various agreements between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries are but ' pale reflections ' of their total intercourse.

*Queen's University of Belfast* E. MOXON-BROWNE

**The European Community's Policy towards Eastern Europe.** By John and Pauline Pinder. *London: Chatham House/PEP. 1975. 45 pp. (European Series No. 25.) Pb: £1·30.*

RELATIONS between the European Community and Comecon have for long been a relatively unproductive, yet at the same time tantalising, area for investigation. Throughout the 1960s the Soviet Union's non-recognition of the European Community and the Community's own reluctance to develop an active collective commercial policy towards Eastern Europe made this sterile ground for the pursuit of co-operation through international commercial diplomacy. Explanations for this non-relationship lie, as John and Pauline Pinder clearly and succinctly demonstrate, in a combination of political reservations and inhibitions on both sides as well as technical and more general economic obstacles stemming from the character of trade between Eastern and Western Europe. This contribution to the Chatham House/PEP series provides a helpful discussion of the political context of the Community's relations with Eastern Europe, a useful analysis of the trade profiles of Eastern and Western Europe and a summary of the evolution of the Community's policy towards the ' state trading ' countries.

The Pinders rightly emphasise the greater fluidity and opportunity created by the European Security Conference negotiations, and the moves on both sides towards de facto recognition and a common position which, since 1973, have enabled the Community and Comecon to grope towards establishing official contacts. The sudden and dramatic maturing of the relationship between at least the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany and the European Community over the Community's fishing policy marks a new stage in relations, which the Pinders' study suggested would depend very much on the extent to which circumstances and vital economic interests necessitated closer contact. The study offers a particularly thoughtful and reasoned contribution to two of the major issues in the Community's relations with Eastern Europe, the interest which participants on both sides have in the multilateral and bilateral aspects of their relations, and the rather dubious ' gains ' (in economic terms) which the Community stands to make by relaxing restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe. In remarkably few pages the authors succeed in demonstrating their familiarity with an undoubtedly complex and relatively inaccessible topic.

*UMIST, University of Manchester* CAROLE WEBB

**European Historical Statistics 1750–1970.** By B. R. Mitchell. *London: Macmillan. 1975. 827 pp. £24·00.*

THIS is a valuable companion volume to *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, an earlier publication by Dr. Mitchell that has proved extremely useful. Divided into sections dealing with climate, population and vital statistics, labour force, agriculture, industry, external trade, transport and communications, finance, prices, education, national accounts, the book enables the economic historian to look up details about each country in order to assess the development of its economic activity and its means of production, distribution and exchange, and then to compare the development of one state with another. The Introduction, while advocating a statistical approach to history in order to increase attention to measurement as the most important methodological development in the social sciences this century, conveys some salutary warnings about the inaccuracies of statistical sources, whether through inefficient compilation or bias in purpose: hence, apart from basic population censuses, 'most statistics prior to 1900 were by-products of taxation or military preparedness' (p. viii). There are major problems of relating prices and values in different countries during a period of chaotic inflation such as the early 1920s (a guide to exchange rates would have been useful for the study of various periods). Corn output was measured by volume in some countries but by weight in others.

As one would expect, the population statistics are a strong element in the book. One has the joy of checking the numbers of children actually at school with the population of school age (showing the limited effects of educational legislation such as that in France after 1880). The technologically advanced production sectors, such as aluminium or motor vehicles, early in the 20th century provide more favourable statistics for a country like France, compared to Germany or Britain, than do the coal and steel industries. There are frustrations, such as the lack of figures on, say, steam engines, or numbers of workers per firm. Nevertheless, the book provides a mine of well-researched information that will help put European history on a firmer footing, and the author invites readers to give helpful criticism for a possible future edition. Fortunately, the period covered by the book makes for a coherent whole, ending as it does with the onset of the world financial and economic crises after 1969. The author has done a great service to those interested in seeing Britain in relation to Europe, and in the social and economic aspects of recent international history. Will Dr. Mitchell look next to the United States, Japan, and the wider world?

*University of Reading* NEVILLE WAITES

**The Diplomats:** The Foreign Office Today. By Geoffrey Moorhouse. *London: Cape. 1977. 405 pp. £7·50.*

IF the denizens of the 'Think Tank' succeed in their efforts, if not wholly to destroy, at least to introduce radical reforms in the diplomatic service, we shall be able from this book to form a very good idea of what it was like before they got their hands on it. I must declare my prejudice in favour of an author who shows his good judgment by frequently quoting me explicitly or reproducing my views, but I can honestly say that Geoffrey Moorhouse has taken great trouble to assemble the facts and has given us a full and

realistic picture of life in the Foreign Office and in British embassies. Of course, with all the detail that he has gathered, there are bound to be some inaccuracies—Lord Brimelow authorises me to say that he never was a spy, though the Russians always thought he was one—but they are relatively few and Geoffrey Moorhouse shows a real understanding of what it is like to be a member of this remarkable and, on the whole, efficient institution. It has not always been responsive to changes in the scene in which it works—it has surely now become too large—but it has served the state well and before we tamper with it we should be absolutely sure that the changes proposed are going to make it work better. Digging the plant up by the roots every few years is not a sound prescription for improving its health.

Geoffrey Moorhouse is an experienced journalist with a lucid and lively style and the book is easy to read without being in any way superficial. If I am to pick out the most rewarding chapter, it is for me the account of diplomacy in the European Community, what he calls 'the great game of the twentieth century', the clearest example of the new diplomacy. He is bold enough to pick out by name some of the best members of the service—I hasten to say that I appear only as an author, apart from being described as 'a first aid kit in one disaster area after another'—and I think his judgment of people is generally good.

Let me pick out a few points at random which I think require some comment. Mr. Moorhouse suggests that the diplomat ought to use the telephone more and should curb his passion for putting everything down on paper. My own experience is that apart from the security aspect, the telephone is responsible for much misunderstanding and lack of precision. The Russians, who are good professionals, even put what they call oral communications on paper, so that there can be no mistake in interpreting any of their manifold ways of saying no. Mr. Moorhouse rightly describes the depressing effect on a man of not having enough to do. I have found that the embassies where the staff are happiest are those where life is full of difficulties and everyone is over-occupied. I do not, however, think it fair to describe embassy communities as colonies surrounded by natives, 'some of whom the embassy employs, while the rest are kept at bay as much as possible, except for those in the influential caste with whom it is necessary to treat for survival and for reasons which justify the diplomatic existence'. No ambassador with any sense does anything but discourage his staff from living in a sort of national ghetto. They are expected to show a real interest in the people of the country in which they are living subject to the limits imposed in some countries by the necessary security rules. They will not be able to do their job properly if they fence themselves off from their surroundings.

Finally, a few minor points which I cannot wholly pass by. Part of the job of the ambassador's wife is to look after the families of the staff. Embassy morale depends greatly on her. It would be wholly uneconomic and unfair to make a member of an embassy pay for mending the central heating of a house which he has not chosen and of which he is only the passing tenant. The sovereign principle for the British Council is to give people what they want—mostly English education—not what you think they ought to want. And for the record, members of the Indian Civil Service, of which I was one, were not automatically pushed into the Commonwealth Relations Office. If they were prepared to forgo their compensation in order to get another job in the government, they were interviewed and, if selected, were sent to the Foreign Service or the Home Civil Service, in accordance with their preference. These are relatively small points: I could argue some more: but

they do not detract from my general impression that the book is a serious and well-researched account of the diplomatic life, which will be recognised as such by anyone who knows something of the British Service in the last few years.

HUMPHREY TREVELYAN

**Test Case:** Italy, Ethiopia and the League of Nations. By George W. Baer. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1977. 367 pp. $14.95.*

**Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939.** Second Series, Vol. XV. The Italo-Ethiopian War and German Affairs October 3, 1935–February 29, 1936. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert. *London: HMSO. 1976. 791 pp. £16·50.*

THE Italo-Ethiopian war, which began with the invasion by Italian forces on October 3, 1935, was a 'test case' in that it put to the test the fidelity of League of Nations member states, especially Britain and France, to the principle of collective action against aggression. It was also a test case in so far as it raised for all countries threatened by Fascist revisionism the momentous question whether they should count on the democracies for protection, or privately seek what terms they could with the dictators. George Baer, an American academic who published *The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War* [1] in 1967, tells the story of the war and the accompanying diplomacy in this somewhat pedestrian book, which begins, not with the Wal Wal incident in December 1934 and the subsequent British and French efforts to avert the war by territorial changes at Ethiopia's expense, but with the October invasion. The reasons for this Italian enterprise are not explained, or even guessed at, except for 'revenge for Adowa', 'pride in Italy on the march', 'land and work, a frontier, settled under the Italian flag, to absorb Italy's excess population' (p. 156). But whatever did the Italians really think they were doing in Ethiopia? It mattered so little to them that after the final conquest in May 1936 Mussolini did nothing to develop the country or settle in it the Italians he rewarded for bearing more children. Curiously enough, it was only League sanctions, intended to stop the war, which seemed to the Italian masses to make it worth fighting.

Mr. Baer has little new to say about British and French management of League sanctions. Like most Americans, he condemns London and Paris for pursuing the 'double line'—the phrase first used about this episode by Lord Templewood in *Nine Troubled Years* [2]—that is, the application of sanctions and, at the same time, the attempt to negotiate a settlement with Mussolini, culminating in the ill-starred Hoare-Laval Plan of December 1935. But sanctions, like war in Clausewitz, are presumably intended to change the opponent's will, and so is negotiation: it is a continuation of sanctions with an admixture of other means. However, British public opinion, the main driving force behind sanctions, was not interested in this; for a few brief months it wanted only one thing, Mussolini's defeat. Baer makes a good point in arguing that Stanley Baldwin, then Prime Minister, failed to exploit this British mood enough. 'Baldwin's mistake was in not insisting upon the government's using the Ethiopian affair to consolidate public opinion behind the need for

[1] London: Oxford University Press.
[2] London: Collins. 1954.

rearmament and a more realistic foreign policy. Since the Great War there had not been any foreign issue around which people of Britain rallied so closely to their government as they did in support of the League ' (p. 147).

But could British opinion be so consolidated? After Christmas the nation's attention switched to Edward VIII and Mrs. Simpson: Hitler's Rhineland coup in March, a far graver threat to peace, raised hardly a stir. The French, as Mr. Baer relates, watched Britain's moralistic paroxysm over Ethiopia with incredulity, as they did a similar British spasm over Suez twenty years later; then turned their eyes to the Rhine.

Sir Eric Phipps, then British ambassador in Berlin, wrote home on November 13, 1935, five days before the full application of League sanctions, that 'the present Ethiopian embroglio is mere child's play compared to the problem that will in some not very distant future confront His Majesty's Government '. His dispatch on German reactions to the war in Ethiopia is printed (No. 213) in the latest volume of the British *Documents*, which covers the period from the outbreak of the war until the end of February 1936, though sanctions were not lifted until June. The volume covers the organisation of sanctions, the angry exchanges with France over mutual support in the event of some ' mad dog ' act by Mussolini against Britain, the talks with Italy about a military and naval detente in the Mediterranean, and the Hoare-Laval Plan and its aftermath. But Germany, German rearmament and Hitler's policies hang over the volume like a spectre. There are massive appendices consisting of Foreign Office papers about a ' settlement ' with Germany, including Sir Robert Vansittart's curious suggestion that handing back Germany's colonies might do wonders. There is Phipps's intimation to Hoare on December 19, 1935 that Hitler ' will proceed to the reoccupation (of the Rhineland) whenever a favourable opportunity presents itself ' (No. 404). And there is R. F. Wigram's memorandum of January 16, 1936 (No. 455) on the demilitarised Rhineland zone, concluding with the words: 'I regard its maintenance over anything but a very restricted future as quite impracticable; and therefore it seems to me that what all of us had best be thinking about now is the means of securing its peaceful disappearance.' Compared with this, the Italo-Ethiopian war was a gigantic irrelevance, not least to its originator.

*London School of Economics* F. S. NORTHEDGE

**The Precarious Truce:** Anglo-Soviet Relations 1924–27. By Gabriel Gorodetsky. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 289 pp. £9·00.*

THIS work aims ' to describe and explain two conflicting trends in Anglo-Soviet relations in the period under examination: the British indifference to the steady deterioration of relations after recognition and the Russians' desperate attempts to salvage them ' (p. 258). It portrays in painstaking detail and with exhaustive documentation the evolution of diplomatic attitudes on both sides. The early Russian assumption that foreign policy and formal recognition were unnecessary in a world teetering on the brink of world revolution had by 1924 turned into a sober acceptance of the need to reach a modus vivendi with the outside world. From 1924–27, the objectives of Soviet foreign policy became increasingly national, with the result that, at the time

of the General Strike, 'Comintern, far from being a pillar of Soviet diplomacy, now appeared to be a thorn in its side' (p. 265).

On the British side, the evolution was in the direction of increasing inflexibility. The MacDonald government was never more than half-hearted in its support for recognition in 1924, a move stimulated by considerations of expediency, such as pacification of left-wing and trade union elements, and potential trade opportunities. This attitude, maintains Gorodetsky, 'was far from providing a firm basis for reciprocal relations' (p. 260). But the Conservative government's policy of holding Russia at arm's length, whether the result of an indifferent attitude or in the expectation that 'isolating Russia would force it to resemble other European countries' (p. 261), was not so different from that of its Labour predecessor. Both governments shared a deep suspicion of Russia's motives, attributing its words and deeds to subversive and propagandistic rather than to diplomatic considerations; both governments were committed to the establishment of a new concert of Europe with Britain holding the balance of power—a policy which implied to some degree the ostracising of Russia.

Gorodetsky's work shows the interaction of these policies and the main events of this fascinating early period of Anglo-Soviet relations: the Zinoviev letter affair, the united front tactics in the trade union movement (the subject of a recent work by Daniel F. Calhoun,[1] which unfortunately does not appear in Gorodetsky's bibliography), the General Strike, Krasin's attempted mission of reconciliation and the Arcos Raid. These and other events are given the most scrupulous and scholarly attention based on a wealth of documentary sources. This study will surely remain the definitive work on the subject for many years to come.

*University of Hull* MALCOLM CHAPMAN

**Scotland and Nationalism:** Scottish Society and Politics, 1707–1977. By Christopher Harvie. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1977. 318 pp. £7·50. Pb: £3·95.*

DR. HARVIE has written two books within the covers of one. The first traces nationalism in Scotland from the Union of 1707 to the present. The second is a general treatment of Scottish history, covering also the activities of Scots abroad.

We have had both kinds of books before, and the question is, what is new this time around? The rise in the electoral support for the Scottish National Party is the most obvious political change in Scotland, but the SNP's vote is only partly inspired by nationalism or by a desire for constitutional change. Dr. Harvie gives us very little information about the reasons for the SNP's successes, and he prefers to look well back into the past for an explanation of the current wave of Scottish nationalism. In particular, he uses the peg of Gramsci's theories on which to hang his own interpretation of why nationalist movements emerge. He thus devotes a great deal of space to Scottish intellectual history, and to literary nationalists, and very little to mass political behaviour.

[1] *The United Front: The TUC and the Russians 1923–1928.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1977, p. 139.

The book is not so much a history as an extended essay, following themes through to their contemporary 'crisis-point' (the failure of the Devolution Bill). Such an anti-climax should be worrying to the author, for a great push towards Scottish independence would now appear to be called for in his analysis ('there is no possibility of maintaining the *status quo*', p. 276). But there is every sign of the status quo continuing, and it would appear that mass rather than intellectual support is the missing ingredient in the 'national liberation' of Scotland.

*University of Glasgow* JAMES G. KELLAS

**L'Ardeur.** By Jacques Chaban-Delmas. *Paris: Stock. 1975. 452 pp. Pb.*

**François Mitterrand ou la Tentation de l'Histoire.** By Franz-Olivier Giesbert. *Paris: Seuil. 1977. 334 pp. Pb.*

'HE might have been the continuator of Gaullism, but Pompidou broke him.' Such was Mitterrand's view of his old friend and rival; and in this political autobiography Jacques Chaban-Delmas concurs broadly. The book is an elaborate self-justification, portraying a man who raised himself from *petit-bourgeois* origins by thrift and hard work to become Premier and Presidential candidate in 1974. Chaban sees himself as spontaneous and frank almost to the point of naïvety, inspired only by the wish to serve France; he regrets that the values of the sports field, where he excelled, are not so easily transferable to politics. Fortunately for the reader, this mask of sanctity sometimes falls long enough to allow us some glimpses into the real political animal; though Chaban is resolutely silent about all the most interesting aspects of his career—the Resistance, his relationship with the *barons* of Gaullism, his role in the Mollet government which gave the torturers a free hand in Algeria and, most of all, his connections with the plotters who overthrew the Fourth Republic.

What Chaban does reveal, unwittingly, is the extent to which for all his Gaullism he was a man of the 'system'. It is no accident that he first entered politics as a Radical (the account of his first election campaign is a must for all connoisseurs of Radicalism). For one so naïve, he learned fast; he it was who persuaded the Gaullist deputies to enter the 'system', and soon his charm and skill at backstairs dealing were ensuring the survival of more than one government. Such finesse was always a Radical hallmark; yet it coexisted with a mystical admiration for the authoritarian de Gaulle: 'J'étais subjugué par ce visage que marquait la certitude de son destin. C'était la France!' (p. 106). But analysis was never Chaban's forte. The French defeat in Indochina is described in terms worthy of Lartéguy: 'La France de Verdun . . . vaincue par une multitude de coolies à vélo et à pied . . . portant comme les fourmis des charges inattendues' (p. 195). Similarly, in domestic politics, the failure of Chaban's 'new society' is attributed not to his inadequate socio-economic analyses of contemporary France but, more consolingly, to the manoeuvres of a group of reactionary advisers who happened to catch Pompidou's ear. Like all good Radicals, Chaban's most lasting achievement was in local politics, where he has presided for thirty years over the considerable development of Bordeaux; at national level, his charm and his tactical skill were not enough to give him a chance against the new power-hungry generation of the French

Right, Giscard and Chirac, who did not learn their ethics on the rugby field. The way they eliminated him in 1974 is an eloquent proof of that.

Mitterrand's career bears a striking resemblance to that of Chaban, with whom he sat in several governments before 1958. His tortuous rise from an austere, provincial Catholic upbringing to the leadership of the Parti Socialiste and possibly of a French government in 1978 is ably charted by Giesbert, a journalist from *Nouvel Observateur*, who brings to his subject a good awareness of postwar French politics, supported by a number of interviews with key personae. In general the author's obvious sympathy for his subject does not gain the upper hand over his powers of critical analysis. Like Chaban, Mitterrand entered politics through the Resistance; like Chaban also he occupied a pivotal place in many Fourth Republic coalitions, missing the highest office only through lack of time. If by 1957 he was a 'cacique' (p. 114) of the system, he had no great faith to sustain him; Faure saw him, aptly, as 'un radical à la Léon Bourgeois. Politiquement, rien ne nous séparait' (p. 321). The early Mitterrand was an opportunist, without long-term aims, but a superb tactician. If he showed periodic fits of reformism, as on colonial policy, then he could forget these when required (*cf.* his total silence as Justice Minister in Mollet's government). Since 1958 he has been lucky; rivals for the leadership of the united Left have died off or discredited themselves and the prize has fallen to him by elimination. While Giesbert shows how hard he has worked to build up an alliance of non-dependence with the Communist Party, so too have others, notably the Centre de recherche et d'études socialistes (CERES), dismissed here with some of Mitterrand's cheaper witticisms.

Giesbert also brings out well Mitterrand's Nixon-like capacity for survival —a useful quality, given some of his own mistakes and the type of smear campaign to which the French Right periodically and unjustly subjects him. But he also suggests that Mitterrand has no clear conception of socialism and that it is unwise to predict what he will do if ever he achieves office. Having benefited from a literary and historical training, Mitterrand is wont to ask, it seems, whether he would be a Blum or a Jaurès if in power. Reading between the lines of this book one suspects that he might turn out to be more of a Wilson or a Callaghan.

*University of Reading* DAVID HANLEY

**1956 Suez.** By Christian Pineau. *Paris: Laffont. 1976. 233 pp. Pb.*

IT is quite widely known that as well as being a politician, Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister at the time of the Suez crisis, is a writer of children's fairy stories. After reading these memoirs, one can only wonder which side of his persona was dominant at the time of writing. Thus, among the many egregious propositions the reader is seriously invited to accept are the following: first, that M. Pineau was unaware of the military plans for an invasion of Egypt which were being prepared during the summer of 1956 and that these were in any case simply general staff exercises; second, that he (and, by implication, the French government) had no indication of Israel's intention to attack Egypt until Ben Gurion's speech of October 15 and subsequent visit to France on the 22nd; and third, that the use of Anglo-French ground troops in the attack was only inserted into the Israeli

plan on October 24 at British insistence. It is one thing to make such claims in the absence of evidence to the contrary; to make them in the light of all that we already know from other participants in the Suez affair beggars belief.

Despite its basic unreliability, however, Pineau's book is not without interest and even value. The summary of the notorious Anglo-Franco-Israeli 'Sèvres protocol' of October 24, 1956, is the fullest in print. The insights provided into other aspects of French foreign policy and decision making are often useful. Finally, there is a fascinating account of the French government's reactions to the kidnapping of the Algerian rebel leader, Ben Bella, from which the normally somewhat colourless figure of René Coty, the then President of the French Republic, emerges with considerable moral stature.

*University of Leicester* GEOFFREY WARNER

**Nazi Youth in the Weimar Republic.** By Peter D. Stachura. *Santa Barbara, Oxford: Clio. 1975. 301 pp. £7·75. Pb: £3·00.*

**The Hitler Youth:** Origins and Development 1922–1945. By H. W. Koch. *London: Macdonald and Jane's. 1975. 340 pp. £6·50.*

ONE of the most pressing tasks facing the victorious Western Allies in 1945 was the political re-education of the German people towards an acceptance of the practices and principles of Western liberal democracy and a rejection of the totalitarian ideology of Nazism. Nowhere was this task seen to be more urgent than with the children and youth who would determine the long-term future of Germany. Concern about the attitudes and role of German youth in the future also arose because of its recent experiences under the Third Reich, and especially because of the part it had apparently played under Nazism, organised as it had been in the Hitler Youth.

The books by Peter Stachura and Hans Koch complement each other nicely since the one deals with the subject of the Hitler Youth up to the *Machtergreifung* in 1933 while the other concentrates on the period after 1933. Koch's book has a special interest since he writes from personal experience of membership in that movement. Both studies deal with the ideological outlook, sociological composition, organisational machinery, leadership and strength of the Hitler Youth, and its wider role and significance within the NSDAP movement generally. Both have a different style and approach to the subject, and both are successful in their own way. Stachura's book developed from his PhD thesis and is a more chronological and intense analysis of the subject before 1933; Koch's approach is a more discursive one which builds up an excellent impression of what membership of the Hitler Youth entailed after 1933 and especially during the war years when many members fought and died in the front line—often their own doorstep, so to speak.

Several interesting points emerge from these studies, most of which were determined by the fact that the movement of pre-1933 years was not the same as that after 1933. Before 1933 the Hitler Youth's '*de jure* existence as a subordinate organ of the NSDAP and for a time of the SA must not obscure the fact that from its inception to Hitler's accession to power it led

*de facto* a life of considerable independence and that there was room therefore to develop its own ideological trend' (Koch, p. 117); after 1933 'it was no longer simply the youth auxiliary of a political party, but in practice was henceforth the youth organisation of the Third Reich' (Stachura, p. 199). In fact, the Hitler Youth's own watershed was really 1931 and not 1933, for in May 1931 Hitler issued orders that were to bring the Hitler Youth 'into firm harness' for the first time in its history (Stachura, p. 133). Two things chiefly concerned the parent NSDAP organisation: the youth movement had its own headquarters at Plauen, some 150 miles west of Munich; while its ideological outlook was a predominantly social revolutionary one determined by the fact that the bulk of its membership came from the working classes—although the Hitler Youth's leadership was largely composed of middle class elements. Hitler's reorganisation of the party system in 1931 arose from the necessity to combat the 'socialists' in the party generally, for example, Otto Strasser.

While Stachura thus gives an extremely useful account of the ideological and organisational ramifications of the Hitler Youth's development before 1933, Koch is extremely interesting on the position after 1933. He too deals with ideological questions, but he also examines the role and work of the Hitler Youth with regard to literature (which also meant propaganda), education, the questions of elites and dissent, and the movement's participation in the war. Koch constantly brings the whole thing down to earth as, for example, when he comments that 'the image of millions of little Hitler Youths diligently and enthusiastically studying or learning by heart Hitler's *Mein Kampf* is one derived from fiction and not from reality. What was found to be too indigestible at *SS-Junkerschulen* was bound to be even more so among younger age groups' (p. 113). When describing how working class and middle class youths in the Hitler Youth were very often at each other's throats, he is making the point that the much vaunted unity of the Nazi State was so much charade.

JOHN P. FOX

**Germany and the League of Nations.** By Christoph M. Kimmich. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1976. 266 pp. $17.50. £13·15.*

WEIMAR Germany's foreign and domestic policies suffer the special burden of often (and sometimes only) being seen in terms of an interregnum between the collapse of the Wilhelmian Empire and the onset and onslaughts of the Nazi regime. In other words, when the Republic expired (as many thought it was bound to), German policy under Hitler simply picked up where the Empire had left off. The value of Dr. Kimmich's book is that it joins the growing number of studies which examine the Weimar period, not only for its own sake but also for its significance in the wider context of German foreign policy since at least the 1870s. Dr. Kimmich has therefore placed his study of German policy and the League of Nations (1918–33) firmly in the mainstream of the current debate about 'Kontinuität oder Diskontinuität' in modern German history, a debate whose existence owes much or all to the establishment and policies of the Nazi regime.

Much of what Dr. Kimmich writes about German foreign policy in this period is not, of course, entirely new. His use of German Foreign Office and other documentary sources, however, enables him to cast a fresh light

on the way in which German policy makers (and German public opinion) regarded the League of Nations. This attitude could be summed up in one word, expediency, for the Germans saw the League through the prism of their fight to revise the Treaty of Versailles and their struggle to bring about the re-establishment of great-power status for Germany on the continent of Europe. The Germans only measured their interest in the League 'by the tangible advantages the League could offer. They saw such advantages less in the benefits Germany might reap in participating in League decisions than in possible mitigation of the peace settlement' (p. 26).

Dr. Kimmich is particularly revealing on German policy and attitudes towards the League in the period 1918–23, when feelings ranged from what one might call 'positive opportunism', welcoming the idea of the League and Germany's possible membership of it because this was seen to be synonymous with a liberal peace, to an attitude of hostility, fear, and even cynicism following the peace treaty and the Entente's rejection of German membership of the League. By 1922, for example, Bernhard von Bülow of the German Foreign Office was arguing that it was better for Germany to remain outside the League because its entry would benefit no one but the League and would curtail Germany's freedom of action and hamper its revisionist policy (pp. 43–44). After Germany joined the League in 1926, Dr. Kimmich sees two distinct German policies pursued. The first, under Stresemann, was predicated on the assumption that by joining the League Germany would promote conditions which would facilitate its recovery of power and eminence, and in this way bring about the desired revisions to the Treaty of Versailles and Germany's international status. The second, under his successors, was predicated on the assumption that unless membership netted tangible revisionist returns, there was no point in submitting to the League's co-operative ethic and limiting Germany's freedom of action.

This is an extremely useful study which draws together many threads of German foreign policy in the Weimar period, though understandably not all of them. One's only reservation—apart from the jarring note of having to read 'memorandums' twice (pp. 56 and 61) and an error involving two different sentences at the top of page 66—is with parts of Dr. Kimmich's conclusion where he seems, to this reviewer at least, to have gone too far in his strictures on Germany's attitudes and policies. While one cannot deny the expediency with which the Germans regarded the League, and given the German and European positions after 1918 this was hardly surprising, his criticisms of the German approach tend to leave one with the impression that the French and British approaches were almost purely altruistic. This was not entirely so. These reservations apart, this is a well-written and worthwhile study of the subject.

JOHN P. FOX

**Gli Americani in Italia.** By Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini. *Milan: Feltrinelli. 1976. 352 pp. Pb: L3500.*

THIS book, which is based upon an enormous amount of documentation made public as a result of the opening of the United States archives and the Freedom of Information Act, tells the story of American interference in Italy's domestic politics from 1943 to 1949. Appearing under the imprint of Italy's best known left-wing publishing house, it makes no pretence at

impartiality and its publication in good time for the 1976 elections was doubtless not coincidental. Indeed, just to emphasise the point, the authors entitle their final chapter, 'Yesterday like today'.

While the book makes fascinating reading, it should be approached with considerable caution. The authors are not professional historians and display a marked lack of sophistication in their handling of the documents made available to them by their transatlantic collaborators. Everything is taken at its face value with scarcely any attempt to differentiate between and to evaluate the various sources. The authors, moreover, are not above bending the evidence when it suits their purpose. One illustration will show both these faults. Faenza and Fini cite a National Security Council memorandum of March 1948 calling for financial and military aid to clandestine, anti-communist groups. They then go on to quote from a Defence Department document, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, which they claim 'spells out in detail' what was meant by such aid (p. 260). In fact, the NSC memorandum in question makes it clear that aid to clandestine organisations was only to be extended if the Communists were to come to power as a result of the April 1948 elections—a contingency which did not of course arise—while the very title of the Defence Department document, 'Importance of Recognising the Anti-Communist Revolutionary Forces', strongly suggests that it embodied a proposal and not a decision.

Other dubious practices employed by the authors include the citation of sources which do not in fact prove the point they are trying to make and bald assertions without the benefit of any evidence at all. An example of the first is the long footnote 4 on page 182 which endeavours to prove that the Americans were responsible for the expulsion of the Communists from the De Gasperi government in 1947, while the second is illustrated by the statement on page 172 that the Americans were responsible for the rupture of the electoral pact between the Socialists and the Communists in 1946.

A critical reader might also be tempted to ask whether the United States was the only foreign country interfering in Italy's internal affairs during this period. There is some discussion of British policy in the early part of the book, but apart from summarising an OSS report of November 1944 which they typically fail to evaluate, the authors maintain a discreet silence concerning the activities of the Soviet Union. Of course, Russia does not open its archives to independent scholars and its critics do not enjoy the advantages conferred by a Freedom of Information Act, but it would be interesting to know whether Faenza and Fini have considered the evidence that does exist, or even whether they care.

Two wrongs do not make a right, however, and those who believe that there should be certain minimum standards of behaviour in the conduct of relations between states cannot fail to be disturbed and indeed angered by some of the information contained in this book. Whatever their motives, Faenza and Fini have performed a valuable service in making this information available to their fellow-countrymen and to the world at large. Scholars, too, will be grateful to them for adding to our knowledge of important and controversial episodes in recent Italian history—particularly the nature and extent of American interference in the 1948 elections—and for pointing up areas worthy of further research by hands more skilled than their own.

*University of Leicester* GEOFFREY WARNER

**The Spanish Civil War.** 3rd rev. edn. By Hugh Thomas. *London: Hamish Hamilton; Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1977. 1115 pp. £12·00. Pb: £3·50.*

HUGH THOMAS's book on the Spanish Civil War appeared in 1961 [1] and at once established itself as the fairest and most comprehensive account then available. In a subject so complex and controversial some points nevertheless called for revision, and a number of amendments were made in the second edition.[2] Since then, with the relative relaxation of censorship towards the end of the Franco regime and the research undertaken by Spanish and foreign scholars, a mass of new material has come to light. Professor Thomas had then to choose, as he tells us in the preface to his third edition, 'between allowing my book to become itself a memory in the history of the literature of the war, and bringing it up to date' (p. xviii). Fortunately, he opted for the latter and has given us both a far larger (1115 compared with 720 pages), and in many respects an altogether new book, which seems likely to hold as authoritative a place in the present phase of Spanish affairs as did its predecessor in earlier times.

In the present volume, in which the author gives increased attention to the economic and social aspects of the conflict, his viewpoint has become 'more, rather than less, critical of General Franco' (p. xix). On some questions, fresh evidence enables him to pass firmer judgments, whilst on others it leads him to revise or qualify previous assumptions. The bald statement, for instance, that the anti-clerical President Azaña 'died in the Church' is replaced by a footnote (p. 950) discussing the controversy on that point. A few colourful passages have vanished from the original. Thus, on Azaña again, we no longer hear that 'his face seemed likely to burst open with its spots, and its heavy jowls of fat' (1961 edn., p. 24), and we must content ourselves with learning that he was ugly. But if the reader misses such vivid touches of reportage, he gains much more of substance: eight useful appendices instead of three, a magnificent and greatly expanded bibliography, and the now mature fruit of the author's wide-ranging but lightly-worn scholarship and his scrupulous fair-mindedness.

STEPHEN CLISSOLD

**Franco's Political Legacy:** From Dictatorship to Façade Democracy. By José Amodia. *London: Allen Lane. 1977. 348 pp. £9·00.*

RECENT developments mean that, to a certain extent, this book has been overtaken by events. A postscript referring to the Spanish political situation as it was in the spring of 1976 strikes a somewhat pessimistic note concerning the transformation of Franco's regime into a more generally accepted system of government. The recently concluded elections have perhaps revealed a greater capacity for political reform on the part of Franco's successors than was expected.

Such observations, however, cannot detract from the usefulness of the volume which is not primarily concerned with the immediate present but is mainly intended to cast light on the nature and functioning of Franco's now seemingly defunct political system. It is all the more welcome for being the contribution of a Spaniard, much exercised by the fate of his own coun-

[1] London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1961, p. 486.

[2] Harmondsworth: Penguin in association with Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1965.

try, and not the commentary of an outside observer. Moreover, the survival of attitudes and institutions from the period covered by the book raises questions about the likely success of Spain's new experiment in 'Liberal-democracy' and so gives to the volume a more immediate relevance.

The author is particularly concerned with constitutional, institutional and legal arrangements. This is not to say, however, that the study is legalistic. The line is plausibly taken that a careful scrutiny of official legislation and pronouncements will yield more information about the workings of an authoritarian regime than some behaviourists would concede. Through such sources it proves possible, in some measure, to discuss the changing pattern of official thinking. These changes can be related, in their turn, to the long-term political, social and economic problems with which the regime grappled. The net result is often a perceptive analysis of political realities. Thus discussions of the position of the head of state; the government; the Cortes; the only officially sanctioned National (political) Movement; the official trade unions and the judiciary all contribute to our understanding of the means whereby Franco's regime came into being and perpetuated itself. Equally, the regime's handling of 'civil rights' and of its political opponents receives thoughtful treatment. Useful notes and a substantial bibliography further add to the general value of the enterprise.

Students of Spanish affairs wishing to learn about Franco himself may be disappointed. The author understandably points them to already existing biographies. On the other hand an examination of a highly personalised regime should perhaps have paid a little more attention to the background and possible motivation of its leading architect. Similarly, a plea could be entered for a more sustained look at Franco's relationships with the groups that supported his regime and the conflicts between them from which he apparently benefited. Further analysis along such lines might have the additional benefit of illuminating official behaviour after Franco's death. The author voices understandable dismay at the incomplete nature of change in the earliest days of the post-Franco era, but in doing so he may not have sufficiently examined the obstructions in the path of would-be 'liberalisers'. Finally, more discussion of external affairs could have been useful. At the outset Sr. Amodia maintains that constitutional developments in Franco's Spain were ad hoc responses to national or international circumstances and signified the need to acquire legitimacy at home and abroad. His subsequent commentary, however, does not tackle the external dimension of this issue in any great depth.

Nevertheless, the book remains a most useful contribution to the still relatively scanty literature on the politics of Franco's Spain. Its careful exposition of major issues and its sound organisation will particularly commend it to those anxious to acquire an overall view of this very recently closed chapter in Spanish history.

*University of Manchester* KENNETH MEDHURST

**Une Suisse au-dessus de tout Soupçon.** By Jean Ziegler *et al. Paris: Seuil. 1976. 200 pp. Pb: c. £3·50.*

THIS book will soon have sold a quarter of a million copies. It has been translated (and adapted) into German, and a translation into English is said

to be on its way. Its author has been recently appointed to a full professorship at the University of Geneva, and is a member of the Swiss Federal Parliament. The book has been of local importance on polarising political attitudes in French-speaking Switzerland, both on the federal and cantonal level, and may have tended to increase the latent tension between the German-Swiss political style and that of their French and Italian-speaking confederates. A celebrated essayist and historian has renounced his Geneva honorary degree, and some six dozen university teachers in Switzerland have signed a protest against Ziegler's (routine) promotion, while the public employees' union in Geneva talked of a strike in his favour.

The book in itself is cheerfully insignificant, complaining that Switzerland does not pursue the policies of Allende's Chile. It is fun to read, even if one's laughter is often against the vanity and impertinence of the author. But a serious and documented exposure of Switzerland's seamy side—all nations have unpleasant aspects—would have been very interesting, and this is a frivolous book, typical of the more irresponsible Left of romance-speaking countries today, and it is directed to that audience.

*University of Leicester* C. J. HUGHES

**The Reluctant Europeans:** The Attitudes of the Nordic Countries towards European Integration. By Toivo Miljan. *London: C. Hurst. 1977. 325 pp. £7·50.*

**The Nordic Council and Scandinavian Integration.** By Erik Solem. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 197 pp. £12·40.*

THESE two books, in their different ways, deal with a part of Europe often neglected in English-language publications. Professor Miljan has aimed at describing, and accounting for, the attitudes of Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland towards West European integration, and he has produced a well-balanced, readable and interesting book that certainly helps to fill the gap in the literature in this area. Professor Miljan has made excellent use of the prolific works in the Scandinavian languages and Finnish and has woven a convincing argument into this mine of information.

The question squarely faced by the author is why these four Nordic countries have been 'not only reluctant Europeans, but reluctant Nordics' (p. 284). Attempts to produce Nordic defence and customs unions failed and the countries, in their dealings with each other, have been satisfied with 'consensualism of the Lowest Common Denominator' (p. 97). They have all had to consider the demands of security in a postwar bipolar world and the drive towards integration spurred on by increased economic interdependence. Each of the countries has shown a marked reluctance to enter into schemes of formal political integration. They have tried to maintain an optimal sovereign independence to safeguard their security and economic interests (p. 284). Professor Miljan applies his argument to each of the four Nordic countries, ranging from Denmark, which belongs to Nato and the EEC, to Finland, a member of neither and cautious in its approach to any Western-orientated organisation. He describes the security policies of these countries and their trade structures and outlines their responses to Nordic co-operative proposals, the free-trade discussion within the OEEC, the

establishment of EFTA and the extension of the European Community. Perhaps it is being too ungrateful to ask why the author did not include Iceland in his otherwise rounded account.

Dr. Solem's book is more specific than Miljan's yet does not quite match its depth. The author examines the Nordic Council in the context of general integration theory and sets out eleven hypotheses concerning the Council to be tested by his study. He detects a lack of consistency between the theory behind Nordic integration and its practice, and recommends certain reforms, such as greater powers for the Nordic Council, the more extensive use of its present powers, the politicisation of Nordic support groups and the extension of 'micro-integration'—integration 'carried out in small matters' (p. 165)—particularly in border areas. However, Dr. Solem is not totally convincing in his case for such changes. He states, apropos Scandinavian integration, that 'There is a need for people to stop thinking in national terms and to start thinking in regional [Scandinavian] terms instead, when looking for specific solutions to problems' (p. 171), and he considers that 'there may be an ultimate need to make inroads into the power and authority of the national administrators' (p. 172). However, one needs to turn to Professor Miljan's book for an explanation of why the Nordic countries have, in certain policy areas, been reluctant to 'think regionally' or subscribe to supranational bodies.

Dr. Solem's book is at its most useful when describing the operation and work of the Nordic Council and other instruments of Nordic integration. He covers the most important functional areas—economics, law, communications, social policy and culture—and examines the consequences of such co-operation on national policies and on the decision-making of the Nordic countries. In this last section the author introduces a survey of the organisation, methods and aims of the Nordic Council which he conducted in 1970 among three groups involved in the Council—parliamentarians, civil servants and members of the government.

Although the work behind Dr. Solem's book was completed a few years ago—the bibliography scarcely extends into the 1970s whereas Miljan's at least reaches 1973—there are still a number of mistakes in the text. Some seem to be the publisher's fault—errors on the map at the front, a misplaced heading (p. 31), misprinting of Nordic words (p. 35 & p. 173). But on other occasions the author has taken too little care: a potentially interesting table of Scandinavian security expenditures is rendered useless by quoting figures in each of the national currencies without any exchange guide (p. 107); the Scandinavian words to describe regional policies are in fact translations of the word 'counties' (p. 101); the main purpose of the creation of EFTA was *not* 'to facilitate the entry of certain European countries into the European Economic Community' (p. 76); and Venstre, Denmark's Liberal Party, can by no stretch of the imagination be described as 'left' in the sense used on page 58.

Despite these reservations, Dr. Solem's book is a useful reference work on the Nordic Council and, along with Professor Miljan's study, should be added to 'European Integration' reading lists.

CLIVE ARCHER

*University of Aberdeen*

**Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics.** By Robert B. Kvavik. *Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 1976. 206 pp. Pb: Nkr.50.00. $11.00.*

THIS first systematic account of Norway's elaborate network of organised interests convincingly demonstrates the inadequacy of the classical structural-functionalist model for understanding the behaviour of groups involved as active participants in making and implementing public policy. Arguing that Norwegian organisations today largely act as 'quasi-public managemental agencies' (p. 154), the author prefers to classify the Norwegian system as a mixture of competitive and corporate pluralism operating on separate but inter-related electoral-legislative and organisational-corporative tiers—an analytical framework first suggested by Professor Stein Rokkan. After examining both types of group behaviour in detail, Kvavik concludes that the Norwegians have institutionalised the corporate pluralist pattern on a 'second tier' to a unique degree. Good use is made of extensive data now collected in Norway to construct a detailed anatomy of the interest group system, and non-Norwegian readers will find many valuable and highly pertinent observations about group roles in the political process. Thus, emphasis is rightly placed on such features as group co-option into the administrative structure through an extensive committee network, the dominance of monopolistic organisation, the value accorded to expertise and technocratic argumentation and the emergence of a group leadership bureaucracy.

But ultimately the study fails to probe deeply enough below the surface, producing a lop-sided and over-simplistic picture. While emphasising the subtle and complex relationships between interest groups, parties and government, for instance, Kvavik fails to capture the essence of this interaction—his too narrow understanding of the 'labour movement' concept being a case in point. Similarly, though noting the danger that reliance on the corporate channel may cut decision-makers loose from grass-roots opinion, he gives only passing mention to the recent vivid illustration of this very hazard afforded by the EEC membership issue. Too ready an acceptance at face value of group leaders' responses to questionnaires gives Kvavik a rather naïvely optimistic view of the social responsibility of interest groups—which may survive only as long as the steady economic expansion and overall agreement on social objectives which allows corporate pluralism to flourish in Norway as it does today. Strangely, too, the smallness of Norway's population is ignored as an explanatory factor. To sum up, the case for rethinking the interest group concept in the light of Norwegian experience can be taken as proved, but the detailed picture leaves something to be desired.

*University of Hull* R. E. GOODERHAM

**The Distant Democracy:** Social Inequality, Political Resources and Political Influence in Norway. By Willy Martinussen. *London, New York: John Wiley. 1977. 246 pp. $15.00. £7·50.*

THE 'distant democracy' is Norway—'distant', because of the obstacles to effective political participation existing there and because of the widespread sense among the citizenry that the day-to-day political process is remote. Not, it might be said, that Norway is peculiar in this respect: the

same holds true of other West European states, in most cases one would expect even more so. Not, again as the author demonstrates, that the stability of democracy in Norway is threatened by this circumstance—perhaps rather the contrary. The book is essentially a rigorous statistically-based analysis of nation-wide survey data from 1969, charting the nature and causes of the extensive inequalities of opportunity for *individuals* to control their living conditions by influencing the public policy decisions affecting them. The author recognises that *group* organisations are of primary importance in Norwegian political life, and may offset lack of political resources at the micro-level: but the impact of these organisations on policy making lies outside the scope of this study. The conceptual scheme used to analyse political participation, political alienation and 'political poverty' is complex and subtle. Some interesting inter-relationships are established and some light is thrown on Norwegian politics at grass-roots level.

This is a meticulous piece of research in political sociology terminating in a controversial political programme. It may be viewed as an extended essay on the conditions for securing effective egalitarian inputs into public policy making. The nature of politics, however, rules out equality of treatment for the inputs received.

*University of Hull* NEIL ELDER

**Elite Structure and Ideology:** A Theory with Applications to Norway. By John Higley, G. Lowell Field and Knut Grøholt. *Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; New York: Columbia University Press. 1976. 367 pp. Pb: Nkr. 75.00. $15.00.*

THIS book will be of value to students of political sociology and comparative government and, more generally, to those with an interest in the political problems of highly-developed societies. To a lesser extent it also has something to offer to students of political behaviour and to historians. A general theory of the relationship between elites and non-elites is advanced in Parts I and III of the study particularly: the application of the theory to the Norwegian case occupies the centre section and is carried over into the third and final part.

The theory itself has Weberian roots and shows at times affinities with the thinking of Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset. The exposition is as lucid throughout as the physical format of the book is unattractive—the latter, no doubt, an economy measure. The analysis has the merit of not placing too great a stress on socio-economic determinants of political behaviour: plenty of room is allowed for an autonomous political order. The assessment of the Norwegian debate over entry to the EEC seems, however, to be too deterministic in respect of the influence of the non-elite sector: there is a strong case for arguing that lack of political flair lost that particular battle. But this is a detail. Many trenchant points are made in the course of developing the theory, both at large and in connection with Norwegian politics, and the book—controversial in much of what it says—is well worth a browse.

*University of Hull* NEIL ELDER

## USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

**Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies.** Edited by Mark G. Field. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1976. 277 pp. £10·90.*

If an Austrian castle seems a bizarre setting for an American-sponsored symposium on social change, expectations of Soviet participation might justly be located in castles in the air. The original aim to promote an East-West dialogue is praiseworthy. Yet one wonders on the evidence of this book whether it would have progressed beyond expressions of fundamental differences or even missionary zeal to enlighten the other side. The book is based on a selection of 19 papers presented at a symposium held in Salzburg in 1972 and sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies. A total of 21 social scientists took part, including two from Poland and one from Yugoslavia (who nevertheless declined to publish their papers). Of the ten essays selected for publication here, seven are concerned mainly with the Soviet Union, two with China and one with Hungary. All addressed themselves to the central question of whether the process of modernisation leads to a general resemblance of political ideology, or whether this process is so unique in socialist states as to lead to the emergence of a new type of society. Convergence or divergence? The answers are surprisingly analogous: that 'the functional prerequisites of an industrial order tend to create a type of society and culture that is fairly uniform wherever it arises, regardless both of historical antecedents and of contemporary forms of governance or ideological commitments' (p. 5).

The contributors delve into such diverse areas of inquiry as modernisation theory and experience (A. Inkeles, E. Vogel and T. Jones), education (M. Matthews), health (M. Field), the Party (R. Lowenthal) and urbanisation (B. Frolic on Russia and China; Konrád and Szelényi on Hungary). Of unusual interest is the paper by W. D. Connor on non-political deviance and social disorganisation (alcoholism, juvenile delinquency and crime).

The problems of such a comparative study are implicit in the attempts to apply Western conventional 'wisdoms' to the modernisation process everywhere or, put another way, in taking Western (particularly American) advanced capitalist societies as the *model* against which modernisation in socialist societies is compared and judged. Whosoever deviates from the straight and narrow is therefore sinning against the 'natural order of things'. It is a curious irony in this connection that whereas Soviet social scientists tend to apply structural functionalist concepts to their own society and social conflict concepts to the West, many Western conservative scholars, as here, do the opposite. Thus, Lowenthal, prophesying the imminent breakdown of Soviet society, asserts that 'Western democratic society is more flexible and better able to cope with its problems than that of the one-party states' (p. 10). That, as many in Britain today would attest, is open to doubt. Another potential stumbling block, should the twain have met, is the focus of analysis: while the book's contributors tend to look at the apex of the superstructure ('the existence and central role of that agency [the Party], with its wide-ranging and quasi-total power over the entire society, *is* the major structural element differentiating communist from non-communist systems' p. 2), Marxists would concentrate on the base, the ownership of the means of production, as the fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism. Again, to demonstrate, as Matthews

ably does, that children from the intelligentsia are over-represented in Soviet higher education is hardly a remarkable fact of convergence or evidence that the Soviet class structure has crystallised into hereditary, socially-differentiated groups.

Convergence aside, the essays do shed welcome light on problems of modernisation in several socialist states and some bring valuable new empirical evidence to bear.

*University of Bradford* JAMES RIORDAN

**The International Politics of Eastern Europe.** Edited by Charles Gati. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London) 309 pp. £16·65. Pb: £4·55.*

THIS book is based on papers originally presented in March 1975 to a Columbia University conference on the international politics of Eastern Europe and then redrafted in order to cover events up to the end of 1975. The fifteen contributions by different American scholars concentrate on the post-1968 era characterised by the East-West detente and the consequences of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but for purposes of comparison facts from older periods are amply used. The question whether Eastern Europe is still an asset or whether it has become a liability to the Soviet Union is tentatively answered in the sense that it has now become, at least in the economic field, more of a liability. In this connection the functioning of Comecon, the role of China and Peking's impact, for example, on Romania, the special position of Yugoslavia on the one hand and of Albania on the other, the significance of *Ostpolitik*, detente, the Helsinki agreement, disarmament and East-West trade are thoroughly investigated. Some useful comparisons are followed by some of more doubtful value, for example, an attempt to find out the symmetries and asymmetries between Nato and the Warsaw Pact.

Careful editing has prevented overlapping and contradictions between the various contributions. The exception seems to be Czechoslovakia which, we are told on page 31, in 1968 'boldly waved the banner of nonalignment', while on page 150 hints of the Dubcek regime's alleged inclination to renounce membership in the Warsaw Pact are called a 'misconception'. Again, on page 158 Prague's alleged 'pro-Western realignment of major foreign policies' is mentioned and on page 220 it is said that in 1968 'military planners in Prague considered scenarios for nonalignment'. In reality, the Dubcek regime, trying in vain to avoid Hungary's fate in 1956, was more than reluctant to do anything in this direction. In discussing *Ostpolitik*, the Erfurt meeting between Brandt and Stoph is mentioned, but the book is silent about the subsequent Kassel meeting which put an end to further endeavours at that level. Not enough attention seems to have been paid to the importance of the existence of a customs-free 'inner-German' trade which makes nonsense of the East German axiom that the two German states have nothing whatsoever in common.

It is in the nature of things that a book of this kind presents more questions than definitive answers, but the value of the volume under review lies in the richness of little known or nearly unknown facts and figures unearthed by the contributors which illustrate many details of communist

policy in Eastern Europe. To this category belong, for example, complaints quoted from Soviet papers about the low quality of consumer goods imported from East European countries.

J. W. BRUEGEL

**Model or Ally?** The Communist Powers and the Developing Countries. By Richard Lowenthal. *New York, London: Oxford University Press. 1977. 400 pp. £8·25.*

THE essays contained in this collection were written and published in the period 1963 to 1976. Professor Lowenthal has updated, expanded and corrected them, and has added an introduction. In contrast to many other collections *Model or Ally?* forms a logical and consistent whole, which is interesting, perceptive and well-written, though occasionally repetitious. Explanations and details which occur in more than one essay have not been edited, so that the reader is likely to have a feeling of *déjà vu* when he reaches, for example, the changes in Soviet strategy towards the developing countries in the late 1950s and 1960s for the third time.

In the introduction the author deals with the contradictions between the Marxist-Leninist view of the world and the practical demands of Soviet and Chinese foreign policy. The epilogue describes the Soviet strategy of 'counter-Imperialism', first proclaimed in 1971. The body of the book is divided into three sections. In 'The Uses and Limits of the "Communist Model"', Professor Lowenthal offers a Weberian analysis of the causes of underdevelopment. He examines types of government, and their success in terms of development needs. But he never clearly defines the criteria for success, and there is no real indication of the correlation between type of regime and economic success. Chapter 2 describes the evolution of the Soviet one-party state and evaluates attempts by 'nationalist modernizers' and fascist states to copy the model. The author concludes that 'the chances of successful application of the one-party system are best in countries which share with the Russian model the basic unsolved problems of development, yet are not underdeveloped to such an extreme degree that the necessary cadres for such a regime cannot be found' (p. 170).

In Part II, 'Big Brother's Troubles or the Dilemmas of Communist Strategy', Professor Lowenthal shows how Lenin's theory of the two-phase colonial revolution proved to be inadequate, and he describes how Chinese and Soviet theory and policy have been adapted. The difference in Soviet and Chinese strategy towards new states is shown to be one of the major issues dividing these two countries.

The final section of the book, 'The Pupil Turns Teacher or the Ideological Boomerang', deals with divergent Marxisms: the difference in the world views held by the Soviet Chinese Marxists, and the rise of a new type of revolutionary movement in the West and in the underdeveloped world. The author believes this new movement to be a universal process, founded on frustration and inspired by despair. For these movements 'action often precedes thought' (p. 317), and 'the gun creates the party' (p. 327). This essay was originally published in 1969 and the tone reflects the despair and pessimism prevalent amongst rational and pacific people in the wake of the student revolts of 1968. A postscript reflects new hope in the transformation of the New Left into believers of 'democratic utopianism' (p. 352).

In spite of some careless correcting (Nyerere is still called the president of Tanganyika) and proof-reading, this learned and thoughtful book is a welcome addition to the now very numerous books on communist-Third World relations. Indeed, it should be read before, or even instead of, many previously published books on the same topic.

*University of Surrey* MARGOT LIGHT

# MIDDLE EAST

**Middle East Economies in the 1970s:** A Comparative Approach. By Hossein Askari and John Thomas Cummings. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distributed in UK by Martin Robertson, London) 581 pp. £25·50.*

THIS study grew out of research upon land reform in the Middle East and then developed into an attempt at a comparative study of a number of Middle Eastern economies, particularly those of the oil states, but with others included. Israel, although often referred to in relation to agriculture, is not taken as a case study, which gives the work an unfortunate imbalance; Turkey and Afghanistan are also largely excluded. The work is not essentially comparative but mainly consists of a number of separate economic studies, some of which are extremely slight. A reader seeking a comparative study would be better advised to read Z. Y. Hershlag's *The Economic Structure of the Middle East.*[1] The value of the work lies in the accounts of the development of institutions such as OPEC and OAPEC, which are clearly set out, and in the discussion of labour migration between the Middle Eastern states. In addition, the final chapter, 'Facing the Future', is well and interestingly written.

The economic goal, against which the authors judge progress, is the achievement by the Middle Eastern states of a standard of living akin to that reached by Western developed countries or Japan. Oil is seen as the major factor providing the capital necessary for this transformation, and the authors note that in the short term the difficulty of absorbing capital, due to limited infrastructure, education and skilled personnel, will be a major problem. Wisely, they stress the need to fund capital into agriculture as well as into the more obvious modernisation and development of industry. When increased consciousness of political power due to oil developed rapidly in the Middle Eastern states from the late 1960s to the denouement of the oil pricing and supply crisis in the winter of 1973–74, it was accompanied by an acceptance of national economic planning. Some states, of course, such as Iran, already had by the 1970s considerable experience in using such planning to spur on administrators and producers. The need for the Middle Eastern states to call on more highly-developed countries, not just for expatriate technologists and administrators, but for more fundamental advice, such as that which Japan may give on the steelmaking of the Gulf region and North Africa, is noted. In general, however, the emphasis of the work is on how Middle Eastern states can make valuable trade-offs of labour and commodities between themselves rather than, as traditionally, seeing their trade as essentially Western-oriented.

[1] Leiden: Brill, 1975. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1976, p. 489.

The conclusion stresses the need for agricultural modernisation and an improvement of socially inequitable land distribution, and here the authors stress the value of tax policies in income redistribution. As so often, the factor inhibiting economic co-operation or even integration between Middle Eastern states is admitted to be political rather than economic. The interdependency of the Western-type developed economies and the Middle East is emphasised as well as the need to avoid confrontation. Sensibly, the authors also call attention to avoiding exaggeration of the importance of the oil crisis of 1973–74, and the value of forging practical links with the Middle East such as those already well-established by the EEC with the Maghreb states. The major deficiency in the work, apart from the weakness of the comparative element, is in any serious discussion of the nature of the international economic depression of the 1970s and the fact that there will be little point in pushing up quotas of industrial production or steelmaking by the Middle Eastern states if the market is not there to absorb such increases.

M. J. GRIEVE

**The Arab-Israeli Conflict.** John Norton Moore (Ed.) Vol. I: Readings. *1067 pp.* Vol. II: Readings. *1193 pp.* Vol. III: Documents. *1248 pp. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1974. £39·30. $95.*

THESE three volumes, totalling 3,459 pages and weighing 9·5 pounds, are rather symbolic of the magnitude of the Middle East confrontation between Arabs and Jews during this century. The project which resulted in this unique and valuable reference work was sponsored by the American Society of International Law, an association of American and foreign legal scholars and practitioners from more than 90 countries. Professor John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia law school was chosen to select and edit the readings and documents. Though not a Middle East scholar himself, Professor Moore, with the assistance of numerous experts in various areas, has assembled an exciting collection of historical material.

In fact, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict* may well be the most useful collection published since the Yom Kippur War for students, writers and scholars interested in probing the depths of this tragedy of colliding nationalisms, cultures and ideologies. Though published in late 1974, the book was largely completed in 1973 and the Introduction makes no reference to the most recent battle of arms in October of that year. None of the readings in Volumes I and II and only a few of those in Volume III make reference to post-Yom Kippur War developments.

The general purpose of this undertaking 'is to promote greater understanding of one of the most persistent and explosive challenges to world order of our time'. 'Every effort', writes Moore, 'has been made to achieve balance on the issues and presentation of the principal viewpoints'. A more specific purpose, which explains the sponsorship, 'is to facilitate access to a range of scholarly readings in the international legal literature and to demonstrate the utility of an international legal perspective in the analysis and settlement of major world-wide disputes'.

The readings and documents are arranged in two simultaneous ways—first, by theme and second, chronologically. Volumes I and II—the readings—are organised around five principal sets of legal and political issues which

define the conflict. Volume I begins with a section on the relevance of international law, with nearly the entire volume dealing with three underlying issues: 1. Arab and Jewish Nationalism and the Rights of Refugees; 2. Freedom of Navigation Through the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal; and 3. The Status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places.

Volume II covers three further basic themes: 1. The Six-Day War and Continued Hostilities; 2. The Role of the United Nations; and 3. Thoughts on Settlement. It is especially unfortunate that (except for three pre-Yom Kippur War speeches—one by King Hussein, another by Secretary of State William Rogers, and the third by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco) this last section is primarily a presentation of readings from the 1960s.

Volume III is a straightforward presentation of 189 documents, beginning with the Basel Programme (1897) and ending with the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement of May 31, 1974. As a reference work, this collection of documents is wonderfully useful. In addition to nearly all the important United Nations documents (all but 36 of the 189 documents are post-1947), a substantial amount of diplomatic documentation is provided. The chronological breakdown is into 6 segments: 1. Origins of the Conflict: 1897–1947; 2. Establishment of the State of Israel and the 1948 War: 1947–1949; 3. From Armistice to War: 1949–1956; 4. The Suez Crisis, the 1956 War, and the Decade of UNEF: 1956–1967; 5. The Six-Day War and the Search for Peace: 1967–1973; and 6. The October War and the Continuing Search for Peace: 1973–

In addition, the 23-page selected bibliography prepared by Mrs. Helen Philos, the librarian of the American Society of International Law, is a useful summation of the major materials relevant to all the issues covered in this project. At $95 few individuals will be adding this collection to their private book shelves, but all Middle East watchers should be aware that as historical and legal questions arise a most convenient reference work is now available. (Abridged edition now available. See Other Books Received.)

MARK A. BRUZONSKY

**Death of a Country:** The Civil War in Lebanon. By John Bulloch. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1977. 202 pp. £4·95.*

**The Crisis in the Lebanese System:** Confessionalism and Chaos. By Enver M. Koury. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 92 pp. (Foreign Affairs Study 38) Pb: $3·00.*

THE Middle East correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* here presents a brief and rather over-simplified account of the immediate causes of the disastrous conflict of 1975–76 in the Lebanon, together with a great deal of illustrative detail, much of it quite horrifying, gathered at first hand or from eye-witnesses. He rightly emphasises the background factors that would probably have led to another breakdown in the fragile 1943 constitution before long, even without the presence in Lebanon of the Palestinian forces which complicated and exacerbated most of the existing divisions and rivalries. The book as a whole is somewhat impressionistic and has clearly been produced in a hurry for a popular market; but as such it is vivid and informative, and, for those who know the country, has the ring of authenticity. They will find parts of it almost heart-breaking. The folly and cynicism of many Lebanese

politicians stand out; Rashid Karami, Prime Minister in theory throughout the conflict but often with no cabinet, emerges as one of the few who seems to have tried to damp down the sectarian flames. The book is essentially reportage, good of its kind.

'When the future is obscure (as it almost always is) we can deal with its obscurity by building models and thereby assessing the viability of certain schemes', writes Professor Koury (p. 59), and his pages and charts are indeed filled with the clangour of conceptual Meccano—theories of social conflict and revolution, 'fused linkages' and the gap between expectation and achievement. The resultant scaffolding seems to me to obscure the structure of Lebanese society and politics, rather than to facilitate any close examination of their workings, which have been the subject of many useful books since Albert Hourani's *Syria and Lebanon*,[1] and to elucidate nothing. This study was written in June 1976, four months before the war ended; some of the author's suggestions for a possible compromise solution already seem out of date.

*University of York* J. S. F. PARKER

**The Arabs' New Frontier.** 2nd rev. edn. By Robert Stephens. *London: Temple Smith. 1976. 279 pp. £5·50.*

**The Kuwait Fund and the Political Economy of Arab Regional Development.** By Soliman Demir. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 138 pp. £9·60.*

IN mediaeval times the Islamic world was for centuries far ahead of Christian Europe in economic organisation, and its urban population—Arabs, Persians and Turks—enjoyed a standard of economic and cultural life only paralleled in Byzantium and China. Economic and cultural historians have provided many widely divergent explanations of why and how these peoples missed their opportunities to develop a capitalist economy and were therefore left behind in the competition for power and prosperity. The more recent and spectacular growth of Western economies has, however, had to rely increasingly on the energy from oil deposits found in the remoter parts of the Islamic lands. So Arabs and Persians at least are now presented with an opportunity to build a new economy based on the windfall capital thus acquired. In these two books a distinguished journalist and a political economist, whose first degree was gained at Cairo, examine how the Arab peoples are setting about this task. Both their books are built around the operations of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.

Mr. Stephens's book is an extensively revised and updated second edition of the book he published in 1973.[1] He tells us in the foreword that it was intended primarily as a description and analysis of the first ten years of the Fund's operations. But it is more than a mere description of these. Beginning with a general chapter on the Arab world, oil and development, and continuing with an account of Kuwait's own history and its transformation under the impact of oil exploitation, he goes on to describe the circumstances of the establishment of the Fund in January 1962, the year after Kuwait

[1] London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA. 1946.

[1] London: Temple Smith.

gained full control of its own affairs, which until then had been circumscribed by British protection. The remaining chapters are devoted to a tour round the many Arab countries which have received loans from the Fund, and this becomes a peg on which to hang thumbnail sketches of their economic development problems.

Without providing a rigorous analysis of these problems Mr. Stephens manages to note in passing most of the obstacles to rapid development of a modern economy in an Arab country: the shortage of expertise in government departments (Morocco p. 98); the difficulties of changing language for the conduct of public business (Algeria p. 116); the costs of confrontation with Israel (Egypt p. 145); the stranglehold on commercial activity exercised by foreign firms (Sudan p. 165); the reliance of governments on support from landowning interests (Iraq p. 221); and the steeply rising populations (Iraq p. 223). But in spite of all these and other difficulties he is able to conclude with qualified optimism that the 'Arabs, if they are prepared to help each other, now have it in their grasp to transform their civilisation and do it in their own way'. Mr. Stephens has provided a very readable introduction to the contemporary modernising Arab world, though it is perhaps a pity that the plan of the book necessarily excludes Saudi Arabia because that country has had no need for a loan from Kuwait. If the rapid evolution of his subject matter inspires him to update it again in three years' time, its value would be much enhanced by presenting the many facts and figures it contains in the form of tables. This would make their recovery very much easier.

Dr. Demir's book is very different and only half as long. Written for a PhD at the University of Pittsburgh, it was originally conceived as a comparative study of transnational development funds in the Arab world. Research soon made it clear that no other Arab Fund had been in existence long enough to provide sufficient comparative material for the Kuwait Fund. So although the book has a chapter on the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, set up by seventeen countries in 1968, it is mainly devoted to a politico/socio/economic analysis of the Kuwait Fund's organisation and methods of operation. It is not a book for the general reader.

> Some proponents of the action approach believe that it avoids the inherent conservative bias of the systems approach (Dawe 1970, p. 208), and that an action frame of reference is not prone to errors of reification associated with systems analysis of organisations (Silverman 1970, p. 50).

Sentences like that one (p. xii of the introduction) tend to deter, but Dr. Demir has a sensitive and intelligent understanding of both Kuwaiti and Arab politics and he has shown how the Fund has succeeded so far in fostering the development of Arab countries, at the same time helping to provide justification for Kuwait's survival as a political entity.

J. C. B. RICHMOND

**The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement:** A Record of the Negotiations 1911–1934. By Archibald H. T. Chisholm. *London: Cass. 1975. 254 pp. £8·00.*

IT is hard to believe today that only fifty years ago the consensus of opinion among oil geologists was that there was no oil to be found on the Arabian

side of the Persian Gulf. One man who refused to subscribe to this opinion was Major Frank Holmes, a New Zealand mining engineer who had worked in a number of countries around the world before landing up in Bahrain in 1922 as a trader and an undisguised concession hunter. Holmes has been rather roughly treated in most published accounts of the beginnings of the Gulf's oil industry, mostly because at different times he trod on the toes of the British government and the major oil companies; and it is one of the many virtues of A. H. T. Chisholm's absorbing and splendidly documented narrative of the conclusion of the Kuwait oil concession of 1934 that he treats these occasions as the peccadilloes they were, and generously accords Holmes his proper place in the modern history of the Gulf.

Holmes was pretty successful in his concession hunting. From Ibn Saud in 1923 he obtained for the company of which he was a partner, the Eastern and General Syndicate, an oil concession for Hasa. A year later he secured a similar concession for the Saudi-Kuwaiti neutral zone, and the following year he acquired another concession for Bahrain. All three concessions were sold by the Eastern and General Syndicate to the Gulf Oil Corporation of Pittsburgh in 1927, after they had first been offered to, and refused by, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now British Petroleum). Holmes then turned his attention to Kuwait, whose ruler, Shaikh Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, he had known since his early days in the Gulf and with whom he enjoyed a friendly, even close, relationship. Anglo-Persian had made a half-hearted approach to Shaikh Ahmad for a concession in 1923, only to draw back after a hurried, preliminary, geological survey in 1924 had indicated the unlikelihood of oil being present in the shaikhdom in any quantities. For his part, Shaikh Ahmad was in no hurry to award a concession to anyone, especially to APOC in which the British government had a majority shareholding. He greatly resented the British government's action in handing over Kuwait territory to Ibn Saud when the neutral zone between Kuwait and Hasa was established in the frontier negotiations at Uqair in 1922, and he suspected that APOC, if it held the concession in Kuwait and found oil there, would gear its producing operations in the shaikhdom to the requirements of its production levels in Persia, not to Kuwait's financial needs or ambitions. When Holmes reappeared, therefore, in 1928, to seek a concession on behalf of Gulf Oil, Shaikh Ahmad gave him a warm welcome.

Although the terms that Holmes offered were rejected by the shaikh as inadequate, the fact that Gulf Oil was bidding for the concession caused flutterings in Whitehall. By treaty the shaikh was required to have any concession granted by him approved in advance by the British government. A further requirement was now imposed in the shape of a 'British nationality' clause, which was to be inserted in any concession and which stipulated that the company to which a concession was awarded had to be British and have a majority of British directors on its governing board. Although this attempt to block Holmes's negotiations failed (it had to be abandoned after a similar requirement respecting the Bahrain concession, which Gulf Oil had sold to Standard Oil of California in 1928, was withdrawn under pressure from the United States government in 1932), other obstructions were thrown up by the British government in the next few years to make sure that APOC would not be shut out of Kuwait—even if it was not exactly itching to get in. It was the removal of the British nationality requirement in April 1932, accompanied by some prodding from Whitehall, that aroused APOC from its torpor. Confronted with the possibility that Gulf Oil might obtain the

Kuwait concession, yet reluctant still to compete for it lest the shaikhdom should prove dry of oil, APOC compromised by asking Shaikh Ahmad in June 1932 for a three-year prospecting licence. The shaikh refused the request. Oil had been struck in Bahrain at the end of May, and he, like Holmes, was convinced that Kuwait, too, had oil. Only a concession of sixty or seventy years' duration, he told APOC, was of interest to him.

It was at this stage that Chisholm, then serving with APOC in Persia, became involved in the story. Sent to Kuwait in August 1932 with APOC's draft concession, he found himself up against Holmes in soliciting Shaikh Ahmad's consent to a concession. His subsequent rivalry with Holmes was, for the most part, a friendly one, the two men, although differing widely in temperament and outlook, as well as background, sharing a mutual liking and respect. The contest went on for more than a year, the two competing negotiations being subject to frequent and prolonged interruptions. Perhaps inevitably, APOC and Gulf Oil at the close of 1933 decided to merge their interests in Kuwait and to make a joint approach to the ruler for a concession. The Kuwait Oil Company, owned fifty per cent by APOC and fifty per cent by Gulf Oil, was incorporated in December 1933, and in February 1934 Chisholm and Holmes returned to Kuwait as joint negotiators. Months of hard bargaining lay ahead of them, made perhaps harder by some of Holmes's idiosyncrasies and intrigues, before the concession was finally secured in December 1934.

For Shaikh Ahmad the concessionary agreement represented possibly an even greater triumph than it did for the two negotiators, for he had got what he had wanted from the start—the participation of American oil interests in the exploitation of Kuwait's oil without alienating the goodwill of the British government upon whom he depended for the security of his shaikhdom against his larger neighbours. He was helped by events, notably by the discovery of oil in Bahrain in May 1932 and the grant of a concession by Ibn Saud to Standard Oil of California in May 1933; but he also owed a good deal to the men with whom he treated and to the decent respect they showed for Kuwait's integrity and well-being.

The Kuwait concession was to run for seventy-five years. It ran, in fact, for not much more than half that time. Whether or not its premature termination should be regretted remains to be seen. Times have changed, and the days of the old Arabian oil concessionaires have passed. Yet their achievements were of an order greater than the contemporary mood, perhaps, will allow; which is one reason why the narrative and documentary record set out here in Chisholm's book is so valuable, recalling, as it does, the true spirit in which those early oil ventures into Arabia were undertaken.

J. B. Kelly

**Bahrain:** Political Development in a Modernizing Society. By Emile A. Nakhleh. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, Heath. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 191 pp. £9·45.*

Contrary to the impression that might be given by Nakhleh's bibliography, there are few valuable works on the Arab Gulf states. In the case of Bahrain, this book makes a significant contribution to an understanding of the political and social development of the state since independence in 1971.

This is largely due to its empirical approach, as the author's analysis fails to go beyond elementary deduction and draw some of the conclusions which his data seems to call for.

Accepting education to be the basis for development, Nakhleh begins with a chapter on the Bahraini education system. His criticism supports a forecast of increasing problems for the islands' population. He points to: (a) the high rate of illiteracy which is unlikely to be reduced as the expansion of education is unable to keep up with population increase; (b) the emphasis on urban education which deprives the rural population of Bahraini stock in favour of immigrants; (c) the absence of higher education institutions to provide the necessary skilled labour force; and (d) the general weakness and low standard of education.

The substance of the book is concerned with political developments surrounding the apparent transition to democracy after independence. The author describes the social clubs, the press, the labour movement and its history, labour problems and the dominance of foreign workers, the state's alignment on strong neighbours in foreign policy, and the events which led to the formation of the Constitutional Assembly in 1972.

This account is backed by considerable statistical and factual data, quotations from government and opposition documents and long interviews; these are the most positive aspects of the book as they provide concrete information on the prevailing situation, despite the author's too great reliance on a functional approach.

Although he presents the formal arguments of various candidates in the election, Nakhleh fails to give an overall view of the political tendencies and their significance in the Gulf context. Similarly, while mentioning the fundamental opposition of the ruling family to the process of democratisation, the author writes as though the road to parliamentary democracy were a historic inevitability and ignores the many contemporary examples which disprove this thesis. He is therefore unable to expand his single-page epilogue on the dissolution of the National Assembly in the summer of 1975 beyond a simplistic explanation based on 'the tensions between traditional tribalism based on family rule and popular participation based on representation, accountability and openness in government' (p. 169).

Apart from its analytical weakness, the book fails to discuss the activities of the Constitutional Assembly and those of the National Assembly which followed it for over a year before being dissolved and autocratic rule re-established. But the political trends presented in the book are relevant to the future of Bahrain and it is helpful to be aware of their existence in any assessment of politics in the region.

HELEN LACKNER

## AFRICA

**Power and Class in Africa:** An Introduction to Change and Conflict in African Politics. By Irving Leonard Markovitz. *Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1977. 398 pp.*

THE argument of this sometimes heated and never very well-organised book is hard to pursue through the digressions, illustrations, citations and attacks on current attitudes. It is that there is no reason to despair of the possibilities

of development in Africa. Political instability is not necessarily a permanent weakness; indeed it can have its advantages if existing regimes are not conducive to development. Moreover, we are assured on the authority of J. H. Plumb that political stability can appear quite suddenly, though we are not told in what circumstances this is to be expected.

The suppression of organised opposition need not cause concern either. What is to be deplored is the domination of too many African states by the 'organizational bourgeoisie', who are even worse than Milovan Djilas's 'new class' because they include private entrepreneurs as well as bureaucrats, and who are either too arrogant to listen to the masses or simply indifferent to them. Hope rests on the belief that the small number of 'radical states' in existence may increase in the future.

The countries cited with approval are Tanzania, Namimbia (*sic*), the former Portuguese colonies, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Congo Republic—in fact all those which are supported by communist powers. Dr. Markovitz quotes the theory that true independence can be gained only through a revolutionary war, conveniently forgetting the unusually peaceable nature of the transfer of power in Tanzania. No doubt his book went to press before it was known that Guinea-Bissau is wholly dependent on imports for essential foodstuffs; no doubt he finds the present situation in Ethiopia gratifying.

One could not enumerate all his questionable assertions and interpretations. A striking instance is a reference to the entrenched position of chiefs in Sierra Leone as something 'revealed' in a study by Martin Kilson. Does he not know that constitutions are necessarily always published? It would have been interesting to know why the chiefs were treated differently there from their counterparts everywhere else in West Africa. But Dr. Markovitz too often mistakes the exceptional for the typical, and vice versa.

The clichés of the school of thought to which he belongs have come to be exchanged as tokens of orthodoxy rather than arguments, and so are carelessly used in contexts where their real meaning is important. Of course the African states are still exporters of raw materials. Why not? He has forgotten the essence of his own criticism—that they are *only* exporters of raw materials.

LUCY MAIR

**Colonialism and Change:** Essays Presented to Lucy Mair. Edited and with an Introduction by Maxwell Owusu. *The Hague, Paris: Mouton. 1975. 264 pp. (Studies in Anthropology 4) Pb.*

THIS book contains an interesting but somewhat disparate and uneven collection of papers. In a category by itself is Aluko's paper on 'Rural Economic Development', a general discussion from an economist's viewpoint with special reference to Nigeria, but containing little new material. Three papers use a particular piece of anthropological fieldwork to examine aspects of social change. Nkunyo argues in 'The Family and Social Change' that most observers discussing changes in the African family have concluded that the main result of the individual's decreasing dependence on his kin has been the increasing significance of the nuclear family. But this also means that there has been an increasing stress on bilaterality as compared with unilineality, and he supports this argument with material from the Anlo of Eastern Ghana. Bond, in 'Minor Prophets and Yombe Cultural Dynamics',

analyses in some detail the case histories of two prophets in Northern Zambia. He argues that they are examples of an indigenous response to Christianity and prepared the local population for social and religious changes. Otite, in 'Encapsulated Political Systems', presents a fascinating paper on the relationship between national level politics and 'traditional' political authorities. Basing himself on events in the former Midwestern State in Nigeria between 1963 and 1966 he shows how the party in power manipulated the law on representation in the House of Chiefs so that, whatever their 'traditional' qualifications, only good party men were able to take their seats.

Four papers take up broader, cross-cultural issues. Brain, in a highly speculative paper, outlines his hypothesis as to how witchcraft fears began amongst early agriculturalists and takes up a number of issues, such as why women are so often the accused, and the significance of witchcraft in contemporary African societies. Joan Vincent, in a most stimulating article, 'Room for Manoeuvre: the Political Role of Small Towns in East Africa', based primarily on Ugandan material, generates a wide-ranging debate on political processes in new nations. She argues that the small town is set in a rural environment where ties are still multiplex. Here big men dominate, but they send their educated sons into the small-town political arena whence paths lead to political heights; and it is here the new class system is generated. Owusu, in 'Comparative Politics, History, and Political Anthropology', has two objectives. He gives an extensive critical review of the recent literature of political anthropology, concentrating on African material, and here he shows both knowledge and insight. Secondly, and this sometimes distorts his review, he pleads for revolution in the Third World and a massive transfer of wealth to it from Europe and America. Perhaps he should consider more carefully Gutkind's contribution, 'Are the Poor Politically Dangerous?', a very wide-ranging look at the position of the Third World urban poor. To suggest they might upset the political stability of their countries, Gutkind says, is politically biased; it is self-evident that with their colonialist/capitalist inheritance these countries are already necessarily unstable; but it is elitist to suggest that the poor will be quiescent, too beset by daily problems to bother with politics. With the right leadership they will engineer real revolutions; they may espouse an apocalyptic ideology which will lead them to overthrow their elites, who are entirely self-interested. Gutkind's polemics against these elites should surely concern Owusu, for is it not necessarily the case, if Gutkind is right, that wealth transferred to the Third World will be translated by them into resources to be used for their own entrenchment?

All in all this is an interesting collection of essays; but I would dearly like to know how Lucy Mair herself would review it.

*University College, London* ROSEMARY HARRIS

**Africa's Industrial Future.** By Richard Bailey. *Blandford, Dorset: Davison. 1976. 198 pp. £5·00.*

It is hard to see why this book has been written, especially as it shows every sign of having been prepared in a hurry. The book is not about Africa's industrial future and says little about that continent's present or past. Most of the chapter titles belie their content and the arguments are inconsequential.

There are a number of generalisations which are at best half-truths; for example, 'throughout Africa more widespread public ownership than is usual in the West is an established, and in some cases, expanding feature of economic life' (p. 8). Or, 'In the post-war period, from about 1948 onwards [in Commonwealth countries]... efforts were made to improve indigenous agriculture...' (p. 114).

On the other hand, the book contains a number of hard facts about the African economy and economies, particularly on the topic of international and intra-continental trade. There are three 'case studies' on Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia. The first two are much too short and superficial to be of much use. For example, Mr. Bailey does not mention the constraints imposed on development in the 1960s by the colonial government's previous neglect of 'indigenous agriculture'. The two chapters on Zambia contain a useful account of the procedures adopted towards the nationalisation of the mines. The final chapter, entitled 'Industrialisation is coming', does not explain the why or the wherefore and baulks a number of issues about income distribution and poverty in the wake of industrialisation (which certainly the World Bank does not nowadays eschew) with the dismissive assertion that 'theoretical arguments are notoriously bad guides as to what actually happens in the real world'; and he cites Brazil, among other countries, as one which has emerged as 'a successful example of export-led development' which has implicitly overcome the problems of income distribution and dependence.

*University of Bath* E. Horesh

**The Politics of South Africa:** Democracy and Racial Diversity. By Howard Brotz. *London: Oxford University Press. 1977. 164 pp. £5·00.*

**Apartheid:** A geography of separation. By Anthony Lemon, with a contribution by Owen Williams. *Farnborough: Saxon House. 1976. 261 pp. £7·95.*

Both these books examine the prospects for significant change in South Africa. It used to be the case that while in the outside world few believed in the long-term viability of apartheid, inside South Africa the likelihood of any major departure from the apartheid blueprint, let alone the prospect of violent revolution, seemed remote. The events of the last few years, particularly the 1973 strikes, Portugal's withdrawal from Africa, and the Soweto riots, have changed white perspectives in South Africa. Though neither author is a South African, both books were written from the 'inside' and reflect the new mood among whites. But both also underline the limits of this change.

Howard Brotz's book is the more revealing in this respect, since it is essentially addressed to white South Africans. It is also the more interesting and original. In particular, he challenges the conventional view that the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism was historically inevitable. The crux of his argument is that chance factors which had nothing to do with racial policy, like the weakening of the United Party as a result of divisions over the Second World War, brought the Nationalist Party to power, and that even today 'for all the preponderance of its parliamentary strength and

power, the Government is not a true centre' (p. 58). He argues that what is required now that it is apparent that the radical blueprint of apartheid has failed to provide a solution to the 'race problem', is 'a restoration of a centre coalition between the moderate segments of English and Afrikaner nationalist opinion' (pp. 59–60).

He believes that such a government would be able to carry white opinion with it in removing injustices to blacks and ultimately bringing about their incorporation in a constitutional democracy with the emphasis on government by consent rather than one man one vote. This summary of Brotz's thesis does not do justice to his book, which contains penetrating insights into the evolution of South African racial policy that contradict both liberal and Afrikaner nationalist interpretations of South African history. However, there is no escaping the fact that from outside South Africa at least his proposals seem laughable. The reason is that from this perspective apartheid is broadly equated with the maintenance of white supremacy. It seems axiomatic that if the government is encountering difficulty in maintaining apartheid by force, it is hardly likely that less authoritarian policies could ensure white dominance.

In a section on the forces of change in his book, Anthony Lemon discusses a variety of more detailed proposals than are put forward by Brotz for a new South African constitution, reflecting the debate taking place among whites about the future. What these demonstrate is that many white South Africans recognise the inadequacy of apartheid as a final settlement of the 'race problem', not that they are willing to abandon white supremacy.

However, Lemon's book is not principally devoted to these issues. Its main merit is as an up-to-date interdisciplinary introduction to the study of South Africa. It contains little original argument, but judiciously summarises the literature on current controversies. The potted history of South Africa is particularly good. Unfortunately, a high quality is not maintained throughout. In particular, the chapter contributed by Professor Owen Williams on political attitudes and voting behaviour is peppered with errors and misleading statements. This is hard to forgive in a book aimed at the general reader rather than the specialist. On the credit side the book is packed with facts and figures and clear explanations. It is free of jargon and has excellent maps. Like Brotz, Lemon is critical of apartheid while sympathetic to the position of the whites as challenges to their dominance grow.

*Queen's University of Belfast* A. GUELKE

**Politics in Liberia:** The Conservative Road to Development. By Martin Lowenkopf. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1976. 237 pp. (Hoover Institution Press Publication Series 151.) $9.95.*

**Liberia and Sierra Leone:** An Essay in Comparative Politics. By Christopher Clapham. *London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1976. 165 pp. (African Studies Series 20.) £4·50.*

SERIOUS new books about Liberia—there are too many of the other kind—are always to be welcomed. Concentration on the de-colonisation process and the problems of new-found independence has largely diverted from that intriguing country the attention it deserves from the student of contemporary

African politics. The circumstances of Liberia's phenomenally rapid modernisation in the postwar decades provide a fascinating test-case for theories of 'neo-colonialism' and 'under-development', which have so far received rather one-sided treatment. Here, a long-standing tradition, patronisingly dismissive of the Americo-Liberian achievement, chimes with fashionable ideology to popularise an image of growth without development [1] which calls for fuller examination.

Professor Lowenkopf's broad survey of the politics of the Tubman era can hardly escape some unfavourable comparison with Liebenow's justly well-known study of *The Evolution of Privilege.*[2] Originally a doctoral thesis presented in 1969, it covers very much the same ground at a markedly more pedestrian pace. Its principal interest lies in the attempt Lowenkopf makes to escape from the weighty influence of the earlier book and to interpret the consequences of President Tubman's 'Open Door' and 'Unification' policies in more positive terms. He stresses the pace of material progress in the hinterland, the skill of the ruling class in retaining political control of the immense foreign investments and the impressive degree of success which has so far attended carefully managed policies of assimilation in neutralising the threat from the indigenous masses. He is properly cautious about the future, but decidedly less pessimistic than Liebenow about the prospects for 'conservative' development. It is a pity that these judgments should appear too often to rest more on the writer's preferences than on hard new evidence. Certainly, Liberia cannot be an easy country to write about. Physical communications are still very poor and a repressive government, acutely sensitive to foreign criticism, has tight control of the meagre flow of information. Any account of the political scene must be patchy and impressionistic, but one cannot escape the disappointing feeling that Professor Lowenkopf has accepted rather too easily the limitations upon his enterprise.

It is one of the strengths of Lowenkopf's book that he appears more aware than did Liebenow of the wider West African context, and this implied new approach comes out much more explicitly in Dr. Clapham's elegant and perceptive little monograph. The formal structure of Clapham's argument, in terms of the exploitation of perceived political recourses for the attainment or retention of power, is open to theoretical challenge as too restrictive and academic, but in practice it works well as the framework for an illuminating, point by point, comparison of the elite politics of the last twenty-five years in Liberia and in Sierra Leone, of all neighbouring countries the one with which it has evidently most in common. The contrast between the politically-diminished Creoles of Freetown and the durable 'civilised' oligarchy of Monrovia is familiar enough, but what this treatment successfully brings out is the greater significance of essential similarities between the two situations. The convergent developments which Dr. Clapham describes support his conclusion that some of the most important 'effects of western penetration are quite independent of formal colonial rule'. It is refreshing to find Liberia reconsidered out of isolation in this way, and it comes rather well out of the comparison. The quiet succession of President Tolbert has underlined the stability and adaptability of the True Whig

[1] Robert Clower *et al*, *Growth without Development: An Economic Survey of Liberia* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

[2] *Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1969). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1970, p. 601.

regime. While Dr. Clapham does not underestimate the difficulties facing both countries, he finds the outlook for Liberia at least 'less depressing'.

One last query must be raised. Liberian statistics are admittedly bewildering, but can Dr. Clapham be right in his estimate (p. 130) of the total Americo-Liberian population at something under 7,000?

*School of Oriental and African Studies, London* D. H. JONES

**Rural Responses to Industrialization:** A Study of Village Zambia. By Robert H. Bates. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1976. 380 pp. £14·40.*

MANY African states seem recently to have entered a phase of political and economic development in which regional inequalities have unleashed old forces of provincialism in new forms and led to the transformation of post-independence politics. The disparities between core areas and peripheral regions are familiar features now in both developed and developing countries, and after colonial rule the population of such disadvantaged rural areas helped, in the author's words, 'to place in power a government that would lay hold of the wealth in the cities and transfer it to the countryside through programs of rural development'. In many ways this book is a study of a competitive system of public services offered in exchange for votes which ended when resources became constrained.

Zambia has been for most of this century a classic mono-economy, dominated by the copper industry; since 1964 it has moved rapidly from being a village society to one dominated by the growth poles along its traditional Line-of-Rail, and Dr. Bates has chosen to study rural responses to industrialisation by field study in the Luapula Province. East of Zaïre's Shaba Province, this area was, until the activities of the BSA Company on the Copper-belt transformed the resource evaluation, the heartland of Central Africa. Throughout much of the colonial period the Luapula retained a degree of prosperity based on lucrative fisheries, combining this with a high level of political radicalism and reciprocal involvement by the provincial administration. One colonial official is quoted as noting, with prophetic insight, that 'Perhaps our only consolation is that [these people] will be equally troublesome to an African administration'. Dr. Bates records and analyses the responses to industrial and urban growth by reference to cash cropping and migration and to political protest before and after independence; as such the book is a mine of information and a model of academic inquiry and method, and one regrets that his data and insights can only be selectively mentioned here.

Dealing with the post-independence phase Dr. Bates shows how a government committed to modernising remote areas and successful in turning a maize-deficit area into one of exportable surpluses, has nevertheless seen its programme fail when judged by the non-success of communal farming and co-operatives or the falling profits to the farmer. In turn, private sales outside the official marketing organisations have been stimulated and migration from the nation's rural hinterland has become a more attractive means of overcoming relative poverty. But the political responses at local level appear to have the most far-reaching consequences. Initially, the rural dwellers of the Luapula secured services from the government by their shrewd manipula-

tion of politicians prepared to compete for scarce resources and thereby to heighten rivalry between districts and provinces. Benefit turned to detriment with the prohibition of opposition parties in 1972. No longer able to exploit a system of competitive parties, the rural dwellers, according to Bates, were among those who stood to lose most from its demise. Where urban migration and rural protest were alternatives for impoverished rural communities, Zambia's attempt to preserve political stability by removing competitive politics may make it more difficult to eradicate rural/urban disparities. For Dr. Bates the choice between private solutions to rural deprivation and new forms of political action to compel public measures by the government will be of central importance in Zambia's future political development.

*University of Newcastle upon Tyne* J. A. HELLEN

**Aid and Inequality in Kenya:** British Development Assistance to Kenya. By Gerald Holtham and Arthur Hazlewood. *London: Croom Helm in association with the Overseas Development Institute. 1976. 265 pp. £12·95.*

A VERY readable book which is strong on facts, making generally good use of primary and secondary sources, but which offers little analytical insight. The reader is offered a detailed breakdown of the composition of British aid to Kenya since independence, and a number of criticisms of the procedures and terms of British aid provision. These are contrasted, sometimes adversely, with the procedures and terms of other major donors. For this reason this book is likely to be of interest chiefly to those who are in the business of aid provision. The refusal of the Overseas Development Ministry to provide aid for recurrent expenditure is criticised as unrealistic and potentially damaging to the Kenyan economy. Members of ODM may also find it helpful to know that the Kenyan government prefers a blunt 'no', together with the reasons why, from a potential donor, to the 'squelchy' and devious beating about the bush which its members apparently associate with representatives of ODM. On balance, however, the authors' assessment of the ministry's performance is a favourable one. Indeed the general line taken in this book is a defence of ODM's aid policies against its critics: not at the operational level (here the authors are critical, as stated above) but at the more fundamental level of the impact of aid on Kenyan development.

This reviewer found that defence unconvincing chiefly for methodological reasons. The authors are concerned mainly to confront criticism from the 'left', but unfortunately they decline to confront these critics on their own ground, preferring to examine aid in isolation from other aspects of Britain's political and economic relations with Kenya on the grounds that ODM has a fair amount of independence in designing individual aid programmes. This argument is weakened, however, by the authors' own conclusion that other British ministries, notably the Treasury, Board of Trade and Foreign Office, also influence aid policy. Throughout this book the analysis is also blurred by the lack of any clear distinction between (i) the authors' account and evaluation of British aid, given an overall acceptance of Kenyan policies since independence, which is based on the presumption that British aid could not significantly influence these; and (ii) the licence the authors give themselves to criticise these policies in piecemeal fashion and to assume that aid donors may after all influence policy. The shifting of ground is confusing.

Finally, the title of this book is *Aid and Inequality in Kenya*, and I would like to record my disappointment at the treatment of the aid-inequality relationship at both the operational and analytical level. The relationship is in my view under-researched and superficially treated and does not justify inclusion of the concept of inequality in the title. The concluding view of the authors is that the aim (of both the Kenyan government and aid donors) should be 'not to endeavour to prevent the growth of inequalities . . but to see that there is no tendency for the cumulative favouring of particular areas or individuals' (p. 259). How one can have the one without the other they do not begin to show.

*University of Sussex* DIANA HUNT

## ASIA

**Inside India Today.** By Dilip Hiro. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1976. 331 pp. £6·95.*

THIS book, written in the main before the declaration of a state of emergency in India in June 1975 but revised to take account of its significance, is a severe indictment of the organisation of Indian political life during the long period when the Indian National Congress was the ruling party at the centre and in most of the states. It provides a very good account of Indian politics since independence, based on a wide range of sources, including the author's own interviews and observations during field work in India between October 1970 and April 1972. Mr. Hiro has obviously done a great deal of research and has established an impressive grasp of the detail of the major policy issues of this period.

He is also concerned to present a general argument about the main direction of political change in India. His main proposition is that the Congress, having served its purpose, is politically outmoded:

> The congress has played out its historically progressive role: a successful challenge to the foreign, imperialistic capital on behalf of the indigenous capital; and substitution or supplanting of the largely absentee feudal ownership in agriculture with directly managed landlordship or 'self-cultivating' ownership by rich peasants (p. 281).

He sees the Congress as being incapable of undertaking further policies of land reform and income redistribution for the benefit of the poor, and predicts a strengthening of the communist movement, to the advantage of the Indian Communist Party (Marxist) and other groups. The latter thesis is backed up by a detailed and informative account of the history of the Indian communist movement, which has divided into several parties since 1964, and an analysis of the main events in the politics of West Bengal in the period 1967–72, during which the CPI (M) played an important part in several United Front governments and incurred the hostility of the Congress government at the centre.

'What lies ahead,' he predicts, 'during the next year or two, is probably a "disciplined" general election. There can be little doubt as to which party will win that sort of election, and why' (p. 289). Like most observers, he assumed that the Congress Party would be returned in any such election,

whereas the recent Lok Sabha poll (March 1977) has been won, against all expectations, by a combination of non-Congress parties, principally the Janata Party and the Congress for Democracy. No one writing when Mr. Hiro did could have anticipated this result, but even so he does seem in his book to be unduly sceptical in his assessment of the way in which the democratic process has worked in India since the 1950s. He attributes electoral success much less to popular support than to the ability of the various parties to manipulate the system through the choice of acceptable candidates, the liberal use of funds, patronage, the projection of leading personalities and the exploitation of election symbols, and he minimises the voters' capacity for independent judgment. Although it is important to consider evidence that political parties and candidates have tried to manipulate the electoral process and that considerations of caste and community have influenced the decision of voters, it is, as recent events have shown, equally important to recognise the strong attachment of the Indian people to free elections. The strength of their political awareness should no longer be in doubt.

*University of Sussex* B. D. GRAHAM

**Nuclear India.** By J. P. Jain. *New Delhi: Radiant. 1974. Vol. I: 200 pp. Rs. 40·00. $10·00. Vol. II: 440 pp. Rs. 75·00. $17·00.*

**India's Nuclear Option:** Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making. By Ashok Kapur. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 295 pp. £13·05.*

**India:** The Energy Sector. By P. D. Henderson. *Delhi, London: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. 1975. 191 pp. Rs. 30.00. £3·25.*

In the field of nuclear policy—military and civil, national and international—India's role is unique, and uniquely important. Among Third World countries India has probably the most highly developed nuclear capability, and the most significant record of involvement in international nuclear affairs, dating back virtually to the end of the Second World War. Present-day India remains on the cutting edge of a number of inter-related issues with a nuclear flavour. Internally, India is in a position to choose between and demonstrate a range of energy policy options; the choice will be profoundly influential on other Third World countries, especially with regard to civil nuclear power. Internationally, India enjoys a position of tantalising ambiguity, having in May 1974 exploded a 'peaceful' nuclear device whose characteristics would in other circumstances be indistinguishable from a nuclear weapon. How India arrived in its present role, and where it might go from here, are discussed in three recent books which neatly bracket the issues: one by an Indian 'insider', one by an Indian 'outsider' and one by a Briton employed by an international agency.

While in the Indian Foreign Office, J. P. Jain was a member of the Indian delegation to the UN Disarmament Commission and many other UN conferences and meetings. In the two volumes of *Nuclear India* Jain writes a paean of praise for the Indian nuclear programme, its technical and political advocates and its triumph against the intransigent selfishness of the nuclear weapons states. Now that Western nuclear advocates have begun to confess their uncertainties, it is ironically refreshing to be reminded of the pure unabashed nuclear euphoria which once also prevailed in Britain and

the United States. Jain's book is dedicated to Dr. Homi Bhabha, father of the Indian nuclear programme, who is lauded in frankly fulsome terms throughout. In Jain's view civil nuclear energy is an unbounded boon to mankind, which the nefarious machinations of the Western nuclear countries attempted to deny to India. However, Indian scientists and statesmen fought heroically in the international arena and brought India, and the rest of the Third World, the prize of an undeniable share of the nuclear booty, including of course the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Non-Proliferation Treaty comes in for particular condemnation: '. . . the NPT sought to restrict [the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency] for non-nuclear-weapons states by denying them the facility of peaceful nuclear explosions. Since such explosions have important industrial and other applications for the economic uplift of a country, no sovereign nation can possibly be expected to submit itself to such patently unjust and discriminatory treatment.' This viewpoint, like many others in Jain's book, is to say the least debatable. But it is undoubtedly enlightening to a Western reader to hear the undiluted voice of *Nuclear India* in full cry. To those who harbour growing doubts about the advisability of spreading nuclear technology and materials far and wide the sound is not encouraging.

Volume II of Jain's book, a compilation of 185 papers, agreements, and other documents relating to Indian nuclear policy from its outset, is a useful adjunct to a much more balanced analysis, also by an Indian, entitled *India's Nuclear Option*. Ashok Kapur is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. His study is a thoughtful and informative dissection of the development of Indian nuclear policy, internally and internationally. His thesis centres on the concept of India as 'a power in the middle'—pivotally involved in the creation of the international nuclear climate, aligned with no 'great power' but too prominent to be ignored. Kapur is less starry-eyed than Jain about the Indian participants, their motives and competence; but he takes pains to elucidate for Western readers the Indian attitude to such controversial affairs as the Indo-Canadian nuclear collaboration and its recent sticky end. Western policy analysts and decision makers would be well advised to give careful consideration to the points Kapur adduces. However, the fault, as he stresses, is not entirely that of 'culture-bound Western prisms': 'If Western analysts need to refocus their perceptions of India's strategic behaviour, Indians also need to help the process of perceptual and conceptual change by better explanations and improved communications concerning the reasoning behind India's behaviour. India's nuclear case is strong, but it is badly understated. Its presentation requires refinement, recognising that not only must arguments be sound, but they must appear so to others also.' Whether or not a Western reader concurs with Kapur's discourse, he is bound to endorse this concluding admonition, which applies with equal force to both military and civil nuclear disputation.

Indian nuclear policy, like that of other countries with extensive nuclear programmes, is embedded, at least partially, in the broader context of energy policy. Professor P. D. Henderson, of University College, London, provides a valuable springboard for consideration of Indian energy policy in *India: The Energy Sector*. Professor Henderson took part in the preparation of a World Bank report on India's energy sector, initiated in 1973 and completed in the spring of 1974. His book, an offshoot of the unpublished World Bank report, is concise, factual and lucid. Part I surveys the energy resources of

India—coal, hydrocarbons, hydroelectricity, nuclear fuels and non-commercial energy sources; the growth and pattern of energy use and supply in India; and the development of Indian energy supply industries. Part II discusses the Indian energy shortage and immediate prospects for coping with it, including supplies into the 1980s. It is, as Henderson points out, a book with a very short time horizon—and, be it said, none the worse for that, in these days of far-fetched projections into the uncharted formlessness of the twenty-first century. The most Henderson attempts to do is 'to provide a broad introductory survey which can form part of ... a much more secure foundation of data and evidence than either exists or is in prospect at the present time'. In fact he accomplishes considerably more; the clarity and crispness of the writing make the book eminently readable, and no mere recitation of statistics. At a time when energy technologies are becoming a key lever for international diplomacy, it is of special importance that policy makers in industrial countries should recognise the opportunities and the context within which international agreements on energy can be concluded. Positive steps towards co-operation on appropriate energy technologies may offer powerful reinforcement of current pressures towards restraint in the dissemination of the more dubious.

WALTER C. PATTERSON

**Politics of the Indian Ocean Region:** The Balances of Power. By Ferenc A. Váli. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1977. 272 pp. £10·50.*

**Arms in the Indian Ocean:** Interests and Challenges. By Dale R. Tahtinen with the assistance of John Lenczowski. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977. 84 pp. (AEI Studies 145.) Pb: $3·00.*

To judge serious academic studies by the banality of their conclusions is to an extent unfair. We should perhaps be relieved that not every author is striving for an unattainable originality of interpretation. Nevertheless if these two books by Ferenc Váli and Dale R. Tahtinen were only to be evaluated in this way there would be little more to say. To begin the final paragraph of a very short book, as Tahtinen does, with the statement: 'Much has been said about the crucial geographic position of the Indian Ocean. Some have contended that the region is destined to be a chessboard for superpower rivalry, but, just because the chessmen are poised, the game need not be played' (p. 44) is almost to convince the reader that he has wasted his time.

Indeed by any standards *Arms in the Indian Ocean* is in fact virtually useless. The last forty pages out of only eighty-four are taken up with tables extracted wholesale from *The Military Balance* (IISS), *Jane's Fighting Ships*, *Jane's Weapons Systems* and *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*. Oversimplifications and obvious generalisations abound—for example, 'Without a doubt, the more than 800 helicopters in the hands of the Indian Ocean states can directly contribute to the needs of those states' (p. 4); and 'On the whole, an examination of the armed forces of the countries indigenous to the Indian Ocean region reveals the presence of a huge number of men under arms and large stocks of material, hardly reflective of a real power vacuum' (p. 10).

Ferenc Váli's book is factually much more substantial. It contains, amongst other things, a useful, but far from profound, chapter on 'Oil, Shipping and

the Law of the Sea'. His summaries of the political situation, territory by territory, are brief to the point of being cursory and his bibliographies eclectic but sometimes original. The exposition of Indian Ocean geopolitics approached from the starting-points of the works of Mahan, Mackinder and Haushofer has an air of unreality and he leans too heavily on the concept of a 'Zone of Peace'. He would have done better to take more notice of the conclusions of Peter Lyon's paper on 'The Indian Ocean as a Strategic Area'[1] which he quotes (p. 39). As with Tahtinen's essay, the reader is left grappling with vague propositions such as the demand 'that the balance-of-power system of the region be submitted to a synoptic scrutiny' (p. 41). Though one may find appealing the notion of the countries of the Indian Ocean littoral reaching 'the nirvana of opulence' (p. 237) via the resources of the sea-bed, a modicum of linguistic restraint and of commonsense would be a relief. It is scarcely surprising that 'White supremacist South Africa ... has so far been unable ... to copy the Australian policy of seeking alignment with the non-European African environment' (p. 236).

Compared, for example, with the clarity and elegance of K. M. Panikkar's *India and the Indian Ocean*[2] these two books are clumsily inept: perhaps their greatest weakness lies in the wide range of undeclared assumptions on which such opinions as are expressed are based.

*University of Aston in Birmingham* WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

**Indian Foreign Policy:** The Nehru Years. Edited by **B. R.** Nanda. *New Delhi: Vikas under the auspices of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. 1976. 279 pp. Rs. 45.00.*

Now that the new Janata government has been in power for a few months in New Delhi, it becomes increasingly clear that its foreign policy pronouncements are not significantly different from those of Mrs. Gandhi and that much of the Nehru legacy lives on, at least in the declaratory dimension of India's foreign policy. Dr. B. R. Nanda, the Director of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, has brought together eleven essays, based on a series of lectures delivered in New Delhi in 1973–74, which review India's foreign policy during the seventeen years when Jawaharlal Nehru was Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister of India. Nanda himself has supplied an excellently incisive introduction to this collection. The contributors are all well-known Indian academics or diplomats, generally covering ground which they have written about more lengthily elsewhere. The essays are clear and competent, sometimes mildly pietistic and, overall, rather dull.

*Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London* PETER LYON

**Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence:** From Sukarno to Soeharto. By Franklin B. Weinstein. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1976. 384 pp. £14·00.*

THE scale and natural wealth of Indonesia obscure for some observers the innate weakness of a distended state beset by physical fragmentation and

[1] From *The Indian Ocean in International Politics*, collected papers of a conference organised by the Department of Extra-Mural Studies, University of Southampton (Southampton: University of Southampton, 1973).
[2] London: Allen and Unwin, 1945.

acute social diversity. This weakness has been felt deeply by successive governments of strikingly different political outlooks. It has been sustained by a common conviction that Indonesia, which endured a bitter and costly struggle for independence, is obliged to exist in a world of hostile external forces. The experience of attaining independence and of maintaining it has created an apprehension of any external relationship on which Indonesia is unduly dependent. Yet at the same time economic deficiency and the inability or unwillingness to accept the rigours of autonomous development have encouraged a paradoxical propensity to seek and accept external assistance. It is this dilemma which is central to Dr. Weinstein's incisive analysis of Indonesian foreign policy.

His purpose in this book is to examine and illuminate the relationship between foreign policy and the condition of underdevelopment by exploring two contrasting phases of Indonesian politics which give rise to correspondingly different external state practice. The bulk of the data used has been gathered in the course of field work enquiry which took the form of extensive and systematic interviewing of generational echelons of what are described as the Indonesian foreign policy elite. Although evident differences emerge in the experience of the three principal generations in Indonesian political life during the past half-century, Dr. Weinstein demonstrates that they are linked by a shared international outlook. And while individual perceptions may vary, there exists a core common view of Indonesia's vulnerable international position. The contrasting faces of Indonesian foreign policy under Sukarno and Suharto are explained convincingly as examples of alternative impulses reflecting major emphasis on either independence or economic aid. The reason for the dominance of one impulse over the other, in a country where the most cardinal of political sins is to compromise national independence, is the prevailing degree of domestic political competition. Thus the factious and combative politics of Guided Democracy generated an assertive foreign policy, while its relative absence under the New Order of General Suharto has made possible external relationships which would not have been tolerated previously.

Dr. Weinstein would not wish to explain every facet of Indonesian foreign policy in these terms, but he has advanced a convincing hypothesis with which to approach its understanding. Indeed, he would go further and suggest its utility for understanding the function and relevance of foreign policy in other new underdeveloped states in other than merely idiosyncratic terms. This is a book of considerable merit and interest which should satisfy a number of audiences, including regional area specialists and general students of foreign policy analysis weighed down with burdensome taxonomies.

*London School of Economics* MICHAEL LEIFER

**China after the Cultural Revolution:** Politics between Two Party Congresses. By Jürgen Domes. *London: C. Hurst. 1977. 283 pp. £6·50.* (First publ. *Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1975* under title *China nach der Kulturrevolution: Politik zwischen zwei Parteitagen.*)

**Factional and Coalition Politics in China:** The Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath. By Y. C. Chang. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 144 pp. £10·50.*

PROFESSOR Domes's book will come as a welcome guide to those people,

most of us probably, who have found it increasingly difficult to follow the fluctuations of political and personal fortunes in China in recent years, who is ' left ' or ' right ' and why they are in or out. Those who are familiar with his previous work, *The Internal Politics of China, 1949–72*, will know the characteristic thoroughness he brings to his research. Typical is the note on p. 25 that the late Dr. Erik von Groeling, the young German scholar to whom this book is dedicated, ' put together 139 reports in the Chinese media on strikes and interruptions in transportation as well as eighty-six reports on peasant unrest '.

Here we may find a reconstruction of the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 and the Tenth Congress in 1973 and the dramatic events in between. The analysis is keen and carefully organised in chronological sequence, and there are no fewer than twenty-one tables relating to background information on leadership personnel, mainly the membership of the Central Committee.

To turn more specifically to some interesting details, no one need be under any illusion that delegates to Party Congresses in China are elected by their own organisation, at least not since the Cultural Revolution. Such matters are centralised within the Party machine. Furthermore, three-quarters of the delegates to the Ninth Congress ' were wearing the uniform of the PLA ' (p. 16), showing the extent of the army's ascendency in both Party and country at that time. Why then did Lin Piao, the army chief, fall from grace and become Mao's chief opponent within so short a time? Here Professor Domes distinguishes two main competing alliances in the Chinese political spectrum. There was the Cultural Revolutionary Left, including Mao's wife and the Shanghai Party leaders, opposed by the Central PLA led by Lin Piao regional commanders, and state administrators led by Chou En-lai. It was the concerted attack of the latter coalition on the policies and personnel of the other that accounted for the turbulence of events in 1970 and thereafter.

This is obviously an extremely chequered picture, and equally obviously only someone extremely interested in contemporary China will have the time or the inclination to do the hard work necessary to follow all the manoeuvres, all the feints and thrusts, sometimes verbal through the media, at other times organisational by means of personnel changes in one provincial power base or another. Only someone as immersed as is Professor Domes in the data will make any sense of it at all, or discern any intelligible pattern. Basically, one could say that this was, or is, a conflict between those in favour of a return to 1958, with an emphasis on collectivisation, a larger agricultural work unit, such as the communes, and a reduction in material incentives, and those who see greater virtue in an emphasis on production, pragmatism in incentive policy, and stability generally throughout the administration. Even this, however, is cutting a lot of corners.

And Mao? He first abandoned his personal secretary and cultural revolutionary ally, Ch'en Po-ta, who, Domes tells us, was the original author of the works attributed to Mao, *On Contradictions*, *On Practice*, and even *On New Democracy* (p. 81). Then Lin's desire to be named head of state sharpened Mao's suspicions, and led to the clash between a reconstituted Party and the army's high command. This left the revolutionary rump with little option but to try to cling on to some position of power at the centre, where they have now been cleaned up by Hua Kuo-feng. The role of the secret police in Chinese politics has yet to be fully spelt out, but clearly under Hua it has been of crucial importance.

These same years have seen spectacular developments in China's foreign policy as well, and Marie-Luise Näth provides an explanation and rationale in her exceptionally clear-sighted analysis in the two chapters she has contributed to this volume. All in all, it adds up to a most impressive contribution to our understanding of China, and it is simply an indication of the pace of events that the death of Mao and the arrest of his widow will have to await treatment in a subsequent book.

The book by Professor Chang covers almost exactly the same ground. It is a brief, factual account that reads a little thinly after the richness of Domes's book. At £10 for 144 pages many readers will probably be deterred. Once again the book is overtaken by events, since it ends with the second demotion of Teng Hsiao-p'ing (after the death of Chou En-lai) and the leftists riding high. The author concludes, on page 137, that 'Unless the Maoists can make communism, in its unadulterated form, work for China despite its failures elsewhere, they will have to face the strong possibility that, in the long run, they may turn out to be the real "clowns"' (i.e. those who go against the tide of history).

*University of Hull* V. C. FUNNELL

**China's Changing Role in the World Economy.** Bryant G. Garth and the Editors of the *Stanford Journal of International Studies.* (Eds.) *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 222 pp. £8·25.*

THIS collection of papers had its origin in a conference, held at Stanford University in the spring of 1974, which sought to re-evaluate China's position and future role in the international economy. Around this broadly unifying theme the various contributions can be grouped into two categories: the first comprising those which approach the question from a general point of view and the second, those which are concerned with more specific aspects.

The first category includes three papers which examine the role of 'self-reliance' in China's strategy of economic development and its implications for its further integration into the world economy. Two of the authors reach the conclusion, albeit by different routes, that the emphasis on 'going it alone' is likely to give way in the future to increased reliance on trade and other forms of international exchange. However, the third paper adopts a different standpoint and argues that the indirect costs which attach to greater international exchange may move China in precisely the opposite direction.

At a more specific level are articles about energy, population, financial policies and China's relationship with Japan. Although all contain a certain amount of useful material and some are interesting for the perspective they adopt, they cannot really be said to break new ground. It is a pity that hardly any use was apparently made of the increasing amount of Chinese source material which has become available in recent years, for this might have added to the value of some of the articles. Perhaps the most useful are those by Victor Li and David L. Denny. The first gives a clear and succinct account of the historical background and more important legal aspects of the off-shore oil dispute over the Senkaku Islands. The latter describes, no less clearly, the practices adopted in recent years by the Chinese in their financial dealings with their trading partners.

But in general, this collection is likely to be of only peripheral interest

to those concerned with China, whether from a purely academic or a more practical point of view. For those in search of factual information, there are more recent and up-to-date sources, while for scholars, the perspectives adopted by some of the authors have yet to be proved fruitful. In any case, it may be thought that the extraordinary events which have occurred in China in the last year or two already suggest the need for further re-evaluation of many of the issues considered in this book.

*School of Oriental and African Studies, London* ROBERT ASH

**The Man Who Lost China:** The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-Shek. By Brian Crozier with the collaboration of Eric Chou. *London: Angus and Robertson. 1977. 430 pp. £8·00.*

MR. CROZIER seems to be justified in his claim to have made the first attempt in English 'to tell the story of Chiang Kai-Shek's life from cradle to grave and to place it in the context of the history of his time' (p. xi). Moreover his biography of Chiang can claim to be full. It covers his long life from his birth in Chekiang province and early education in Japan to the losses of the Kuomintang in China and his final sixteen years in the 'island redoubt' of Taiwan (though the last section is much briefer than the early ones). It is obviously not a definitive biography. Indeed there are doubts whether one can ever be written, because, as Professor Martin Wilbur has written, the archives in Taiwan have been 'sanitized'. Mr. Crozier's account is not 'sanitized' and records many personal details about Chiang which contradict the conventional image of puritanical abstinence often associated with him. Unlike its predecessors in the field, the book is not hagiography: it is a candid and detailed, but basically favourable, description of one who was an important force in east Asian politics from the 1920s to his death in 1975.

Like everyone who has pondered Chiang's career, the author is in search of clues to his character. When Chiang resigned in 1927—one of the many occasions when he used that device—and went to Japan, he met a former commander from his earlier days at military academy in Tokyo (1907–10), General Nagaoka, and inscribed for him a message which read, 'Never neglect my Master's instructions'. In fact, this dictum was utterly untypical of Chiang in youth and middle age when he could be headstrong, temperamental, sulky, and solitary. He would not accept the instructions of his patron, Sun Yat-sen, who was in any case too idealistic for him; nor was he good at making compromises with his Kuomintang contemporaries. Despite his seeming placidity, he could be tempestuous.

For Mr. Crozier, the gravest of Chiang's many errors of judgment was his instruction to the young Marshal in Manchuria in 1931 not to resist the Japanese there. This set the guidelines for his policy of concentrating on domestic problems and ignoring external intrusions which were only arrested after his release from captivity at Sian in 1936. On Chiang's controversial military strategy in Chungking towards Japanese incursions, Crozier comments: 'he had no plans for victory; only for survival, for outsitting the enemy. In time, he had guessed, the Americans would be drawn into the war; then he would be rewarded for tying up a million or so Japanese soldiers. Perhaps even the Russians, too, would be sucked into this conflict'

(p. 221). As this quotation suggests, a charitable attempt is made to understand and interpret Chiang's thinking.

This is a popular book which is eminently readable. Indeed the author has great success in making the turbulent 1920s in China intelligible. Some will spot mistakes (Mr. Crozier gets the Shanghai incident of 1932 wrong); academics will not like the system of references. There is not a vast amount of significant new material contained in it; but his judgments on the more familiar sources are always interesting. For the general reader, this book is a useful, lucid and detailed biography of a central figure whose career at the top spanned over half a century of China's modern history.

*London School of Economics* IAN NISH

**Japan and a New World Economic Order.** By Kiyoshi Kojima. *London: Croom Helm. 1977. 190 pp. £7·95.*

PROFESSOR Kojima's book deals with three interdependent subjects. First, he examines Japan's role in the world economy. Secondly, he presents existing plans and his personal views about how post-miracle Japan should transform itself into a country advancing through far greater concentration on sophisticated technologies. Finally, he explores in detail in what form the industrial transformation of Japan and of other advanced industrial countries ought to be brought about so as to advance the cause of the industrialisation and economic emancipation of the underdeveloped world.

On the way, Professor Kojima—an internationally respected professor at the prestigious Hitotsubashi University of Tokyo—offers a variety of original and highly stimulating ideas, all, ultimately, geared to his central preoccupation, the continued progress of the industrialised world within a genuinely new international economic order. Unlike American foreign investment policies, Japan's should be 'trade-oriented' rather than 'new industries-oriented' (p. 82), and '. . . an integrated aid, investment-*cum*-preference structural adjustment policy is required' (p. 87). Apart from the farming out of labour-intensive and heavy raw materials-consuming industries, '. . . Japanese foreign direct investment' should aim at 'establishing a network of intra-industry specialisation with those countries, not only in consumer goods but also in intermediate goods production as well as machinery . . .' (p. 159).

In brief, in rich-poor country relations 'there is a shift of emphasis from aid and trade expansion of a " surplus disposal " type to that of a " structural adjustment " type' (p. 159), and thus funds for assisting structural adjustment in advanced countries '. . . would be more efficient than direct aid to developing countries' (p. 164). Yet such an enlightened north-south policy still '. . . crucially depends upon the prosperity of horizontal trade in knowledge-intensive products between advanced countries' (p. 160).

To provide a suitable framework, Professor Kojima revives his widely discussed proposal for a Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) with the participation of the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and, gradually, the countries of East Asia and Latin America. 'Could not the Eurobloc and a PAFTA be transformed into a world-wide Multilateral Free Trade Arrangement after a decade or so . . .'—he asks (p. 168). But according to his own analysis on the following pages, Japan would be the chief beneficiary and the United States the carrier of the heaviest sacrifices,

and so he is forced to envisage intermediate solutions for North-east Asia and South-east Asia, before settling at the end for the more modest invitation to economic integration between Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

Professor Kojima's outline of a new world and regional economic order is both generous and highly desirable. But his book was completed in December 1975 when recession and mass unemployment could still be considered as temporary features of advanced economies. And that goes a long way to explain why, unfortunately, outside Japan his proposals are finding a diminishing audience.

TIBOR MENDE

## NORTH AMERICA

**Secrets, Spies and Scholars:** Blueprint of the Essential CIA. By Ray S. Cline. *Washington: Acropolis. 1976. 294 pp. $10·00.*

UNLIKE many other books by former CIA employees, which tend to take the form of *exposés*, this is written by a loyalist to the organisation. As with many of his contemporaries, Ray Cline's connection with intelligence work began with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the war. He was recruited into the newly-formed CIA in 1949 and stayed with the organisation until 1969, rising to become Deputy Director for Intelligence. He then became Director of the State Department's small bureau of Intelligence and Research. He left in 1973 after falling out with Kissinger. The most significant aspect of Cline's career is that it was on the pure intelligence side of the CIA's activity, concerned with collecting, interpreting and disseminating information on foreign governments, as opposed to clandestine activities. Because 'dirty tricks' have captured the headlines, pure intelligence work tends to be forgotten, though this provides the CIA with its main, and most useful, purpose. Cline's book therefore represents a valuable addition to the literature by helping to redress the balance.

Using his personal experience for illustrative purposes, Cline tells the history of the CIA, concentrating mainly on the formative years. Though this story has been told before, Cline adds much new detail. His thesis that the British influence was critical in determining the character of the American intelligence effort is on the whole convincing, though he may have relied overmuch on the biography of William Stephenson [1] in developing the argument. Cline is obviously nostalgic for the heroic and romantic days of the 1950s and Allen Dulles's leadership of the CIA. He does, however, recognise that many of the Agency's problems stem from this period. Dulles spent little time on pure intelligence matters (5 per cent according to Cline) and concentrated instead on extending American influence by covert means.

Cline betrays, with justice, the irritation of the intelligence specialist with the large degree of effort that has been put into clandestine activities. This has served to distract senior officials from their proper job of producing sound intelligence reports and estimates and has left the specialists, who are basically academic types, suffering through guilt by association with the misdeeds of the clandestine operatives. For this reason Cline proposes that an open and accessible Central Institute of Foreign Affairs Research be set

[1] W. Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

up to consolidate the analytical work now undertaken in the intelligence community. This sort of work he sees as being perfectly respectable and best carried out openly and with few cloak-and-dagger affectations. He has a number of other equally sensible proposals for Congressional oversight and executive control of covert activity (which he would continue on a modest scale).

Though some of his proposals are quite radical they are presented in a moderate manner. Cline is, above all, a loyalist. He castigates the press and Congress for the ferocity of their attacks on the CIA while acknowledging that the Agency had been engaged in dubious activities. He helps to maintain the fiction that the *Penkovsky Papers*[2] are authentic. He never suggests that one of his former colleagues was anything other than a patriot and a professional deserving of the deepest respect. In fact, this book is remarkably without vitriol, considering that Cline was rumoured throughout his career to be at the centre of deep and bitter rivalries within the CIA—especially with Richard Helms. On the whole this is a readable and thoughtful book. If the picture of the CIA it presents is not complete, at least it is more well-rounded than other sensational offerings on the same subject.

*Chatham House* L. FREEDMAN

**Informal Entente:** The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918–1928. By Michael J. Hogan. *Columbia, London: University of Missouri Press. 1977. 254 pp. $12.50.*

THIS work on Anglo-American economic diplomacy during the decade after the First World War is in the tradition of the classic study by Richard N. Gardner of the post-1945 period.[1] In many ways Hogan's book is a pioneer work: he has utilised primary sources both in the Public Record Office in London and the National Archives in Washington, supplemented by an extensive collection of private papers. It is more than merely a reassessment of accepted opinions, and proves to be a substantial piece of original research.

The emphasis of this study is on the United States, the British aspect being more tangentially treated. Hogan's case is that after the First World War the emphasis in American international economic policy shifted from the public to the private sector. President Hoover, for instance, favoured private rather than public management of United States loans (p. 82). Similarly, American officials believed that 'government operation was not the best method of extending international communications' (p. 105). Instead, private emissaries established agreements between Britain and the United States, especially in the South American and North Atlantic sectors, on international cable communications, absorbing 'cable conflict into a pattern of cooperation institutionalized at the private level, and widened the area of informal Anglo-American understanding' (p. 106). Hogan also shows that as the wartime concern for a secure system of radio communication lessened, the emphasis shifted from public to private management.

Perhaps the most revealing section, however, is that on petroleum policy.

[2] O. Penkovskii, *The Penkovsky Papers* (New York: Doubleday; London: Collins. 1965).

[1] *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy*: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1956). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1957, p. 96. (New expanded ed.: McGraw-Hill. 1969.)

By emphasising the commercial agreements rather than the diplomatic controversies, Hogan suggests that there was a good deal more harmony between Britain and the United States in this field than has been realised. He demonstrates that the British were interested in co-operation to prevent destabilising and unprofitable competition. Further, such agreement could help to conserve Britain's economic and political interests in the Middle East against Russian communism and revolutionary Arab nationalism. For the Americans, not only would such co-operation minimise economic conflict, but it would also reduce the demand for 'statist' programmes that were seen as 'serious detriments to business efficiency and political stability' (p. 159). Hogan quotes from a memorandum by a State Department oil expert, written in February 1921, which defined the petroleum question as being primarily an Anglo-American one, and one which could be resolved on a world basis through international reciprocity between the two countries. He argues that British and American oil interests eventually institutionalised a petroleum entente at the private level and that the results were superior to either 'statism' or the 'old individualism'. He demonstrates his case with both Latin American and Middle Eastern examples.

This work, as well as being of obvious value to historians of international economics, is also of considerable interest to scholars concerned with Anglo-American relations. Hogan's case that this period saw an 'informal pattern of Anglo-American entente' (p. 158) can be assessed in terms of the Washington Conference of 1921 and 1922 and its outcome. If anything, it reinforces the work of Professor W. N. Medlicott.

*University College of Wales, Aberystwyth* R. OVENDALE

**The Politics of Attraction:** Four Middle Powers and the United States. By Annette Baker Fox. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1977. 371 pp. $18·50.*

IT is common for authors to study one particular country's relations with a super-power, or the nature of a super-power's participation in an alliance. A number of studies have also concentrated upon particular types of powers (such as small powers), seeking to identify the role they play in world politics. Either as sole author, joint author or co-editor, Dr. Fox has already written books that to some extent fall within these categories. In *The Politics of Attraction* she again demonstrates the considerable scholarship one expects from her writing. Yet the subject she has chosen is, as her publisher claims, 'unusual'. The book concentrates on Canadian, Mexican, Australian and Brazilian relations with the United States since the Second World War. A wealth of material is provided on all four countries although, as Dr. Fox admits, the main focus is on Canada and Mexico and 'Inevitably, the largest proportion of this study concerns Canada' (p. 8). But the purpose of the study is not simply to provide a comparative assessment of four countries' relations with the United States. Rather, it is to examine the nature of 'middle power' relations with a super-power, using the four powers under consideration as case studies.

The scope of the work is wide. Dr. Fox considers the four countries' relations with the United States in terms of the issue areas of defence, foreign trade, foreign direct investment and global foreign policy orientation. Chapters are organised on a functional, not a country basis, and any reader

wishing to gain knowledge on American relations with one particular country will find this a distracting book. Nevertheless, for those interested in a comparative assessment, particularly of Canadian/United States relations and Mexican/United States relations, this is a valuable work. Dr. Fox's analysis is rigorous. Her conclusions are generally well argued and sound. Her study shows, inter alia, that Mexico and Canada were more likely than Brazil or Australia to take an independent line on foreign policy issues; that the four powers were readier to respond positively in defence matters than in economic affairs to co-operative ventures with the United States and that only Canada had a considerable area of joint activity with the United States.

However, the success of the book as a first step towards constructing general theories about the relationships of attraction between middle and super-powers is less clear. Dr. Fox's treatment of the theory of the relationships involved is perfunctory. Her definition that 'middle powers', unlike 'great powers' (defined as Japan, France, West Germany, Britain), 'do not engage the continuing attention of top-level policy makers in Washington' and that their leaders, unlike those of great powers, 'often exhibit towards the United States an attitude of something like awe' (p. 2) does not seem satisfactory to this reviewer. Moreover, could such a definition be applied to the politics of attraction towards other super-powers? Dr. Fox does not consider this question. Indeed, the number of 'middle powers' that would fall within her category (even accepting her definition) may be relatively small, since as Dr. Fox recognises at the end of her book, her analysis is mainly applicable to middle powers 'attracted to and in turn attractive to only one major power and to cases where the expectation of violence or coercion is absent in a complex system of interactions' (p. 296). An enlarged theoretical chapter might have indicated more clearly the applicability of the definitions used in a wider context than that of simply American relations with the four powers under study. Set within a larger theoretical framework the validity of the conclusions reached in this study for relationships between other states would have become more apparent. As such, this valuable case study might have become a major pioneering work.

E. J. HUGHES

**Canada-United States Relations.** Edited by H. Edward English. *New York: Praeger for the Academy of Political Science. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 180 pp. £9·75.*

**Public Opinion and Canada-United States Economic Relations.** By Terence A. Keenleyside, Lawrence LeDuc and J. Alex Murray. *Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1976. 26 pp. (Behind the Headlines 4.) Pb: $0.75.*

FOR Canadians, comment and criticism, survey and speculation concerning their ties with the United States, is a recurrent and endless art whose practice pre-dates an independent Canada. Professor H. Edward English has edited a lucid and mercifully rather short set of essays which probe various aspects of the theme of Canada-United States relations. Most of the essays were first produced for and discussed at a conference held in Washington, DC, in October 1975, under the joint auspices of the American Academy of Political Science and the Center of Canadian Studies of the School for Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.

The avowed purpose was, in the words of the foreword, to define the issues that 'threaten the long-standing friendship between the two countries and to promote a better understanding of their mutual interests'—and especially of current Canadian preoccupations with 'foreign control'. Accordingly, the book is divided, like Caesar's Gaul, into three unequal parts. The first contains two deft essays, each providing a general perspective, one by an American and one by a Canadian. Then follow six essays on various aspects of Canada's domestic concerns—'national unity and foreign control' is the sub-heading—whose titles fairly indicate their contents: Quebec and the Bicultural Dimension (a contribution which clearly shows that it was written before November 15, 1976); Western Disenchantment and the Canadian Federation; Constitutional Aspects of the Canadian Economy; The Response to Cultural Penetration; Foreign Investment in Primary Industries; and Foreign Investment in Manufacturing. The third section also consists of six essays, under the heading 'Canada and the United States in an Interdependent World'—though once again the Canadian domestic dimension obtrudes prominently, more conspicuously than does that of the United States. It is not possible to assess these essays seriatim here, but overall they strike this reviewer as sober, informed, judicious, mostly rather conservative, and well designed to satisfy the Academy, which 'serves as a forum for the dissemination of informed opinion on public questions but makes no recommendations on political issues'.

Three academics from the University of Windsor, Ontario, combined together to produce an essay issued here in an attractive pamphlet form, which argues convincingly that 'over the last decade the Canadian public has become increasingly concerned about the nature of the Canadian-American economic relationship' and that this growing concern has been roughly matched by various government policies.

*Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London* PETER LYON

## LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

**Latin America's New Internationalism:** The End of Hemispheric Isolation. Edited by Roger W. Fontaine and James D. Theberge. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 327 pp. £14·00.*

COLLECTIONS of essays and papers presented to conferences seldom make satisfying books. Even when all the contributions are of a high standard—which frequently is not the case—they seem only too rarely to be directly related to what is stated to be the common theme. Nor do the editors of such volumes always furnish introductory and concluding chapters aimed at giving a measure of coherence to what inevitably are unco-ordinated individual contributions. This book displays weaknesses of the *genre*. The papers it contains were originally presented at a conference on 'Latin America in the World System', sponsored by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and held at Williamsburg, Virginia, in April 1975. The purpose of the conference was 'to assess Latin America's current political and economic position in the world, and not simply the

hemisphere alone. Contemporary relations with Western Europe, Japan, and the Socialist bloc, as well as Canada and the Third World nations, are examined. Other essays look at the region's resources necessary to carry out the new and expanded role: oil and other minerals as well as its growing military capability.' The conference concluded that 'Latin America can no longer be considered an isolated backwater, well out of the mainstream of world politics' (p. v).

The implications for the United States of Latin America's 'new internationalism' are not overlooked. Indeed, the first chapter, written by one of the editors, has American policy makers particularly in mind. Professor Fontaine's 'historical overview' takes the curious form of contrasting the 'prudence' of the first generation of United States leaders (such as Jefferson, Monroe and John Quincy Adams) in their Latin American policy with the misguided 'Pan-Americanism' of their successors (and notably James G. Blaine) towards the end of the nineteenth century. It would appear that Professor Fontaine's object was to reconcile United States policy makers to the end of the special relationship with Latin America inherent in the latter's new internationalism.

In this reviewer's judgment, an introduction was needed showing how Latin America's isolation from the mainstream of world politics was promoted by a deliberate policy on the part of the United States (embodied in the Monroe Doctrine) of preventing its southern neighbours from developing international relationships outside the hemisphere which might threaten its interests; and indicating how the various papers demonstrate the extent to which, in recent years, Latin America has been successful in breaking out of the (comparative) isolation the United States has been able to impose upon it throughout most of this century. An unsatisfactory opening chapter is unhappily matched by the last essay of the book: short and superficial 'reflections on Latin American solidarity'. Clearly, the development of Latin American solidarity would greatly affect the region's role in world affairs. The subject deserved more serious treatment.

Most of the intervening essays provide valuable information about Latin America's growing economic links with Canada and with countries and regions outside the western hemisphere; and about such subjects as key resources, conventional arms transfers and nuclear proliferation in Latin America. Interesting points are made by various contributors concerning the special cases of Brazil and Cuba, though, in a study of Latin America's new internationalism, these two countries surely merit chapters to themselves. There are many tables of useful statistics. Students of hemispheric and wider international relations will find much of interest on particular aspects of the book's stated theme. What they will not find is an overall analysis of Latin America's changing role in world affairs which, in addition to being important in itself, would make each of the individual chapters much more meaningful.

*University of Hull* GORDON CONNELL-SMITH

**Economic Nationalism in Latin America:** The Quest for Economic Independence. By Shoshana B. Tancer. *New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 251 pp. £14·00.*

THE publishers claim that their series of 'Special Studies in International

Economics and Development', of which this book forms part, 'makes available... significant, timely research...'. This book could have been timely, for, although the sources used will be familiar to students of the subject, it would have been convenient to have had the main spheres in which Latin American economic nationalism has been manifest, and the directions it has taken, brought together in a single volume. This is what the author sought to do, in dealing with the historical background, industrialisation, regional integration, international trade and lending, foreign direct investment, control of natural resources and commodity agreements. Unfortunately her method has been to depend overwhelmingly on her sources, to the extent that some paragraphs consist entirely of statements derived from elsewhere (for example, p. 205). Any analysis or assessment of the material displayed is lacking from these pages of opaque English. The book cannot be regarded as research, and it is significant only as an example (perhaps a reflection of the pressure on American academics to get into print) of what can achieve publication.

Errors of fact are many. The intentions ascribed to the Spaniards in first setting out for the New World (p. 1) were not those with which Columbus solicited support from John II of Portugal and later from Ferdinand and Isabella. Printing in Spanish America was not totally forbidden (p. 3); the first book was printed there in 1539. It was not the Iberian monarchs but Pope Alexander VI who invented the concept of the Tordesilhas line (p. 4). John III of Portugal did not change his mind about the system of donataries in Brazil (p. 5); the experiment failed. John VI of Portugal did not try to tighten control over Brazil in the early 1820s (p. 9); the radical Cortes in Lisbon attempted to restore the Portuguese commercial monopoly. On page 10 the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1810 on trade with Brazil is treated as part and parcel of the treaty by which Portugal recognised Brazil's independence in 1825. George Canning was no lord (p. 11).

Nearer our own time. European immigrants to Latin America did not all arrive with socialist or anarchist ideologies in their baggage (p. 12). A high priest of Latin American economic nationalism, Juan Perón, is misleadingly and incompletely reflected (pp. 32 and 62) and President Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia not at all. The investment policies of the International Finance Corporation are presented confusingly and so inaccurately (p. 102). The Report of the Pearson Commission is stated to have appeared both in 1968 (p. 86) and in 1969 (p. 113). 'Infrastructure projects are no longer attractive to the private investor' (p. 125). In fact it depends what and where they are, and how large. On page 183 'international lending capability' should clearly be 'international creditworthiness'. Space does not allow this catalogue to be continued. Finally, there are various spelling mistakes, including, almost unbelievably, the name of Napoleon.

It only remains to draw attention to the price asked for this book.

N. P. MACDONALD

**Development Policy in Small Countries.** Edited by Percy Selwyn. *London: Croom Helm in association with the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex. 1975. 207 pp. £6·95.*

**Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean.** Edited by Vaughan A. Lewis. *Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. 1976. 358 pp. J$6.50.*

THE question of very small states—those with a population of less than one million—has, in recent years, suffered neglect. While nobody now denies the moral, or even the legal, rectitude of national self-determination, there has been relatively little analysis of the specific problems and aspirations of the approximately 25 per cent of all countries in the world, independent or dependent, which fall into this category, except in terms of their possible UN membership. Now ungraciously referred to as 'the remnants of empire', they were discussed at two conferences in Barbados in 1972 and 1974 respectively, and the edited results form the basis of these contributions.

The proceedings of the first, the Conference on Problems of Small Developing Countries, should have provided several broad and intellectually inviting pathways for consideration at the second, the Conference on the Independence of Very Small States with special reference to the Caribbean. But this is not apparent and the volume edited by Selwyn has far greater balance in contributions, and is better presented. However, given that the conference was held in the Caribbean, one could have expected greater accuracy about that area. For instance, Bernard Schaffer, in an otherwise commendable essay on 'The Politics of Dependency', asserts that Antigua became independent in 1965, that Britain has the legal right to interfere in the internal affairs of any Associated State, and that St. Vincent remains a Crown Colony. The second volume, written exclusively by Caribbean scholars, suffers not from this but from poor editing. On the one hand, the fifteen essays are of variable quality, while on the other, some are plainly out of place, such as Edward Greene's 'Institutionalisation of Party Systems', or are of marginal utility in terms of the theme, as with J.-P. Fonteyne's discussion of the Caribbean Sea and international law, and 'Size or Class: Factors Affecting Trinidad and Tobago's Foreign Economic Policy' by Carl Parris. Also, there is overwhelming concentration upon the Commonwealth Caribbean with no mention of Puerto Rico (a paper on which was edited out) and other non-British dependencies.

But at several points, both works focus on the concept of 'viability' and criticise its suggestive links with sovereignty. George Abbott, in the Selwyn volume, argues that it has had a chequered career, that to the mass of the people independence is a more important goal and that viability has no meaning except in relation to the purposes of those people, for 'in the last resort any national unit which can maintain its separate existence is *ipso facto* viable' (p. 12). This is echoed by Patrick Emmanuel's perceptive essay in the later volume which discusses the question of whether small societies impose non-viability on themselves through adopting 'Western' values and beliefs, particularly in the Eastern Caribbean, given its peculiar historical and colonial heritage. However, as this area has known no other experience, major value reorientations are difficult to envisage; perhaps this is why when both volumes purport to be 'policy-oriented' or 'practical', there is little of the kind apart from scattered broad generalised aims such as re-educating people to grow more food, to create more sectoral linkages, to

promote regionalism and to restructure unsuitable governmental administrations.

On another plane, Schaffer's theory of the ideology of 'extantism' whereby formal independence is maintained by international convention, whatever the place of the state on any dependency scale, is buttressed by Vaughan Lewis who argues that very small independent states will be able to adapt to the international environment (which will be itself adapted by them), thus making redundant the question as to whether it possesses insufficient instruments from its orthodox 'sovereignty arsenal' to cope with the complexities of that environment. Finally, both volumes come together to agree that size is a constraint in tackling other problems rather than being a problem in itself, and that size is only significant when combined with poverty and isolation. But is not that near to where the whole debate begins?

*North Staffordshire Polytechnic* TONY THORNDIKE

**The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision:** Politics in an Authoritarian Regime. By Susan Kaufman Purcell. *Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1976. 216 pp. £10·25.*

The book's subtitle 'Politics in an Authoritarian Regime' accurately states the author's perspective on the decision-making process in Mexico. In this she is in opposition to the more democratic interpretation put forward by Robert E. Scott and others who see the Mexican President's task as one of reconciling divergent interests in the hope of securing a consensus. Susan Purcell agrees with Frank Brandenburg that important political decisions are, indeed, made by the executive. She believes that the Mexican government is essentially authoritarian, inclusionary, and non-repressive. Interest groups react to, rather than initiate, political processes.

Late in 1961, López Mateos decided to implement the provision for profit-sharing embodied in the 1917 Constitution. There was no question of a demand for this from labour, which feared that its implementation would only eliminate the concept of class warfare to which they were still attached. The business sector believed that it would lead to labour conflicts and would not be workable. Why, then, did López Mateos seek to carry out this reform? The reasons were varied. The Cuban revolution made Mexico seem less revolutionary. There had also been labour dissatisfaction which had led to strikes in the late 1950s. Moreover, Mexico had reached the stage of industrial development where a profit-sharing system was economically feasible. The personal element was equally present since López Mateos had long identified himself with the workers and he sought to be remembered by them.

The government maintained its autonomy throughout the process involved in carrying out the President's decision. The plan remained a secret in order not to mobilise opposition. Once López Mateos announced the decision, labour and business groups were invited to participate on the commission which defined the programme. Thus, the principal functional groups involved played a reactive role rather than an initiating one. Participation on the commission also permitted reconciliation between labour and business. The third party was made up of *technicos* who saw to it that a profit-sharing system was devised which would benefit the workers, but which would not harm the normal investment process.

Susan Purcell maintains that this decision was an example of patrimonial

rulership which encourages vertical relationships and discourages horizontal ties; a tradition more in keeping with Mexico's corporate and authoritarian ways. The only weakness in her argument lies in the fact that the question at issue was not only not controversial, it was not even thought about. Had the issue been a current one, pressure groups might have mobilised, and the role of the President could have been that of reconciler. Perhaps the truth of how political processes work in Mexico is less amenable to either Robert Scott's or Susan Purcell's interpretations, and responds, instead, to the presence or absence of political pressures. Based on first-hand interviews, this book is a welcome addition to the literature of an intriguing subject.

*Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio* ROBERT K. LACERTE

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

**Il Siglario Mondiale:** Di Enti e Imprese Economiche. *Milan: Banca Commerciale Italiana. 1977. 1253 pp.*

ALTHOUGH originally intended to guide the staff of the *Banca Commerciale Italiana* through the maze of abbreviated names of public and private bodies encountered in the business and financial press, this dictionary could now be used with profit by researchers all over the world. Abbreviations, acronyms and initials in forty-eight languages are deciphered and if the result is in a language other than English, French, German, Italian or Spanish, an Italian translation is also given. In all cases the town in which the head office is located is added.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**International Organizations:** A Guide to Information Sources. By Alexine L. Atherton. *Detroit: Gale Research Company. 1976. 350 pp. (International Relations Information Guide Series Vol. 1.)*

THIS guide will mainly be of use to students in the English-speaking world who are seeking information on international organisations in general or on the League of Nations, the United Nations or the specialised agencies in particular. It does not cover international regional organisations such as the EEC, OAU or Nato. The first part deals with bibliographies, abstracting services and other guides to sources of information. The second is a series of short subject bibliographies. The student will be helped by a full table of contents and author, title and subject indexes.

*Chatham House* D. H.

**Africa Yearbook and Who's Who 1977.** *London: Africa Journal. 1976. 1364 pp. £20·00.*

THE first edition of this all-African publication starts by surveying the events of 1975 to March 1976 and ends with an extensive biographical section. The bulk of the work comprises a general section, a section on the major regional organisations, including their composition, organisation and

relevant addresses and a country-by-country review. This includes a physic: description, historical background, a survey of political events to date and visitor's guide. There is a summary of Africa's relations with the UN an the EEC and a brief survey of African sporting achievements. As the fir reference book of this kind to attempt coverage of the whole continent, it i well researched, highly informative and fills the need for a comprehensiv encyclopaedia and who's who of Africa, although the title 'Yearbook 1977 is misleading.

*Chatham House* K. B.

**World Armaments and Disarmament:** SIPRI Yearbook 1977. *Stockholm Almqvist and Wiksell for the Stockholm International Peace Researc Institute; Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1977. 421 pp. Sw.k 140.00.*

THE eighth issue of the SIPRI yearbook which continues the analysis of th world's arms races and the attempts to stop them up to the end of 1976, i an essential reference book for anyone working on the subject. Part I is general review of the year, Part II deals with developments in world arma ments and Part III with developments in arms control and disarmamen The volume is completed by a chronology of major events concerning dis armament and related issues, lists and texts of treaties and detailed statistica information.

*Chatham House* D. H.

## OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

BRUUN, Kettil, PAN, Lynn and REXED, Ingemar: *The Gentlemen's Club:* Inte national Control of Drugs and Alcohol. Chicago, London: Universit of Chicago Press. 1975. 338 pp. £7·50, $12.50.

DIEBEL, Terry L. and ROBERTS, Walter R.: *Culture and Information: Two Foreig Policy Functions.* Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the Center for Strategi and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington. 1977. 62 p (Washington Papers, Vol. IV, No. 40.) Pb: £1·95, $3.00.

JOHNSTON, Ray Edward, ed.: *The Politics of Division, Partition and Unificatio* New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London 98 pp. £11·55.

LERNER, Allan W.: *The Politics of Decision-Making*: Strategy, Cooperation an Conflict. Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1977. 213 pp. (Sage Library of Socia Research 34.) £8·65. Pb: £4·55.

LITTLE, Richard: *Intervention*: External Involvement in Civil Wars. London Martin Robertson. 1975. 236 pp. £6·85.

NEUMAN, Stephanie G., ed: *Small States and Segmented Societies*: Nation Political Integration in a Global Environment. New York: Praeger. 197 (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 238 pp. £10·75.

PFALTZGRAFF, Robert L., Jr.: *The Study of International Relations*: A Guid to Information Sources. Detroit: Gale. 1977. 155 pp. (International Relatio Information Guide Series Vol. 5.) $18.00.

## DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

BURCHETT, Wilfred and ROEBUCK, Derek: *The Whores of War*: Mercenaries Today. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1977. 240 pp. Pb: £0·75.

FRANK, Lewis Allen: *Soviet Nuclear Planning: A Point of View of SALT*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977. 63 pp. (AEI Studies in Defense Policy 1.) Pb: $3.00.

GOODPASTER, Andrew J. and HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. *et al*: *Civil-Military Relations*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977. 84 pp. (AEI Studies 141.) Pb: $2.50.

GREENWOOD, Ted: *Making the MIRV*: A Study of Defense Decision Making. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger for the Program for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by John Wiley, Chichester.) 238 pp. £8·25, $16.50.

JORDAN, Gerald, ed.: *Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900–1945*: Essays in honour of Arthur Marder. London: Croom Helm; New York: Crane Russak. 1977. 243 pp. £6·95.

KRAMER, Heinz: *Nuklearpolitik in Westeuropa und die Forschungspolitik der Euratom*. Cologne: Carl Heymanns. 1976. 237 pp. (Studien zur Politik 2.) Pb.

PFALTZGRAFF, Robert L. Jr. and DAVIS, Jacquelyn K.: *The Cruise Missile*: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain? Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 1977. 53 pp. (IFPA special report.) Pb: $3.00.

## POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

ASH, William: *Morals and Politics*: The Ethics of Revolution. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1977. 170 pp. Pb: £2·95.

BIBLIOTHÈQUE DE LA FONDATION PAUL-HENRI SPAAK: *La Crise des Paiements Internationaux et le Développement du Commerce Est-Ouest*. Brussels: Bruylant for the Centre de Recherches sur les Institutions Internationales, Geneva. 1976. 160 pp. Pb.

BIDDISS, Michael D.: *The Age of the Masses*: Ideas and Society in Europe since 1870. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1977. 379 pp. (Pelican History of European Thought Vol. VI.) Pb: £1·50.

BRACEWELL-MILNES, Barry: *Economic Integration in East and West*. London: Croom Helm. 1976. 218 pp. £7·50.

DORE, Ronald: *The Diploma Disease*: Education, Qualification and Development. London: Allen and Unwin. 1976. 214 pp. (Unwin Education Books 32.) £5·95. Pb: £2·50.

FELDSTEIN, Martin S. and INMAN, Robert P., eds.: *The Economics of Public Services*. Proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic Association at Turin, Italy. London: Macmillan. 1977. 529 pp. £20·00.

GOLDSTENE, Paul N.: *The Collapse of Liberal Empire*: Science and Revolution in the Twentieth Century. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1977. 139 pp. £7·20.

HOLSTI, K. J.: *International Politics*: A Framework for Analysis. 3rd edn. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1977. 548 pp. (First publ. Santa Barbara: Clio for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967; reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1968, p. 749. 2nd edn. publ. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972; reviewed Oct. 1972, p. 664.)

OECD: *The Treatment of Family Units in OECD Member Countries under Tax and Transfer Systems.* A report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. Paris: OECD. 1977. 140 pp. Pb: $7.00, £3·40, F 28.00.

PARKINSON, Nancy: *Educational Aid and National Development*: An International Comparison of the Past and Recommendations for the Future. London: Macmillan. 1976. 411 pp. £10·00.

PRESLEY, John R. and DENNIS, Geoffrey E. J.: *Currency Areas.* London: Macmillan. 1976. 114 pp. £7·95.

RUSTOW, Dankwart A. and MUGNO, John F.: *OPEC: Success and Prospects.* New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations. 1976. London: Martin Robertson. 1977. 197 pp. $12.50, £7·85.

TINBERGEN, Jan (co-ordinator) *et al.*: *Reshaping the International Order*: A Report to the Club of Rome. London: Hutchinson. 1977. 325 pp. Pb: £2·95.

WALTER, Ingo: *International Economics of Pollution.* London: Macmillan. 1975. 208 pp. £7·95. Pb: £3·95.

## WESTERN EUROPE

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: *Torture in Greece*: The First Torturers' Trial 1975. London: Amnesty International. 1977. 96 pp. Pb: £0·85.

BOULLOCHE, André, RICHTER, Klaus and WARREN, Kenneth (compilers): *The Sciences and Democratic Government*: Highlights of the Fourth Parliamentary and Scientific Conference, Florence, 1975. London: Macmillan for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Science and Technology. 1976. 149 pp. £6·95.

CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, REFERENCE DIVISION: *The Central Government of Britain.* London: HMSO. 1977. 37 pp. Pb: £0·75.

COFFEY, Peter: *Europe and Money.* London: Macmillan. 1977. 95 pp. £4·95.

HEATH, Edward: *A British Approach to European Foreign Policy.* Thirty-third Montague Burton Lecture on International Relations delivered at the University of Leeds, Feb. 16, 1976. Leeds: Leeds University Press. 1977. 14 pp. Pb: £0·45.

HODGART, Alan: *The Economics of European Imperialism.* London: Edward Arnold. 1977. 88 pp. Pb: £2·25.

LECOURT, Robert: *L'Europe des Juges.* Brussels: Bruylant. 1976. 321 pp. Bel.frs. 1420 (Belgium), Bel.frs. 1340 (elsewhere).

LEVINÉ-MEYER, Rosa: *Inside German Communism*: Memoirs of Party Life in the Weimar Republic. Ed. by David Zane Mairowitz. London: Pluto. 1977. 222 pp. £4·80.

MATTHEWS, Jacqueline D.: *Association System of the European Community.* New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 167 pp. £12·20.

MORGAN, Annette: *From Summit to Council*: Evolution in the EEC. London: Chatham House/PEP. 1976. 75 pp. (European Series 27.) Pb: £1·50.

NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (Ed.): *The Netherlands Civil Code: Book 6: The Law of Obligations.* Draft Text and Commentary. Leyden: Sijthoff. 1977. 654 pp. Fl.120.00, $48.00.

NORTHAWL, Rod and CORBETT, Richard: *Electing Europe's First Parliament.* London: Fabian Society. 1977. 28 pp. (Fabian Tract 449.) Pb: £0·60.

OECD: *Denmark* (Economic Survey). Paris: OECD. 1977. 68 pp. Pb: $2.50, £1·10, F 10.00.

PENNIMAN, Howard R., ed.: *France at the Polls*: The Presidential Election of 1974. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1975. 324 pp. (AEI Foreign Affairs Study 22.) Pb: $4.50.

REISSNER, Larissa: *Hamburg at the Barricades and Other Writings on Weimar Germany*. Trans. by Richard Chappell. London: Pluto. 1977. 209 pp. £4·80.

SAUNDERS, M. Roy: *Tax Planning for Businesses in Europe*. London: Butterworths. 1977. 334 pp. £12·00.

STUART, Mackenzie: *The European Communities and the Rule of Law*. London: Stevens for the Hamlyn Trust. 1977. 125 pp. (Hamlyn Lectures, 29th series.) £4·90. Pb: £1·95.

WALKLAND, S. A. and RYLE, Michael, eds.: *The Commons in the Seventies* London: Fontana/Collins for the Study of Parliament Group. 1977. 285 pp. Pb: £1·50.

WOODHOUSE, C. M.: *Modern Greece*: A Short History. London: Faber and Faber. 1977. 332 pp. Pb: £2·95. (First publ. under the title *The Story of Modern Greece* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968); reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1969, p. 142.)

## USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

BERTSCH, Gary K.: *Values and Community in Multi-national Yugoslavia*. Boulder, Colorado: East European Quarterly. 1976. (Distrib. by Columbia University Press, New York and Guildford.) 160 pp. (East European Monographs 17.) $11.00.

BOCIURKIW, Bohdan R. and STRONG, John W., eds.: *Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe*. London: Macmillan. 1975. 412 pp. £10·00.

GARLAND, John S.: *Financing Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe*: Problems of Bilateralism and Currency Inconvertibility. New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 168 pp. £12·20.

GRECHKO, A. A.: *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*: A Soviet View. Washington: US Government Printing Office under the auspices of the US Air Force. 1977. (First publ. Moscow, 1975.) 349 pp. (Soviet Military Thought 12.) Pb: $3.20.

KOPELEV, Lev: *No Jail for Thought*. Trans. and ed. by Anthony Austin. London: Secker and Warburg. 1977. (First publ. in Russian, 1975.) 268 pp. £6·00.

KOSNIK, Joseph T.: *Natural Gas Imports from the Soviet Union*: Financing the North Star Joint Venture Project. New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 214 pp. £9·10.

MOSES, Joel C.: *Regional Party Leadership and Policy-Making in the USSR*. New York: Praeger; London: Pall Mall. 1975. 263 pp. £8·00.

SYMONS, Leslie and WHITE, Colin, eds.: *Russian Transport*: An Historical and Geographical Survey. London: Bell. 1975. 192 pp. £7·25. Pb: £3·50.

US AIR FORCE: *Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970–1975*: A Soviet View. Washington: US Government Printing Office under the auspices of the US Air Force. 1977. 295 pp. (Soviet Military Thought 11.) Pb.

## MIDDLE EAST

BÁMDÁD, Badr ol-Moluk: *From Darkness into Light*: Women's Emancipation in Iran. Trans. and ed. by F. R. C. Bagley. Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press. 1977. 140 pp. $8.00.

KARANJIA, R. K.: *The Mind of a Monarch*. London: Allen and Unwin. 1977. 265 pp. £6·95.

LANDAU, Yehuda H. *et al.*, eds.: *Rural Communities*: Inter-Cooperation and Development. New York: Praeger in co-operation with the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Haifa and the Settlement Study Centre of Rehovot. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 166 pp. £9·75.

LENCZOWSKI, George: *Middle East Oil in a Revolutionary Age*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1976. 36 pp. (National Energy Study 10.) Pb: $2.50.

LIEBER, Robert J.: *Oil and the Middle East War: Europe in the Energy Crisis*. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1976. 73 pp. (Harvard Studies in International Affairs 35.) $7.45. Pb: $3.45.

MOORE, John Norton, ed.: *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*: Readings and Documents. Abridged and rev. edn. Princeton: Princeton University Press for the American Society of International Law. 1977. 1285 pp. £22·50. Pb: £10·20.

## AFRICA

DAVIDSON, Basil, SLOVO, Joe and WILKINSON, Anthony R.: *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1976. 374 pp. Pb: £1·25.

LEGUM, Colin: *Vorster's Gamble for Africa*: How the Search for Peace Failed. London: Rex Collings. 1976. 127 pp. Pb: £1·50.

LEYS, Colin: *Underdevelopment in Kenya*: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism 1964–1971. London, Nairobi: Heinemann Educational. 1975. 284 pp. £4·00. Pb: £2·00.

SANDBROOK, Richard: *Proletarians and African Capitalism*: The Kenyan Case, 1960–1972. London: Cambridge University Press. 1975. 222 pp. (Perspectives on Development Series 4.) £8·00, $23.50.

SCHUETTINGER, Robert L., ed.: *South Africa: The Vital Link*. Washington: Council on American Affairs. 1976. 120 pp. Pb: $5.00.

## ASIA

APPADORAI, A.: *Documents on Political Thought in Modern India*: Vol. II. London: Oxford University Press. 1977. 892 pp. £14·00. (Vol. I reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1975, p. 122.)

CHAWLA, Sudershan: *The Foreign Relations of India*. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson. 1976. 165 pp. Pb.

ENDICOTT, John E.: *Japan's Nuclear Option*: Political, Technical and Strategic Factors. New York: Praeger. 1975. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 289 pp. £11·00.

KIM, Se-Jin, ed.: *International Peace and Inter-System Relations in Divided Countries*. Proceedings of the second Korean-German Conference, Sept. 23–28, 1976. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification. 1977. 157 pp.

KIM, Se-Jin, ed.: *Korean Unification*: Source Materials with an Introduction. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification. 1976. 420 pp. $15.00.

KIM, Se-Jin, ed., with YU, Suk-Ryul: *Documents on Korean-American Relations 1943–1976*. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification. 1976. 558 pp. $18.00.

LEONG, Sow-Theng: *Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1926*. Canberra: Australian National University Press. 1977. 361 pp. (Asian Publication Series 4.) A$18.95.

RANA, A. P.: *The Imperatives of Nonalignment*: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period. Delhi: Macmillan Company of India. 1976. 322 pp. Rs. 60.00.

## NORTH AMERICA

BOLTON, John R.: *The Legislative Veto*: Unseparating the Powers. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977. 50 pp. (AEI Studies in Legal Policy 148.) Pb: $2.25.

COLEMAN, Frank M.: *Hobbes and America*: Exploring the Constitutional Foundations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Books Canada, London.) 159 pp. $12.50.

MILLER, Arthur Selwyn: *The Modern Corporate State*: Private Governments and the American Constitution. Westport, Conn : Greenwood Press. 1977. (Distrib. in Europe by Westport Publications, London.) 269 pp. (Contributions in American Studies 23.) $15.00.

REEVES, Richard: *Convention*. London: Hutchinson. 1977. 246 pp. £4·50.

SEWELL, John W. AND STAFF OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL: *The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977*. New York: Praeger for the Overseas Development Council. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 245 pp. Pb: £3·30.

## LATIN AMERICA

CAMP, Roderic Ai: *Mexican Political Biographies*: 1935–1975. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 1976. 468 pp. Pb: $8.95.

ETCHISON, Don L.: *The United States and Militarism in Central America*. New York: Praeger. 1976. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 150 pp. £7·70.

JENKINS, Rhys Owen: *Dependent Industrialization in Latin America*: The Automotive Industry in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 298 pp. £14·80.

SILVA, Hélio: *1945: Porque depuseram Vargas*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizaçao Brasileira. 1976. (O Ciclo de Vargas Vol. XV.) 562 pp. Pb.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

BAYLISS, Gwyn M.: *Bibliographic Guide to the Two World Wars*: An annotated Survey of English-Language Reference Materials. London, New York: Bowker. 1977. 578 pp. £15·00.

HOWELL, John Bruce: *Tanganyika African National Union*: A Guide to Publications by and about TANU. Washington: Library of Congress, General Reference and Bibliography Division, Reader Services Department. 1976. (Available from the African Section, Library of Congress.) 52 pp. (Maktaba African series.) Pb.

SELLERS, Robert C., ed.: *Armed Forces of the World*: A Reference Handbook. 4th edn. New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Martin Robertson, London.) 278 pp. £13·40.

ZOGHBY, Samir M.: *Arab-African Relations 1973–1975*: A Guide. Washington: Library of Congress, General Reference and Bibliography Division, Reader Services Department. 1976. (Available from the African Section, Library of Congress.) 26 pp. (Maktaba African series.) Pb.

# BOOKS REVIEWED, OCTOBER 1977